Indian Army: News & Discussion

[somnath]

The Army is leaking like a sieve!

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 438955.cms

One of the pitfalls of the greater media savvy is that you get the bad with the good...Regardless of the merits of the case, there are surely vested interests within the Army playing off the media against each other..

[Amit J]

Looks like a rifle grenade to me.

It didnt look like a typical RPG, any ideas on the make of it ?

[Gaur]

^^
I said rifle grenade, not rocket proppeled grenade (rpg). Again, this is what it looks like to me. Don't take my word for it. Also, no idea of the make. AFAIK, IA does not use rifle grenades any more. And I have little idea of BSF inventory, but they would most probably be using rifle grenades phased out by IA.

[ashthor]

How long/quick will it take to train our paramilitary forces like BSF, CRPF, ITBP, etc in times of need to be a full fledged infantry or make them capable of operations in the mountains.

Thanks.

[Jamal K. Malik]

No Indian land lost to China: Army Chief

[AdityaM]

No Indian land lost to China: Army Chief

^ ofcourse, its all a matter of perception

[pgbhat]

Ongoing Revision of Indian Army Doctrine ---- Col. Ali Ahmed

Rajat Pandit, attributing his information to ‘sources’, indicates that ‘The (Cold Start) plan now is to launch self-contained and highly-mobile `battle groups', with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours.’ He states that this is in keeping with the lesson of Operation Parakram and is to undercut any delay that would enable Pakistan to shore up its defences and outside powers to intervene diplomatically. The launch from a standing start is operationally useful in that it would be against limited opposition and would facilitate more options for the subsequent deep-battle. Strategically, it has the advantage of heightening conventional deterrence directed at influencing Pakistani proxy war.

However, it is politically problematic in that it restricts the time window of examining non-military options. In the event of a grave provocation for instance in the form of another 26/11, pressures to proceed on militarily sensible timetables arise. The resulting situation would be reminiscent of the The Guns of August. While preparedness to furnish the political head with options in the circumstance is the Army’s prerogative, care needs to be taken against being stampeded. Second, though the Cold Start strategy is reportedly cognizant of the nuclear overhang, a second opinion is necessary. This is not to second guess the Army, but since the judgment is at the interface between the conventional and nuclear planes, it is one best taken jointly between military and civilian principals.

Part I under revision is sketchy on limitation in conflict. Having a section on limitation has the advantage of placing the Army on one page and informing the nation how the Army intends engaging with the nuclear overhang. Communication being useful for deterrence, knowledge of this with the enemy also helps in staying any itchy nuclear fingers. The current doctrine has rightly accepted that ‘victory’ can be ‘defined in other terms such as reconciliation, stabilisation (acceptance of the status quo) or acceptance of an agreed peace plan.’ The nuclear backdrop implies that military action supplement diplomacy, and not the other way round, though both are instruments towards the same political ends.

The Army therefore needs to build in suitable ‘exit points’ in the unfolding of its operation, such as prior to launch of pivot corps offensive resources, prior to launch of strike corps, prior to break out of enemy operational depth and prior to developing a threat to terminal objectives. These would act as cues to maximising diplomatic pressures on the enemy leadership to concede legitimate and reasonable aims. In this conceptualisation, the military threat of incremental coercion brings Schelling’s concept of deterrence i.e. ‘the threat that leaves something to chance’, into the equation. The onus for things getting out of hand, resting with the enemy, serves to deter. That there would be no pauses at these junctures entails getting national political resources in concert. This necessitates explicit inclusion in doctrine after due consultations.

This brings one to the issue of doctrinal formulation and promulgation in India. The absence of a Chief of Defence Staff leads to each service formulating and promulgating respective doctrine on its own. While admittedly this would be after due formal and informal networking with other services, yet organisational theory informs that this cannot be without the contaminating element of inter-service rivalry. The Joint Doctrine released earlier can serve to inform fresh doctrinal reflection, but not much more. The Ministry of Defence, which in the view of critics is by default exercising de-facto CDS functions, cannot be expected to adjudicate. Any faultlines that arise will then await the harsh test of conflict before being dispensed with. This is self-evidently untenable and requires attention at the political level.

Understandably, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit has said that the Army’s deliberations “betray a hostile intent as well as a hegemonic and jingoistic mindset which is quite out of step with the realities of our time." It appears that even the routine exercise, announced well prior, of doctrinal review has deterrence value. It remains to be seen how the final document addresses what Bernard Brodie described as the principle challenge for militaries of the nuclear age – that of deterrence rather than war fighting.

[Amit J]

How long/quick will it take to train our paramilitary forces like BSF, CRPF, ITBP, etc in times of need to be a full fledged infantry or make them capable of operations in the mountains.

Thanks.

The BSF and ITBP already operate on some of the highest altiudes where armed forces are deployed, the CRPF on the other hand am not sure about. As far as acting like a regular infantry unit against a regular army unit of a country, am sure they are capable of that but that is not their mandate. The CRPF is more of internal security and the BSF and ITBP for Border policing

[sumshyam]

RFP For Mi-17 Avionics Upgrade This Month !!

The 100 million dollar upgrade would primarily be a cockpit upgrade in the almost two-decade old choppers, where state of the art LCD screen, touch screen and other features would be installed in the cockpit, so as to reduce attention of the pilot from the cockpit.

[Singha]

imo this CDS thing is not a panacea to the 'jointness problem' no more than a marriage counselor can suddenly take a boy and a girl from a college class and make them want to marry immediately.

the desire has to come up from within all the services and be a bottom up process of integrating their diverse communication links and ways of working.

the A&N is already a tri service cmd. they should set up a bi-service NE command and another
tri-service+CG+BSF command for Gujarat imo.

[sum]

'80 pc army tanks are night blind. It's a concern'

Admitting that about 80 per cent of India's [ Images ] battle tanks were 'night blind', Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor has said that the process to provide night vision capabilities to the tanks for warfare after dark was in progress.

"Yes, you are right. One of the major area of my concerns is to remove the night blindness of the tanks so that we are able to effectively fight in the night as we are able to do in the day," Kapoor told media persons in New Delhi [ Images ] on Thursday.

"There are projects already in the pipeline for ensuring the kind of night vision capability that some of our adversaries have. It takes at least three to four years and some of the projects are likely to fructify in the next year or so," he added.

Pakistan reportedly has a fleet of tanks of which 80 per cent have night vision devices and China's whole tank fleet has the capability.

On the delays in the artillery modernisation, Kapoor said it was also a matter of concern, as the army wanted better guns.

"Keeping that in mind, the trials for the towed guns are scheduled in February," he said.

Referring to the ban on a Singapore-based company owing to its name figuring in a CBI probe against former Ordnance Factory Board Chief Sudipto Ghosh, Kapoor said the Defence Ministry had recently decided to allow the trails, pending a decision on awarding of the contract till the case in the court was over.

Kapoor said the army was looking at procuring additional guns from other countries through the foreign military sales route.

"It does not matter under what route the guns come by, but it is important for a professional army to ensure that it has the requisite equipment to meet the requirements of the nation," he added.

Kapoor also said there was a need for modernising the army's air defence arm and that it needed tremendous amount of push, which had been done.
"Both air defence guns and missiles are in the pipeline and some of them will fructify soon," he added.

The IA armour and artillery seems to be in a fCked state right now.

Illuminating comment for this article:

Night Blindness of 80% Indian Army Tanks.
by Arnab Bhattacharya on Jan 15, 2010 11:15 AM | Hide replies

Friends,
The truth is coming out. This was the one of the very reasons why India abstain from becoming too belligerent and resorted to that erstwhile policy of tolerance and self-restrain in the post 26/11/2008 period. There are many other lacunae as well.This is where we have been led into by our leaders whom we elect to lead our country.

[jimmy_moh]

http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/jan/ ... oncern.htm

what the hell ..........

i hope IAF anf Navy dont have night blindness

[parshuram]

excuse me but where did figure of 80% come out i mean did general actually said that his 80% of tanks can't fight in night. This is ridiculous more of jingo .. A DDM alert perhaps as hilarious point is that Pakistan has exactly 80% tanks that can fight in night ...

Get some life people [journos of course ]

[tejas]

The question is can India's T-72s fight at night because they still make up most of India's tank fleet. While the jingos here dream of conquering Tibet, we have obsolete tanks and are nearly naked in terms of artillery. The OFBs are simply job factories for selfish unions not arsenals for the nation.

The amount and scope of arms imports is astonishing. No country can be truly independent under these circumstances. I sometimes wish Russia would stop selling India weapons. Just as oil/trade subsidies vanishing in 1991 forced India's incompetent "leaders" into common sense "reforms" the rest of the planet had implemented decades/centuries earlier, if we were left to be abused by the west only, the import problem would simply have to be solved ( privatize defense production).

[manjgu]

tejas, the best post of 2010.. well said.

[ramana]

Maybe the babus dont fund night vision equipment due to their Indic values of not fighting at night?

[Sanjay]

This scares me - please calm down. No Indian tanks are not "night-blind". Even the Vijayantas and T-55s have either IR or Xenon night-fighting equipment or II night sights.

The bulk of the T-72 fleet has II night sights with more than 300 - possibly 700 - having TISAS.

The T-90s have TI sights and a contract for large numbers of TISAS and fully integrated TI sights is being dealt with but held up over tech transfer issues.

[sumshyam]

India To Pull Thousands of Troops From Kashmir

Posting in full..!

NEW DELHI - India has decided to remove several thousand troops from the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir, which for two decades has been the scene of low-intensity battle between the Army and terrorists crossing the border from Pakistan.

Refusing to give a specific number, a senior Indian Defence Ministry official said a "large number" of troops will be withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir in phases.

An estimated 350,000 Indian troops are stationed in Jammu and Kashmir, along with 200,000 paramilitary forces.

The troop reduction will begin this month, the Defence Ministry official said, adding that the paramilitary forces there will take over from the troops.

Sources in the Indian Army said troops stationed along the Pakistan border in Jammu and Kashmir are as vigilant as ever despite the planned withdrawal.

The Indian troop pullout from Jammu and Kashmir coincides with media reports here that China has taken over some Indian territory along the disputed Line of Actual Control that serves as a border between the two countries.

Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony said in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, that there has been no change in the India-China border.

[RayC]

Most probably the dual tasked formations will return to their permanent location.

[aditp]

This scares me - please calm down. No Indian tanks are not "night-blind". Even the Vijayantas and T-55s have either IR or Xenon night-fighting equipment or II night sights.

The bulk of the T-72 fleet has II night sights with more than 300 - possibly 700 - having TISAS.

The T-90s have TI sights and a contract for large numbers of TISAS and fully integrated TI sights is being dealt with but held up over tech transfer issues.

The IR nightfighting equipment you are talking about is an active searchlight that will immediately give away your position to the enemy. It is just like fighter pilots keeping their radars in standby until they enter target is within range of their own missiles, when they go active. TI on the other hand is a passive device and doesnt reveal your own position to the enemy. This is what the chief is refering to.

[ASPuar]

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/our-h ... s/567998/0

Our Harmed Forces

Shekhar Gupta
Indian Express

Over the past two weeks I have had to field several calls from Pakistani TV channels seeking a comment on what they see as “provocative” statements made by the army chief, General Deepak Kapoor. I give them all one short answer: this is an Indian general thinking aloud, expressing personal views at a semi-academic discussion. The problem is, you are responding as Pakistanis listening to a general. You forget that he is an Indian general, not Pakistani.

The implication is, in one fundamental sense we do not take our generals as seriously as the Pakistanis do because, howsoever radical their views, we know that they do not control larger strategic policy. But, in another fundamental sense, while we do not at all fear our generals, we respect and love them more — and that is also partly because we have no concerns over their indulging in extra-constitutional adventurism or mischief, ever. That is something India and its armed forces are so proud of. And that is why the current spectacle of the army chief answering a hall full of sceptical journalists’ questions not so much about soldiering or strategy as about sleaze and scandal is so unfortunate. In fact it is doubly unfortunate that it had to happen in his Army Day-eve press conference, and India woke up to headlines of a land ‘scam’ at the top in the army just when it was displaying its best in ceremonial parades around the country.

I know too little about the so-called land scam in Sukna cantonment (near 33 Corps HQ) in Siliguri to have a view on it. But what I can say without any hesitation is that our system’s — the army and political leadership’s — inability to come clear on this early enough has caused enormous damage to the fair name of what still is our finest national institution.

You never want to see your military brass on the defensive, whether facing the enemy, or your own media. But that’s how they have been now for several years. Either on the defensive, or complaining, even whining. Sadly, so un-soldierlike. When was the last time you saw a general — and I use the words “army” and “general” generically, including all three forces and their commanding ranks — talk either grand strategy, modernisation, or unveil a vision for the military? You could go right back to the mid-’80s and may discover that the last time you heard such genuinely military talk was when General Sundarji took over and, by a happy coincidence we had already, in Admiral Tahiliani, a visionary chief of the navy. The air force then had many combat veterans of the 1965-71 vintage at top levels and together the three forces inducted new weapon systems, wrote new doctrines and built confidence, morale and, above all, the sense of dash, adventure and excitement that attracts the finest young people to join the forces.

In recent years, on the other hand, you have seen the top brass complaining in public about pay commission injustices — which were mostly justified complaints — or about other assorted un-soldierlike inanities or, now, land scams. Frankly, the last time I saw an Indian soldier talk like a soldier was when General Padmanabhan talked to the media at the peak of tension during Operation Parakram.

If, over these past two decades, the armed forces have begun to look — and sound — like just any other “department” of the government, the fault lies with their own leadership, the civil servants who “control” them, and mostly with the politicians who lead them. Grievances over the pay commission should never have been allowed to fester and the political leadership should not have waited till the brass — led by the then navy chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta — had begun washing that dirty linen in public. If you ask them, they will tell you they had good reason to do so, and if they hadn’t, obvious, hurtful injustices would not have been reversed. I disagreed with their method, but in substance they are mostly right.

But why did the political leadership let it drift? The last thing you want to do is distract your soldiers by open, bureaucratic-style spats, or force them to take their grievances public, like any other exploited section of our society. Nobody moved in time to comfort them, to even give them cover when ex-servicemen took the grievances public. The generals, not clever enough — and not expected to be so — to fight a war through the media, were hung out to dry by the political leadership while the bureaucracy quietly sniggered on the sidelines.

This is exactly what is happening now with the Sukna “scandal”. This is just the kind of situation where the defence minister, secretary, somebody should have taken charge and convinced the nation that its army and its defence ministry had the institutional strength, ethos and a strong enough ethical foundation to deal with the issue rather than, once again, leaving it to the chief himself. India has had a healthy tradition of keeping the institution of the chief above public controversy. Even when problems arose, these were sorted out internally, without making an ugly public spectacle, except in the Krishna Menon phase of skulduggery which lost us the 1962 war. We have forgotten that. But the larger state of our armed forces has begun to resemble 1962.

Of course, some of the more garrulous recent chiefs have not helped. But where is the political leadership? Missing in action? I am sorry if that sounds like a cheap shot. But what is one to say when this country has had such uninspiring political leadership for its armed forces for so long, starting with George Fernandes who saw himself as more a senapati by himself and Siachen Glacier as his only charge — and a permanent photo-op. Or now A.K. Antony under whose leadership the brass has got caught in ugly public situations twice already, over the pay commission and Sukna. Or, under whom almost all major acquisitions have got delayed by half to a full decade.

And these are things we need desperately, desperately: new guns for an artillery which has not ordered one since 1987, air-defence missiles without which the navy’s newest, finest capital assets are left naked to air attacks, new fighters for an air force which is down to 32 squadrons from 45. The defence minister’s, and probably even the UPA’s, primary objective is to complete yet another tenure without any arms purchase scandal. That is why the tiniest whiff of a controversy leads to cancellation of trials and even tenders. If you are as old as I am, or a pucca cricket enthusiast, you will know Bapu Nadkarni, an all-rounder who became famous setting a record with his gentle left-arm spin that will now never be broken: 29 overs, 26 maidens, and no wickets for three runs. Even when he batted, he scored at a somewhat similar pace. Perhaps in the spirit of those times for Indian cricket, he always played for a draw. Antony has now become the Bapu Nadkarni of Indian politics, and certainly so in his tenure as Raksha Mantri. It is causing a drift, jeopardising India’s military strength and, institutionally, undermining the armed forces.

Our serving generals will never question the political leadership. But deep down when they see their leaders waffle, play safe and distant, it feeds right into their soldiers’ disdain for the lazy, cowardly civilian. And then they begin to make mistakes. We still have one of the finest, most loyal, disciplined armies in the world, willing to follow its orders and, most important of all, take casualties. They deserve better leadership, both from within, and definitely from the political class.

[Sanjay]

I know what you mean and I am sure that your interpretation of the chief's comments are correct. However, the tanks aren't "night-blind" especially since over 3000 of them have image intensifiers. Probably close on 1000 will have some sort of TI sight soon.

[parshuram]

That is my point sir , if the tanks are really night blind and that too 80% and given the fact that Pakistani's have 80 % of there tanks with these capabilities it would be a cake walk for them all what they have to do is to just start the battle at night and they will be breathing down our neck by dawn next day .

[RayC]

NV devices deteriorates with use.

I presume that what the General meant was that the replacements seems to be hard to get by and hence whatever is available is not picture perfect.

[Gagan]

The Arjun does not have the remotely controlled small arms weapons station like the T-90

[Gagan]

On the T-90, this weapons station can be fired completely by the crew sitting inside the tank, no need for the crew to expose themselves to the outside environment.

[Rahul M]

http://www.stratpost.com/50-lt-cols-promoted

50% Lt Cols promoted
Saturday, January 9, 2010
By Saurabh Joshi

The Indian Army’s results for the promotion of officers to the rank of full Colonel are out. The good news is that more than fifty per cent of infantry and artillery Lieutenant Colonels from the batch of 1994 will get their red collar dogs, with the increase in the number of vacancies due to the AV Singh committee’s recommendations. 55 per cent of the artillery officers and 53 per cent of the infantry officers under scrutiny have been promoted to the rank of Colonel.

Officers from the armored and mechanized infantry have not, however, benefited much from these recommendations because of the comparatively smaller number of vacancies available at the rank of Colonel. Less than 40 per cent of the 1993-batch armored officers under consideration have been approved.

[ASPuar]

Meanwhile, in other news, 1994 batch IPS officers in TN are being promoted to IGP (purportedly equivalent to Major General). Rememeber, that 1993 batch IA officers, will have started IMA in 1991, and not been given any credit for that. 1994 batch IPS, actually only took the exam in 1994, and were inducted into service in 1995!

Even the most strident arguer will concede, that only is this not "fair", (which is subjective, and open, in the minds of some, to debate), but it defies any real sense.

[ramana]

Looks like Shekar Gupta caught on finally that the UPA govt idea is to delay and stall arms procurement as long as possible which could be related to the track pee process. I said this couple of years ago in one of the threads when they blacklisted all the arty competitors. Excellent dis-armament move. Ref to Bapu Nadkarni is not apt for he was playing for atleast a draw while the rest of the cricket team in those days was playing to lose.

[Stan_Savljevic]

Xpost: Indian Army in the coming decade: Role, Threats and Challenges ---- Maj Gen GD Bakshi (Retd)
http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=ma ... 75&u_id=88

[Rahul M]

Looks like Shekar Gupta caught on finally that the UPA govt idea is to delay and stall arms procurement as long as possible which could be related to the track pee process. I said this couple of years ago in one of the threads when they blacklisted all the arty competitors. Excellent dis-armament move. Ref to Bapu Nadkarni is not apt for he was playing for atleast a draw while the rest of the cricket team in those days was playing to lose.

ramana ji, while mouthing a few honeyed platitudes shekhar gupta continues to insinuate against the forces.

> he makes it sound as if the general was indeed beating the war drums in contravention with India's declared policy while in reality he was merely outlining the army's would be response to a very real threat perception. he further ridicules the army by saying "we don't take them seriously"
army may not drive foreign policy but it is a myopic nation indeed that ignores the very enforcers of its security policies while formulating it.

>

You never want to see your military brass on the defensive, whether facing the enemy, or your own media. But that’s how they have been now for several years. Either on the defensive, or complaining, even whining. Sadly, so un-soldierlike. When was the last time you saw a general — and I use the words “army” and “general” generically, including all three forces and their commanding ranks — talk either grand strategy, modernisation, or unveil a vision for the military? You could go right back to the mid-’80s and may discover that the last time you heard such genuinely military talk was when General Sundarji took over and, by a happy coincidence we had already, in Admiral Tahiliani, a visionary chief of the navy. The air force then had many combat veterans of the 1965-71 vintage at top levels and together the three forces inducted new weapon systems, wrote new doctrines and built confidence, morale....

for one, Gen Sundarji didn't talk of 'just' military, grand strategy includes topics beyond just the military and he was also one of the primary architects of our nuclear doctrine.

there have been a number of excellent visionary chiefs since then. the sitting ACM and his immediate predecessor have been nothing less than game changing for IAF, there has been a huge change in mindset that makes the IAF much more forward looking than ever before.
the person he calls 'garrulous' and 'not clever enough', Adm Mehta, has outlined how India's strategic outlook dovetails with its maritime doctrine and thrown these aspects in a clarity never achieved by the mandarins.

I could go on but these should be enough to expose the vile nature of this article.

[sum]

From Orbat:

#

India currently has 47 division-equivalents in its Army. Mandeep Bajwa and Editor completed a detail study over several days and have concluded that with 100% probability the Indian Army has 47-division-equivalents. This is not counting one of the two new divisions, as we don't have brigade numbers for it, or the two new divisions. On current plans it is likely India will have 51-division-equivalents by 2012 (three brigades to a division). The count excludes 5 division-equivalents of specialized counter-insurgency troops.
#

We regret we cannot share more detailed information as we do not wish to aggravate anyone in authority. Our purpose is simply to tell the world that its likely, with its 1000 infantry, mechanized, armored, parachute, special forces, field artillery, air defense artillery, CI, and engineer battalions the Indian Army is the largest in the world. Indian battalions, with the exception of armor, tend to the large: almost 900 for infantry/mechanized and near 1100 for CI battalions. So these are not 300, 400, 500, 600 man battalions.
#

Moreover, none of the battalions is reserve, nor does India have a system of differentiating combat/combat support formations by the level of equipment or readiness. PRC, once reserves are counted, likely has more divisions and battalions than does India. But the Indian forces are fully trained and equipped, ready to go now.
#

Also BTW: we have not counted 350 border forces battalions - Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Assam Rifles, and SSB. These battalions are expected to perform first-line combat duties in wartime.

[sumshyam]

Russia Again All Set to Become India’s Top Arms Supplier in 2010

As per defence sources Russia with recent defence deals with India has left behind its business arch rivals Israel and United States with Following deals:

1. India has agreed to join the $10 billion Russian project to build the Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA fifth-generation stealth fighter.
2. The supply 29 MiG-29K fighter jets of worth over $1.2 billion those would be be stationed at Admiral Gorshkov, additional to 16 MIGs that would be Admiral Gorshkov
3. Fresh approval Admiral Gorshkov’s of $2.3 billion with Supply year 1013.

Apart from above. under is the list of Indo Russian Defence deals going under supply line:

1. Six Talwar-class stealth frigates for Rs 8,514 crore. Talwar, Trishul and Tabar inducted. Deliveries of Teg, Tarkash and Trikand from 2012

2. 657 T-90S main-battle tanks for Rs 8,525 crore. Over310 already inducted. Another 1,000 T-90S tanks to be manufactured in India.

[AdityaM]

Army chief suffers hearing loss due to american weapon demo
deaf n dumb will have a lot to gloat about this

[SaiK]

how come he did not have a noise canceling ear block/head gear?

[svinayak]

Army chief suffers hearing loss due to american weapon demo
deaf n dumb will have a lot to gloat about this

But look at the bottom of the page

What's your Opinion

Deepak Kapoor

[ramana]

That article is a psy -ops form TOIlet paper.

[putnanja]

IE reporting the same now ...

Army Chief suffers partial hearing loss

Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor has fallen to a common affliction that affects artillery officers and has been declared partially deaf after he suffered damage to his ears during a firepower demonstration in the US last year. The officer, who suffers ‘moderately severe to severe mixed hearing loss’ in his left ear, has been placed in a lower medical category of ‘H2’ following a medical examination.
...
...
General Kapoor, who has a medical history and has undergone surgery on his left ear in 1972 and the right ear in 1982, suffered ‘acute deafness in the left ear’ after he attended an exercise in the US in July last year. His medical report at the Army’s Research and Referral hospital, which was conducted in November, says he was exposed to loud noise in the form of small weapons firing and gun firing during a counter terrorism demo by US soldiers.
...
...

[Surya]

seems nonsense linking it to a US demo

most gunners normally have this problem and in the past our gunners did not have ear protection

At least I have seen Bofors teams witht he protection so hopefully it is more prevalent but older gunners may suffer from years of unprotected firing

seems strange and murky

[RayC]

Most combat arms personnel have various degrees of deafness due to the loud noise of the weapons they fire.

On the lighter side, it is good. They can't hear the bad language used!