Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by ramana »

Ashok Mehta from a Track II meet in Singapore:


LINK:

http://www.dailypioneer.com/221345/Dial ... nored.html
EDITS | Wednesday, December 9, 2009 | Email | Print |


Dialogue can’t be ignored

Ashok K Mehta

Even in the worst of adversarial relations, there is merit in keeping the conversation going. Snapping dialogue leads to unwarranted erosion of painstakingly nurtured confidence building measures and people-to-people contacts. Between India and Pakistan playing cricket in a third country is not cricket. One year after 26/11, and seven dossiers later, much water has flown down the Indus and Ganga without breaking banks. Pakistan has repeatedly called for resumption of composite dialogue held in abeyance since Mumbai, saying let terrorists not hold the peace process hostage. India is unmoved, refusing to revive talks till the 26/11 culprits are punished.

Track II, the saviour during such an impasse, provides a useful feedback on the mood in the two countries though both country delegates tend to toe the official line with few good exceptions. Last month’s Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-hosted India-Pakistan conference in Singapore, the seventh in a row after the attack on Parliament, proved a useful exception. It has good luck charm as its members have become Vice Presidents, Prime Ministers, Members of Parliament, editors and media advisors to Prime Ministers.

Here are a few vignettes of the conference which covered US strategy in AfPak and the ongoing wars against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan; prospects of India-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan; unrest in Balochistan and India’s alleged involvement; sectarian violence in Gilgit-Baltistan; situation and internal dialogue in Jammu & Kashmir and the four-point Kashmir formula; and India-Pakistan relations post-Mumbai; and the way ahead.

{Looks like a BR Meet with Pakis!}

First, the macro view. Compared to India which has fared commendably in assimilating and integrating tribal areas in the North-East and managing unrest and alienation in Jammu & Kashmir, the Pakistani experience has been bitter and unsuccessful.

While India has used carrot and stick, that is dialogue and calibrated military force, Pakistan has resorted to maximum military means to quell insurgencies, employing intense fire power including air and heavy artillery which has led to civilian casualties, displacement of population, alienation and destruction of infrastructure.

The list of foul-ups is long — the separation of East Pakistan, the turmoil and turbulence in the Frontier Tribal Areas, sectarian violence in Gilgit-Baltistan and the unrest in Balochistan, which is now ripe for another Bangladesh. The discussions on Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan were especially embarrassing for the Pakistani side as the two delegates from these areas pulled no punches.

The big picture emerging in new Pakistan as visualised by its delegates seemed too good to be true. The new actors in this new Pakistan were a fiercely independent media, an independent judiciary and a robust civil society. According to this visualisation, the Army and the ISI had said tauba and so had the ISI to dirty tricks. For abundant caution there was a post script — both will say tauba once more.

The Pakistani specialist on Afghanistan painted a bleak picture of US and Pakistani military campaigns to quell their respective Talibans. He felt that the wars were unwinnable due to poor intelligence. Privately though, a Pakistani mentioned that the ISI was very strong inside Afghanistan, confirming Gen Pervez Musharraf’s recent assertion that the ISI had penetrated all militant organisations though ground operations do not reflect proportionate success.

The Afghan Taliban will not negotiate and reconcile as they know they are winning even after the civilian and military surge is effective. The elusive Mullah Omar had a 98 per cent following among the Taliban and was the blue-eyed boy of the Pakistani Army. He would not annoy it as the Taliban need sanctuaries in Pakistan. Latest reports indicate that he has been moved from Quetta to Karachi to avoid being struck by US drones.

The Afghan expert added that foreign forces are anathema for the locals. Who is helping the Afghan Taliban, he asked. Iran was playing a double game and Russia and China had secretly received Taliban delegations.

Afghanistan has become an emotional and contentious issue between the two countries. Islamabad seeks strategic depth which some Pakistanis feel is an outdated concept and shudder at the thought of a Taliban takeover. The last thing India wants is a return of the Taliban and certainly no depth of any kind for Pakistan. This does not translate into encirclement of Pakistan as the delegates feared. Despite the common goal of minus Taliban, both countries are cancelling each other out, rather than cooperating to help Afghans grow and prosper.

Pakistan will not even permit nutritional biscuits to be sent overland and since 2002 these have been transitted through Iran at 20 per cent extra cost. Pakistan is highly suspicious of India’s generosity — $ 1.2 billion developmental assistance — as their delegates sarcastically enquired: “Where was India when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan hosted 5 million refugees?”

Surprisingly, a Pakistani delegate said that Islamabad must recognise that India as a regional power has a role to play in Afghanistan. Their respective agendas must be discussed to allay each other’s concerns. Ideally they should undertake joint projects in sectors like IT, communication, power, health, etc. Such was the mixed picture on cooperation in Afghanistan.

The discussion on Balochistan was the first of its kind, thanks to its mention in the Sharm el-Sheikh joint statement. The Baloch presenter painted an explosive situation of the province and how the richest and largest region was impoverished due to wrong policies and misgovernance of Islamabad. Another Bangladesh, he warned, was in the offing. Unsubstantiated allegations about India’s involvement were listed which included training of 600 Baloch by R&AW inside Afghanistan.

That Kashmir was no longer the core issue was the breaking news. Terrorism, poverty, illiteracy, etc, were priority concerns. Pakistanis may have disowned Gen Pervez Musharraf but in India he is credited with the four-point Kashmir formula which has secured broad consensus in Jammu & Kashmir as well as in the rest of India.

For the time being, India is no more Enemy Number One. Islamabad has come around to allowing simultaneous release of Indian movies in Pakistan but is not prepared to accept India’s offer to switch its troops from east to west to fight the Taliban to the finish with the assurance of no harm from India. How can we trust India after what it did in creating the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan, asked the Pakistanis. The lesson from Singapore was: Keep talking but also open the official line quickly.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by ramana »

A long post from Nightwatch for sake of completeness:

Pakistan: Dr. Kaleem of Rescue 1122 stated that at least 12 people were killed and 10 others injured in twin blasts in the Qasim Bela area of Multan Cantonment, near the local headquarters of the Interservices Intelligence Directorate, the News International reported 8 December.

Multan is the location of one of the Pakistan Army’s two armored attack corps. The latest attacks in Rawalpindi, Lahore and now Multan suggest ex Army and other security personnel are involved in the planning process.

Interior Minister Rehman Malik said evidence of India's involvement in terror incidents in Pakistan have been given to the foreign office in Islamabad, APP news service reported 7 December.

These accusations appear crafted to try to deflect onto Indian agents some of the blame for Pakistan’s lethal intelligence and security failures.

The Pakistan economy is the most important potential victim of the rash of bombings and the security operations. A quick survey shows the economy has done well during the world wide recession, growing at over 5% per annum. Reserves are high but foreign direct investment has plummeted owing to the decrease in internal security.

The resilience of the economy is about the only asset the Zardari administration has retained and can claim justifiably as one of its accomplishments. It is now in jeopardy because of the counterinsurgency operations in the North West and the bombings which now afflict every major city without warning. Without improved security, the economy will sink. Security and economic develop are sequential.

Afghanistan: A NightWatch review of security incidents in the first week of December shows no sign of surge. The most interesting event was a clash in Konduz Province in northern Afghanistan in which the Taliban got shellacked by a tribal militia force. The government description of the incident said the police whacked the Talebs, but the Talebs' spokesman said it was a tribal militia. That makes it tonight’s good news.

Anecdotal news reports continue to indicate that the Taliban are not popular among the Pashtuns. The local Taliban shadow administration in the district is decisive and swift in its problem solving style. It does not indulge Western jurisprudential practices of adversarial arguments. It searches for the truth, over justice, and quick settlement of disputes. That is appealing and people move on. It is identical to the Taliban propaganda campaign that brought them to power without much fighting in 1986 – they ended the fighting.

The lingering strong distaste for atavistic Taliban applications of Quranic law is an enormous potential asset for an honest district or provincial governor loyal to the government. The credibility of the government in Kabul is irrelevant. The integrity and wisdom of local government officials are irreplaceable.

Taliban are not winning the conflict, but they are winning the bureaucratic battle. Pashtuns hold their nose and accept swift resolution of disputes and life goes on, rather than struggle with bribes, dash, and never ending appeals in Western-transplanted dispute settlement procedures, usually called modern courts. Rural Afghanistan is not ready for all of that modern overburden.
and
Notes to new analysts of insurgencies:

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, a good guy, told the US Marines soon to deploy to Afghanistan, “We are not winning, which means we are losing and as we are losing, the message traffic, out there to insurgency recruits keeps getting better and better and more keep coming.”

Something is seriously wrong in this formulation of the problem.

NightWatch has studied more than 60 internal instability problems, including dozens of ongoing insurgencies in the past 42 years. In the latest NightWatch Special Report on Afghanistan, the data showed the fight in Afghanistan still is an insurgency. It is not a revolutionary movement.

The Taliban and supporting groups have expanded to the limits of Pashtun enclaves in Afghanistan, but have not converted the fight into a national uprising. Even in the Pashtun south, the Taliban are considered the lesser of two evils, the other being corrupt local – not national – officials.

A small measure of sustained American-style security and honest government – not always guaranteed even in the US – would transform Taliban sympathizers into pro-US sympathizers. And eventually into pro-government supporters.

Based on the NW study of insurgencies, the NATO-US-Afghan Coalition is not winning, as Admiral Mullen said, but that DOES NOT MEAN it is losing. Insurgency is the label for a stable, chronic condition of internal instability. It may be represented as an equation in which government resources match insurgent resources: Insurgency = (Resources.Gov + Resources.insurgents = 1).

Insurgency is a rung on a ladder of instability phenomena in which the rung below is organized criminal behavior and the rung above is national revolutionary movement, heading for national revolution and change of government system. Such an end state would be re-installation of a Quran-based emirate in Kabul. That cannot happen as long as NATO forces back the Kabul government and that government does not abdicate.

These rungs on the ladder are known, well documented conditions. The Intelligence Community has failed to document them for 60 years, but the Warning Staff did for many decades, until it was disestablished.

The indicators of transition are well established, clear, plus auditable, replicable and non-refutable. There is no guess work here. The Taliban are NOT a national revolutionary movement and will never become one through their own efforts. Regrets to Mullah Omar, but 1996 will never come again.

The Taliban have expanded throughout the Pashtun communities because the Coalition lapsed in committing resources to match the increase in Islamic resources that flowed eastward from Iraq. Resources includes money, morale, tactical technique and weapons technology.

The Taliban created an imbalance in resources that the Coalition has taken two or more years to correct to maintain the fight as an insurgency.

The notion that “not winning” = “losing” exposes a failure of basic understanding about the nature of insurgency as a phenomenon of living systems. That might be what some folks think US Marines need to hear before deployment, but it is just not true. In insurgency studies, “not winning” means you are still in the fight. One hopes that is what Admiral Mullen intended to communicate to the Marines, because that is the truth in the data.

Insurgency is a chronic, not terminal condition. It will last as long as committed resources on both sides of the equation are roughly equal. If the forces of order gain additional resources that the insurgents cannot match, the insurgents decline into organized criminal bands – a police problem.

If the insurgents gain outside resources that the forces of order fail to match, they expand in the direction of a national revolution. In Afghanistan, the Taliban have moved in that direction, but the key point is they have failed to rally all the Pashtuns and have not expanded outside the Pashtun communities. That should be good news for clever Coalition leaders with insight.

Not winning means the fight is still roughly equal. And that is primarily attributed to uncontested air power, to insightful local Coalition commanders, and to the visceral Pashtun resistance to domination by any one. And that is tonight’s good news.
So it boils down to how to provide good governance in Afghanistan.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Amber G. »

This may have been posted before, but it may be worth watching ....Utube video of SOS saying
"what you sow..so shall you reap"
Hillary Clinton CONFESSION About US responsible for AfPAK
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Jarita »

Why it is not in Indias interest to send troops - int. write up

http://www.rememberjenkinsear.blogspot.com/

That said, if I were an Indian strategist, I would not go for it. After all, the Indian supply line would run through Iran, and who knows how serious the unrest in Iran really is? If the Indians send troops to Afghanistan, they risk encouraging the US to leave. After all, the idea of handing the fight in Afghanistan over to India is much more attractive to a US policy maker than admitting a Taliban victory would be. Finally, as has been noted elsewhere in this blog, there is a significant Maoist revolt in India itself. At the moment, paramilitary units are expected to fight against the Maoists, with the army staying out. On the other hand, if the Maoists win against the paramilitary units, the army will probably have to get involved. Large as it is, the Indian army would be hard pressed to fight a war in Afghanistan, defend Kashmir against the Pakistanis, defend Arunachal Pradesh against the Chinese, and suppress the Naxalites at the same time. Something will have to give. That something would likely be Afghanistan. The Islamists could than claim that Allah enabled them to defeat Russia, the US and India. Not good
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by svinayak »

The Reinvention of Robert Gates
How his ideological journey will shape the war.

http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the ... bert-gates
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by RamaY »

Jarita wrote:Why it is not in Indias interest to send troops - int. write up

http://www.rememberjenkinsear.blogspot.com/
Jarita-ji

Nothing innovative in that write-up. The person behind the blog is a common confused US citizen.

There are better strategies to solve the Af-Pak problem permanently, depending on what the US’s long-term vision is. For example:
- US Can stop its financial and military aid to Pakistan. Divert all that aid to Afghanistan so it can build a strong army and civic/industrial infrastructure.
- Support India’s stand on J&K and influence Pakistan to give up POK.
- Destroy all known terrorist camps within Pakistan.
- Support Afghanistan’s stand on Durand Line. Put all its forces in Af-Pak border and stop the terror-tourism from Pakistan in to Afghanistan.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by sunnyP »

[youtube]<object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/6vzLye7W_9A&hl ... ram><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/6vzLye7W_9A&hl=en_GB&fs=1&" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>[/youtube]


Hitchens on the Afghan troop 'surge'.

He's hugely critical of Obama's policy of pandering to the Pakistanis whilst ignoring "the democratic, secular superpower of the region" India.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Hiten »

not reading it myself

written by some guy called Shibil Siddiqi

wrote something about pakistan being West's enforcer in Afghanistan [not sure what context]

quick scroll gave impression of he being a pro-uniformed jihadi [could be wrong not read it]

Obama's Surge and Pakistan
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Hiten »

CS Moniter - Why Pakistan's old jihadis pose new threat – at home and in Afghanistan

In an interview, a jihadi talks about why state-sponsored militants who once fought in Indian-controlled Kashmir are now joining the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

P.S: Mods/Admins/WM could this thread be renamed to FAK-AP watch. No point being politically correct.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Ananya »

this is not suprising at at all. this is just resource sharing and proper usefulness for people in bench !!!!
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by arun »

X Posted.

The dam of denials of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan crumbles.

After years of denial the Defence Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan finally admits that there is such a thing as a Quetta Shura:
Quetta shura no longer poses threat: Ahmad Mukhtar

Friday, 11 Dec, 2009

QUETTA: The government has admitted the existence of the Afghan Taliban's Quetta shura for the first time, and says it has taken them on. …………………

However, until this admission by the Defence Minister — the government has so far denied the existence of any Taliban leadership or the Quetta shura — in Balochistan's capital.

Dawn
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by NRao »

How can Quetta Shura exist any longer?

IT has moved to Karachi!!!! With an assist from the ISI that too. Pakis know that.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by shyamd »

DNW:
Al-Qaeda Resurgent - I
Osama Bin Laden Moves to Baluchistan, Pakistan
Osama bin Laden's new pad is more comfortable and brings him closer to the war action in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the US is pressing all its intelligence assets into cutting off his escape route this time.
Al-Qaeda Resurgent - II
New European Networks Poised to Strike
Germany's BND spy chief is certain that new al Qaeda cells made up of unknown Western-looking operatives have Berlin, London, Paris, Rome and Moscow in their sights for large-scale attacks as curtain-raisers for another major operation in the US.
Obama's New Afghanistan Strategy
Makes Pakistan Part of the Problem - Not the Solution
Expanding the US war to Pakistan is the unspoken tenet of Obama's Afghanistan doctrine. Extricating the US army from both countries will be vastly more difficult than ending one war.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by ShauryaT »

ramana wrote:NRao there are more Pashtuns in TSP than in Afghanistan.
Having said that the Pashtuns in TSP are Ghilzai supporters vs the Durrani supporters in Afghanistan.

Ghilzai = Lodis etc
Durrani = Ahmed Shah Abdali etc.

So in addition to Pashtun Civil War against TSP, there is a inter-Pashtun fight.
Quite accurate. I also think, if it was not for the TSP led and instigated Taleban, who in turn are led by the Ghilzai's, it is the Durranis, who would take a natural lead, among the Pashtuns. The Durranis are unlikely to fall for the ways of the Taleban and hence are unlikely to fall for the machinations of the TSP. So, in a way, marginalizing TSP, settles the inter-Pashtun fight?
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Hiten »

Train the Afghans
.....Since the end of the Vietnam War, American interventions abroad have always been influenced by the mood and rhythm of politics at home......

.....For a non-traditional donor, India has made a generous contribution of $1.2 billion towards reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. New Delhi is Kabul’s largest regional donor and its fifth-largest global donor. Nearly 4,000 Indians are at work in Afghanistan, constructing roads and buildings, creating schools and hospitals, helping with sanitation and agriculture. As India has expanded its reconstruction efforts, Taliban attacks on Indian nationals have escalated, raising costs and delaying projects.

......As American forces prepare to drawdown, attacks on Indian installations are bound to increase, so jeopardising our existing effort — never mind further progress. If India persists with its current policy, it will, by the summer of 2011, have to make some tough choices: either increase the security presence in Afghanistan, or accept a gradual atrophy of its developmental efforts......Successive opinion polls show that a great majority of the Afghans, including the Pashtuns, welcome India’s activities in their country........

......The best way to insure India’s efforts and demonstrate its long-term commitment would be to contribute to the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). And there is a significant role India can play.
Currently, the ANA stands at about 91,000 soldiers organised into 117 battalions.
.... The initial plans to develop an independent, fully-capable Afghan military by 2010 were scrapped and replaced by plans to field 134,000 ANA troops by 2014. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) recently revised this projection upwards, calling for 134,000 troops by December 2011 and 240,000 by 2014. This would mean that by 2011, 122,000 troops would be on active duty and 179 total battalions would have formed.

However, the Western coalition has not allocated sufficient trainers, equipment or resources to increase the ANA by 40,000 soldiers in the next two years........The original projection was that the ANA would be an independent force as early as 2009 or 2010. Revised estimates of its capabilities are more conservative although still too optimistic.......Recent assessments by the US Government Accountability Office have concluded that only 40 per cent of Afghan National Army units were capable of conducting operations with coalition support. Clearly there is a lot to be done vis-à-vis the ANA, and quickly.......

.....the Indian government is understandably reluctant to respond to a suggestion from the Americans. A request from Kabul might evoke a different response.....

.......An alternative that New Delhi should consider is to train the Afghan forces in India. Officer cadets from Afghanistan have been training in Indian military academies for several years now. This programme can easily be reconfigured and the intake scaled up. The Indian Army already has a variety of officer training programmes of different lengths, which can be adapted for this purpose......

....Training in the Indian model might also be more appropriate to the demands of commanding troops from diverse ethnic backgrounds. After all, the Indian Army is a classic example of multi-ethnic national force.
Similarly, India can take on training of non-commissioned officers and recruits. The infrastructure for the latter in particular is quite strong. Each of the Indian Army’s 29 infantry regiments has its own centre for training recruits. Simultaneous training at a few of these regimental centres can substantially enhance the size and quality of ANA forces. Finally, the Indian Army has several counter-insurgency schools, which can be used for more specialised training.

In short, our capacity to train the ANA is not in doubt. But the clock has already started ticking. Getting our act together after the American pull-back or an appreciable worsening in the security situation in Afghanistan may be too late. India’s experience of supporting the anti-Taliban forces in the 1990s should serve as a stark reminder of this fact. The stance that India adopts in the coming months may well prove decisive in the long run.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by abhishek_sharma »

Obama's Indecent Interval

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... ur_vietnam
The U.S. president and his advisors labored for three months and brought forth old wine in bigger bottles. The speech contained not one single new idea or approach, nor offered any hint of new thinking about a conflict that everyone now agrees the United States is losing. Instead, the administration deliberated for 94 days to deliver essentially "more men, more money, try harder."
First, Obama noted that Afghanistan is being conducted by a "coalition" of 43 countries -- as if war by committee would magically change the outcome (a throwback to former President George W. Bush's "Iraq coalition" mathematics). The truth is, outside of a handful of countries, it's basically a coalition of pacifists. In fact, more foreign troops fought alongside the United States in Vietnam than are now actually fighting with Americans today. Only nine countries in today's 43-country coalition have more than 1,000 personnel there; nine others have 10 (yes, not even a dozen people) -- or fewer. And although Australia and New Zealand have sent a handful of excellent special operations troops to Afghanistan, only Britain, Canada, and France are providing significant forces willing to conduct conventional offensive military operations. That brings the coalition's combat-troop contribution to approximately 17,000. Most of the other 38 "partners" have strict rules prohibiting them from ever doing anything actually dangerous. Turkish troops, for example, never leave their firebase in Wardak province, according to U.S. personnel who monitor it.
The president went on to assert that the Taliban are not popular in Afghanistan, whereas the Viet Cong represented a broadly popular nationalist movement with the support of a majority of the Vietnamese. But this is also wrong. Neither the Viet Cong then, nor the Taliban now, have ever enjoyed the popular support of more than 15 percent of the population, according to Daniel Ellsberg, the senior Pentagon official who courageously leaked the Pentagon Papers revealing the military's endemic deceit in the Vietnam War.
The president's final argument, that Afghanistan is different because Vietnam never attacked American soil, is a red herring. History is overflowing with examples of just causes that have gone down in defeat. To suggest that the two conflicts will have different outcomes because the U.S. cause in Afghanistan is just (whereas, presumably from the speech, the war in Vietnam was not) is simply specious. The courses and outcomes of wars are determined by strategy, not the justness of causes or the courage of troops.
The U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned determined by statistical analysis that the ANA will never grow larger than 100,000 men because nearly 30 percent either desert or fail to re-enlist each year. The ANA is disproportionately Tajik, drug use is a major problem, all recruits are illiterate, and last month the ANA reached only half its modest recruiting goal despite 40 percent unemployment nationwide. The American media, in its own regression to 1963, simply regurgitates Pentagon press releases that vastly inflate the actual size of the Afghan military, which is actually less than 60,000 men, just 32,000 of whom are combat troops.
The strategy's other component for dealing with the Taliban, "negotiating with moderates," is also ludicrous to anyone who is familiar with the insurgents. The Taliban are a virus. There is no one to negotiate with, and from their perspective, nothing to discuss. And the Taliban know they are winning.
Most critically of all, Pakistan's reaction to Obama's speech was to order its top military intelligence service, the ISI, to immediately begin rebuilding and strengthening covert ties to the Afghan Taliban in anticipation of their eventual return to power, according to a highly placed Pakistani official. There will be no more genuine cooperation from Pakistan (if there ever was).
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Dmurphy »

Christopher Hitchens on why India is important for stabilizing Af-Pak

[youtube]6vzLye7W_9A&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by anupmisra »

Grow up, guys
We are a poor country, we don’t have an open cheque book, historical and cultural ties mean we don’t have to ‘buy’ influence in Afghanistan like others do, etc. But when was the last time you heard about Pakistan doing anything to help out ordinary Afghans — the same ones we claim to care so much about, or at least the Pakhtuns among them? Where are the schools we have built, the roads we have fixed, the policemen we have trained, the farmers we have given seeds to, the doctors we have trained, the micro-businesses we have funded, the … you get the idea.
Like a churlish parent obsessed with the exercise of antediluvian rights over his child, the security establishment here continues to treat Afghanistan as its rightful ward that it should be allowed to do as it pleases with. Afghanistan is ours and the rest of the world better not forget that, that’s the message we send.
We only like the Afghan Pakhtuns who want to stay on their side of the border.
Three, get India out of Afghanistan
Start with India. This from The Wall Street Journal in August: ‘From wells and toilets to power plants and satellite transmitters, India is seeding Afghanistan with a vast array of projects. The $1.2bn in pledged assistance includes projects both vital to Afghanistan’s economy, such as a completed road link to Iran’s border, and symbolic of its democratic aspirations, such as the construction of a new parliament building in Kabul. The Indian government is also paying to bring scores of bureaucrats to India, as it cultivates a new generation of Afghan officialdom.’
Consider China. From a report in The Telegraph, UK, last month: ‘China’s growing influence in the Afghan economy has been hailed by [Afghanistan’s] mining minister, who has revealed that projects acquired to feed Beijing’s industrial base will triple government revenues within five years…. The Chinese firm developing Aynak [copper deposits near Kabul] plans to employ 20,000 Afghan workers.’
And let’s not even touch the vast amount of American aid that is being poured into Afghanistan. Though, if you’re willing to listen, anyone in the security establishment here will pipe up with the fact that for every $30 America spends in Afghanistan, it spends $1 here. :((
In fact, the WSJ article quoted earlier also noted tartly: ‘In terms of pledged donations through 2013, India now ranks fifth behind the US, UK, Japan and Canada, according to the Afghanistan government. Pakistan doesn’t rank in the top 10. Elsewhere, too, our record has been drab and uninspiring, grim even.
Politically, all we seem to do is whinge and carp and complain. Afghanistan is ours, ours, ours and you guys — the outsiders — have screwed up what could have been a good thing. You arrogant Americans shut out the Taliban at the Bonn conference, you foolish Britons refused to hand the Taliban a few token provinces and ministries in return for becoming a part of the Afghan government later.
For sure, the big boys have to take us seriously because of our political and military position in the region. But they will never want to take us seriously if all we do is curl up sullenly in the foetal position and lash out at others until we get our way in ‘our’ Afghanistan. :rotfl:


Aah! Pakis! :roll:
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Gagan »

Who is Cyril Almeida? And why is she calling pakistan as 'our' country and referring to pukes as 'we'?
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by pgbhat »

Gagan wrote:Who is Cyril Almeida? And why is she calling pakistan as 'our' country and referring to pukes as 'we'?
it is a he.... from K'chi
http://www.cyrilalmeida.com/about/
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

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Post by Lilo »

'Osprey' makes combat debut in Afghanistan
The Marines countered that the aircraft can do extraordinary things because of its speed and range, and that it does better at higher altitudes than critics say.
Afghanistan, with its great distances and challenging terrain — and more likelihood that the aircraft will face combat
In Afghanistan, though, where distances can be much greater than Iraq, the additional speed and range it offers will boost what the Marines and other units can do.
For one thing, it will allow them to react to information about the enemy much quicker.
The aircraft is so fast, in fact, that it can sometimes make two trips back and forth in the time it takes a helicopter to make one trip.
Luckily, the Ospreys are getting significantly more armament for this deployment. One of the criticisms of the Osprey early on was that it couldn't defend itself well, as it was equipped with only a light machine gun on the rear ramp and had no defenses that could face forward. At Leatherneck, though, they are being retrofitted with a belly-mounted robotic machine gun and sophisticated targeting optics, all of which retracts into the aircraft before landings.
Also, the 7.62 mm machine gun on the back has been replaced with a much heavier .50-caliber gun.
ombaba is pulling in all the special ops and covert ops gear into af-pak.
The bredators and reapers were there already. Now the Sentinels and Ospreys are increasingly thrown into the mix.

all for some covert ops in baluchi right under PAFs nose, hain ji ?
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

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http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/t ... ptich.html

Three different views of Obama's Afghanistan strategy, neatly summarized. It begins thus:
On Friday, The New York Times op-ed page put up a neatly modulated triptych of informed opinion on Obama's AfPak strategy. Assessments by Ahmed Rashid, Nathaniel Fick and Marc Lynch all centered on the imposition of a timeline for the beginning of a draw-down of U.S. forces. Read left to right, their verdicts formed a continuum: the timeline is a mistake (Rashid), the timeline is a calculated risk (Fick), the timeline is a brilliant strategic stroke (Lynch).

Each argument was compelling in its turn; taken together, they probably echoed the debate as it played out in the White House. They also illustrate Andrew Exum's observation: "I know about 50 really smart people on Afghanistan with lots of time on the ground there, and no two have the same opinion about what U.S. policy should be."
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

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http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/opinion/13atran.html

Scott Atran in today's New York Times:
The original alliance between the Taliban and Al Qaeda was largely one of convenience between a poverty-stricken national movement and a transnational cause that brought it material help. American pressure on Pakistan to attack the Taliban and Al Qaeda in their sanctuary gave birth to the Pakistani Taliban, who forged their own ties to Al Qaeda to fight the Pakistani state.

While some Taliban groups use the rhetoric of global jihad to inspire ranks or enlist foreign fighters, the Pakistani Taliban show no inclination to go after Western interests abroad. Their attacks, which have included at least three assaults near nuclear facilities, warrant concerted action — but in Pakistan, not in Afghanistan. As Mr. Sageman, the former C.I.A. officer, puts it: “There’s no Qaeda in Afghanistan and no Afghans in Qaeda.”

Pakistan has long preferred a policy of “respect for the independence and sentiment of the tribes” that was advised in 1908 by Lord Curzon, the British viceroy of India who established the North-West Frontier Province as a buffer zone to “conciliate and contain” the Pashtun hill tribes. In 1948, Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, removed all troops from brigade level up in Waziristan and other tribal areas in a plan aptly called Operation Curzon.

The problem today is that Al Qaeda is prodding the Pakistani Taliban to hit state institutions in the hopes of provoking a full-scale invasion of the tribal areas by the Pakistani Army; the idea is that such an assault would rally the tribes to Al Qaeda’s cause and threaten the state. The United States has been pushing for exactly that sort of potentially disastrous action by Islamabad. But holding to Curzon’s line may still be Pakistan’s best bet. The key in the Afghan-Pakistani area, as in Southeast Asia, is to use local customs and networks to our advantage. Of course, counterterrorism measures are only as effective as local governments that execute them. Afghanistan’s government is corrupt, unpopular and inept.

Besides, there’s really no Taliban central authority to talk to. To be Taliban today means little more than to be a Pashtun tribesman who believes that his fundamental beliefs and customary way of life are threatened. Although most Taliban claim loyalty to Afghanistan’s Mullah Omar, this allegiance varies greatly. Many Pakistani Taliban leaders — including Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed by an American drone in August, and his successor, Hakimullah Mehsud — rejected Mullah Omar’s call to forgo suicide bombings against Pakistani civilians.

In fact, it is the United States that holds today’s Taliban together. Without us, their deeply divided coalition could well fragment. Taliban resurgence depends on support from those notoriously unruly hill tribes in Pakistan’s border regions, who are unsympathetic to the original Taliban program of homogenizing tribal custom and politics under one rule.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

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US aid package to focus on water, power projects
WASHINGTON: Power and water projects would be an early priority for nearly $1.5 billion a year in new US non-military aid for Pakistan, which was to be passed by the Senate on Sunday, senior US officials said.

The assistance bill, which some critics in Pakistan see as infringing on the country’s sovereignty, was passed by the Senate in a larger spending bill on Sunday. The House of Representatives passed a similar bill last week.

Congress has pushed for strict safeguards for the money and the State Department is due to file a report on Monday to key committees on Capitol Hill, outlining how the aid will be spent and detailing controls to curb wastage.

“There are no blank checques being handed out,” said a senior US official. “The strategy is to work more through Pakistani organisations and to try to support the Pakistani government’s efforts to deliver services to its people.”

Auditors: The official said Pakistani and international auditors had been sent into about 50 Pakistani government offices, civil society groups and other bodies to conduct “pre-award audits”, checking that personnel systems, book-keeping and other controls were in place before they could apply for US aid. reuters
Last edited by Gerard on 17 Dec 2009 21:38, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: URL fixed
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

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NYTimes :: Pakistan Rebuffs U.S. on Taliban Crackdown

One notch .......................
Demands by the United States for Pakistan to crack down on the strongest Taliban warrior in Afghanistan, Siraj Haqqani, whose fighters pose the biggest threat to American forces, have been rebuffed by the Pakistani military, according to Pakistani military officials and diplomats.
Of course. But then:
The demands, first made by senior American officials before President Obama’s Afghanistan speech and repeated many times since, were renewed in a written demarche delivered in recent days by the United States Embassy to the head of the Pakistani military, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, according to American officials. Gen. David Petraeus followed up on Monday during a visit to Islamabad.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

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From Tribune, 14 Dec., 2009


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20091215/edit.htm#6
Gandhi would have blessed Obama’s ‘just war’
by K. Subrahmanyam


US President and Commander-in-Chief Barack Obama was acutely aware of the apparent inappropriateness of his receiving the Nobel Prize for Peace even as he was inducting an additional 30,000 troops into the Af-Pak theatre of war.

In his Prize acceptance speech, he said, “I come here with an acute sense of the cost of armed conflict – filled with difficult questions about the relationship between war and peace, and our effort to replace one with the other”.

He went on to assert “We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified”.

He had always acknowledged his admiration for Gandhi and Martin Luther King. He said: “I am a living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there is nothing weak, nothing passive, nothing naïve in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King”.

He then proceeded to outline his point of departure. He said: “But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake, evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al-Qaeda leaders to lay down their arms. To say force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history, the imperfections of man and the limits of reason”.

Obama obviously is not aware, when subjected to the same dilemma Gandhi in 1947 advised to the Government of India the same course of action that he had chosen. It is a supreme irony of history that Obama has to face the choice of war and peace in the same Af-Pak region and the causation of the dilemma for both Gandhi and Obama is the same mindset which uses terrorism as an instrument of policy .

Obama can rest assured that if Gandhiji had been alive he would have his blessings as Brigadier Sen had, as he left to command the Indian force trying to save Kashmir valley from the terrorists from the same FATA region, at that time led by ‘General’ Akbar Khan of the Pakistani Army.

Pyarelal, Gandhiji’s private secretary, has vividly described Gandhiji’s attitude towards the use of force by India against the tribal raiders from the same FATA region. In his book “Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase” he records that when the Kashmir invasion by the tribesmen was at its height and the invading army composed of Afridis and the like, ably officered, was advancing on Srinagar, burning and looting villages all along the route, Gandhiji remarked in one of his prayer addresses, “It was difficult to believe that this intrusion could take place without some kind of encouragement from the Pakistan Government”

He could not escape the conclusion, he said, that the Pakistan Government was directly or indirectly encouraging the raid. The Chief Minister of the Frontier Province was reported to have openly encouraged the raid and had even appealed to the Islamic world for help. It was therefore right for the Union Government to save the fair city by rushing troops to Srinagar. He would not shed a tear if the little Indian force was wiped out bravely defending Kashmir like the Spartans at Thermopylae nor would he mind if Sheikh Abdullah and his Muslim, Hindu and Sikh comrades died at their post in defence of Kashmir. That would be a glorious example to the rest of India. It would make the people of India forget that the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs were ever one another’s enemies.

Some people were shocked by Gandhiji expressing his appreciation of the Indian Government’s action in sending troops in defence of Kashmir. His exhortation to the defenders to be wiped out to the last man in clearing Kashmir soil of the raiders rather than submit was even dubbed Churchillian”.

When General Cariappa asked Gandhiji to tell him how he could teach his soldiers the spirit of non-violence without endangering their sense of duty to train themselves professionally as soldiers Gandhiji replied that he was still groping in the dark for an answer and he would find it and give it to him someday. That day never came since the Mahatma was assassinated next month.

Gandhiji and Martin Luther King were leaders who changed the status quo and in their offensive operations to change the status quo they very effectively used non-violence. So far the world has not seen non-violence used to preserve the status quo against an adversary who is on the offensive to change the status quo according to his values...Therefore, non-violence is not effective against Hitlers, Stalins, Maos and bin Ladens and their patrons. In such circumstances a just war becomes inescapable.

There is a continuity from Operation Gulmarg of Akbar Khan in 1947 through Operation Gibraltar of 1965 to the terrorism perpetrated by the associates of al Qaeda in Kashmir from 1989 onwards, the Kargil infiltration, 9/11 and subsequent threats posed by al Qaeda and its associates to various democratic, pluralistic and secular societies.

The origin of this threat is the mindset associated with the belief in holy war and in the manifest destiny of one’s faith to prevail over others.

Obama pointed out in his speech that no holy war can be a just war and elaborated “For if you truly believe that you are carrying out the divine will, then there is no need for restraint – no need to spare the pregnant mother, or the medic or even a person of one’s own faith. Such a warped view of religion is not just incompatible with the concept of peace but the purpose of faith – for the one rule that lies at the heart of every major religion is that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us”.

But the US initiated, sponsored and sustained a holy war (in the words of author John Cooley, an unholy war) from 1979, triggering the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan followed by nine years of unrestrained carnage in that country.

Those who enthusiastically participated in that holy war are today accusing the US of having deserted them and in contradiction to the values expressed by Obama, the US administration feels defensive about having discontinued its association with the warriors of the “holy war” of the eighties during the period 1990-2001.

If, according to Obama, holy wars are not just wars then the war in Afghanistan in the eighties, which was a war of choice for the US, cannot be a just war. It was a costly Cold War aberration like the support to dictatorships during that period. The present war is a just war, which in all likelihood would have earned Gandhi’s approval.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by gandharva »

Arghandab & The Battle for Kandahar

https://www.michaelyon-online.com/argha ... ndahar.htm
Image
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by ramana »

Nightwatch, 14 Dec 2009

NightWatch special comment: Today, NightWatch researched the Afghan National Police. One news report quoted a US Marine colonel’s rather correct comments about the need to improve the Afghan National Police. But that is not a Marine Corps task, nor an Army task. In fact, the US has no standing force whose “skill sets” match the challenges of the Afghan National Police. Neither does Germany, who took the early lead in police training. The French Gendarmerie plus the Republican Guard blended might come closest to having the training, capabilities and experience that the Afghan police desperately need.

The research effort today found the plan for the police. Of the 82,000 police, more than 44,000 are to be uniform cops trained in detecting crimes, protecting property, crime prevention and road traffic management, according to the plan. Not one of those skills – appropriate for a modern Western law abiding nation – is remotely relevant to the primary threat to these policemen.

It is hard to imagine a more misguided and misdirected program. In the police planning documents available online, fewer than 5,365 policemen are to be trained and equipped as paramilitary/SWAT units. And yet, the fighting data shows that all Afghan police should have that quality of training and equipment. Every unit in every district should be a commando-capable unit with the appropriate training, weapons and vehicles. Or should have a back-up element with that skill set. This should be a no-brainer.

If those skills are the focus of training, as the documents indicate, the Western Coalition has been recruiting men for a suicide mission, because the police duties in Afghanistan are a lot like commando-infantry duties, not law enforcement. The astonishing fact is not how corrupt the police are, but that any show up for duty at all.

Policemen have died by the thousands every year for Afghanistan because of a lack of training in combat operations against a light infantry enemy; a lack of mobility so that hot pursuit has been a joke; and for pathetically low pay, but still men volunteer.

The Coalition has done things upside down, in emphasizing the Army – an external defense force -- over the police who man the frontline against the Taliban in the 400 districts. The two needed to work together and grow in tandem.

In fairness, NATO and allied army forces have done reasonably well what they know how to do well and were told to do – raise an army. But that has always been only half the security challenge and policy makers should have known, had they studied the history.

Since 2001, the police have been pretty much neglected, mis-led, mis-trained, under equipped and given no mobility worthy of the name– international harvester pickup trucks? Come on! They been outgunned and outmaneuvered by the anti-government tribesmen for eight years. Their training has been devoted to a modern urban sense of law enforcement. That is completely irrelevant to law enforcement in a war zone with millions of non-combatants.

The policemen are the front line and the face of the administration, but their leaders show no sense of elitism and no leadership vision that accords the policemen the credit they are due, even taking account of bribery and payoffs. Whoever developed the plan for the Afghan National Police did not research or ever grasps the challenges policemen encounter in primitive, pre-modern societies.

No surge of maneuver troops will accomplish anything that lasts if a competent, permanent paramilitary force does not hold the ground and consolidate the gains. At least one Marine colonel recognized, at last, the criticality of a paramilitary police force, not traffic cops and criminal investigators. They come after the Taliban are whipped in 99% of the firefights in the districts.

As an aside, one might also wonder who was the savant who decided that districts the size of US counties only needed 100 policemen or fewer. Will someone please provide him a copy of Afghanistan, by Dupree? Even in the US, a county police force will total more than a 100 officers in most counties and they will not include village or town police forces within the county but separate from the county force.

Fewer than 100 Afghan policemen for every district and major town borders is criminally insufficient.

As a second aside, over the weekend, news services reported a pay raise for the Afghan army and police. The monthly payroll for army soldiers will total $37,582,000 per month or $450, 984, 000 per year, In other words less than half a billion per year. New services from Afghanistan state men have flocked to the recruitment stations to apply.

Increasing the pay for the police to $400 per month would be cheaper, totaling $32,800,000 per month and $393,600,000 per annum. If an extra $100 per person per month can create jobs and reduce the violence, it would be money much more effectively spent than on the fully loaded rate of a single gallon of gasoline, which is $4,000 per gallon delivered to Helmand Province, or the fully loaded cost of an American Marine or Infantry soldiers.

Readers, the total annual payroll of the Afghan army and police, including a $100 per month pay increase, is less than the monthly cost of US soldiers in Afghanistan. Time to start using American economic sense to help fight the war. As added bonuses, the Afghans actually speak the local languages, know the terrain and know the residents. In the US armed forces, each of those skills would be result in added pay increases.

It is a tiresome refrain, but the time is overdue for the US got serious about Afghanistan so that Afghans take charge and responsibility for Afghanistan. White or olive European and American Christians are temporary help and have always been.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by ShauryaT »

Gamble on Pak, not Af
I have a different take on some aspects of the article, chiefly on the call to TSP elites and to settle with India. I will write to the author in detail about it. The below is on the mark.
There is truth in Pakistan’s anxiety that all that the troop surge will do is shift the centre of battle, putting enormous pressure on Pakistan. We also have to recognise that no military, especially an ethnically heterogeneous one, finds it easy to wage war on its own territory, against its own people. Pakistan is right to not relish the prospect of having to pick up even more of the pieces of the collateral damage the American strategy in Afghanistan will impose upon it.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Lilo »

Tashkent Prioritizes its Strategic Role in Afghanistan’s Future
Uzbekistan’s state railroad company Ozbekiston Temir Yollari has won the Afghan government’s tender to build rail infrastructure linking the northern Afghan border town of Hairatan with Mazar-e Sharif,
The contract stipulates that Uzbekistan must also repair the 20 kilometer segment of the rail line between Termez and Hairatan. It is planned as part of the international trans-Afghan corridor, linking Central Asia with Pakistan’s ports via Termez in Uzbekistan.Consequently, Uzbekistan will emerge as the largest cargo transit terminal station in the region.
Many security experts have raised concerns over the potential threat to the northern distribution network (NDN), as the Taliban may shift its emphasis to the northern regions of the country as the volume of cargo transiting through the NDN will significantly increase as the surge gets underway.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/s ... f130581df0
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by NRao »

Gerard
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Gerard »

ramana
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by ramana »

Peter Galbraith, the son of John Galbraith, is a Paki supporter and is referred to as such in BB's book "Daughter of Destiny".

He might have tried to engineer a soft coup in Kabul by getting rid off karzai who is giving takleef to the TSP interests.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by gandharva »

Christopher Hitechens take on the Obama administration’s Afghanistan “surge” policy is worth hearing

Image

http://msnbcecn.vo.llnwd.net/e1/video/f ... 091215.flv
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Gagan »

One aspect of providing security to the Afghan Nation is training the Afghan Army and Police and getting up the numbers backed by military strength, so that they may take care of their own security.

The other very important aspect which must be pursued simultaneously is degrading the Taliban and the Pakistan Army's military warfighting capability so that they are no longer able to mount a military threat to the Afghan Nation.

In this regard,
1. The taliban (represented by the Quetta Shura, Haqqani and Hekmatyar) and AQAM need to be taken out and exterminated.

2. The various tribal gangs need to be dealt with with financial lucre primarily and with military force against the ones who are reluctant to fall in line. The overall emphasis has to be reducing the number of weapons in their hands so that they are not able to post a significant challenge to afghanistan, and if need be can be easily suppressed by the Afghanistan National Army.

3. Pakistan's military needs to reform.
a) Pakistan's army's war fighting ability needs to be severely degraded so that they are not able to usurp the civilian leadership within Pakistan and indulge in covert military misadventures in Afghanistan or India. Pakistan does not face an existential threat militarily from India, which has no need to take over Pakistan. Pakistan offers neither mineral wealth nor oil in significant quantities to be an attraction to India, the fertile lands in Pakistan's northern Punjab are but a fraction of what India has. Pakistan needs to stop being a rentier state to great powers who wish to use it to keep India on the toes.
b) The military has to be taught to remain subservient to the civilian leadership within Pakistan. This is the root cause of the entire Islamization, global jihadi terrorism nightmare that the world is facing. Essentially the jihadists are boldly strutting about in Pakistan because they know that their safety and protection is underwritten by the Pakistan Army, which needs them for covert military ops in Afghanistan and India.
c) The world powers need to come to a gentleman's agreement to not interfere in this region. No covert ops in Af-Pak once the region is stabilized. to this end, the US, Russia, India and China need to agree that the natural process of peace in Afghanistan is going to be allowed, through nation building alone - no undermining of each other's efforts, and no covert military support to taliban.

JMT.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Gagan »

A very interesting read. Essentially a collection of news stories from various sources.
US Escalates Bombing While Nuclear Pakistan Falls Apart
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Gagan »

U.S. Missiles Kill 15 People Near Border in Pakistan

The fact that the US had to fire 10 missiles to take out 17 taliban itself speaks of what happened there. The talibs were ambushed and were targeted even as they tried to escape.

Isko kehte hain "Dauda dauda ke maara"
:rotfl:
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by ramana »

Gagan wrote:U.S. Missiles Kill 15 People Near Border in Pakistan

The fact that the US had to fire 10 missiles to take out 17 taliban itself speaks of what happened there. The talibs were ambushed and were targeted even as they tried to escape.

Isko kehte hain "Dauda dauda ke maara"
:rotfl:

So ti was swarm of drones?Arent they getting desperate?
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Post by Ananya »

they want to take out as many as possible in the shotest possible time frame , given that TSP is not being flexible any more and these guys would be shielded
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