Intelligence & National Security Discussion

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 26 Dec 2009 12:15

The forces at the command of the MoH are insufficiently hardened to handle domestic CT, imo, with the exception of ITBP and AR.

Counter terrorism and counter insurgency ops should have only one objective- the complete eradication of the threat. It should not be treated as an ongoing goal which turns into a slow bleed for forces.

The essentials of CT/COIN:

1. Eradicate local physical threat, ie militant groups, self styled commanders, so called liberation armies etc. (A job to be handled by the CPO's, supported by intel from IB)

2. Destroy their sources of domestic and foreign funding (A job for the IB, R&AW, and MEA), through diplomatic and covert actions.

3. Eliminate foreign training and support facilities (IHQMOD)

4. Eliminate residual criminality by providing a peaceful and civilised atmosphere for the people (State govt, central govt, using special police agencies, and a special purpose public service delivery administration). Nothing signals a returned peace like a police force and administration which serves the public, instead of ruling it, land records which are clear, transparent, and establish ownership, courts which deliver timely and palpable justice, roads that are paved, schools and colleges that teach, sewage lines which work, electricity which doesnt go off, and large corporates turning up to set up shop.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 26 Dec 2009 12:31

ASPuar wrote:The forces at the command of the MoH are insufficiently hardened to handle domestic CT, imo, with the exception of ITBP and AR.

Counter terrorism and counter insurgency ops should have only one objective- the complete eradication of the threat. It should not be treated as an ongoing goal which turns into a slow bleed for forces.

The essentials of CT/COIN:

1. Eradicate local physical threat, ie militant groups, self styled commanders, so called liberation armies etc. (A job to be handled by the CPO's, supported by intel from IB)

2. Destroy their sources of domestic and foreign funding (A job for the IB, R&AW, and MEA), through diplomatic and covert actions.

3. Eliminate foreign training and support facilities (IHQMOD)

4. Eliminate residual criminality by providing a peaceful and civilised atmosphere for the people (State govt, central govt, using special police agencies, and a special purpose public service delivery administration). Nothing signals a returned peace like a police force and administration which serves the public, instead of ruling it, land records which are clear, transparent, and establish ownership, courts which deliver timely and palpable justice, roads that are paved, schools and colleges that teach, sewage lines which work, electricity which doesnt go off, and large corporates turning up to set up shop.

Completely erroneous, IMHO...CT/CI is primarily a local policing job, central forces can at best help, but the bulk of the fighting, and the burden of failure, has to be borne by the local police..CT/CI does not necessarily require uber special forces troops (barring specific situations/ops)..It is primaily driven by intel, and adequately staffed and equipped forces that can react fastest...The latter is best performed by the local thana, as is tactical intel..In these days of trannational terror netowrks, intel is where "central" agencies can contribute most, as they have multiple resources..All sucessful CI campaigns in India, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and WB against NAxals, have been police actions, where Army/Paramils have played only a peripheral role..

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 26 Dec 2009 13:58

Erroneous? I beg to differ.

The local police is not equipped, and should not be equipped IMHO, to handle ak-47 weilding, grenade throwing, land mine planting insurgents. That would lead to a fortress mentality, rather than a simple civil police force, which maintains law and order. In my opinion, the heavy duty action, and the local police work should be kept seperate, because the public is not given a sense of security by the current trend towards howling sirens, camoflage outfits, and automatic weapons that our police is employing.

For providing "strategic" sescurity, a fully armed force should be maintained, and kept out of public sight. Local police should remain that. Local police.

The armed forces played a very significant role in Punjab by the way, and I would scarcely call the Andhra and WB naxal questions closed, whether by the police or anyone else.

And if CPO's etc are not required for such ops, would you say the current massive expansion of CPOs for internal security is misguided?

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 26 Dec 2009 18:16

Maybe its going a bit OT here...

But first up for the Punjab example - KPS Gill's accounts (Knights of Falsehood, and the The Punjab Story) are quite illuminative on that...Even taking the casualty figures of the Punjab Police and the Army, as well as the number of militants killed by the police v/s the Army give some indications.

Local CI requires a local response, in terms of policemen who are from the region, have local tactical intel sources in the area, and are usually closest to the ground to react to a situation...Punjab CI was a classic case of a Jat sikh militancy being combated by a Jat Sikh police force. Of course there was strategic "air cover" in the form of RAW's covert retaliatory actions in Pak and IA's area dominance ops, but bulk of the fighting was done by the Jat Sikh force.

In WB, naxalism is a finished case, I am referring to the naxal movement of the '70s..That was combated by a Calcutta Police force led by IG Ranjit Gupta - it was a bengali middle class led uprising combated by a "petty bourgeoasie" police force. (what is happening now in WB is not naxalism, but a fight bwteen uneducated trinamool and half-educated CPM!)Whiole the AP is not a done deal yet, by the Naxal's own admission they have been almost wiped out of there, thanks to some concerted police action..

Broadly speaking, CT and CI are two dfferent challenges..The former is primarily an urban phenomenon, as the terrorist has media and public glare as his main motive..CI on the other hand, is largely a rural phenomenon (except perhaps in Kashmir), as the insurgent is looking for area domination, to reduce the writ of the state in physical area terms..The policing capabilities required in the two cases are very different..

CT is an all-in-all intel led affair..Intel is the be all and end all of it..It does not require a police force armed with AK47. A competent enough and adequately staffed force with 303s would do just as well, as the "targets" are usually small in number and not looking to engage the police directly..the trick has to be the find the terror module before it strikes..And this is where all the show of action by state govts look phony - Force1 commandos with M16 rifles are a complete waste in Mumbai..they need a bigger number of policement in the city, men who can fire their 303s and 9mm pistols if and when required..But above all, a first class intel network that only a local police force can spawn..There is absolutely no space for IA/Paramil in tactical CT ops - they will/may sometimes be required for "strategic" ops in support, but that will be in a different theatre altogether..

CI, along with the mandatory intel, has a bigger "operational" aspect to it..Better equipment is certainly one of the key factors, as is better training..But again, the moot point is that the first unit to respond will be the local thana - it is there that staffing and training needs to happen..Howsoever well trained the paramil unit, and, howsoever well equipped, the unit staffed by men from (say) TN and Bihar will never have a "feel" for the place if deployed in AP in the way a local AP police unit will..That has also been the story of the success of AP against naxals - it is not the Greyhound force, though it has been important, it is the tremendous beefing up of thana capacities that has been the key determinant.. Ajai Sahni has done some extensive research on this, and covers it in detail in the SAIR portal....Paramil/Army again here has a very limited role, in terms of area domination ops, trng etc..Look at the Veerappan case, they deployed the NSG - with no results..No fault of the NSG, the deployment was designed to fail.What worked finally was a local Karnataka/TN police force..

Local police is "local", but all tactical terror incidents are also local, and require competent local response...The number of incidents requiring Sayaret Matkal type interventions are very very small...

And yes, the increase in paramil is a very bad idea.Its a classic case of incompetent state govts not being prodded enough to perform and the Ministry of home tryign to increase its turf in the bargain...

vishal · Post by **vishal** » 26 Dec 2009 22:06

Ref. Chidambaram's IB speech in which he says ARC reports to the NSA. I thought ARC was under the RAW & therefore reported to the PM via the Cabinet Secretary.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 27 Dec 2009 04:27

somnath wrote: Local police is "local", but all tactical terror incidents are also local, and require competent local response...The number of incidents requiring Sayaret Matkal type interventions are very very small...

And yes, the increase in paramil is a very bad idea.Its a classic case of incompetent state govts not being prodded enough to perform and the Ministry of home tryign to increase its turf in the bargain...

Somnath, a well reasoned post, and I think we dont differ so much in what we are saying, except for a few points.

1. I agree that CT is a job done best by local police, with inputs from a strong intel network.

2. However, there are war-like situations prevailing in areas such as J&K, Nagaland, and even part of Andhra/Orissa/Chattisgarh, etc. These require a different sort of response.

3. IMO, expansion of Central Police Orgs is a white elephant style drain on the exchequer, designed mostly as a power grab for the MHA bureaucrats, and as a boost to the image of an ambitious Griha Mantri, that will yield little in the way of results. The net result will be the creation of a series of parallel armies, duplicating capabilities, but yielding nothing, because theyre not trained to fight an external aggressor, and not suited to fight an internal one.

4. KPS Gill also speaks of a "residual criminality" which is the aftermath of an insurgency. I will maintain that a special administrative "cleanup" unit, if you like, is required to be put into place, to make sure that all aspects of civic life are revived, rejuventated, and revitalized, and the population is made aware of what it is that can be achieved in the presence of security and stability provided by the Indian union.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 27 Dec 2009 08:06

vishal wrote:Ref. Chidambaram's IB speech in which he says ARC reports to the NSA. I thought ARC was under the RAW & therefore reported to the PM via the Cabinet Secretary.

Exactly, and he referered to the NTRO as well, reporting to the NSA now..Quite surprising..

Its a pity that an "advisory" position, working in the intersect of intel, foreign policy and defence, has been converted into a half baked intel czar one..With the usual disastrous consequences..The result is of course another ambitious person, this time the home minister, wants to beceom the intel czar!!

satya · Post by **satya** » 27 Dec 2009 13:52

PC knows the state of our local police & know its something that will take time so to fill in those gaps till local policing come on its own , NCTC will fill in the shoes of anti-terror ops as a single authority getting all terror related intel inputs & analysis & conducting ''operations'' . In doing so , NCTC will get specific anti-terror intel feeds from all other intel agencies . MAC is & will come on its own as a specialized analysis center studying trends with terrorism one of many intel trends to be taken up & providing regular analysis to NCTC. With NCTC we will have in place officially an agency that will undertake anti terror operations throughout India. Will NSG be used or from IB or some never exist on paper troops , we will never know in public sphere. Another question to be clarified in some will be about NCTC chief reporting to IB or str8 to MHA ?

This is the core content , as for State special Branch & Distt. level SBs , a medium term plan with state police reforms long term decade long to say .

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 27 Dec 2009 14:52

satya wrote:NCTC will fill in the shoes of anti-terror ops as a single authority getting all terror related intel inputs & analysis & conducting ''operations'' .

What does "operations" mean in real effective terms? So if the NCTC discovers that the next "Ghazi Baba" is hiding somewhere in Sopore, it will fly down a detachment of NSG, or whichever "undercover" force it has, and get it to scour the alleys of Sopore? Or will it pick up the phone and tell the local SP Sopore and/or the CRPF commander the available details and ask him to proceed? If its the latter, which seems more practicable, whats the difference between what the MAC is purporting to do and what NCTC is supposed to be?

IB has within its mandate the exclusive sharter for counter intel in India...Will NCTC now be getting involved in managing counter intel ops against ISI, CIA, Mossad, given that PC's proposal is to get IB to report to NCTC?

CT is but one part, albeit a very important, maybe the most important part today, of CT...But it is not the be all and end all of intel .

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 27 Dec 2009 14:56

What does "operations" mean in real effective terms? So if the NCTC discovers that the next "Ghazi Baba" is hiding somewhere in Sopore, it will fly down a detachment of NSG, or whichever "undercover" force it has, and get it to scour the alleys of Sopore? Or will it pick up the phone and tell the local SP Sopore and/or the CRPF commander the available details and ask him to proceed? If its the latter, which seems more practicable, whats the difference between what the MAC is purporting to do and what NCTC is supposed to be?

if ghazi baba is accompanied by abu hamza and abu gamchaa, 20-something, armed and lately from afghanistan, NCTC would be well advised to ask local SOG to lockdown the perimeter of the area while they fly down with NSG.

satya · Post by **satya** » 27 Dec 2009 16:00

Somnath

You are confusing & bringing other issues don't do that . And my advise please don't speculate on the type of troops that will be used , there will be directives & protocols that will be followed for such situations but never in public information space .What you r saying is mere speculating on nature & types of troops and what exactly are we suppose to gain from this ? . NCTC is the part of single most important step that GoI has taken since 26/11 starting with having a single agency for investigation ( NIA) , analysis ( MAC), operations ( NCTC) being put in place. Right step in right direction .

NCTC will have in place among its database information of local state security apparatus of area concerned & capability of this local security apparatus providing it with options as which unit to be tasked with particular operation .

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 27 Dec 2009 16:29

An unnecessary multiplicity of agencies is being created, and work is being duplicated. The eventual and predictable net result? Turf wars, and confusion, blame games, and CYA ops.

A clear directive should be given to each agency to do its work. I think the MHA is just making hay while the sun shines (it has a powerful minister), and is out to grab whatever it can. Which is why expansion seems to be so haphazard, and in whatever direction is possible. I dont think PC is thinking things through very carefully at all.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 27 Dec 2009 18:18

satya wrote:Somnath

You are confusing & bringing other issues don't do that . And my advise please don't speculate on the type of troops that will be used , there will be directives & protocols that will be followed for such situations but never in public information space .What you r saying is mere speculating on nature & types of troops and what exactly are we suppose to gain from this ? . NCTC is the part of single most important step that GoI has taken since 26/11 starting with having a single agency for investigation ( NIA) , analysis ( MAC), operations ( NCTC) being put in place. Right step in right direction .

NCTC will have in place among its database information of local state security apparatus of area concerned & capability of this local security apparatus providing it with options as which unit to be tasked with particular operation .

Satya, I am simply reacting to published info, coming from PC himself..It is he who has repeatedly referred to bringing NSG under NCTC and now talked of the "operational" role of NCTC. Unfortunately, in a country where the basic problem in the security apparatus is of staffing adequacy, creating more agencies is the worst solution of all..And most of his proposals has focused on creating new organisations or bringing existing ones under MoH.

NIA was a rank bad idea. There is an existing "central" investigations agency, CBI, that has in the past worked on terror related cases (in fact it used to, in fact still has, a "Punjab Cell", an STF - for Mumbai blast cases and so on)..It already has the staffing and a modicum of infrastructure..Instead of beefing that up, NIA is created, which is only "bleeding" officers from other stretched forces (incl CBI) and having to create its own infrastructure..And in the meanwhile also trying to carry out its mandate of "investigations"...

Back to NCTC, PC repeatedly refers to the US NCTC as the inspiration. Obviously he has learnt the wrong lessons, or at least implementing the wrong ones..The US NCTC has no "operational" mandate, it is a multi-agency analysis centre that tries to predict terror attacks from various strands of intel and then passes on the info to the relevant "operational" unit..Very similar to the MAC design here, at least whatevre is available in the public domain...

NSG is not staffed or trained for CT/CI roles, to start with there isnt enough nmumbers in there with them..As I keep reiterating, CT/CI is a very local effort at the operatinal level..Even with the new "hubs", the NSG will always be a very "foreign" force for most CT/CI scenarios, barring some very specific ones.

Rahul M wrote:if ghazi baba is accompanied by abu hamza and abu gamchaa, 20-something, armed and lately from afghanistan, NCTC would be well advised to ask local SOG to lockdown the perimeter of the area while they fly down with NSG.

Unfortuntey, the real ghazi babas dont wait holed up in a room, allow themselves to be ringfenced by the police, and then await uber quality troops to come in and inflict on them glorious martyrdom..they are usually in the dark underbellies of the city, have tactical intel of their own, and move rapidly melting into the populace..Even with "specific" intel, pinning the ghazi baba down within a small area is the most difficult task. And that can be done only by a force that is "local"...Once done, the key is to finish the operation off, not prolong it - longer it takes, lesser the chances of success..And it can be best done by a competent police force, in 999 out of 1000 cases does not need sayaret matkal type forces..Black Thunder, Bluestar, IC814, or even Taj Mahal type scenarios are few and far between.....

(BTW, there was an interesting story somehwere about the taking out of the real Ghazi Baba in Kashmir, by the police officer in charge of the operation - cant find the link now)...

The situation gets even "worse" for NSG type forces when opne talks of (primarily) rural CI scenarios, where familiarity with terrain, local tactcial intel, proficiency in the local language are key determinants of success...

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 28 Dec 2009 06:36

Stowaway booked under Passport Act

“Jaipur Police, ATS (Anti-Terrorist Squad) and SOG (Special Operation Group) of Rajasthan Police are interrogating the man and officials of Military Intelligence will also interrogate him,” the source said, adding Hussain was booked under the Passport Act.

“Investigation so far reveals that his aim was just to escape from his employer in Medina and get back home. But at the same time, this is a very serious thing which could put passengers’ lives at stake,” an official said.

sanjchopra · Post by **sanjchopra** » 28 Dec 2009 13:32

Key Dawood aide shot dead in Nepal

Ankit Desai · Post by **Ankit Desai** » 29 Dec 2009 08:16

I think this is one of the historical decision mad by UPA specially by PC. It makes police accountable. I thought that its mendatory for police to file any complain which came from but it was not the case, now, I particularly happy that decision has been taken.

Register all complaints as FIRs: Centre

The objective of the circular to the states and UTs is to ensure that even if a complaint is false, police have to investigate it after registering the FIR".

If the complaint is found to be false, police can always drop the FIR. But that should not be a deterrent in registering genuine complaints as FIR".

[Pardon me if its a wrong thread]

Ankit

kit · Post by **kit** » 29 Dec 2009 13:03

Couldn't resist posting from a slightly unsavory source but here it is

China has a growing reputation for taking every opportunity to do a little espionage on the side, especially an overseas business operation is close to a military base. For example, the U.S. government is threatening to block a Chinese firm from developing a mine in Nevada, because the operation would be too close (80 kilometers) to Fallon Naval Air Station, where experimental work is done. Earlier in the year, Australia also blocked Chinese investment in a mining operation that was near Woomera (where missiles are tested.) In Taiwan, Chinese government officials are not allowed to own real estate. While there are some national security concerns at play here, Taiwan is mainly concerned with preventing corrupt Chinese officials from hiding their loot in the form of Taiwanese commercial and residential property.
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/china/a ... 91228.aspx

A new Doppler weather radar (Chinese) near to the country's prime naval base in mumbai comes to mind ! Was the Navy sleeping ?

kit · Post by **kit** » 29 Dec 2009 13:08

On the same line if the Chinese offer to give a big discount on a new radar for traffic management (lets say 50% discount) in mumbai., would the Airport authority go for it ? If this goes on like this all that the chinese intelligence would need to do is subsidize major radar and telecom communication system inside India to get their job done , much easier don't you think than going for all that spy sats and expensive gizmo's !

Oh by the way a similar Chinese Doppler weather radar with a long range has already come up near to Thiruvananthapuram .. which incidentally is of some strategic importance !!! You guys know what i am talking about.

aditp · Post by **aditp** » 29 Dec 2009 13:34

kit wrote:On the same line if the Chinese offer to give a big discount on a new radar for traffic management (lets say 50% discount) in mumbai., would the Airport authority go for it ? If this goes on like this all that the chinese intelligence would need to do is subsidize major radar and telecom communication system inside India to get their job done , much easier don't you think than going for all that spy sats and expensive gizmo's !

Oh by the way a similar Chinese Doppler weather radar with a long range has already come up near to Thiruvananthapuram .. which incidentally is of some strategic importance !!! You guys know what i am talking about.

Oh Yes. Trust the babudom

sum · Post by **sum** » 29 Dec 2009 18:17

On the same line if the Chinese offer to give a big discount on a new radar for traffic management (lets say 50% discount) in mumbai., would the Airport authority go for it ?

400% YES unless the IB is able to get the current minister/babu to agree to their viewpoint.

kit · Post by **kit** » 29 Dec 2009 19:50

sum wrote:
On the same line if the Chinese offer to give a big discount on a new radar for traffic management (lets say 50% discount) in mumbai., would the Airport authority go for it ?
400% YES unless the IB is able to get the current minister/babu to agree to their viewpoint.

Thats very heartening to hear ! Why do we need the armed forces if the babudom are intend on screwing them with all the ineptitude and total lack of concern for everything that concerns the country or the people dedicated to protect their own lives ?! How can the system ever improve ?
This is something which i wouldn't mention normally but i think something like a common enemy is in order., through out history it is the common hatred for an enemy imagined or otherwise that has galvanized people and peoples.The erstwhile USSR and USA are good examples, the latter survived by better management of its resources and entrepreneurship of its people.

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 29 Dec 2009 22:47

Mumbai police intensifies checks after tip off

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 31 Dec 2009 12:38

On the missed signals about the Nigerian

More on the intelligence failure. The failure to share information about the would-be Christmas bomber is not the critical failure. All intelligence officers know to share threat information. It is insulting to suggest the alternative. The media coverage implies people in one or more agencies were guarding jealously the information each had collected. That misrepresents the actual nature of the intelligence failure and the way intelligence reports are disseminated throughout the 16 agencies. It is the height of cheek for some one to report that NCTC never got the report to which the President referred. Every agency gets almost every report, according to former CIA officer on public radio today.

As in all past intelligence failures, the most critical failure is cognitive, meaning a person must recognize information is important before he or she recognizes the need to share that insight. There is no technology or technique in use that would ensure that perfect, unquestioning information sharing would have generated a warning to the airline industry, unless some recipient first discerned a credible threat in it. The probabilities of that occurring were zero because holders of similar information in different agencies all discounted or ignored it.

This problem is not about sharing. It is about the quality of the thinking. Those who had the information failed to recognize that it needed to be acted on. That is a cognitive failure of threat recognition and is the critical first step in any warning system. You have to see dots before you can begin to try to connect them.

There are lots of reasons for not seeing dots, including volume of ambiguous reports, press of time and lack of analytical education about threat phenomenology, to name only a few. These are the same shop worn, albeit still accurate and relevant, explanations for every intelligence failure since the Berlin crisis of 1948. So what happened to the idea of transformation of analysis? Nothing seems to have change much, analytically.

An accurate identification of the nature of the failure is important in order to find a solution that works to correct it. After $ billions spent on intelligence, the intelligence agencies apparently continue to make the same cognitive mistakes they made in 2001 and are getting the same result. Whatever those $ billions were spent on, they did not correct the cognitive shortcomings. Taxpayers would be justified in feeling just a little short-changed.

US Strategic Warning experts produced from long experience six sequential steps in effective warning:

- Recognition that a report contains threat information

- Authentication that the report is not an exercise message or mistake

- Validation that the information has some probability of accuracy

- Communication of the information to analysts

- Assessment (Analysis/synthesis/diagnosis and prognosis)

- Communication to executive action elements

Well trained warning analysts work these steps quickly and accurately. In the Christmas bombing attempt, none were worked accurately, if any were worked at all. Most analysts today will not have ever heard of the six steps.

As mentioned yesterday, the drone attacks and other offensive clandestine operations are essential, but they clearly are not enough to keep the Republic safe. There also must be an effective intelligence warning system; something more than relying on a burly airline passenger to recognize the threat and then subdue an attacker already on the plane.

sum · Post by **sum** » 01 Jan 2010 10:23

X-post:

Anujan wrote:This is bigger than first reported:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/world ... an.html?hp

The C.I.A. operatives stationed where a suicide bombing occurred Wednesday - killing at least eight Americans - were responsible for collecting information about militant networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and plotting missions to kill the networks’ top leaders.

Seven of the victims at Forward Operating Base Chapman were C.I.A. officers, and one of the victims was the base chief

Massive, massive blow to the CIA.

Btw, do we even have a inkling of how many ( if any) RAW afsars we have lost in the line of duty?
I have so far been able to ID only a few IB men who have been martyred ( and all of them in J&K)

Sudip · Post by **Sudip** » 01 Jan 2010 11:10

Massive, massive blow to the CIA.

Dont want to go too deep into it but this ex-cia guy in this video explains how CIA is working in af-pak
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcMWGwtCzgA&feature=geo

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 02 Jan 2010 05:55

UK 'not sharing' Pak intel despite pact with India

LONDON: Notwithstanding a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries since 2004, an informed diplomatic source revealed that the British government is still reluctant to share intelligence about Pakistan with Indian officials...
The subject could also arise during national security adviser M K Narayanan's visit to London in February.
Britain generally restricts exchange of sensitive extracts to the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Regardless of much improved bilateral ties, India is not a part of this favoured group yet.

sum · Post by **sum** » 02 Jan 2010 09:48

Very obvious thing since lots of British wrongdoings will come to light and they must be having tons of double agents in Pak ( like Omar Sheikh) who would get compromised.

Karna_A · Post by **Karna_A** » 02 Jan 2010 10:03

Its only tactically a blow. In bigger picture, SeeAiA would now understand not to trust AiAsAi and its proxies which would be better to avoid bigger blows later.

Massive, massive blow to the CIA.

sum · Post by **sum** » 02 Jan 2010 10:05

Karna_A wrote:Its only tactically a blow. In bigger picture, SeeAiA would now understand not to trust AiAsAi and its proxies which would be better to avoid bigger blows later.

Massive, massive blow to the CIA.

True but 9-10 CIA men( few quite senior) lost means atleast 40-50 ( at a minimum) contacts lost which would leave a serious void in Unkils data collection in that region leading their patrols more prone to ambushes due to lack of intel.

Karna_A · Post by **Karna_A** » 02 Jan 2010 10:18

That's just a 4-6 months deficit. The real issue is SeeAiA has still to understand whom to trust and whom not to. Indians figured it out a long back. The inquiry on the deaths will find out who across the border knew, planned and benefitted from this and this would have bigger repurcussions on AiASAi and SeeAiA coordination than loss of a few contacts.

True but 9-10 CIA men( few quite senior) lost means atleast 40-50 ( at a minimum) contacts lost which would leave a serious void in Unkils data collection in that region leading their patrols more prone to ambushes due to lack of intel.

sunny y · Post by **sunny y** » 02 Jan 2010 11:52

Pak claims arrest of RAW agent from Balochistan

http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/jan/ ... histan.htm

Avinash R · Post by **Avinash R** » 02 Jan 2010 15:53

Get full-body scanners for airports, warns IB
TNN 2 January 2010, 01:34am IST
The Intelligence Bureau this week carried out a comprehensive airport security review, necessitated by the incident on the Amsterdam-Detroit flight. It conveyed to the home ministry the urgent need for body scanners as they were the only foolproof way to prevent such an incident.
...

The closest India has come to acquiring a body scanner was when the Joint Parliamentary Committee on security recommended use of the equipment for Parliament security in March 2008. An inter-departmental technical committee was formed to take the proposal forward but it got stuck in the Lok Sabha Speaker's office for over a year before, as sources revealed, the file went missing because of negligence. The same proposal was again put forward after the new Speaker, Meira Kumar, took over but it is still languishing.

Vehicle scanner, which too has never been used in the country, has also been recommended by the intelligence agency in its review. These equipment are manufactured only by a few countries like the US, UK, France and Israel and don't come cheap. A single body scanner can cost India no less than a crore.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 02 Jan 2010 16:44

Ad in todays paper for vacancies for "Research Officer" in R&AW. Theyre wanted for technical cadres though. Anyone with an engineering degree/physics degree/MCA/Bsc Comp Science can apply.

Dilbu · Post by **Dilbu** » 02 Jan 2010 17:16

True but 9-10 CIA men( few quite senior) lost means atleast 40-50 ( at a minimum) contacts lost which would leave a serious void in Unkils data collection in that region leading their patrols more prone to ambushes due to lack of intel.

More than the ambushes on patrols it will be the targeted predator strikes on keeda/talibunnies inside TSP that will get affected.

animesharma · Post by **animesharma** » 02 Jan 2010 17:51

ASPuar wrote:Ad in todays paper for vacancies for "Research Officer" in R&AW. Theyre wanted for technical cadres though. Anyone with an engineering degree/physics degree/MCA/Bsc Comp Science can apply.

Which Paper?

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 02 Jan 2010 18:11

IB recruiting tech grads and normal.

http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=294

vipins · Post by **vipins** » 02 Jan 2010 18:17

ASPuar wrote:Ad in todays paper for vacancies for "Research Officer" in R&AW. Theyre wanted for technical cadres though. Anyone with an engineering degree/physics degree/MCA/Bsc Comp Science can apply.

http://www.thesarkarinaukri.com/wp-cont ... 01/GOI.png

animesharma · Post by **animesharma** » 02 Jan 2010 18:20

Thanks!!

sum · Post by **sum** » 02 Jan 2010 22:05

The closest India has come to acquiring a body scanner was when the Joint Parliamentary Committee on security recommended use of the equipment for Parliament security in March 2008. An inter-departmental technical committee was formed to take the proposal forward but it got stuck in the Lok Sabha Speaker's office for over a year before, as sources revealed, the file went missing because of negligence. The same proposal was again put forward after the new Speaker, Meira Kumar, took over but it is still languishing

With even neta log not bothering about themselves, slim chance of this happening on a all-India scale any time soon

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 03 Jan 2010 06:32

I thought the full body scanner thing is in major metro airports in india? but were stopped because it was a bit too revealing for wimmin and men.