China Military Watch

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 24 Nov 2009 20:21

prasanth, apparently their hull design is even more of a problem, not that the reactor fares any better. btw, you may want to edit your reply to Droy. you have failed to understand what he has written and given a reply on a completely different point.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 27 Nov 2009 17:35

While China's navy grows apace,despite doubts about its quality,its progress in aerospace is nothing short of spectacular.The latest news from the Dubai air show and media reports,AWST.Flight,etc.,indicate that its 5th-gen fighter will fly shortly with deliveries too within a year to the PLAF,and new L-15 supersonic trainer flown at Dubai.The same issue of AWST reports that HAL has produced only 4-5 Hawks instead of 25 this year forcing the IAF to resort to planning for emergency buys from abroad.The Chinese 5th-gen fighter,details in the Intl. thread,have surprised the US,whose def.sec.Gates,who ridiculed the Chinese saying that it would not appear for another 10 years.The relentless drive by the Chinese to modernise and equip their armed forces with upgraded imports and new indigenous designs,shows that in some respects the Chinese are even ahead of the Europeans.Apart from fighters ,including the two designs that Pak is acquiring and trainers,the Chinese are developing a wide range of transports and other specialised aircraft and helos.They have the will,the money and the guilde to steal the tech they require from every country using every Chinaman who goes abroad as agents.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 27 Nov 2009 17:50

indicate that its 5th-gen fighter will fly shortly with deliveries too within a year to the PLAF

Nihat · Post by **Nihat** » 27 Nov 2009 18:12

,indicate that its 5th-gen fighter will fly shortly with deliveries too within a year to the PLAF

With all die respect this seems very unlikely , the Chinese have most of their military hardware by copying other procucts and in the matter of the 5th gen. fighter they have no point of refrence to copy. All has to be done from scratch, assume for absurdity sake that they did manage to hack into Amercian systems holding vital data on JSF and Raptor , it'll still take the Chinese years to make sense of that , much less a finished product.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 27 Nov 2009 18:51

the L-15 is essentially a license produced yak-130, the two aircraft are identical in all but name.
even the engines used were identical for initial versions, apart from specs and external appearance. only the tail arrangement is different. not surprising given yakolev bureau's involvement in the L-15 program.

===================
the chinese 5-gen program at the moment is at best a stealth optimised J-10, which can be considered 4+ gen at best. nothing comparable to the F-22/F-35 or the PAK-FA.

and the "very good looking Chinese 5th-gen fighter" (quote=Philip in naval thread) exists in the internet only.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 28 Nov 2009 14:45

The pics in AWST are quite an interesting design,featuring forward/flat-faced wings,etc.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 28 Nov 2009 14:51

you mean this one ?

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 29 Nov 2009 13:12

The Beijing-Brazil Naval Axis

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... 9?page=0,5

Moreover, this article states:

The trouble is, only four countries still operate carriers capable of launching conventional aircraft.

It appears that they think only US, Brazil, France and Russia operate aircraft carriers. What about India?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 29 Nov 2009 14:10

harrier isn't what you call a CTOL aircraft, it's a V/STOL aircraft.

but the article is making a mountain out of a molehill. it needed a subject for shock value and chose this one.
brazil's carrier experience is extremely limited. in spite of operating carriers since 1956 it was only in 2000 that brazilian navy first operated fast jets from a carrier, that too an old obsolete design like the A-4 skyhawk and only for bare minimum training purposes.

I seriously doubt PLAN has anything worthwhile to learn from the brazilians.

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 04 Dec 2009 20:23

Top Chinese General holds talks with Antony

Juggi G · Post by **Juggi G** » 05 Dec 2009 21:41

US Admiral : China to have first aircraft carrier by 2015

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Dec 2009 19:23

Air Force Monthly, Nov 2009 issue, page 27 reports that the Russians are willing to sell both the Su-34 and Su-35 to the Chinese. Includes Chinese production.

Dmurphy · Post by **Dmurphy** » 09 Dec 2009 09:34

Next generation of Chinese tanks to possess all-dimensional attack capability

13:32 GMT, December 8, 2009 “China will produce the next generation of main battle tank which is able to launch all-dimensional attacks and conduct all-directional self-protection with the number of tank crew reduced to 2,” said Mao Ming, director of China North Vehicle Research Institute (CNVRI) when receiving the interview of Tank and Armored Vehicle magazine.

According to Mao Ming, the most advanced tank in active service in the PLA is type-99 main battle tank, which has 3 crew members after a feeding man is eliminated. He held that the next generation of main battle tank is likely to have only 2 crew members, i.e., a gunner and a driver sitting side by side.

Mao Ming said that the enhanced information ability will be the most important change to the next generation of tanks. The target detecting device in the tank is connected with a command-and-attack network with many command systems and sensors from which the tank will receive real time useful information about the target. The fire performance of the tank will be further expanded. Besides direct aiming and launching missiles, the tank also has indirect aiming and shooting ability. It can not only hit near-distance and far-distance objects, but also hit aerial targets. Generally speaking, the main battle tank of the next generation will combine the direct and indirect aiming to realize all-dimensional attacking.

When it comes to the weight of the tank, Mao Ming pointed out that China’s main battle tank of the next generation should be lightweight with good strategic mobile capacity which meant rapid deployment in the combat area. The chassis system of the tank will be a general-purpose one with changeable and modularized loads for battles in the city or field battles in north China and in south China.

Vivek K · Post by **Vivek K** » 09 Dec 2009 10:01

Has China got a strong case of brochuritis to go with its photoshoppitis? Paging Dr. Shiv for a diagnosis.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 09 Dec 2009 10:39

About US and Chinese Navy

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... ar_of_2015

An entire generation of [its] (American) mid-career commissioned and noncommissioned officers tried to learn counterinsurgency land warfare in the desert and mountains of central Asia while their counterparts in China conducted fleet exercises to learn how to destroy them."

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 09 Dec 2009 16:39

Didn't know where to post this:
Nepal: Surkhet Air Strip for Indian Air Force, Target Tibet

How will China react to the fresh agreement made in between the Government of Nepal and India that allows the Southern neighbor, China’s arch rival, to construct an Air Base for the Indian Air Force in Surkhet?

The Jana Disha Daily, the Maoists’ Party mouth piece dated December 7, 2009, claims that in the consultative meeting held between the representatives of the Government of India and Nepal, December 4-7, 2009, Kathmandu, the Nepali side has provided a clear go-ahead signal to India to construct the Air-Strip for the Indian Air Force.

It was earlier reported that India has already built air-strips deep inside Bhutan and an air-strip in Surkhet of Nepal will serve the Indian security interests in a much more enhanced manner, say experts.

As per the agreement the government of Nepal will have to allocate some ten hectares of lands in the area to construct the Air Strip.

...

“The very idea of constructing an air belt in Surkhet is basically not a Nepali brain. Instead, it is the Indian mind to build an air strip right inside Nepal from where the Indian regime, should an imaginary war with China becomes a reality by 2012 as claimed by Bharat Burma, an Indian defense analyst, could pounce upon Tibet that adjoins the Nepalese border”, claim Nepal’s analysts.

Surkhet is close to the tri-junction, Kalapani, where China meets India in Nepali territory.
Nepal’s defense analysts claim that the Indian Army can strike the heartland in Tibet as and when India and China go to war.

...

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 09 Dec 2009 16:55

Jana Disha Daily, the Maoists’ Party mouth piece dated December 7, 2009, claims............

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 09 Dec 2009 17:52

Possible propaganda / rumor?

The airfield is small and is located in south western nepal in the plains, just across the indo nepal border, north of Bakshi ka talab. Don't know how strategically significant this is, considering that 3 major IAF bases are close by.

If this is true, this is an advanced landing ground.

The chinese are building as many as 27 airstrips all along the Indo-Tibet, Nepal-tibet and Bhutan-tibet borders.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 10 Dec 2009 01:37

Aditya G wrote:PRC's DH-10 cruise missile:

http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/attach ... 1175491004

Looks familiar?

Interestingly in the background of that DH-10 picture, covered in camouflage

we probably see China's own version of Rutan's Long-EZ design. they also have a UAV which looks like our ADE rustom-I

for those who came late we acquired the rights to the Long -EZ in the eighties and built the LCRA which is the basis for one of the UAV's that is called Rustom named after Professor Damania.

(the above is a x-post from the pak acq thread)

Added later: and just behind the DH-10 we can probably see another UAV which could be the one similar to the global hawk that was seen undergoing taxi trials ....

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 10 Dec 2009 02:45

Philip wrote:The pics in AWST are quite an interesting design,featuring forward/flat-faced wings,etc.

(for a good pic): http://www.space-library.com/091116AWST_Contents.pdf

China Close To Testing Next-Gen Fighter

abhiti · Post by **abhiti** » 10 Dec 2009 03:03

Gagan wrote:Possible propaganda / rumor?

Pure maoist propaganda and scare mongering targeted for poor Nepali and to some degree at maoist masters in China. I don't see strategic value for that airport given that Bareilly is close by. The flip side is that if the airport was available to Chinese that would be of strategic value for them, no wonder India is preempting.

Lilo · Post by **Lilo** » 13 Dec 2009 11:36

The Top 10 Stories You Missed in 2009 - The Beijing-Brazil Naval Axis

The Pentagon thinks that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could have multiple carriers up and running within the decade, with construction costs likely to run into the billions. With little in the way of naval aviation experience, China would need to get its sailors and pilots up to speed in a hurry to meet that timetable -- and that means finding an already operational carrier to train on.

The trouble is, only four countries still operate carriers capable of launching conventional aircraft. The United States has little interest in helping the Chinese military; France is prohibited from doing so by a European Union embargo; and Russia has recently grown more wary about military cooperation with its powerful southern neighbor. That leaves Brazil, which was only too happy to let PLAN officers train aboard its 52-year-old carrier, the São Paulo (which it bought from France in 2000). Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim revealed the program in an interview with a Brazilian defense website in May. Although the exact terms of the deal are unknown, it is widely thought that the Chinese might be funding a restoration of the aging São Paulo in exchange for the training program. A Chinese naval website also hinted that China might be helping Brazil build nuclear submarines, and Jobim himself said that he hoped the program would lead to military cooperation in other areas.

now the question which begs to be asked is how did india miss the boat for indo-brazil mil cooperation ?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 13 Dec 2009 11:45

article posted earlier in this very page. please do not re-post.

Neerajsoman · Post by **Neerajsoman** » 13 Dec 2009 17:23

rahul_h wrote:

Alos, in one paki forum i was shocked to see that there are more than 2 production lines of j-10 in china with capacity of manufacutring at least 2 aircraft per month.

Just imagine the fast growing rate of this fighter which gained its Full operatinal clearance in 2005 and 180 of them has been inducted till now.

Compairing to LCA which we can manufacture just 2 per year and then take it to 8 per year

The J-10 has faced similar issues to the Tejas. The Chinese still haven't figured out how to make their WS-10 engine spool up quickly enough, and are using RD-93 engines which are almost identical to the series 1, RD-33 engines that spew so much smoke you can spot the aircraft 20km away (we are replacing the Series 1 with license produced RD-33 series 3 engines in our MiG-29 fleet).

The Chinks do not have access to Western technologies, and western governments are loath to cooperate on tech development or transfers. We can at least get SNECMA or General Electric to help out. Furthermore, they are seen as enough of a threat for Russia not to offer them their top-of-the line technologies or assistance in offensive technologies (they may give them S-300/400 SAMs, but never something like the Su-30MKI or MiG-35).

There are also doctrinal differences between China and India. While we have used Soviet equipment for a long time, we continue to espouse a doctrine of limited, surgical operations. China follows Soviet doctrine which essentially entails swarming with cheap, expendable equipment. Just as Pakistan maintained a technological edge over us from the late 50's to the 90's to neutralise our numerical advantage, we must do the same with China. We cannot afford to lose the edge as Pakistan did with us, and we won't because Captain America and his patsies will come to our aid even if we majorly screw up. As a democratic country, we can't afford to go on a military spending spree, or press-gang people into working for the Defence-Industrial complex, because we can't (usually) just take people into the countryside and shoot them if they protest. Of course, that does not mean we should become complacent, or else we'll end up groveling to the American regional agenda, has Pakistan has done for 40 years.

Edit: My god, terrible typos at 7am, before coffee

Lilo · Post by **Lilo** » 13 Dec 2009 18:46

Rahul M wrote:article posted earlier in this very page. please do not re-post.

my bad i missed the earlier one.

This one may be a 'plant' but :

Next generation of Chinese tanks will only has 2 crew members

“China will produce the next generation of main battle tank which is able to launch all-dimensional attacks and conduct all-directional self-protection with the number of tank crew reduced to 2,” said Mao Ming, director of China North Vehicle Research Institute (CNVRI) when receiving the interview of Tank and Armored Vehicle magazine.

According to Mao Ming, the most advanced tank in active service in the PLA is type-99 main battle tank, which has 3 crew members after a feeding man is eliminated. He held that the next generation of main battle tank is likely to have only 2 crew members, i.e., a gunner and a driver sitting side by side.

When it comes to the weight of the tank, Mao Ming pointed out that China’s main battle tank of the next generation should be lightweight with good strategic mobile capacity which meant rapid deployment in the combat area.

a speculative image

A Light weight MBT design in 21st century .. i think is this is the only instance .
IMHO they are being specifically built for mountain combat in the northern and eastern frontiers of PRC.

Neerajsoman · Post by **Neerajsoman** » 13 Dec 2009 19:04

Lilo wrote:A Light weight MBT design in 21st century .. i think is this is the only instance .
IMHO they are being specifically built for mountain combat in the northern and eastern frontiers of PRC.

Well, you kind of have to decide what an MBT is. I does sticking a 125mm cannon on a Scimitar light tank make it a "lightweight MBT?"

On mountainous terrain, the most important considerations are clearance, beam and ease of support/maintaninance. The beam is far too wide on an MBT, while the clearance on a light tank is too low, and tracks left idle in snow have a tendency to get frozen and cracked due to ice expansion.

What we will get for mountain warfare is something that is neither a light tank nor an MBT. In fact, most modern forces have begun to revert to multi-axle wheeled vehicles for mountain and arctic units. These are quieter, narrower, have lower life-cycle costs, and ease of rapid deployment with greater range.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 13 Dec 2009 19:34

Neerajsoman wrote:There are also doctrinal differences between China and India. While we have used Soviet equipment for a long time, we continue to espouse a doctrine of limited, surgical operations. China follows Soviet doctrine which essentially entails swarming with cheap, expendable equipment. Just as Pakistan maintained a technological edge over us from the late 50's to the 90's to neutralise our numerical advantage, we must do the same with China. We cannot afford to lose the edge as Pakistan did with us, and we won't because Captain America and his patsies will come to our aid even if we majorly screw up. As a democratic country, we can't afford to go on a military spending spree, or press-gang people into working for the Defence-Industrial complex, because we can't (usually) just take people into the countryside and shoot them if they protest. Of course, that does not mean we should become complacent, or else we'll end up groveling to the American regional agenda, has Pakistan has done for 40 years.

Stereotype much?

Your reading of the Chinese doctrine is straight out of the 1960s, based on the Korean and Sino-Indian wars. Today the Chinese are actively pursuing a hi-low approach. The idea is to use relatively hi-tech systems, employed by select well-trained and professional units against weaker regional opponents in a WZC mode; while the low-tech mass systems and some hi-tech asymmetrical systems will continue to provide defense and deterrence against counter attack by a more hi-tech opponent in a People's War mode.

The Pakistani strategy does not work for the same reasons that some of the better Indian commanders and strategists have demonstrated to a limited degree time and again - over a large frontage the advantage is always to the side with the greater mass and quantity. Quality, on a narrow battle-front, can win battles - but quantity wins wars. The Sino-Indian front is huge, and when one considers that Pakistan is also their proxy, it becomes positively a massive pincher front. One cannot hope to deal it simply with "quality"; one needs quantity and self-sufficiency in achieving that quantity.

There is absolutely no reason to believe that a democratic country cannot afford to go on a massive militarization program: The first industrialized war ever fought was completely within a democracy - the American Civil War. It is a matter of culture and political will. Right now many Indians are cherry-picking a small, lazy and perverted part of their culture to avoid making difficult political decisions - when they take in their culture in its entire form, they will also find mechanism to be strong while still being democratic. Geopolitics is always in a flux, so you can't depend on anyone except yourself. When it is said that God helps those who help themselves, do you honestly expect America to come to your rescue unless they see profit and chances of success? The Chinese can easily show them why it may not be not profitable; you have to show them why it is so.

Lilo · Post by **Lilo** » 13 Dec 2009 19:52

Neerajsoman wrote:
Lilo wrote:A Light weight MBT design in 21st century .. i think is this is the only instance .
IMHO they are being specifically built for mountain combat in the northern and eastern frontiers of PRC.
Well, you kind of have to decide what an MBT is. I does sticking a 125mm cannon on a Scimitar light tank make it a "lightweight MBT?"

On mountainous terrain, the most important considerations are clearance, beam and ease of support/maintaninance. The beam is far too wide on an MBT, while the clearance on a light tank is too low, and tracks left idle in snow have a tendency to get frozen and cracked due to ice expansion.

What we will get for mountain warfare is something that is neither a light tank nor an MBT. In fact, most modern forces have begun to revert to multi-axle wheeled vehicles for mountain and arctic units. These are quieter, narrower, have lower life-cycle costs, and ease of rapid deployment with greater range.

accepting what you stated, this sudden reversion to a light weight MBT design (could be a ~35 tonne in the weight class of type 69) from the type 99 (~ 56 tonnes) is perplexing.

Neerajsoman · Post by **Neerajsoman** » 13 Dec 2009 20:26

ParGha wrote: The Pakistani strategy does not work for the same reasons that some of the better Indian commanders and strategists have demonstrated to a limited degree time and again - over a large frontage the advantage is always to the side with the greater mass and quantity. Quality, on a narrow battle-front, can win battles - but quantity wins wars. The Sino-Indian front is huge, and when one considers that Pakistan is also their proxy, it becomes positively a massive pincher front. One cannot hope to deal it simply with "quality"; one needs quantity and self-sufficiency in achieving that quantity.

Our advantage is that the border region on China's side is virtually uninhabited for 500 miles with mountainous terrain. Even with China's massive strides in infrastructure and mobilization, their weakness is their necessarily long supply lines. Surgical strikes and low-intensity warfare are far better suited to Tibetan terrain, where any massed attack would be a logistical nightmare.

China has not faced a major conflict since 1949. They have little or no expertise in countering low-intensity warfare. They still pursue the conservative land-warfare doctrine of the Soviet Union--they still expect the kind of cold-war situation Eastern Europe had been preparing for. Armoured thrusts and bombs don't work anymore. We've seen that on comparable terrain in Afghanistan and our own efforts in Kargil & Kashmir in general.

ParGha wrote: There is absolutely no reason to believe that a democratic country cannot afford to go on a massive militarization program: The first industrialized war ever fought was completely within a democracy - the American Civil War. It is a matter of culture and political will. Right now many Indians are cherry-picking a small, lazy and perverted part of their culture to avoid making difficult political decisions - when they take in their culture in its entire form, they will also find mechanism to be strong while still being democratic. Geopolitics is always in a flux, so you can't depend on anyone except yourself. When it is said that God helps those who help themselves, do you honestly expect America to come to your rescue unless they see profit and chances of success? The Chinese can easily show them why it may not be not profitable; you have to show them why it is so.

I'm sure we would convert Tata's Motors lines to tank production if we went to war, like Ford did in WWII. Unfortunately, you forget the pre-war situation in the US--they were woefully unprepared until 1940, when the war clouds started getting serious, and the US started supplying the UK. Democracies do not go on massive militarization drives in peacetime--it is only so when teh inevitability of unlimited war becomes apparent, and that too when there is no nuclear umbrella. We would need something massively eye-opening to build like China has been doing. Kargil at least provided what little momentum we currently have, but we certainly need more.

Times have changed since the Civil War. First--that was a civil war in a society that had the right to bear arms in its constitution, and virtually every white man who could afford to owned a weapon. Secondly, the complexities of manufacturing weapons has increased to the extent that it is incomparable. Sure, we could make 100 times as many needle-guns and muskets as germany and the US combined in the 1860's--we have that capability in country made weapons in Bihar and surrounding areas. Just won't work now.

Neerajsoman · Post by **Neerajsoman** » 13 Dec 2009 20:45

Lilo wrote: accepting what you stated, this sudden reversion to a light weight MBT design (could be a ~35 tonne in the weight class of type 69) from the type 99 (~ 56 tonnes) is perplexing.

Frankly, the Chinese aren't all that much better than us when it comes to original design capability. Even the Type 99 is based on a modified T-72 chassis--it may be superior, but at the end of the day, it's still reverse-engineered wit hadded bells and whistles.

Would really have to see it to believe it when it comes to a "Light MBT" from China, especially one that looks like a screenshot of Battlefield 2142.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 13 Dec 2009 21:09

Neerajsoman wrote:Our advantage is that the border region on China's side is virtually uninhabited for 500 miles with mountainous terrain. Even with China's massive strides in infrastructure and mobilization, their weakness is their necessarily long supply lines. Surgical strikes and low-intensity warfare are far better suited to Tibetan terrain, where any massed attack would be a logistical nightmare.

No, that is a disadvantage. You are jumping a critical step - because India is a democracy it has to defend before it can counter-attack; especially if you will be needing external assistance that you hope for. In that context the lesser distance between the border and important Indian cities (as opposed to Chinese cities) is a liability. The Chinese WZC doctrine calls for a rapid and focused attack on a politically important target, destroy defending military targets, draw the enemy to negotiations at one's advantage, withdraw from the area before a messy insurgency starts. It can be launched from Tibet - despite the linger logistical lines - with pre-positioned stock, well-established roads and railways. Indian doctrine states that first the immediate threat is to be addressed - i.e. the attack must be deflected and bogged down, for which quantity and coverage is necessary. After that comes the counter-attack and gains from which negotiations can be done. Hosh before josh.

Neerajsoman wrote:China has not faced a major conflict since 1949. They have little or no expertise in countering low-intensity warfare. They still pursue the conservative land-warfare doctrine of the Soviet Union--they still expect the kind of cold-war situation Eastern Europe had been preparing for. Armoured thrusts and bombs don't work anymore. We've seen that on comparable terrain in Afghanistan and our own efforts in Kargil & Kashmir in general.

The Chinese have fought the Korean War against the US in 1950s (with 200,000 killed bloodier than all of India's wars and insurgencies since Independence), the Sino-Indian war in 1962, faced-down the Soviets in the 1960s, two Sino-Vietnamese wars (each larger and bloodier than all the Indo-Pak wars combined) in 1970s and 1980s, numerous civil disturbances and insurgencies. So what are you talking about? They are also closely studying the Soviet-Afghan War and the two Iraq Wars, understanding how the militaries won, how the politicians lost, and coming up with strategies to translate military victory to political victory as well. It is you who seem to be struck in the past. Bottom-line, India has no wish to "win" like the Afghans - India can win straight up... and the cheapest, least bloody way of winning is convincing that the other guy he WILL lose and for that you need mass.

Neerajsoman wrote:I'm sure we would convert Tata's Motors lines to tank production if we went to war, like Ford did in WWII. Unfortunately, you forget the pre-war situation in the US--they were woefully unprepared until 1940, when the war clouds started getting serious, and the US started supplying the UK. Democracies do not go on massive militarization drives in peacetime--it is only so when teh inevitability of unlimited war becomes apparent, and that too when there is no nuclear umbrella. We would need something massively eye-opening to build like China has been doing. Kargil at least provided what little momentum we currently have, but we certainly need more.

The problem today is that the Chinese have a lot more TATAs than India. To play catch-up is wasteful. Time to side-step and move on.

Neerajsoman · Post by **Neerajsoman** » 13 Dec 2009 22:09

ParGha wrote:

Neerajsoman wrote:
Our advantage is that the border region on China's side is virtually uninhabited for 500 miles with mountainous terrain. Even with China's massive strides in infrastructure and mobilization, their weakness is their necessarily long supply lines. Surgical strikes and low-intensity warfare are far better suited to Tibetan terrain, where any massed attack would be a logistical nightmare.

No, that is a disadvantage. You are jumping a critical step - because India is a democracy it has to defend before it can counter-attack

The western sector is conducive to massed Armour thrusts by our enemies through the desert. When we're defending in the Tibetan and Himalayan mountains, that changes the game. Even though the front is long, there are few places where land forces can cross over. Also, India's revised defense plans consist of striking and holding simultaneously, not defending then attacking. It allows for the maximization of leverage come ceasefire--it's better to hold at least as much of the enemy's territory as the enemy holds yours. The time of unlimited war on India was over the day of Operation Smiling Buddha. In conjunction with the sudden awakening the IAF and Army have had, and our new-found space surveillance allies in Israel, it would be hard for China to jump India.

ParGha wrote:The Chinese have fought the Korean War against the US in 1950s (with 200,000 killed bloodier than all of India's wars and insurgencies since Independence), the Sino-Indian war in 1962, faced-down the Soviets in the 1960s, two Sino-Vietnamese wars (each larger and bloodier than all the Indo-Pak wars combined) in 1970s and 1980s, numerous civil disturbances and insurgencies. So what are you talking about? They are also closely studying the Soviet-Afghan War and the two Iraq Wars, understanding how the militaries won, how the politicians lost, and coming up with strategies to translate military victory to political victory as well. It is you who seem to be struck in the past. Bottom-line, India has no wish to "win" like the Afghans - India can win straight up... and the cheapest, least bloody way of winning is convincing that the other guy he WILL lose and for that you need mass.

That kinda proves my point. All of China's wars have consisted of them chucking as many of their forces as they could muster against their enemies in a pretty wayward fashion (in 1962, we could have defended effectively if Nehru had not been in denial). The Amur standoff with the USSR was resolved because both nations had nukes. Kinda the same reason China is not gonna attack India full scale. The Chinese lack subtlety in their military doctrine. They may be trying to evolve more subtle doctrines, but for that you need the impetus and experience.

For example, China's counter-insurgency strategy has been to take people into the countryside and shoot them in the face, then repopulate the dissidents' land with loyalists (Lhasa is a case in point). They can do that in their country in peacetime because they can commit genocide without anyone knowing. We have actually had to learn how to play the game, during and after Punjab, Kashmir & the Northeast.

Our mountain divisions and paramilitary forces like RR have proved as good or better than insurgents at their own game--something Gen. Deepak Kapoor alluded to when he spoke of a need to "develop asymmetric capabilities", and the possibility of low-intensity conflict under a "nuclear overhang."

ParGha wrote:The problem today is that the Chinese have a lot more TATAs than India. To play catch-up is wasteful. Time to side-step and move on.

That's my point entirely. Pakistan's strategy of fomenting insurgencies in India was a very smart one. It failed because they used religion as the impetus--if the Kashmir conflict had not been Islamised, there would be a Pakistani flag on the Srinagar state Assembly today. We can't conventionally win through attrition, so we must win through subversion.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Dec 2009 23:36

Neerajsoman wrote:
Our advantage is that the border region on China's side is virtually uninhabited for 500 miles with mountainous terrain. Even with China's massive strides in infrastructure and mobilization, their weakness is their necessarily long supply lines. Surgical strikes and low-intensity warfare are far better suited to Tibetan terrain, where any massed attack would be a logistical nightmare.

China has not faced a major conflict since 1949. They have little or no expertise in countering low-intensity warfare. They still pursue the conservative land-warfare doctrine of the Soviet Union--they still expect the kind of cold-war situation Eastern Europe had been preparing for. Armoured thrusts and bombs don't work anymore. We've seen that on comparable terrain in Afghanistan and our own efforts in Kargil & Kashmir in general.

Please explain the following points:

1. Which long supply lines are you talking about?
2.How was the Soviet land warfare doctrine, with Deep Battle Concept and Operational Manoeuver Groups, a conservative doctrine?
3.How much time do you think GOI/Indian Armed Forces will have to foment guerilla warfare and sabotage on the PLA and use the same(Guerilla Warfare/Sabotage tactic) to an extend that it will lead to significant impact on PLA like tying down of forces?

Thanx.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 14 Dec 2009 00:48

Neeraj,

Neerajsoman wrote:That kinda proves my point.

No, it does not prove your point - it only proves that the Chinese have had plenty of experience with major conflicts since 1949. Now I feel like I am stuck in an infinite loop. I give a full picture, you cherry-pick whatever you want, and I start over. To break out of it, let me summarize: The Chinese forces are far more dynamic and adaptable than your posts convey. A less biased read of history will easily show you that. However they are not unbeatable. A mirroring high/low approach is the best form of defense, considering India's over all profile and commitments. Becoming a Pakistani India is not a viable response to an Indian China.

Neerajsoman · Post by **Neerajsoman** » 14 Dec 2009 01:06

rohitvats wrote: Please explain the following points:

1. Which long supply lines are you talking about?
2.How was the Soviet land warfare doctrine, with Deep Battle Concept and Operational Manoeuver Groups, a conservative doctrine?
3.How much time do you think GOI/Indian Armed Forces to foment guerilla warfare and sabotage on the PLA?

Thanx.

1. China would rely on supply lines stretching from Kunming and Chengdu, as well as the Tibetan rail to Lhasa to support any assault on India. Yes, it has existing stockpiles in Tibet, but the logistical complications of moving supplies even internally in Tibet create opportunities for sabotage and subversion. In fact, consolidation of supplies at specific points on the border would be a primary indicator of intent.

2. the Soviet doctrine depended greatly on the consolidation and protection of supply lines as the combined force moved ahead. Furthermore, their operations were not suited to the geographical limitations of mountain warfare--I can just imagine China attempting to squeeze a mechanized infantry division through a mountain pass. As such, Soviet doctrine was "ambitious" in a traditional sense, however it was theater specific and creatively unambitious. The US developed doctrines to counter DBC (which was only ever used successfully against an already weak Germany) and OMGs. These doctrines were based on forward-deployed groups of specialized units conducting hit-and-run strikes on the advancing enemy, blunting the force of the thrust before the main force counterattacked. This is essentially why we're raising more mountain warfare units in India.

3. We're not looking to create an insurgency in the traditional sense, but fight an irregular war. Mao wrote endlessly on the topic, but his lessons were lost on the PLA after it massively swelled its ranks (his book, On Guerilla Warfare is a good read). It would be easier for Indian forces to be inserted into Tibet and sabotage supply lines than for Chinese forces to do the same, as Chinese forces have a disproportionately larger area of responsibility (uninhabited at that) on their side of the border. It's the difference between policing the road between Bhagalpur and Nathu La, and policing the road between Lhasa and Nathu La.

Neerajsoman · Post by **Neerajsoman** » 14 Dec 2009 01:22

ParGha wrote:Neeraj,
Neerajsoman wrote:That kinda proves my point.
No, it does not prove your point - it only proves that the Chinese have had plenty of experience with major conflicts since 1949. Now I feel like I am stuck in an infinite loop. I give a full picture, you cherry-pick whatever you want, and I start over. To break out of it, let me summarize: The Chinese forces are far more dynamic and adaptable than your posts convey. A less biased read of history will easily show you that. However they are not unbeatable. A mirroring high/low approach is the best form of defense, considering India's over all profile and commitments. Becoming a Pakistani India is not a viable response to an Indian China.

How exactly would you call the PLA "adaptable" across the Korean War and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict? Yes, I agree, their ability to absorb casualties is great, but war experience is not measured in how many people you lose, or slaughter. If they were truly adaptable, they would have taken the whole of the Korean Peninsula with that kill-ratio, and taken Arunachal long before we Pokhran II. Chucking people over the top is not experience, it's World War I and Field Marshal Haig all over again. I'm not arguing against the Chinese soldiers' willingness to die, but the ability of PLA command to organize a modern war, in which the acceptability of losses is far lower than the 50's--especially when the front is so far removed from inhabited China proper.

China has never had a modern insurgency since Mao came to power. The Red Guards of the cultural revolution were a bunch of kids wielding sticks, easily put down by regular forces and punitive measures. Civil disturbances were not put down by balancing policing powers with political management, but by brute force alone. You can't study an insurgency from afar as a third party--or else the US would have "won" in Afghanistan by now.

I never said we should begin instigating an insurgency in Tibet--it would not work. I am saying that in case of war, it would be strategically sound to draw on our counter-insurgency experience to cause disruption behind enemy lines.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 14 Dec 2009 01:43

Neerajsoman wrote:How exactly would you call the PLA "adaptable" across the Korean War and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict?

Sino-Indian War, 1962. And no, India did not lose it just because of Nehru - though as the person with the greatest power, he held the most responsibility for that debacle. Others also held lesser degrees of power and either they were also incapable, or they were a minority outnumbered by many others who were incapable. But I digress. The PLA was quite adaptable in the Sino-Indian War of 1962, based on lessons they learned in Korea. Acclimatization, winter/high-altitude preparation? Check. Induction of semi-auto and automatic weapons at platoon levels? Check. Envelopment and flanking of entrenched positions? Check. Engagement of LoCs? Check. Tactical, operational and strategic coordination from junior officers to Gen. Zhang Gouhua? Check. By the way, all of those had been found to have been wanting in Korea. Definitely adaptable. So much for the past.

Both China and India have changed dramatically from those days. For tomorrow, do consider how their WZC is supposed to work and how it can be made not to work.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 14 Dec 2009 02:07

1. China would rely on supply lines stretching from Kunming and Chengdu, as well as the Tibetan rail to Lhasa to support any assault on India. Yes, it has existing stockpiles in Tibet, but the logistical complications of moving supplies even internally in Tibet create opportunities for sabotage and subversion. In fact, consolidation of supplies at specific points on the border would be a primary indicator of intent.

You do realize that in case of any conflict the PLA will be first one to fire a shot in anger?So, if the Polit Bureau decided to 'punish' India, what is the lead time available to it?And during the prep phase, how much supplies can it dump in rear and forward areas to sustain operations?

Internet tell me that during Pacific Campaing the US Army required 20kgs of supplies per man per day (includes FOL/ammunition/clothing/medicines/pro-rata distribution of vehile weight etc). Assuming same has gone up by 200% for US Army. Further, assuming that PLA required 50%@30Kgs/day.

Assume a war scenario:20days intense conflict;2 PLA Group Armies@45,000 men each=90,000 men+support troops=150,000 men (AP Front). Logistics required@30kgs/soldier=150K*30*20 = 90,000tonnes. Now, the Tibet rail is expected to carry 2.1million tons freight in 2010. Using only this service, the PLA can stock for this war in a 2months times (actually lesser, I've assumed lesser tempo)

As for internal transfer and forward deployment, you forget that they have better horizontal and lateral connectivity than us. The distance of their last post from the Tibetan Plateau is lesser than say, Tawang from the Assam Valley.

Just check the orientation and distance of road here:
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=28.8326439&lo ... =0&m=b&v=8
Just how close it comes to the LAC in the Central and Eastern Section of LAC in AP?

the Soviet doctrine depended greatly on the consolidation and protection of supply lines as the combined force moved ahead. Furthermore, their operations were not suited to the geographical limitations of mountain warfare--I can just imagine China attempting to squeeze a mechanized infantry division through a mountain pass. As such, Soviet doctrine was "ambitious" in a traditional sense, however it was theater specific and creatively unambitious. The US developed doctrines to counter DBC (which was only ever used successfully against an already weak Germany) and OMGs. These doctrines were based on forward-deployed groups of specialized units conducting hit-and-run strikes on the advancing enemy, blunting the force of the thrust before the main force counterattacked. This is essentially why we're raising more mountain warfare units in India.

I have no idea how you've arrived that this conclusion about the DBC.
Please read here:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_battl ... proponents

It says and I qoute:"Deep battle envisaged the breaking of the enemy forward defences, or tactical zones, for fresh uncommitted mobile operational reserves to exploit by breaking into the strategic depth of an enemy front. The goal of any deep operational was to inflict a decisive strategic defeat on the enemy and render the defence of their front more difficult or impossible". I can live this as a aim of a strategy

And as for how good a strategy the OMG was, please read here:

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchroni ... lecky.html

It discusses the OMG Concept and ways, which author feels, NATO needs to adopt to challenge the same. If the whole aim of NATO was to nullify the advantages likely to accrue to Soviet OMGs, that wouldn't be exactly unimaginative or unambitious?Right?

As for the mountain terrain, you're comment on Soviet doctrine and PLA was out of context. and btw, there is ample room for armored warfare in the western sector where more than one mechanized division can be squeezed through

We're not looking to create an insurgency in the traditional sense, but fight an irregular war. Mao wrote endlessly on the topic, but his lessons were lost on the PLA after it massively swelled its ranks (his book, On Guerilla Warfare is a good read). It would be easier for Indian forces to be inserted into Tibet and sabotage supply lines than for Chinese forces to do the same, as Chinese forces have a disproportionately larger area of responsibility (uninhabited at that) on their side of the border. It's the difference between policing the road between Bhagalpur and Nathu La, and policing the road between Lhasa and Nathu La

[/quote]

And how will it be easier for IA proper? SFF and SF troops I can understand, but IA proper fighting a guerilla warfare? YEs, we can create a headache for the PLA, I do not doubt that for a moment. But on what scale? Just nuisance value?Or achieve tactical as well as strategic aim?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 14 Dec 2009 02:14

ParGha wrote: Both China and India have changed dramatically from those days. For tomorrow, do consider how their WZC is supposed to work and how it can be made not to work.

Please to be providing link/info on the bolded part. Thanx.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 14 Dec 2009 02:37

rohitvats wrote:Please to be providing link/info on the bolded part. Thanx.

Best bet: http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedin ... .chap8.pdf

This essay shows how China’s military planners have articulated the doctrine of war zone campaign (WZC, or zhanqu zhanyi) as a major type of local war that may enhance local and temporary PLA superiority. It then shows how they have fleshed out three major campaign strategies that may enhance the probability of such superiority. The strategies include “elite forces and sharp arms” (jingbing liqi), “gaining initiative by striking first” (xianji zhidi), and “fighting a quick battle to force a quick resolution” (suzhan sujue).