India Nuclear News And Discussion

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Dec 2009 07:35

The two Kodankulam reactors were bought from Soviet Union and Russia stretched and delivered. Later Russia under Yeltsin said they would abide by NSG rules.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 16 Dec 2009 10:55

Interview with Kakodkar

Very interesting.

On TIFR

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 16 Dec 2009 10:56

Misplaced Trust: Kaiga Incident - by TS Subramanian

Hari Seldon · Post by **Hari Seldon** » 16 Dec 2009 11:22

Uranium exports to India by Australia on cards

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 16 Dec 2009 11:28

rachel wrote:There is a question been bugging me but everytime i ask, no one answers.. probably cuz they think it's too stupid or basic.

Very fundamentally: before the US-India nuke agreement, we had already bought Russian reactors and uranium for them.

I'm confused. Why did we need the US-India agreement then? Just to be able to buy American and Areva reactors?

Why do we need to buy French and American reactors? Are they that much superior to Russian reactors? I'm sure if we need a huge number of reactors, the Russkies can build em fast enough for us.. can they not?

Or is the key issue the fact that with the US-India agreement, we now have the right to buy uranium for any safeguarded reactors, Indian or foreign?

With all this cr*p re: buying US reactors, I dont see why we need the buggers at all? Russia is giving us full re processing rights, no BS involved. Just stick to them.

Or is it the case that we have to buy a few French and Yankee junk-ractors just to thank them for their blessed agreement, which allows us to buy Kazakh uranium for all our unsafeguarded reactors?

My response would be as follows:

Kudankulam 1 and 2 contract, along with life-time LEU supply for these Nuclear Power Plants (npp's), was signed before NSG cartel formation and so Russia continued to honour it, even afterwards. At that time, as a fall out of the Tarapur 1 & 2 fiasco -- the US had reneged their part of the contract to supply LEU for these plants and also blocked India from reprocessing of the spent fuel from these plants or even shipping it back to the US -- there was no question of buying npps from the US. Also, at that time France, Canada, UK etc chose to toe the US line against India.

I think, India embarked, as a matter of strategy, on the current mission of negotiating the Indo-US deal and NSG waiver, just in order to be able to set up a competition to the Russian npp offers. Russian quotation of npps (and even spares / equipment for Kudankulam 1 & 2) might have been getting higher and higher (as in the case of the Aircraft Carrier Deal). There may also be interconnections (invisible to persons like me) between the npp deal and Russia's collaboration with India with regard to the nuclear submarine and other defence deals.

Post recent NSG "clearance", France has started singing a different tune; the business lobby in the US also apparently sees an opportunity to milk India.

Do we need to buy French and American reactors? In my opinion, no; we do not need to buy npps from anybody for that matter. Importing npps does not guarantee faster project completion.

After the NSG clearance, there is, in fact, a possibility that all the "old friends" (colour of their "feathers" is also the same) may once again form behind-the-scene cartels so that they can jointly push up the prices, at the opportune time, not only for the npps, but also for spares and Nat U and LEU that Indian planners might be dreaming of importing.

I do not think the present Indo-US 123 deal or NSG clearance will allow India to buy U from Kazakhstan for any of our unsafeguarded reactors. India placed some of its India-built npps in the safeguarded list (for which it can import U) -- according to me, just as a part of "up-front seed/earnest money", the remaining being promises to sign NPT, CTBT etc, -- in order to clinch the 123 and NSG deal. It was sought to be justified via a stage-managed publicity blitz about shortage of indigenous U, just as food-politico mafia resort to, at regular intervals, in the case of kanda-batata.

In the final analysis, as far as I am concerned, there is no short-cut to achieving technology independence; steady (even if apparently slow) indigenous development is the only way. European nations found this out during their 1000-year "dark age", and when they did, they could industrialise, in a matter of a few centuries. In our nation's life-cycle, we seem to be (re)entering a technologically "dark" age now.

Russians are so much easier to work with on this nuke stuff.

If the agreement ever gets broken, they will not ask for return of anything: reactors, uranium, or reprocessed material.
They dont mind if we reprocess, I think they will even sell us reprocessing technology if we want.

They're so much better than the Yanks.

I would tend not to subscribe to this view. All donors tend to extract their pound of flesh, with or without visible blood letting

Just my views.

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 17 Dec 2009 02:58

NSA spells it out: Fast breeder reactors not to be used for military purpose

In the clearest enunciation of the government’s position on what it intends to do with the fast breeder reactor programme, National Security Advisor M K Narayanan told a conference of security experts in Bahrain last Saturday that India’s fast breeder reactors are not for “military purposes” and the government had “no intention” to place it in the “military realm”.
...
...
“The 2006 separation plan between India and the US, which has since been embedded in the IAEA safeguards agreement, refers to those items that are to be kept in the safeguarded category and a few in the non-safeguarded category. We had a long debate about our position on the fast-breeder reactor, and the Indian and US negotiators reached the point that the fast-breeder reactor was still in a very experimental stage. Therefore, it was not yet time to decide whether it should or should not go under safeguards. I want to underline the point that the fast-breeder reactor is not meant for military purposes. I think there was a reference to that. We have no intention for the fast-breeder reactor to be put into the military realm.”
...
...
“We have already passed many milestones on the way to this target. We have identified many of them and achieved several benchmarks. Our 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor is today in an advanced stage of construction...India’s experiment with fast breeder reactors and the use of the thorium cycle could prove extremely useful to ensure energy security in the future,” said Narayanan.

The NSA went on to elaborate on India’s plans in the Q&A session, making it clear that FBRs will not be used for making nuclear weapons. “We see the three-stage, close-fuel cycle of the pressurised heavy water reactor, the fast breeder and the thorium fuel as the hope of the future. Anybody who has some understanding of nuclear weapons would realise that you do not require the fast breeder to produce nuclear weapons.”
...
...

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 17 Dec 2009 04:26

Gayi bhains pani mein.

ABV announces that they are willing the negotiate CTBT the very day of the tests. Now, after fighting tooth and nail to get the breeders out of safeguards, here is our NSA, folding it in. I can only "hope", the powers that be are getting something worthwhile in return for all these compromises. Reminds me of a statement John Burns had made that over time 99% of the Indian nuclear establishment will be under safeguards. Looks like he was right.

Also, if the FBR's are not the surest and fastest way to a fissile material stock pile then what is? The 6 PHWR's in low burn mode? Cirrus is going to be decommissioned, that just leaves Dhruva as the sole dedicated reactor to produce WG Pu (minus reprocessing) so far.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 17 Dec 2009 07:05

Sanatanan wrote: Do we need to buy French and American reactors? In my opinion, no; we do not need to buy npps from anybody for that matter. Importing npps does not guarantee faster project completion.

Much depends on how fast the GoI wants to expand nuclear power generation in India.

How many reactors can DAE build *simultaneously* on its own? Even if technology was not a bottleneck, project management and financing probably are.

If India opens up nuclear power generation to private Indian operators such as Tata or L&T, etc, they have the option of raising capital from the private Indian and international market.

In addition resources for project management will come from reactor suppliers such as GE-Westinghouse and Areva.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 17 Dec 2009 07:14

Homi J Bhabha: the World War's Gift to India

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Dec 2009 08:14

M K Narayanan :: The Manama Dialogue

Mr Chairman, distinguished participants of the Manama Dialogue, it is always a great pleasure to participate in the Manama Dialogue. I think this is the third time that I have been present. I should have been here last year, but because of the unfortunate incidents I could not attend.

I believe all of us who are present here recognise the fact that the Manama Dialogue has achieved a well‑deserved reputation as an international conference of high standing and it always, therefore, a pleasure to be a participant. I commend the IISS and in particular Dr. Chipman, its Director General, for bringing together this extraordinary range of policy makers and experts for this conference.

Mr Chairman, I propose to organise my remarks this afternoon by firstly focussing on current trends in nuclear power globally. Next will be some thoughts about future trends and challenges as seen from India’s perspective. Finally I will refer to nuclear security and underline India’s firm commitment to universal nuclear disarmament.

Mr Chairman, over the past decade, there has been a very major change over the perception of nuclear power the world over. Today the stage is firmly set for a major expansion in the use of nuclear power. This renewed, widespread interest in nuclear power, accompanied by the steady growth of the global nuclear industry, has been referred to as a global, nuclear renaissance. Facts suggest that this phenomenon is now here to stay.

I believe there currently about 436 nuclear power plants in operation in the world. Over 90% of them are in Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) countries. Significantly, however, of the 53 new nuclear power reactors under construction, a very large percentage is in non‑OECD countries, particularly in Asia. Of particular interest to this audience is the fact that the most important developments in nuclear power are taking place in our region.

In 2006 the GCC announced their interest in a joint nuclear development programme. Since then the kingdom of Bahrain and the United States have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU). I think this was last year, 2008. The United Arab Emirates has concluded a memorandum of understanding with the United States and France with regard to nuclear power reactors. Egypt has said that its first reactor will come on stream by 2017. Other countries that have expressed a great deal of interest include Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria. There is a similar trend in South East Asia. Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand have all announced plans for the construction of new nuclear power plants.

In addition I believe, with Copenhagen in the background, that there is a far greater realisation the world over of the value of nuclear power as a clean and sustainable energy source, essential to avoid the kinds of green house emissions against which we are struggling and to address the challenge of climate change. A realistic estimate is that the complete nuclear power chain from mining to reactors and waste disposal emits only 3.24 grams of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour. This compares extremely well with wind and hydropower and is much less than fossil fuels. In the larger energy source basket, nuclear power is, therefore, an increasingly important component for the nations of the world. For a number of countries including India nuclear power is seen as the energy coefficient for the future.

For India energy is vital; this is the engine of India’s economic growth, which has averaged 7‑9% during the last decade. It is anticipated that by 2030 India’s overall, projected energy deficit, if we rely only on domestic fuel resources, would be 150,000 megawatts. By 2050 it is expected to go up to the astronomical figure of 412,000 megawatts. Until such time as solar energy becomes an adequate resource, nuclear power is the only effective way to bridge this gap. Our internal studies confirm that the various plans we have devised in terms of nuclear energy, if they are expanded and come to fruition, it should be possible for us to produce 60,000 megawatts of nuclear energy in the foreseeable future; that is by 2030. This is significant, but it is still inadequate to meet our energy deficit.

Believe me when I say that we are confident that, given India’s mastery of the key aspects of our three‑stage, closed nuclear fuel cycle, we can leapfrog into the future. Based on ongoing research into advanced fuel cycles, our nuclear scientists have calculated that we could close the energy deficit of more than 400,000 megawatts by 2050. I know to many of you this may look like wishful thinking, but let me tell that these statistics are based on very realistic projections. We have already passed many milestones on the way to this target. We have identified many of them and achieved several benchmarks. Our 500 megawatt, prototype fast breeder reactor is today in an advanced stage of construction. We are experimenting with an advanced heavy water reactor, which uses thorium as a fuel and has inbuilt proliferation‑resistant characteristics. It also has advanced safety and security features. India’s experiment with fast breeder reactors and the use of the thorium cycle could prove extremely useful to ensure energy security in the future.

International co‑operation is a vital aspect in progressing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The former director general of the International Atomic

Energy Authority (IAEA) has often commended India for its very positive role in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. I would like to state on behalf of the Indian government that we are ready to place our proven and wide‑ranging capacities and capabilities in civil nuclear reactors at the disposal of those countries, which are currently engaging and emerging in the global renaissance in nuclear energy. We are ready to help countries with small power grids wishing to enter nuclear power generation at low cost. Given our experience with thorium‑based nuclear technologies, we are ready to contribute to global research and development into new, proliferation‑resistant fuel cycles. In many ways we are today at the cutting edge of civil nuclear research. Along with France and many other countries, we are participants in the thermo‑nuclear experimental research programme.

I would like to mention to this audience that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy extend far beyond the realms of just power and electricity. There are many promising applications in the area of medicine, agriculture, food production and food preservation, as well as water desalinisation. India has supplied Vietnam with nuclear technology to deliver cancer therapy under a programme initiated by the IAEA. In regard to water management we have a hybrid nuclear desalinisation demonstration project in southern India, which is based on river osmosis and which produces nearly 2 million litres of water per day. We have another water desalinisation plant, which produces 4.5 million litres of water per day. This has greatly helped to address water shortages in some of our coastal areas. Nuclear science is also currently engaged in rejuvenating mountain springs, sources of drinking water in the high Himalayas.

Last year was a red-letter year from the point of view of India’s progress in the realm of civil nuclear power. Last year we were able to get an India‑specific safeguards programme from the International Atomic Energy Agency. From the Nuclear Suppliers Group we also obtained a clean exemption for India. The Nuclear Suppliers Group decision to resume civil nuclear co‑operation with India recognises India as a country with advanced nuclear technology and an impeccable record of non-proliferation. The recognition given to India’s use of civil nuclear technology is a highly significant development in the onward march of civil nuclear energy. Currently we in India are witnessing an explosion in regard to several civil nuclear co‑operation agreements with countries across the globe such as France, Russia, Canada and the United Kingdom.

Having talked about the benefits nuclear power and energy can achieve for nations, let me come to the issue of nuclear security. We in India have always been conscious of the possible misuse of sensitive nuclear technologies and proliferation issues. For this reason India maintains effective export controls on nuclear materials and related technologies. Even though we are not a party to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, we have adhered even more strictly than many NPT signatories to non-proliferation norms and requirements. We fully endorse the International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns in this regard. We are fully supportive of its efforts to raise the bar on these issues.

The task before the international community today is to adopt at one level a more forward‑looking approach to shape the ongoing nuclear renaissance. At another level there is a requirement to ensure the needs of security are met and to achieve greater safety of nuclear installations and materials. We need to ponder on this point at some length. In terms of nuclear safety I think it is important that the very strict norms are constantly upgraded. These should be strictly followed by any country that wishes to enter the arena of nuclear power. This is not too difficult. The norms are easy to follow and I think the IAEA watchdogs are very careful about what is being done there and they take care to see that there are no leakages.

On the issue of nuclear security, however, I think the issues are much more difficult. The most serious danger that we see is the possibility of terrorist gaining access to nuclear materials and technologies. I think the issue is more complex than it is generally perceived to be. The threat is not only from outside. In some cases I think the threat is from within and that is something about which we need to be careful.

In our view the possibility of terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials and technologies and the shadow of nuclear terrorism is perhaps the gravest threat to global security and mankind at this moment. An act of nuclear terrorism could have catastrophic consequences. Strict and adequate preventive measures are vital for this purpose. The world must acknowledge and admit the possibility of a link between international terrorism and the possibility of them being able to obtain nuclear material leading on to weapons of mass destruction. We need a far more intensive exchange of information and intelligence among nations on the issue of nuclear security. This has to be under the aegis of IAEA, although perhaps it can sometimes be outside it.

We need a much better idea about the protective mechanisms in place for new nuclear installations and we must ensure that the norms prescribed by the IAEA are very strictly followed. Additionally I believe there is a need to put in place a proper international response in case there is a nuclear misadventure. India has been in the forefront in this respect. India has introduced a resolution in the UN on measures to prevent terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. This was adopted by a consensus by the UN General Assembly some time ago. This is aimed at strengthening the international resolve to prevent terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It is in this respect that India greatly welcomes President Obama’s initiative to host a summit on nuclear security in April next year. India will contribute very substantially and actively to ensure the success of this summit.

This brings me to a more fundamental issue – promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy would be greatly advanced by a renewed commitment to the universal elimination of nuclear weapons. India has a long‑standing commitment to global, non‑discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. India was perhaps the first country in the world to call for a ban on nuclear testing as far back as 1954. India also called for a non‑discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation in 1965.

In 1988 at the UN General Assembly the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Ghandi unfolded an action plan for ushering in a nuclear‑weapon‑free world. This was a clarion call for universal nuclear disarmament. In 2006 India again put forward a set of proposals at the UN General Assembly that outlined specific steps that would lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This included a proposal for the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention that would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and provide for their elimination within a specified timeframe.

It is unfortunate that, despite the years that have passed, there has not been much progress in regard to nuclear disarmament. We have recently felt encouraged by some positive signs in this direction. It would seem that nuclear disarmament is perhaps back on the international agenda. One of the more important proposals is the one co‑authored by Dr Kissinger, George Schultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn, leading on to the very significant speech made by President Barack Obama in Prague in April this year. In that speech he outlined his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. This has greatly gladdened our hearts. We also feel encouraged by the willingness of the United States and Russia to negotiate further cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

Finally, I want to quote from a recent speech made by my Prime Minister at the international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This was in September this year. I believe his words aptly summarise the approach we can follow to ensure success as far as nuclear energy is concerned, as well as its security. ‘If we can use the power of the atom wisely for the universal good, the possibilities are unbounded. If we do not, the consequences will also be devastating for peace and for progress that all nations seek for their people. The choices are stark, and the challenges are, indeed, daunting, but it is not beyond the imagination of the human mind to devise suitable solutions and strategies. This task will require the collective will, wisdom, and determination of the world community, but it is a task that can no longer be put off.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Dec 2009 08:45

The Manama Dialogue :: Third Plenary Session - Question & Answer Session

Mark Fitzpatrick wrote: I fear that I have used up my quota of questions for this 6th Manama Dialogue, but if I could be advance my quota from next year! I would like to pose questions for each of the speakers. Those were very rich presentations. National Security Advisor Narayanan mentioned the use of the breeder reactor technology as potentially useful for many other countries. When the US-India nuclear cooperation deal reached its fruition, India put forward a planned division between its civilian and its non‑exclusively civilian facilities. The fast breeder reactor was not included among the list of facilities that were strictly for civilian use. I am wondering whether fast breeder reactor technology is to be shared with other nations, if it will not have to be moved to the civilian use category in the future?

A second question for the National Security Advisor, if I may? North Korea frequently uses the India example as a talking point, and says it wants to be treated like India, and accepted as a nuclear armed state in the future. India is not involved in six-party talks with North Korea, but if you were to be involved in talks with North Korea, how would you try to dissuade them of this talking point?

Jason Alderwick, Maritime Analyst, Defence Analysis Department wrote: If I could ask Mr Narayanan, given that you spoke very eloquently about the need to control proliferation of nuclear weapons and WMD, what is the likelihood of India joining the proliferation security initiative, or at least becoming an active participant or an observer?

M.K. Narayanan wrote: There is a very wide range to cover, but let me try to answer them. Some of them are beyond answering in the sense that they are highly complex and complicated. The distinguished delegate from Korea raised the question of India/Pakistan relations and the safety of nuclear weapons. Mr Qureshi is here; I think we can honestly say that we are not fighting a war or a conflict at the moment. That is not the issue. Insofar as India’s concerns about nuclear safety, our nuclear weapons and installations are in very safe hands. We have no reason to doubt their security and safety. I cannot speak for Pakistan, but I think the Pakistani authorities have, from time to time, affirmed that their nuclear weapons are safe. I presume that, as responsible countries and governments, we accept this. As I mentioned, there is always a danger, so we need to keep on enhancing the level of safety and security of these plants, particularly where there are nuclear weapons. That is all I have to say on this issue.

Mr Fitzpatrick’s question is a little loaded, if I may say. The 2006 separation plan between India and the US, which has since been embedded in the IAEA safeguards agreement, refers to those items that are to be kept in the safeguarded category and a few in the non‑safeguarded category. We had a long debate about our position on the fast‑breeder reactor, and the Indian and US negotiators reached the point that the fast‑breeder reactor was still in a very experimental stage. Therefore, it was not yet time to decide whether it should or should not go under safeguards. I want to underline the point that the fast‑breeder reactor is not meant for military purposes. I think there was a reference to that. We have no intention for the fast‑breeder reactor to be put into the military realm.

As the distinguished vice minister said, fast‑breeder reactors are the hope of the future. Uranium, whether in its natural state or otherwise, will become a scarce resource as the world goes increasingly far into its nuclear renaissance. When uranium was not a scarce quantity, many countries, other than France and one or two others, did not experiment with fast breeders. I am not a nuclear scientist; I am only repeating what our nuclear scientists say. If the fast breeder really comes into its own, it will produce more fuel than what it put into it. That would be a very satisfactory state of affairs.

Our intention, why is why I went into such great lengths to express where our energy deficiency lay – we are talking in terms of 400‑odd gigawatts by 2050 – is that we need every ounce of energy that we can. We see the three‑stage, close‑fuel cycle of the pressurised heavy water reactor, the fast breeder and the thorium fuel as the hope of the future. Anybody who has some understanding of nuclear weapons would realise that you do not require the fast breeder to produce nuclear weapons.

Coming to the North Korean example, India has tried to avoid entering international negotiations on this question. It has its own views on this point. This question has been eloquently answered by the chairman here, who commented on continuing to add countries. The six‑party talks on North Korea are being led adequately by the groups that are there. I do not think they need more people. Six is comfortable; seven could be a crowd. We would like to keep India out of them.

A delegate from Iran talked in terms of violation of the NPT. I am sorry to say that India is not a signatory to the NPT. The reason for that is not that we do not agree with the NPT stands for, but we are opposed to the rather discriminatory and iniquitous manner in which it treats certain haves and have‑nots.

The first question is we are not violators of the NPT; the US knows as much as anybody else about that. The previous administration recognised the importance of nuclear energy to overcome India’s energy deficiency. It was aware of India’s impeccable and, I would say, exemplary record of non‑proliferation. They recognised that, while we are not a signatory to the NPT and not a member of the NPT, we have conformed to every rule. Certain additionalities were sought from us to strengthen our export legislation. We have carried them out. We have since signed every document required for the purpose, including the IAEA safeguards. We have ratified them and received a declaration. We have started the process of filling out the annexes. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSC), which is a grouping of 45 countries, including all the permanent member countries (P5) plus several others, came to the understanding and the recognition that India deserved to be a member of the NSC. I think there is probably a mistake in the mind of the Iranian delegate about where we stand. Of all the countries in the world, India is at the very top in adhering to each of the NPT norms. We are not a signatory purely for the reason that we regard it as iniquitous and discriminatory. If that is removed, we would have no problems.

The delegate from Morocco said that the nuclear dawn is what we want to look for. There is hope and optimism. If we strengthen the IAEA, now that, apart from its normal safeguard, the IAEA also has additional protocols, there will be hope for the future. That is the way we need to go.

A delegate raised the issue of focusing on Iran. We are very clear in our minds. Any country that needs nuclear energy for civilian purposes is entitled to it. I know there have been occasions when India has not sided with them. Take the latest one: we fully support Iran’s need for civil nuclear energy.

However, if there is a violation according to international standards, and if the IAEA and the Board of the Director General says to the contrary, India has tried to play by the rules. That is all we have done. We stand by the commitment that Iran deserves what it needs.

If the international community is making a mistake about what Iran is doing, we should correct it. The word from this meeting is that there is more openness and transparency. We would not hold back Iran. Iran is a great civilisation and an important country. Iran has been a friend of ours for thousands of years. We have the second‑largest Shia population in the world, which looks to Iran. Therefore, we recognise the merits of the case. If we were to move forward on the nuclear issues, the role of the IAEA as a guardian of nuclear safety must be apparent. We stand by it. I mentioned that in my talk and would like to reiterate it again.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Dec 2009 08:49

AK had always argued that the FBR was at a "very experimental stage" and therefore cannot be included in any separation plans.

It was other parties that thought (perhaps rightly) in terms of FBRs being a great military asset.

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 17 Dec 2009 11:46

RaviBg wrote:NSA spells it out: Fast breeder reactors not to be used for military purpose

“The 2006 separation plan between India and the US, which has since been embedded in the IAEA safeguards agreement, refers to those items that are to be kept in the safeguarded category and a few in the non-safeguarded category. We had a long debate about our position on the fast-breeder reactor, and the Indian and US negotiators reached the point that the fast-breeder reactor was still in a very experimental stage. Therefore, it was not yet time to decide whether it should or should not go under safeguards. I want to underline the point that the fast-breeder reactor is not meant for military purposes. I think there was a reference to that. We have no intention for the fast-breeder reactor to be put into the military realm."

So, in 2006, the FB reactor was in experimental stage, and now it is no longer in experimental stage, and it has been determined that it can be put under safeguards?

"Anybody who has some understanding of nuclear weapons would realise that you do not require the fast breeder to produce nuclear weapons.”

I seem to recall that the U233 produced was ideal for weapons?

Some background information about MK Narayanan: MK Narayanan’s new bête noire: P Chidambaram http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/stor ... K6Q=&type= (part 5 of a five part series; previous parts are linked)

Also, from interview of Kakodkar linked to above:

Do you feel sad that the thorium-fuelled AHWR project did not take off during your tenure? You told me in 2004 that the ground-breaking ceremony for the AHWR would take place by the end of 2004. It is yet to take place. Has the AHWR become a non-starter?

It is not a non-starter. I would have liked to see the AHWR construction start before I laid down office. Nevertheless, the AHWR will continue to remain an important development both from the Indian and the global perspective. [The construction of] the AHWR will be an important development whenever it takes place, and it will take place. There is no doubt about it at all. It is just that for a new development, you have to ensure that everything that should be taken care of has been taken care of and in the process, you lose time. I have no great excitement about when it takes place – during my time or others’ time. But that it will happen one day is an important thing.

"It is just that for a new development, you have to ensure that everything that should be taken care of has been taken care of and in the process, you lose time." Anybody have any idea what the delays are about?

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 17 Dec 2009 12:41

nrao, the other parties you mean USA? you are right. it was brilliant on our part 'cause those plutonium from FBRs are any way inputs for our third stage thorium reactors.

we should be going for more FBRs, based on capacity planning for the future use of thorium cycle usage (bhaba's 3rd phase plan).

we don't want some external forces to play hands and politics and scuttle the whole issue. the brilliance is part where our scientists have to play to keep it guessing for mil or non mil, since our baboo brains need some strategies like that.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Dec 2009 19:12

Let us get one thing out of the way: MKN. Outside of the Gandhi family I doubt if he has any standings. He is more of a distraction than anything here.

Having said that, what he stated WRT FBRs is party line stuff - from what I recall.

AK has always maintained that FBR is experimental and therefore it is too early to decide on anything. (AK wanted India to have the same authority to flip-flop reactors between civilian and military, but that did not work. However, what he did get - natural I guess - is that India will decide which reactor falls on which side of the separation plan fence - not a very big deal, but .........)

Now, here is my read.

FBRs: India seems to be way ahead of anyone WRT FBR techs. It is my understanding (and I could be wrong) that the only country truly competing with India is Russia. Japan tried it for ENR purposes only - and "failed". France has not taken it seriously but certainly did not envision a FBR the way India did (for obvious reasons - they had access to plenty of "cheap" Uranium.)

The attraction of the Indian FBR seems to be "Thorium" - only because we JUST may run out of Uranium and it is not replaceable (yet). The Indian FBR (IFBR?) "breeds" - freakishly it produces more than it consumes.

Then it has built-in nonproliferation technologies (I have no clue what that means - it is party line, so I am stating it).

When one meditates, one sees the value of these beast - specially when Uranium runs out. In theory (at least) who will compete when there is no Uranium? So, there appears to be tremendous export value to this reactor set.

So, why at this point in time even talk about FBR and "military". I THINK the game plan is to get India a seat at the high table - FIRST. Then ..........................up to the rest, disarm or arm.

JMTs.

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 17 Dec 2009 21:15

Johann wrote:
How many reactors can DAE build *simultaneously* on its own? Even if technology was not a bottleneck, project management and financing probably are.

. . .

I recollect that at one time India was leading the World in the number of reactors actively under construction. For want of a better reference now, I cite this IAEA document, which in Table 2, column 3 shows that in 2003, India had 8 reactors under construction, the highest among all the countries indicated therein. This situation may have changed now as a result of lack of funding, I do not know. But I feel it should be possible to pickup ability to manage multiple reactor construction given realistic schedules.

I feel that as a result of Dr Bhabha's forethought (in establishing a Training School for Nuclear Technology in DAE, and having a constant trickle of recruitment of engineers in DAE through the Training School) India now has an adequate pool of nuclear engineers capable of managing multiple projects simultaneously.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 17 Dec 2009 22:04

India’s Nuclear Power Plans to Borrow $6.5 Billion

Nuclear Power Corp. of India, the nation’s monopoly atomic generator, plans to borrow as much as $6.5 billion to fund six new reactors as the second fastest- growing major economy grapples with power shortages.

India guarded on international nuclear report

India also opposes the recommendation to apply equivalent non-proliferation and disarmament obligations to “the three elephants in the room’’ — India, Pakistan and Israel — who will not join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nor will the NPT admit them as nuclear weapon States. “This ignores the differentiated nuclear histories and records of all the nuclear-armed States. The advocacy of non-proliferation disciplines for non-NPT States also ignores India’s existing commitments and responsible behaviour in comparison with the NPT five and Pakistan,” they said.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 17 Dec 2009 22:08

India capable in terms of nuclear deterrence: research organization

"In terms of deterrence, India has the capability, which it needs to have. Any deterrence is the function of what is the threat against which you are creating it and in that particular aspect, we are totally self-sufficient. India's deterrence capabilities are fully safe and all the infrastructure required is also in place," DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat told media in the national capital.

"In terms of capability, what matters is the efficacy of your deterrence and not the numbers I can assure you that in terms of efficacy, we are at par with whatever adversaries we are looking at," he said in response to questions about the doubts raised by the country's two nuclear scientists K. Santhanam and P.K. Iyengar.

Saraswat dismisses doubts over India's nuclear deterrence

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 18 Dec 2009 03:33

India to miss New Year US nuclear gift - K.P. NAYAR

...
Elements within the Obama administration opposed to the principles behind the nuclear deal, although unable to stop it or roll it back, have managed to delay a round of talks that would have led to the finalisation of a bilateral agreement for the reprocessing of spent US nuclear fuel by India, which is the next step towards operationalising the controversial deal.

...
But foreign secretary Nirupama Rao said in New Delhi yesterday that “the next round of talks has not been scheduled as yet. It will be done shortly. We hope to finalise the agreement at the earliest.”

...
But elements within the department, working in concert with others in the administration and the US Congress who are firmly opposed to even minor adjustments in the existing global non-proliferation regime, decided to resort to that time-honoured tool of bureaucrats that is used to thwart the will of their political bosses: delay, delay.

...

Obama either needs to push it through as Bush/Hadley/Rice team had done earlier, or risk taking the India-US relationship back a few steps.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 18 Dec 2009 07:56

It'll happen when Obama visits India next year - if it has to happen.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 18 Dec 2009 08:22

It will happen, and it has to happen within whatever the time frame is.

Alternative would be no reactors for the US.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 18 Dec 2009 08:32

NRao wrote: So, why at this point in time even talk about FBR and "military". I THINK the game plan is to get India a seat at the high table - FIRST. Then ..........................up to the rest, disarm or arm.

JMTs.

Strange logic. A high seat at the table, based on what, moral power? Let us not talk about export of FBR, we ourselves have a loooong way to go to prove the success of the FBR, especially commercially. Having a reactor classified as "Strategic" has NO impact on its connection with the civilian grid. It simply means that it will not be under safeguards. Also, if you are hoping for a GoI official (even if AK did earlier) to declare that we intend to use the FBR as breeders of WG Pu, then we can might as well wait for the Kalki Avatar.

The best known public record is that Cirrus produced a third of the WG Pu for our strategic needs. Now, given the capacity of Cirrus, it is easy to figure, how much and from where does the balance come from. The 6 PHWR's even in low burn mode (some times) will provide only X, provided it is indeed being used that way consistently. (I know what Tellis says, but my sources are Indian

) My hopes of a verifiable FMCT are next to zero and I fully expect an FMCT to be in place, based on the 2008 draft of the US. India is NOT required for it to come into effect. However, I expect India to meekly sign up to the treaty, in the interest of global disarmament. Given the unlikely scenario that we will ever test again, in most future scenarios and without the breeder used for strategic needs, we are likely to be the second lowest holder of fissile material (likely lowest being N. Korea) among all states with nuclear weapons (NWS+4), ironically the one with the most likely threat of being in a nuclear war.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 18 Dec 2009 08:44

we are likely to be the second lowest holder of fissile material (likely lowest being N. Korea) among all states with nuclear weapons (NWS+4), ironically the one with the most likely threat of being in a nuclear war.

Is India the second lowest? How much fissile material does India have according to your Indian sources in its strategic stock? I think you should also spell out who your Indian sources are? Do they have their own version of this chart? If so let us all have a look at it please?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 18 Dec 2009 09:50

ldev wrote: Is India the second lowest? How much fissile material does India have according to your Indian sources in its strategic stock? I think you should also spell out who your Indian sources are? Do they have their own version of this chart? If so let us all have a look at it please?

There are dime a dozen estimates and charts such as the above that one can find, however their credibility outside of the western block + Russian estimates are anything but credible.

Here you go on my secret source!

India had undertaken to close down, within four years, the recently renovated CIRUS reactor? This is one of the two research reactors that have been producing weapons grade plutonium (the other one is Dhruva). In fact, it has hitherto been supplying one-third of the fissile materials that we use for our weapons programme.

Rescued from the abyss

Now, do you want to challenge Arun Shourie, go right ahead! But before you do that, do the following.

Lookup Adm Raja Menon's first book on India's nuclear policies. Lookup BK's first and other books on India's nuclear policies, go through the MCD. Also, cross relate this info with the latest estimates from K. Subrahamanyam (indicating about 150 weapons needed - he upped his numbers from about 60) further cross relate with as many papers from IDSA. Triangulate all this information, and see the ranges you come up with. The best assumption is the 6 PHWR's in the military realm, are mostly for reserve or fall back military use, as they are connected to the grid, producing good old electricity. Now, add FBR to the civilian tag.

I will leave it to your good knowledge on what will India's fissile material be in the future. On TSP consider new facilities of TSP, especially the one's producing Pu since, 2005. Where will India be when capped with FMCT, with TSP not signing up to such a cap.

So, sorry, no graph!

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 18 Dec 2009 11:19

ShauryaT,

You gave a very specific ranking of second lowest to India after North Korea. So that translates into a specific amount. What is that amount of available fissile material for India according to your sources? I looked at the chart posted originally in the Deterrence thread by Shiv and it gave the number that it did. If your sources have some other specific number they should spell it out.

If they are shy about identifying themselves and the information they have is not in the public domain should you be posting inferences based on that information on BRF?

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 18 Dec 2009 11:22

Pokhran-II Revisited P.K. Iyengar

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 18 Dec 2009 11:37

Siddharth Varadarajan writing in The Hindu (18 DEc 2009). Quoting in full as all the paragraphs seem to be important, foretelling negative implications for India:

Mamata, G8 ban cast shadow on Indo-Russian nuclear deal Siddharth Varadarajan
Moscow unhappy with choice of Haripur as site for future reactors

New Delhi: Indian officials put on a brave face earlier this year when the G8 decided to ban the sale of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to countries that had not signed the NPT, insisting the resolution was not binding and that members of the rich nations club remained free to sell sensitive nuclear items to India.

But when negotiations to finalise a broad-based nuclear compact were held in Delhi earlier this month, all attempts by the Indian side to include ENR items and technology in the areas of cooperation envisaged by the new agreement drew a firm nyet from the visiting delegation. “Russia’s hands are tied because of the G8 decision,” they told the Indian negotiators.

The matter was eventually resolved by introducing permissive language on ENR in Article 6(3) of the India-Russia inter-governmental agreement, allowing for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology and facilities and components of such facilities pursuant to a subsequent agreement. The language is roughly similar to what Article 5(2) of the India-U.S. ‘123 agreement’ says except for using the imperative ‘shall be transferred’ instead of ‘may be transferred’ when referring to ENR items. {All over again, we see a resort to an essentially useless strategy of using words to mean different things to the different sides negotiating the agreement, forgetting that to be viable, agreements must have a common understanding!}

In separate interviews to The Hindu, Russian and Indian officials said the negotiations were complicated by the assurance Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Sobyanin gave National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan in Delhi early November that Moscow had no objection to including ENR within the ambit of cooperation. Mr. Sobyanin was not familiar with Russia’s policy on the matter and was unaware of the implications of the G8 commitment, Russian officials said. When the Indian side raised this assurance during the negotiations, Nikolai Spassky, deputy head of Rosatom, said the Russian Foreign Ministry insisted that ENR transfers were not possible under Moscow’s new commitments.

Though the text was frozen late on December 2, Mr. Spassky sent a fax to Delhi two days later — less than 48 hours before Prime Minister Singh was to fly to Moscow — requesting, at the instance of the Russian foreign office, that the word “shall” be changed to “may” in the sentence dealing with future ENR transfers. The Russian Ministry also had last-minute objections to the IGA’s ‘non-hindrance’ clause — which, it felt, granted legitimacy to India’s military nuclear sector. That is why there was uncertainty on the Indian side over whether the agreement would be initialled during Dr. Singh’s visit, with Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao striking a guarded tone at her departure-eve briefing. In the event, the Russian side backed off, but only after the Prime Minister raised the matter with President Dmitry Medvedev, Indian officials said.

Asked whether India might have had better luck on the ENR front with Russia had the agreement been concluded before the G8 summit at L’Aquilla this July, Russian and Indian officials said it was difficult to say. In fact, work on the IGA draft began this January. But with the Ministry of External Affairs blissfully unaware of the contents of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s November 2008 ‘clean text’ banning ENR sales to non-NPT states, New Delhi did not accord the proposed agreement the sort of priority it deserved, given persistent American attempts to restrict sensitive nuclear technology sales to India.

Russian officials said that if Delhi could not get everything it wanted out of the new agreement, Moscow too was disappointed with one aspect: the choice of Haripur in West Bengal as the site for the four additional Russian reactors India has committed to buy.

With Mamata Banerjee opposing land acquisition there, Rosatom feels poorly done by. “The best sites have been earmarked for American companies,” a Russian official said. He added that Haripur is on India’s east coast and could be vulnerable to tsunamis. According to him, when Mr. Spassky expressed a desire to visit the site earlier this year, the Department of Atomic Energy advised against it, saying it would “not be safe” because of local opposition. “As you can imagine, that did not make the Russian side feel very reassured about the choice of Haripur.”

For me, the Russians (for that matter even the French, or the Canadians etc etc) are not necessarily any better to "Deal" with than the US.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 18 Dec 2009 22:21

ShauryaT wrote:K. Subrahamanyam (indicating about 150 weapons needed - he upped his numbers from about 60) further cross relate with as many papers from IDSA

Dont know whether K.Subrahmanyam said that, but it was stated by Sundarji circa mid 90s. Even 60/70 odd figure was from him. Whichever way you cut it, it was a very old figure, on which everyone latched on. It doesnt anyway indicate the exact stockpile we have. If Indians were using unconventional material for their bomb, then every tom, dick, harry calculations go for toss.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 18 Dec 2009 22:26

SSridhar wrote:Pokhran-II Revisited P.K. Iyengar

It looks more and more like politicians issuing statements everyday on newspapers criticizing the ruling party.

If these numbers are correct, and no one has contradicted them

Usual logic followed by PKI.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 18 Dec 2009 22:29

The Santhanam and now PKI efforts will be for naught - unfortunate as they may seem to be.

What GoI had to say has been said and perhaps done.

AK's last interview was more as a citizen, certainly not as a GoI rep.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 18 Dec 2009 22:46

On other posts, I think someone has hit the "Japan Model" wall.

I hit that wall and the only thing that happened is that I went on BP medication. Now since I am off that medication I have no intention of going down that path again. So, Arun can say anything he wants (does he still have that problem?) or Indian scicom can say anything they want (eg: as long as policy remains the same, we .................), IF the "Japan Model" still holds, we have very little to go on. Very, very little.

On dynamics, we are witnessing (in the US) what a bureaucracy can do. Politicians can say and agree on anything they want, hey, but if these wheel refuse to turn, they refuse to turn.

Strategists (good and bad) come and go - jayathi, gatchathi ........... So what else is new? (I have not seen anything new form them so far.)

On "high table" please read a post made a few days ago on what the GoI plans are. Again, anyone of us can say and do whatever we want ......... GoI has a plan and they will enact that - even after making statements in Parliament.

I learned long back ........... read those tea leaves and when they change, read them again.

BUT, it is interesting to see the NEW dynamics on the world stage.

I am more hopeful today - even though it seems a LOT more chaotic. Actually chaos seems to fit Indian politicians and bureaucrats better.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Dec 2009 22:51

Can someone lookup this article?

Richard Mackenzie,"Nuclear Standoff on the Sub-Continent", AF Magazine, march 1993, Vol 76 No.3 ?

If possible I would like a scan please.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 19 Dec 2009 09:35

ldev wrote:ShauryaT,

You gave a very specific ranking of second lowest to India after North Korea. So that translates into a specific amount.

I will quote my post again, so that it is clear on what I said.

in most future scenarios and without the breeder used for strategic needs, we are likely to be the second lowest holder of fissile material (likely lowest being N. Korea) among all states with nuclear weapons (NWS+4),

I was clearly referring to a future scenario in light of various factors, elaborated in posts above - not necessarily current ones. So, please represent my arguments accurately.

What is that amount of available fissile material for India according to your sources? I looked at the chart posted originally in the Deterrence thread by Shiv and it gave the number that it did. If your sources have some other specific number they should spell it out.

The stock pile numbers are classified also I have not seen direct stock pile numbers from sources, I would believe in. However, one can gauge on what the number will be based on various readings. So, sorry, you will have to come to your own conclusions on the matter.

If they are shy about identifying themselves and the information they have is not in the public domain should you be posting inferences based on that information on BRF?

I see no harm in contemplating on information from public sources. If every two bit western analyst can, than why can we not? unless you are here at someone else's bidding to convey the message that, we should not be discussing this? If you are, then who these might be and also what right do they have to ask me to shut up? If informed citizens do not talk about national security issues, then who exactly does?

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 19 Dec 2009 13:53

ShauryaT wrote:
in most future scenarios

What scenarios are you taking about? Have you spelt out any scenarios?

However, one can gauge on what the number will be based on various readings.

Can you give one or two or three readings so the matter is clearer.

I see no harm in contemplating on information from public sources.

What public sources have you cited? Can you provide a link to any public source cited by you which shows India's current stockpile or any scenario as stated by you or the likely outcome of that scenario? At least the chart posted above is in the public domain. It clearly states that India has a total of 6.4 tons of fissile material as part of its military and strategic stockpile and gives the numbers for other countries.

If every two bit western analyst can, than why can we not? unless you are here at someone else's bidding to convey the message that, we should not be discussing this? If you are, then who these might be and also what right do they have to ask me to shut up? If informed citizens do not talk about national security issues, then who exactly does?

Comment away. But do not say that "my sources" have said so and so or "according to my sources". If your sources are so authoratative they should have hard numbers however wrong they might be and if they feel so strongly about this issue they should get those numbers published. Or they should give you those hard numbers and you should have no hestation in posting those numbers here on BRF with the names of your sources isnt it?

But to say that not in the present but at sometime in the future based on various scenarios and under various readings, India will have the second lowest amount of fissile material feels like a lot of hot air.

See based on that kind of reasoning somebody else might say that based on various other kinds of scenarios and with various other readings and with the Tarapur spent fuel stockpile run through the FBR on an exceptional basis as part of its experimental operation India will have the third largest military and strategic stockipile of fissile material in the world.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 Dec 2009 16:38

NRao wrote:The Santhanam and now PKI efforts will be for naught - unfortunate as they may seem to be.

PKI's language is much more decent than Santhanam and could therefore be accused of being weak and not forceful enough I guess. However the question I would like to ask Dr. Iyengar is:

If an 8 kiloton bomb (PKI's latest claim) tested in 1974 at 107 meters depth produced a 47 meter radius crater (Sublette - using satellite estimates) how would a 25 kiloton fission device in 1998 (Dr. Santhanam's statement) produce a 25 meter crater (as per Dr. Santhanam) at 100 meters depth ((Dr Santhanam's claim) ?

8 kt......107 meter depth...47 meter crater...1974
25 kt ...100 meter depth...25 meter crater...1998

See Sublette "What are the real yields of India's nuclear tests"
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/I ... ields.html

The Yield of Pokhran I (Smiling Buddha)
The wide shallow crater produced (reportedly it had a 47 m radius and was 10 m deep; recent high resolution commercial satellite imagery indicates a crater radius of 60 m)

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 Dec 2009 16:43

One of the claims that has been made from time to time about India is that India is sitting on a huge pile of spent fuel that India is not reprocessing to extract the Plutonium. The reason being that India is a "good boy" who is waiting for some agreement to be reached about that spent fuel. I think that spent fuel was of US origin initially and the US is not taking it back.

I wonder if anyone can corroborate this story in any way.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 19 Dec 2009 17:59

Ghost of Tarapur haunts reprocessing agreement with U.S.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 19 Dec 2009 18:05

shiv wrote:I think that spent fuel was of US origin initially and the US is not taking it back.

A memorable quote from Dennis Kux's book

"We have no authority and no plan now for the shipment of these waste products back to our own country" - President Jimmy Carter (news conference, 1976)

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 19 Dec 2009 19:34

shiv wrote:One of the claims that has been made from time to time about India is that India is sitting on a huge pile of spent fuel that India is not reprocessing to extract the Plutonium. The reason being that India is a "good boy" who is waiting for some agreement to be reached about that spent fuel. I think that spent fuel was of US origin initially and the US is not taking it back.

I wonder if anyone can corroborate this story in any way.

To begin with (or should I say 'for starters'?

), perhaps you could check out these two references:

1. Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors, IAEA publication (June 2006

).
Please see the article titled "EVOLVING POLICIES IN EXPANDING ECONOMIES" by S.K. JAIN of NPCIL (page 89 et seq). Sections 7, 8 and 9 give some insight.

2. Survey of wet and dry spent fuel storage, IAEA-TECDOC-1100. (July 1999

). Section 3.3.5 deals with India.

Quoting from Section 3.3.5.1 of this document:

The 280 tHM (2000 assemblies) Tarapur AFR(RS) facility, which was commissioned in 1991 with a 25 year design life, was provided to service the two Tarapur BWR reactors whilst the back-end policy was derived. The facility now also accommodates fuel from the Rajasthan PHWR NPP (Kota) as an interim measure whilst additional storage facilities are being provided at that plant.

I do not know whether or not the "huge pile" of spent fuel, referred to in your post, takes into account the spent fuel rods that are kept for under water cooling for periods of 5 to 10 years. Thus there would be significant number of spent fuel rods in the inventory both at Tarapur 1 & 2 [subject to the US-India 123 signed long ago for Tarapur 1&2] and in all the operational PHWRS [not subject to any international agreement except for RAPP 1&2].

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 19 Dec 2009 21:43

Anil Kakdokar's recent interview with T S Subramaniam

Question:

You have told me that “If I want, I can reprocess the spent fuel from [the existing American reactors at] Tarapur tomorrow”. Will you do that?

Kakodkar's answer:

We will do the reprocessing in accordance with our priorities. Reprocessing the spent fuel from Tarapur is not the most important priority at this moment. But what I stated was the legal position.