India-Russia: News & Analysis

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 07 Dec 2009 03:05

The US-Soviet dance in the Indian Ocean in 1971 was much like the US-Soviet dance in the Mediterranean during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.

It was Nixon versus Brezhnev in both cases. In both wars superpowers attempted to bolster their position by reassuring their allies and cautioning their allies opponents.

Neither side was actually willing to see the situation escalate in to an actual war. It was a game of chicken that no one was willing to see through to the end.

The thing to note in 1971 was that while the Soviets supported the creation of Bangladesh, they were very much opposed to the continuation of the war on the western front. Nixon's main concern was also ending fighting on western front as soon as possible, and his main intention in sending the Enterprise task force was as a reminder of US regional interests. So superpower conflict over the issue was actually quite limited.

The US-Soviet confrontation in 1973 was however more serious, with the US going to 'DEFCON three', and there were more nuclear elements to the mutual sabre rattling.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 07 Dec 2009 04:06

i have read somewhere that apparently sergei gorshkov himself told the commander of the Viraat later that he had had nothing to worry about.

He had apparently made his subs tail the enterprise all the way from south east asia itself.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 07 Dec 2009 04:34

Igorr,
Is it possible to get an english translation of this and so many other russian videos that we see here at BRF.
I don't understand russian at all, and would love to hear and understand the videos in full.

Do the russian TV channels have english versions of these reports?

Karan Dixit · Post by **Karan Dixit** » 07 Dec 2009 12:11

Igorr wrote:My two words about Mr.Manmohan Singh visit in Moscow and a good video about Russian fleet in Bengal Bay, 1971.

An English translation would be nice.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 07 Dec 2009 13:36

There have been rumours from time to time about India's "insurance policy" had the US militarily intervened.That the Soviet naval forces were also active in the IOR was also a known fact,but the details still remain a mystery with this clip shedding more light on the matter.The details would undoubtedly remain classified and the fact that the war was ended so quickly,thanks to the Indian armed forces under the principal leadership of Gen.Sam Manekshaw,that the US forces came too late to be of any help.The Paki belief that they could hold out for months and that the US and the Chinese would save their skins was a fatal mistake.Zulfie's Bhutto's raving and ranting at the UN indicates at how shocked and desperate they were to find that their chief sponsors and godfathers had failed them in time of need.A signal lesson to anyone who takes Uncle Sam's guarantees of support seriously!

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 07 Dec 2009 14:56

Didnt the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty , guranteed a Soviet Response incase of 3rd party intervention against India.

Igorr · Post by **Igorr** » 07 Dec 2009 20:06

Gagan wrote:Igorr,
Is it possible to get an english translation of this and so many other russian videos that we see here at BRF.
I don't understand russian at all, and would love to hear and understand the videos in full.

Do the russian TV channels have english versions of these reports?

The translation have been done, just look for it there below the video.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 07 Dec 2009 20:25

India & Russia think alike on terrorism

Medvedev expressed concern over the "grave challenge of terrorism".

The Russian leader said: "There is a common threat that India and Russia face. We should consolidate our anti-terror base. We will provide concrete help in anti-terror activities."

He added: "The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan underlines the importance of this... Terrorism is the biggest evil of current and last century."

vipins · Post by **vipins** » 07 Dec 2009 20:56

D Roy wrote:i have read somewhere that apparently sergei gorshkov himself told the commander of the Viraat later that he had had nothing to worry about.

He had apparently made his subs tail the enterprise all the way from south east asia itself.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Hist ... d-War.html

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 07 Dec 2009 21:20

Russia could build upto 20 nuclear reactors in India

Indian PM and Russian Prez sign nuclear deal

Russian PM, Putin to visit India in March next year

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 07 Dec 2009 21:40

Philip wrote: the US forces came too late to be of any help.The Paki belief that they could hold out for months and that the US and the Chinese would save their skins was a fatal mistake.Zulfie's Bhutto's raving and ranting at the UN indicates at how shocked and desperate they were to find that their chief sponsors and godfathers had failed them in time of need.A signal lesson to anyone who takes Uncle Sam's guarantees of support seriously!

Its clear from the transcripts of Nixon's white house tapes and declassified papers is that the administration was aware of the amount of Bangladeshi antipathy towards the Pakistanis had written off East Pakistan before the war even started.

What they were concerned about was West Pakistan - they clearly feared India, buoyed by success in the east might decide to go for decisive victory in West Pakistan as well.

It is also clear that no orders were given to the naval task force to actually intervene - it was more of a show the flag exercise, with its mere presence intended to encourage caution.

This is similar to Soviet deployments to the Mediterranean in 1973 intended to induce caution amongst the Israelis not to drive to Damascus, or destroy the Egyptian 3rd Army and retake the Sinai.

What was going on in the PRC is less clear - PLA commander and CPC no. 2 Lin Biao's power struggle with Mao had just come to a head in September after his coup failed - so Mao probably had other things on his mind, like eliminating Lin Biao loyalists from the PLA's high command. Plus, its possible that like the Americans they'd already written off East Pakistan as a lost cause.

Jarita · Post by **Jarita** » 07 Dec 2009 22:21

Russia supports Indias claim for perm UNsec seat

http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/Rus ... 83987.aspx

bahdada · Post by **bahdada** » 07 Dec 2009 22:26

Neshant wrote:Definately fake news.

There is no way Soviet anything would intercept an American warship over some third world country's strife.

If Enterprise had attacked India, all the Soviets would have done is made a protest at the UN, supplied India with some arms hoping to draw US into another Vietnam situation and that's about it.

Thank you. However, Probably wont stop the seemingly BR predominant anti-Ameri"khan" bhaiya's from letting off their rajma fueled hot air supporting good ole Rodina as our Savior.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 07 Dec 2009 22:32

sanjaykumar wrote:Amazing stuff, never knew there were Soviet atomic subs ready to intercept the Enterprise in the Indian Ocean.

in spite of what neshant says, the veracity of this information is not in question.

this is well known since those days. soviet navy was then headed by Adm gorshkov, who had quite good relations with India and IN.

Neshant wrote:Definately fake news.

There is no way Soviet anything would intercept an American warship over some third world country's strife.

If Enterprise had attacked India, all the Soviets would have done is made a protest at the UN, supplied India with some arms hoping to draw US into another Vietnam situation and that's about it.

this is not news in that sense, only detailed information about a topic we know the outlines of.

---------------------
this is the translation in igorr's blog.
http://igorrgroup.blogspot.com/2009/12/ ... l-bay.html

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 07 Dec 2009 22:44

http://www.izvestia.ru/world/article3136179/

Is there a english version of this

KaranR · Post by **KaranR** » 07 Dec 2009 23:11

Austin"]Didnt the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty , guranteed a Soviet Response incase of 3rd party intervention against India.

Pakistan: By Owen Bennett Jones of BBC.

Pakistan's international problems were not restricted to India. The United States, having always supported the unity of Pakistan, now started making contingency plans for a possible break-up. Much has been written about the splits in the US administration at this time: Kissinger and Nixon, in the White House, were generally more sym-pathetic to General Yahya than the State Department. In the event, the divisions in Washington didn't make much difference: with Congress and the press complaining about the repression in East Pakistan, decisive US military intervention to keep Pakistan together was never a realistic possibility. The Indians, meanwhile, were reaching out to new allies. The signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Moscow in August 1971 gave the Indians the crucial assurance they wanted. True, it wasn't a security guarantee but it did state that: 'in the event that any of the parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately start mutual consultation with a view to eliminating the threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for the countries'. It was an effective counter to Pakistan's hopes of receiving military support from China. In the event, Beijing never delivered as much as Yahya wanted. China did speak of its commitment to Pak¬istani unity but never came close to military intervention. And, if Pakistan was being outmaneuvered at the regional level, things didn't look much brighter at the United Nations where opinion was increasingly swayed by press reports of atrocities in East Pakistan and of the suffering in the refugee camps.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 07 Dec 2009 23:51

KaranR wrote: Pakistan: By Owen Bennett Jones of BBC.

...The signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Moscow in August 1971 gave the Indians the crucial assurance they wanted. True, it wasn't a security guarantee but it did state that: 'in the event that any of the parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately start mutual consultation with a view to eliminating the threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for the countries'. It was an effective counter to Pakistan's hopes of receiving military support from China.

I don't know if the Indo-Soviet agreement was the main deterrent to the PRC.

In November 1978 the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a treaty with almost identical wording (article six) on the mutual security front - but of course the two were much closer than India and the Soviets, with Vietnam, like Cuba, Mongolia and Wasaw Pact countries part of COMECON, and the Vietnamese granting basing rights to the Soviets.

Despite this, the PRC invaded Vietnam in a 'teach a lesson' war in March 1979. The Soviets supported Vietnam diplomatically, and with arms shipments, but did nothing beyond that.

The Chinese already had the measure of the Brezhnev Kremlin. After all in 1969, the Chinese deliberately provoked border clashes with the USSR in the Far East, and dared the Soviets to escalate.

So I'm very skeptical that the Chinese would have cared much about Soviet threats in 1971 if they really wanted to start something.

KaranR · Post by **KaranR** » 08 Dec 2009 00:52

[

I don't know if the Indo-Soviet agreement was the main deterrent to the PRC.

I believe weather also played a major role. The Indian army timed the event, when most of the passages were blocked by snow. It would have been difficult for the Chinese.

I also believe the Chinese weren’t that stupid, to get involved and increase the conflict.
Americans wanted the Chinese to get involved, but they smell the rat [trap] and declined the offer.

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 08 Dec 2009 01:39

Johann wrote:
I don't know if the Indo-Soviet agreement was the main deterrent to the PRC.

In November 1978 the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a treaty with almost identical wording (article six) on the mutual security front - but of course the two were much closer than India and the Soviets, with Vietnam, like Cuba, Mongolia and Wasaw Pact countries part of COMECON, and the Vietnamese granting basing rights to the Soviets.

Despite this, the PRC invaded Vietnam in a 'teach a lesson' war in March 1979. The Soviets supported Vietnam diplomatically, and with arms shipments, but did nothing beyond that.

A lot had changed between 1971 and 1979. By the time China invaded Vietnam, the US was out of its Southeast Asian imbroglio, and the Soviets were concentrating on Afghanistan.

In 1971 it was the Americans who had limited resources to dedicate to the assistance of their Pakistani allies, being involved in Vietnam at the time... so a little pressure from Soviet subs encouraged the Americans to back off from bullying India. In 1979 the tables were turned, and the Soviets were getting ready to commit their resources to Afghanistan. Then, the Chinese calculated they could afford to attack Soviet allies with impunity.

The Chinese already had the measure of the Brezhnev Kremlin. After all in 1969, the Chinese deliberately provoked border clashes with the USSR in the Far East, and dared the Soviets to escalate.

.

Oh, the Chinese got the "measure" of Brezhnev in 1969 all right. Mao calculated that the Russians would accommodate and turn tail in a tactical retreat which the Chinese could eventually capitalize on as a strategic victory.

They were completely wrong. The Chinese raided Zhenbao Island on March 2, 1969, ambushing the Soviet garrison there. That was the provocation.

The answer from the Soviets involved storming Zhenbao Island and keeping up such a ferocious artillery barrage against the Chinese troops deployed along the Ussuri that the Chinese folded in complete humiliation.

End result: Some 31 Soviet troops dead... against 800-1000 Chinese.

The Chinese learned the lessons of 1969 well. Two years later, there wasn't any question that the Chinese were influenced to keep out of the Bangladesh War by our treaty with the Soviet Union.

Rupesh · Post by **Rupesh** » 08 Dec 2009 03:06

somnath wrote: The tupee ruble trade ultimately caused the Indian taxpayer to pay up a lot more than what we would have otherwise paid if the trade was fully in hard currency. of course it was necessary at that time, dont know anyone, Idnia or Russian, pining to go back to those days today.

Any problem in typing Rupee-Rouble, India

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 08 Dec 2009 05:52

Rudradev wrote: A lot had changed between 1971 and 1979. By the time China invaded Vietnam, the US was out of its Southeast Asian imbroglio, and the Soviets were concentrating on Afghanistan.

In 1971 it was the Americans who had limited resources to dedicate to the assistance of their Pakistani allies, being involved in Vietnam at the time... so a little pressure from Soviet subs encouraged the Americans to back off from bullying India. In 1979 the tables were turned, and the Soviets were getting ready to commit their resources to Afghanistan. Then, the Chinese calculated they could afford to attack Soviet allies with impunity.

Firstly, you are a little confused about the dates. The Sino-Vietnamese war took place from February to March of 1979. The Soviets did not invade Afghanistan until December, but the tipping point for the decision was in October of 1979 when Amin's Khalq faction of the Afghan communist party liquidated Taraki, the head of the Parcham faction, and Moscow's preferred client. So no, the Soviets were not even considering intervention when the Chinese invaded. The earliest point at which intervention was considered (and dismissed) by the Politburo was following the revolt of the Afghan Army in Herat under Ismail Khan on March 17th, the day after the Sino-Soviet war ended.

Secondly, the US and Soviet Union had their own set of mutually understood rules about conflicts between their friends and clients, whether the theatre was the subcontinent, or the Middle East, or Southern Africa, and the understanding was that you didn't invade each others friends. The Chinese however had their own set of rules.

Oh, the Chinese got the "measure" of Brezhnev in 1969 all right. Mao calculated that the Russians would accommodate and turn tail in a tactical retreat which the Chinese could eventually capitalize on as a strategic victory.

They were completely wrong. The Chinese raided Zhenbao Island on March 2, 1969, ambushing the Soviet garrison there. That was the provocation.

The answer from the Soviets involved storming Zhenbao Island and keeping up such a ferocious artillery barrage against the Chinese troops deployed along the Ussuri that the Chinese folded in complete humiliation.

End result: Some 31 Soviet troops dead... against 800-1000 Chinese.

The Chinese learned the lessons of 1969 well.

Dig deeper Rudradev. The clashes continued until September. Chinese pressure continued to increase, and the Soviets continued to get more worried about the situation.

The Chinese manpower losses were disproportionately heavy, but that was also typical of Chinese operations against the UN in Korea.

The Soviets were worried enough that they made it clear (via their defence attache in Tehran) that they would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to stop a major Chinese offensive - they made it clear that this would be on Russian soil.

The Soviets also sounded out the Americans about the possibility of a joint, or at least unopposed attack on Chinese nuclear facilities. This is the same proposal the Americans had made to the Soviets in 1963-64. The Americans enjoyed returning the same answer the Soviets had given back then.

Ultimately its the Soviets who asked for border talks with the Chinese in order to defuse tensions, which began in October of 1969.

The Chinese demonstrated that the Soviet Union was keener on avoiding conflict than they were, that Russia was not confidant of its conventional military advantage, and that no matter what happened the two superpowers would never gang up on it. In addition it signaled to all the skeptics that the Sino-Soviet break was definitive.

Two years later, there wasn't any question that the Chinese were influenced to keep out of the Bangladesh War by our treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese avoided initiating war with India in 1965 without either Western or Soviet warnings, even though the Sino-Pakistani alliance was in effect.

The PRC however has always chosen the time and place of its conflicts with care, unlike the Pakistanis. For example it has never allowed itself to fight two major opponents at the same time. At that point the PLA was pouring troops in to North Vietnam, and preparing for a war with the US should the Americans go north to save South Vietnam.

Lin Biao's failed coup and subsequent attempted defection to the Soviet Union in September of 1971 was a political earthquake for the PLA and CPC. There was absolutely no chance that Mao would initiate a war with anyone at this point.

There's a connection to the Ussuri river clashes here. Internally it also had the advantage of mobilising China to a full war footing, which finally ended the factional madness of the cultural revolution. The PLA under Lin Biao took over the management of all major institutions, replacing the different Red Guard groups, and Lin was elevated to the number two spot in the party, putting total power just within his reach. Lin's failure to seize power, and his fall meant that Lin's chosen commanders within the PLA were also purged. Mao always ensured there was little likelihood of war when he launched a major purge - whether it was 1944, or 1966, or 1971.

Rupesh · Post by **Rupesh** » 08 Dec 2009 06:27

From Russia with love: 4 new nuclear reactors

MOSCOW: On Monday, as Moscow experienced its first real snowfall this winter, relations between India and Russia experienced more than a thaw, on a range of interests encompassing nuclear trade, shared Af-Pak perceptions and a plan to boost commerce to $20 billion by 2015.

The discussions between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Sunday evening and at their more formal meeting on Monday gave what is seen to be a much-needed push to bilateral ties. The process is expected to be consolidated during Singh's meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Medvedev and Putin are slated to visit India next year, with the latter expected sometime in March.

The Singh-Medvedev meeting yielded a rich cache of agreements which included establishing a credit line of $100 million and a nuclear agreement that is expected to provide momentum to India's nuclear trade. Singh said there would an addition to the two reactors being developed at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu while a site was being considered at Haripur in West Bengal.

Vishal_Bhatia · Post by **Vishal_Bhatia** » 08 Dec 2009 09:09

Johann

Sir, I believe you are wrong with the assertion that the Soviets were worried about the situation. It was the other way around. The Soviets were wanting for war, and the Chinese were scared, so much that their forces retreated inland much away from their borders. In the same time, the Red Army went from zero tactical nukes to 200. The Soviets planned to take both Lop Nor and Biejing, and were capable of doing that. And there was nothing Mao's 4-million peasant army could do anything about it.

The only thing that stopped the Soviets was NATO and the balance of forces in Western Europe.

Rony · Post by **Rony** » 08 Dec 2009 09:48

Johann wrote: I don't know if the Indo-Soviet agreement was the main deterrent to the PRC. .

Its definetely not the main deterrent but one of the deterrent. The other main deterrent being 1967 Nathu La and Chola Clashes.

India -China 1967 clash

Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border.

At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India.

Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers.

The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces.

The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries.

However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans.

Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962.

Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.

History of Modern China by R.S.Chaurasia

1n 1967 the chinese invaded Nathu La and Chola etc but had to withdraw with heavy losses.After the liberation of bangladesh in 1971 and due to Indo-Soviet treaty had to lessen her anti-India activities and china expressed desire to improve relations with India.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 08 Dec 2009 18:54

Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.

Hmm.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 08 Dec 2009 19:07

The smoothness with which the Indo-Russian nuclear deal has been achieved is in sharp contrast to that wiht the US! In fact,the GOI should now leverage the Indo-US relationship comparing it with that with Russia and not compromise for anything less.That the Gorshkov deal was also finalised,to mutual discomfort,is another sign of the solid foundation upon which Indo-Russian relations are built.The latest AWST has a quote from an American analyst,in a piece about China's aviation progress,saying that the only contest (military tech. advantage) that China is waging is with India ,which "it is winning".The piece says that China has used a variety of means,espionage,quasi and tech transfers from Israel,the West and Russia,to modernise its military industry.India cannot be left behind China,which can in the future,as it is doing now,pass on its best eqpt. to Pak,giving us a two-front tech and numbers headache.There is vast scope for Indo-Russian tech transfer,espcially in sub and warship technology,apart from the aviation industry and missile ,metallurgical,space and an other exotic military tech.There are little obstacles to acquiring this from Russia,as it has been doing so far.WE can contribute too with our IT expertise.It is up to India to maximise the realtionship and take it to new heights in the coming decades.relationship

Rupesh · Post by **Rupesh** » 10 Dec 2009 23:26

New Russian missile fails again in testing

MOSCOW: Russia's new nuclear-capable Bulava missile has suffered a new failure in testing which was the likely source of a mysterious light that appeared over Norway, Russian newspaper reports said today.

The submarine-launched Bulava missile was test-fired from the Dmitry Donskoi submarine in the White Sea early yesterday but failed at the third stage, the Kommersant and Vedomosti newspapers reported, quoting defence sources.

No further details on the circumstances of the launch were available.

The test was the 13th test-firing of the Bulava and the ninth time that the launch has failed, Vedomosti said.

Sriman · Post by **Sriman** » 10 Dec 2009 23:35

Rupesh wrote:New Russian missile fails again in testing

MOSCOW: Russia's new nuclear-capable Bulava missile has suffered a new failure in testing which was the likely source of a mysterious light that appeared over Norway, Russian newspaper reports said today.

The submarine-launched Bulava missile was test-fired from the Dmitry Donskoi submarine in the White Sea early yesterday but failed at the third stage, the Kommersant and Vedomosti newspapers reported, quoting defence sources.

No further details on the circumstances of the launch were available.

The test was the 13th test-firing of the Bulava and the ninth time that the launch has failed, Vedomosti said.

Here are the details on the mysterious light that appeared over Norway:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldne ... -test.html

Karan Dixit · Post by **Karan Dixit** » 11 Dec 2009 09:40

Both India and Russia have dismissed the "good Taliban" theory that is seen as a bid to work a "deal" with a section of the terror outfit currently operating in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan. A section of the US policy establishment has been tempted to consider this option which has its backers in Pakistan.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 316504.cms

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 11 Dec 2009 10:30

Philip wrote:The smoothness with which the Indo-Russian nuclear deal has been achieved is in sharp contrast to that wiht the US! In fact,the GOI should now leverage the Indo-US relationship comparing it with that with Russia and not compromise for anything less.

Well, the US did all the heavy lifting in the NSG for us to get the waiver required for anyone, Russia included, to trade with India...No one else, Russia included, could have done it for us..That has been the biggest gain from the Indo-US nuke deal. Of course, thanks to domestic issues, american companies are losing out on contracts!

Indian and Russian paths will be ever so congruent in the strategic space in the near future, not least on a shared perception of the "afghan problem", and a common interest in dealing with China.

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 11 Dec 2009 10:45

somnath wrote:Of course, thanks to domestic issues, american companies are losing out on contracts!

Not for domestic issues, but mainly because the reprocessing agreement isn't signed yet. And the liability bill is yet to be passed. Given the Bhopal gas tragedy and the US behaviour in that scenario, there are plenty of skeptics on limiting liability for US companies.

One question I have about the liability bill is, if any accident occurs due to design/manufacturing fault by the seller of the equipment, will only the operator still be liable for damages/compensation? Will the seller not face any penalties?

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 11 Dec 2009 10:50

^^^I know (allusion to domestic issues were pending debates in the US about the semantcis of the reprocessing agreement).. on the question of limited liability, its a huge red herring - I posted in the nuke thread on this spearately..

kmkraoind · Post by **kmkraoind** » 14 Dec 2009 19:38

Russia launches GLONASS satellites

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 15 Dec 2009 06:13

Vishal_Bhatia wrote:Johann

Sir, I believe you are wrong with the assertion that the Soviets were worried about the situation. It was the other way around. The Soviets were wanting for war, and the Chinese were scared, so much that their forces retreated inland much away from their borders. In the same time, the Red Army went from zero tactical nukes to 200. The Soviets planned to take both Lop Nor and Biejing, and were capable of doing that. And there was nothing Mao's 4-million peasant army could do anything about it.

The only thing that stopped the Soviets was NATO and the balance of forces in Western Europe.

Vishal,

It is a matter of record that the Soviets initiated the process of de-escalation. It is also a matter of record what kind of messages they passed on to the Americans. The Soviets like the Americans feared Mao's total disregard of human costs - in fact it is this disregard that was at the root of the Sino-Soviet split that took place under Khrushchev.

In any extended non-nuclear war (the kind Mao preferred) the Soviets would have faced huge problems. The 'People's War' doctrine had no problem trading space for time. In fact one of its tenets is to draw attacking forces as deeply in as possible - units are far less able to provide mutual support, and supply lines are vulnerable.

The military region where the PLA was most vulnerable was not Lanzhou or Beijing (which faced Mongolia), but Sinkiang in the far west. In fact the Soviets stood up the Central Asian Military District in the summer of 1969 in order to manage that sector. Besides Sinkiang, Soviet war plans would have concentrated on Manchuria i.e. Shenyang Military Region.

The Chinese interior is simply vast - the volume of troops, munitions, spares, POL, etc required to sustain an offensive campaign of the kind the Soviet General Staff favoured is enormous.

But vast as these areas are, the Sino-Soviet border area was far more accessible for the Chinese than the Soviets. Manchuria was very well connected to the rest of China. The logistical life-line that connects the Soviet Far East to its industrial and population centres on the other hand is a very slender one that has serious vulnerabilities.

Soviet concerns were serious enough that they continued to massively build up their ground forces, support forces, aircraft, and nuclear missiles in the Far East steadily throughout the 1970s.

In April 1977 Brezhnev with Defence Minister Ustinov visited the Trans-Baikal Military District and declared that the PRC is now the ‘Main Adversary’ rather than the US and NATO.

In December 1978 the Soviet General Staff establishes Far Eastern Theatre of Operations High Command (TVD) under Gen. V.I. Petrov. Almost 1/3rd of all Soviet conventional forces are placed under its command. This matched the TVD in Poland meant to coordinate the entire western theatre in a war against NATO. Plus of course there was the nuclear overmatch.

So as you can see, the Soviets were far better prepared against the Chinese in 1979 than they were in 1971 or 1969. And yet they did nothing when the Chinese invaded Vietnam, a country ruled by a fraternal communist party which was economically integrated with the Soviet bloc and militarily allied.

It is more than possible that the Soviet leadership's embarrassment over the shredding of their defence guarantees to Vietnam played a role in their decision to go charging in to Afghanistan to save their clients, against the advice of the Soviet General Staff.

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 15 Dec 2009 10:06

Or perhaps the Soviets realised that the tough little b astards gave China a hiding; one that has effectively dissuaded it from venturing far from Tienanmen square in pursuit of Maoist revolutionary glory.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 15 Dec 2009 10:58

Sanjay,

The Vietnamese signed the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty in November 1978 to cover their flank as they invaded Cambodia in December to overthrow the Khmer Rouge.

It was identical to the way that India signed the Indo-Soviet treaty in 1971 while it was planning the overthrow of Pakistani rule in what is now Bangladesh.

As I said earlier, the language of the mutual defence clauses was identical, although the agreements that came out of it were considerably closer in the Soviet-Vietnamese case because of ideological reasons.

China in 1971 was in turmoil, but imagine if it had advanced within 3 weeks to Shimla and Dehradoon, and were looking down at the Gangetic plains and Delhi, while and the Soviets did nothing other than fly in supplies to Bombay?

That's the scale on which Soviet guarantees were discredited.

The PLA didn't do as well as it expected to, but it's impossible to describe their campaign as a 'hiding' by the Vietnamese.

The Chinese advanced all the way to Lang Son, the last major line of defence before the Red River delta, the heart of North Vietnam with the capital of Hanoi, the port of Haiphong and the major rice basket of the Delta. In fact the Vietnamese were preparing to evacuate south when Beijing suddenly announced its unilateral end to the war. The Vietnamese did not interfere with the Chinese withdrawal even as the PLA conducted something of a scorched earth policy on its way back.

Chinese casualties against the Vietnamese were tiny compared to their losses against the US and UN in the Korean war, and significantly less than those suffered by the Vietnamese in the Sino-Vietnamese war.

The PLA's biggest problems in their offensive was not Vietnamese resistance (fierce as it was, and equipped with more modern Soviet weapons) but their lack of preparation and the state of the Chinese defence industry - shortages of radios hindered all-arms coordination during rapid offensive, significant logistical problems, the obsolescence of the PLAAF, etc.

Deng had two major strategic goals with the invasion - to compel the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Cambodia, and to discredit Soviet power in the region. The invasion failed on the first count, but succeeded on the second.

Mao would have had no problem prolonging the invasion of Vietnam war until he achieved both goals.

The difference is that by 1978 China was led by Deng, not Mao. Deng unlike Mao cared a great deal about the economic costs of war. Mao's goal was to turn the PRC in to an ideological and military superpower, while Deng's goal was to turn the PRC in to an economic superpower.

So what you had instead from 1984-88 was a protracted low-level border war between the PRC and Vietnam over the issue of Cambodia, which ended when Vietnam under pressure from Gorbachev agreed to withdraw its forces from Cambodia as part of the general winding down of the Cold War.

Chinese growth in the 1980s was strong, while Vietnam's was not so good. The only way Vietnam could have forced the Chinese to back down would have been the threat of escalation in to an expensive major war, and that would have required Soviet backing that simply wasnt available.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 15 Dec 2009 15:33

somnath wrote:
Philip wrote:The smoothness with which the Indo-Russian nuclear deal has been achieved is in sharp contrast to that wiht the US! In fact,the GOI should now leverage the Indo-US relationship comparing it with that with Russia and not compromise for anything less.
Well, the US did all the heavy lifting in the NSG for us to get the waiver required for anyone, Russia included, to trade with India...No one else, Russia included, could have done it for us...

Thats because NSG is primarily a "mukhauta" by the US to pursue its agenda. It was US which was blocking India and created NSG to serve it.

Russia was never the bottleneck.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 15 Dec 2009 17:04

The Russian ambassador's media statement that Russia could supply upto 12 N-reactors,more in Bengal and more at another possible location,as there are no hurdles in the Indo-Russian nuclear supply agreement,is very welcome.The GOI should carpe diem,"seize the day",and let the French and the US follow suit,in deals without any compromise and without prejudice India's position on N-weapon matters.When the chips are down,one's true friends stand up to be counted.With Russia,there is far less talk,far less bullsh*t and worthless semantaics and bombast,something alien to US diplomutts,who use more style than substance.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 16 Dec 2009 03:52

Philip,

Nuclear exports are far more important for Russia than they are for the US. They're much keener on getting to contract signing stage.

But even in the case of Russia, I think the Iranians would disagree "With Russia,there is far less talk,far less bullsh*t and worthless semantaics".

The Iranians are still waiting for the Russians to complete the Bushehr reactor and supply the nuclear fuel, and they're still waiting for their S-300 SAMs. The Russians have been promising imminent fulfillment of the contracts for about four years now....and the Syrians are still waiting for some deliveries as well.

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 16 Dec 2009 04:55

From Globalsecirty.org

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... ietnam.htm

Hanoi's post-incursion depiction of the border war was that Beijing had sustained a military setback if not an outright defeat. Most observers doubted that China would risk another war with Vietnam in the near future. Gerald Segal, in his 1985 book Defending China, concluded that China's 1979 war against Vietnam was a complete failure: "China failed to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from [Cambodia], failed to end border clashes, failed to cast doubt on the strength of the Soviet power, failed to dispel the image of China as a paper tiger, and failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition." Nevertheless, Bruce Elleman argued that "one of the primary diplomatic goals behind China's attack was to expose Soviet assurances of military support to Vietnam as a fraud. Seen in this light, Beijing's policy was actually a diplomatic success, since Moscow did not actively intervene, thus showing the practical limitations of the Soviet-Vietnamese military pact. ... China achieved a strategic victory by minimizing the future possibility of a two-front war against the USSR and Vietnam."

After the war both China and Vietnam reorganized their border defenses. In 1986 China deployed twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions and Vietnam thirty-two divisions along their common border.

The 1979 attack confirmed Hanoi's perception of China as a threat. The PAVN high command henceforth had to assume, for planning purposes, that the Chinese might come again and might not halt in the foothills but might drive on to Hanoi. The border war strengthened Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet military role in Vietnam increased during the 1980s as the Soviets provided arms to Vietnam; moreover, Soviet ships enjoyed access to the harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. The Vietnamese responded to the Chinese campaign by turning the districts along the China border into "iron fortresses" manned by well-equipped and well-trained paramilitary troops. In all, an estimated 600,000 troops were assigned to counter Chinese operations and to stand ready for another Chinese invasion. The precise dimensions of the frontier operations were difficult to determine, but its monetary cost to Vietnam was considerable.