Hadn't a BRF-ite ( cant remember who) posted about Indians maintaining some Taliban contact some time back( as per his panwallah)?Is it time for India also to be a chameleon like TSP, and instead of its steadfast opposition to Taliban, open up lines of communication with Taliban?
In fact, Mr. Obama’s trip is occurring during the Afghan night, and he is expected to be on his way back to Washington before most Afghans wake up Monday morning.
Air Force One landed at nighttime at Bagram Air Base after a 13-hour nonstop flight for a visit shrouded in secrecy for security reasons; Mr. Obama quickly boarded a helicopter for the trip to Kabul, landing at the presidential palace for talks with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan.
While Mr. Obama noted that military progress has been made in Afghanistan, he added, pointedly, that “we also want to continue to make progress on the civilian process,” mentioning several areas, including governance, anti-corruption and the rule of law.
His remarks came as he stood next to Mr. Karzai at the presidential palace after their meeting. Mr. Karzai is expected to visit Washington in May for additional talks.
In his comments, Mr. Karzai promised that his country “would move forward into the future” to eventually take over its own security, and he thanked Mr. Obama for the American intervention in his country, The Associated Press reported.
The Afghanistan trip also shows the president pivoting to national security concerns now that he has gotten the bulk of the health care fight behind him. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France is to visit Mr. Obama this week in Washington, and Mr. Obama will be hosting a nuclear nonproliferation summit in Washington next month.
It began as a fluke in the early 1970s, when administrators at the University of Nebraska at Omaha launched the Center for Afghanistan Studies. They wanted to distinguish the school as an international institution, and no other university was studying the then-peaceful nation half a world away. As Afghanistan became a central battleground in the Cold War and then in the war against terrorism, the center -- and its gregarious, well-connected director, Thomas Gouttierre -- were fortuitously poised. Equal parts research institute, development agency and consulting firm, the center has collected tens of millions of dollars from the U.S. military, the State Department and private contractors for its programs at home and in Afghanistan.
Funding Issues:"I don't think the University of Nebraska has any business teaching kids anywhere in the world how to be killers," said Paul Olson, president of Nebraskans for Peace, an activist group that has been calling on the university to close the center for the last decade. As evidence, Olson points to the center's $60-million contract with the U.S. government in the 1980s to educate Afghan refugees who were living in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation. It printed millions of textbooks that featured material developed by the mujahedin resistance groups -- including images of machine guns and calls for jihad against the Soviets. Gouttierre says criticisms of the center are "revisionist" and fail to acknowledge the challenges of working in a society that has been at war for three decades. The center's aim, he says, has been to build cultural understanding and empower the Afghan people.
The U.S. funded its educational projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan until the 1990s, when the Taliban took power and the contracts dried up. That left the center to do "whatever was necessary" to continue its programs, Gouttierre said. In 1997, that meant signing a contract to train workers for Unocal, a California company that was trying to build a natural gas pipeline in Afghanistan. That year, several Taliban ministers came to Nebraska for a tour of the campus. Several women's groups, angry over the Taliban's repressive policies against women, protested.
It was the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that launched Gouttierre -- and the center -- onto the international stage. The morning of the attacks, Gouttierre showed up to teach his Introduction to International Studies lecture and found half a dozen reporters sitting in the center aisle. Over the next 10 months, he said, he gave more than 2,000 interviews to journalists from around the globe who wanted to learn about the rise of the Taliban and about Osama bin Laden, whom Gouttierre had researched while on a United Nations peacekeeping mission to Afghanistan in the 1990s. The center's newfound prominence helped garner more funding.
shaardula wrote:
It was the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that launched Gouttierre -- and the center -- onto the international stage. The morning of the attacks, Gouttierre showed up to teach his Introduction to International Studies lecture and found half a dozen reporters sitting in the center aisle. Over the next 10 months, he said, he gave more than 2,000 interviews to journalists from around the globe who wanted to learn about the rise of the Taliban and about Osama bin Laden, whom Gouttierre had researched while on a United Nations peacekeeping mission to Afghanistan in the 1990s. The center's newfound prominence helped garner more funding.
Good to see MEA banging heads and trying to work out a policy. We should look at Iranian policy, who are they backing etc. The route to Afg goes through Iran.In the wake of a possible American pullout from Kabul next year, New Delhi has sharply re-oriented its strategy towards Afghanistan by reaching out to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami party and keeping its door open in case of a reconciliation effort by the Taliban.
While the new Afghan policy is being crafted at the highest levels with National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon playing a lead role, New Delhi is learnt to have made contact with Hizb-e-Islami party even though it knows that Hekmatyar is firmly under Pakistani control. New Delhi is also now amenable to talking to Taliban in case the latter are to open an engagement. This change in Indian posture comes as Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid also talked about reconciling with India.
Top government sources told The Indian Express that New Delhi wants to reach out to the second generation Pashtun leaders like Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai, and is with the former Northern Alliance leaders like Marshal Fahim, Karim Khallili and Mohammed Mohaqiq in backing President Hamid Karzai’s government.
This fine-tuning of India’s position on Afghanistan comes after exchange of views between top diplomats. After the February attack on Indians in Kabul, Vice-President Hamid Ansari, Pakistan-Afghanistan envoy Satinder Lambah and former West Asia envoy Chinmay Gharekhan wanted India to adopt a neutral position in Afghanistan. This essentially meant keeping out of Aghanistan politics but carrying on the development works in the war-torn republic.
This month, this view was nuanced further by the UPA government, with New Delhi now all for an independent or neutral Afghanistan that does not require the crutches of neighbouring Pakistan. According to a paper prepared by the Ministry of External Affairs on the subject, India should back an Afghanistan that keeps out terrorism emanating from Pakistan and does not allow the state to slip back into the violence spiral of 1990s. The sub-text of the paper is that Afghanistan will come under the total influence of Pakistan if New Delhi were to let matters go out of hand.
While a section in South Block wants India to go back to supporting the former Northern Alliance faction, the fact is that all the top six alliance leaders are firmly backing Karzai, including Marshal Fahim, heir of legendary Ahmed Shah Masood, and Uzbek leader Mohammed Dostum. New Delhi is conscious of the fact that its former allies like Iran of the Northern Alliance days are still confused on whether they want the Americans out or the Taliban.
It is in this context that New Delhi wants to reach out to Pashtuns in the south and on the Durand Line while retaining ties with its Northern Alliance friends and President Karzai. So rather than the expected downscaling of Indian engagement in Afghanistan, New Delhi is all for enlarging it, lest it wants to let the republic be dominated by extremist forces of the past.
This needs to be highlighted.It is in this context that New Delhi wants to reach out to Pashtuns in the south and on the Durand Line while retaining ties with its Northern Alliance friends and President Karzai. So rather than the expected downscaling of Indian engagement in Afghanistan, New Delhi is all for enlarging it, lest it wants to let the republic be dominated by extremist forces of the past.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani army has undertaken an agitprop operation alleging links between India and the Taliban. Military aircraft drop pamphlets in North Waziristan on ties between the Taliban and India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The pamphlets also talk of relations between Israeli intelligence outfit Mossad and Indian consulates in Afghanistan.
Until recently, the official Indian stand was against attempts to differentiate between "good Taliban" and "bad Taliban." Of late, however, New Delhi has signaled its willingness to try out the line. The policy draws support from the thinking of the country's security establishment over more than a decade of experience in the Af-Pak region as well.
If RAA agints are responsible more power to them.shyamd wrote:interesting article
Talking to Taliban and Tribal Warlords
Sunday 28 March 2010
by: J. Sri Raman, t r u t h o u t | News AnalysisMeanwhile, the Pakistani army has undertaken an agitprop operation alleging links between India and the Taliban. Military aircraft drop pamphlets in North Waziristan on ties between the Taliban and India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The pamphlets also talk of relations between Israeli intelligence outfit Mossad and Indian consulates in Afghanistan.
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mutual suspicion, IED mubarak among themselves. Make them to look behind their rear to see if anyone is bent on soosai mission. 
wishing them lots of luck.
X Posted.In Afghan end-game, India gets that sinking feeling
Mon Mar 29, 2010 11:57am IST ……………………..
But the London conference on Afghanistan in January was a turning point for many in India. It ushered in the idea that Europe and the United States could accept getting certain Taliban commanders involved in a deal to bring stability to Afghanistan.
"There is a genuine sense of disappointment - even disbelief - that the US perspective on reconciling the Taliban evolved all too abruptly, contrary to what Delhi was given to understand," said M.K. Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat who has worked in Islamabad and Kabul.
While a significant number of other Afghanistan watchers say the euphoria over London was overdone, and question especially whether Washington significantly softened its position on reconciliation with the Taliban, Bhadrakumar's view is common in India……………………
Reuters
.Here is a rather different interpretation of Obama's Kabul trip:Pranav wrote:Barack Obama has been visiting Kabul.
Hopefully that means that the US will stop sitting on the fence, and will do whatever it takes to stabilize Karzai and defeat Pak-sponsored elements.
Need a better strategy for Afghanistan. I would say we should stage an attack on the Indian embassy and take Indians hostage there. This would lead to India sending troops to Afghanistan. We will then surround Pakistan on both sides. The Indian presence and the presence of India's spy agency would ensure a breakup of Balochistan.Sanku wrote:This is from a channel which is not known to be critical to the UPA govt and MMS etc.
India outplayed, outsmarted in Afghanistan
The point is, the writing is REALLY on the wall.
This assumes Taliban is different from TSPA. They were never the enemies. They are all-lies in GWOT.Johann wrote:While I find the Taliban utterly odious, I do have to admire how they have transformed their fortunes.
Forgive my impertinence, but that is not the question.Johann wrote:The question is what the limits of Taliban pragmatism are, and the extent to which anyone can outbid the PA.
Good points. I think what the US has failed in is "institution building" rather than nation building, if they're allying with Pakhto warlords against the Taliban, they have to pretty much convert warlords to play by their rules in return for US$.The US needs to introduce political alternatives to the Taliban. But it appears from news reports that Petraeus is that.Johann wrote:Manu, its a very good question, except that the vast majority of that sum has been spent in Iraq. And the majority that money went to build a massive supply chain, re-equip the Iraqi army and anti-Al Qaeda militias, and build random stuff to be blown up.
If you want it in a nutshell, the Taliban *really* wants to be back in power, and have done what they needed to. The Bush and Obama administrations have not thought deeply about a political strategy in Afghanistan because they didn't want to *really* have to figure out a place as complicated as Afghanistan.
The majority of Afghanistan's population is rural, and there was no Coalition or Afghan government presence in the majority of Afghan villages after the Taliban collapsed. It was wide open.
The Pashtun villages waited for 1,2,3,4 years for someone to show up, and the first people who did were the returning Taliban, who took the trouble to recruit locally and operate locally.
When after 2006 you start to see a Coaliton patrol of 8 men show up in soft hats and smiles for tea and a chat you're not in any position to do anything because the Taliban have already taken over, and will behead anyone who collaborates. Even when you're worried sick about the Taliban ambush on the patrol from your house. The patrol calls in an airstrike when they're pinned down and running out of ammo - your wife and sister are killed. Now your son says he wants to join the Taliban for the fighting season - he'll get both revenge and a stipend. Maybe even a motorbike.
The Taliban has been far better at organising its control and integration of populations from the central shura down to the village level, and its been far more ruthless in eliminating opposition. Why wouldn't they do well?
Op-Ed Columnist
This Time We Really Mean It
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: March 30, 2010
This newspaper carried a very troubling article on the front page on Monday. It detailed how President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan had invited Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Kabul — in order to stick a thumb in the eye of the Obama administration — after the White House had rescinded an invitation to Mr. Karzai to come to Washington because the Afghan president had gutted an independent panel that had discovered widespread fraud in his re-election last year.
Rule No. 1: When you don’t call things by their real name, you always get in trouble.
Rule No. 2: “Never want it more than they do.”
Rule No. 3: In the Middle East, what leaders tell you in private in English is irrelevant. All that matters is what they will defend in public in their own language.
Here is a possible solution to the mess that might satisfy both the Afghans and Americans:Some prominent Afghans say that Mr. Karzai now tells associates that the Americans’ goal here is not to build an independent and peaceful Afghanistan, but to exercise their power.
In January, Mr. Karzai invited about two dozen prominent Afghan media and business figures to a lunch at the palace. At the lunch, he expressed a deep cynicism about America’s motives, and of the burden he bears in trying to keep the United States at bay.
“He has developed a complete theory of American power,” said an Afghan who attended the lunch and who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. “He believes that America is trying to dominate the region, and that he is the only one who can stand up to them.”
Mr. Karzai said that, left alone, he could strike a deal with the Taliban, but that the United States refuses to allow him. The American goal, he said, was to keep the Afghan conflict going, and thereby allow American troops to stay in the country.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/world ... l?ref=asia
So it appears that the US is sabotaging any attempts at peace except on terms acceptable to the ISI and itself. Mullah Barader was taken down, but Haqqani, the ISI poodle, who is hated by ordinary Afghans, is "absolutely salvagable".In the April 2010 edition of The Atlantic magazine, Maj-Gen Michael Flynn, director of intelligence, US Central command, was quoted as saying that militant leaders Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were both “absolutely salvageable”.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/daw ... ion-us-140
That confirms the Pakistani attempts to push the candidature of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar through. BTW, Hekmatyar will also be acceptable to Iran. Haqqani is a source of great strength to the Quetta shura. He is not a Taliban in that sense of the word. He was a warlord co-drafted into the Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan. So, winning him over is less of an ideological problem. Besides, the ISI has a big sway over him and his sons. So, the assessment of them being 'salvageable' is accurate.Pranav wrote:In the April 2010 edition of The Atlantic magazine, Maj-Gen Michael Flynn, director of intelligence, US Central command, was quoted as saying that militant leaders Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were both “absolutely salvageable”.
Agreed. Too many people here think that the US is omnipotent and frighteningly competent, when mostly the opposite is true. They are just as bumbling as anyone else, they just have more ammunition to play with.I am saying the precise opposite - America's failures in Afghanistan aren't just because of conflicting geopolitical goals. They are because there are huge institutional and psychological barriers at the top of the system when it comes to *realistically* turning goals in to concrete, sustainable reality in any place that is truly foreign to them. Does that sound like an official line to you?!
I slightly disagree on this line of thinking. I've a different view and interested to know what others think about it. First of all, unkeel's engagements in Iraq and Afg. are not "wars" but "international engagements". Since these are not wars, the outcome is not to "win" or "loose", but to stay engaged; while making sure that it happens with minimum human loss. From what I've heard, unkeel do not enter a country unless they have reason to believe that they can stay their for at least 50 years. Post Vietman, their strategies have changed. Afg. could be a perfect place to station a very very long-term base. Military planners very well know the value of spending Aaamrikhi blood and money. IMO news and analysis that comes out in media from military and policy experts and generals is a bunch of BS. What goes on behind the walls of Pantagoon and what comes out are two totally different things.Too many people here think that the US is omnipotent and frighteningly competent, when mostly the opposite is true. They are just as bumbling as anyone else, they just have more ammunition to play with.
For many countries actually this turmoil is good for their geo-political goals.Brad Goodman wrote:
The question I have is why are all these countries (porkies excempted) acting like fence sitters. Most glaring case is China. Does CCP not realize that lawless AfPak left to porkies and talibunnies would in long term be the worst security nightmare for them along their eastern borders. So if they are suspicios of Unkil they need to partner with them so that they have a stake in a stable Afghanistan rather than relying on ISI and talibunnies to secure their interests.
I guess you are correct in your analysis. But since Asia will suffer most with this terror what is stopping China & Russia to step up and play a role. I guess if taller than mountain friend sheds its myopic vision it will realize TSP is the worst thing to its own security. If Unkil leaves Afpak the next target of talibunnies would be establishing republic of KorasanKavu wrote:If this was a World War on Terror, then it is not Afghanistan nor Iraq, It is Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is America's war on Terror.
So what situation do we anticipate once Unkil declares victory and runs away.ramana wrote:They are sitting on the fence because the US itself is weakening some elements of the TSP terror apparatus while keeping the others intact.Eg. Kunduz Airlift, letting OBL flee to TSP, AQK proliferation, not cracking down on TSP terror camps etc., etc.