Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

Jarita · Post by **Jarita** » 27 Feb 2010 00:17

Steve Hynd on twitter writes the following abt Indias involvement in Afpak

@pragmatic_d your welcome. I just call it as I see it, hope India doesn't make US' mistakes

@pragmatic_d on contrary, superpowers usually face greater risk to citizens. Gunboat diplomacy comes after the fact, normally

@pragmatic_d *shrug* It's up to Indians. They can bang hawkish drums or get on with being the next superpower, their choice.

Also drains in non-financial ways. Cycle of fear/domestic politics/unconsidered response not good for looking long-term

Border security and law enforcement req'd, not foreign coffer-draining adventures that become ball-n-chain in so many ways

Terror v India like terror v US. Ant bites, frankly. Embarassing to national pride, but more die of lack of medical help or in car accidents

Ant bites, frankly. Embarassing, but more Indians die in car accidents

Why should Indians let prideful urge to "do anything" now hamstring that with fiscal drain of Afg?

India can supass China in i to 2 decades, but only if it cultivates maritime economic power and needed infrastructure

There's not a lot India can do about that. Rather than embroil itself in continental quagmires, it should turn seaward and to infrastructure

India's main competitor is China. China pretty much owns Pakistan and will own Afg. within a decade

India wins if it turns away from Pak/Afghanistan. It gets breathing space to expand instead of a ball and chain designed by China and Pak

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 27 Feb 2010 00:54

Jarita wrote:Steve Hynd on twitter writes the following abt Indias involvement in Afpak

@pragmatic_d your welcome. I just call it as I see it, hope India doesn't make US' mistakes

@pragmatic_d on contrary, superpowers usually face greater risk to citizens. Gunboat diplomacy comes after the fact, normally

@pragmatic_d *shrug* It's up to Indians. They can bang hawkish drums or get on with being the next superpower, their choice.

Terror v India like terror v US. Ant bites, frankly. Embarassing to national pride, but more die of lack of medical help or in car accidents

Ant bites, frankly. Embarassing, but more Indians die in car accidents

Why should Indians let prideful urge to "do anything" now hamstring that with fiscal drain of Afg?

India can supass China in i to 2 decades, but only if it cultivates maritime economic power and needed infrastructure

There's not a lot India can do about that. Rather than embroil itself in continental quagmires, it should turn seaward and to infrastructure

India's main competitor is China. China pretty much owns Pakistan and will own Afg. within a decade

India wins if it turns away from Pak/Afghanistan. It gets breathing space to expand instead of a ball and chain designed by China and Pak

All the advice coming to India when for the most of 1980s and 1990s India was not in the picture.
It is all about the national interest of their country

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 27 Feb 2010 09:11

ramana wrote:I dont think the Pakis make that distinction. Their ideology links everything in one pot. No nuanced compartmentalization of a modern mind.

That is my part of my point. The other part is that their ideology does not make a distinction outside the pot too.

The vacillation on their part is very evident.

They love no one but themselves, and they hate everyone but themselves.

Irrespective of what centric they are (US, India, whatever) the fact remains they hate everyone else. And that IMVVHO is great because they will have to stew in that dung based thinking for ever.

IMHO this game they are playing will not last too much longer.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 27 Feb 2010 09:29

NRao wrote: IMHO this game they are playing will not last too much longer.

Nehru too was of the same opinion.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 27 Feb 2010 23:56

ShauryaT wrote:
NRao wrote: IMHO this game they are playing will not last too much longer.
Nehru too was of the same opinion.

I was not aware of that, but, am I in good or bad company?

My position, and reasonS, has been the same since about 2000. In fact IMHO the events that should lead to a clash are fast approaching.

Let us see.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Meanwhile another Paki balloon gets popped:

UK troops to remain in Afghanistan 'for five years'

So much for Hamid Gul's comments on US and Taliban!!!

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 27 Feb 2010 23:58

Tangential, but ..........................

Russia blames Nato for heroin surge from Afghanistan

Victor Ivanov said at least 30,000 people died in Russia every year from heroin, 90% of it from Afghanistan.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 28 Feb 2010 00:00

US 'plans to oust Taliban from Kandahar'

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Feb 2010 00:16

It is useful to recall which areas in Afghanistan are controlled by which shuras in TSP. This will make clear which gang will emerge as 'good ' Taliban.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 28 Feb 2010 00:27

I recall reading an article in which a Afghan Taliban invited India to the table with "assurances" that they will not be anti-India. Now, these guys could be (and probably would be) classified (!!!!!!) as the 'good' Taliban. But, guess what? I am very, very sure that such guys would be picked up the very next day by the ISI ( and even perhaps disposed off).

My read is that the Pakis have a "with us or against us" policy with the Afghan Taliban - both inside and outside Pakistan. And they, unlike Bush, enforce it.

THE problem - in this entire Af-Pak or Pak-Af affair, as I see it - is the ISI. Get rid of them and we ALL have a real good chance of leading a relatively peaceful life. As long as the ISI remains in its present form they will have a few remote controlled devices which they will use - the on going game.

JMTs.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 28 Feb 2010 00:28

VinodTK wrote:Mac Deford: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India: Where Lies Our National Interest?

Meanwhile, the keynote speaker - and one of the world's great experts on the Taliban, Ahmed Rashid - suggested that what was really behind Pakistan's capture of Baradar was that Afghan President Karzai, with American knowledge but without Pakistani involvement, had been negotiating with Baradar in an effort at reconciliation with key Taliban leaders. When the Pakistanis found out what was going on, they grabbed Baradar, whose whereabouts in Karachi they had long known, to nip this peace effort in the bud; not that the Pakistanis are necessarily against negotiations, but they insist on being a major player.

What he missed saying is that the Pakis do NOT want India in the "negotiation" process too.

A case of good Taliban?

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 28 Feb 2010 05:23

Found this
Link

Several prominent Tajik (Persian-speaking Sunni) politicians have long-standing ties to New Delhi because India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW, the equivalent of the CIA) provided aid to the old Northern Alliance at a time when it was under siege in the late 1990s by the Taliban. These Tajiks are die-hard enemies of the Taliban, who had committed massacres against them. The Taliban animus against India thus is multifaceted

Read it all
ISI hand in Taliban's Kabul attack?

Highly placed government officials confirmed to TOI that India's external intelligence wing, RAW, had repeatedly warned the government about meetings between the Taliban and ISI officials since September last year aiming to attack Indian interests in Kabul.

The first of the intelligence inputs came in September 2009 from RAW which said that officials from ISI's joint intelligence (north) wing had discussed plans to carry out attacks against Indian aid workers in Kabul with the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar group. Of all the Taliban insurgent groups, Hekmatyar heads the smallest one but is well known for being ISI's most trustworthy ally in the region. His Hizb-e-Islami group is fighting alongside the Taliban against the US-led forces.

"Since then, almost every month there had been credible information about meetings which ISI officials had with the Hekmatyar and Haqqani factions of Taliban to discuss the modus operandi for the attacks. It's only natural for Indian security agencies to believe that these meetings could have culminated in Friday's attacks,'' said a source, adding that New Delhi was still waiting for a report from the Afghan government on the identity of the attackers.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attacks but their spokesperson did not specify which faction was responsible. According to sources, the input from RAW suggested that most of these meetings to target India were held with the Hekmatyar group. The same ISI officials are said to have had such meetings with the Haqqani faction which too is known for being strongly backed by Pakistan.

The inputs said that officials from ISI's joint intelligence (north) and joint intelligence (miscellaneous) wings were present in these meetings. While joint intelligence (north) is responsible for ISI's operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the miscellaneous wing is known to carry out disruptive activities in foreign countries, mainly India. In fact, the infamous Karachi Project, which was confirmed by the home ministry earlier, is said to be the brainchild of joint intelligence (miscellaneous) wing.

Indian officials are also closely looking at the possibility of an army officer, Samir Ali, having played a role in the blasts. Ali is one of the army officers who have been named by India in the dossier provided to Pakistan on February 25. While it's not yet confirmed whether Ali is a serving officer or has retired, he is known to carry out operations for ISI. "Even if he has retired from the army, as per the information we have, he is certainly working for ISI and his focus is India,'' said an official, adding that Ali is wanted in 26/11 and was also one of David Headley's handlers.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 28 Feb 2010 05:45

There is an important bit in the statement of confidence from the Brit Army :

"I do not think we can afford to fail in Afghanistan because of the intoxicating effect failure will have on those militants who oppose democracy and our freedoms.

Why even the question of "failure"! It should never have crossed the mind of such a confident spokesperson! On the related news item, look at the concluding section in the "Afghan conflict :critical juncture" article linked from the main bbc page of the quoted article.

The reality of the situation is there: something I have been trying to draw attention to. Urban centres will be "cleared". But connecting those urban points up and enclose a territory that can be governed will be next to impossible given that the Talebs will mostly be locals. Given that the AFG economy for many many years will still be dominated by the heroin trade and other smuggling. So that it will still be the rugged countryside and not urban centres which will control the purse strings. How long will UK+USA be in a position to support the gov financially? How much of that finance will actually be siphoned off to safe havens in Dubai or Turkey? How much of that will be plowed back to fuel insurgency? No answers!

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 28 Feb 2010 08:36

brihaspati wrote:There is an important bit in the statement of confidence from the Brit Army :

"I do not think we can afford to fail in Afghanistan because of the intoxicating effect failure will have on those militants who oppose democracy and our freedoms.
Why even the question of "failure"! It should never have crossed the mind of such a confident spokesperson! On the related news item, look at the concluding section in the "Afghan conflict :critical juncture" article linked from the main bbc page of the quoted article.

The reality of the situation is there: something I have been trying to draw attention to. Urban centres will be "cleared". But connecting those urban points up and enclose a territory that can be governed will be next to impossible given that the Talebs will mostly be locals. Given that the AFG economy for many many years will still be dominated by the heroin trade and other smuggling. So that it will still be the rugged countryside and not urban centres which will control the purse strings. How long will UK+USA be in a position to support the gov financially? How much of that finance will actually be siphoned off to safe havens in Dubai or Turkey? How much of that will be plowed back to fuel insurgency? No answers!

Very true. That risk exists. And will continue to exist. Managing that risk could mean only doing so for a while and then the situation reverts to very ancient ways. That is the "Af" part.

However, any such reasoning on the "Pak" aspect of the equation? Do you see any future for the Pakis? Can we influence them to turn around and head in the right direction?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 28 Feb 2010 19:09

Afghan mission 'gone well' but real battle to come

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 04 Mar 2010 01:55

Kabul blast: Holbrooke’s comments surprise India

NEW DELHI: The contention by US Special Envoy on Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke that Indians were not the target of the latest Kabul attack has come as a surprise to the government here.
...
...
Holbrooke had told reporters in Washington yesterday that he did not "accept the fact that this was an attack on an Indian facility like the (Indian) embassy. They were foreigners, non-Indian foreigners hurt. It was a soft target. Let's not jump to conclusions."

The sources here wondered on what basis Holbrooke made the statement.
...
According to sources, the attackers, after detonating an explosion, stormed the two hotels and hunted for Indians staying there. One of the attackers, speaking in Urdu, even was calling his targets by name, according a report in Washington Post.

It is widely believed that LeT is a proxy for Pakistani agencies.

...

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Mar 2010 09:25

HoleBrook is out of touch. He does not read news reports not understand Urdu. Besides he has his won agenda, which is why India should act on her own. Perhaps "under the radar" to some extent ..... if that is even possible.

But, in short, who cares for this guy?

satya · Post by **satya** » 05 Mar 2010 17:40

Natural law brings AfPak crashing

The US's AfPak special representative Richard Holbrooke has run into head wind almost simultaneously in four key capitals in and around the Hindu Kush - Islamabad, Kabul, Tehran and New Delhi.
Holbrooke no doubt achieved spectacular success in London, by rushing an agenda of "reintegration" and reconciliation of the Afghan Taliban through the assembled gathering of statesmen. The gathering included such inveterate critics of the doctrine of the "good Taliban" as India, China and Russia. But Holbrooke kept the lot together. That was probably the finest hour of AfPak diplomacy.

Pakistan sets ground rules
But did he force the pace? No sooner had the crowd dispersed from London, than AfPak diplomacy began unraveling. First, Pakistan went ahead and "captured" the Taliban's deputy head Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. The funny thing is that Baradar was shaping up as a key interlocutor for AfPak diplomacy. The Mullah or his men were darting in and out of the Persian Gulf oasis towns having secret rendezvous with American envoys. Call it Track II or whatever, but a track was being cleared for the US's reconciliation with the Taliban's Quetta shura - its top leadership organ.

Or, at least, that was how Washington assessed the situation. Of course, these goings on were completely in the know of Pakistan. But there was a crucial difference: they were not being conducted through Pakistani mediation. So, Pakistan just nabbed Baradar. The dilemma facing AfPak diplomacy today is: how do you negotiate when you don't have an interlocutor? A kind of recess is developing in the AfPak diplomatic calendar.

Pakistan's message is straightforward: any negotiations with the Taliban ought to be conducted through the proper channel, namely, Pakistan's ISI. Actually, it is not too much to demand. Pakistan committed a great deal of resources to stop the Taliban disintegrating through some of their darkest days between 2001 and 2004. Islamabad cannot be expected to just roll over and let the Americans inherit the crown jewels ("strategic assets") when the hour of glory is nearing.

Karzai delivers a blow
Witnessing the determination in Islamabad to lock the stable doors to prevent the studs from being stolen, Kabul seems to have followed suit. Afghan President Hamid Karzai went ahead with a decree "Afghanizing" the country's election commission. Curiously, Karzai acted unilaterally, just as Holbrooke was on a visit to Kabul.

There is some dramatic irony insofar as Karzai intended his move with the primary purpose of preempting the sort of regime change that Hobrooke attempted during the last presidential elections. Karzai has decreed that the Afghan election commission shall henceforth have no more foreigners - that is to say, there is no more scope for the US to plant proxy agents who might dictate terms within the election supervisory body.

The timing is interesting insofar as the Afghan parliamentary elections are due in August. Karzai expects insurgent groups to increase their participation in the elections to make the new parliament more representative. He has negotiated with the Taliban with this objective in mind. Karzai hopes to see the new parliament as an Afghan political base for himself that would insure against any US attempts to oust him.

AfPak diplomacy, on the other hand, is moving on an altogether different track to engage the Taliban with a view to integrate the latter in the Afghan mainstream politics, which would certainly necessitate Karzai making way for an "interim government" within a year or so. If he succeeds in constituting a new parliament with a four-year term as prescribed by the constitution, the US game plan will crash land.

The political stakes are indeed high. Karzai has, plainly put, cocked a snook at AfPak diplomacy. Washington has been left with no option for the present but to take Karzai's blow and pretend nothing happened. The only way out now will be to deny Karzai the international funding without which he may be hard-pressed to the elections in August. But that is a blatant strong-arm tactic. Besides, Karzai is a tenacious leader and may still find a way out to hold the elections, and that could deal a blow to American prestige.

Conceivably, Holbrooke left Kabul with mixed feelings. It is unclear whether Karzai took him into confidence about his move to clip the AfPak wings, though Karzi probably did not. Quite obviously, Karzai's move is primarily directed at the sort of diplomacy Holbrooke practises - loaded with a lot of muscle power.

An Iranian set-up
From Kabul, Holbrooke apparently headed for his first ever tour of Central Asian capitals as "part of an accelerating intensification of our [AfPak] diplomatic outreach efforts". But Iranian reports have since interpreted that Holbrooke's real mission was to hold a clandestine meeting with the Jundullah terrorist leader Abdul Malik Rigi at the US airbase at Manas on the outskirts of the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek.

Washington is studiously keeping mum at the Iranian allegation. But Tehran has followed up on the matter with Bishkek. The Kyrgyz ambassador in Tehran has been summoned to the foreign ministry and asked to explain how his country's government got mixed up with a notorious terrorist like Rigi.

The story is still unfolding and there is no need to second-guess that if the Iranians chose to divulge so much already to the media, they must know a lot more. Rigi is presently undergoing interrogation at the hands of the Iranian authorities. If the Iranian media reports have any basis, AfPak diplomacy stands exposed as inept and ludicrous. The Iranians seem to have not only plucked Rigi out of the hands of his American mentors (which doesn't speak highly of the US intelligence capability) but it is all but certain that Pakistani intelligence may have directly or indirectly been privy to the Iranian operation.

A storm in Delhi
But what happened on last Tuesday was much worse. For no apparent reason, Holbrooke waded into the explosive subject of the terrorist attack in Kabul on February 25 which resulted in the killing of nine Indians, including two senior army officers. At a press briefing in Washington on Tuesday, he rubbished the preliminary assessment of Indian (and Afghan) officials that it was a targeted attack by the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-i-Taiba masterminded by the ISI.

"I don't accept the fact that this was an attack on an Indian facility like the embassy.'' Holbrooke said. ''They were foreigners, non-Indian foreigners hurt. It was a soft target. And let's not jump to conclusions. I understand why everyone in Pakistan and everyone in India always focuses on the other. But, please, let's not draw a conclusion which - for which there's no proof."

The Indian embassy was attacked by a suicide bomber last October, with 17 people killed. It was also bombed in July 2008 when 60 people died.

In principle, Holbrooke had a point, as the inquiry into last week's Kabul attack is still underway. But there is evidence that the terrorists went from room to room and sought out the Indians before killing them. Delhi is shocked that Holbrooke would go out on a limb apparently to cover up for the ISI.

But why he spoke at all - and its awkward timing - is becoming important. After all, diplomacy is also about remaining silent. Especially when Delhi and Islamabad are entangled in high-strung diplomacy under close US watch from behind the curtain.

The feeling in Delhi is that Holbrooke spoke on purpose. He is no doubt a consummate diplomat.

Holbrooke was likely indulging in a complex image-building exercise. The Baradar setback aside, Holbrooke has been having a rough time with the Pakistanis. According to the Delhi grapevine, he refers to the Pakistanis in a highly disparaging way as "useless fellows". The reading in Delhi is that the Pakistanis receive Holbrooke with elaborate courtesy and lavish hospitality, but prefer to do hard business with the Pentagon on the substantive issues of AfPak policy.

Holbrooke probably hoped that by placing ambassador Robin Raphel, who enjoyed past connections with the Pakistani establishment and the Taliban leadership, as his deputy in Islamabad he would get an inside track on the Quetta shura. But for Pakistan, anything involving the Quetta shura is for now deadly business. Pakistan is using Raphel to lobby in Washington for increased aid and so on, but it keeps the Quetta shura out of the matrix.

The harsh reality is that Pakistan is in a position to make or unmake AfPak diplomacy - and also AfPak diplomats. It holds the trump cards to deliver the Taliban to the negotiating table. And Islamabad is skilled enough to manipulate Washington.

In sum, with Karzai spinning out of control and Islamabad making a mockery of AfPak diplomacy, Holbrooke most probably spoke out of pressure. Viewed from Delhi, Holbrooke made a high-profile attempt to ingratiate himself with the powers that be who control Lashkar-i-Taiba. Whether he will succeed in this enterprise or not remains to be seen but he has certainly annoyed the Indian establishment.

The Indians made diplomatic demarche both at Delhi and at Washington, taking exception to Holbrooke's "unhelpful" outburst over the Kabul terrorist strike. After repeatedly rebuffing Holbrooke's request to visit Delhi for consultations, Indians finally received him only in late January in the immediate run-up to the London conference. Holbrooke blithely forecast at his press conference on Tuesday that he hopes to visit Delhi next with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. How Mullen (or Delhi for that matter) views the prospect remains to be seen.

Will Obama step in?
Why is AfPak diplomacy in such disarray? It isn't entirely Holbrooke's fault. For one thing, South Asians aren't like the "junkyard dogs" that he came across in the Balkans in the mid-1990s. They are a deeper lot credited with oriental patience and can be every bit as tenacious as Holbrooke himself must be.

Then, there is also a far deeper issue. Holbrooke is seriously handicapped by an AfPak brief that keeps evolving in his hands. This was not like the case with Yugoslavia where the Bill Clinton administration pursued a cold-blooded agenda. The Washington Post reported that the AfPak diplomacy has confused all protagonists, including the Afghans.

At any rate, Holbrooke has been left somewhat stranded on the center stage. The worst thing that can happen to a diplomat is to be expected to stay in the limelight and yet not do anything.

Second, unlike in the 1990s, the US's influence is much diminished today, but its diplomats work as if they operate in a unipolar world. The plain truth is that regional powers like India, Iran or even Pakistan are far from convinced about the US's AfPak policy. And they can be expected to do their utmost to safeguard their interests, no matter what the US diplomats prescribe as good enough.

The tailwind that the London conference was expected to generate dissipated all too soon and AfPak diplomacy is running into head winds that may make forward movement difficult. But Obama gets an opportunity to tack into the wind in early April when he is due to meet the prime ministers of India and Pakistan on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 05 Mar 2010 19:57

"I don't accept the fact that this was an attack on an Indian facility like the embassy.'' Holbrooke said.

Facts have to be accepted. There is no other way Mr. "Ambassador".

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 05 Mar 2010 20:03

Official: Another Taliban leader arrested in Pakistan

Pakistani attempts to control who does what:

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - A top Taliban leader has been arrested in the southern port city of Karachi, Pakistan, a senior Pakistani military official told CNN.

The official did not say when or how Agha Jan Motasim was arrested.

Motasim is the sixth Taliban leader to be arrested in the past month, the senior Pakistani official said. The others are: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Mullah Abdul Salam, Moulvi Abdul Kabir, Mullah Muhammad Younas and Mullah Muhammad Mir.

Indian silence on this matter is also rather strange.

Hari Seldon · Post by **Hari Seldon** » 05 Mar 2010 21:11

NRao wrote:Facts have to be accepted. There is no other way Mr. "Ambassador".

You mean, Mr Dumbassador, right?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 05 Mar 2010 22:08

^^^^.

Yup.

Holbrook reminds me of the old chalta-phirtha-dak-ghar (mobile post office) of yester India. At least these mobile post offices had value, served a great purpose.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 05 Mar 2010 22:32

NRao wrote:Official: Another Taliban leader arrested in Pakistan

Pakistani attempts to control who does what:

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - A top Taliban leader has been arrested in the southern port city of Karachi, Pakistan, a senior Pakistani military official told CNN.

The official did not say when or how Agha Jan Motasim was arrested.

Motasim is the sixth Taliban leader to be arrested in the past month, the senior Pakistani official said. The others are: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Mullah Abdul Salam, Moulvi Abdul Kabir, Mullah Muhammad Younas and Mullah Muhammad Mir.
Indian silence on this matter is also rather strange.

The 'good' members in Quetta Shura are being taken out. Its clear from the article satya posted that Barader was working with Karzai to turn the Poplazais out of the Quetta Shura which would have broken it up or collapsed it. However TSP arrested those guys and US can't do anything because Holbroke has no clout and fulminates on the weak. Instead of being furious with TSP he wants to mollycoddle their terrorism. And that will reinforce their intransigence.

PS: Also the term 'useless fellows' is an Indic term for 'veddava' ie is those who cant conduct Hindu ceremonies due to death of their wives. Is Holbrooke consorting with Indics?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 05 Mar 2010 23:22

Re Popalzais being rounded up :

Malayappan wrote:Pak agencies nab key Afghan Taliban leader
What I note in this piece is
Reports from Afghanistan said Agha is the son-in-law of Mullah Omar. Agha had introduced himself to investigators as Tayyeb Popalzai
Some questions, some conjectures -

Is it kosher for a Ghilzai to have Popalzai as surname, even if it is to cheat? And if the first sentence is true, can a Ghilzai have a Popalzai son in law?
If Agha is indeed arrested, and he is a Popalzai, another piece would have fallen in place. If so will it be prudent to conclude that pakistan has placed its bets firmly on Ghilzais, even if at the cost of Popalzais?
The second question here is the US attitude to this dimension. Can we conclude that the US goes with pakistan's bet - given the pressures on Karzai, evident bonhomie between US and paki army etc? On this count Kandahar Taliban are mostly Popalzais? If so, they should expect a big squeeze post Marja.
If this proceeds as per US and paki plans, Karzai will be toppled (or even worse), and a Haqqani nominated warlord will be crowned as the moderate Taliban. US can be expected to place him in Kabul with paki army 'advisors' overt or covert presence.
Other elements like Tajiks-Uzbegs-Hazaras as well as Popalzais will get a grand squeeze from US - media offensive (warlordism, corruption etc), cajoling and bribing, targeted assassinations etc to fall in line.
India should announce quietly and clearly that it has legitimate historical and cultural interests in Afghanistan, and it owes to play its role to the people of Afghanistan, and it will defend its interests and fulfill its responsibilities despite any other country's priorities. And kick off the diplomatic piece with Putin's visit - hopefully there will be some clear indications in their joint statement.

Mullah Omar's other s-i-l is OBL. So what kohser about that?
It makes sense even the Tailban made sure that they had a Popalzai as the PM in their time.

I too think its a Popalzai purge out of Taliban is underway. The reason is the Popalzai Taliban have kinship links with the ruling Karzai govt and could be accomodated by the latter. The Ghilzais, if that is who the TSP and US are betting on, haven't been ruling/governing since 1700s and are fully discredited in the tribal structures due to their excess cruelty and other things. So for the Ghilzai formula to work the tribes have to be re-made. Quite bloody.

To me the KArzai search for good Taliban was to split the Poplazais out of the Taliban and forge unity govt with the non-Pashtun Afghans. However Holbrooke threw a haddi in the kabab by propping up Abdullah^2 against Karzai in last elections and allegations of corruption and fraud.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 05 Mar 2010 23:32

>>Indian silence on this matter is also rather strange.

Not if you factor in that from our perspective, there is no "good Taliban". This is a temporary American construct the purpose of which will be served once most or at least some of these ignorant morons are handed over. Pakistan then will be left holding rather interesting reputation among the remaining "bad Taliban" as their mentor/maintainer in chief. Classic divide et impera by Uncle Sam.

Probably without recognising it, due to a particular kind of stupidity that does not permit a collective visualisation of the big picture among the Pak top echelons, they are engaged in a series of tactically brilliant moves that will end up in them hoisted on their own petard in the orificial position (or to put it in BRF terms, GUBO on their own flagpole). This is when Foggy Bottom will open up and Amritraj will re-enter the picture.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 05 Mar 2010 23:41

I think the TSPA outfoxed the US by arresting the Poplazai Tailban to ensure the talks will be with the others who are under their control. No Ghilzai will be able to talk to Karzai and desert the Taliban ranks.
The counter move should be to ensure for the handover of the arrested Popalzais to Afghanistan. But US doesn't trust Karzai is they made it very clear last year. They need to be clear what does the US want? if they want a snake to be let loose on India as needed then TSPA will win. If they want Afghan stability then they have to make up their mind that arresting spent terrorists is not a solution to the problem.

Fate has its own way of making thing clear. If the US doesn't press for access to Popalzai then they want to feed the snake despite all the pious protestations of Holbrooke.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Mar 2010 00:05

JE,

Point taken.

I should have been more explicit. I think this is prefect time for Indian one-liners "told you so, Pakistan is loaded with Taliban and now they are being picked up. Bet it is the same with AQ too."

Then keep absolutely quite, till the next one-liner time.

India, it seems to me, can no longer make big, long speeches. The end game for THIS phase is near. One-liner time.

Also, is it just me? This Holebrooke guy seems to be a frustrated single zip code on the move!!! Does not seem to realize that that is all he is - a bunch of old, static numbers. Seems to me that Madam Clinton has played a great game here. Took two of the most burning issues and handed them to two people who could get afford to get burnt and not impact her rule. (And, if they win, so much the better.)

However, I still maintain that ISI needs to go. Only then there will be shanti in the region.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Mar 2010 00:10

I recall a Afghani Taliban inviting India to the table.

Is there a "Taliban" group that India is comfortable with?

krithivas · Post by **krithivas** » 06 Mar 2010 00:11

#1) This is the price of inaction - that ISI can act with impunity and without any fear of any retribution.
#2) DDM as usual - Publishing detailed emotional state of staffers. Fear.
#3) If there is no action, then there is only Fear.

http://ibnlive.in.com/news/isi-asks-kar ... ml?from=tn

The R&AW chief told the Prime Minister that his agency had picked up a conversation between ISI head Shuja Pasha and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai himself.
..........
Pasha reportedly asked for a scaled down Indian presence in Afghanistan, including its cultural presence, in return for negotiating a truce between Karzai and the Taliban.
.........
Sources confirm that two Indian government staffers working at the Embassy want to pack their bags and come home.
...
Others employees are equally rattled and there are reasons to be nervous.
...

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Mar 2010 00:16

The Popalzai Taliban.

OK let me say what I think Indian strategy has been vis a vis Afghanistan. India does not have a contiguos border to influence Afghanistan. And the presence of multiple identities in Afghanistan would lead any outsider, who supports a faction, into the cauldron. So modern India's stance has been to support the legitimate government in Kabul. Note the emphasis on legitimate.
The corrollary is any legitimate governemnt will reflect the aspirations of a majority of the people.

And this will lead to erasure of lines.

If this is correct then the group that supports the legitimate govt in KAbul is the one that will be satisfactory to India and Indian interests.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 07 Mar 2010 01:59

^^^^^
Power to the Popal?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 07 Mar 2010 03:12

krithivas wrote: ISI asks Karzai to scale down India's presence

1) India seems to have some rather sophisticated snooping technologies - if they can snoop on a Pasha-Karzai conversation. (they should be able to do a far better job inside India here on out too.)
2) With letting this particular cat out of the bag, India has put a lot of people in a tight corner - good for them. IMHO, this lets the air out of the "talk with Pakistan" balloon. IF the Pakistani intent was to bring India to the table AND ensure Indian absence in Afghan affairs, that has been deflated even before it got started. Ability to snoop on the ISI Chief has made "scale down India's presence" a joke in a way - Karzai has not say in this matter
3) 30,000 Taliban in and around Kabul with ability to "strike at will"? Why is NATO there at all? Another balloon that is leaking whatever
4) US and other parties will now need to take India a lot more seriously. All these years India had to rely on the US for key snooped information (Kargil - between Mush and Nawaz Bhai - or was it another general?). Is any network safe? May be Indian made daughter boards have ..........................

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Mar 2010 10:36

ramana wrote:Cutting to the chase this is what I see as viable. I can go on and on about the factors that influence Afghanistan but it will be like a RAND report or worse IDSA article.

PLAN:

- US increase troop presence and crushes bad Taliban. Otherwise it will lose and the malaise kicks in.
- US manages TSP while doing this. Not at cost of any other nation.
- The good Taliban get regularized into para-military scouts etc. Crucial to get them under a uniform and get rid of their tribal dress. The Afghan National Army still gets its share of Tajiks and Uzbegs and Hazaras as top layer to guarantee the ethnic rights.
- The Ghilzais and Durranis have to make up and work out a compromise certified by the loya jirga to ensure Pashtun solidarity.
- An all powers conference to declare Afghan neutrality is crucial to return Afghanistan to buffer status like in the 19th century. This is to neutralize any wet dreams of wannabe jihadis. Same time all the ethnic areas will have millat/autonomy status: Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras and Uzbegs. The rights of sub-minorities in these areas are guaranteed by Afghan National Govt eg. Pashtuns in Tajik areas und so weiter.

A G-8/OECD/INDIA and PRC economic program has to be worked out to stabilize the country. US will have the TSP economic stabilization program.

A strong advice is to seek Pashtun autonomy in TSP as a self determination right same as the Kurds in Iraq to satisfy the self determination rights. as this is related to the Afghan issue.

abhishek_sharma wrote:NWFP renaming

http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=27650

ISLAMABAD: In a major development, the PML-N and the ANP are inching towards an agreement to rename the NWFP as “Pukhtoonkhwa-Abaseen” and a final decision would be announced in this regard soon.

According to sources in both the parties, the ANP had already showed flexibility on its demand of renaming the NWFP as Pukhtoonkhwa and even agreed on the names of ‘Afghania’ or ‘Pukhtoonistan’ but the PML-N was demanding the affix of “Abaseen’ or “Khyber with Pukhtoonkhwa to satisfy the people of Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara belt, where Saraiki or Hindko dominates, respectively.

All is well.

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 07 Mar 2010 12:20

ramanaGaru

Please send me an an e-mail at laksast_ at hotmail dot com

RudraJi,

I will send you an an e-mail. You are the man. I am trying to place you. But did you show up at Akbar restaurant in NJ during one of our BR meets? Man, I miss NJ.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 07 Mar 2010 19:43

Ramana ji,

Thanks for those reposts. I totally missed those nuggets. Does fill in some gaps (that I had).

Airavat · Post by **Airavat** » 08 Mar 2010 14:01

TTP chiefs claimed dead

Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, deputy chief of the TTP, was among those killed in Mohmand tribal agency, the private Geo News reported.

Qari Zia-ur-Rehman, who was leading militants in Bajaur in fight against the security forces, was also killed in the operation in Pandiali area of Mohmand agency, according to reports.

Another senior TTP commander Fateh was also reported killed in the operation, Geo reported while quoting sources as saying.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Mar 2010 22:52

Nightwatch comments:

Pakistan: Interior Minister Rehman Malik said today that Faqir Mohammad, a senior commander of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, i.e., TTP) and a commander in the Bajaur region, may have been killed in a helicopter gunship attack, Reuters reported on 6 March.

Rehman Malik said Faqir Mohammad was meeting with another commander in the basement of the building when Pakistani forces attacked on the 5th. Malik added that another Taliban commander, Fateh Mohammad, also was killed along with at least 16 insurgents.

Comment: The significance of the report is it shows the pressure continues against Afghan and Pakistani Taliban leaders.

One dimension of the anti-Taliban campaign that receives little attention in US media is the larger political significance of the campaign. It is the outward manifestation of a profound political realignment.

The Pakistan Army forged a political alliance with Islamic fundamentalists during the regime of General Zia ul-Haq in the mid-1980s. Musharraf arranged and relied on support from the Islamists to have himself elected president twice, but they proved unreliable political partners after the siege of the Red Mosque in mid-2007. Musharraf’s violent reduction of that Islamist insurrection was the trigger for the formation of the Pakistani Taliban.

Despite the increasingly violent insurrection, including the murder of Benazir Bhutto, the Army did not abandon the Islamists and resisted suppressing them until the South Waziristan campaign against the Mehsud tribe. Even then, other Islamist leaders, including all significant Afghan Taliban leaders, remained protected by the Army and its agent, the Intelligence Service. Madrassahs, Islamic schools, always proliferated during periods of Army rule, including under Musharraf, according to a study published by the Daily Times.

Since late January all that has changed. The Army with the Intelligence Service as its agent has turned on previously protected Islamist leaders from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus the Army has turned against one component of its political support base, meaning it has burned some political bridges. The reversal is not total because Mullah Omar is still at large. One may be absolutely certain Pakistani intelligence knows precisely where he lives and provides guards because they knew where lesser luminaries lived before they were arrested.

The Islamists overreached and their leaders are on the run. Pakistan has become a hostile environment for them and that is a permanent solution to their ability to make mischief, for as long as it lasts. The Pakistan Army has given the government strong leverage for protecting Pakistani interests in any power sharing arrangement in Afghanistan and for stopping the rise of Islamist political influence in Pakistan, for a time.

Afghanistan: Update. A local police spokesman in Baghlan Province said 20 militants from Hizb-e-Islami surrendered to the Afghan government, Xinhua reported 7 March. The fighters joined the government after a 6 March clash between Hizb-e-Islami and Afghan Taliban militants in the Kokchinar area of Baghlan-e-Markazi District where the fighting resulted in at least 30 people killed. The reported reason for the clash is rivalry over extending power and collecting taxes from local agricultural products.

The spokesman said police had surrounded the area, which still is seeing sporadic fighting between the two sides.

Comment: The government has not disclosed the identity of the Hizb-e-Islami group leader, but the locale of the fighting corresponds to the recent PBS special about the operations of the Central Group under Commander Mirwais. Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is notorious for switching sides in order to align himself and his followers with Helmatyar’s estimate of the likely short term winner, which appears to be the Afghan Government.

I think he is mis-reading the situation. TSPA is hitting/taking out those terrorists who are against itself: Poplazai Taliban in Quetta Shura, TTP etc. What they are doing is ensuring that only bad Taliban are available for the negotiation table when it happens.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 09 Mar 2010 04:45

My KSA monitor - interesting take.
Contours of the US-Taliban peace deal

by Zia Sarhadi
(Monday, March 8, 2010)

"US politics revolve round grabbing others’ resources - peacefully if they may, forcibly if they must. In Afghanistan’s case, force has failed to achieve the desired result so Uncle Sam, an ill-mannered and uncouth operator, is about to put on the charm offensive all over again, for oil and gas and to save his thick hide."

Regardless of US spin, the endgame in Afghanistan has begun. Aware that they cannot defeat the Taliban militarily, the Americans have changed tune. They are now talking about enticing “moderate” Taliban from the hardcore in order to weaken the insurgency but as even Mike Mullen, Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted early last month, the insurgency has spread to Afghanistan’s northern provinces as well, much beyond the traditional Taliban stronghold in the south and west.

American officials including the top US general in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal, have admitted that there is no military solution. McChrystal said that every military campaign must have as its endgame a political solution. When generals start talking about political solutions, it is a tacit admission that they have failed in their military mission and are looking for a face-saving exit strategy. Whether the Taliban will offer one is open to question.

The new policy was publicly announced in London on January 28 when foreign ministers from 70 countries assembled in the British capital, ostensibly to raise funds for Afghanistan that would be offered as inducements to preen away “moderate” Taliban from the hardcore. It is like looking for Dalmatians without spots. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, facing an increasingly hostile public, admitted that the war cannot go on forever. At the London conference an estimate $1 billion were pledged. Afghan President Hamid Karzai once again appealed to the Taliban to join his government and he also announced that a Loya Jirga would be convened and he invited the Taliban leader, Mullah Umar to join him. He was profuse in his praise of the one-eyed Taliban leader calling him a “brother” and said we have to sit together and talk.

Talking may be better than fighting but if the Taliban feel, as they clearly do, that they are winning and that the Americans do not have stomach for a prolonged fight especially in view of the rapidly deteriorating US economy with millions of people out of jobs and millions more forced to live in tents, they may decide to wait out the Loya Jirga even if Karzai promises to serve lamb kebab and rice.

According to Crescent International contacts in Pakistan, back channel negotiations are already underway between the Taliban leadership and the US through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Saudi regime. The Saudi intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz has been negotiating with Mullah Omar through his senior aide and commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was captured in Karachi at the end of January but was reported only on February 15. His capture has raised questions about the true motive of the operation. Publicly, the Taliban have dismissed the idea of negotiations; this is for public consumption because they do not want to be seen as negotiating with the kafirs, especially in the eyes of their rank-and-file members who have been brought up on the notion that there will be no negotiations until all foreign troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. If they are, there will be precious little left to negotiate.

The gap between public pronouncements and private dealings is being narrowed by Pakistani and Saudi intermediaries. During Karzai’s visit to Saudi Arabia under the cover of performing Umrah on his way back from London, he met King Abdullah on February 2. He again appealed to the Saudi monarch for help as he had done during the London conference. Abdullah told him that he would agree only if the Taliban were to first cut off links with Osama bin Laden. This would not be difficult; Osama is already dead notwithstanding the fake audio taped messages that are periodically broadcast on Al-Jazeera, an American mouthpiece in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda, too, does not exist; it is a creation of the Americans and they raise this bogeyman in order to justify their worldwide military aggressions and to frighten their ill-informed public into supporting ill-conceived policies.

Secret discussions between the US and Taliban were resumed through Pakistani and Saudi intermediaries last November. The Americans wanted the Taliban to stop attacking government buildings in Kabul. The Taliban would have agreed but President Barack Obama’s troop surge announcement on December 1 at West Point upset them. Obama had taken several weeks before making the announcement. The US ambassador, Karl Eikenberry, too, had spoken out against the troop surge. It was not because of any higher principle or that the ambassador, who had served until 2007 as the top US commander in Afghanistan, had suddenly become a peacenik. Eikenberry was in indirect contact with the Taliban and he knew that the troop surge would undermine those efforts, especially since everyone had realized that America and its allies would not be able to defeat the Taliban militarily. His argument was: why provoke them?

He was proved right. As soon as Obama announced the troop surge, the Taliban cut off all contacts. And in order to drive home the point, they launched a massive attack on Kabul on January 18 targeting the presidential palace as Karzai was swearing in the few ministers appro-ved by parliament; the finance, justice and mines ministries, the central bank, as well as the Serena Hotel, the Ariana cinema and a new shopping mall. Some 20 Taliban were involved in the attack that was both daring and brazen in its scope. They delivered the message that no place, not even Kabul with its high security buildings, was safe from such attacks. Karzai certainly got the message; within 10 days, he was ap-pealing to the Taliban for talks.

Through Pakistani and Saudi interlocutors, the Taliban have been urged to resume negotiations. The new deal being hammered out is that the Americans would not increase their troop strength substantially; that troops heading for Afghanistan would simply replace those that are ending their tour of duty. This will save face on both sides: the Taliban would get what they want and Obama would say that he has fulfilled his pledge of a troop surge.

This does not mean that peace will break out in Afghanistan tomorrow. Negotiations, especially conducted through intermediaries and in secret, often have a tendency of falling apart as a result of misunderstandings or miscommunication. There are also the divergent interests of the parties involved. The Americans do not intend to leave the country completely. After all, they did not spend hundreds of billions of dollars to return home empty-handed. What they are looking for is a way to reduce direct military involvement while the heavy lifting is handed over to the Afghans. As Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University (England) put it, “The spin is that Afghanistan can take charge of its own security.” That is not the case and Karzai knows it. His regime would not last a few weeks if foreign troops leave, hence his talk about Western troop presence for the next 15 years or more. The real question is whether the Americans can afford such a long-term commitment to prop up a corrupt, unpopular puppet. The Taliban can at least guarantee security and would not need the Americans to prop them up.

So what does the future hold? No quick breakthroughs can be expected. The negotiations will drag on for quite some time. The Americans want to avoid the Saigon moment (the 1975 scramble out of Saigon when Americans clung to helicopter skids as they took off from the US embassy with the Vietcong pouring into the city) as well as the retreat march out of Kabul as the Russians experienced in February 1989. Instead, they would like to keep some contingents under the guise of reconstruction teams to “rebuild” Afghanistan, the country they have ravaged for nearly 10 years. They would even promise to pay for reconstruction provided the Taliban agree to allow the oil and gas pipeline from Central Asia through Qandahar and into Pakistan. It was the same pipeline deal they had rejected back in July 2001 that resulted in the US invasion of Afghanistan. The events of 9/11 were just a pretext for launching the invasion.

US politics revolve round grabbing others’ resources - peacefully if they may, forcibly if they must. In Afghanistan’s case, force has failed to achieve the desired result so Uncle Sam, an ill-mannered and uncouth operator, is about to put on the charm offensive all over again, for oil and gas and to save his thick hide.

Malayappan · Post by **Malayappan** » 09 Mar 2010 08:55

A guide to recent militant arrests and deaths in Afghanistan and Pakistan from FP

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Mar 2010 22:13

X-Post...

Gagan wrote:One possible solution to the Af-Pak problem is here on this CIA map that we've all seen.

Why don't the powers that be, make Afghanistan the dominant power in Af-Pak and leave it to deal with both the pakistani-remnant and Iran? It might sound silly today, but one of the aims of pakistan's strategic depth policy is to prevent any such eventuality. It seems the generals in pindi fear this.

Why not let their fears have a life of its own?

Added later: Karachi is a contested region between the baloch and the Sindhis - how many people know that? Karachi lies to the west of the Indus, and the balochis allege that their territory was taken from them and handed over to the sindhis. This map shows karachi to be a part of sindh.

Also POK reverts back to the Indian nation with a common border between india and afghanistan, cutting off chinese access to pakistani-remnant.

The Indian preference should be an independent Sindh.

Malayappan · Post by **Malayappan** » 10 Mar 2010 07:09

The AfPak endgame is nigh from The Pioneer by Nitin Pai

Gen Kayani’s moves suggest that he sees the final lap