Dalai Lama at apex of Sino-Indian tensions ---- By Peter Lee
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Disappointed foreign journalists - deprived of the opportunity to observe the Dalai Lama sipping butter tea in calm defiance of the Chinese dragon - might as well instead journey a mere 640 kilometers westward to find the true epicenter of Sino-Indian tension: Kathmandu. The burgeoning crisis in Nepal - and the frantic competition between New Delhi and Beijing for influence in this volatile, nascent democracy cum impending failed state - has attracted remarkably little international attention.
Nepal is an independent country stretching across the Himalayas between India and China. Predominantly Hindu, it is a major destination for Tibetans fleeing China. How many Tibetans reside in Nepal is unknown. While 30,000 are officially registered, thousands more entered the country after 1989 illegally. At the same time, the Nepalese government has bowed to Chinese pressure and began to refuse asylum to Tibetan refugees. The Tibetans - and the Nepalese government - aroused China's displeasure in 2008 when Nepal's capital of Kathmandu was rocked by angry anti-Chinese demonstrations in the aftermath of the June unrest. An unexpected turn of political events provided China with a much more enthusiastic Nepalese partner just in time to harass Tibetan anti-Olympic demonstrators in August of the same year.
India's Foreign Minister, Shyam Saran - the same Saran who was architect of India's alliance with the Bush administration - decided to do something about Nepal's independent-minded but ineffective monarchy, which was not only floundering in its attempts to suppress an extensive Maoist insurgency but also buying arms from China in the process. Saran midwifed an alliance of the Maoist insurgents and disaffected Kathmandu insiders that toppled the king and brought Nepal's 240-year old monarchy to an end.
But then, in a shocking development that neither Saran nor Nepal's self-styled revolutionary vanguard likely expected, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) - instead of becoming a marginalized junior partner destined for disarmament and irrelevance in a pro-Indian regime of cooperative Kathmandu fat cats - carried the day in the parliamentary elections and won enough seats to form the government with its chairman, Prachanda as prime minister.
The Nepalese Maoists, despite their name, are not allies of the CCP. They are ideologically closer to US Marxist Robert Avakian and Peru's Shining Path than Hu Jintao and the CCP (which had been supplying Nepal's King Gyanendra with weapons to fight them and which they describe as "revisionist"). Nevertheless, the Maoists recognized India's fundamental hostility toward their movement and extended a hand of friendship to China. Prachanda rejected the traditional pilgrimage to New Delhi for his first overseas trip and went to Beijing instead to attend the closing of the Beijing Summer Olympics. He also announced that his government intended to renegotiate the friendship treaty between Nepal and India, which he termed unequal.
China accepted with alacrity. During Prachanda's one-year tenure as prime minister, China dispatched a dozen delegations to Kathmandu, including two PLA delegations bringing security assistance and a visit by China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yang Jiechi. A think-tank funded by the Indian Ministry of Defense, the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, highlighted in "Nepal: New 'Strategic Partner' of China?" [7] a series of Chinese statements that were qualitatively different from the usual barrage of flattery and economic aid that China concentrates on impoverished potential junior allies, and which undoubtedly set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi - Beijing seems to have provided something that sounds very much like a security guarantee to Nepal.
The increasing level of bilateral engagement also indicates that China is wooing Nepal as a new strategic partner. This has been confirmed by the statements made by various Chinese officials. For example, on 16 February 2009, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said in Beijing that China would prefer to work with Nepal on the basis of a strategic partnership. In fact, Vice Minister of International Department of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China, Liu Hongcai said in Kathmandu in February 2009 that 'we oppose any move to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal by any force.' Similarly, on November 4, 2008, Liu Hong Chai, International Bureau Chief of the Chinese Communist Party, stated that 'China will not tolerate any meddling from any other country in the internal affairs of Nepal- our traditional and ancient neighbor.
Prachanda reaffirmed Nepal's One China policy, declared his government would not permit Nepal to be used as a base for anti-China activity, vigorously suppressed Tibetan demonstrations, harassed Tibetan residents, and apparently turned a blind eye when ten Chinese security personnel crossed the border into Nepal to demand that a photographer from the Agence France Presse news agency erase his camera's memory chip. It was too good to last.
Through an unknown combination of domestic incompatibility and foreign interference, the Maoists were frozen out of the Nepalese government in May 2009 as the result of a scuffle over removal of the pro-Indian army chief of staff, and an unpopular but pro-Indian moderate communist took over. (See Maoists isolated over army chief, Asia Times Online, April 28)
The Maoists went into opposition and have carried out their threat to gridlock all government business - through a parliamentary boycott - until matters are ordered to their satisfaction. The small and incestuous world of Kathmandu politics has been diverted by the non-stop bustle of Nepalese politicians to New Delhi and Beijing to consult with their patrons. The Maoist leadership visited China for an eight-day visit in October 2009, obtaining a statement from Beijing stating that the Maoists should not be frozen out of the constitution-writing and peace process activities that the Nepalese Constituent Assembly is supposed to be pursuing, despite their absence from the ruling coalition.
At the beginning of November, the Maoists announced their push for power, albeit within the context of Nepal's murky combination of post-insurgency power-sharing and democracy. They have promised to bring the current government to its knees and return to power through a program of mass action conducted over the next two weeks, ostensibly non-violent but undoubtedly accompanied by intimidation and harassment courtesy of the bullyboys of the Maoists' Young Communists League.
Signs are that they will succeed.
The Nepalese government, which unwisely exhausted its budget several months ahead of schedule despite the knowledge that the Maoists had gridlocked the budgetary process, rather abjectly requested the Maoists not to engage in their mass action. Prachanda also rather magnanimously agreed not to shut down Kathmandu's international airport at the urging of the Western embassies, and predicted he would shortly be back in power.
As Nepal threatened to descend into chaos, the Chinese government threw another $200 million dollars at the mess, in the form of a credit from its Export Import Bank for hydropower and infrastructure projects at a concessionary interest rate of 1.75%. The Maoists are keenly aware that they cannot push things too far and Nepal will not become a Chinese satrapy or a communist paradise. The implicit shadow over all Nepalese actions that displease New Delhi is the memory of what India did to Sikkim in the 1970s: destabilization of the regime of an inconvenient monarch, followed by riots, request for assistance by pro-Indian local politicians, the arrival of Indian troops in the capital, and a plebiscite in which, by a margin of 97.5% to 2.5%, voters chose to join the Indian Union.
In a tribute to the instincts of moderation and business as usual, India's Congress Party, China, and the US administration appear jointly determined to keep a lid on things in Nepal - and in South Asia. In an exercise in political triage that provided hostile advocates with opportunities for outraged posturing but reflected a sober understanding of geopolitical realities and US interests, President Obama postponed his meeting with the Dalai Lama until after his visit to Beijing, and allocated the first state visit by a foreign leader to Washington to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan.
For its part, China knows that India holds the cards - especially the Tibet card - in South Asia. It is looking for a modus vivendi that keeps the focus on economic growth instead of military adventurism. The successful continuation of the current regional security regime in South Asia - based on denial of Tibetan aspirations avoiding destabilizing actions at the Sino-Indian border - relies to a significant extent on New Delhi.
The current system will be put to a more stringent test if the bellicosely nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party were to replace the relatively lamblike Congress party as the majority party in India's parliament. By entering into an equal alliance with the US and obtaining international validation of India's treasured nuclear program, the Congress party effectively stole the BJP's national security thunder and trounced it in the most recent elections.
Unable to score political points against the Congress party at this date for its closeness to the US, the aggrieved BJP has directed its fire at the ruling party's sensible and moderate China policy as insufficiently protective of India's security and honor. The Chinese ambassador paid a formal call on the head of the BJP, no doubt hoping for reassurance that the BJP's outbursts were mere cynical posturing and Beijing could expect the usual pragmatism if and when the BJP regained power. What he received instead was a detailed rehashing of India's security grievances against China.
If the BJP takes power and decides to exploit China's vulnerabilities in South Asia, the world might indeed get that 2012 war that Bharat Verma was talking about.
Notes
1.
China may attack India by 2012, Times of India, July 12, 2009
2.
What are the origins of the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations?, Article in "The National Interest" by former United States ambassador to India Robert D Blackwill, Summer 2005
3.
India's voice on the global stage very important: Bush Hindustan Times, October 30, 2009
4.
The China-India Border Brawl, Wall Street Journal Asia, June 24, 2009
5.
Rivals China, India in escalating war of words, Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 2009
6.
India and the Tibet card, Times of India, November 23 2008
7.
Nepal: New 'Strategic Partner' of China?, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, March 30, 2009