You're calculating using Marine Corp supplies during an island-hopping campaign in the tropics. The PLA, a traditional army, going over snow-covered, rugged terrain at altitude--just the amount of heating fuel to be carried will increase the load by 100% "per soldier." Then, you fail to take into account supplies for artillery, mechanized, armored forces, including fuel and support logistics required for DBC-ish combined action. If i pulled another number out of my ear, I would say your estimate is a good 300-400% off.rohitvats wrote:Assume a war scenario:20days intense conflict;2 PLA Group Armies@45,000 men each=90,000 men+support troops=150,000 men (AP Front). Logistics required@30kgs/soldier=150K*30*20 = 90,000tonnes. Now, the Tibet rail is expected to carry 2.1million tons freight in 2010. Using only this service, the PLA can stock for this war in a 2months times (actually lesser, I've assumed lesser tempo)
Thanks for the deeply patronizing definition. All that is saying is they break through the lines, and use fresh reserves to take advantage of breaches to undermine the enemy ranks beyond. Everyone before and after Attila the Hun used that, usually with light skirmishers. It's not exactly innovative, unless you have a pl specific to your adversary's forces and geographical location. Their WZC relies on specialized groups breaking through the Indian front. Great. That's what we've been dealing with in Kashmir for god only knows how long. We're raising additional mountain divisions for precisely this kind of thing, and transferring expertise from Kashmir as we partially demilitarize that theater.rohitvats wrote:It says and I qoute:"Deep battle envisaged the breaking of the enemy forward defences, or tactical zones, for fresh uncommitted mobile operational reserves to exploit by breaking into the strategic depth of an enemy front. The goal of any deep operational was to inflict a decisive strategic defeat on the enemy and render the defence of their front more difficult or impossible". I can live this as a aim of a strategy
The current Indian plans for re-militarization, intel efforts and infrastructure development along the border should quite sufficiently discourage the Chinese from pursuing the old-school WZC mode, as this relies massively on surprise and Indian unpreparedness. In fact, repelling the initial low-level attacks would be enough make the Chinese revert to default mode: massed attacks, which are difficult to sustain in the Himalayas and the Tibetan plateau.
PS: My sources on Chinese strategy are mostly on JSTOR and journals with subscription access. Of course, one really doesn't even need those--the Chinese base their theoretical thinking on Sun Tzu almost word for word. Alas for them, their preparations are quite out of tune with The Art of War, because they discount the strength of experience on our side. It's too bad we've dispensed with the chapters of the Arthashastra relating to war in our own strategic studies syllabi.