Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

munna · Post by **munna** » 04 Mar 2010 00:11

^^ Enlightening RahulM! I would not wish the sons of the nation to die in those machines. Also gyaani posters can also comment about the Soviet philosophy of treating soldiers as expendable commodities. Why do some posters think that tanks designed for such a doctrine will somehow protect our soldiers better? Speaking of irony.

negi · Post by **negi** » 04 Mar 2010 00:29

^ Well firstly RU is no longer in a same position as 60's/70's both economically and militarily , even the T-90 is not in service in substantial numbers when compared to T-72/T-80 as far as RuA is concerned .

RU has a huge landmass to defend and hence obviously needs armour in huge numbers to outflank the enemy in order to hold or gain ground this reflects in their tank design , their climate permits their crew to operate in a crammed space hence no AC or cooling subsystems required to cool the equipment . RuA does not have as many men as PLA or the IA hence the autoloader to keep the crew size small and yet maintain the numerical superiority vis a vis the NATO.

Rahul btw that T-72BM was taken out by a IED/RPG/ATGM/APFSDS ?

nirav · Post by **nirav** » 04 Mar 2010 00:53

RayC wrote: ...
Indeed the IA wants equipment for tomorrow’s war. Deliver it! ...

But isnt that the main problem Saar ?
How would they deliver Arjun tanks at a rapid pace unless economically viable sizeable orders are placed for it ?

Also, now the Arjun tank was initially supposed to go in for "comparative trials" which has now changed to "trying to figure out a role" for Arjun tank trials ...

Why NOT have a showdown between the T-90 Vs the Arjun to figure out which tank is indeed 'lousy equipment' in which our fine army men could end up loosing lives ?!

If a T-90 can be accepted without its bells and whistles to fill in the "void", and well, order 300+ off the shelf and plan for 1000 more for manufacturing here, why Cap Arjun orders at just 124 ...

The monies spent on the T-90 fleet for equipping it with all the bells and whistles could very well have been spent on Arjun MK1 or MK2 for that matter .. !

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 04 Mar 2010 01:08

Okay I have had enough.

Look, analysts do often know more about the defense INDUSTRY and TECHNOLOGY and ISSUES than a man in the uniform.

I think everybody here remembers the USAF officer briefing about COPE THUNDER and saying that the SU-30 MKIs engines were made by Tumansky!

Truth be told military professionals are often wanting when it comes to seeing the larger picture or at the other end of the spectrum knowing certain details.

when they start looking at a product, they invariably first look at a brochure- which surprise surprise is made by an analyst.

while EVALUATING a weapons system a number of constituents are consulted and not just combat soldiers.

IF CIVILIAN ANALYSTS DID NOT COUNT FOR MUCH THE PENTAGON/CIA/KGB/GOD would have stopped hiring them a long time ago.

Secondly that stupid argument about "doing it yourself" cannot be allowed to pass.

For instance Y does not like the way x politician cleans his ass after answering nature's call - then should Y propose to do it himself to set the record straight hain?

Also while I know this is a jingo website, SOLDIERS do not provide the only form of PUBLIC good. there are a lot of people who never lifted a gun in their lives and are anonymous, but whose contribution is no less to the SECURITY and WELL BEING of this nation.

I know that the contrary has not been implied but it should not be forgotten either.

All parties whether SOLDIER/ANALYST/SCIENTIST need to get off the bloody high horse and "discuss" without getting unnecessarily rhetorical about CONTRIBUTION/EXPERIENCE etc.

UPrabhu · Post by **UPrabhu** » 04 Mar 2010 02:43

RayC wrote:
manjgu wrote:rayC.. frankly i did not quite understand your reply and my dads opinion is not relavant here since he is not participating. all i am saying that there seems to be an apparent contradiction in your posts on the indicated matter ... so could you please clarify your stand on the matter.

btw i think the debate has shot off on a tangent ... time to take a shower !!
Yes your father is not participating, but I am sure you talk to him sometimes; espeicay when you want money!!:).

Ask him!

If he is from the combat arms,he will surely explain it to you!

Typical! Ad-Hominem arguements by RayC

Vivs · Post by **Vivs** » 04 Mar 2010 02:57

One can take the points made in this debate in two ways -

1. Neither the T-90 nor the Arjun are perfect. There is plenty of reason to worry as has been stated

OR

2. The T-XX and Arjun have unique capabilities and strengths. Hopefully the IA and DRDO/Avadi can realize this, put their heads together and make a tank that can take on atleast the best that TSP and China currently have or will in the future (e.g., the khans decide to reward TSP with Abrams!!).

I hope better sense prevails, decision makers put their egos (if any

) aside and give the country what it needs...a superior tank at an affordable cost.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 04 Mar 2010 03:07

^^you forgot the third point ,both tanks are supposed to be on different roles, and are incomparable according to an army source,....
For IA there isnt any 'superior' tank present , its using both as two separate solutions for same problem at different theaters of war,,.
AFAIK ,few months back, they asked a RFI for light tanks .

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 04 Mar 2010 03:13

Samay wrote: For IA there isnt any 'superior' tank present , its using both as two separate solutions for same problem at different theaters of war,,.

Well that is the argument isn't it? The Arjun is a much better tank than the T-90 especially in crew-protection and firepower (not to mention lower ground pressure and better p/w ratio). So if the IA says there is no superior tank aren't they being disingenuous?

And what role can the T-90 fulfill that the Arjun can't?

Fani_A · Post by **Fani_A** » 04 Mar 2010 03:29

[quote="Rahul M"][/quote]

we should look for value for money. upfront unit cost or life-cycle cost is only one of the many factors. fair comprehensive analyais may favour procuring something costing double or more.

common sense indicates that developing from scratch as per our own unique requirements should provide the best unit. however limitations of time, personnel, money etc. may make foreign purchases or upgrades or indigenous-foreign hybrids necessary. also requirements may change over the years. it appears that indigenous development should be perpetual with the goal of achieving the best value mix of units. maybe a totally indigenous force will materialize in long term. until psu and private industry develops to the world class standard, there should be no hesitation in getting a helping hand from trustworthy sources.

i am sure majority of Indians will not mind paying a little extra to ensure country's safety in all reasonable scenarios. though funds are maybe only half the problem.

need to keep an open mind. objective. issues can be anywhere. let us just recognize them and fix them. we all want the same thing.

Vivek K · Post by **Vivek K** » 04 Mar 2010 03:38

Well said Rahul! I hope this post reverberates farther than cyber space. There is still time to do the right thing here.

munna · Post by **munna** » 04 Mar 2010 03:50

Rahul's post has actually brought home hard, the horrors suffered by the tank crews of T-XX series throughout the conflicts of 1990s and 2000s. I emphasise once again that a country that designs its equipments with a philosophy of "expendable soldiers" and "quantity is a quality itself" will not design the safest of all machines. The argument of certain posters about safety of T-XX series vis a vis Arjun or in fact any other tank/threat in the world is clearly exposed. T-XX series tanks may have other qualities to them but "superior safety/survivability" aspect stands thoroughly debunked.

PS: A google search throws up heaps of mangled T-XX series tanks. Can we somehow get to know whether they were knocked out by other tanks or RPGs/Missiles? Also one mitigating factor might be that most of the time T-XX series entered war without excellent air support apart from Georgia conflict or is it not?

andy B · Post by **andy B** » 04 Mar 2010 05:05

Err...for people who say that the T-XX and ze Arjun are different tank classes and hence cannot be compared...I would like to ask a simple question.

Wokay during the cold war if god forbid the Bear had decided to make a move then what would they have faced off against...you would have had 72 and 80s series flowing through the Fulda gap and facing off against the Challengers, Abrams, Leos ityadi...or would the Bear have had a heavier tank to face off against these?...if not then in my opinion they are very much comparable and forget the fulda gap even anywhere else it still would have been the same tanks facing off against each other...the difference between them is they were designed with different ideologies.

The Yindoos took some of the western philosophy of tank design I guess and added yindoo elements to it and thus we have a heavier class Arjun...I am guessing all the people who say that they are not comparable would have agreed to compare em if the Yindoos had taken the Bear's recipe for the T-XX and based their design on them...

Strictly JMT

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 04 Mar 2010 05:12

The entire argument of T90 vs Arjun is basically moot in this day and age because large scale tank battles are a thing of the past, especially from a domestic Indian perspective. Further, the cost of upkeep and their actual utility in a limited conflict of the future will be marginal at best. Not to forget that in today's ATGM and RPG proliferate world, a lumbering metal box is just another giant bull's eye waiting to be blow to smithereens! Add to this the nuclear umbrella and the tank-adverse terrain pertinent to the Indian subcontinent and large tank armadas seem redundant.

It doesn't matter if it is Arjun or T90, both of them are obsolete and both of them should have been replaced yesterday! Even the Arjun is crude in comparison to all modern Western tanks and even modern Eastern Tanks like the PLA's Type 99 or the JSDF Type 90s etc. Even during the Cold war, despite the threat of massive Soviet armor, the NATO generals were unfazed because they knew that a few well placed tactical nukes would obviate any numerical armor superiority the Soviets had.

negi · Post by **negi** » 04 Mar 2010 05:32

^ Let us leave the N part out for then there is nothing left to discuss and in this case both WARSAW and NATO had credible and demonstrated nuke capability to deter each other from pulling the trigger .

The Tanks are still needed and relevant in today's world specially if you wish to 'hold ground' or make 'territorial gains' a large and powerful armored column is required to compliment the infantry , the proliferation of ATGMs or other man portable anti tank munitions only means that new MBTs have to be more protected than ever before else as far as their importance or role in the battlefield is concerned it has by and large remained unchanged .

Arjun in its present form is obviously not as refined as the best out there but that is because the respective countries and their armies have committed themselves to the platforms in question and they have matured to the present level only after seeing decades of service and upgrades/versions as per user's needs .

vina · Post by **vina** » 04 Mar 2010 06:04

RayC wrote:I would not mind buying A Star because that would suit my pocket. To believe that the other cars have had no problems would be wrong. The fuel pump leak problem is because of filling the petrol tank right up to the neck of the fuel inlet. One should not fill a tank beyond the specification. Ask Hormazd.

OT , besides you know very well that the answer you gave is a fillibuster. The 800 and Alto do not have this problem and filling a tank right up to the inlet (beyond the auto releases fill point) would have got an advisory, not a recall of the A Star sold around the world. This is a design / manufacturing failure.

If you BLUNTLY state that for technology improvement we should sacrifice defence personnel lives, then you might as well stand post and face the brunt. As a Commander of troops, I will be damned to make them cannon fodder. The most unfortunate comment I must say. I am aghast that you feel that the defence personnel’s lives is that cheap!!

Allright. So are you not going to fly in a civilian Airbus /Boeing plane from now? The FBW systems are great when they work, but quite scary when the computers shut down. An Air France A330 went down in the Atlantic off Brazil with a loss of some 300 lives. Just fell off the skies..Poof.. And mind you, the A330 has been in service for nearly 15 years now. So should we go back to the pre FBW era ?. Well, hello, in that case, in all probablity the recent ditching into the Hudson River of an Airbus A320 by a pilot who became a national hero probably wouldnt have happened (the computers were working fully in this case, and even in such extreme situations assisted the pilot greatly in aircraft stability and control, it probably would have been next to impossible to do such precise flying manually , with engines out and having to ditch in a short strech of river at correct attitude and speed and hundered other parameters exactly right)

I googled Lawn Dart and it gave this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawn_darts

The name lawn dart was given to the F-104 star fighter and later the F-16. The F-104 in Luftwaffe service had an absolutely terrible record and so did the F-16 during development and testing. The number of pilots (serving not just test), lost in them is seriously high ..Well, know what ?. As of today, India is looking to buy some of them "Lawn Darts" , the F-16..

As far as V22 Osperey, the aircraft crashed while it was being developed. Obviously, since it is still not acceptable, it has not gone into service. By your logic, they should have had a squadron and have the whole lot killed in the bargain just to please people like you who wish to use the defence personnel as guinea pigs. Your point is? Indigenisation at the cost of defence personnel’s lies? Wow!! Good logic!

The V22 Osprey is in SERVICE ,it is fielded in Iraq and might be appearing in Afghanistan as well. The "incidents' with the V22 were post induction with many of them carry an ordinary grunt marine under training going down many of them in training on Osprey.

Still not perfect /"proven" mind you, still crashing, but the Americans have inducted them. And what can I say, the US Marines fly important folks in that. A certain Senator Barack Obama when he was visiting Iraq was flown around in a V 22 Osprey!.

At the end of it, remember, I am not advocating indigenization ,which until recently meant "Import Substitution" .. If what you want to do is to replace a 1980s T series with a 1980's Indian copy of a T series, we are wasting our time. But if it is a new system that is forward looking and better than what we can import, that is a different ball game.

If you are so keen on learning and gaining experience, put your life at stake. It is like those who claim that INSAS 5.56 does not kill. Fine, I will buy that argument if those who make the claim stand in front and take a couple of INSAS bullets and live to tell the tale!

. All of us do that ALL the time. When you ride a new car, an airplane , anything , you do put your life at risk. People take risks in business ALL the time and in fact face far greater uncertainties sometimes (especially in a place like India) than a commander on the battlefield! .

Cold war on hair trigger? Maybe. However, only a hot war can prove equipment. Pattons touted as the greatest of tanks came a cropper against ancient Indian tanks. So, that is how the cookies crumble.

The M-48 Patton was a 1948 tank, the same vintage as the Centurion. So not much difference there. I have a chunk of a shattered driver's screen from the Patton (it is around 3 inches or so thick bullet proof glass) , sort of inheiritance from my Grand Father, who actually fought in those machines. In fact, the Centurion was a far better protected tank in certain respects than the Patton, which was more like the T series with thinner armor and better mobility.

Unmanned vehicles and unmanned devices were not because of the Iraq War. It was there and thought about many years before. It may surprise you, but the IA was thinking of the same way back in the late 70s.

Sure, they go back to WWII and the German buzz bombs. But as a substitute for manned vehicles and stuff like sensor to shooter cycle getting compressed like the Predator and flying machines in Afghanistan from sitting in Colorado could have happened only in the past decade or so because of technology improvements !

Now since you know all, by what date will the Arjun be available in bulk so that Pakistan does not have a home run?

How about maybe NEVER ?. That is not a glib or flippant answer!. The current version of Arjun may not be the best answer going forward or there might be better ways of doing it. But unless you INDUCT them today you will not be able to come up with the required answer tomorrow!

The Arjun or whatever the next version is going to be called is not for TODAY, but for TOMORROW. That is the job of YESTERDAY's weapon (the T series and whatever is in inventory). The point is unless you go through the pain of development, you will not have the answer for tomorrow. You will end up running to the Russians again and get the Black Eago or T-100 or whatever they will be making and tell us that it is the greatest and latest in the world..

(even if it was designed for Russian conditions and doctrine)

Indeed the IA wants equipment for tomorrow’s war. Deliver it!

You want it, then help develop it by doing your part and you will get it. Sit on your hauches and behave like you are shopping around for a car, you will never get it. All you will do is go and buy the next model cars in the global bazaar.

What upsets me is that there are people like you who want the defence personnel to be guinea pigs.

Why don't you and your ilk be our guinea pig?

What makes you think that we arent? . You are a "guinea pig" the moment you step into a 787 (when it rolls out) an A380 (it is in service) or even fly a 40 year old 747. The planes , cars, trains and all sorts of electrical and other equipment are safer today because you learned from the crashes and mishaps and design and manufacturing failures and systemic failures of the past.

And just like you benefited from others unfortunate experience, if a similar experience happens to you, somebody else in the future might have the benefit of that experience.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 04 Mar 2010 06:31

Andy

the issue is that even the Bear knows it needs a better tank but it has no money and it is unable to do anything more to the T series beyond cosmetic stuff. Hence hardly bothering to order the T 90.

The M1 on the other hand has a plan for another 2 decades.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 04 Mar 2010 07:28

just one clarification, the argument that "arjun and T-72/90" are different categories and hence shouldn't be compared is patent BS to say the least. there is only one MBT category in IA and both tanks are competing for the same niche. and the 60's-70's design T-72/90 falls short of the arjun in every aspect. other than cost, where it is costlier. like that guy in the ad says "yeh tera zyada hai".

Brando wrote: It doesn't matter if it is Arjun or T90, both of them are obsolete and both of them should have been replaced yesterday! Even the Arjun is crude in comparison to all modern Western tanks and even modern Eastern Tanks like the PLA's Type 99 or the JSDF Type 90s etc.

in what way ? care to explain ?

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 04 Mar 2010 08:07

Rahul M wrote:
Brando wrote: It doesn't matter if it is Arjun or T90, both of them are obsolete and both of them should have been replaced yesterday! Even the Arjun is crude in comparison to all modern Western tanks and even modern Eastern Tanks like the PLA's Type 99 or the JSDF Type 90s etc.
in what way ? care to explain ?

The most glaring being the relatively crude sensor suite compared to all the other modern tanks. The lack of modern network centric data management systems for tank commander and crew, the lack of an active protection system, the lack of electronic counter measure systems, the lack of even an autoloader(*well this is subjective) and so on. Its not hard to point out how the Arjun can be improved.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 04 Mar 2010 08:10

Now that herr guederian has spoken, I will slink away

Vivek K · Post by **Vivek K** » 04 Mar 2010 08:23

God! Brando where have u been all this time! Please ead up a bit more about the Arjun and the GSQR. And yes, the Arjun cannot fly, nor can it go underwater!!

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 04 Mar 2010 08:26

the only thing lacking in arjun vs western MBT is independent thermal sight for commander. it is a cost issue nothing technically prevents it.

wrt BMS it is a fleet wide thing and IA needs to deploy a standard BMS to network regiment after regiment , just a IAF is working on a fleet wide datalink. this is a major weak area for night fighting.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 04 Mar 2010 08:32

Samay wrote:^^you forgot the third point ,both tanks are supposed to be on different roles, and are incomparable according to an army source,....
For IA there isnt any 'superior' tank present , its using both as two separate solutions for same problem at different theaters of war,,.
AFAIK ,few months back, they asked a RFI for light tanks .

What are the different roles?

Are the two be used for different theatres?

Any link?

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 04 Mar 2010 09:09

Brando wrote:The most glaring being the relatively crude sensor suite compared to all the other modern tanks. The lack of modern network centric data management systems for tank commander and crew, the lack of an active protection system, the lack of electronic counter measure systems, the lack of even an autoloader(*well this is subjective) and so on. Its not hard to point out how the Arjun can be improved.

You mean this was in the 1994 army laid final requirement?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 04 Mar 2010 09:15

brando, I though of giving a detailed reply, but WTH, you will not read it anyway and I'm tired of trying to show light to people who have their mind made up.

so here goes,

. "even an autoloader !" "even the type 99 !" this is too much !

btw, does the in-service abrams feature all of those things ?

auto-loader for instance ?

also, how is the sensor suite "crude" (in comparison to what ? ), please explain ? just throwing in an adjective is not an explanation.

for educating the ill-informed.
http://www.india-defence.com/reports/4266

Defensive Aid Systems for Arjun MBT Ready: DRDO

Daily News & Updates
Dated 10/3/2009
Printer Friendly Subscribe

The DRDO's Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) in Avadi, has taken up the development of a Defensive Aids System for armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs).

This is to enhance the survivability of tanks against anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) threats and to reduce the probability of detection by target acquisition systems.

Under this project, two major systems -- an Advanced Laser Warning and Countermeasure System (ALWCS) and Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) are being developed. MCS is to provide multispectral signature management of the vehicle to reduce the vehicle signature against all known sensors and smart munitions.

MCS system has been developed in collaboration with Barracuda Camouflage Ltd, Gurgaon. The system has been integrated on MBT Arjun and the performance evaluation trials have been successfully completed. The methodology and the technologies can be adopted for any AFV platform.

ALWCS system comprises laser warning system, IR jammer, and aerosol smoke grenade system. This is being developed jointly with Elbit Systems Ltd, Israel. The system will be integrated on MBT Arjun and performance evaluation trials are expected during summer 2009.

BMS is in the works, see the arjun Mk2 article from frontierIndia.

______________________

lastly, these are just add-ons that can be added anytime if the basic product is good. with a lead time of 3-4 years at most (much less if an off-the shelf package is used) it's not at all difficult to refit the tanks with such equipment. the incremental improvement of the abrams is a perfect example.

Kakarat · Post by **Kakarat** » 04 Mar 2010 09:16

Brando wrote: The most glaring being the relatively crude sensor suite compared to all the other modern tanks. The lack of modern network centric data management systems for tank commander and crew, the lack of an active protection system, the lack of electronic counter measure systems, the lack of even an autoloader(*well this is subjective) and so on. Its not hard to point out how the Arjun can be improved.

The improvement of arjun is a ongoing process, its sensor suite is getting a upgrade, its getting the mobile camouflage system and a passive protection system developed bt DRDO

MBT Arjun's new Defensive Aid System ready for tests - Livefist March 2009

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_o_no4M2xEPY/S ... h/tank.JPG

Kakarat · Post by **Kakarat** » 04 Mar 2010 09:28

In this video the mobile camouflage system on MBT Arjun is visible

Vivek K · Post by **Vivek K** » 04 Mar 2010 09:43

Bah! Can DRDO design a shape shifting addition for the Arjun? Only then will it compare to the T-90's low profile!!!

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Mar 2010 10:19

Rahul M wrote:brando, I though of giving a detailed reply, but WTH, you will not read it anyway and I'm tired of trying to show light to people who have their mind made up.............<SNIP>

How dare you question the wisdom of Herr Generaloberst Guderian.....don't you know that Herr General is the final authority on all things with tracks and guns? Such temerity from you......you need to enrol in the General Staff College where you'll be taught the great works on theories and tatics by Herr General on Mechanized Warfare. Only then can you comment on such issues..till then, go hide in your cave with your goat.....

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 04 Mar 2010 10:28

Kakarat wrote:
Brando wrote: The most glaring being the relatively crude sensor suite compared to all the other modern tanks. The lack of modern network centric data management systems for tank commander and crew, the lack of an active protection system, the lack of electronic counter measure systems, the lack of even an autoloader(*well this is subjective) and so on. Its not hard to point out how the Arjun can be improved.

The improvement of arjun is a ongoing process, its sensor suite is getting a upgrade, its getting the mobile camouflage system and a passive protection system developed bt DRDO

MBT Arjun's new Defensive Aid System ready for tests - Livefist March 2009

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_o_no4M2xEPY/S ... h/tank.JPG

The Arjun's improvement has been an "ongoing process" since the 80s with no end in sight. I'll call it when I see it, till then its "in development claims" will remain on paper only!
The basic criteria set for the tank itself was outdated and its primary stated objective of being an "indigenous tank" yet unmet. Also, even with those systems developed in India, there is no third party or combat use of the Arjun to even discern a vague estimate as how good its fire control system or sensor suite really is.

Bottom line is that even today, it is an unproven tank that India's own military is hesitant to accept. There can be no worse statement as to its quality for an objective point of view. That is all I will say about it.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 04 Mar 2010 10:34

So what do you suggest should happen Brando.....

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 04 Mar 2010 10:38

RayC..

I am 45 and my father is 80 . He now hates to talk anything about the services. I dont go to him for money

) .. On the contrary I provide 3 Ladhaki children scholarships and try to spend atleast 3 weeks every year teaching in some school in Ladhak or Uttrakhand living in fairly spartan conditions. I worry for India as much as you do as many others in this forum. Please dont think everyone in this forum is a 12th grader ( a thing i learnt from Arun_s ). Though , I am willing to learn something from a 6th grader as well. Neither we with our fancy degrees , the repository of knowledge/wisdom nor are army folks. We all bring different exp to the forum and enrich it and learn.

Coming back to thread, I am not for a moment suggesting that sub standard eqpt to be carried into war to prove indian products. All that I am saying that there are calculated/ controlled risks to be taken in carrying indegenistion as an article of faith and as an instrument of our national security policy. vina and others, made some valid points and atleast to me the answers were not pointed and satisfactory.

All that vina said was that casualties/losses are part of a product dev cycle to which you took objection. You took it off on a tangent with G pigs argument.

Many of you would have recently heard of a IAS couple in Bhopal from whose residence approx Rs 400 cr in cash was recovered. The gentleman in question had just been shifted to MP from the Defence Ministry !! folks should understand that why indian products are not liked.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Mar 2010 10:40

----------Self Deleted----------

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 04 Mar 2010 10:40

sorry.. i learnt the need to provide scholarships from Arun_S.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Mar 2010 10:43

Sanku wrote:.......<SNIP> And finally the CAG report that I was looking for which forms the bedrock of other reports

http://www.cag.gov.in/reports/defence/1 ... /chap3.htm

According to the Army the overall reliability of MBT Arjun was far from satisfactory as it had failed to fully meet even the bottom line parameters. DRDO while contending that the summer trials of 1997 clearly met eight out of the ten bottom line parameters have agreed to make efforts for changes/requirements which can then be incorporated in due course in the limited series production. Despite the Army’s reservations regarding the MBT - Arjun in its present form and even though a fully integrated PPS-15 tank (reference tank for bulk production) was yet to be successfully evaluated by the Army, the Ministry in August 1996 sanctioned the manufacture of 15 numbers of Limited Series Production tanks by Ordnance Factory Board at an estimated cost of Rs 162 crore without CCPA’s approval and decided to commence Limited Series Production work using PPS-12 as reference tank. Clearance for bulk production of MBT was yet to be given by the Army as of November 1997.
Hey even DRDO accepts that only 8 out of 10 BASELINE requirements were met..........<SNIP>

So, after all the noise you made about knowing everything on Arjun, you finally get hold of something worthwhile to debate upon. That is a good start.

Now to the report. All you've done is selectively quote one part that suits your viewpoint. When infact, the complete reports does contain information tha de-bunks all lot that you say. To begin with, DRDO accepted that it met only 8 out of 10 requirements. That part is correct. But how about highlighting this part:

Following the summer 1994 trials, Army HQ in consultation with DRDO laid down ten imperatives for acceptance of MBT as under:

-improved accuracy of the gun at battle ranges,
-establish accuracy in the dynamic mode to acceptable
levels,
-enhancement of overall mission reliability,
-fielding of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) and Medium Fording capability,
-configuration of ammunition bin with blow-off panel, (new requirement added for the first time in 1994)
-ergonomics needs substantial attention,
-cruising range to be enhanced,
-firing in the rear arc at zero degree is a must,
-provision of an emergency power traverse and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), and
-an all electric power traverse to obviate the problem of leaks that occur in the present system in our environmental conditions (new requirement added in 1994).

And let me qoute this for the sake of clarity on the debate as in 1997:

The Summer trials carried out in April 1997 on PPS-15, reference tank for bulk production indicated that though there was improvement from the previous years, it was still below the acceptable standards. The major deficiencies pointed out in the summer trials of 1996 i.e. accuracy of gun at battle ranges, mission reliability, lethality of ammunition, containerisation of ammunition bin, emergency traverse etc. continue to persist and were yet to be solved. The Army accordingly indicated in July 1997 that in its present form, the overall reliability of MBT Arjun was far from satisfactory. The Army further indicated that periodic failures of equipment and subsystems tend to reduce the confidence level of troops. The Army also observed that the aspect of armour protection had not been tried out.

Army recommended in June 1997 that Limited Series Production should commence only after all the observations and shortcomings noticed were rectified and shown to them. DRDO contended that eight out of ten bottom line requirements were met. As PPS-15, reference tank for bulk production, during user evaluation trials in April 1997 had indicated many shortcomings, the Project Manager MBT Arjun recommended in June 1997 that limited series production should commence only after all the observations and shortcomings noticed were rectified and shown to the users and that there should be no design freeze till this was confirmed by the users. DRDO however, contended that the summer trials of 1997 clearly met eight out of the ten bottom line requirements laid down by the Army. They added that containerisation of ammunition will be demonstrated in 1998 but that the development of on all electric gun control system which is a new requirement will take three to four years. It was however, noticed in Audit that certain priority contentious issues like accuracy at battle ranges, fire control system, quality of ammunition, transmission, mission reliability, protection etc. were deliberated between the Army and DRDO and in November 1997 DRDO agreed to make efforts to incorporate changes/ requirements in due course in the limited Series Production and thereafter. It is not clear how these changes can be incorporated when production facilities are established. Interestingly, in a similar situation when the Army refused to give clearance for production of PPS tanks before successful trial evaluation of prototypes and sorting out all deficiencies before commencement of production of PPS tanks, the CVRDE gave a similar assurance and went ahead with the production of PPS tanks. Subsequent events however, proved that the CVRDE was unable to keep the promises it made to the Army

And remember another of your claims that IA ordered the Arjun even though it did not meet the GSQR? No it did not. The IA placd indent for 124 Arjun tanks only after 2000. This is from the same report:

26.10 Limited Series Production

Before commencement of production of a defence equipment/system, the design has to be frozen and GS Equipment Policy Committee have to approve its introduction into service. As the Army was not satisfied with the performance and maintainability of PPS 1 to 14, made available to them for evaluation, it was mutually decided by the Army and DRDO in March 1996 that no design freeze will be made till a fully integrated PPS 15 was made available and successfully evaluated by the Army. Accordingly, the Ministry (Department of Defence Production) in August 1996 sanctioned the manufacture of 15 Limited Series Production (LSP) tanks by Ordnance Factory Board using PPS-15 as reference tank after its successful trial evaluation by Army. The Ministry also accorded its approval for the import and transfer of technology from foreign companies for the Power Pack, Gun Control and Fire Control Systems. However, subsequently in the Steering Committee Meeting held on 27 August 1996, it was decided to commence limited series production work using PPS-12 as reference tank. This decision was yet to be ratified by the Army (November 1997). A fully integrated PPS-15 was yet to be successfully evaluated by the Army and thereafter design frozen. However, in the Arjun Executive Board (AEB) meeting held on 9 September 1997 it was decided that Director General Ordnance Factories (DGOF) should continue with the activities involved in the limited series production of Arjun tanks without waiting for formal clearance from the users for production of MBT Arjun (LSP) subject to final General Staff approval. The AEB also recommended that all feasible improvements suggested by the users be incorporated and demonstrated to users on PPS 15 tank so that it becomes a reference tank.

The sanction of Rs.162 crore for the limited series production was also accorded without obtaining the CCPA approval on the grounds that the expenditure would be met from the budgetary allocation of DGOF and also on the plea that the initial sanction of MBT included production of 42 tanks of which only 27 tanks were now planned for production. The stand of the Ministry is not tenable as DRDO had already produced 32 tanks (12 prototypes, 15 PPS, two torsions bar tanks, one test vehicle, one recovery tank and one MK-II vehicle) and had also exceeded the sanctioned cost in producing these 32 prototype/PPS tanks. Thus, sanction of LSP for 15 tanks without approval of CCPA was irregular. The DRDO stated in November 1997 that while CCPA approval was being expedited for production of 124 tanks, a decision was taken to go ahead with the production of a small batch of 15 tanks, in order to maintain continuity.

Rest assured, there was no hand holding by IA in 1997 and ever since. As for other claim that you made that Arjun has defects and hence, can't be inducted, how about using google and sharing the information with us?

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 04 Mar 2010 10:44

rohitvats .. Is their a GSQR against which T 90 tank was inducted??

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 04 Mar 2010 10:48

Rahul M,

Here is my reply.

First of all, if one wants to decide then all tanks are death traps on tracks (and not on wheels as you quaintly put it), more so if the tank crew is not well trained and if the adversary uses the right type of ammunition and attacks the soft spots.

Here are some examples.

Subject: British Army's Challenger 2 pierced by an Iraqi insurgent (goverment coverup)
5/19/2007 12:17:16 PM
One of the British Army's Challenger 2 tanks was pierced by an Iraqi insurgent missile more than eight months earlier than the Government has previously admitted.

The Ministry of Defence had claimed that an attack last month that breached a tank's armour was the first of its kind in four years of war in Iraq. But another Challenger 2 was pierced by a powerful rocket-propelled grenade in August last year during an attack that blew off part of a soldier's foot and injured several others……
The Challenger 2 is reputed to be one of the most sophisticated tanks in the world and those used in Iraq by the British Army are built with Dorchester armour, the composition of which is top secret. The tank is also fitted with explosive reactive armour (ERA) at its front that should deflect any weapon fired at its hull.
http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/2-18415.aspx

During the Gulf War only 18 Abrams tanks were taken out of service due to battle damage: nine were permanent losses, and another nine suffered repairable damage, mostly from mines. Not a single Abrams crewman was lost in the conflict, while inside the protection of the M1A1's armor, by enemy fire. Casualties did occur, but in all known cases, the cause was fratricide from other US weapons.
http://fprado.com/armorsite/abrams.htm

and yet this is another comment:

Only 23 M1A1s were taken out of service in the Gulf[10] and one of these losses resulted in crew deaths from Iraqi fire.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1_Abrams

and more:

According to the Army’s Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 23 Abrams tanks were destroyed or damaged in the Persian Gulf area. Of the nine Abrams destroyed, seven were due to friendly fire, and two were intentionally destroyed to prevent capture after they became disabled. Other Abrams tanks were damaged by enemy fire, land mines, on-board fires, or to prevent capture after they became disabled." From Early performance assessment of Bradleys and Abrams
http://archive.gao.gov/d31t10/145879.pdf

Therefore, who do we believe and if indeed the truth of the War has been revealed.

Now. Let us visit training - factor that decides the outcome of battle.

The Battle of Asal Uttar

Almost 100 Pakistani tanks were either destroyed or captured.[4] while Indians claim to losing only 32 tanks during this offensive.

India had 45 old American M4 Sherman tanks, 45 light French built AMX-13 tanks, and 45 British-built Centurion tanks.

The Pakistani force contained no less than 300 of the new American M47 Patton tanks along with a few M24 Chaffee Tanks. The 46-ton Patton was considered one of the best and most modern designs of the time and included a 90mm main gun that outranged the Indian tanks. The Indian tanks were largely outgunned (the Shermans and AMX-13s only having 75mm main guns) as well as grossly outnumbered by a factor of no less than 2:1. Four inches (100mm) of steel armor plating on the Patton's made them proof to all but the most close range or lucky shots.

Read more at Suite101: Battle of Asal Uttar 1965: Largest Tank on Tank Armor Battle Since World War Two http://modern-war.suite101.com/article. ... z0hBFmcq2u

So. ‘The 46-ton Patton was considered one of the best and most modern designs of the time’ lost out to motley and vastly inferior tanks of the IA and lost 100 of their tanks considered the best in the world!

How let us see the Lebanon War. And observe the much acclaimed Israeli philosophy and see how training matters.

The second set of problems involved the IDF’s failure to adjust its tactics and doctrine to the changes in its adversary’s capabilities. Thus, while the IDF may have been well aware of the hundreds of anti-tank weapons that Hezbollah had acquired from Iran and Syria, there is no evidence that Israel’s armored forces had adjusted their tactics to this new reality. As a result, columns of Israeli tanks moved into South Lebanon along narrow paths in a hilly if not mountainous terrain, where they were easy prey for well-hidden Hezbollah fighters carrying shoulder-held anti-tank missiles. This led an Israeli tank commander to note sarcastically: “The Iranians supplied the missiles; we supplied the targets.”
http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publicati ... /MEB10.pdf

The above three links will indicate that no matter how highly a tank is touted to be, in the final analysis it is the man behind the machine and there is no PERFECT machine.

Now let us see why the Iraqis were a dead loss in the Second Gulf War. Again, it was training and morale.

In less than six weeks, 795,000 Coalition troops destroyed a defending Iraqi army of hundreds of thousands, losing only 240 attackers.(8) This loss rate of fewer than one fatality per 3,000 soldiers was less than one tenth of the Israelis' loss rate in either the 1967 Six-Day War or the Bekaa Valley campaign in 1982, less than one twentieth of the Germans' in their blitzkriegs against Poland or France in 1939-40, and about one one-thousandth of the U.S. Marines' in the invasion of Tarawa in 1943.(9)
This unprecedentedly low loss rate came as a major surprise, despite great efforts before the war to predict losses. These efforts attracted many of the country's foremost scholars and policy analysts, and exploited the best available net assessment methods. The results were way off. All published results radically overestimated casualties: the best got no closer than a factor of three; the next best missed by a factor of six. The majority were off by more than an order of magnitude; official estimates were reportedly high by at least that much, while some official projections were reportedly off by more than a factor of 200.(10)
Progress was rapid. Iraqi conscript infantry offered little resistance and surrendered in large numbers as Coalition forces overran the forward defenses. By February 26, Kuwait City had been reached, and three heavy divisions of the Coalition VII Corps were massed for a direct assault on the Republican Guard.

Beginning on February 26, VII Corps drove through the Guard from west to east. Unlike the infantry at the border, however, the Guard fought back. By then the surviving Iraqis in the KTO were attempting to withdraw via Basra; perhaps three Guard and another three Army heavy divisions had been redeployed into blocking positions in an attempt to keep their retreat route open.(17) These units were in prepared defenses on familiar terrain, and the result was the heaviest fighting of the campaign as they met the Coalition's heaviest forces head on.
For some 41 hours, a series of battles was fought as VII Corps overran the Iraqi blocking force. Initial contact was made by the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), which struck the Iraqi Tawakalna division on a stretch of mostly featureless desert near a map reference line called "73 Easting"; the ensuing engagement thus became known as the "Battle of 73 Easting." Advancing through a heavy sandstorm, the U.S. regiment was ordered to find the enemy, defeat any forward covering forces, determine the position and extent of the main defenses, and fix them in position for assault by the heavier forces advancing behind them. About 4 p.m. on the afternoon of February 26, the regiment's lead troop, under the command of Captain H.R. McMaster, made contact with the main Iraqi position.(18) Launching an immediate assault, McMaster's troop of 9 M1 tanks and 12 M3 Bradleys subsequently destroyed the entire defensive belt in front of them, hitting 37 Iraqi T-72s and 32 other armored vehicles in about 40 minutes. The adjoining troops immediately followed suit. Before stopping to regroup at around 5 p.m., this nominal scouting mission by three U.S. cavalry troops had overrun and wiped out an entire Republican Guard brigade. Subsequent Iraqi counterattacks were beaten off with heavy losses, leaving a total of 113 Iraqi armored vehicles destroyed at the cost of one U.S. Bradley lost and one crew member killed by Iraqi fire (with a second vehicle loss attributed to fratricide). Some 600 Iraqi casualties were removed from the battlefield.(19)
The other actions followed a similar pattern. The largest of these, the Battle of Medina Ridge, pitted the 2nd brigade of the U.S. 1st Armored against the 2nd brigade of the Medina Luminous division. In 40 minutes of fighting, the U.S. brigade annihilated the Iraqi armor in place, took 55 Iraqis prisoner, and killed another 340. No U.S. casualties were suffered.(20) At Objective Norfolk, two battalions of the U.S. 1st Infantry division destroyed more than 100 armored vehicles of the Iraqi Tawakalna and 12th Armored divisions with the loss of two U.S. Bradleys.(21) In the Battle for the Wadi Al Batin, a battalion of the U.S. 3rd Armored division wiped out an Iraqi brigade, killing more than 160 armored vehicles while losing less than a half dozen of its own.(22)
By the morning of February 27, the Iraqi blocking force had been effectively wiped out. In all, VII Corps destroyed as many as 1,350 Iraqi tanks, 1,224 armored troop carriers, 285 artillery pieces, 105 air defense systems and 1,229 trucks. VII Corps itself, by contrast, lost no more than 36 armored vehicles to enemy fire, and suffered a total of only 47 dead and 192 wounded.(23)

On the other hand, some critics have argued that Iraqi shortcomings, not Coalition strengths, were the main reason for the war's one-sidedness. In particular, some have argued that Coalition losses were so low because an unmotivated, dispirited Iraqi army simply did not fight back. As John Mueller recently put it, "The Americans gave a war and no one showed up." A related argument holds that the Iraqis were militarily incompetent, or hopelessly outnumbered.(27) If so, then the Gulf War was less a revolution than merely the "mother of all military anomalies."(28)

http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html

This will indicate the Iraqi morale and the devastation done by superior weapons and air.
It must also be considered that all these reports are from western media and therefore if they are biased, it would not be surprising.

Now, onto superior ammunition and systems and how it makes everything fit for a war of yesterday.

The Americans used Depleted Uranium shell. Iraqis had none. Had they have it, the all armour would have become ‘death traps on tracks as this statement indicates - Casualties did occur, but in all known cases, the cause was fratricide from other US weapons.

Armour penetration is increased by concentrating the force of a shell into as small an area as possible, so the projectiles tend to look like giant darts. The denser the projectile, the harder the impact for a given size. DU is almost twice as dense as lead, making it highly suitable. The other metal used for anti-tank rounds is tungsten, which is also very hard and dense. When a tungsten rod strikes armour, it deforms and mushrooms, making it progressively blunter. Uranium is "pyrophoric": at the point of impact it burns away into vapour, so the projectile stays sharp. When it breaks through, the burning DU turns the inside of a vehicle into an inferno of white-hot gas and sparks.

As with most weapons, depleted uranium is not as deadly as its proponents - or its critics - claim. One tank was hit four times with no casualties. Twenty US vehicles took penetrating hits from DU weapons during the Gulf war. Thirteen crew members were killed, but 113 others - almost 90% - survived. The long-term health effects are not known.
It is likely that DU will be phased out eventually, not for health reasons but for military ones. It was introduced to solve the problem of breaking through heavy armour. But tank armour is concentrated mainly at the front, facing the main threat; it is thinner on the sides, and thinner still on top. If the entire vehicle were clad in thick armour it would be too heavy to move. Instead of brute force, the clever approach would be to attack the weakest point.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/ma ... ade.kosovo

The successor to the T-72BM, the T-90 uses the tank gun and 1G46 gunner sights from the T-80U, a new engine, and thermal sights. Protective measures include Kontakt-5 ERA, laser warning receivers, the EMT-7 electromagnetic pulse (EMP) creator for the destruction of magnetic mines[5] and the Shtora infrared ATGM jamming system. It is designed and built by Uralvagonzavod, in Nizhny Tagil, Russia.

Here is a comment:

Ok for starters unless Pakistan some how gets an M1A2 these two tanks wont face each other, by the time US tanks face Russian tanks the US will be using something totaly different and Russia will have the T-95. Ok The US currently uses one of the most powerful guns in the world, the 52cal 120mm, second it uses DU and Chobham armor, thrid (but probaly first) the US has highly trained crews and some of the best electronics to assist them. forth the M1 is faster then the T-90. Ok the T-90 has the most advanced ERA in the world, an anti missle system and electronics equivilent to the origonal M1(remeber the US uses for more advanced stuff) The problam which kills the T-90s is the poor quality of the gun(Russian manufacturing is inifior to the US) that means less propelent and thus a lower velocity, and second is the Autoloader, well how t is arragned in the tank with live ammo in the crew area(I think the autoloader itself is fine the US considered using on in the A2). Ok well now we can say the M1 will win hands dow? No. you can't it depends on the crew and the battle conditions(though the M1 can function any where) and the M1A2 is not invincable. It depends on the crews, take an Iraqi crew and put them in an M1 and put a US crew in a T-72, the end result the T-72 wins, why? well the training of the US crews, as well as been tought about their own equipment they also learn about the enemy tanks(the need to know their strengths and weaknesses in order to take advantage. ok thats combatwise, tech wise M1A2, not even the T-95 will beat the M1A@ in electronics, so that sais it for the T-90..

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/2-8906.aspx

The photo of the T 72 in Chechnya is impressive. However, what caused it has not been mentioned. How did that happen? Simply posting a photo does not allow one to comprehend or prove a point. A medium artillery shell can destroy a tank; or an aircraft bomb, even if it is an iron bomb. So, photos alone don’t tell the whole tale. Could you also appended some photos of Abrams (the finest tank in the world) damaged in the Second Gulf War when fighting a demoralised Iraqi army so that one could realise how tanks appear when damaged.

So, T 90 is junk and Arjun is sparklingly fit?

It is conceded that Russian tanks are low in comfort and indeed does not have a blow away ammunition stack. However, it has a low silhouette and trained and it is not surprising that tankmen prefer to present a smaller target than be a showpiece in a Madri Gras parade!

As far as Ajai Shukla is concerned he is entitled to his views and that of his editor which is obvious. I am conversant how the management works on an article. I wonder if you have noticed a change of heart of Shukla. He has not explained why and I think I raised some issues in this context.

I recently had a discussion (albeit short) with an ex COAS who is also an Armoured Corps officer. I rather believe him than a paid journalist.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Mar 2010 10:49

Brando wrote:...........<SNIP>

The improvement of arjun is a ongoing process, its sensor suite is getting a upgrade, its getting the mobile camouflage system and a passive protection system developed bt DRDO

MBT Arjun's new Defensive Aid System ready for tests - Livefist March 2009

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_o_no4M2xEPY/S ... h/tank.JPG

The Arjun's improvement has been an "ongoing process" since the 80s with no end in sight. I'll call it when I see it, till then its "in development claims" will remain on paper only!
The basic criteria set for the tank itself was outdated and its primary stated objective of being an "indigenous tank" yet unmet. Also, even with those systems developed in India, there is no third party or combat use of the Arjun to even discern a vague estimate as how good its fire control system or sensor suite really is.

Bottom line is that even today, it is an unproven tank that India's own military is hesitant to accept. There can be no worse statement as to its quality for an objective point of view. That is all I will say about it.

You're another example of someone who shoots his mouth to make his presence felt:roll:..... you don't know jack shit about the subject at hand and yet you feel you can give expert comment? Go someplace where such inanities pass of as intelligent discussion....and sorry, that even in jest I called you Guderian. It is an insult to such an august personality.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Mar 2010 10:52

manjgu wrote:rohitvats .. Is their a GSQR against which T 90 tank was inducted??

Sir, IIRC GSQR are not available in public domain. While we do know the GSQR numbers for Arjun, I don't think anyone can claim on public forum as to their content. But may be Chacko can give a better reply.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 04 Mar 2010 10:53

kakarat, I can only see normal camo netting there ?

__________________________________
anyway, a re-run of the T-90 protection vs Arjun protection level.

T-90
http://web.archive.org/web/200801290439 ... 91020.html

On October 20, 1999 extensive trials of T-80U and T-90 protection from various types of threats were conducted at TsNIIO 643a Testing Grounds. The tests involved firing large amounts of ordnance (including several versions of RPG ATGL, light and heavy ATGMs, and APFSDS rounds) at frontal projections of T-80U and T-90 MBTs both protected with Kontakt-V ERA and stripped of it.

* Infantry ATGLs (fired at a distance of 40m)
o RPG-7 (using advanced 105mm grenade PG-7VR with a tandem warhead, pen. 650mm RHA)
o RPG-26 (disposable launcher, pen. >500mm RHA)
o RPG-29 (advanced 105mm launcher, pen. 750mm RHA)
* ATGMs (fired at a distance of 600m)
o Malyutka-2 (pen. >600mm RHA)
o Metis (pen. 460mm RHA)
o Konkurs (pen. 650mm RHA)
o Kornet (pen. >850mm RHA)
* APFSDS (fired from T-80U MBT at a distance of 1,500m, the most likely round is 3BM42)

The trials yielded the following outcome:

* ATGLs
o T-90: RPG-29 produced a total of 3 penetrations.
No other RPG rounds could penetrate even the stripped target.
o T-80U: RPG-29 penetrated 3 times with ERA, all 5 times without ERA.
Of all other grenades, one PG-7VR penetrated the stripped target.
* ATGMs
o T-90: No ATGMs could penetrate the ERA-equipped target. One Kornet ATGM penetrated the stripped {without kontakt-5 ERA} target.
o T-80U: 2 Kornet ATGMs penetrated the ERA-equipped target, all 5 penetrated the stripped target.
No other ATGMs could penetrate.
* APFSDS
o T-90: ERA-equipped target could not be penetrated. Furthermore, after firing the crew entered the vehicle, activated it and was able to execute the firing sequence.
Without ERA, one round penetrated.
o T-80U (data available only for stripped target): One round almost penetrated (3mm hole in the inner lining, no visible equipment damage); two penetrated to 1/2 thickness; one missed the target completely; one hit the gun.

fofanov's conclusion :

# RPG-29 proved to be by far the most potent weapon among those used. As powerful as heavy ATGM Kornet, it appeared to assure the frontal penetration of T-80U even for the squad-level firepower. Even though T-90 fared better, it is still not immune to it. Considering sufficient proliferation of this weapon and the fact that this is still a fairly light infantry weapon, it is the most dangerous adversary of modern Russian MBTs, and is a very disturbing development.
# Original reports that ATGM Kornet performance is severely degraded by ERA due to its peculiar order of internal components proved true as the ATGM with at least 100mm higher penetrating potential was not superior to a much lighter RPG-29.

compare this to the arjun :
it is well known that arjun's kanchan armour defeated the 3BM-42 round (also known as 'mango') in the 80's itself. this was widely reported at the time. kanchan itself has been through major improvements since that time.

please note the import of this gentlemen,

>> the basic arjun armour of the 80's, without ERA could defeat the 3BM-42 round. the modern T-90 armour of 1999 (it has not changed since) can't defeat the 3BM42 (which is anyway an obsolete round in today's world) without ERA. one can only wonder how it will fare against modern APFSDS rounds.

>> cut to 2000. http://frontierindia.net/the-kanchan-armor/
As a side note, in January 2000 at Proof & Experimental Establishment (PXE), Balasore, Arjun tank armor defeated all available HESH and FSAPDS rounds including Israeli FSAPDS rounds. {which are more advanced than the obsolete 3BM42 mango which defeated the T-90 armour}
conclusion : even without ERA arjun's protection levels are same or better than the T-90 WITH ERA.

>> now what happens when ERA is added to both arjun and T-90 ?
you decide.

and before I start hearing

about how DRDO has no ERA, please look at the T-72 CIA upgrade, it uses the DRDO developed ERA and there are about 650 in service ?
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 42#p703442

a more advanced version surpassing the T-90's ERA is in development.

p.s. why am I hearing persistent rumours from otherwise reliable sources that T-90 is using elements of kanchan armour ?

people with access to paanwalas pliss to confirm/reject.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 04 Mar 2010 10:54

manjgu wrote:RayC..

I am 45 and my father is 80 . He now hates to talk anything about the services. I dont go to him for money ) .. On the contrary I provide 3 Ladhaki children scholarships and try to spend atleast 3 weeks every year teaching in some school in Ladhak or Uttrakhand living in fairly spartan conditions. I worry for India as much as you do as many others in this forum. Please dont think everyone in this forum is a 12th grader ( a thing i learnt from Arun_s ). Though , I am willing to learn something from a 6th grader as well. Neither we with our fancy degrees , the repository of knowledge/wisdom nor are army folks. We all bring different exp to the forum and enrich it and learn.

Coming back to thread, I am not for a moment suggesting that sub standard eqpt to be carried into war to prove indian products. All that I am saying that there are calculated/ controlled risks to be taken in carrying indegenistion as an article of faith and as an instrument of our national security policy. vina and others, made some valid points and atleast to me the answers were not pointed and satisfactory.

All that vina said was that casualties/losses are part of a product dev cycle to which you took objection. You took it off on a tangent with G pigs argument.

Many of you would have recently heard of a IAS couple in Bhopal from whose residence approx Rs 400 cr in cash was recovered. The gentleman in question had just been shifted to MP from the Defence Ministry !! folks should understand that why indian products are not liked.

You have misunderstood my post, thanks to that person who claimed it ad whatever. He was brilliant since he had nothing more to comment but raise Cain!

I have great respect for those who are senior to me, like your father.

I only asked you to ask him (your father). I am sure he would know better than us.

And if he is 80, I am sure he will know more than you or me and how things these days have gone down the drain.

Notwithstanding, do convey my deepest regards to your father. That is the least I can do for a senior ex serviceman!

As far as Vina and product improvement, it should not be at the cost of an active regiment.