Shaping intelligence for the world of tomorrow
by Vice President Hamid Ansari
We remember Rameshwar Nath Kao today for his work and for his engaging personality. In regard to the former, I cannot help recalling a couplet by an Arab poet of the 10th century:
These are our works, these works our souls display/Behold our works when we have passed away.
Ramjee Kao created an organisation, negotiated rather than confronted inter-agency contentions and achieved a historic success. He could also be indulgent to a fault. Those who worked closely with him have described Kao as a complex mix of objectivity and subjectivity in matters concerning human relationships. A peer in a position to assess from a distance described him as a fascinating mix of physical and mental elegance, and one who was shy to talk about his accomplishments.
Kao’s business in life was intelligence, more specifically external intelligence. Its relevance is in no need of commentary. We can go as far back as Kautilya, or even earlier, to perceive its importance.
In fact, the methodological sophistication exhibited in Kautilya’s chapters on the secret service and internal security can be read with benefit even today. The same holds good for Sun Tzu’s chapter on secret agents. He highlights the relevance of ‘foreknowledge’ and concludes with the interesting observation that ‘there is no place where espionage is not used.’ Over centuries the ambit of intelligence, and the craft itself, expanded and enriched itself in response to requirements. Techniques were refined and technology opened up qualitatively different vistas.
{So he knows a bit of history}
In the 20th century individual agents on specific assignments gave way to regular agencies. Fascination with the unknown also brought forth a vast amount of literary output that combined fact and fiction, working powerfully on public imagination and even lending respectability to questionable acts.
There is merit in C.P. Snow’s observation that “the euphoria of secrecy does go to the head.” 
A particularly serious problem relates to the misuse of intelligence. The
classic instance in recent times is the process leading to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The July 2004 Report of the US Senate Select Committee on Pre-War Intelligence Assessment of Iraq revealed that “group think dynamics” led the intelligence community to interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusive and ignore in the process established mechanisms to challenge assumptions and group think.
Closer to the mark was the secret Downing Street memo of July 23, 2002 in which the head of British intelligence reported after discussions in Washington that “intelligence and facts were being fixed around policy” of regime change. The Iraq inquiry now in progress in London is shedding more light on this.
{How are these two rlevant to Indian experience? Why doesnt he quote from KRC or Henderson-Brooks or other Indian relevant reports?}
It is hardly necessary to remind an Indian audience that ministerial responsibility to the legislature, and eventually to the electorate, is an essential element of democratic governance to which we are committed by the Constitution. The methodology of this is in place for most aspects of governmental activity; the exceptions to it pertain to the intelligence and security structure of the state.
{Not true. The Indian agencies report to the Executive. They are staffed by officials who serve at the pleasure of the President of India.}
How then is oversight and accountability ensured?
The traditional answer and prevailing practice, of oversight by the concerned minister and Prime Minister and general accountability of the latter to parliament, was accepted as adequate in an earlier period but is now considered amorphous and does not meet the requirements of good governance in an open society.
Concerns in the matter have primarily arisen on two counts: (a) the nature and extent of supervision over intelligence services exercised by the political executive and (b) the possibility and scope of misuse of these services by the political executive. Both concerns emanate from the absence of specific accountability, on these matters, to the legislature.
{This worthy is part of the govt and wants to dismantle the agencies of the govt!}
The problem is not a new one and has been faced by other democratic societies. In the late 1970s opinion in the United States reached the conclusion that “oversight of the intelligence community is essential because of the critical importance of ensuring the nation’s security, as well as checking the potential for abuse of power.”
As a result, two congressional committees were established in 1976 and 1977. Despite this, the 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 found the congressional oversight of intelligence “dysfunctional” and recommended structural changes.
A similar exercise was conducted in the United Kingdom through the Intelligence Services Act 1994 that established the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the intelligence services.
Other countries like Canada, Australia, South Africa, Norway, Germany, Argentina, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania have also put in place similar mechanisms of public accountability.
{All those countries have direct instances of misuse of agencies.
Hence the oversight. In India the Executive which can misuse is directly accountable to the Parliament.}
It has been argued that the scope of the mandate of the parliamentary intelligence oversight committee is crucial for its success. Three models of the mandate can be identified: (a) comprehensive to include both policy and operations, as in the US and Germany (b) limited to matters of policy and finance, as in the UK (c) focused on human rights and rule of law, as in Norway.
The basic purpose of all three is to ensure that government policy in a given field is carried out effectively within the boundaries of the law. For this reason, it is felt that without access to some operational detail, an oversight body can have or give no assurance about the efficacy or the legality of the intelligence services.
Given these models of calibrated openness to ensure oversight and accountability, there is no reason why a democratic system like ours should not have a standing committee of Parliament on intelligence that could function at least on the pattern of other Standing Committees.
Since internal and external intelligence do not in our system report to the same minister, the possibility of entrusting this work to the Standing Committee on Home Affairs may not meet the requirement.
The shortcomings of the traditional argument, of leaving intelligence to the oversight of the executive, became evident in the Report of the Kargil Review Committee and its sections on intelligence in its findings and recommendations. It identified flaws, acknowledged the absence of coordination and of “checks and balances”, and noted the absence of governmental correctives. The report referred to relevant systems in major countries but did not include in it their systems of oversight and accountability.
{These are all in the purvey of Executive branch. Why does the legistalive branch want to inject itself into the process. What does the Constituion have to say on separation of powers?}
Some correctives were introduced pursuant to the establishment of the National Security System and the report of the Group of Ministers on the reform of the national security system in its entirety. These improvements enhanced internal accountability and coordination but did not go far enough and did not put in place a more open system of public accountability.
In the discussions that followed the publication of the Kargil Review Committee Report, and apart from inter-agency spats and the blame game, one informed commentator described it as a “substantive contribution in educating our Parliament and public opinion” aimed at “introducing transparency in this sensitive sector.”
Arguments of this nature tend to be condescending. They ignore the time-honoured formula which is the bedrock of democracy: that “instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action.” They belittle the capacity of elected representatives to be responsible in matters of national security. Also overlooked is the fact that depending on the fall of the electoral dice, these same representatives are transformed into the political executive entrusted with the responsibility of supervising the work of intelligence agencies.
The contention that openness and public discussion would compromise the secrecy essential for intelligence needs to be examined carefully. Operational secrecy is one aspect of the matter and has to be maintained.
The legislature, nevertheless, is the organ of the state that allocates funds and is therefore entitled to insist on financial and performance accountability. The practice of subsuming allocations is not conducive to transparency; it may even encourage misuse.
The proposed standing committee could fill this void; it could also function as a surrogate for public opinion and thus facilitate wider acceptance of the imperatives of a situation.
Given the nature of emerging threats to human security, a wider sampling of opinion would in fact facilitate better comprehension of the issues and of possible remedies to attain total national power and comprehensive defence.
{WoW. Now its human security and not just national security!}
Let me conclude by saying that in a fast changing world, the challenges facing intelligence practitioners are enormous. Can they adapt their organisations, policies and practices to a world in which there is a qualitative change in the notion of security and in the nature of threats?
Both compel a paradigm shift in procedures and objectives; so does the imperative of accountability in terms of democratic norms of good governance. Each of these needs to be factored into the work patterns of the intelligence operative of tomorrow. A timely synthesis would pave the way for success.
Excerpted from the Fourth R.N. Kao Memorial Lecture delivered in New Delhi on January 19
