ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

[Kanson]

Kanson ji,

I posted a "later" estimate of the cost of the US NMD programme...(Re)Quoting from there:

Coyle says since Reagan's 1983 Star Wars speech, the United States has spent at least $120 billion to develop missile defense, although the actual figure is probably much higher. According to the Government Accountability Office, the missile agency has spent about $56 billion since 2002 and is budgeted to spend an additional $50 billion through 2013.

The US has spent about 56 billion in the last 6 years, and planning to spend at leats 50 billion more in the next 3 years - all for something whose reliability is suspect even against a "ballistic missile threat that employs even simple decoys"..
This, when the US is not even buiolding its NMD for China and Russia, but purportedly for rogue states with far simpler tech...We, on the other hand have to plan for China and Pak...

Somnath ji, I dont know it is prudent to compare the cost of home-grown to that of US systems. From Dr. Saraswat interview..

Secondly, the production costs have come down. For example if the cost of production of a Prithvi missile was Rs 4-5 crore in the early phase, after six-seven years it is only Rs 7 crore now. First, a surface-to-surface missile like it is not available. If at all you get it, it could cost $8 million. If the development and production costs of Prithvi over the last 15 years is around Rs 300 crore for all three versions, a US Army Tactical Missile System (ATMS), initial costs is estimated at $800 million annually.

300 Cr comes to less than 100 million. What is quoted for ATMS is annual cost only. So i leave it your decision on the relevance of comparing US Star Wars with ours.

A BMD is not just about buying a super radar and linking it up to a bunch of interceptor missiles..As Dr Saraswat said in an interview, the interceptor is really the last leg of the system - a whole network of radars, sensors, satellites, C4I elements need to be put in place...In a recent interview with Force mag, Dr Saraswat said that the "first phase" of India's BMD can be deployed by 2013...We dont know what "first phase" would mean though, not yet in any case...

True, it got C4I etc. And it is also true that we dont know what goes in Phase I, so we take only general clue rather than grinding to minute details. With these you cant say, it will cost more than 3 B USD or the otherway. But if you compare the relatively simple program that of Israel and combine that with cost table in our case, you can compare to a fair judgement that it will be much less than what you stated. I'm only stating the obvious. Secondly, those sensors and C4I will all be part of Integrated AD circuit of AF serving larger mission. So you cant count that as a stand alone cost for ABM alone, just my view.

And as I said in the earlier post, the system has to be far more "efficient" in the Indian context due to the extreme short missile flight time between India and Pak (or for that matter China)...the 20-25 billion cost, in that context would be a very very aggressive one, especially as we have no "legacy" to build on, unlike the US...

Ofcourse, the system has to be far more efficient and thats why MoD/DRDO official reasoned that we cant buy the system to suit our needs and the only option is to make the system for ourselves. Thats is the reason we rejected the PAC offer from US, if you remember. I think def min., Pranab M made a statement to this effect.

And yes, both warheads and missiles are far cheaper to produce..

On warheads, data is always nebulous due to the extreme secrecy of the process around the world..But a Brookings institution study on the cost of nuclear weapons say that about 86% of the Us expenditure on nuclear weapons were on delivery systems and security systems...Warheads is the balance - for the US, that translated to about 800 billion over a 56 year period (1940-1996, at constant 1996 prices, so inflation-adjusted)..So thats about 15-16 billion dollars every year, for a US-sized arsenal (hitting numbers of 40-50k for a time and including large numbers of more-expensive-to-produce-and-maintain thermonuclear bombs)...For a smaller arsenal running into a couple of thousand, you can extrapolate the cost of warhead production - not more than a billion dollars, or even less...

the study is here:
http://www.brookings.edu/projects/archi ... wartz.aspx

Now delivery systems is what has gotten so much cheaper than what they were 30-40 years back...So you have cruise missiles available at a million dollars each, ballistic missiles of the simpler (Prithvi) variety at a couple of pops..

Ji, the brookings link has this to say...

These included not only the well known strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, but also artillery shells, depth charges, and nuclear land mines. In fact, when we add the cost of deploying offensive delivery systems to those of defensive weapons, along with the costs associated with targeting and controlling the arsenal, we find that 86 percent of what was spent was spent on building a variety of launch systems and ensuring that not only could they be fired when ordered to do so but,

This 86% cost includes, bombers, submarines, so on so forth. In our discussion wrt Pak context, we are talking only abt Ballistics missile with N warhead. I said, adding N Warhead in hundreds and thousands in not joke. One has to pay enormous cost not only to develop. So if you count only the ballistic missiles leaving other lanching platforms etc, cost of N material to missile goes higher, much higher that 24%. That is what i'm trying to say.
Even if you say it is 24% including all sensors and other platforms, for me developing ABM missile system will cost less than 24% cumulatively and it is much easier for me to produce these missiles compared to having N tipped BM - just a comparison.

The 20kt N weapon that we tested in POK-II costs around 1 Cr at that time of development. And it is believed to be developed in 80s.

Second for a country like India, where N material is precious and needed for the parallel power generation programme, i probably dont want to match Paki with missile for missile and i can substitute ABM missiles for the Paki N BM. Thats why i said, ABM is part of the offensive and it imparts its own quality to the offensive arm. I can play with them to create a force structure and response system in whichever way i like to defeat the Paki in all gamed events of N warfare.

Further,fissile material enrichment is not a "black box" to anyone anymore - a range of chaps seem to be able to do it easily now...And ramping up is much simpler as well - as we can see with Iran's example....

Combine the two data points and you can see how much easier and cheaper it is to ramp up fissile material enrichment and missile production...The point is that the science and tech for both these are very very well known - everything is all there on the internet...

So Iran has now N bomb? Proof ? Ok it depend on lot of things. It will be easy for countries like Japan. Question is whether it will be easy for Pak ? at what cost and timeframe ?

BMD, on the other hand, is an evolving tech, and people are still figuring out the limits of missile capabilities...How much did we spend on developing Brahmos? 250 million dollars? But how much will a BMD system need to spend to have a chance of tracking and eliminating a supersonic cruise missile, given that even a subsonic one is not really within its capabilities today?

Dear Somnath ji, if we can take out hypersonic RV at lower atmosphere, why not a supersonic CM ? Supersonic CM can be easily taken when it is at mid course, only at the terminal phase it gives problem. BMD system when all sensors are hooked gives much enough early warning to take the CM much earlier before it enters the terminal phase.

Having said that, as I said, it might just still work in the Pak context...Maybe the resource differential is so large that the incremental efffort that Pak will need to make will cripple it even further...But then, what about China? A BMD programme will also cause China to move more numbers of its nuke forces closer to our border, and as the BMD gains "public" credibility, also ramp up....There is a "reverse gap" between us and China in resources - what happens to our own "minimum deterrence" levels against them then?

If you understand how Chinese conducted themselves after the Agni-3 test and news of Agni-5, you can clearly see, Strength respects Strength. Only way forward is to augment both the offensive and defensive capabilities and conduct diplomacy through this strength and that will be more apt than what the Hindu editorial/column profess.

[K Mehta]

Somnathji
Imagine you are a paki general.
You have 100 missiles. Assume 15 each for 6 major cities and 10 spares!
Now assume 50% probability of ABM stopping the missile.
You will have to launch a majority of your missiles (>50%) to achieve a sure hit! Even here with CEP, plain probability etc, you might not be able to achieve your task completely! You would like your 100% payload to be nuclear, instead you will have to use it for some other decoy! It would reduce the number of Kt yield carried by the missiles.

So you would launch decoys but building decoys is not as easy as it seems
the decoy should have the same density atleast for the ABM to be fooled

The major reason for the deployment of ABM is to make the enemy unsure of his first hit success.
Now if peskistan has to launch about 100 missiles, would it be difficult to detect? and stop it using intelligence and diplomacy?

I had read a book about the US ABM system and its deployment called Ballistic Missile Defense : Benson D. Adams. The exact arguments as you post it and and actual math done to counter it (along with kind of decoy and avoidance mechanisms) was mentioned in the book. Will reply in detail later, but take it for what its worth, the deployment of BMD was a gamechanger in the cold war and placed heavy penalties on the side facing it, that too in case of a BMD which was nuclear based.

Indian BMD is much simpler and better than the US BMD deployed then! A battery of exoatmospheric interceptor can take out a mulitple warhead missile.

Please note cruise missile defence is separate from BMD, however the radars can be used by the CMD. Any good AD will act as a CMD, especially for subsonic CM. At the moment we dont need to worry about supersonic CM cause there arent many of those kinds around and peskis dont have them for sure!

And PS no defence can act against JDAM, doesnt mean we dont build a BMD capability!

The real worth of BMD is not in the expense that you make but the expense it makes the other side to counter it!

[somnath]

K Mehta ji,

The question is precisely of probabilities..I had started with that...

Now if peskistan has to launch about 100 missiles, would it be difficult to detect? and stop it using intelligence and diplomacy

Well, once launched, there isnt time for diplomacy ...On strategic weapons, the idea should be to ensure that they never have to be used....

The exact arguments as you post it and and actual math done to counter it (along with kind of decoy and avoidance mechanisms) was mentioned in the book. Will reply in detail later, but take it for what its worth, the deployment of BMD was a gamechanger in the cold war and placed heavy penalties on the side facing it, that too in case of a BMD which was nuclear based.

I havent read the book...But there are numerous studies now (including one done by CFR that I posted earlier) that question the very basis of NMD...Again, as I said before, it worked in the US-USSR scenario because the "resource gap" was sufficient to beggar USSR in the process...We dont know, given the current (cheaper) costs of nuclear offensive weapons and delivery platforms, and the relative gap in the Indo-Pak (and a reverse one in Indo-China), whether that holds true in our case...

You have 100 missiles. Assume 15 each for 6 major cities and 10 spares!
Now assume 50% probability of ABM stopping the missile.
You will have to launch a majority of your missiles (>50%) to achieve a sure hit! Even here with CEP, plain probability etc, you might not be able to achieve your task completely! You would like your 100% payload to be nuclear, instead you will have to use it for some other decoy! It would reduce the number of Kt yield carried by the missiles.

Precisely - I had quoted a much better probability-exercise earlier in the thread..Therefore, if I am a Paki general, I would increase my offensive missiles by a factor of 4, to (say) 400 missiles...Cost of extra 300 missiles, going by the "Prithvi rate", would be about 2000 crores, and 300 warheads (going by Kanson's estimate - dont know where it comes from, but lets take it) another 300 crores...So in about 500 million dollars, I have negated the probability advantage of ABM version 1...In order for us to restore the advantage, the ABM has to be further beefed up, with more overlapping radar coverage, greater sat surveillance, more accurate tech on HTK, the works....What are the incremental costs of that?? If you look at the CFR study, quite huge even for the US, that has a legacy of doing these things...Point being, is India's resource gap vis a vis Pak big enough to sstain this exercise? And how do we manage the same set of escalation vis a vis China?


Kanson ji,

Secondly, the production costs have come down. For example if the cost of production of a Prithvi missile was Rs 4-5 crore in the early phase, after six-seven years it is only Rs 7 crore now. First, a surface-to-surface missile like it is not available. If at all you get it, it could cost $8 million. If the development and production costs of Prithvi over the last 15 years is around Rs 300 crore for all three versions, a US Army Tactical Missile System (ATMS), initial costs is estimated at $800 million annually.

Dr Saraswat is being disengenuous here..300 crores - @ 7 crores apiece, that would mean we have only produced about 40-45 missiles?!! the total number of tests of Prithvi would probably equal that number!! So something's not right..

If you want to compare costs - compare across a range of platforms...What is the price of a Brahmos v/s the price of a Tomahawk? Or the price of a Nag v/s the price of a Javelin...Or the price of a Rohini v/s the price of an equivalent thales radar? Costs of similar tech platforms are broadly similar, maybe we have a 20-30% cost advantage, but its neve in the 800 million-300 crore type of difference...

But if you compare the relatively simple program that of Israel and combine that with cost table in our case, you can compare to a fair judgement that it will be much less than what you stated. I'm only stating the obvious. Secondly, those sensors and C4I will all be part of Integrated AD circuit of AF serving larger mission. So you cant count that as a stand alone cost for ABM alone, just my view.

There goes the first set of issues..First up, no one has a clue onnhow much Israel is actually spendign on the Arrow programme, especially as the US is bankrolling a significant portion of that...Second, both Israel and the US are trying to develop a system for relatively "crude" threats, from Iran and NoKo for instance...And you have an estimate of the costs that the US is incurring from the CFR report posted above...We on the other hand, are planning for a much more sophisticated set of enemies, and those that are virtually cheek-by-jowl with us...If at all, our expenses for a "like-to-like" deployment will be much higher...

This 86% cost includes, bombers, submarines, so on so forth. In our discussion wrt Pak context, we are talking only abt Ballistics missile with N warhead. I said, adding N Warhead in hundreds and thousands in not joke. One has to pay enormous cost not only to develop. So if you count only the ballistic missiles leaving other lanching platforms etc, cost of N material to missile goes higher, much higher that 24%. That is what i'm trying to say.
Even if you say it is 24% including all sensors and other platforms, for me developing ABM missile system will cost less than 24% cumulatively and it is much easier for me to produce these missiles compared to having N tipped BM - just a comparison.

You have completely misread the point...86% of the cost was incurred in delivery platforms and infra, while 14% was incurred in warheads...So as you see, most of the expenses were incurred in the former - and the US was building a complicated 3-stage delivery patform, comprising air, land, sea based weapons, spread across continents...Pak on the other hand, has a simple land (ballistic/cruise missile) - based platform, much simpler thse days...Further, the US spends a lot of money on refining its ballistic missiles for accuracy etc..But really in Pak's case, it doesnt have to - a CEP of 1 km is as good as a CEP of 40 metres in a strategic weapon scenario...Scud/Prithvi/M11-type missiles are much cheaper to mass produce...

Dovetail that with what you yourself said:

The 20kt N weapon that we tested in POK-II costs around 1 Cr at that time of development

dont know where you got this number, but lets take it as accurate...

an incremental 100 Prithvi-type nuke missiles will therefore cost about 800 crores....Add in simple innovations like MaRV, and you see how much mroe lethal (for an ABM system) it gets...Add in abur-type cruise missiles, that are even cheaper, and you get the idea...

Second for a country like India, where N material is precious and needed for the parallel power generation programme, i probably dont want to match Paki with missile for missile and i can substitute ABM missiles for the Paki N BM. Thats why i said, ABM is part of the offensive and it imparts its own quality to the offensive arm. I can play with them to create a force structure and response system in whichever way i like to defeat the Paki in all gamed events of N warfare.

Precisely..But when Pak increases its nuke arsenal from (say) 100 to 400 because we f30ielded ABM version 1, do we keep our own arsenal to 150? Or will we be forced to increase our numbers to at least 300, if not completely match Pak? Especailly as we dont really know how good any ABM system is...

Please note cruise missile defence is separate from BMD, however the radars can be used by the CMD. Any good AD will act as a CMD, especially for subsonic CM.

Ideally yes..But not in the Indo-Pak context sir...Pak has a stated cruise missile bsed nuke platform...Subsonic cruise missiles are damn hard to detect, and a salvo of cruise missiles will b overwhelming for most AD systems...Therefore, in our context, ABM has to include cruise missile -and Dr Saraswat pointedly said in an interview recently that our current system cannot counter cruise missile evenin design intent...

Net net,

If you understand how Chinese conducted themselves after the Agni-3 test and news of Agni-5, you can clearly see, Strength respects Strength

No doubt...But the question is what should be the "form" of our deterrence? Should we be trying to fied a bigger force of Agnis wth greater sophisitication? Or should we get into an ABM-induced scrap that might be prohibitively expensive, and unsustainable?

[Karan M]

Somnath-ji

Fair number of changes need to be made in the costing above, but lets leave that be, these details are better left to be guessed at by the opponent.

Ideally yes..But not in the Indo-Pak context sir...Pak has a stated cruise missile bsed nuke platform...Subsonic cruise missiles are damn hard to detect, and a salvo of cruise missiles will b overwhelming for most AD systems...Therefore, in our context, ABM has to include cruise missile -and Dr Saraswat pointedly said in an interview recently that our current system cannot counter cruise missile evenin design intent...

That would be totally incorrect. He has in fact made it a point to stress that the AAD can even intercept any cruise missile provided adequate sensor coverage is possible, and then went on to state that with the incorporation of Phalcon AWACS, DRDO AEW&C, and Aerostat radar coverage, as envisaged, defence against cruise missiles is part and parcel of the integrated IADS being set up. All the other missile systems either under procurement, or development are also capable of achieving CM interception with adequate cueing, as mentioned above.

As things stand sir, Pak., is on the backfoot thanks to the ABM program and they are very unhappy with the whole deal as their import/put together approach to missile systems is under strain. Their entire procurement system is also under severe stress, as they are not able to match the number of procurements taking place in India given their laudable state of the economy. The country is more and more dependent on the US gravy train. It is simply not sustainable over the long term. We are going to see a lot of complaints and grief from their end about the water issue, the ABM, and our conventional acquisitions in the days to come. Hence, I do hope Shri VK Singh-ji also lets loose the occasional comment about the Cold Start Doctrine to make them more happy with the state of affairs.

[negi]

Somnath ji I am wondering as to why are you so skeptical of effectiveness of BMD capability ? The doctrines,strategies or even scenarios are built around military might and imo there is no doubt about the fact that BMD capability serves as a key input to the powers at the helm who formulate our nuclear doctrine .

From a purely technical pov a well proven and demonstrated capability to take out an enemy ballistic missile with Pk>0.9 by employing a layered BMD system is a significant development specially when we take into consideration the suicidal neighbor we have to bear with . Most of the open source info around Pakistan's nukes pegs the number below '100' (which I doubt it must be far less than that ) and with most of our cities and strategic installations under the BMD umbrella TSP leadership will have to resort to a saturation attack on select few targets and hope that some of them make it through the BMD shield .

Also Djinn power savvy pakis are nowhere near to mastering MIRV or even the TN type bombs .

[somnath]

That would be totally incorrect. He has in fact made it a point to stress that the AAD can even intercept any cruise missile provided adequate sensor coverage is possible, and then went on to state that with the incorporation of Phalcon AWACS, DRDO AEW&C, and Aerostat radar coverage, as envisaged, defence against cruise missiles is part and parcel of the integrated IADS being set up. All the other missile systems either under procurement, or development are also capable of achieving CM interception with adequate cueing, as mentioned above.

I am pretty sure - cant find that interview online right now...will post it if/once I get it..

Given that even the US NMD does not plan to counter cruise missile threat, I will be sceptical...Of course, "given adequate sensor coverage, etc etc etc", one can hypothesize anything...Problems with such ceterus paribus conditions are one isnt sure how much/many consitute the condition itself..

I am all for building deterrence, that should anyway be the fulcrum of any defence strategy...Problem is that there has been no debate on whether BMD is effective, even operationally, even for a moment if its affordable, in the Idnian context...

Unlike in the US, where all the literature has been almost unanimously scptical..And this when, I reiterate, the basic objective for the US is to counter relatively unsophisticated threats like Iran and NoKo, over literally thousands of kms..

another study on NMD..

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_a ... nical.html

From a purely technical pov a well proven and demonstrated capability to take out an enemy ballistic missile with Pk>0.9 by employing a layered BMD system is a significant development specially when we take into consideration the suicidal neighbor we have to bear with

Sir, even the US does not make such claims, and they have been at the game for much longer...Most tests, as quoted by th CFR article I posted before, are "controlled", and designed to "generate" success...Our system uses many foreign components as its buildign blocks - Israeli acquisition radar, French Fire control radar....To somehow assume that we have chanced upon a miracle tech is optimism and hope - neither is a good strategy..

Pakistan (and more improtantly China) need to be deterred..the question is whether an ABM is the right tool in our portfolio, or whether that only creates more strategic imbalance in our context, diverting attention from the "core" measures we need to take...

[Austin]

Negi most of the BMD test done in India and abroad ( US etc ) are done in a very controlled environment and is well choreographed event ( but its still challenging since its like something travelling at 7.1m/s is intercepted by another interceptor and various altitude ).

They generally do not take into account the sophistication/challenges of maneuverability RV( within MRV too there are various level of sophistication ) and countermeasures/decoys ( within decoys too there are various levels of sophistication and depends on capability of the country and is a closely guarded secret )

BMD system can be effective if its backed by very capable offensive system , if the offensive system can take out most of adversaries first strike system ( which is a tough and challenging task ) , then advanced BMD can take care of leakers.

Some glimpse of how advanced an RV can get is shown here The missile that does not care confirmed and mentioned in Lightening Bolts.

It would be interesting if few of the BMD test can prove intercepting Agni-1 and 2 RV if these Agni's fired by Indian SF is intercepted by DRDO BMD team as part of its test process , although DRDO is aware of Agni's capability and how its RV will behave ( tricks & trade ) but it would be a challenging test for Indian BMD.

[nachiket]

BMD system can be effective if its backed by very capable offensive system , if the offensive system can take out most of adversaries first strike system ( which is a tough and challenging task ) , then advanced BMD can take care of leakers.

That is the case if you do not follow a NFU policy. Not applicable in India's case. Another reason for us to throw out the NFU policy.

Another case is if Pakis use a tactical nuke on our troops in a conventional war and we get the chance to strike back with nukes. But I think the Pakis won't stop at that. If they reach a position where the only way to avoid losing the land battle is to nuke the IA formations, they will throw every nuke they have against us along with it. There's no way they would stop at a a few tactical nukes and give us an opportunity to take out their first strike system without mainland India feeling the heat.

[negi]

Austin I am aware of the above hence my point about discussing effectiveness of BMD system against TSP arsenal who are yet to demonstrate capability in areas of maneuvering RVs or even a bus capable of dispensing decoys alongside the actual warhead , as for your point about careful orchestration of the test can you be more specific and clear as to what do you mean by those ? As I see it apart from the challenges in areas of early warning and detection if reentry profile of TSP warheads can be replicated then one can put in a lot of faith in these tests.

[Kanson]

Somnath-ji,

1. It is my mistake to talk abt cost of N weapon as 1 Cr as i'm not either so sure or can't substantiate; apologizes. I only tried to point out that the weapon could have cost 3 or 4 times more now to give a rough/raw referrence. So let it pass.

2. Dr. Saraswat mentioned in 2004 the cost of Prithvi is 7 Cr. While the Prithvi production was started in 90s, he gave the figure of 3-4 Cr for the Prithvi produced 7 yrs before 2004. We dont know how many produced in 90s and how many in 2004...

Another example: Agni-III development cost is stated to be 10-15 Cr as of 2007 ( The Hindu ). So I request prudence in comparing our system with US system in terms of cost.

3. According to the Brookings link, 86% = Bombers, Submarines etc + defensive systems( whatever that means) + target acquisition systems( whatever that means) + other ityaadis +ballistic missile(obvious). Here in Pak context, we are here taking only Ballistic missile for consideration. So that equation doesnt holds good.

4. Definition of CEP of a missile in simple terms represents only 50% of missile is expected to reach the specified target within the limit. ex. if CEP is 1km then of the missiles fired towards that target, only 50% of missile fired will reach within the 1 km mark. Rest 50% misses the 1km mark. What is not stated is the misses are by what margin. It is generally assumed to be a normal distribution. What i'm trying to say is CEP is itself somekind of gimmick. So a CEP of 300m doesnt mean that the missile fired cant fall 10 km off the target.

4. You are taking anything granted when talking abt MaRV. MaRV is nothing new. We have seen that several decades before. But no one talks abt how accurate those MaRV are. Those MaRV are potent weapons only when they reposition themselves after manoeuvering to the target. Many countries can talk abt having MaRV, like Iran. Question is whether they have a mechanism to reposition them(RV) to the target, if so what their CEPs.( Pls see my note on CEP.) We also have MaRV in terms of Prithvi/Dhanush, Agni-2, Agni-3 as well Shaurya. Only we started to talk abt employing Dhanush for Anti-ship role recently. Agni-2 adopted different method to re-target. I like to bet that only Chinese are developing these techs recently and damn sure Paks dont have such tech. It is considered/rumoured that Chinese developed MIRV tech only in this decade.

5. *Most* of the ill-talk about BMD is due to mis-information, perceived results as failure, incomplete information and mostly paranoia. I don't fault them becoz in a existential threat, even if defence system like BMD can be good for 99%, there exists 1 % chance for the offensive system like N tippled BM to take them. What they mostly miss is BM too suffer from same problem and not all expected BM are supposed to hit them. Pls check the Arrow developed controversy during early phase of developement. All half-baked information are peddled to say Arrow BMD wont work. And there are also lobbies involed in spreading such information. So my simple request, dont take things literally.

6. Coming to our BMD, we have taken the best of two systems and combined them in our system. After the failulre of Patriot in stopping the SCUD missile( the failure is not in missile or guidance, it due to warhead), Americans migrated to hit-to-kill mechanism. While Russians experimenting the results of Patriot failure, developed directional warheads. Russian ABM deploys directional warheads. We adopted both, hit-to-kill and directional warhead and recently modified that to gimballed directional warhead. S-300/S-400 missiles contains directional warhead and it was proved in test trials that it can take down TBM. According to FAS, Indians witnessed the test. Our BMD employs such mechanism that any last changes in the direction of the incoming warhead even at the fag end to the point of fraction of a second can be handled due to gimballed directional warhead, better dual sensor network and better kill vehicle so there exists mechanism to take down MaRV and we have dual sensor both RF and IR; it helps in discriminating the target. We are also developing multiple kill vehicle. [all these are stated by Dr.Saraswat or others in this rank and in public domain] So why to take undue worry or perceive any manufactured deficiency in our BMD system. Users are also involved in the testing of the system. Considering the Army's rigorous test regime and taking note from incidence involing Brahmos Mk-II system test, there is no need worry abt the efficiency of the system against the BM missile, even if one not have much confidence in the developers, drdo.

I rest my case.

[negi]

Sir, even the US does not make such claims, and they have been at the game for much longer...Most tests, as quoted by th CFR article I posted before, are "controlled", and designed to "generate" success...Our system uses many foreign components as its buildign blocks - Israeli acquisition radar, French Fire control radar....To somehow assume that we have chanced upon a miracle tech is optimism and hope - neither is a good strategy..

There is a lot written in US circles on everything the discussion is about capability to take out a GHAURI/SHAHEEN class ballistic missile which as on date do not have any maneuvering RV or even a MIRV capability .

Lastly these missiles fall under IRBM category something very different from the SS-18 , Topol or even DF-31 family i.e. different reentry angle and speed .

Pakistan (and more improtantly China) need to be deterred..the question is whether an ABM is the right tool in our portfolio, or whether that only creates more strategic imbalance in our context, diverting attention from the "core" measures we need to take...

ABM capability is a concept which will evolve with time for instance Kanson has already mentioned we already hear DRDO talk about multiple kill vehicles (I guess even Lockheed Martin is working on similar lines) so yes this is an area which needs to be invested into , its significance with regards to India's MCD imo needs to be discussed in a separate thread .

[somnath]

Kanson ji,

So I request prudence in comparing our system with US system in terms of cost.

I would only refer you to my earlier point - compare the costs of systems that are reliably available (Brahmos/Tomahawk, Nag/JAvelin etc) - do you see any major difference? Therefore, to assume that India's cost of a BMD system deployment can be radically lower fo the same (in fact we need greter) capability is simply fallacious..

3. According to the Brookings link, 86% = Bombers, Submarines etc + defensive systems( whatever that means) + target acquisition systems( whatever that means) + other ityaadis +ballistic missile(obvious). Here in Pak context, we are here taking only Ballistic missile for consideration. So that equation doesnt holds good.

Precisely my point! Pak has to spend much much less to ramp up its delivery capabilities (ie ballistic missiles) today than US had to in the Cold War!

Respectfu;y sir, this is disengenuous:

*Most* of the ill-talk about BMD is due to mis-information, perceived results as failure, incomplete information and mostly paranoia. I don't fault them becoz in a existential threat, even if defence system like BMD can be good for 99%, there exists 1 % chance for the offensive system like N tippled BM to take them. What they mostly miss is BM too suffer from same problem and not all expected BM are supposed to hit them.

Read the CFR article, or the last one I posted...People deeply involed in the system are sceptical about its efficacy...The level of sophisitication required of an ABM system is far ahead of those required in a simple BM system...The PAC IIIs were far superior in tech, and many times more expensive than the Scuds...Despite that, very few Scuds got intercepted - and Scuds are a '50s tech...Later gen BMs (and MaRV is quite old stuff, as you say) have far greater flexibilities incorporated...And BMD tech, which has had to move to HTK, is getting costlier and costlier to keep up!

As you say, we are using components from various countries - Israel, Russia, France in our BMD system...There is nothing to suggest that ours will be radically different in terms of performance! Scientists by their very nature will be bullish..How many years was Agni "under induction" after DRDO certified it "ready"?

To dismiss opinions of people who have been doing this for decades to me would be foolish..And no one's done this more than the US...

At the end, maybe it works, we dont know yet - we havent even done half a dozen tests...But what is the cost of coverage? The Americans are doubling their expenditure every year on this (they spent 56 billion in the last 6 years, they are going to spend 50 more in the next 3!)...And even then, they are scaling back anc scaling back big time...

[somnath]

Lastly these missiles fall under IRBM category something very different from the SS-18 , Topol or even DF-31 family i.e. different reentry angle and speed .

Negi ji, the americans are also trgeting "simple" missiles of the Shaheen (Nodong) category, their NMD does not target the Topols at all! They are looking to counter rogue states only!

[negi]

Precisely my point! Pak has to spend much much less to ramp up its delivery capabilities (ie ballistic missiles) today than US had to in the Cold War!

How many nuclear warheads TSP has in its inventory ?

More importantly the delivery platforms are legacy systems (infact GHAURI is a souped up SCUD D ) , even taking into consideration the skepticism raised around Patriot BLK-1's capability against SCUDs in first Gulf War in 90's , I think as on today PAC-3 would be able to shoot down these legacy systems with a very high Pk .

[negi]

Negi ji, the americans are also trgeting "simple" missiles of the Shaheen (Nodong) category, their NMD does not target the Topols at all! They are looking to counter rogue states only!

And they have demonstrated successful hits against such targets , I think the hooha around the NMD is more due to the political nature of the issue else technology wise Nodong class type missiles are pretty much addressed by the THAAD and PAC-3 combine .

-- Boss please drop the ji .

[Kanson]

Somnath-ji,

a genuine request: Pls check what a gimballed directional warhead and hit-to-kill vehicle can do in terms of performance in neutralizing the target.
In simple terms: even if hit-to-kill vehicle can miss the target, gimballed direc. warhead can take any manoeuvering target.

It doesnt matter whether PAC3 is superior or costly. For me what works is important. Anyway fwiw, we dismissed the PAC3 as inefficient to our needs. I dont know why you want to judge our performance based on what US did or doing. If US fails, is it written down that we cant succeed ? US is using Leopard gun and we developed our own tank gun. Does that mean our tank gun doesnt fire?

Read the CFR article, or the last one I posted...People deeply involed in the system are sceptical about its efficacy...The level of sophisitication required of an ABM system is far ahead of those required in a simple BM system...

high level of sophisitication doesnt mean anything unless you say what those are ? Samething for others, if you use only qualifiers( hitech, lowtech etc), the discussion cant be carried forward meaningfully. You have to say exactly why it is perceived that way.

[somnath]

And they have demonstrated successful hits against such targets , I think the hooha around the NMD is more due to the political nature of the issue else technology wise Nodong class type missiles are pretty much addressed by the THAAD and PAC-3 combine .

Is it? And after that, we hear this

"Additional test data collected under realistic flight test conditions is necessary to valida$te models and simulations and to increase confidence." - Charles E. McQueary, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

From
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18792/na ... fense.html

posted above...

How many nuclear warheads TSP has in its inventory ?

About 90-100, depending on the source..One estimate hereunder:

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/N ... whohaswhat

and mind you, 3-4 years back, most people were talking about a Paki arsenal of 25-30 warheads...

The ability to ramp up is exponential, especially as you master the Uranium enrichment process (which they did before us, to be fair)...

a genuine request: Pls check what a gimballed directional warhead and hit-to-kill vehicle can do in terms of performance in neutralizing the target.
In simple terms: even if hit-to-kill vehicle can miss the target, gimballed direc. warhead can take any manoeuvering target.

the interceptor is the last leg of the system....Do we have enough satellite coverage to detect launch? Or enough AWACS to track from launch? OR enough overlapping radar coverage? Has the system (satellite, radars, AWACs, other sensors) been networked and tested? Is the system capable to tackling a mass attack? What we have currently are defined tests of a single missile launch being tracked and "killed"....Presumably the Americans have gone some way beyond that, and they are nowhere close to being confident of it, even against the likes of Iran/NoKo....Without casting aspersions on DRDO's capabilities (and to be fair they too, shorn of the rhetoric are talking of multiple tests, and a phase 1 deployemnt by 2013), how cost effective is it?

Some of the basic questions to be answered are: Do we spend the limited dollars in creating a force of 100 agni-3s/5s in double quick time or do we spend the same money on a rudimentary, phase 1 BMD? what creates sufficient deterrence? In a scenario (India, Pak, China) where even numbers on warheads are pure guesswork, how do we maintain a balance in strategic terms? Trying to talk of ABM without taking these into account is not strategically wise..

[Kanson]

Somnath-ji, answers for you many querries are below, most of them mentioned by Saraswat himself.

As ballistic missile Dhanush lifted off INS Subhadra on the afternoon of March 6 and swooped towards the Orissa coast 150 km away

“The whole process of target classification takes 30 seconds. Then the batteries (of the interceptor missile), which are in hot stand-by conditions, can be launched within 100-120 seconds of target detection,” Saraswat said.

Within 160 seconds of the radars picking up the target, Saraswat's newest missile lifted off and raced at a speed of 3,500 metres per second out of the earth's atmosphere. The mission: kill the hostile missile before it reentered the atmosphere. As it climbed sharply, ground radars fed its embedded computers with the enemy's position, trajectory and velocity-all this in 100 milliseconds. Soon the interceptor's radio frequency homing seeker spotted the enemy and went for the kill. As chances of missing a direct hit are high, the interceptor's new gimballed directional warhead burst within nine metres of the 'hostile' missile and blew it into smithereens-a safe 80km away from the intended target.

The system can take care of threats from all Pakistani missiles, which have ranges less than 2,000 km. For taking care of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) "you need interceptors which can fly 6,000 to 7,000 metres per second," said a DRDO scientist. Saraswat wants to develop it as the next phase, while simultaneously planning for two more tests with the present capability. "You need at least five tests in this phase," said he.

Can the enemy jam the system and mislead the interceptor? Yes, the enemy would try to jam the ?frequency of the data-link between the radars and the interceptor. "So ?we have catered for frequency diversity," said Saraswat. "And the interceptor batteries would be distributed. Even if they jam one or two, the remaining would be working."

DRDO officials concede that an enemy would be launching a volley of missiles. "My radar can handle 200 targets simultaneously," said Saraswat. He is confident that with sufficient batteries of interceptor missiles, even volley attacks can be neutralised.

Airborne radars mounted atop aircraft, which India is acquiring from Israel, will help track missiles above 2,000 km. For tracking missiles of the range of 6,000 km, the interceptors will take help of radars mounted on satellites.

Meanwhile, with the impending acquisition of air-based surveillance platforms, scientists hope to extend the surveillance range beyond the present 600 km to more than 2,000 km into enemy territory. That, incidentally, is more than the distance between the two farthest points in Pakistan.

Satellite is expected in 2014/15 for the Phase-II. Most of the technical details mentioned here are for Phase-I. Only land based RADAR is used to pick up target fired across 150 km off the cost of Orissa. 'Iron Dome' by Israel deploys only land based RADAR, and all these are networked. Only for higher ranges AWACS and Satellite based sensors are needed.

Links:
1. http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/unc ... 64598.html
2. http://week.manoramaonline.com/cgi-bin/ ... =EDITORIAL

Some of the basic questions to be answered are: Do we spend the limited dollars in creating a force of 100 agni-3s/5s in double quick time or do we spend the same money on a rudimentary, phase 1 BMD? what creates sufficient deterrence? In a scenario (India, Pak, China) where even numbers on warheads are pure guesswork, how do we maintain a balance in strategic terms? Trying to talk of ABM without taking these into account is not strategically wise..

Somnath ji, frankly, i dont know how and what structure are planned. There is no public document or white paper regarding the same. May be some other gentleman can take your question.

[bhavani]

While going over the SIPRI weapons database i found one interesting thing that we imported quite a few ST-68U tinshield from Russia. Tin shield radars are generally used with S-300 System. There are also sometimes mast-mounted on tall structures to give longer range. i have always heard rumours that we posses S-300 in milited numbers.

I wonder where we have use this ST-68U system deployed. I always think we should have been a part of S-400 program. We should have bought some batteries of S-400. It would give us great long range coverage till the LRSAM thing comes into picture. Keeping the ABM thing aside our SAM defences are too short ranged and need an overhaul. The new paki F-16 can easily jam our 1960's SA-3's.

Our Navy has better SAMS currently like SA-N-17 and SA-N-12, barak compared to our airforce and army.

[VikB]

Guys, thanks for a lovely informative debate there.

We have two enemies. Currently by the look of it and in its current form, the BMD raises the stake for TSP. It has lot of enriched uranium but less mastery on the delivery system. Even if we consider the recent tests by DRDO, being able to take out our own launched target missile with a gimballed directional warhead is a major leap in our capabilities and surely puts us in the league of very few nations with such a capability. TSP really has to recalculate its traditional posture of u-dont-do-anything-else-i-ll-throw-mizzile. The BMD tests have surely set the cat amongst pigeons.

Our dear Eastern neighbour is more straight forward. The Agni programme is meant to tame her. Here what will work best is the mutually-assured-distruction logic. There is a lot of similarities between the cold war era US-USSR and today's India-China. As such, having a strong missile defence programme matched with an equally agressive MIRV enabelled ICBM plan will surely make us sleep comfortably and massively change the war-equation as being prepared by our pesky neighbours.

[sawant]

Is there a cheaper, more effective option than ABM... why dont we have multiple sateliites providing us the best possible reconnaisance that money can buy... the best way to deal with abdul is to be smarter and master ELINT... otherwise there will be all speculation and overspending....

[K Mehta]

K Mehta ji,

The question is precisely of probabilities..I had started with that...

Precisely - I had quoted a much better probability-exercise earlier in the thread..Therefore, if I am a Paki general, I would increase my offensive missiles by a factor of 4, to (say) 400 missiles...Cost of extra 300 missiles, going by the "Prithvi rate", would be about 2000 crores, and 300 warheads (going by Kanson's estimate - dont know where it comes from, but lets take it) another 300 crores...So in about 500 million dollars, I have negated the probability advantage of ABM version 1...In order for us to restore the advantage, the ABM has to be further beefed up, with more overlapping radar coverage, greater sat surveillance, more accurate tech on HTK, the works....What are the incremental costs of that?? If you look at the CFR study, quite huge even for the US, that has a legacy of doing these things...Point being, is India's resource gap vis a vis Pak big enough to sstain this exercise? And how do we manage the same set of escalation vis a vis China?

somnathji
a critical question that book asked was
whether the adversaries would have improved their weapons qualitatively and quantitatively if the ABM did not exist?
the answer is mostly yes, these nations will continue to stockpile and produce more missiles, irrespective of whether we have ABM or not. ABM therefore is needed. What you are focusing on is the cost aspect if I am understanding your posts correctly.

Give me a day and I will post a bit of detail on this line, both based on my understanding of the book and what i learnt about future Indian missile programs from Dr. Saraswat's talk, I had attended.

This, when the US is not even buiolding its NMD for China and Russia, but purportedly for rogue states with far simpler tech...

PS: The book clearly mentions the reasons why US stated the NMD was for rouge states and not the bigger powers, while they were actually meant for the bigger powers and had a bearing on them! It was for diplomacy and not naming an enemy! The debate in senate was mentioned in it and was on the same lines as you are taking now!

[Kanson]

Is there a cheaper, more effective option than ABM...

yes, it is called bribe. It can do wonders if you found a good partner.

[Kanson]

It would give us great long range coverage till the LRSAM thing comes into picture.

Wait till LRSAM comes online. Picture becomes clear over that time.

[somnath]

Kanson ji,

I had read Dr Saraswat's interview..And I woudl draw your attention to the following:

The whole process of target classification takes 30 seconds. Then the batteries (of the interceptor missile), which are in hot stand-by conditions, can be launched within 100-120 seconds of target detection

How many batteries of missiles will be required for adequate coverage if they are to be in "hot standby conditions" 24/7? Say in a Parakram-type scenario, where the threat perception stretches for nearly a year?

My radar can handle 200 targets simultaneously," said Saraswat. He is confident that with sufficient batteries of interceptor missiles, even volley attacks can be neutralised

How many batteries, what is the attendant C4I infrastructure?? Above all, they havent tested it..Dr Saraswat is "confident" - but prrof of the pudding is in the eating..

Rest of the interview, you would see host of references of capabilities still not available - sat-mounted radars for instance...Or those that we have recently acquired - the Phalcons for example - have we managed to link them up with the current system? How many AWACS would we need again for a 24/7 coverage over extended periods?

Only land based RADAR is used to pick up target fired across 150 km off the cost of Orissa. 'Iron Dome' by Israel deploys only land based RADAR, and all these are networked. Only for higher ranges AWACS and Satellite based sensors are needed.

The current set of tests have key "fixities" built in - they know "where" the target missile is being launched from, they know the precise coordinates of that location, they know the approximate time window of the missile launch, they know the "type" of missile being launched, they know how many missiles (currently single) are being launched..And a ton of other things that I am technically not competent of knowing...Its a "controlled" test - to be fair, so have been most tests under NMD...

Iron Dome is built to counter short range Katyushas - very different set of imperatives to a BMD system....

whether the adversaries would have improved their weapons qualitatively and quantitatively if the ABM did not exist?
the answer is mostly yes, these nations will continue to stockpile and produce more missiles, irrespective of whether we have ABM or not. ABM therefore is needed. What you are focusing on is the cost aspect if I am understanding your posts correctly

There are two potential adversaries:

1. "Rogue" states with rudimentary, but unpredictable capabilities -NoKo, Iran
2. Adversaries with known, developed missile/nuke programmes - Russia, Pak, China etc..

For the former, most of the current literature find BMD inadequate because of the sheer "unpredictability" of the situation..You spend tens, hundreds of billions on a system that you are not sure will work against a sneak attack...Its simply not a cost effective solution..

For the latter, BMD is consideered strategically destabilising...The US NMD does not even profess to have capabilities to take out a missile attack from a "considered", developed enemy...But fielding of a BMD virtually forces the other party to drastically increase its own offensive arsenal, thereby setting in force a cycle of strategic arms race that people are trying to limit for decades now...Strategic weapons are meant for deterrence, not use...And you need a level of fixity on the deterrence, even if that fixity is not a number but a principle...I havent read the book you are referring to, but I dont think that the NMD has even been tested against a "salvo" attack - which is what surely someone like Russia or China would do in case they intended to attack the US..

K Mehta ji, will wait for your report on Dr Saraswat's talk - shoudl have interesting nuggets!

[geeth]

>>>How many batteries of missiles will be required for adequate coverage if they are to be in "hot standby conditions" 24/7? Say in a Parakram-type scenario, where the threat perception stretches for nearly a year?

In a war like situation, leave alone the missile batteries, the whole nation will be in "hot standby condition". Even at present, the first thing that is done is to switch on the air-defence units if there is any indication of hostilities. Once the BMD is operational, IMO they will on 24x7 duty. The network will be designed for this kind of operational duty.

[Kanson]

How many batteries, what is the attendant C4I infrastructure?? Above all, they havent tested it..Dr Saraswat is "confident" - but prrof of the pudding is in the eating..

Rest of the interview, you would see host of references of capabilities still not available - sat-mounted radars for instance...Or those that we have recently acquired - the Phalcons for example - have we managed to link them up with the current system? How many AWACS would we need again for a 24/7 coverage over extended periods?

1. Reg, no. of batteries, infra, how many, what cities, all these questions were raised in one of the interview with Saraswat. But he refused to divulge any details on this. Obviously, no one want to share their strength of the batteries.

2. Ofcourse, proof of the pudding is in eating. But how we know what they are testing. We are only feeding upon the information what they provided. For instance, test of PAD was broken to public for the first time in 2006. But the clip which showed the PAD tested in 2006, released by drdo, also showed the lauch of AAD, which was first tested later in 2007 nearly one year after, as BM defence.

3. Sat mounted is needed for Phase-II. AWACS we are procuring , as you can see from the news. For 24/7 coverage, apart from AWACS, we can also utilize the EL/M-2083 radars, which we procured from Israel. This is derived from Green Pine and will be useful for the Phase-I. It kind of acts as early warning. We positioned them along the border.
http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Ele ... srael.html

According to Jane's sources, the Elta Systems EL/M-2083 Aerostat Programmable Radar (APR) is derived from the company's L-band (1 to 2 GHz) EL/L-2080 'Green Pine' ground-based, phased-array, search, acquisition and fire-control radar and is described as being a 3-D sensor that can acquire and track targets at both "high" and "low" altitudes, with the latter height band including targets such as cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and microlights being used by special forces or terrorists. For its part, the baseline 'Green Pine' radar is capable of simultaneous search, detection, alerting, tracking ("rapid" track-while-scan) and weapon guidance functions and comprises an antenna assembly, power and cooling units and a control centre shelter, all of which are mounted on semi-trailers. The sensor scans electronically in azimuth and elevation and, according to sources, has a detection range of up to 500 km, can track and illuminate targets travelling at velocities "in excess of" 3,000 m/s and can guide an Arrow anti-ballistic missile to within 4 m of a specified target.

4. As i said before, we are giving enough importance for network Centricity/Connectivity. As you can see from other projects and developement. All these will be part of the bigger AD net.

The current set of tests have key "fixities" built in - they know "where" the target missile is being launched from, they know the precise coordinates of that location, they know the approximate time window of the missile launch, they know the "type" of missile being launched, they know how many missiles (currently single) are being launched..And a ton of other things that I am technically not competent of knowing...Its a "controlled" test - to be fair, so have been most tests under NMD...

If you read the interview and other news, you would know that, defending team doesnt know all the parameters of the launched BM. It is tested more like a real stituation. For ex. defending team doesnt know in which direction the target is approaching, what velocity, what type of BM, is it 700 km hatf or 1500 km Ghauri, attacking team might have withhelded the exact lauch time. And then there is target classification. In the recent aborted test, MCC/LCC aborted the launch as the approaching missile is not considered as threat to its protecting island/area - this is done without any user input/guidance - totally in hands-free mode and this is described as hot standby mode. The system takes care of itself. If i heard anything new further, i will share with you regarding this.

I hope you have more doubts, but as the test progresses( we are still in develooping phase), you may get answers to all you querries.
PS: We can avoid formal addressing like "ji" etc.

[Kanson]

A view on our BMD very well written.


India's Missiles Fly Up the Learning Curve
http://www.airforce-technology.com/feat ... 251/[quote]

A truism in many sports holds that offence gets headlines, but defence wins championships. Although it is only roughly analogous to sport, war and military technology exhibits the same skew in media coverage, as the evolution of India's strategic missile capability shows. Judging by recent test results, the second half of the equation may hold as well.

The defence doesn't rest: programmatic outperformance

Sandwiched between successful 2009 trials of the BrahMos cruise missile on 5 March and the Prithvi II nuclear-capable SRBM in mid-April, the 7 March test of an indigenous ABM missile was equally successful in terms of test objectives (although it received a fraction of the coverage, judging from Google hit statistics). Taken in programmatic context, however, the ABM test is much more impressive in three ways: success rate, development speed and technical challenge.

Success rate

So far India has gone three for three in ABM interceptor flight trials, each of which had a different test profile. In the first trial, a two-stage interceptor missile later named the Pradyumna incapacitated the target, an incoming Prithvi-II missile, at the upper edge of the stratosphere, 48km up. A year later, a single-stage missile developed under the advanced air defence (AAD) programme defeated another Prithvi-II 15km up (the altitude of many transcontinental plane flights). In the most recent test, another Pradyumna sporting improvements such as a gimballed directional warhead achieved an explosive kill of its target at an altitude of 75km, well into the mesosphere.

In contrast, the Prithvi SRBM itself failed three of its first six trials, and the newer Agni-III MRBM failed its first test. Failure rates of 50% in the first few tests of new weapons are neither unusual nor portents of ultimate futility, but this makes the Indian BMD track record even more impressive.

Development speed

India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) publicly revealed its BMD programme right after the first test in November 2006, less than three years ago.

At that time, Indian programme managers conceded that BMD research had been underway 'for years', but given that DRDO had tried diligently to make the Trishul SAM work in ABM mode for years, as well, the Pradyumna programme couldn't have been DRDO's primary initiative.[I was saying in another discussion that Trishul served as basic block for the other programme] In any event, ABM weapon testing could be completed by 2010 given current rates of progress, according to VK Saraswat, head of missile development at DRDO.

In contrast, DRDO has pursued offensive ballistic missile development since 1983, when it initiated the integrated guided missile development programme (IGMDP). Even now, according to one Indian commentator, the Agni-I is the only fully operational nuclear-capable ballistic missile in India's arsenal. Most of this protracted development cycle has consisted of post-testing production and field integration delays, which should quell undue optimism about the young BMD programme, but even so, both ABM interceptors are ahead of all previous IGMDP timetables.

Technical challenge

Judging technical difficulty of a mission by the number of nations that can execute it, BMD is the most challenging military task, as only the US and Russia have independently fielded fully indigenous BMD systems (the Israeli Arrow is a US-Israel joint venture). The anti-satellite task is actually second (US, Russia, and China), and long-range ballistic missiles currently run third, although this club seems to be in the process of doubling.

If any nation can benefit from BMD, it's India

Indeed, ballistic missile proliferation in Asia makes India's BMD programme even more significant in the long term than its offensive nuclear ballistic missile programmes.

First and foremost, the November 2008 Mumbai attack and the current spread of Taliban influence in Pakistan have raised the spectre of Pakistani missiles and/or nuclear warheads falling into the hands of terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence is at best uncertain.

Beyond the Pakistani threat, whether national or subnational, India's offensive ballistic missile programme lags behind that of its main regional rival, China. Although DRDO has improved its success rate for offensive tests recently, China has just as much momentum and occupies a more advanced position, especially in terms of long-range ICBMs either operational or in the pipeline.

BMD is therefore India's most likely countervailing asset in the foreseeable future. China's high-altitude SAMs can engage some ballistic missiles, but only to a 30km ceiling, and evidently China has no R&D effort comparable to India's BMD programme at this time. In this respect, China's ASAT capability doesn't really count, as ballistic missiles are to satellites as fighter aircraft are to armoured personnel carriers. Last but not least, India is significantly better than China at software development and programming, which are critical to BMD system effectiveness.

Finally, India itself lags in deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. Should India's naval missile programme follow the same timetable as India's other strategic naval and missile programmes, a BMD capability could add significant survivability to India's nuclear deterrent.

Can failure breed success?

To be fair, India's offensive ballistic missiles don't deserve direct managerial comparison to the BMD programme. As noted previously, the BMD programme hasn't yet reached the point where Indian R&D usually derails; as Saraswat himself cautioned, deployment rates are 'not in [DRDO's] hands'.

More important, early failures pave the way to ultimate success: as Thomas Edison said in response to derision at the thousandth failure of the prototype light bulb: 'now we know a thousand ways that it won't work'. Current BMD development benefits from the advances and setbacks of IGMDP, which included the Akash and Prithul SAM projects as well as the Agni and Prithvi. In fact, the Pradyumna ABM was originally called the Prithvi air defence (PAD) missile because it used the generic Prithvi missile design. Conversely, the DRDO strenuously attempted to give the Prithul ABM capability before ultimately admitting failure.

However, other factors may underpin programmatic BMD outperformance. In no particular order:

The one way in which interceptor missiles are less complex than offensive ballistic missiles is that modern versions of the former don't carry nuclear warheads. [India doesnt have such problem, it can if needed very much augment Interceptor missiles warheads with N warhead, case in point is Akash]
The BMD was not developed under the auspices of IGMPD, suggesting that the latter may have been (or would become) too bureaucratic.
The BMD programme not only post-dated the IGMPD, but also probably started during, and quite possibly because of, the ramping up of Pakistan's missile capability. In this regard, the 1999 Kargil conflict occurred just a year after Pakistan detonated its first nuclear munition.
Is true danger the mother of efficiency?

There is in fact an exact historical precedent for the correlation of serious perceived threat and speedy weapons development: the first generation of US strategic nuclear missiles.

By 1952, nuclear warheads had become small enough to put on missiles, but the US missile programmes did not really kick into high gear until 1957, when the Sputnik launch, along with faster-than-expected Soviet development of its first ICBM (the SS-6), created fears of a Soviet-US 'missile gap'. Consequently, the USAF and USN made development of ICBM and SLBM systems their top priority, creating all-star teams of scientists and engineers with essentially unlimited resources.

The effect of concentrating talent, subordinating bureaucratic processes to a tight deadline, enabled by top-level political support and underpinned by strong psychological fear, produced results. A 1958 US catch-up plan called for full operational deployment of nine Atlas squadrons and four Titan squadrons by March 1963. By October 1961, the Strategic Air Command subsequently activated 13 Atlas and six Titan squadrons – 18 months early. The Polaris SLBM project was similarly successful: the first successful test launch was in 1960, just four years from project initiation, and IOC occurred in 1961.

"India's ballistic missile programme lags behind that of its main regional rival – China."In contrast, the second generation of US strategic nuclear weapons systems came in behind schedule, over budget, and arguably under promised capability – at a time when nuclear weapons had become much more survivable and effective in their deterrent role.

If past is prologue, then India's long record of military procurement frustration might be ending – at least in the strategic nuclear weapons space. Indeed, the DRDO is on a roll with its recent tests of offensive missiles; even the January 2009 BrahMos test failure was rectified within weeks.

In the end, the best military procurement principle may have come from essayist Samuel Johnson: 'nothing so wonderfully concentrates the mind as the prospect of hanging in the morning'.[/quote]

[SSridhar]

Next test in June

"We will conduct a flight test of the anti-missile system again in June to build the ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield against incoming medium or long-range missiles," Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) Director-General V.K. Saraswat told IANS

"Analysis of the earlier trial revealed there was a leakage in the target missile leading to system failure. We are rectifying it to ensure the next flight test in June will hit the target and demonstrate our advance capability in developing the missile defence shield against any adversary missile attack," Saraswat said

[Kailash]

DRDO chief stresses on space based security

With the focus of the Indian military is increasingly shifting towards space-based technologies, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has already put in place the building blocks of an anti-satellite system that can put the country on par with China, DRDO chief VK Saraswat said on Sunday.
Speaking at the national conference on frontiers of aeronautical technologies in Bangalore, he said “We have a few building blocks of space-based technologies and some more will be ready in the coming years,” said Saraswat who is also the scientific advisor to the defence ministry.
The laser based space sensors and exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) programmes of DRDO act as perfect combination to track the space-based attacker and guide the ballistic missile system to target it.
Saraswat added, “We need orbital space, radio frequency spectrum, and rapid replacement capacity, low cost satellites to replace or replenish to counter the threats.”
“We also need infra red sensing satellites in the geostationary and low earth orbits for early warning of the approaching target,” he said.
Apart from the anti-satellites, Saraswat stressed the need for space-based intelligence satellites and sensors for protection in air, ground and sea.

The bolded portion is probably planned for phase 2

[Kanson]

The laser based space sensors and exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) programmes of DRDO

[sawant]

As ballistic missile Dhanush lifted off INS Subhadra on the afternoon of March 6 and swooped towards the Orissa coast 150 km away

Was the missile targeted AT the coast ? and what if we had failed to intercept it ... is there any self-destruct mechanism on it in case the test fails ?

[suryag]

For every test that happens there is software that tracks if the unit under test is tracking the pre-programmed path, if it fails it lets the safety officer know who can then choose to destroy the unit under test.

[vasu_ray]

with a conventional warhead on a gimbaled directional base they could destroy the incoming target BM at a point where their respective trajectories came the closest which was 7m, if instead a nuke warhead that explodes directionally is used can we have a larger margin on the closest point for the hit to kill mechanism to succeed, say 250m?

there are tactical nuke warheads to bust underground silos which might be exploding directionally

Also, this distance is less to do with ABM radar inaccuracies and more to do with MaRV trajectories and increasing the probability of intercept

[Craig Alpert]

Russian S-400 missiles to go into serial production

Russian long range ballistic missiles for S-400 Triumph surface-to-air missile systems will go into serial production in the autumn, a leading missile manufacturer said on Friday.

Earlier media reports said the S-400 missile system was incomplete as long range ballistic missiles, among others, had not been adopted for it.

"On December 26, 2009 the preliminary tests were finished and the missile was put forward for state tests," Kommersant daily quoted the general director of Almaz-Antei, Igor Ashurbeili, as saying.

"In the third quarter of 2010 we should finish them, along with combat duty launches, and then put it [the missile] into serial production in the fourth quarter," he added.

According to Ashurbeili, there were no technical failures or difficulties concerning the long range missile tests.

"The tests of S-400 missile lasted for about 3 years...We are bewildered by the bacchanalia of rumors and slander concerning the issue as an ordinary working process is going on," he continued.

Ashurbeili added that the situation regarding the production of missiles after 2012 is unclear as Almaz-Antei does not have "any signed contracts for 2012".

The S-400 Triumph boasts unique characteristics. It can destroy any air target, including aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise and ballistic missiles within a range of 400 kilometers and an altitude up to 30 kilometers. The system is almost three times more efficient than its Russian and foreign counterparts.

There are no plans so far to export the S-400. It will be produced only for the Russian Armed Forces. An additional two systems will be deployed by the end of 2010.

[nits]

Russian S-400 missiles to go into serial production

Is it part of India's wishlist...?

[Prem]

( Chinese money at work)
India’s missile defense/anti-satellite nexus
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1621/1

In January 2010, Saraswat tipped India’s hand further when he told reporters, “India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites,” and that “We are working to ensure space security and protect our satellites. At the same time we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets.”9 This last part is very similar to statements made by some US officials charged with protecting US space assets. Saraswat did acknowledge, “Basically, these are deterrence technologies and quite certainly many of these technologies will not be used.”10 If that last part is true, it does raise the question of how much of a deterrent these technologies may actually provide, since the Indian government claims not to intend to use them.

Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik gave in February 2010 perhaps the real reason why India has expressed any interest in an ASAT program in his explanation, “Our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon systems because our neighborhood possesses one.”11

The Indians may have decided that they should be able to cover all contingencies for future conflicts. The Pakistanis are already well within range of Indian ballistic missiles, and by developing this long-range missile capability, the Indians will be able to counter China as well
India’s interest in developing this missile defense/ASAT capability also could be seen as an unintended consequence from the October 2008 US-India nuclear deal. In it, the United States agreed to lift its ban on nuclear trade with India, despite India’s not having signed the NPT and actively flouting the spirit of that treaty by holding nuclear weapon tests. The nuclear deal put India in a unique position relative to other non-conforming states to the NPT, thanks to its now special relationship with the United States; India may think that its benefactor will quietly look the other way while it develops ASATs
The Agni-III or -V may be powerful ballistic missiles, but they cannot be scaled down and just swapped into the Indian missile defense network in order to have a missile defense capacity; thus claims about their effectiveness equaling an enhanced ASAT or missile defense capability should be taken with a grain of salt.India’s ASAT plans are worrisome because in the Indians’ anxiety to keep up with China, they may unexpectedly create the exact thing that they are trying to avoid: a conflict in or about space. If their statements are misunderstood or if they ratchet up the rhetoric, they may thrust India into the position of having to hope that its missile defense interceptors do, indeed, serve as able ASATs.

[Craig Alpert]

US to fund installation of Israeli rocket defence system

Barack Obama is to ask the US Congress for an extra $200m in military aid to help Israel get a short-range rocket defence system in place. The system is designed to shoot down mortars and rockets from Gaza or Southern Lebanon with guided missiles. The system, called Iron Dome, has gone through testing and installation will start later this year. According to US State Department figures, direct military aid to Israel was $2.55bn in 2009. This is set to increase to $3.15bn in 2018.
...........................

[Kailash]

Review Cites Flaws in U.S. Antimissile Program

Mr. Obama’s announcement of his new antimissile plan in September was based on the Pentagon’s assessment that the SM-3, or Standard Missile 3, had intercepted 84 percent of incoming targets in tests. But a re-examination of results from 10 of those apparently successful tests by Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis, being published this month, finds only one or two successful intercepts — for a success rate of 10 to 20 percent.
.....
“The allegation is wrong,” Richard Lehner, an agency spokesman, said Wednesday. He said the SM-3 is “attaining test scores that many other Defense Department programs aspire to attain.”

Even so, the Pentagon later admitted that 4 of the 10 analyzed flight tests carried no mock warheads at all.
.....

The deployment of the SM-3 is also seen as essential to convincing Israel that the United States has an effective technology to contain Iran, even if the Iranians obtain a nuclear weapon.
......
the kill vehicle hit the warhead only once or twice. The rest of the time, the interceptor struck the rocket body — a much larger target.

In combat, the scientists added, “the warhead would have not been destroyed, but would have continued toward the target.”
......
Mr. Lehner added, however, that target missiles in 4 test flights carried no mock warheads, but rather “a nosecone with a weight up front for ballast.” The 4 flights with no warheads — which Dr. Postol and Dr. Lewis included in their analysis of 10 interceptions by the SM-3 — included 3 early ones and a flight last July, the most recent in their analysis.

The science is so complex and cluttered that it may just politics which decide the test results!

[Tanmay]

http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/jul/ ... issile.htm