why even bother ? the army will issue a GSQR after four years of work, read jane's the day after and issue a new GSQR the next week. and once a tank made to their specs is ready they will say it was late and go on to buy russian anyway.Surya wrote:needs the ARmy to spec out its requirement for next gen"CVRDE should work on future gen"
Where did you get the 1500 MBT number from? Is it from Wiki? The reason I ask is that Israel has these whole lot Armored Divisions (active+reserve) and those are very low numbers (even if I add the low category tank numbers from Wiki). Last I checked, IDF had 3 Active Armored Divisions [active component (2*Armored Bde+1*Artillery Bde)+reserve component (1*Mech Bde+1*Armored Bde)] + 9 Reserve Armored Division. These cannot be filled with the number of MBTs that you've mentioned. The numbers of tanks should be around 7,000-8,000. Let me look up for source for the numbers.nrshah wrote:..........<SNIP>............So did Israeli army rejected Merkava 1 because it had some problems? over 250 Merkava 1 were ordered and built before going for 2 or 3 or 4....
Do you know what is the size of inventory of MBT in Israeli army? It is close to 1500 tanks.. An order of 250 signifies 16% of tank force committed to Mk 1 which as you stated had some problem. Compare the same with a peanut order of 124 arjun in an inventory of around 4000 tanks and u will understand the level of co operation and efforts to desi products... Even 500 arjuns are only 12.5% compared to 16% of Israel...<SNIP>....
So, the IAF is fully behind MCA, and have outlined what it expects from it in official documentation. Same is the case with LCA where it expects to have around 200 LCAs. So there is commitment and intent, and the IAF is fully behind LCA. That gives the confidence to the ADA to go ahead with development of technologies as they know it will hold good for LCA and also form basis for MCA. Also note that ADA has decided to go ahead with an imported engine while simultaneously trying to develop kaveri in parallel. Do you think the GoI would go for that if all that the IAF wanted to order was 40 LCAs?...
As per official documentation by the IAF, it wants the MCA to be a twin-pilot configured multirole stealth aircraft capable of "close air support, all weather interception, air defence suppression, long-range strike, electronic attack, limited command & control and reconnaisance" -- that's the profile from an official IAF wishlist to the ADA last year. That might roll right off the air force's tongue, like off a brochure, but they're deadly serious. Putting all speculation to rest when it officially began dialogue about the MCA in 2008, the IAF said it was not willing to look at a strike aircraft with other capabilities. It wants a fully multirole (preferably, swingrole) aircraft for the job.
...
chocolate will be fantastic. There is a lot of good news that is going to flow. I am working on confirmations. After that more chocolates can flow.Kanson wrote:Good or bad, let keep the news flowing.
and vice-versa i presumeWhat we need to see is it take hits from other tanks (especially 120 mmm non russian ones) and what survives inside?
Both T-90 and ARJUN then are dead end in Tank Design prespective.Oh and by the way - we do not hate the T 90 - just think its a dead end in tank design, will leave a lot of dead Indian crews and find the Arjun superior. Reverse the numbers and you will not hear fro us.
absolutelyand vice-versa i presume
T55\Vijayanta\t 72??
hope u will not resort to name callingWow
this is what you came up with ??
smacks lips
will come back - got some meetings - later gator
unless someone else skewers you -
Which it has, it has devoted a full regiment worth of manpower and has baby sat CVRDE as it made its way.putnanja wrote: The IA has to fully support the Arjun and work out the kinks in service. .
Yes, isnt it amazing, we have tons of those which need changing, yet for some reason bashing upp T 90 has become fashionable.d_berwal wrote:
Both T-90 and ARJUN then are dead end in Tank Design prespective.
where were ur concern when we had vijayanta/T-55/T-72(virtully no armor) facing there T-80u / AK-I
about Arjun not being perfect when first inducted by the IA how do they explain a huge order of 1500+ T-90s being placed only to get receive a buggy platform when the first batch arrived ; in case of the former had similar trust and support been extended to DRDO and CVRDE in form of assured orders Arjun's induction and growth as platform would have been faster .Of course GoI can not finance R&D hoping MoD will accept it they are from the same body after all (nitpicking). MoD finances a project after deciding its need and MoD is also the final acceptor.putnanja wrote:Sanku, you sadly don't know how the procurement/development works. The GoI doesn't finance R&D projects hoping the MoD will accept it.
And what do private industries bid on the basis of? Paper models? Or pre developed expertise as well as R&D monies already spent and prototypes and competencies developed? (Rhetorical question the answer is obviously the later)It is similar situation in all countries. Developing products costs lot of money. In US/Europe etc, the users come up with the requirements and call for bidding from private industries. They then select the winner and fund the project while being totally involved in the project in all phases.
Which I have not asked DRDO to do. I have asked for competency development in the field of fighting vehicles like was done with ADA.To ask DRDO to comeup with something and then ask the armed forces to accept it just doesn't make sense. It has to be user driven and user must be involved in all aspects of the development
Like 25 years instead of 30 yesnegi wrote:And for those who
Rahul da, the same page says that IDF has 12 Armored Divisions. The same ties up with the number I gave: 3 Active+9 Reserves. If IA with 3*Armored+ (I) Armored Bde+RAPIDS has ~4000 tanks, then an Army with 12 Armored+4 Mechanized Divisions should have far higher number. The authors could have corelated the two numbers: ~3800 tanks+12 Armored Divisions. My guessestimate is that those numbers are for 3 Active Armored Divisions+ Mehcanized Divisions.Rahul M wrote:rohit, the reference of the wiki page for the inventory data is this. http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291245235226.pdf. turn to page 11, the number of MBTs is given as 3360(3740) I expect the number in () is the reserve force figure. that would put it closer to your estimate.............<SNIP>
Ah the baki argument about quoting development timelines of Yindoo weapons development programme when other arguments fail . SHould we also include the development timelines of T-90 (basically a upgraded T-72 , 1970 vintage) ; and of course compare the platforms now that timelines are being quoted.Sanku wrote: Like 25 years instead of 30 yes
Yeah like the sight going kaput in desert heat or when some gung ho afsar claimed MBTs do not need AC only to eat crow soup later . And what happened to the mythical Refleks firing capability of T-90 which we hear BDL is having issues producing (ToT anyone ?Meanwhile, T 90s issues are way different than Arjun; Arjun had basic GSQR issue till 1998-2001 (didnt even meet GSQR fully in 1998 but was waived in anyway after saying they will meet by 2001) After this it still had tons of robustness issues has found in joint testing by all stakeholders even in 2004.
).Time will tell how many T-90s will be delivered by Avadi out of stipulated 1000 and in what time , we have the MKI template in front to get a fair idea about the way things run in India.And yes if Avadi could not manufacture 124 tanks in time without a firm order of X numbers of tanks they should not have committed to meet the production targets which they have slipped by about 100%.
Yes it took 25 years for DRDO to DESIGN,BUILD and DELIVER a MBT and how many years did the Jernails in IA took to get their ARTY guns ? last I checked they were busy doing trials .And yes about 25 years of Arjun development does tend to bias IA somewhat
It is so easy to spout BS without any thing to back up what you say, right. This when more than one poster has pointed the facts. But you are sure selective in your reading.Like 25 years instead of 30 yes
Here we go again.....more BS.And yes if Avadi could not manufacture 124 tanks in time without a firm order of X numbers of tanks they should not have committed to meet the production targets which they have slipped by about 100%.
Guess, what would you say about 25 years of changed GSQR and shifting of goal posts doesn't count.......bad bad DRDO...And yes about 25 years of Arjun development does tend to bias IA somewhat
Forgot to address this point in earlier post. Guess your frontline MBT's electronics not being able to withstand the environment in their most likey area of operations is not basic enough. While Arjun was told to go and get the whole system to work in the same environment without any facny-shmancy "environment control" nonsense........Meanwhile, T 90s issues are way different than Arjun; Arjun had basic GSQR issue till 1998-2001 (didnt even meet GSQR fully in 1998 but was waived in anyway after saying they will meet by 2001) After this it still had tons of robustness issues has found in joint testing by all stakeholders even in 2004.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... l/army.htmBetween 1977 and 1987, the IDF reconfigured its units as its tank inventory grew, reducing the number of infantry brigades while increasing the number of armored brigades from twenty to thirty-three upon mobilization. {=roughly 3450 tanks}
Uri_T? This is his site: http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/Rahul M wrote:now where is that IDF armoured corps vet we had on BR a few months back ?
As long as you keep on posting the stuff you write, I'm not exactly going to "COOL OFF". I cannot allow you to post BS about the system and get away with it. You can consider it my "jeeehaaaarrdddddddddd"..Sanku wrote:Err rohitvats; cool off, if you think IA is really the all powerful malevolent beast killing Arjun you are welcome to your view, meanwhile I am really glad to know that IA is THAT powerful. I can only say "I wish"
....and also as a shameless tactic to increase my post count .....I think you're the god send who'll help me achieve the BRF Oldie status faster than I thought.....see, we have the positive spin-offs already of the Arjun program...... Rahul da, I have read an anlysis (have no link) from Ravi of orbat.com on the strength of IDF Armor forces and the high number of Armored Divisions being their mainstay.Rahul M wrote:now where is that IDF armoured corps vet we had on BR a few months back ?
anyway, 12 armoured divs does sound a bit on the higher side don't you think ? I mean 7-8,000 tanks would put it right up their with the largest tank inventory alongwith US army and PLA-GF isn't it ? that would be a little odd for a country the size of israel ?
from wiki I can count only 3 active armoured divisions with a total of 5 armd bdes. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_Armor_Corps
globalsec summary says :http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... l/army.htmBetween 1977 and 1987, the IDF reconfigured its units as its tank inventory grew, reducing the number of infantry brigades while increasing the number of armored brigades from twenty to thirty-three upon mobilization. {=roughly 3450 tanks}
here are the orbat estimates. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... orbat2.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... ipment.htm
the bottomline is, as things stand now, almost all of IDF's armoured forces tip of the proverbial spear consists of merkava mk3 and mk4 and the rest also includes the mk2 and mk1.
True words....how i wish the PA had bought the M1s then.....ParGha wrote:knee-jerk reaction? It reminds me of something an acquaintance at a UK arms house once said, If the Paks had bought M1 Abrams in 1987, India would have immediately bought Leo2s - christened most likely as 'Arjun', the indi project aborted. And India would have settled for an East/West mix of 'arjuns' and 'ajeyas'. I think he is right, too! Just something for you all to think about.
Sriman wrote:Uri_T? This is his site: http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/Rahul M wrote:now where is that IDF armoured corps vet we had on BR a few months back ?
You're most welcome on the thread. We need your expertise to answer a question that has cropped up here with respect to the Armored Divisions in IDF.Uri_T wrote:....Hello to all dear friends of the forum
If I can contribute to this thread I would be happy
I need to read more of that thread
http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/
rohitvats wrote:You're most welcome on the thread. We need your expertise to answer a question that has cropped up here with respect to the Armored Divisions in IDF.Uri_T wrote:....Hello to all dear friends of the forum
If I can contribute to this thread I would be happy
I need to read more of that thread
http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/
How many Armored Division does IDF has? Open source gives information as 3 Active+9 Reserves? Also, how many tanks per regiment does IDF maintain or roughly the total number of tanks in service (a broad range)? if any of this is something which you think cannot be discussed on public forum, we'd understand. But do help out with general information which you think does not compromise operational security.
I understand your concerns and still much appreciate the nugget of information shared by you...many thanx.Uri_T wrote: Well well with all my love to India and to this forum I can not discuss such information
I served in the IDf tank corps back in the 70's and later as a reserve till late 80's
My son is serving today as a tank commander in th 188th Brigade (Merkava mk 3) so his security
is in my heart! as well as my nation .............
It is well known that the IDF use 4 tank Division as the regular army 7, 188 ,401 ,460
each have app 100 tanks in 3 Battalions each
During all the years the IDF used the regular divisions as a training platforms to teach crewman
for their 20 years to come as reservists in the force!!!
I think the hint is clear
God bless you all
http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/
I was on a reporter’s conference call yesterday with Army Maj. Gen. Keith Walker, the service’s Future Force Integration Directorate Commander, who discussed Army modernization post FCS. I asked him about new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Infantry Fighting Vehicle and how he sees it fitting into the future force. The GCV is intended to replace the Bradley, he said, and will also be used as a battlefield medical vehicle.
The number one priority of the GCV, according to what’s written in the initial capabilities document and the capability development document, he said, is to provide armored protection to the soldier, particularly against IEDs. Close behind it is mobility. “The MRAP is not mobile off the roads… protect the individual soldier, having a mobile off-road capability and having it networked… are the three [priorities] that come to mind.”
I asked him about GCV strategic mobility, which back in the day was the main goal of the FCS manned ground vehicles (seen above in an artists rendering), to be light enough to fly full brigades to distant battlefields. To be useful in a place like Afghanistan the GCV would have to be lighter than the 30 ton Bradley which is too heavy to fly there in any real numbers.
“We would hope that it would be lighter [than a Bradley], but there are some mathematics here. To survive an IED you’ve got to heavy up,” Walker said. The Army’s goal is to build an off-road mobile, heavily armored infantry fighting vehicle, but build it in such a way that it can be made lighter over time. Hence, the modularity concept that figures so prominently in GCV design.
“It’s written in the requirements that as technology changes and allows the vehicle to lighten up, that we can do that. The exact opposite of what we’ve done the last eight years where we’ve taken a Humvee and slapped appliqué armor on them and they’ve gotten heavier and heavier… to be able to take advantage of technology to make it lighter over time.”
“I suspect it would be heavier than a Bradley to start with and the idea is that we would be able to lighten up over time as technology enables us to,” Walker said.
With the Army talking about replacing the Bradley fleet, I can understand, as one industry source told me, why Bradley builder BAE Systems is right nervous. They stand to miss out on serious recapitalization money if the decades old Bradley fleet is retired. Although, some think GCV will face long development delays if for no other reason than the country’s rather dire fiscal situation will put a crimp on major new weapons programs. Best case scenario for BAE is GCV gets delayed and Bradley fleet is recapitalized over the next decade, and they wrap up the GCV contract if that program ever gets going.
When I spoke to BAE executives last fall, they sounded pretty confident they would win GCV because, as they said, they’re the premier infantry fighting vehicle builder. To boost their chances, BAE announced this week that they’ve teamed with Northrop Grumman to leverage the latter’s networking and sensor expertise.
Actually rohitvats, In 1996, Arjun Tank cleared all requirements laid down by the Army. It was a very stringent review by the Army and VCOAS had reviewed it. The Army designated the XV PPS tank as the reference tank for production. The person you quoted is terribly of the mark.rohitvats wrote:Forgot to address this point in earlier post. Guess your frontline MBT's electronics not being able to withstand the environment in their most likey area of operations is not basic enough. While Arjun was told to go and get the whole system to work in the same environment without any facny-shmancy "environment control" nonsense........Meanwhile, T 90s issues are way different than Arjun; Arjun had basic GSQR issue till 1998-2001 (didnt even meet GSQR fully in 1998 but was waived in anyway after saying they will meet by 2001) After this it still had tons of robustness issues has found in joint testing by all stakeholders even in 2004.
Thank you for that information. As for being off the mark, well, our dear freind is off the mark most of the times when it comes to Arjun Story....so nothing new here.....chackojoseph wrote: Actually rohitvats, In 1996, Arjun Tank cleared all requirements laid down by the Army. It was a very stringent review by the Army and VCOAS had reviewed it. The Army designated the XV PPS tank as the reference tank for production. The person you quoted is terribly of the mark.
Uh Chacko; the reference is not mine, its seen in many open source literature including the GoI relelases at the time. There were some issues still in 1998 but they were considered solvable by 2001 time frame and hence IA decided to still go ahead despite less than 100% meeting of GSQRschackojoseph wrote:Actually rohitvats, In 1996, Arjun Tank cleared all requirements laid down by the Army. It was a very stringent review by the Army and VCOAS had reviewed it. The Army designated the XV PPS tank as the reference tank for production. The person you quoted is terribly of the mark.Sanku wrote:Meanwhile, T 90s issues are way different than Arjun; Arjun had basic GSQR issue till 1998-2001 (didnt even meet GSQR fully in 1998 but was waived in anyway after saying they will meet by 2001) After this it still had tons of robustness issues has found in joint testing by all stakeholders even in 2004.
I am for Arjun to, but see no need to whitewash the history or carry out a witch hunt with scapegoats to show that its a good Tank, if this needs be done it probably means that the folks defending it have no confidence in what they are defending in the heart of their heart.
DEFENCE: DRDO
Way Off Target
By Manoj Joshi
November 24, 1997
Its army project director at the time, Brigadier (retired) D.R. Gole, went on record last month alleging that there were serious deficiencies in the fire-control system of the tank, reducing its probability of hitting an enemy tank with the first shot to anywhere between 20-80 per cent. The required accuracy is of the order of 90 per cent. Despite the well-publicised problems, the Army has in a mature decision agreed to accept 124 tanks of the first batch, while insisting on the required improvements in the second. These include some "slimming" down of weight, redesigning to accommodate an internal auxiliary power unit and a better gun, and provision of reactive armour to neutralise incoming kinetic-energy shells.