Pakistan arms sales, ops, doctrine, etc

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Feb 2010 10:31

rohitvats wrote:
durgesh wrote:A challenging doctrine

.....<SNIP>.....

In a war limited by time, mobility is the single-most important factor which if used to its full potential will help attain the political aim in the desired time and space framework. But this requires a perfect matching of the physical means of mobility with the mobility of the mind, as the value of a highly mobile force can be reduced to zero by commanders whose minds are characterised by lack of imagination, initiative and flexibility. “Adherence to dogmas has destroyed more armies and lost more battles and lives than any other cause in war. No man of fixed opinions can make a good general.” (J.F.C. Fuller)
.....Given this, while Cold Start is a sound concept, though not original, the Indian war directors need to question the ability of their commanders at all levels to execute it efficiently and sustain the advantage gained from striking first. ..............<SNIP>

To counter Cold Start, the Pakistan Army will have to create more armour-dominated brigade-sized reserves from the existing resources if possible, and a more flexible military system and structure.......<SNIP>
durgesh, thank you for the article. Some plain and simple speaking (apart from the nuclear sabre rattling)from ex-PA officer. Not the usual bombastic nonsense.

As for the capability of Indian commanders in terms of maneuver warfare, to use the 1965 and 1971 analogy is gross stupid. He had enough example from history closer in timeline. The orientation of all the 3 Armored Divisions in Southern Punjab-Central & Northern Rajasthan in 2002 which was so bold a move that it led to mass scale browning of pants in PA (what do you think made mushyrat to come on TV and talk bhaichara) to the spate of excercises that IA has conducted over last so many years now.Even as we speak, IA strike formations are sitting in desert on 3 month long excerciseto validate their concepts.

The bolded part confirms the conclusion that I had drawn from reading on the net. That PA is raising Corps Reserve formations centered around armored brigades to counter the CS. V Corps and XXXI Corps already have their Corps Reserve up and running which btw are akin to PA Armored Divisions.Though, wether PA has been able to kit these formations with all the necessary stuff is anyones guess. More on it later.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 09 Feb 2010 12:25

ramana,

Thank you cross posting the post.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 10 Feb 2010 00:43

What will be the paki response on recent developments in Indian defence, that is they seem unable to compete in conventional capabilities ,both quality and quantity wise.
Therefore their first response would be to strengthen their nuclear assets, but what else they would be planning ??

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 10 Feb 2010 03:03

Their first priority would be to stall the CSD forces. So see them acquire and field formations to that effect.

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 10 Feb 2010 07:01

x-posting from TIRP
ISI chief, four commanders retiring this year

ISLAMABAD: The top brass of Pakistan Army is all set to undergo a reshaping process with the retirement of at least 12 three-star generals, including four corps commanders, during the ongoing calendar year, warranting promotion of major generals and the necessary reshuffle.

Three of the lieutenant generals, including incumbent Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt-Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, are scheduled to retire next month. However, according to informed sources, Lt-Gen Pasha in all probability will get an extension ‘in the interest of continuity’.

A senior security official told Dawn that the army chief did not need to send a summary for extension in the tenure of a three-star general. He cited the example of Lt-Gen Masood Aslam, Corps Commander for Peshawar, who was to retire last year but was given an extension by the army chief.

The other extensions in the recent history of Pakistan Army were of Lt-Gen Hamid Javed, chief of staff to former president Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf, and the chief of Strategic Plans Division, Lt-Gen Khalid Kidwai.

The incumbent ISI chief will reach the age of superannuation on March 18. Others who are due to retire next month include Lt-Gen Tanvir Tahir, Inspector General of Communications and Information Technology, General Headquarters (GHQ); and Lt-Gen Mohammad Ashraf Saleem, Commander of Air Defence, Pakistan Army.

Lt-Gen Ahsan Azhar Hayat, currently serving as Inspector General of Training and Evaluation at the GHQ, will retire in the middle of March.

Another four lieutenant generals, including two corps commanders, will be retiring in May. They are Corps Commander for Lahore Lt-Gen Ijaz Ahmad Bakshi, Corps Commander for Mangla and Chairman of the Special Support Group, Lt-Gen Nadeem Ahmed, former Corps Commander for Mangla and incumbent Deputy Chairman Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (Erra) Lt-Gen Sajjad Akram, and Lt-Gen Sikandar Afzal, force commander for the United Nations mission in Liberia last year.

Others who are scheduled to retire during the current year are Lt-Gen Masood Aslam, Corps Commander for Peshawar, who is already on extension, Lt-Gen Shahid Iqbal, Corps Commander for Karachi, Lt-Gen Zahid Hussain, Quarter Master General (QMG), and Lt-Gen Mohammad Asghar, Rector of National University of Science and Technology (NUST).

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 10 Feb 2010 17:56

ramana wrote:Their first priority would be to stall the CSD forces. So see them acquire and field formations to that effect.

Agree that this could be their first priority , but my analysis and some past references suggest that paki doctrine was indeed closer to CSD concept than India .
They were able to mobilize faster in 1987,2001 ,.
They were always under doctrine to attack first ,as evident from previous wars ,and therefore would be closer to adapt to CSD themselves. And from above mentioned article

The probable objective areas for Cold Start could be (1) Ravi-Chenab corridor from two directions, an IBG along Jammu-Sialkot-Daska axis and another across the Ravi to link up with the first IBG, and (2) in the south against Reti-Rahim Yar Khan-Kashmore complex. To counter Cold Start, the Pakistan Army will have to create more armour-dominated brigade-sized reserves from the existing resources if possible, and a more flexible military system and structure.

i guess they are better prepared to handle this kind of war than what was formulated by Gen. Sunderji
my question is
what if they do a faster CS on us ?? For that we know their armour-supported infantry is better prepared ,not by quantities but by preparation,. //
Just looking for some wisdom

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 10 Feb 2010 18:42

That’s an interesting question. Being a smaller army gives PA the benefit of cohesiveness.

1. In case PA pulls a fast one on us, and launches multiple brigade sized thrusts, which are the units that will absorb the thrust? I don’t think its practical for an IBG to stand aside and let a holding corps absorb that thrust.
2. Will an IBG retain its strike capabilities, if it is forced into defensive action?
3. Is the command mechanism robust enough to transfer units from holding corps to IBG, in the event IBG component units do not retain offensive capabilities? Or even better, reverse roles?
4. What is the role of the earlier holding corps concept in the new cold start doctrine? I believe the older concept was strike corps moves into enemy territory and holding corps takes its place.

A Sharma · Post by **A Sharma** » 10 Feb 2010 18:44

Two military men killed in Tirah copter crash

Updated at: 1425 PST, Wednesday, February 10, 2010
PESHAWAR: Pakistani army officials said one of their helicopter gunships has crashed near the Afghan border and two people are dead.

Pakistani army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas says the Cobra helicopter went down Wednesday in the Teera Valley in Pakistan's Khyber tribal area.

Another army official said the helicopter's pilot and gunner lost their lives in the incident. He said the crash appeared to have been caused by either bad weather or a mechanical failure.

The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 10 Feb 2010 19:51

Agree that this could be their first priority , but my analysis and some past references suggest that paki doctrine was indeed closer to CSD concept than India .They were able to mobilize faster in 1987,2001.They were always under doctrine to attack first ,as evident from previous wars ,and therefore would be closer to adapt to CSD themselves.

Quick mobilization of resources on part of IA is only one component of CSD. Another, and equally important component is to be able to initiate assault and sieze initiative in the first 72-96 hours window. And this complicates the situation for the PA.

What you're refering to wrt the PA is only one component - quick mobilization.But here again, the holding corps of PA used to reach their jump off points quickly.The main strike elements of PA - I Corps (Army Reserve North) and II Corps (Army Reserve South) with 6th and 1st Armored Division would mobilize but remain uncommitted.They would have been moved only in case of committment of Indian Strike Corps.

Now, this is where the IBG are likely to become game changer. But for starters, IMO these will be with the holding corps+strike corps (but deployed forward).So, here we have a armored heavy formation (8 planned), close to the IB and ready to attack at short notice. My gut feeling is that an IBG will be between an armored division and a RAPID.

Let us take an example: X Corps has 2 RAPIDs (18 and 24)+16 Infantry Division+6 Independent Armored Brigade (6 IAB). Now, assuming 24th matures into an IBG (lets call it 24 IBG) and other two stay as such. In case of hostilities, X Corps can attack on a major axis with 24 IBG. It will also have option to launch 18 RAPID+6 IAB combine on another axis with 16 ID as reserve and guarding the one of the flanks. And the I Strike Corps, which is usually found in the Souther Punjab-Northern Rajasthan Sector, has not even entered the equation. Earlier, it would have been 1 Strike Corps launching the offensive with X Corps as support element.

Now what does PA do? Earlier, before the outbreak of hostilities, PA XXXI Corps (opposite IA X Corps) would have mobilized to its defensive formations and while IA X Corps would have done the same, it used to have limited offensive capability. We would wait for I Corps to reach its jump off position (with enemy in its defensive position). And once the I Corps (and other Strike Corps) gets going, PA would commit its strike formations.

In case of CSD, not only will PA XXXI Corps have to reach the defensive line quickly but be ready to face the offensive from X Corps. And in case of any IBG achieving good gains, PA will have to commit the ARN/ARS. And the Indian Strike elements have yet to enter the picture. IA Strike Corps can build on the initial gains of IBGs and convert the same into major break through.

To counter Cold Start, the Pakistan Army will have to create more armour-dominated brigade-sized reserves from the existing resources if possible, and a more flexible military system and structure.
i guess they are better prepared to handle this kind of war than what was formulated by Gen. Sunderji my question is what if they do a faster CS on us ?? For that we know their armour-supported infantry is better prepared ,not by quantities but by preparation. Just looking for some wisdom

As I explained earlier, CSD is not only about the mobilization but also includes dominating the enemy in 72-96 hours window. And as for the steps taken by PA, this is what I posted somewhere else:

PA has established Corps Reserves in two of its Holding Corps. These are 25th Mechanized Division with V Corps-Karachi and 26th Corps with XXXI Corps-Bahawalpur.These are the Armored Divisions in all but name and have been created so that PA does not need to draw its Strike Formations(Army Reserve North/Army Reserve South) to counter the thrusts of IBG.Also, they don't want the planned IBGs to gain an upper hand in first 72-96 hours of hostilities, which these formations are likely to do given their planned structure, and take away the 'favorable stalemate' plank of PA.The Corps Reserves in PA (they are amalgamation of existing assets-more so in case of V Corps) have been raised due to what happened in Op Parakaram and CSD.

Counter CSD by PA is interesting point. I need to think on those lines for some time.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 10 Feb 2010 20:01

these new formations have been raised from older units or new build al-khalid tanks? I think al-khalid is the only new series of tanks they have acquired post-kargil?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 10 Feb 2010 23:09

Singha wrote:these new formations have been raised from older units or new build al-khalid tanks? I think al-khalid is the only new series of tanks they have acquired post-kargil?

Trust an old hand to jump straight to brasstacks......

I'm in the process of putting together a paper on PA Armored capability but it is some time away....but off the cuff we can see the dilemma faced by PA. PA always has tried to maintain parity with IA in terms of number of formations...but ours tend to be more heavy....example: Indian Armored Division has 6 Armored Regiments while PA Armored Division has 5....

Ideally when new types are inducted, you'd expect them to replace the older system....but it is not so in case of PA...older systems are retained and upgraded (you've to hand it to them that they are quite good at it....ROSE program..T-59 upgrade etc.)..given the fact that PA survives on handouts...this is always the case...

The Al-khalid and T-80UD represent their best armor with ~300 (this is educated guess) and 320 numbers respectively...assuming PA Armored Regiments have same tanks as India--45+10(reserve)..it gives them ~5 Regiments each of each type...that is 10 Regiments in all......so the dilemma facing PA commander is how to distribute the assets?If he concentrates all these assets in two prime armored divisions (1st and 6th), others will be left with upgraded but legacy systems......if he selectively allots these units to other formations in additom to armored divisions, then you're 'mailed fist' isn't that strong a fist anymore....or he may cut down on the war wastage reserve and inflate the number of units with these new toys and spread them around...but then, as usual, the staying power of PA goes down that much faster and you'll hear the 'nucleeeeeaaaaaaaaaaaarrrrrrrrrr waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaar' threshold argument......given the PA strategy to fight a short war..it is likely to adopt the latter approach (low reserves).....

These formations are likely to be amalgamation of old assets but some new raisings...for example, for donkey years I've been hearing about V Corps-Karachi having 3 Independent Armored/Mechanized Brigades....all they had to do was give them a Division HQ+support elements (easier said than done...especially for cash starved PA) and you have a new armored division...I'm quite sure these Corps Reserves aren't going to be fully up there as we (or even PA) describe their Armored Division......they are most likely to be centered around an armored brigade but will have quite a few of anti-tank assets (wheeled+tracked ATGM assets)...

SivaVijay · Post by **SivaVijay** » 10 Feb 2010 23:19

In the case of thrust inside Pakistan what kind of role can we expect for the fanatics, will they be infiltrated inside the occupied areas and do some suicide attacks behind enemy lines(area controlled by IA)? Was there any scenarios on the CSD in the scenarios thread?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 10 Feb 2010 23:23

SivaVijay wrote:In the case of thrust inside Pakistan what kind of role can we expect for the fanatics, will they be infiltrated inside the occupied areas and do some suicide attacks behind enemy lines(area controlled by IA)? Was there any scenarios on the CSD in the scenarios thread?

All the gyaan above is based on bits and pieces of info available and some head scratching........no one knows the details of CSD.....so please take what i post fwiw..

and rear area security is always factored in any operation....we do not need CSD to cover for that...

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 11 Feb 2010 00:29

Now, this is where the IBG are likely to become game changer. But for starters, IMO these will be with the holding corps+strike corps (but deployed forward).So, here we have a armored heavy formation (8 planned), close to the IB and ready to attack at short notice. My gut feeling is that an IBG will be between an armored division and a RAPID.

Not every IBG will have RAPIDs(4)

What you're refering to wrt the PA is only one component - quick mobilization.But here again, the holding corps of PA used to reach their jump off points quickly.The main strike elements of PA - I Corps (Army Reserve North) and II Corps (Army Reserve South) with 6th and 1st Armored Division would mobilize but remain uncommitted.They would have been moved only in case of committment of Indian Strike Corps.

...is an assumption only and rest of the case is based on this assumption.!!

....if he selectively allots these units to other formations in additom to armored divisions, then you're 'mailed fist' isn't that strong a fist anymore....or he may cut down on the war wastage reserve and inflate the number of units with these new toys and spread them around...but then, as usual, the staying power of PA goes down that much faster and you'll hear the 'nucleeeeeaaaaaaaaaaaarrrrrrrrrr waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaar' threshold argument......given the PA strategy to fight a short war..it is likely to adopt the latter approach (low reserves).....

this is what I didnt wanted to mention, but an all out nuclear war is a paki commander's dream .
Here is a scenario ,
Before we penetrate ,pakis thrust a reverse/counter CS(or a start) on us, we retaliate not just by holding them but opening fronts at different points , . They have already entered into our territory,and are using advanced/precision strike weaponry (ex babur) to weaken defences, Meanwhile IBGs(still in learning phase) gain ground on other side ,. paki reserves are low,which will be if they strike first or inflate present holding divisions . It will be a suitable time for them to use controlled nukes on IBGs/strike corps that have penetrated their land (using FUD). Inflict a serious damage and blunt our advances.
Now they are free to loiter in our land , Im using this phrase because we will not be using WMDs or heavy casualty weapons on them on our land,
,now pi$$ers and sleeper cells in delhi(some dedicated politicos) will play their part and will force the Indian govt to talk and accept some terms and conditions by outcry .
We lose because we didnt use what we have, they win by precisely using what they have .

All they have to do is to initiate ,and strike first !!

Rohitvats , please bring your analysis on Counter CSD from pakistan and its prevention , soon .

k prasad · Post by **k prasad** » 11 Feb 2010 01:38

tsarkar wrote:That’s an interesting question. Being a smaller army gives PA the benefit of cohesiveness.

1. In case PA pulls a fast one on us, and launches multiple brigade sized thrusts, which are the units that will absorb the thrust? I don’t think its practical for an IBG to stand aside and let a holding corps absorb that thrust.
2. Will an IBG retain its strike capabilities, if it is forced into defensive action?
3. Is the command mechanism robust enough to transfer units from holding corps to IBG, in the event IBG component units do not retain offensive capabilities? Or even better, reverse roles?
4. What is the role of the earlier holding corps concept in the new cold start doctrine? I believe the older concept was strike corps moves into enemy territory and holding corps takes its place.

Some newbie questions re tactics, that i'm just thinkin of sitting here in my very comfortable armchair.

Would it be a good idea to do a sort of double envelopment in concert with Defence-in-depth by letting the attacking pak units gain ground and go deep into indian territory (abt 10 -20 km or so), pin them against entrenched holding corps while the strike IBGs swing around to attack the flanks and rear, and simultaneously pound them with arty and rocket barrages to destroy morale and forces.

The potential problem will be an envelopment of the attacking IBGs, especially if the paks can bring reinforcements, and the enveloped force breaks out. However, if the IBGs are truly mobile, they should be able to use maneuver to prevent that from happening.

I'm thinking something on lines of the Battle of Yarmouk, where the smaller Arab cavalry destroyed far larger Byzantine forces through fast, multi-axis attacks and enveloping pin prick attacks from many different directions, and equally quick withdrawals. The IBGs, if attacking the flanks would be in this ideal situation to move quick and strike hard and move on before the enemy could regroup.

Also noting that the Pak units that do attack will need to be as mobile as our IBGs, wouldn't that also bring point 2 to bear, since they'll lose defensive capabilities without the free space

Given the above that i've said, wouldnt our IBGs too be in a similar risky position unless they can be readily reinforced and continuously supported. To my novice mind, this cold start seems to require exceptionally large levels of coordination and leadership flexibility and imagination, and also a large support base in terms of arty & air support on call and the possibility of needing reinforcements very quickly.

Thoughts/criticisms/opinions?? Am I talking absolute senseless dung?

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 11 Feb 2010 01:44

Is II corps - Multan headed to Gujranwala?
Pakistan re-deploying forces from south to the north close to chicken neck area?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 11 Feb 2010 08:05

arun wrote:Head of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani

140,000 Pakistani troops involved in waging “Jihad-fi-Sabilillah” or “Jihad in the path of Allah” against Pathan / Pashtun fellow Muslim religious co-adherents and fellow citizens.

2,273 Pakistani troops killed while waging “Jihad-fi-Sabilillah” or “Jihad in the path of Allah” against Pathan / Pashtun fellow Muslim religious co-adherents and fellow citizens.

See Dawn here:

Kayani spells out terms for regional stability

Of the above number, about 80,000 would be from the Frontier Corps, largely a Pashtun force, manned by officers of the PA. Safe to presume that most of the dead were from these corps, making it a Pashtun on Pashtun war, within Pakistan.

SivaVijay · Post by **SivaVijay** » 11 Feb 2010 08:22

Some more newbie doubts:

- We are like the great MGR and Rajinikanth, they take 3 punches from the bad guys and lot of abuse befor hitting back.
- Now we have been served 2 punches(parliament and Mumbai), now if a third punch will cause CSD to go into effect,
THat means the Pakis know CSD is coming becoz in this case it is reaction to a terror attack, which means tha PA will be preparing simultaneously, the second issue is JK is a hotpot this days we cant expect the ppl there to be as in 1965 when they handed over paki infiltrators,now it is ppl on the inside who are inciting the mob.

So here is my situation, A very intense spat of violence in JK and the army is sent and gets muddled, the paki then get ready to meet the CSD and then cause a terror strike, they have prepared a strong force near sialkot(Using the corps reserve) , Now after the terror strike if they preempt and lauch a strike to cut off JK then how will things unfold?

Will the 72-96 hr window be still valid as the pakis have shored up their defences bfore the Terror strike went ahead? What can we expect of our politicos? Do we have any states like DEFCON in US where by rising the Defcon the units take their position automatically without explicit political consent?

All this are my thoughts and I may be wrong, gurus pls clarify if so.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Feb 2010 09:55

ok, so by stripping reserve units and digging into reserves of eqpt he can put more
fighters on the front, but ofcourse the thickness and staying power also gets adversely affected.

still, its a reasonable strategy for a short war, using up whatever they have rather than holding out for a long war because due to nuclear factors and two thekedars (prc and khan) the chances of a long war are minimal.

the M113 is a simple and cheap product which they can probably make themselves
and supplement by purchasing from turkey and other nato countries who are retiring
them out. Unkil probably has a few thousand in some desert boneyard - ready for
the people's militia of WW3. M113 can provide better mobility in deserts and marshes than trucks.

the PAF can also be expected to use this all-out-in-24-hrs mode. they will be all
over the place even undertaking token strikes on goa, karwar, varanasi, jabalpur
and beyond to spread FUD, active hysteria in indian media and gain international
recognition.

I think we should change the game. invest a lot of standoff weapons and IAF weaponry to inflict devastating damage from the air and sea on their weapons depots, ordnance factories, railways, power plants, shipping while soundly thrashing the PAF on the side. even the thekedars should be hard put to foot the
bill and the economic dislocation of this nature will naturally incite riots and infighting as a impotent PAF gets its wings clipped and a prepared IA sits comfortably on indian side 'daring' the PA to come over. PA rear areas have to be POUNDED on a 24x7 bases for a few days whenever they are seen to concentrate.

this is probably the stable long term end-state of the how-to-deal-with-tsp problem. we are reaching there via CSD....in a few yrs as IAF bulks up and IA
gets all the long range C3I and weapons, I expect there to be revisions.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 11 Feb 2010 15:58

“so the dilemma facing PA commander is how to distribute the assets?”

Typically divide regiments with newer tanks among divisions. Not all tanks in a division are used at the same time. Some breakthrough, some consolidate the breakthrough.

The newer tank regiments would be used for the breakthrough, then stand aside and let the older tank regiments consolidate. Consolidating/holding forces consolidate/defend the flanks/gains made. Operating in defensive role while in offense, don’t require cutting edge stuff.

Thinking of counter-counter-CSD

Israel Tal and Moshe Peled in 1956 and 1967 changed roles of units and formations based on the situation as it evolved. If a particular maneuver unit faced tough opposition or casualties, its role was changed to that of holding. If a particular holding unit noticed a gap/advantage it could exploit, its role was changed to strike. Units, commanders and troops need to train hard and stay mentally prepared for enabling that kind of flexibility. Including logistics and support units.

arun · Post by **arun** » 11 Feb 2010 16:19

A Sharma wrote:Two military men killed in Tirah copter crash

Updated at: 1425 PST, Wednesday, February 10, 2010
PESHAWAR: Pakistani army officials said one of their helicopter gunships has crashed near the Afghan border and two people are dead. ......................

Further casualties. Rescue team sent to the downed Cobra helicopter gunship attacked leading to a Brigadier getting killed while a Colonel and Lieutenant were injured.

Would not a rescue mission of this nature normally not involve officers as senior as Colonel’s and Brigadier’s?:

Thursday, February 11, 2010

Army brigadier killed, 2 injured in Tirah attack as chopper crashes

JAMRUD/PESHAWAR: A brigadier was killed while a colonel and lieutenant were injured after suspected Taliban in Khyber Agency’s Tirah Valley attacked a rescue team sent after a crashed Cobra helicopter, official sources said on Wednesday. “Brig Hussain has embraced shahadat during the rescue mission sent after a Cobra helicopter crashed, killing its pilot and gunner,” officials told Daily Times. The injured colonel and lieutenant were shifted to Peshawar for treatment. …………………

Daily Times

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Feb 2010 17:28

maybe the gunship was smuggling gold or heroin hence the alacrity of the top brass in reaching the scene.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Feb 2010 17:46

tsarkar wrote:Israel Tal and Moshe Peled in 1956 and 1967 changed roles of units and formations based on the situation as it evolved. If a particular maneuver unit faced tough opposition or casualties, its role was changed to that of holding. If a particular holding unit noticed a gap/advantage it could exploit, its role was changed to strike. Units, commanders and troops need to train hard and stay mentally prepared for enabling that kind of flexibility. Including logistics and support units.

perhaps logistics will be a bigger headache for us given the distances and variety of terrain involved ?

anyway, uploaded a quick and dirty locator map of the formations we are discussing.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Feb 2010 18:15

Rahul M wrote:............<SNIP>..

Rahul, you're being too modest here....that is great map to start with..infact what I wrote about the CSD becomes more clear by looking at this map.....

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Feb 2010 18:32

Not every IBG will have RAPIDs(4)

Sorry, I could not get the drift. What I was trying to explain was that the format of an IBG will be between an Armored Division and a RAPID. And as for how will these IBG materialize, RAPIDs in 12 and 10 Corps are prime candidates.They have the nucleus of an integral armored brigade (2*Armored Regiments+2*Mechanized Regiments). The other two infantry brigades can be mechanized with necessary tank support and evolve the same into an IBG. What is missing from the equation is a flight of Mig-27 and integral gunships.

...is an assumption only and rest of the case is based on this assumption.!!

This is not an assumption....more of a fact given the organization of PA an the assets it holds. As I had said earlier; one of the basic requirement of the CSD is to draw the PA Strike elements which are held back to see how IA Strike Corps fan out. If this 'assumption' (that PA does not commit it reserves) is proved wrong, CSD/IBG concept would have served its purpose....PA commiting its ARN/ARS without Indian Strike Corps committed means that IA planners wil know where to strike the hammer....

this is what I didnt wanted to mention, but an all out nuclear war is a paki commander's dream ..........<SNIP>..

I don't see any nukes getting used....and as for the counter CSD...will not happen in the sense we are looking at it. For a simple reason that it is IA which will fire the first shot in anger. What PA will sure do is try and contain the IBG thrust and counter attack using the Corps Reserves...idea to localize the affair without calling in the 'big boys'. So, what you are looking at is a see-saw battle scenario where we will gain some and loose some. For CSD to be a success, the IBG and its parent formation will have to have overwhelming firepower and apart from the mechanization of forces and induction of arty/MRLS, the biggest trump card is the IAF. An IBG with a dedicated flight or two of 3/6 Mig-27s can create complete havoc in the PA ranks.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Feb 2010 19:02

I feel a couple of soviet style airborne brigades(call them IBG) if you will equipped with BMD/BTR/4x4 type
vehicles and adequate helicopter support for the initial long move across the chessboard can bring us large
gains in territory, FUD, media impact etc..which again would be in the list of goals for a short war.

it could also used as a trigger to force the PA to wheel out its ARN/ARS and finally concentrate its assets in the open for IAF to have a go at.

losses can be expected to be severe unless very flexible heliborne logistics are put in and leadership is sound.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 11 Feb 2010 19:31

I don't see any nukes getting used....and as for the counter CSD...will not happen in the sense we are looking at it. For a simple reason that it is IA which will fire the first shot in anger. What PA will sure do is try and contain the IBG thrust and counter attack using the Corps Reserves...idea to localize the affair without calling in the 'big boys'. So, what you are looking at is a see-saw battle scenario where we will gain some and loose some. For CSD to be a success, the IBG and its parent formation will have to have overwhelming firepower and apart from the mechanization of forces and induction of arty/MRLS, the biggest trump card is the IAF. An IBG with a dedicated flight or two of 3/6 Mig-27s can create complete havoc in the PA ranks.

For a nearby scenario Sufficient Installation of necessary components like better tanks,gunships needs heavy investments and in a very small time frame , to convert IA's IBG doctrine in the 3D way,involving all three services(which we are currently workng upon),so as to build a war machine,with all the sophisticated machinery it could have, like the USarmy way.Are we ready for it ?
Is there sufficient time?,
I dont consider 2020 a near target(the way we are building currently) but a very far away goal wrt preparation against pakis, maybe our people could suffer a lot by then,or maybe someone bigger at our own backyard comes closer??
Isnt it that our army is lagging somewhere?,whatever the reasons maybe ,but excuses doesnt matter at all.
One such reason is COIN involvement

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Feb 2010 19:47

Singha wrote:I feel a couple of soviet style airborne brigades(call them IBG) if you will equipped with BMD/BTR/4x4 type
vehicles and adequate helicopter support for the initial long move across the chessboard can bring us large
gains in territory, FUD, media impact etc..which again would be in the list of goals for a short war.

it could also used as a trigger to force the PA to wheel out its ARN/ARS and finally concentrate its assets in the open for IAF to have a go at.

losses can be expected to be severe unless very flexible heliborne logistics are put in and leadership is sound.

That is an extremely expensive proposition...suitable only if you print the world's dominant currency or per force dedicate large percentage of your GDp for defence (Soviet style)....even to put together an Air Assault Brigade will entail huge costs....an air assault battalion in US Army with 30 UH-60 costs USD 350 millon+ (with each Uh-60 priced at USD 14 million each(2008 price-wiki)).... a brigade with its complement of gunships will cross USD one billion

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 11 Feb 2010 19:57

You’re right Rahul, larger armies have always had problems with cohesiveness, leadership and logistics. In many battles throughout history, significant parts of larger armies were not employed for the above reasons.

What is important for the CSD to succeed is leadership that understands the concept and moulds himself and his unit accordingly. Equipment isn’t as major a factor as leadership and strategy is.

To explain my point, supposing a strike formation commanding general is told his formation’s role has changed, he shouldn’t take it as an insult to his or his unit’s capabilities, but rather reflective of the grand scheme of things. Similarly, if a holding formation’s general is told his role has changed to strike, he shouldn’t hesitate saying that isn’t what my unit was designated, equipped or trained for. And same goes for personnel in those units.

I hope field exercises do factor this contingency, wherein formation roles are changed impromptu, and the entire support structure has to adapt real time. If X tons of ammo & POL were to be supplied to A division and Y tons to B, and their roles change, then logistic needs to adapt accordingly and fast. If 23 sq IAF had to support A division and had FAC deputed, and roles change, then 23 sq IAF should be seamlessly able to support B division. Recce assets need to be made available to B division. Of course, it is easier said than done!

Rohit –

“For a simple reason that it is IA which will fire the first shot in anger.”

In 1965, we assumed Pakistan won’t attack in the Jammu region and it attacked Chamb.

In wartime Pakistan, all decision making will be unified from GHQ Rawalpindi. On the other hand, our decision making, dependent on our executive leadership, is slower.

Nothing stops PA from a preemptive strike using its formations, artillery and field ballistic missiles on an IBG to degrade its capabilities. This is where adaptability of formations will be critical for the larger success.

But if we are preparing for a set piece battle, ie, formation X to draw out and neutralize enemy formation Y, then the old adage comes to mind, “no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy.”

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 11 Feb 2010 20:39

Singha wrote:I feel a couple of soviet style airborne brigades(call them IBG) if you will equipped with BMD/BTR/4x4 type
vehicles and adequate helicopter support for the initial long move across the chessboard can bring us large
gains in territory, FUD, media impact etc..which again would be in the list of goals for a short war.

it could also used as a trigger to force the PA to wheel out its ARN/ARS and finally concentrate its assets in the open for IAF to have a go at.

losses can be expected to be severe unless very flexible heliborne logistics are put in and leadership is sound.

This is exactly what is being done, so it seems. To build the strategic lift capability, which at present levels is restricted to about a brigade. Investment in these special forces and their training thereof, including recovery, though expensive and risky is the need of the hour and they can be used in a multitude of scenarios, including our mountains on both sides.

Added: There are two critical areas in respect to the above that I am waiting/hoping for some news on. More capable ICV's and some investments in fixed wing airborne gunships.

Pratik_S · Post by **Pratik_S** » 11 Feb 2010 21:42

Main trouble for Pakistanis will be the engine. The current RD-93 is good 30years old and is relatively underpowered. The WS-13 which seems to be the only replacement to the RD-93 is also a Chinese copy of RD-93 and i don't think its an improvement over the Russian version. The only country likely to help Pakistan is France but as of now no Snecma engine could be fitted into JF-17. So Russian and Chinese engines are the only hope for that bird.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 11 Feb 2010 22:46

rohitvats wrote:I don't see any nukes getting used...

I do. As long as Pakistan has special weapons in its arsenal, it is criminally stupid to assume it will not use them in a conflict where it is taking a beating. India has a long history of strategic miscalculating what Pakistan will and will not do. Without naming names, I can assure you that some of India's most respected strategists once claimed that Pakistan will be more confident and responsible country once it got nukes and settled into a MAD relation with India.

No more Chankianess, please; keep it simple - hope for the best, but prepare for the worst.

The Cold Start, in its simple 1994 study and recommendations on readiness and mobilization, is a good military principle which any country can benefit from. IBGs, in so far as the concept promotes more modular, flexible formations and promote greater initiative and adaptability, is also a good principle which is only lately coming to India. But to think that these two alone can address the problem posed by Pakistan is expecting a Band-Aid to fix a hemorrhage deep inside the body.

India needs a comprehensive doctrine to deal with all problems as and how they come. The recent announcement that the three services are pursuing joint sub-conventional, electronic warfare and amphibious/air ops doctrines is much more promising. The Pak sub-conventional war against India is very cheap - maybe even profitable (via various criminal enterprises) - for them; it won't do to make it even more relatively advantageous for them by reacting conventionally. In the middle of the spectrum, conventional capabilities and preparedness are also important - but not the end-all and be-all of India's security options. Finally one MUST prepare for the WORST - i.e. accept that special weapons being used is very much a possibility, and plan the new infrastructure, procurement and training projects accordingly - and prepare to WIN.

Nihat · Post by **Nihat** » 11 Feb 2010 23:14

What would you think India's sub-conventional War doctrine refers to specifically?

Chinmayanand · Post by **Chinmayanand** » 12 Feb 2010 00:14

Robert Gates’ threat of war - By General Mirza Aslam Beg (RETD)

Before visiting Pakistan, Robert Gates warned from New Delhi that, should 2007 Mumbai like incident occur again, India would attack Pakistan, meaning thereby that the past Mumbai killings have been solely attributed to Pakistan and if such an incident occurred again, responsibility would be that of Pakistan, and in retaliation, India would be perfectly justified to attack Pakistan. In this situation USA would not be in a position to restrain India. Rather it may support this venture.

The message is fraught with ominous consequences and therefore demands a clear assessment of our ability to respond, if such a threat develops. This assessment therefore, is based on existing ground realities, which determine the military power balance between Pakistan and India. No doubt, the Indian armed forces are numerically superior to Pakistan, but they suffer from some inherent weaknesses and, it will take them a long time to overcome these.

Indian armed forces are in the midst of a transition, - replacement of the obsolete Russian weapons system with high-tech American-Israeli-European weapons. India started this changeover in 2005 after signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement with USA and hopes to complete it by the year 2015. Already it has spent about a hundred billion dollars on the new acquisitions. Their entire military system at present therefore, is weak, because they have the old and absolute weapons and about thirty percent of the recently acquired new systems. They suffer from a predicament, similar to what we suffered in early seventies, because, USA bad abandoned Pakistan in 1965 and we had not been able to induct new weapons and equipment from other sources. India exploited this weakness and dismembered Pakistan. Thus, India suffering from such weaknesses, now, is not in a position to wage a full f1edged war against Pakistan.

India faces another serious problem, in that, despite their best efforts of the last forty years, they have failed to manufacture their own tanks, guns, cruise missiles, fighter aircrafts, battleships and submarines. This in essence, constitutes a major weakness of the Indian armed forces, because, the present day war cannot be won with weapons borrowed or purchased from others. And, contrary to the weaknesses of India and cognising the implications of self-reliance, Pakistan has achieved up to ninety percent of indigenisation of weapons and equipment. We have our own tanks, guns, cruise missiles, fighter aircrafts, battleships and submarines as well as we have a stock-pile of war reserves, of over forty days, as compared to just eleven days of war reserves in 1965 and seven days in 1971. Whereas India’s war reserves as of today are limited to 15 days only. Thus, Pakistan in this respect also enjoys a clear edge over India.

The third dimensional capability of Pakistan is, in the way of higher military education and superior military and operational strategy, which is the hallmark of our military leadership, and was demonstrated some twenty years back in 1989, during Ex-Zarb-e-Momin. The Offensive Defence concept was practised and over the period, has been actualised as the fundamental doctrine of war. Offensive Defence means that our forces having fixed the enemy, will carry the war into their territory. Compare it with the Cold Start doctrine of India, of fighting a war on two fronts, which is more of a fiction than a realistic military doctrine.

Mr Robert Gates, as well as the Indian military planners, while taking into cognisance the existing military balance between Pakistan and India, must also consider the new phenomenon of the Asymmetric War, which, during the last thirty years, has established the supremacy of Men and Missiles, over the most modern and technologically superior armed forces of the world, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Kashmir. The Asymmetric War, in essence is the name of the Islamic Resistance, with its hardcore resting along the Durand Line. It is our strength. Thus, conventional as well as irregular armed forces, together provide the emerging shape of the Fourth Generation of modern warfare, as Joseph S Nye, the former Assistant Secretary of Defence USA and a professor of Harvard University, defines: “The hybrid wars, conventional and irregular forces combatants and civilians become thoroughly intertwined” to win wars and help establish the new order. In case, war is forced on Pakistan, it would be a long and decisive war, where new geo-political realities would emerge, establishing new frontiers of peace in the region.

Nuclear weapons are not the weapons of war because these have never been used as such. United States used it against the Japanese in 1945, which already had lost the war, nor had the capability to retaliate. American purpose was primarily diplomatic, i.e. to declare to the world that, America was entering the centre stage of world politics, to establish its global primacy and pre-eminence. There are other instances also, where nuclear powers, possessing hundreds and thousands of atomic weapons could not use them, to save themselves from very difficult and embarrassing situations. The Americans lost the war in Vietnam; the Soviets lost their empire in Afghanistan; the Israelis could not cover the shame of defeat at the hands of Hezbollah in 2005; the Americans having suffered defeat in Iraq, now are facing a worse defeat in Afghanistan, yet they find no recourse to use their nuclear capability. Their NATO partners are equally embarrassed, yet they cannot think of using their nuclear weapons to cover the shame of impending defeat. Similarly, India and Pakistan can fight only conventional wars and win or loose, but they dare not use nuclear weapons against each other, because it would destroy everything, leaving nothing but ashes, one could hope to capture and rebuild. And therefore, our people must not carry the wrong notion that Pakistan is powerful because it has nuclear capability. On the contrary, it is the conventional military capability, which provides security and lends resilience to the nation, as of now, and provides space to the po1itical government, to establish good governance.

Nuclear weapons are also great equalizer, between nuclear capable adversaries. “Between India and Pakistan, perfect deterrence exists” - declared George Fernandis, the former Defence Minister of India, after Pakistan demonstrated its capability in May 1998. And that precisely is the function of the weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan’s policy of Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrence, supported by the Policy of Restraint, together serves the purpose of a stable nuclear deterrence. Nuclear capability also doesn’t compensate for the conventional military capability, and working on this principle the conventional military capability of Pakistan has been so developed as to make it a real symbol of national power, to defeat all aggression from within and outside.

Such are the ground realities, which determine the capabilities of our armed forces which cannot be wiped off by contrived constructs of our adversaries, nor Pakistan can be scared of going to the brink, if a war was forced on it. J F Dulles has rightly said: “If you are scared to go to the brink you are lost.”

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 12 Feb 2010 00:43

Nihat wrote:What would you think India's sub-conventional War doctrine refers to specifically?

I have seen excerpts from and references to the army's sub-conventional warfare doctrine, and they mainly were focused on the military and political aspects of counter-insurgency and counter cross-border terrorism ops. I would extrapolate that the Navy and AF's input to the joint doctrine that we will eventually see in public domain will be along similar lines. As to what we won't see, I think the three services' role will be mainly in training and support role.

Kartik · Post by **Kartik** » 12 Feb 2010 02:01

from the article that Durgesh posted

India faces another serious problem, in that, despite their best efforts of the last forty years, they have failed to manufacture their own tanks, guns, cruise missiles, fighter aircrafts, battleships and submarines. This in essence, constitutes a major weakness of the Indian armed forces, because, the present day war cannot be won with weapons borrowed or purchased from others. And, contrary to the weaknesses of India and cognising the implications of self-reliance, Pakistan has achieved up to ninety percent of indigenisation of weapons and equipment. We have our own tanks, guns, cruise missiles, fighter aircrafts, battleships and submarines as well as we have a stock-pile of war reserves, of over forty days, as compared to just eleven days of war reserves in 1965 and seven days in 1971. Whereas India’s war reserves as of today are limited to 15 days only. Thus, Pakistan in this respect also enjoys a clear edge over India.

really, this is the biggest pile of pig refuse that I've seen in a longg time! Its plainly obvious that this man is trying to fool the people of Pakistan into thinking that not only do they not have obsolete weapons (more than half their orbat is obsolete) but that they've achieved superb results in indigenisation when the truth is the exact opposite ! talk about 90% indigenisation in Pakiland coming from a military guy- wow, I can hardly even believe that someone from that background will be such a bold liar. or maybe the background (PA) explains how they can lie so easily.

If this is the thinking of the Paki military elite, then I am glad- they are delusional, self-aggrandizing and seem to live in a la-la land. The fact that Pakis don't have anything even close to 40 days of War Wastage Reserve was openly admitted by Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail in his blog on the Kargil war. And its also a fact (this can be corroborated from Parliamentary reports) that the Indian WWR is for 1 month high intensity conflict, followed by 1 month at regular intensity. this 15 day figure this idiot is quoting is pure BS.

The third dimensional capability of Pakistan is, in the way of higher military education and superior military and operational strategy, which is the hallmark of our military leadership, and was demonstrated some twenty years back in 1989, during Ex-Zarb-e-Momin. The Offensive Defence concept was practised and over the period, has been actualised as the fundamental doctrine of war. Offensive Defence means that our forces having fixed the enemy, will carry the war into their territory. Compare it with the Cold Start doctrine of India, of fighting a war on two fronts, which is more of a fiction than a realistic military doctrine.

more self-aggrandizing nonsense. The article is meant for domestic consumption and aimed at making people feel good about the PA. Motivation is the main aim, so truth can take a back seat, or maybe even better, not even get into the car.

Mr Robert Gates, as well as the Indian military planners, while taking into cognisance the existing military balance between Pakistan and India, must also consider the new phenomenon of the Asymmetric War, which, during the last thirty years, has established the supremacy of Men and Missiles, over the most modern and technologically superior armed forces of the world, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Kashmir. The Asymmetric War, in essence is the name of the Islamic Resistance, with its hardcore resting along the Durand Line. It is our strength. Thus, conventional as well as irregular armed forces, together provide the emerging shape of the Fourth Generation of modern warfare, as Joseph S Nye, the former Assistant Secretary of Defence USA and a professor of Harvard University, defines: “The hybrid wars, conventional and irregular forces combatants and civilians become thoroughly intertwined” to win wars and help establish the new order. In case, war is forced on Pakistan, it would be a long and decisive war, where new geo-political realities would emerge, establishing new frontiers of peace in the region.

here this man openly shows the true face of the PA and Pakistan's strategy over the years- develop and support jehadis and try to use them as a backup reserve element. I hope this article is noticed by others as well since he clearly mentions "This is our strength". anyway, it would only be valid if India tried to hold on to Paki territory, which is unlikely. The aim for the IA would be cause maximum damage to PA and Paki infrastructure and then withdraw.

Nuclear weapons are not the weapons of war because these have never been used as such. United States used it against the Japanese in 1945, which already had lost the war, nor had the capability to retaliate. American purpose was primarily diplomatic, i.e. to declare to the world that, America was entering the centre stage of world politics, to establish its global primacy and pre-eminence. There are other instances also, where nuclear powers, possessing hundreds and thousands of atomic weapons could not use them, to save themselves from very difficult and embarrassing situations. The Americans lost the war in Vietnam; the Soviets lost their empire in Afghanistan; the Israelis could not cover the shame of defeat at the hands of Hezbollah in 2005 ; the Americans having suffered defeat in Iraq, now are facing a worse defeat in Afghanistan, yet they find no recourse to use their nuclear capability (notice that this dimwit doesn't mention the shame of Pakistan losing in Kargil and having to withdraw forces). Their NATO partners are equally embarrassed, yet they cannot think of using their nuclear weapons to cover the shame of impending defeat. Similarly, India and Pakistan can fight only conventional wars and win or loose, but they dare not use nuclear weapons against each other, because it would destroy everything, leaving nothing but ashes, one could hope to capture and rebuild. And therefore, our people must not carry the wrong notion that Pakistan is powerful because it has nuclear capability. On the contrary, it is the conventional military capability, which provides security and lends resilience to the nation, as of now, and provides space to the po1itical government, to establish good governance.

so he's trying to project the PA as the guardians of peace and good governance in Pakiland..the aim of the article is clear. to justify continued large expenditure on conventional weapons for the PA, PN and PAF even as the economy runs on glucose fed by other nations. India should encourage this, and haemorrhage the Paki economy by forcing them to spend beyond their means to try and maintain parity.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 13 Feb 2010 01:03

US Arms Sales are propping up Pakistan as a Regional Challenger

Gurmeet Kanwal

February 11, 2010

The American ambassador in Islamabad has said that the US Defence Department is considering the sale of 12 unarmed drones to Pakisatan to encourage it to cooperate in the war on terror. It is not beyond Pakistan’s technological capability to arm these UAVs with air-to-ground missiles for use in conventional conflict.

A few months ago, Air Chief Marshal Rao Quamar Suleman, Chief of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), had accepted the first F-16 Block 52 aircraft on behalf of his nation at the Lockheed Martin facility at Fort Worth, Texas. The remaining aircraft will be delivered in 2010. The total order, worth US$5.1 billion, is for 12 F-16Cs and six F-16Ds. When this transfer is completed, it will raise the total number of F-16s in service with the PAF to 54. The Pakistan Air Force received its first F-16, in the Block 15 F-16A/B configuration, in 1982.

Earlier, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency had notified Congress of a Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of 115 M109A5 155mm self-propelled howitzers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised by Pakistan, could be as high as $56 million.

This is not the first time that the US has offered major arms packages to Pakistan, nor will it be the last. The United States had co-opted Pakistan as a frontline state in its fight against communism during the Cold War and armed it with Patton tanks, F-86 Sabre Jets and F-104 Starfighters, among other weapons and equipment. Despite strong US assurances, all of these were used against India. US-Pakistan cooperation was expanded further when the former Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. In the 1980s, the CIA gave Pakistan huge quantities of weapons for the Afghan mujahideen. These included shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles, some of which were recovered by the Indian Army from Pakistan’s terrorist mercenaries in Kashmir. However, as soon as the last Soviet tank left Afghan soil, the United States dropped Pakistan like a hot potato and slapped sanctions on it.

Post-September 11, the United States not only ignored Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation but also its emergence as the new hub of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism. It also tolerated General Musharraf’s dictatorial regime because it suited US national interests in the war against terrorism. The US designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) in March 2004 had irritated Indian policy planners because Indo-US relations had just begun to improve. The “next steps in strategic partnership” (NSSP) had been announced only in January 2004 and India was looking forward to a comprehensive engagement with the United States. The Indo-US strategic partnership is now on a firm footing, but developments such as the sale of major conventional arms to Pakistan run the risk of damaging the growing relationship.

The sale of conventional arms to Pakistan ostensibly to fight terrorism has been criticised even in the United States. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report has questioned the sale: "It (the F-16 Block 52) incorporates advanced weapons and avionics for air-to-air combat that appear unnecessary for counterinsurgency operations. Less expensive and less sophisticated aircraft such as attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and combat search and rescue aircraft would appear to have greater utility in combating insurgents and other non-state actors than supersonic fighter aircraft." It is another matter that Pakistan has been actually using fighter aircraft to strike targets on ground in Swat and South Waziristan. These are tactics that are bound to generate a severe backlash against its armed forces, as has been witnessed in a spate of attacks against senior army personnel in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

The United States justifies arms sales to Pakistan on several grounds. Besides the need to continue to retain Pakistan’s support in the hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists, the United States realises the fragility of the civilian regime in the face of Islamist hardliners in the army, the ISI and the country. It sees the Pakistan Army as a stabilising force in a country that is being gradually Islamised beyond redemption. The United States feels that it must do all that it can to keep the civilian regime in power. It is also deeply concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into jihadi hands if there is an Islamist coup. Hence, the United States feels inclined to offer some sops to satisfy Pakistan’s corps commanders at regular intervals. The sale of eight Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, the Phalanx gun systems and the 2000 TOW anti-tank-cum-bunker busting missiles falls in this category. Also, India and Pakistan are among the largest arms buyers in the world today and no US administration can neglect the military-industrial complex.

Though the sale of the Orion reconnaissance aircraft will make things relatively more difficult for the Indian Navy, they do not pose a direct new threat to India. The proposed sale indicates a US design to engage the Pakistan Navy in joint reconnaissance and patrolling of the sea lanes in the Gulf region by bolstering its capability while a similar exercise is being undertaken with the Indian Navy in the southern Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Straits. Clearly, the United States is planning to cooperate with the Indian Navy through its Honolulu-based Pacific Command and with the Pakistan Navy through its Central Command. Such an arrangement will also keep the Indian and Pakistan navies from having to launch joint operations and undertake search, seizure and rescue operations together.

If India wishes to influence US arms sales decisions, it must develop adequate leverages to make the United States reconsider the pros and cons very carefully. The supply of a new batch of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan will certainly enhance the strike capabilities of the PAF even though the Indian Air Force will still continue to enjoy both qualitative and quantitative superiority. India is justified in seeing the move to go ahead with the sale of the F-16s as an US attempt to balance its strategic partnership with India by once again propping up Pakistan as a regional challenger.

we should never buy amriki weapon stuff,
they are planning to use pakis against iran,India and India against china,. and our politicos are helping them for well known reasons

Chinmayanand · Post by **Chinmayanand** » 13 Feb 2010 05:09

Samay wrote: our politicos are helping them for well known reasons

For the same well known reasons , they will buy amriki maal .

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 13 Feb 2010 21:16

Also include

1.
Refurbishment and modification of three excess P-3 aircraft with the E-2C HAWKEYE 2000 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Suite. The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale for refurbishment and modification of three excess P-3 aircraft with the E-2C HAWKEYE 2000 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Suite, spare and repairs parts, simulators, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, system software development and installation, ground/flight testing of new systems and system modifications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $855 million.
2.
... 7 RF TOW 2A Fly-to-buy Missiles, 415 RF Bunker Buster Missiles, 7 RF Fly-to-buy Bunker Buster Missiles, upgrade of 121 TOW Basic/TOW-I launchers to fire TOW II configuration for wireguided and wireless missiles, TOW Data Acquisition Systems, gunner aiming sight, testers, cameras, spare and repair parts, technical support, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, technical data and publications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $185 million.
3.
Harris High Frequency/Very High Frequency radio systems, which include 1,558 20-Watt High Frequency (HF) Man Packs, 2,188 20-Watt HF Vehicular Systems, 175 150-Watt HF Vehicular Systems, ancillary equipment, spare and repairs parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics services and other related elements of program support. The radios will enable Pakistan to improve on its capability to provide current and updated intelligence between patrols and higher headquarters. Also, the radios will increase interoperability between Pakistan and the U.S. and coalition forces assisting in the efforts to curtail and eliminate terrorist activities.
4.
500 AIM-120C5 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); 12 AMRAAM training missiles; 240 LAU-129/A Launchers; 200 AIM-9M-8/9 SIDEWINDER missiles; 500 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Guidance Kits: GBU-31/38 Guided Bomb Unit (GBU) kits; 1,600 Enhanced-GBU-12/24 GBUs; 800 MK-82 500 pound General Purpose (GP) and MK-84 2,000 pound GP bombs; and 700 BLU-109 2,000 pound with FMU-143 Fuze.
5.
Modification/overhaul of 14 F100-PW-220E engines, 14 Falcon UP/STAR F-16 structural upgrade kits, de-modification and preparation of 26 aircraft, support equipment, software development/integration, modification kits, spares and repair parts, flight test instrumentation, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related requirements to support the program. The estimated cost is $151 million.
6.
60 F-16A/B Mid-Life Update (MLU) modification and Falcon Star Structural Service Life Enhancement kits consisting of: APG-68(V)9 with Synthetic Aperture Radar or APG-66(V)2 radar; Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems; AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe Systems; AN/ALE-47 Advanced Countermeasures Dispenser Systems; Have Quick I/II Radios; Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals; SNIPER (formerly known as AN/AAQ-33 PANTERA) targeting pod capability; Reconnaissance pod capability; Advanced Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Units; MDE included in the MLU modification and structural upgrade kits 21 ALQ-131 Block II Electronic Countermeasures Pods without the Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) or ALQ-184 Electronic Countermeasures Pods without DRFM; 60 ALQ-213 Electronic Warfare Management Systems; 1 Unit Level Trainer; and 10 APG-68(V)9 spare radar sets.
7.
... 7 spare APG-68(V)9 radar sets; 36 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems; 36 AN/ARC-238 SINCGARS radios with HAVE QUICK I/II; 36 Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs); 36 Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals; 36 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems; 36 APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe Systems; 36 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites without Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) or AN/ALQ-184 Electronic Counter Measures pod without DRFM or AN/ALQ-131 Electronic Counter Measures pod without DRFM or AN/ALQ-187 Advanced Self-Protection Integrated Suites without DRFM; or AN/ALQ-178 Self-Protection Electronic Warfare Suites without DRFM and 1 Unit Level Trainer;
8.
50 UGM-84L (submarine-launched), 50 RGM-84L (surface-launched), and 30 AGM-84L (air-launched) Block II HARPOON missiles; 5 Encapsulated HARPOON Command Launch Systems; 115 containers; missile modifications; training devices; spare and repair parts; technical support; support equipment; personnel training and training equipment; technical data and publications; U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $370 million.

10.
300 AIM-9M-1/2 SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles, missile containers, test sets and support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $46 million.

12.
Six PHALANX Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), upgrade of six PHALANX CIWS Block 0 to Block 1B, spare and repair parts, modification kits, supply and support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics services and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $155 million.
13.
Six AN/TPS-77 Air Surveillance radars, support equipment, spare/repair parts, publications/technical data, personnel training/equipment, and U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $100 million.
14.
Six Aerostat L-88 Radar Systems, spare and repair parts, facility construction and support, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $155 million.
15.
Six used C-130E aircraft with engines, one C-130E operational capabilities upgrade aircraft for cannibalization with engines, upgrade of engines to Allison 56-A-15 engines, modification kits, spare and repair parts, devices, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $75 million.

---from livefist

the above saamagri is around $10+ bn worth
If we have to match it with equal purchase from usa,then that amounts to nearly $16-20bn owing to the fact that we have to purchase keeping china in mind as well.
that may prompt unkil to give more bakshish to pakis ...
we should be buying only those us stuff which are not very significant and are based on prompt measures,say future strategies should not be based on these weaponry
It gives a feeling that there is a war preparation going on in pakiland ,with arousal of several new bunkers on loc , it seems like usa is motivating pakisatan and in turn fueling jnk and Indo-pak tensions once again ...

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 14 Feb 2010 04:49

U.S. delivers 48 field artillery cannons to Pakistan Army