Quoted price ? Did we have GOI confirming on that or is that Ajai information which may be true but cannot be verified .Can any one provide GOI sourced price of T-90 and Arjun for 2010 or previous year if such info is available ?
Why would GOI release this information if it goes against the decision to procure the T-90. So far Shuklas data bears out what is available from public sources and plain logic. As far as we recall, original price of tank T-90 was based on certain assumptions, including then year price of material plus belief that TOT would allow for smooth manufacture. Inflationary costs in Russia and materials are now to be factored in, plus issue that the Russians have been stalling on TOT.
Again this is just speculation about its advantage or horrible disadvantage.
Since the IA is going to fight the next great tank battle if that happens and knows what it wants let GOI/IA decide how many Arjun and T-90 do they need , if IA needs more Arjun the GOI will certainly oblige , if they do not need any more Arjun there is no point shoving off their throat for all we know they will just end up rotting in some maintenance depot.
There is this mysterious sympathy for DRDO at BR the general view seems to be , if they develop something and defense forces do not accept it then there must be something wrong with the defense force , if they do then DRDO develops world class product because defense forces have accepted it.
If DRDO chief says some thing he must be proclaiming gospel truth , if the defence service do not accept with DRDO view then they must be corrupt or anti-DRDO
Why not we stick to the facts about what is known about the T-90 versus trying to debate about DRDO or the Army? It is irrelevant to the facts of the matter which is about the tank itself. That the Indian forces do not accept DRDO equipment which is subpar is also a fact, but that is irrelevant right now as the issue is of the T-90 itself.
It is not speculation but fact that the T-90 design has very bad limitations.
The T-90 acquisition should be criticized on the grounds that it is a dated design, nothing less nothing more. If the Indian Army had standardized on a superior design to the Arjun then much of the criticism of the T-90 would be absent.
Unfortunately despite much of the support of the T-90 so far here and elsewhere, the basic issues remain the same, about the tank design being obsolete.
Worst part of issue is that the T-90 tank bears no real comparative advantage over Chinese tank development which are also derived from the basic tank T-72 platform. Russia has even licensed them same Refleks missile (Janes, 2006) which is on T-90. And these are likely to be inducted in Indian subcontinent, suitably painted green, as Al Khalid MK2, MK3 or thereafter, further eroding Indian advantage.
So let us consider the basic facts:
Technology related problems:
-Critical lack of volume affecting tank electronics and heat issues - documented by abnormal wastage rate of Catherine imagers in trials and thereafter; how will India fit advanced electronics into the tank, like its Battle Management systems?
-Dated auto-loader design affecting tank round designs from progressing. What will IA do when next gen rounds need to be purchased and is the case worldwide, need longer penetrator?
- No APU, more wear and tear of the system; engine already does less than 1000 Hp as documented in IA trials itself.
- Dated design with ammunition stored all over tank, exposed to hit from anti tank ammunition, chances of crew survivability are bleak, as documented in several conflict T-72 tank has taken part in
- Firecontrol system with poorer Pk than other tanks today, including Arjuns.
Supply chain issues:
- As of 2008, for tank T-72 OFB was holding supplier conferences for indigenizing parts which Russia had not given access to, the belief that tank T-90 will be indigenized rapidly is moonshine.
- As of 2009, Ministry of Defence was forced to acknowledge that due to slow availabity of parts and assemblies for tank T-72, overhaul and upgrade was massively behind schedule and has invited pvt sector to participate, incidentally which mentions parts sourcing to be done by overhaul specialist as well. This is nothing but money back to Russia.
-Lack of TOT. Why is it that India is making its own armor for Tank T-90 and has to request Russia for TOT of gun barrels which was part of the original deal? Why does India still have to run behind DRDO/Pvt sector to develop items such as ballistic computer to use own ammunition? This is blatant arm twisting by Russians.
Procurement mistakes:
- No offsets for tank purchase and follow on orders? What has happened to the DPP-2008/2009 POLICY of at least 30% offsets in all purchases beyond Rs. 300 Crores?
- In case of tank T-90, the tank suffers from issues which are still not rectified many years on, but which were considered grounds for stalling the Arjun tank production. Given same standards of probity, tank T-90 acquisition should have been stopped at 310 units till issues were resolved and not rewarded by further 1347 units.
Bottomline:
- This is a obsolete design which Russia itself is planning to dump once it gets something better. Also has significant supplier issues which will come back to haunt us later.
- India seems to have a habit of buying obsolete equipment from the world over and then regretting its decision much later, and Russia seems to have acquired a taste for taking India to the cleaners, as seen in Gorshkov case. Why should we defend such a poor acquisition.
- It is also not unpatriotic or being anti-Army to point out that of various directorates of Army, Armoured Corp and Artilerry have had significant lack of vision and foresight in planning acquisitions and improving capabilities or having risk mitigation strategies in case of any plan delay.
-Various other procurement goofups in Army acquisition are handled here:
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2007/05/ ... chase.html
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2007/05/ ... needs.html
A pertinent quote:
The CAG report No 4 of 2007, which minutely examines 37 separate defence acquisitions between the period 2003 and 2006, is particularly critical about the way the army takes the very first step towards buying military equipment: deciding exactly what it needs.
Any householder buying an expensive item first decides what she needs. If the purchase is a refrigerator, she chooses a size that fits the number of family members and the space she has to install the refrigerator. Functions like frost-free and bottle space depend on household usage. And, importantly, there's the element of opportunity cost; choosing a fancy model with an ice dispenser means having to go without that blender she also needs.
The military's Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) is supposed to start with an identical process, identifying precise requirements for the equipment proposed to be purchased. Laying down those requirements in the form of General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) is the first, and the most vital, part of any procurement. According to the CAG, the army goes wrong from this very first step.
The CAG report, in unusually blunt terms, points out that GSQRs have been wrongly formulated, reflecting neither the army's own requirements, nor the reality of the market. In the GSQRs for 11 purchases that were scrutinised, the CAG found that four spelt out requirements that were unavailable anywhere in the world. In four cases, the requirements "were unrealistic with respect to the actual requirements on the ground," which means that they did not meet the army's operational needs. And in seven cases, there was no way of testing whether the equipment met the parameters specified in the GSQRs.
The CAB observed that unrealistic GSQRs meant that, "in 66% of the cases, only a single vendor was pre-qualified." In "single-vendor" cases, the vendor's monopoly means that he can virtually dictate his own price. Even more serious was the CAG's observation that GSQRs were formulated "sometimes merely on the basis of manufacturer's brochure." Global vendors, admittedly with vested interests, have long alleged that Indian GSQRs are formulated to favour particular vendors. The CAG comes close to confirming that.
The MoD admits that its procurement regulations lay down that in single-vendor situations, the GSQRs are supposed to be reformulated and fresh tenders issued. This procedure, however, was not observed in a single case under audit.
The CAG's report also illustrates that GSQRs did not differentiate between essential and inessential requirements in a piece of equipment. Amongst several examples provided by the CAG is the purchase of High Resolution (HR) Binoculars, procured to keep a watch on Pakistani and militant activities across the LoC. Indian suppliers, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Ordnance Factories Board (OFB), lost out to a foreign vendor, despite their HR Binoculars meeting all the GSQRs during user trials, and having proved themselves superior to the foreign suppliers in the three vital aspects of clarity, resolution, and magnification. Ignoring those important aspects, (and, in fact, incorrectly citing "good resolution and clarity" and "better magnification" as reasons for buying the foreign binoculars) the contract was awarded to the foreign company on the grounds of extraneous reasons like "eye-piece movement" and "minimum focusing distance", which barely figured in the GSQRs.
This was just one of many such cases in which, "parameters were specified which were unimportant, unverifiable and non-measurable. There was no grading of the parameters as critical and non-critical and nor was there an inter-se priority or weightage of the parameters."
The CAG also criticises the army's tendency to place orders piece-meal, without first determining the quantities it needs, disqualifying itself from economies of scale. In one example cited in the report, the army's 9th Plan included the procurement of 4700 rocket launchers (RL Mk III). The army eventually bought rocket launchers in three separate contracts for smaller amounts, in a space of just ten months, incurring a loss of almost Rs 10 crores.
Again, see virtually identical issues with T-90 versus Arjun:
1. Unrealistic GSQRs specified for Arjun, asking for maximum extent of technology possible. When achieved, same GSQR ignored for tank T-90, leading to a single vendor situation, subsequent arm twisting by vendor
2. No clear idea of what is essential vs non essential. Depending on author, report, litany of charges against Arjun, which is again designed according to 1 but if one criteria is met, another is introduced.
3. Piecemeal orders of the Arjun, and then no further orders which basically means cost of batch 1 is high and if batch 2 is ever decided prices will be definitely higher. Also, piecemeal orders of T-90, despite basic issue rectification not having taken place allowing prices to be hiked further, when manufacturer has not even met standard of fault free equipment.
This is not about corruption per se (as we dont have any information to state that the decision maker who chose T-90 dis so for personal gain) but ad hocism, poor procedures in purchase decisions which lead to poor decision making.
Subsequently institutional inertia makes these decisions near irreversible for something like the tank T-90.