Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

[Sanku]

Even in its current form, IA will require ~4000 tanks. With 1,647 T-90 and around 1200 T-72(upgraded)..we will still need additional 1,200 more tanks to replace older T-72 and T-55/Vijayantas. If the IA does not start inducting Arjun in numbers now, how is it ever going to replace those numbers? And the way IA is behaving, I have a distinct feeling that T-90X number is going to increase, especially the directly purchased one. That, my freind, is where the game will show up...and where it stinks to high heavens....

rohitvats I am with you pretty much on this last post of yours; yes MoD is reactionary etc etc.

But then I also am fairly sure that if Arjun has solved its problems (which apparently it has) IA will induct it in numbers, and all the rumors from DEFEXPO are towards the same direction.

So just what are we arguing about.

PS> Yes T 90 numbers will also increase including the directly purchased ones, and as I keep saying, the core issue here is Avadi. Who is going to tackle that now?

[RayC]

I know Gole.

He is not the person to pull his punches.

I spoke to a retired Chief the other day, who is also an Armoured Corps officer and he cryptically called the Arjun s "Mk I"!!

I sure hope that the Arjun comes of age and is accepted since indigenisation is the call of the hour.

At the same time, one should not accept equipment to 'promote' indigenisation at the cost of lives of those who are to man such equipment in war or lose a war because of 'promoting' local military industry.

[vina]

At the same time, one should not accept equipment to 'promote' indigenisation at the cost of lives of those who are to man such equipment in war or lose a war because of 'promoting' local military industry.

RayC, this is exactly the problem!. The Army simply does not have a history or mindset of inducting next generation "latest" equipment.

If you want "proven" equipment, well you can induct only something that is atleast a decade old and proven in production and lifecycle and everything.

If you want to induct "future" looking systems, you have to participate in the development, induction and the teething troubles that go through with inducting such equipment.

Let me give you an example. Every army ( US- Abrams , Germany - Leo, Brits - Challenger, French Le-Clerc, Russians T- 90/84 etc) went through the development and induction pains. It is obvious that every change/every new iteration will bring it's own pains (like the T-90 is STILL under development in some sense of Thermal Imagers, protection equipment etc).

The Indian Army absolutely SHOULD have done the same thing with Arjun by inducting a limited number in the 1998 timeframe or so and given real world operational feedback . By insisting on a "fully proven" tank, they just delayed that process of fixing every issue by a decade , the DRDO had to do the "proving" on their own.

The tanks are just ONE example. The same is true with probably every major system (ship, tank, aircraft, artillery, you name it).

And no , by inducting "futurustic" equipment you are not promoting "indigenization" but rather, by participating and driving the development process you arrive at a solution that probably best addresses your operational situation and implementation of new doctrines.

Until now, the Army has imported "proven" stuff from elsewhere and fitted them into their operational doctrines and not the other way around. And the first time, they imported something "unproven/ futuristic" (like the T-90 versions with French Thermal Imagers ..talk about mish mash of "illfitting imported components" and got the guns to fire Indian Ammo) , the thing started falling apart and you need to get into "development" and bug fixing mode.

The Arjun problems and delays are not DRDO's alone (oh they do get to shoulder a large part of the blame), but a significant, nay even major one would be the institutional inability of the Army (and also the Air force in the LCA) to participate and drive ab initio development / refinement projects. That lack of institutional capability is a big contributory thing to the problems. The sooner the Army and the Air Force (Air Force seems to have got the message and turned a new leaf and are doing it) fill in the gap there the more constructive it will be . The blame game and dumping on the DRDO is just hiding away from harsh realities.

In short this is the problem. Other major armies have experience , mindset and temper in developing solutions that address operational problems and situations specific to it and develop new solutions / doctrines /strategies leveraging new weapons and technologies. The Indian Army on the other hand, the innovation might at best be in taking existing weapons and systems and depolying them better /more innovatively. It doesnt extend to finding new game changing fundamental solutions.

As an anology the Indian Army seems to be able to find better ways of using Archers and deploying them and using them,but incapable of bringing into service something like a musket and fundamentally changing the way wars were fought.

That situation in India was left to the Brits. Train the Native Thambis and Pandeys and Sardarjis in the use of muskets and blow the old Mughal /Central Asian style cavalry and mounted archers out of the battle field with sustained volleys of fire power!.

[manjgu]

vina.. I think when Rayc uses the word proven he means both 'proven' equipment and a 'proven' history/capability of producing things. in the case of arjun probably both things were missing and so the lack of confidence. though i agree with you that product development is not indian forte. IN seems to have both proven equipment and a proven history of design/development.

inducting new equipment / products means taking certain risks... and early induction of Arjuns in small numbers would not have affected operational preparedness or exposed troops to unneccesary risks... and probably given a fillip to the arjun program. the tanks could have participated in excercises etc and flaws could have been ironed out?

development of indica from tatas could serve as loose analogy.

[RayC]

At the same time, one should not accept equipment to 'promote' indigenisation at the cost of lives of those who are to man such equipment in war or lose a war because of 'promoting' local military industry.

RayC, this is exactly the problem!. The Army simply does not have a history or mindset of inducting next generation "latest" equipment.

If you want "proven" equipment, well you can induct only something that is atleast a decade old and proven in production and lifecycle and everything.

If you want to induct "future" looking systems, you have to participate in the development, induction and the teething troubles that go through with inducting such equipment.

Let me give you an example. Every army ( US- Abrams , Germany - Leo, Brits - Challenger, French Le-Clerc, Russians T- 90/84 etc) went through the development and induction pains. It is obvious that every change/every new iteration will bring it's own pains (like the T-90 is STILL under development in some sense of Thermal Imagers, protection equipment etc).

The Indian Army absolutely SHOULD have done the same thing with Arjun by inducting a limited number in the 1998 timeframe or so and given real world operational feedback . By insisting on a "fully proven" tank, they just delayed that process of fixing every issue by a decade , the DRDO had to do the "proving" on their own.

The tanks are just ONE example. The same is true with probably every major system (ship, tank, aircraft, artillery, you name it).

And no , by inducting "futurustic" equipment you are not promoting "indigenization" but rather, by participating and driving the development process you arrive at a solution that probably best addresses your operational situation and implementation of new doctrines.

Until now, the Army has imported "proven" stuff from elsewhere and fitted them into their operational doctrines and not the other way around. And the first time, they imported something "unproven/ futuristic" (like the T-90 versions with French Thermal Imagers ..talk about mish mash of "illfitting imported components" and got the guns to fire Indian Ammo) , the thing started falling apart and you need to get into "development" and bug fixing mode.

The Arjun problems and delays are not DRDO's alone (oh they do get to shoulder a large part of the blame), but a significant, nay even major one would be the institutional inability of the Army (and also the Air force in the LCA) to participate and drive ab initio development / refinement projects. That lack of institutional capability is a big contributory thing to the problems. The sooner the Army and the Air Force (Air Force seems to have got the message and turned a new leaf and are doing it) fill in the gap there the more constructive it will be . The blame game and dumping on the DRDO is just hiding away from harsh realities.

In short this is the problem. Other major armies have experience , mindset and temper in developing solutions that address operational problems and situations specific to it and develop new solutions / doctrines /strategies leveraging new weapons and technologies. The Indian Army on the other hand, the innovation might at best be in taking existing weapons and systems and depolying them better /more innovatively. It doesnt extend to finding new game changing fundamental solutions.

As an anology the Indian Army seems to be able to find better ways of using Archers and deploying them and using them,but incapable of bringing into service something like a musket and fundamentally changing the way wars were fought.

That situation in India was left to the Brits. Train the Native Thambis and Pandeys and Sardarjis in the use of muskets and blow the old Mughal /Central Asian style cavalry and mounted archers out of the battle field with sustained volleys of fire power!.

It is not the IA’s mindset or history that prevents induction of indigenous equipment. I am sure you will agree that crap is not what should be accepted just because it is indigenous. Why are we buying Maruti cars instead of the warhorse Ambassadors?

True one must go through the teething problems of ‘futuristic’ equipment. But at the cost of lives who will man those equipment? Is that what you are suggesting? If so, you can use it, but leave the armed forces out of it. It is horrifying for a person in uniform to even accept that one should as per you ‘absolutely SHOULD have done the same thing with Arjun by inducting a limited number in the 1998 timeframe’. That means for technology improvement, one should sacrifice the Armed Forces lives. I fail to see the logic! Wars are not video games! It all about lives and winning the war!

Let us not quote the West. They have fought no wars after WW II. We are ever since Independence in the ‘war’ mode. Therefore, there is no comparison.

It must also be understood that induction does not mean one or two tanks or even 124. It means laying out a production line. That costs money. And if it turns out to be a lemon, who will cover the cost for a useless project? CAG will go all guns going and people like you will burn time on the internet as to how foolish all were!

It is another misnomer that one buys equipment and then fits into the op doctrines. In fact it is the reverse.

I agree that the Armed Forces ask for the Moon when they formulate their GSQR. The DRDO should tell them what is feasible or not. They go over the Moon asked by the Armed Forces and Armed Forces are delighted. And then they fail to deliver not only what they promised over the moon but less than the moon!! That is the harsher reality!

[manjgu]

RayC .. i did not understand how inducting a not so 'proven' eqpt in limited no endangers soldiers life, when the purpose of that induction is to identify flaws in an operational / close to reality env for possible improvement and not really to use the eqpt for war. unless you are referring to things like barrels bursting during training etc.. ( i assume that such basics would have been taken care in a intial prototype). surely, the life threatening aspects of a product could be assured before trial induction.

'induction' for improvement purposes does not mean laying down production lines IMHO ... production lines will be laid once a certain degree of refinement/acceptaibility happens. Building initial product prototypes will always be a expensive affair ( due to low volumes/ numbers). But the whole idea of having indegenous products is to save money in the long run and ensure independence.

The attendant criticisim to a project which turns out to be lemon by folks like us and CAG is also sympotomatic of a mindset not conducive for product dev. But not taking "controlled" risks is also symptomatic of a mindset not conducive to product dev.

[RayC]

RayC .. i did not understand how inducting a not so 'proven' eqpt in limited no endangers soldiers life

Simple.

If one Regt is to 'prove' an equipment, and a war breaks out, then are they to sacrifice themselves to 'prove' the efficacy of the equipment?

Or should such a Regt not be employed and so have less available to fight the war?

In the Army we prepare for war and we cannot legislate when it shall be thrust on us and so we have to be ready all the time!

Barrels burst or ammunition cook off is because of production faults!

[manjgu]

if the Govt and involved institutions are really serious about indegenous product development as a vital cog in the national security policy then why cant units be created to assist in induction of new products.

I dont know if it should be 1 regiment or 1/2 regiment or comprised of 1000 men or 2000 men but structures will have to be created to support such initiatives espicially when we dont have a history of product development. These could be manned by a mix of serving/retired officers/soldiers /men from DRDO etc with the express purpose of hastening induction / participating in excercises and not going to war with experimental eqpt. While one can argue it will cost money but what about potential long term cost benefits.

Unfortunately there is no incentive to induct indian eqpt while there are many to induct phoren eqpt.

[RayC]

Unfortunately there is no incentive to induct indian eqpt while there are many to induct phoren eqpt.

INSAS.

Foreign made?

Give a good product and none can complain!

Maruti Jeeps and Mahindra and Mahindra Jeeps, Tata and Leyland truck?

Guess what?

Govt produced Jongas are out and Marutis are still in!

To be frank, in High Altitude Jongas were better. Yet......

So?

The bottom line is that it must meet the requirement! Foreign or indigenous!

[vina]

It is not the IA’s mindset or history that prevents induction of indigenous equipment.

That is true. If you read carefully again, you will note what I think is the problem is the Indian Army's INSTITUTIONAL FAILING as the primary cuase.

Why are we buying Maruti cars instead of the warhorse Ambassadors?

By the logic you are arguing, you will be buying the "warhorse" Ambassador instead!. Dont belive me ?. Consider this. You had the proven "A" segment cars from Maruti/Suzuki the 800, the Alto and now the latest version the "A Star" . Which one will you buy, the latest "A Star" which got recalled for a fuel leak problem with O rings and solenoids or the previous version the "Alto" , which is proven over millions of cars and billions of passenger miles? .

Look at the problems at Toyota, a brand that made it's name for bullet proof and indestructible reliability. Why the post 2003/4 odd models are in trouble ?. Is it because of the introuction of drive by wire systems ?. So are you going to buy a 2004 Toyota Camry instead of a 2010 Camry?

That means for technology improvement, one should sacrifice the Armed Forces lives. I fail to see the logic! Wars are not video games! It all about lives and winning the war!

The answer bluntly is YES, that is unfortunately how engineering works. It is the accumulated wisdom of real world learning , experience and feedback that gets reflected in future generations of products.

Just google around and find out what is/was called the "Lawn Dart" (hint, we are looking to buy it ..shocking innit?) . Also, find out just how many were killed in the "Lawn Dart's" development, test and induction phases . And those lives lost mind you that is for just ONE product. Also google around for something called V22 Osperey. Find out how many lives have been lost for the Osperey until now. It will shock you. The Osperey is NOT YET in full service!

The problem with India is until recently we did not have the industrial base to build weapons, but could only import . The insitutional mindset in the Army reflects that. Now India has the industrial base (when I mean India,I mean the country and not the babu /DPSU/DRDO monkeydom), so that mindset should change. The reason why the others are spending time, treasure, effort and yes LIVES on developing new weapons is becuase they know that they will be fighting Tomorrows Wars with YESTERDAY's weapons if they dont!. That is why.

Let us not quote the West. They have fought no wars after WW II. We are ever since Independence in the ‘war’ mode. Therefore, there is no comparison.

Surely this is joke. There was something called the cold war on which untold wealth was spent in developing all kinds of weapons and they were literally on hair trigger. If you want a "hot war" how about Korea, Vietnam, all the Arab Isreali wars (which created the Isreali Arms industry), Afghanistan (US and USSR) and not to mention Gulf Wars. Learnings from each of those wars went to develop next gen weapons.. Vietnam experience led to the "Teen Series" fighters. Gulf War led to unmanned vehicles.

I agree, that India's strategy until the 70s was correct. But what we missed out on what the Isrealis did, that is develop a robust indigenous industry. Isreal is a far smaller country which faced/faces a far greate existential threat than us and are in perennial "war mode" . Even they dont import nearly as much as we do and have fielded far greater number of systems!.

It must also be understood that induction does not mean one or two tanks or even 124. It means laying out a production line. That costs money. And if it turns out to be a lemon, who will cover the cost for a useless project? CAG will go all guns going and people like you will burn time on the internet as to how foolish all were!

That is why product development is risky. But remember, no risk, no gain!. If you dont risk developing drive by wire systems because of "risk" , you will be history becuase your competitors who have the guts to take risks will!.

It is another misnomer that one buys equipment and then fits into the op doctrines. In fact it is the reverse.

Not true. In reality, your op doctrine is circumsribed by the choice of weapon platforms that you have and that is always limited because of cost, geo strategic concerns and what exactly fits your op doctrine may really not be available to you. If for instance the Abrams was the "best tank" suited to the op doctrine you had in mind in the 80s, so what? It was probably not available to you anyways.

I agree that the Armed Forces ask for the Moon when they formulate their GSQR. The DRDO should tell them what is feasible or not. They go over the Moon asked by the Armed Forces and Armed Forces are delighted.

Those are institutional failings. When the army actually partners in development and the guy who do that, all that will get worked out. So first get the institutional failings fixed.

And then they fail to deliver not only what they promised over the moon but less than the moon!! That is the harsher reality!

Right. They were set up to fail. They then failed. So you go get some other system (like T-90) which really doesnt seem to be all that it was said to be has failings in real world and then scramble to fix it , coz your backside is exposed if the fixes dont happen.. Somehow all that rhetoric of "lives" , 'winning wars" etc get lost in that scramble.

The point I am making is that you cant win tomorrows wars with yesterday's weapons. If you dont go through the pain and trouble and hopefully not shedding blood during development , you surely will be battered and bleeding in war.

[manjgu]

RayC...

INSAS - a good example of indigenous dev - i am sure INSAS has also evolved from its first incarnation/version based on its usage, which is the whole idea about product dev.. prototyping and then iterative improvements.

Maruti is by no means indegenous development ... its japanese tech , screwdrivered here in india. By that yardstick / logic even BEL is doing indigenous development?? when in fact it is majorly assembling imported tech.


the paucity of such examples is also indicative that something is seriously wrong with the way this whole issue is dealt with. and we as a nation are not upto speed on this aspect. Yes. there is a vested lobby starting right from ministers, babus, arms dealers who encourage imported arms.

Q. Do you see any issues with units dedicated to hastening product trails/induction and not tasked for war?

[manjgu]

vina.. good points. i learned a few things from your post.

[Sanku]

While in general I COMPLETELY agree with Vina that IA needs to handhold and/or partner in development, I am not sure how this plays out in Arjun saga (this specific context)

What I dont understand IA ALREADY has dedicated manpower to baby sit CVRDE, for many many years (20 years now?) around 18-20 Arjuns have been with IA and such.

Since 1998 IA is building itself around the Arjuns it receives (where as the initial plan was to complete the 124 production by 2004, and then later 2007 time frame)

What further hand holding is expected?

[manjgu]

the indian policy makers ( GOI ) have not yet understood the importance of having indegenous def products / industry and the role it plays in ensuring a independent foreign policy and in securing national interest.

Retiring def officers of all ranks are being lapped up videshi def manufacturers ... videshi tie ups are happening left right and centre... i dont know if DRDO etc have a hope in hell to do anything in coming times. and when will desi industry graduate from being just assemblers of videsh stuff.

Sanku .... How the hell have the chinese taken such big steps in creating local products?

[chackojoseph]

Uh Chacko; the reference is not mine, its seen in many open source literature including the GoI relelases at the time. There were some issues still in 1998 but they were considered solvable by 2001 time frame and hence IA decided to still go ahead despite less than 100% meeting of GSQRs

These have also been posted umpteen times before, and thats why I didnt even think that it would by questioned. Anyway for your reference here is ONE of MANY

http://www.india-today.com/itoday/24111997/defence.html

DEFENCE: DRDO
Way Off Target
By Manoj Joshi

November 24, 1997

Its army project director at the time, Brigadier (retired) D.R. Gole, went on record last month alleging that there were serious deficiencies in the fire-control system of the tank, reducing its probability of hitting an enemy tank with the first shot to anywhere between 20-80 per cent. The required accuracy is of the order of 90 per cent. Despite the well-publicised problems, the Army has in a mature decision agreed to accept 124 tanks of the first batch, while insisting on the required improvements in the second. These include some "slimming" down of weight, redesigning to accommodate an internal auxiliary power unit and a better gun, and provision of reactive armour to neutralise incoming kinetic-energy shells.

I am for Arjun to, but see no need to whitewash the history or carry out a witch hunt with scapegoats to show that its a good Tank, if this needs be done it probably means that the folks defending it have no confidence in what they are defending in the heart of their heart.

I quoted you what is official communication and not opinion. The 1996 trials are official. If Arjun wouldn't have passed the 1996, then probably we would have been discussing FMBT.

Subsequently, the design of the tank was transferred to the production agency.

The article you mention has certain flaws:

For ex, The mention of accommodation of internal auxiliary power unit. This point has either a omission or commission flaw. The problem with the print (same print stuff is repeated in website) is that an article gets edited to such an extent that even the author doesn't recognize it. (I know this better. My opinion that we should not do something turned out to be 'we should do it. And they wouldn't issue correction) The brig does not mention if it was in the last QR or the adjustments they wanted in a review meeting. If it was the part of the original QR, the APU would have been built into it. Just for your info, the VCOAS used to review the project periodically.

The Gun has a problem? What?

Slimming of the weight: This was going on even last year. The super duper army men who were deputed to look into couldn't do it. They were throwing punches in the dark. finally it was found that if they do it, the protection levels mentioned in QR won't be met. So we can say army failed too. Shave off the armor, weight comes down too. Army learnt it the hard way. finally, the face saving report mentioned that few kgs here and there have been reduced (iirc 100 kgs?)

FCS has issues in the summer, irrespective its Arjun ot other tank. Also, we had further fcs problem as the 1998 sanctions set in.

[Sanku]

Sanku .... How the hell have the chinese taken such big steps in creating local products?

There appear to be three distinct points that you make above as such they have their own merit and can be discussed; however I dont think some have a direct bearing on specific Arjun issue -- I do agree that GoI itself has not promoted Indian Mil-Ind complex enough, it did set up DRDO labs and OFBs but they themselves are all over the place, some are good, some middling and some plain lost.

At the same time the overall goals that have been set for them and related push (carrot and sticks) appear to remain fairly conservative in most cases -- for example no mission mode -- we need 60% Indeginsation in 10 years kind of vision etc.

OTOH China does have a strategic vision for defence and offence, which is linked to the overall Chinese vision for the country and they manage to make the entire country march to that tune -- we get where we are by hit and trial and lot of hoping and praying and by individual miraculous efforts which seed things.

Fairly different approaches

[Sanku]

I quoted you what is official communication and not opinion. The 1996 trials are official.


If Arjun wouldn't have passed the 1996, then probably we would have been discussing FMBT.

Statement 1 and 2 are not linked. It is YOUR infrence that a 100% success was needed in 1996.

Official sources (quoted in the India today article) state that Arjun met most parameters barring some, but it was decided to clear the tests so that things could move ahead.

The details were in official publication at the time too (GoI releases etc)

If you can bring any better source on the table which says otherwise let us discuss, I have no inclination to discuss your inferences and opinions on a matter clearly captured in black and white through many many sources.

And oh yes, use google.

[chackojoseph]

Sanku, this is for you:

1985 – 1990

There had been significant enhancement in the battle tank technologies world wide and there was a possibility of these tanks being introduced in the Indian Sub Continent. This prompted Indian Army to change its GSQR and in November 1985, third GSQR No. 467 was issued. The changes in GSQR were:

a)More lethal gun of 120mm caliber.
b)Requirement of Fin Stabilized Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (FSAPDS)
c)Development of Semi Combustible Cartridge cases and high energy propellant.
d)Integrated Fire Control System based on sight stabilized system with periscopic gunner sight.
e)Thermal Imaging system for gunner’s main sight for night fighting capabilities.
f)Provision of “Kanchan Armour” for enhanced immunity.

In addition following conditions were in the new GSQR:

•Manufacture of 23 Pre production Series (PPS) Tanks to enable full scale troop trials and after that smooth transfer technology (TOT) to a production agency.
•Setting of Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) evaluation center and augmentation of infrastructure facilities.
•Realistic assessment of technical and user trial.
•Import of engines for prototypes and PPS.

The revised financial implication because of the new GSQR was Rs. 280.80 Crores which was issued in 1987. The GSQR escalated the cost of materials, stores and the import cost spiraled due to weakening Rupee.

The development of the tank was progressed with reference to the new GSQR. DRDO had to re – design the structure of chassis/ hull. The turret had to be designed again to cater to improved armour protection and a high power to weight ratio power pack. The MBT now also to feature Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) warfare and protection system, Medium Fording capability, auxiliary power unit (APU), Laser Warning System (LWS) and Global Positioning System (GPS).

The period of 1985 – 1990 was significant in history of Arjun Tank for the progressive evolution of a number of systems through exhaustive field testing. A total of 12 Arjun Tank prototypes were built in order to prove the design, development and system integration of a number of systems through field testing.

The integration of first prototype with a proper 1400 hp engine was accomplished in 1989. During the automotive trials of the prototypes a total of 20,000 Kilometer run in various terrain. Arjun MBT covered 11000 kilometers in dessert terrain and 1000 kilometers in river bed terrain. The weapon system was also tested by firing 540 FSAPDS and 560 HESH.

The APU was already there in 1997 when the article you mentioned was written.

Then read this

The status of the Arjun Tank was reviewed by the COAS in May 1994 and “bottom line requirements” were laid down. After the completion of the 1994 trials on MBT Arjun, a presentation was made to the COAS and he laid down “Imperatives” in August 1994.

[Sanku]

Chacko

So?

1) What is the source? As far as I know you have copy pasted from your won article on frontier net, so now you quote yourself to provide proof to your assertions.

2) I fail to see your point ALL open source official info and info which quotes official sources clearly state that although Arjun met most requirements, there were still important gaps which were promised to be fixed before production and IA went along in order to do its bit to speed up the process.

What are you saying which contradicts this?

Note I have posted a 1997 article from India Today and Manoj Joshi both VERY CREDIBLE SOURCES quoting the exact status in 1997. If you use google you will find many more such correlation to the above statement including statement by GoI (which I have posted here before but am too lazy to dig up again)

[milindc]

Chacko

So?

1) What is the source? As far as I know you have copy pasted from your won article on frontier net, so now you quote yourself to provide proof to your assertions.

2) I fail to see your point ALL open source official info and info which quotes official sources clearly state that although Arjun met most requirements, there were still important gaps which were promised to be fixed before production and IA went along in order to do its bit to speed up the process.

What are you saying which contradicts this?

Note I have posted a 1997 article from India Today and Manoj Joshi both VERY CREDIBLE SOURCES quoting the exact status in 1997. If you use google you will find many more such correlation to the above statement including statement by GoI (which I have posted here before but am too lazy to dig up again)

Wow... Now Manoj Joshi is a credible source..............

[chackojoseph]

Sanku,

So, what point are you making?

[Rahul M]

manoj joshi used to be a reliable source but that was in the late 80's and early 90's. for the better part of 2 decades he has been peddling DDM level stuff. you do remember the absolutely worthless article he wrote on the IAF a few months back ? his reports also show a blind hatred for anything desi ala the types of rajat pandit since mid 90's (coinciding with his move away from frontline to TOI ?)

his reports are HARDLY the source of gospel truth you are making them out to be. I know it's just my opinion, but chacko is a far more reliable source than him, alongwith the likes of TS subramanium etc.

so now you quote yourself to provide proof to your assertions.

well yeah, he happens to be a reputed journalist, unlike most of us here. I don't see how that is a problem. it's not his fault that the rest of the Indian media can't be bothered to put in the hard work and produce informative reports. people like him are rare in India, Harry was in a similar mold. I don't see why should knock them for being better than the rest.

[kvraghav]

INSAS is being quoted as a big success of army indeginization but it is also a looser because we did not capitalize on it.I mean why did we not envision a future assault rifle even when the current one is success?Instead we sit idle then go for imports as like the recent rfp released.

[chackojoseph]

Rahul M,

Thanks for the confidence.

INSAS is being quoted as a big success of army indeginization but it is also a looser because we did not capitalize on it.I mean why did we not envision a future assault rifle even when the current one is success?Instead we sit idle then go for imports as like the recent rfp released.

Have you heard of medium Sub machine carbine? Its INSAS family.

[Tanaji]

If one Regt is to 'prove' an equipment, and a war breaks out, then are they to sacrifice themselves to 'prove' the efficacy of the equipment?

Or should such a Regt not be employed and so have less available to fight the war?

In the Army we prepare for war and we cannot legislate when it shall be thrust on us and so we have to be ready all the time!

Barrels burst or ammunition cook off is because of production faults!

Agree of course.... I don't think anyone here will disagree what you have stated. Just one trifling question:

Why wasnt the same concern and logic used in case of Russian products? More to the point, the T90 had defective thermal imagers. The army had accepted this product long before this was found out. Why did the Army not carry out the same exhaustive suite of trials for the T90 as it did for the Arjun where this would have come to light? Curiously, why did the Army induct MORE T90s rather than saying, no more T90s and rejecting it out of hand?

Instead the Army is (correctly) working with the manufacturer to get this resolved, while accepting the tank and committing to 1600 in all! Why not the same courtesy and standards to Arjun? Did the VCOAS say the T90 was Mk1? Nooo ....

A level playing field is all that we ask!

[Kanson]

Way Off Target

If anything of use, it is written by well renowed writer/columnist/defence analyst/political analyst and as well god-knows-what Manoj Joshi.

Its army project director at the time, Brigadier (retired) D.R. Gole, went on record last month alleging that there were serious deficiencies in the fire-control system of the tank, reducing its probability of hitting an enemy tank with the first shot to anywhere between 20-80 per cent. The required accuracy is of the order of 90 per cent. Despite the well-publicised problems, the Army has in a mature decision agreed to accept 124 tanks of the first batch, while insisting on the required improvements in the second. These include some "slimming" down of weight, redesigning to accommodate an internal auxiliary power unit and a better gun, and provision of reactive armour to neutralise incoming kinetic-energy shells.

How is that you went on record at the sametime alleging and that too serious deficiencies ? only mr. Joshi can answer that.

In case..in case by any chase anyone mised this part of the news...for their sake..

Most disturbing are continuing doubts about the accuracy of its gun, which, strangely enough, is more accurate when it fires on the move, rather than when it's standing still.

no comments. I leave it to the audience who is watching the tamasha...

So probably true to his reporting job he(joshi) also quoted the reply from DRDO.

"This problem is related to the training and mind-set of 43 Cavalry crews, who are converting from T-72 tanks, which cannot fire on the move," says a DRDO official.

[Sanku]

manoj joshi used to be a reliable source but that was in the late 80's and early 90's. for the better part of 2 decades he has been peddling DDM level stuff..

Indeed and the report is in 97, still in 90s and in any event India Today is certainly a very credible source the most in media for Defence (I have been looking at issues since late 70s)? In any event, the article does quote official sources In any case there are tons of articles etc backing the statements in that article (about Arjun)


Chacko -- the point I am making is simple, the Arjun saga is publicly played out with all variable visible, there is no hidden conspiracy or great mystery. Arjun has been slow in coming because of well understood systematic issues with the system, yet GoI has not shown overall a great urgency in vision in fixing those issues. MoD has muddled through the process and the Tank is now finally ready (as per last reports) and will now be inducted.

However to have a sustained induction of Arjun's the systematic issues need to be resolved or we will see the continuation of the painful delays.

Kanson; yes I read the line, I was also rather amused by DRDO complaint that IA does not know how to train on tanks. That was quite telling really.

DRDO needs IA officers to be deputed to it to work on R&D issues like weight reduction but see nothing strange in them telling IA on how to train? Perhaps DRDO officials (including the ones deputed from IA) should have themselves sat in those tanks and showed IA how its done and trained the users?

[chackojoseph]

Chacko -- the point I am making is simple, the Arjun saga is publicly played out with all variable visible, there is no hidden conspiracy or great mystery. Arjun has been slow in coming because of well understood systematic issues with the system, yet GoI has not shown overall a great urgency in vision in fixing those issues. MoD has muddled through the process and the Tank is now finally ready (as per last reports) and will now be inducted.

However to have a sustained induction of Arjun's the systematic issues need to be resolved or we will see the continuation of the painful delays.

Unfortunately, you are quoting yourself, just as you have accused that I have quoted myself. So, I guess, i will not be able to believe your position either. No one has said that there are hidden and open conspiracies. You are making that up yourselves.

[Kanson]

Kanson; yes I read the line, I was also rather amused by DRDO complaint that IA does not know how to train on tanks. That was quite telling really.

Why you are always skipping and skirting the problem. The reply by drdo probably is for the problem quoted in the paragraph above. to be systematic, you should start discussing how a tank can shoot accurately while on the move and not when stand still..Keep your gyaan coming on this.

[Sanku]

Chacko -- the point I am making is simple, the Arjun saga is publicly played out with all variable visible, there is no hidden conspiracy or great mystery. Arjun has been slow in coming because of well understood systematic issues with the system, yet GoI has not shown overall a great urgency in vision in fixing those issues. MoD has muddled through the process and the Tank is now finally ready (as per last reports) and will now be inducted.

However to have a sustained induction of Arjun's the systematic issues need to be resolved or we will see the continuation of the painful delays.

Unfortunately, you are quoting yourself, just as you have accused that I have quoted myself. So, I guess, i will not be able to believe your position either. No one has said that there are hidden and open conspiracies. You are making that up yourselves.

Arre bahi, difference between paraphrase and quote is there or no?

Meanwhile I have already quoted a report not written by me (I am not Manoj Joshi) -- your turn

And Kanson -- I am not skirting anything -- but apparently subtlety is lost on you.

[Sanku]

One more example on IAs anti Arjun approach

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/04oc ... onal.htm#1

Gen Vij pointed out that Squadron of Arjun tank had taken part in operation Parakram and done very well.

Responding to a query on Arjun tank going back to Avadi factory after it was launched by Defence Mininster Pranab Mukherjee, General Vij said this was a normal occurance as equipments continously were being improved upon.

"No country in the world inducts higly tecnical equipment on first go," he said.

[Sanku]

And when I say official sources PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING

http://164.100.24.208/ls/CommitteeR/Def ... report.pdf

Page 79 onwards -- its pretty clear what is what

-------------

And in a unrelated section there is sting in the tail (in the Naval section)
-- for those who keep saying "look at Navy"

The reason why Navy is better than the other two Services is because Navy is more technological advanced. So, we should have really 50 per cent scholarship to the officers of our Services because tomorrow’s war is technological. Our personnel of Navy are well trained in technology. It does not cost that much because for giving 50 per cent scholarship, it will cost a couple of crores of rupees only but the kind of human capital it will create in our defence services which will improve the entire capability of Defence. So, Navy is doing better because they design themselves and they know what exactly they need which the other two Services do not know

So disband DRDO and let the design and development move in house into IA and IAF eh?
(and to those who have shown themselves to be challenged by subtlety of expression; the above statement on mine was a rhetorical joke)

-------------

This sort of stuff "baccha log" is "structural issues" in MoD/DRDO/Forces Mil-Ind complex.

[Kanson]

^^ thats called teething problem. Every new production run whether in defence or other industry faces these problems, thats why it is called hiccups. Once the production run stabilizes problems automatically iron out. With only 5 tanks... you can expect such problems.

Yeah....pls ask IA to do that....all they have done is producing super duper RFP copying from janes.(joke only saar). As i said before, you need that culture. It wont come unless u practise. Except few examples...IA is not encouraging that culture. And proudly saying as a custodian of British Indian Army traditions, they are not taking the intiatives to come out of that inertia..

[Sanku]

^^ thats called teething problem. Every new production run whether in defence or other industry faces these problems, thats why it is called hiccups. Once the production run stabilizes problems automatically iron out. With only 5 tanks... you can expect such problems.

Yeah....pls ask IA to do that....all they have done is producing super duper RFP copying from janes.

tcchhh Kanson -- dont be petulant now, IA is supposed to make the GSQRs IT IS their job -- GoI has tasked them for it -- you have a problem with that?

Cant be helped sorry, this is the real world, this is how it is. Deal with it.

[narayana]

tcchhh Kanson -- dont be petulant now, IA is supposed to make the GSQRs IT IS their job -- GoI has tasked them for it -- you have a problem with that?

Agreed sanku but why the requirements are ignored in phoren maal induction,when su-30 was inducted it was a paper plane and you know about t-90.if our armed forces are so generous on phoren maal what makes them so stringent on desi stuff.

i am not saying that armed forces should get substandard equipment because its desi,but if they can give time to phoren maal to mature why not for indigenous stuff.

and DRDO has proved it Arjun,Aakash,LCA,ALH etc etc

[chackojoseph]

Arre bahi, difference between paraphrase and quote is there or no?

Meanwhile I have already quoted a report not written by me (I am not Manoj Joshi) -- your turn

Sanku,

I thank you for the debate.

[RayC]

And proudly saying as a custodian of British Indian Army traditions, they are not taking the intiatives to come out of that inertia..

One wonders why the standards of the IA is going down.

It was pretty good when the 'British Army traditions' were in place!!

[chackojoseph]

One wonders why the standards of the IA is going down.

It was pretty good when the 'British Army traditions' were in place!!

You are very right. So were the British Officers who kept the traditions in place. An old maj gen once told me that British traditions were better with the British Officers, just like scotch from Scotland. Currently its diluted. He was in service from WW 2 to 1970's.

Lot of the oldies I meet up with fondly remember the British Superiors.

[manjgu]

rayC... request you to respond to points raised by vina and ignore the flame baits.

[Kanson]

And proudly saying as a custodian of British Indian Army traditions, they are not taking the intiatives to come out of that inertia..

One wonders why the standards of the IA is going down.

It was pretty good when the 'British Army traditions' were in place!!

We always wish IA to do well. Even our laments are toward this end.

It is my belief that it is this constant penchant for the British Army traidition/standards is bringing the IA not to realise its own potential, Sir. People are so enamoured about British that they always lookup to their methods and standards, failing to realise their own potential. Every solution and method has a shell life. What was good at one point of time may not be good at later point. Quit India movement was very famous and rattled the British but the same solution of hartal/bandh is currently considered as deterimental to the society/economy. Even those MNCs like Motorola and General Electric suffered from this inertia but they moved on. So, for IA to realise its full potential, it needs to have its own leaders and visionaries and should have its own systems and create methods and procedures that is valid to this time and for this generation of people. I strongly believe any change, only IA and its personnel are most suited to bring that. Outsiders can only give some direction. And i also believe that there are enough potential lying within the IA. All it needs is a rat who can bell the cat - a small push and atleast a leader. This is my idea behind my statement. And i take leave and give room for Manjgu to take your attention.