Kargil War Thread - VI

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 24 Nov 2009 13:05

"yet the Indian security establishment ‘over time’ had conditioned itself to the validity of the nuclear deterrence of Pakistan and the self induced assessment that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is controlled by its army which may be rash enough to press the nuclear button. "...

i really think this one comment sums it all.... though i would be more specific and said 'political establishment ' instead of security estaiblishment... today the sardar ji is saying that he does not how to deal with napakis.... in that case he should resign and let someone deal with napakis....

very cogent and hardhitting article....

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 30 Nov 2009 23:11

Hello Rajkumar,

I believe the book Ray sahab is referring to is called "Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict" by Julian Thompson. It is available on Amazon for $12.

For a more general but historical perspective, I've read "Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton" by Martin Creveld.

But in terms of hard data, the book "So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast" by James Matthews and Cora Holt is hard to beat; it is a summary of the US Transportation Command's strategic deployment for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. I will be happy to supply a copy of this book to an interested person.

My opinion on these subjects is that of an amateur, so please be warned!

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 01 Dec 2009 11:56

I read the article by AM Goel.

Having served twice in Kargil and both time in operations, I can state that the deployment is based the intelligence perceptions at the national level and intermediate commanders cannot change the deployment at will.

The perception at the appropriate level, based on the overall intelligence appreciation, was that Kargil was a low threat sector owing to the immensely difficult and daunting terrain and the glaciated areas.

Thus, an independent brigade with additional BSF was adequate.

There was at that time only one road through which the Pakistani side of Kargil opposite Dras and Dalunang via the Burzil Bai Pass to Gultari and onto Dalunang. And one road from Skardu to Pakistani area opposite North Indus.

Had there been adequate surveillance by intelligence agencies from the highest to the lowest, changes in troops deployment, movement of troops could give indications of Pakistani intentions.

One might add that the Burzil Bai closes and opens practically the same time as the Zoji La, give or take 15 days on the average. Therefore, any change in troop density, guns and stores could have been detected since they would have been pumped in before the Burzil Bai closed!

Field commanders, right from the Corps Cdr to the Coy Cdr would have to depend on intelligence inputs and to feel that they were napping is too far fetched!

I hope I have understood the article by AM Goel!

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 01 Dec 2009 22:06

Dear Ray,

IIRC in 1998 Pakistan Army had conducted an exercise for which troops were deployed, but were never pulled back. Ignoring the corps level troops movement for a moment, it seems that we failed to detect the preparation for war even in March - April 1999. Air Cmde Tufail (PAF) writes:

... some time in March 1999.....the Army’s mobilisation and other preparations that he had seen in Skardu. His analysis was that ‘something big is imminent.’ Helicopter flying activity was feverishly high as Army Aviation’s Mi-17s were busy moving artillery guns and ammunition to the mountain tops. Troops in battle gear were to be seen all over the city. Interestingly, Messes were abuzz with war chatter amongst young officers. In retrospect, one wonders how Indian intelligence agencies failed to read any such signs, many weeks before the operation unfolded. .....

Who is responsible for failure to detect the build up on the border? Isnt it the MI whose mandate is to gather intelligence upto 10 kms from border?

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 01 Dec 2009 22:49

Aditya G wrote:Dear Ray,

IIRC in 1998 Pakistan Army had conducted an exercise for which troops were deployed, but were never pulled back. Ignoring the corps level troops movement for a moment, it seems that we failed to detect the preparation for war even in March - April 1999. Air Cmde Tufail (PAF) writes:

... some time in March 1999.....the Army’s mobilisation and other preparations that he had seen in Skardu. His analysis was that ‘something big is imminent.’ Helicopter flying activity was feverishly high as Army Aviation’s Mi-17s were busy moving artillery guns and ammunition to the mountain tops. Troops in battle gear were to be seen all over the city. Interestingly, Messes were abuzz with war chatter amongst young officers. In retrospect, one wonders how Indian intelligence agencies failed to read any such signs, many weeks before the operation unfolded. .....
Who is responsible for failure to detect the build up on the border? Isnt it the MI whose mandate is to gather intelligence upto 10 kms from border?

Frontline intelligence is MI.

Beyond that is that of RAW.

It is a joint mosaic that leads to what is happening!

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 13 Feb 2010 06:00

Havent seen this posted before

Amazed we had so much in common: Pak officer on Indian Kargil pilot

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/amaze ... t/475787/0

Air Commodore (retd) Kaiser Tufail, the Pakistani officer who “interrogated” Flight Lieutenant K Nachiketa after his MiG-27 fighter crashed during a bombing run in Kargil in 1999, claims they “discussed his father’s heart problem and the recent marriage of his sister” during an hour-long exchange after his capture.

Tufail, whose blow-by-blow account of how the Pakistani Army plotted the Kargil operations was reported by The Indian Express on Friday, maintains he had a “very civil” conversation with the downed Indian pilot, discussing family problems, peculiarities of their respective services and “shared a vegetable patty”.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 Mar 2010 10:17

Do we have an estimate of how many heavy caliber (155mm, 130 mm and mortars) shells were fired by IA in Kargil?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Apr 2010 00:07

A dated commentary on run-up to Kargil air action.

http://www.indiadefence.com/tipnis.htm

Sorry if already known.

WHAT'S HOT? –– ANALYSIS OF RECENT HAPPENINGS

THE TIPNIS OUTBURST ON KARGIL
An IDC Analysis

New Delhi, 21 October 2006

The need for India to appoint a CDS, which we had been advocating since Kargil, was once again brought to the fore by the unnecessary washing of dirty linen in public by one of our former Chiefs of Staff, in this case former Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis. No doubt the motivation was to gain publicity for his recently published book of memoirs. Perhaps it was in retaliation for what the former Army Chief Gen. Ved Malik had written in his book. We have often wondered why it is necessary for people in power, who are now retired, to write books to justify their actions when they were in office –– maybe because their actions were questionable in the first place and now need to be justified for posterity. Recent cases in point are Vishnu Bhagwat, Jaswant Singh, Ved Malik, A Y Tipnis and Pervez Musharraf. Hopefully we will soon get the low down from Natwar Singh and George Fernandes too!

Tipnis was known to be an upright officer. He was the Chief of Air Staff in early May 1999 when the Kargil intrusions by the Pakistan Army took place . Gen Pervez Musharraf was the architect of that secretly planned controversial foray to snatch the commanding strategic heights along the LOC from under the Indian army’s nose, and cut India’s road link to and from Ladakh. His book In the Line of Fire, is doing the rounds and has been widely reviewed in India and Musharraf claims Pakistan nearly succeeded in winning the war.

Interestingly, in a nine page article in the October issue of FORCE magazine, brought out on the eve of the Platinum Jubilee of the Indian Air Force on 8th October, Tipnis went public on the reasons for delay in actions taken to meet the Kargil intrusion with air support. He bared names and conversations peppered with details of all the secret parleys that took place between the Chiefs and Vice Chiefs of the Armed Forces for many days and with others including their interaction with the NSA Brajesh Misra and the former EAM Jaswant Singh till 24th May.

The matter appears to have finally been discussed with PM Vajpayee for the first time in a CCS meeting that was held only on 25th May, and he decisively gave his approval on that day to employ air power along the Line of Control in Kashmir to remove the Pakistani aggression in the words, “Theek hai, kal subah se shuroo karo “ (All right, start tomorrow morning). Before that date there were ad hoc meetings. The MOD seems to have been sidelined. In India only the PM who is the de facto Commander in Chief can give higher military decisions under the powers vested in him under Article 52 of the Constitution. The President is a ceremonial Commander in Chief, and the three Chiefs are equal and autonomous, which in the past too had led to many anomalous situations in the wars that India has fought. The Government is reluctant to release the official papers of these wars so no lessons can be learnt.

The baring of hitherto secret machinations of the pre Kargil war happenings made by one of the prime actors responsible for India’s security, the then Chief of Air Staff, needs heeding. Tipnis’s outburst as it appears in print, reveals the inherent weaknesses in the current decision making process in India’s higher military command. It also brings to sharp focus the diffused way in which the nation’s security responsibilities are divided between the three Chiefs with no single head to coalesce the collective Services viewpoint, and project it to the Government. There are 19 separately situated commands so no theatre command responsibility exists, except perhaps in the Andaman and Nicobar Command. Gen SF Manekshaw realized these weaknesses when preparing for the 1971 war and he assumed the mantle of a CDS as a one off case, as he had Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s tacit support. Today with coalition Governments in place such a tactic may not work, and needs institutionalization. Strangely, kept out of the decision-making loop for days was the powerful Defence Secretary, as he was junior to the Chiefs. The newly instituted National Security Adviser, whose role has changed from merely being an adviser to that of a decision maker at a level of the Defence Minister, comes out in the revelations.

The start point of the action to unleash India’s aerial might, according to Tipnis, actually began on 9th May when his Vice Chief, Brar came to his office for a cup of coffee and informed him that the ACAS (Intelligence) had inputs that the Army was in some sort of difficulty in the Kargil area, but the Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen Pal, was away on leave in Pune and the IAF’s AOC, J and K, in Srinagar had not been informed of anything untoward or been approached for any help. In New Delhi, the Army Chief, who also the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Gen V P Malik was abroad and Lt Gen Chandrashekar was officiating as the Army Chief and Admiral Sushil Kumar was officiating as the COSC. The COSC is a post held in rotation by the senior most Chief by appointment in office. It appears that only telephonic talks took place between the Vice Chiefs. On 14th May Chandrashekar met the Air Chief and told him the Army could throw out the intruders if the Air Force provided Mi-17 attack helicopters in support of the Army to hasten the matter.

The Air Chief was reluctant to accede to this request without a Government approval as he wanted air power to bear and the CBM (confidence building measures) agreement with Pakistan did not permit flying within 8km of the borders. In a COSC meeting on 16th May, called at the behest of the Air Chief and which irritated the Navy Chief, it was decided not to approach the Government but maintain status quo. In another meeting with the Defence Minsiter and NSA in the Army Ops room on 17 May, the NSA said status quo to be maintained on the use of air power. In the CCS meeting on 18 May , where it seems the PM was not in attendance, the EAM Jaswant Singh suggested status quo be maintained on the use of the Air Force as he was also to travel abroad, and this would internationalize the issue. Finally, it was only on 25 May that the PM gave the okay to use air power, after a delay of more than three weeks. The Army has always contended that had air power been provided earlier there may have been less loss of lives on our side and the whole skirmish could have been wrapped up quickly.

{Yet what steps did they (Indian Army) take to escalate the situation through the normal chain of command. None as they wanted to keep it low key. To me it looks like the chain of command was totatlly oblivious of the political cost to India and show how quickly the PM took the decision when informed. After the nuke tests the situation is not the same. TSP undertaking such an act of aggression might have been ok before the tests but after the tests its matter of credibility to defend the soverignity. Hence the aggression had to be repelled.}

...........

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 16 Apr 2010 00:47

ramana wrote:
{Yet what steps did they (Indian Army) take to escalate the situation through the normal chain of command. None as they wanted to keep it low key. To me it looks like the chain of command was totatlly oblivious of the political cost to India and show how quickly the PM took the decision when informed. After the nuke tests the situation is not the same. TSP undertaking such an act of aggression might have been ok before the tests but after the tests its matter of credibility to defend the soverignity. Hence the aggression had to be repelled.}

...........

In other words it was a trap with not many knowing what is the implication.
BTW ABV was a PM of a caretaker govt and technically was not the head of the state due to losing the vote of confidence

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Apr 2010 01:01

The info in the Tipnis article was excised from the KRC as it reflected poorly on upper military- political command.

As far as we know the intrusion was started in April '99 while the camps were setup in early Oct 98.

When was the vote of confidence? I think it was mid- April 1999 and the deciding vote was Saifuddin Soz or Jayalalitha's MP at that time. I recall Subramaniam Swamy running around making sure that AIDMK wont vote for NDA.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 16 Apr 2010 01:40

IK Gujral's vote was the other deciding factor. He got the seat in Jlandhar as SAD supported independent. When he was PM, he had wiped out all loans made by SAD/INC/Punjab govt to farmers in one stroke thus wiping out tens of thrusands of crores of debt accrued by Punjab govt.

BJP made sure SAD did not support him in the Jalandhar const the next time. Seeing the the direction of the wind, he decided not to contest the election next time.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 16 Apr 2010 03:27

ramana wrote:The info in the Tipnis article was excised from the KRC as it reflected poorly on upper military- political command.

As far as we know the intrusion was started in April '99 while the camps were setup in early Oct 98.

When was the vote of confidence? I think it was mid- April 1999 and the deciding vote was Saifuddin Soz or Jayalalitha's MP at that time. I recall Subramaniam Swamy running around making sure that AIDMK wont vote for NDA.

The fall of the govt was on April 17

# INDIA / POLITICS Voice of America 17 April 1999 -- INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER RESIGNED ON SATURDAY AFTER LOSING A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENT BY ONE VOTE. THERE WERE 269 VOTES IN FAVOR OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MOTION OF CONFIDENCE AND 270 AGAINST.

KARGIL TIMELINE

1998

June 1998 - first and most important warning was a June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta
In June 1998 the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) reported that ammunition supplies were being dumped and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector.

July 1998 - July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities.

Aug 1998 - In August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC. Pakistani artillery flowed in as winter approached, a reversal of the normal practice.

Oct 1998 - Pervez Musharaff appointed COAS
By October, RAW was sufficiently concerned about developments to issue an express warning about the prospect of a "limited swift offensive", pointing in particular to the "constant induction of more troops from peacetime locations like Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala and Okara into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." Its assertion that a war was possible provoked an immediate challenge by the Director-General of Military Intelligence, and an inconclusive verbal discussion followed.

Nov 1998 - Northern Command, in its own internal assessments, recorded that November 1998 saw a three-fold increase in Pakistani troop movement in the Kargil sector when compared with November 1997. Vehicular movement doubled, while pack-animal movement increased nine-fold. As late as November 1998, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban troops who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999.

1999

Feb 1999 - On February 9, 1999, troops of the 5 Para Regiment spotted movement on the top of Point 5770, a strategic height in the southern Siachen area on the Indian side of the LoC.

Feb 1999 - The Lahore Declaration was a historic declaration signed by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, and the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore on February 21, 1999.

Mar 1999 - Again, on March 4, between eight and ten Pakistani soldiers were seen removing snow from a concrete bunker to the west of the summit of Point 5770. That evening, fire was exchanged over the area.

Strangely, the Siachen-based 102 Infantry Brigade removed the officer who had reported the intrusion, Major Manish Bhatnagar, not the Pakistani troops who had occupied the position. On the eve of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan, it is likely that India had no desire to initiate a bruising exchange of fire on Siachen. The 121 Brigade, which ought to have been told that Pakistan troops had demonstrated aggressive intent in an adjoining area, was not even informed of the development.

For one, despite both the flow of intelligence on possible infiltration in the Kargil sector, troops were actually pulled out from frontline positions. Soon after the loss of Point 5770, 9 Mahar Regiment was removed from its defensive positions along the Yaldor Langpa stream and stationed at a rear position near Leh. The 26 Maratha Light Infantry, which protected the crucial infiltration route from Mashkoh to Dras, was also pulled off forward duties.

Despite the summary removal of approximately a quarter of its troops, there is evidence to show that 121 Brigade did act. Troops were withdrawn from the Mashkoh area for just 80 days in the winter of 1999, down from 177 days in 1997 and 116 days in 1998. Yaldor was left undefended for 64 days from February to April, where troops had been withdrawn for 120 days in 1997 and 119 days in 1998. Kaksar, another key area, was undefended for just 38 days, where it was left open for over 200 days in previous years.

April 1999

April 11 - India says it has successfully test-fired a longer-range model of its Agni ballistic missile.

April 14 - The AIADMK withdraws support from the ruling coalition. President K.R. Narayanan asks the government to seek a confidence vote in parliament.

April 17 - India's 13-month-old BJP-led government falls after losing a confidence motion by just one vote. This may have been a trigger for Pakistan to be aggressive in Kargil

April 26 - India's parliament is dissolved and early elections are called. This may be one of major reason for the Pakistan Military to start the aggressive operation in Kargil.

Why was it that commanders in Leh and Srinagar were so slow to respond not just to the intelligence warnings that were available, but to the growing worries of their own subordinates?

General Malik argued that no troops were withdrawn by XV Corps from 3 Infantry Division's area of responsibility. This is, without dispute, true, since 9 Mahar and 26 Maratha battalions remained around Leh. Yet, General Malik's letter does not explain why General Budhwar chose to pull back soldiers needed to guard the LoC to rear positions when both intelligence warnings and field commanders believed threat levels were escalating.

General Malik also pointed out that the headquarters of 70 Infantry Brigade was inducted into the Dras area in October 1998, suggesting that the Army was indeed taking the warnings it received seriously. However, he omitted to mention the critical fact that only its headquarters' staff, not the fighting force, had been deployed when fighting broke out in May 1999.

With a dissolved parliament confrontation in the border is usaully avoided.

#
# INDIA/POLITICS Voice of America 13 April 1999 -- IN INDIA, POLITICAL PARTIES ARE PLOTTING STRATEGIES AFTER AN ALLY OF THE HINDU-NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT DECLARED IT WILL LEAVE THE RULING COALITION.
#
# INDIA POLITICS Voice of America 14 April 1999 -- INDIA'S COALITION GOVERNMENT IS TEETERING ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT A KEY COALITION PARTNER IS OFFICIALLY WITHDRAWING ITS SUPPORT.

# INDIA / POLITICS Voice of America 15 April 1999 -- DEBATE BEGAN IN INDIA'S PARLIAMENT THURSDAY OVER THE FATE OF PRIME MINISTER ATAL BEHARI VAJPAYEE'S 15-MONTH COALITION GOVERNMENT. INDIA'S PRESIDENT ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEEK A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE AFTER A KEY COALITION PARTNER WITHDREW FROM THE GOVERNMENT, WEDNESDAY.

# INDIA POLITICS Voice of America 16 April 1999 -- THE OUTCOME FOR A SCHEDULED VOTE OF CONFIDENCE SET FOR SATURDAY IS STILL TOO CLOSE TO CALL.

# INDIA MISSILE Voice of America 16 April 1999 -- INDIA ON FRIDAY SUCCESSFULLY TESTED A SHORT-RANGE MISSILE. FRIDAY'S ACTION IS JUST THE LATEST MISSILE TEST THIS WEEK IN SOUTH ASIA.

# INDIA / POLITICS Voice of America 17 April 1999 -- INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER RESIGNED ON SATURDAY AFTER LOSING A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENT BY ONE VOTE. THERE WERE 269 VOTES IN FAVOR OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MOTION OF CONFIDENCE AND 270 AGAINST.

# INDIA POLITICSUSIA 19 APRIL 1999 -- INDIA'S WARRING POLITICAL PARTIES MOMENTARILY PUT ASIDE THEIR DIFFERENCES ON MONDAY AND AGREED TO ADOPT A BUDGET. THE BUDGET AGREEMENT HAS HELPED TO EASE FEARS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY FOLLOWING SATURDAY'S VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE AGAINST PRIME MINISTER ATAL BEHARI VAJPAYEE.

# INDIA/POLITICS Voice of America 20 April 1999 -- HECTIC POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES AMONG INDIA'S OPPOSITION GROUPS, AS THEY COMPETE TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT TO REPLACE THE HINDU-NATIONALIST LED COALITION THAT LOST A CONFIDENCE VOTE THREE-DAYS AGO.

# INDIA'S GOVERNMENT FALLS AS ITS MISSILES FLY Voice of America 20 April 1999 -- INDIA'S HINDU NATIONALIST BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY, THE B-J-P, FAILED TO MAINTAIN ITS MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT. THE RESULTING UNCERTAINTY HAS PLUNGED THE WORLD'S MOST POPULOUS DEMOCRACY INTO POLITICAL TURMOIL. AFTER NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MISSILE TESTS DURING THE PAST TEN DAYS BY BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN, SOME OBSERVERS SEE THE SUBCONTINENT AS A GROWING WORRY.

# INDIA POLITICS USIA 21 APRIL 1999 -- JUST FOUR DAYS AFTER A VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE AGAINST ITS POLITICAL OPPONENTS, INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY SEEMS TO BE HAVING INCREASING DIFFICULTY FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT.

# INDIA POLITICS Voice of America 23 April 1999 -- INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY HAS BEEN GIVEN ONE MORE CHANCE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. EARLY FRIDAY THE CONGRESS PARTY APPEARED TO HAVE FAILED TO GET THE NECESSARY VOTES FOR A MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT.

INDIA'S PRESIDENT, WHO HAS TO APPROVE ANY NEW GOVERNMENT, CALLED SONIA GANDHI TO HIS IMPOSING RESIDENCE TO ASK HER TO BRING ENOUGH LETTERS OF SUPPORT FROM HER ALLIES TO PROVE SHE CAN FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT.

MRS. GANDHI, THE ITALIAN-BORN WIDOW OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER
RAJIV GANDHI, SAYS SHE WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT BY FRIDAY.
GANDHI ACTUALITY SAID-

I DON'T KNOW HOW MANY NUMBERS THEY CLAIM TO HAVE. THEY
SAY, I BELIEVE, THEY HAVE 270, WELL WE HAVE 272 AND WE
HOPE TO GET MORE. WE ARE CONFIDENT WE WILL GET MORE.

WHILE SHE APPEARS CONFIDENT, SONIA GANDHI WAS CHALLENGED
WEDNESDAY BY A KEY ALLY. MALAYAM SINGH YADAV, WHOSE PARTY HAS 20 DEPUTIES AND WHO VOTED WITH SONIA GANDHI TO BRING THE VAJPAYEE GOVERNMENT DOWN, SAYS HE HAS GIVEN NO ASSURANCES HE WILL BACK HER EFFORTS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT.
SONIA GANDHI -- THE ITALIAN-BORN WIDOW OF FORMER PRIME
MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI -- MET WITH INDIA'S PRESIDENT K.R.
NARAYANAN FRIDAY NIGHT TO ASK FOR MORE TIME TO GET THE 272 VOTES SHE NEEDS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. INDIA'S PRESIDENT HAS TO APPROVE ANY NEW GOVERNMENT.

MRS. GANDHI, THE LEADER OF THE CONGRESS PARTY SAYS SHE HAS
LETTERS OF SUPPORT FOR 233 VOTES AND WILL BE ABLE TO GET THE REST SOON. SHE SAYS THE PRESIDENT GRANTED HER REQUEST BUT SHE DOES NOT HAVE MUCH TIME.

// INSERT GANDHI ACTUALITY //

I HAVE BEEN TOLD TO DO WHATEVER WE HAVE TO DO AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

# INDIA / POLITICS Voice of America 26 April 1999 -- INDIA FACES ITS THIRD NATIONAL ELECTION IN THREE YEARS AFTER THE COUNTRY'S CARETAKER CABINET RECOMMENDED FRESH ELECTIONS ON MONDAY. THE DECISION WAS CONVEYED TO INDIA'S PRESIDENT WHO MUST NOW OFFICIALLY DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT AND CALL NEW ELECTIONS.

May 1999

May 1999 - Chinese moves in LAC Ladhak
"Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings," Malik discloses in the book. He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.

"This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil" Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan. Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing's assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India. The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights. He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA's Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.

This may be one of the reason for not sending aggressive rescue missions to bring back captured Indian battalions. With only a caretaker government in India running the show there was a serious situation of China and Pakistan together attacking India.

May 4 - Lt. Gen. Kishen Pal was on leave in Delhi on May 3 to attend to his wife's surgery. When he got word of the sighting of the intruders at Banju, he ordered 3 Inf Div. to reinforce 121 (I) Bde and returned to Srinagar. Patrols were sent out starting from May 4, but due to weather conditions, they sighted the enemy only on May 7 and made contact on May 8 and came under heavy fire. By this time, all operational commanders were at their HQ, including the much reviled (in the press) Maj. Gen. Budhwar.

May 6 - In the first fortnight of May 1999, Captain Saurabh Kalia 4 JAT Regiment (Infantry) in the Kargil Sector went out for patrol duty three times in the Kaksar area of Kargil. He observed and reported large-scale intrusion of Pak Army and foreign mercenaries in Indian side of LoC (Kargil). He assumed guard of "Bajrang Post" at the height 13,000-14,000 feet to check infiltration along with 5 soldiers in the Kaksar area
On May 15, 1999, after a continuous cross fire with Pakistan armed forces from across the LoC, he and his troops ran out of ammunition. It is also believed that their signal instrument was out of order, or not working in those conditions. They were finally encircled by a platoon of Pakistan rangers and captured alive before any Indian reinforcement could reach for their help. No trace of this entire patrol was left and Skardu Radio of Pakistan reported that Lt. Saurabh Kalia and five of his men were captured alive.
They were in their captivity for over twenty-two (May 15, 1999 – June 7, 1999) days and subjected to unprecedented brutal torture as evident from their bodies handed over by Pakistan Army on June 9, 1999.

May 7 - Chinese Embassy Bombing in Kosovo - China US relationship problem. This bombing and an escalation is unexplainable. This event may have kept Chinese from entering the war in Kargil looking at the international publicity given to Chinese reaction.
May 9 - The start point of the action to unleash India’s aerial might, according to Tipnis, actually began on 9th May when his Vice Chief, Brar came to his office for a cup of coffee and informed him that the ACAS (Intelligence) had inputs that the Army was in some sort of difficulty in the Kargil area, but the Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen Pal, was away on leave in Pune and the IAF’s AOC, J and K, in Srinagar had not been informed of anything untoward or been approached for any help. In New Delhi, the Army Chief, who also the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Gen V P Malik was abroad and Lt Gen Chandrashekar was officiating as the Army Chief and Admiral Sushil Kumar was officiating as the COSC. The COSC is a post held in rotation by the senior most Chief by appointment in office. It appears that only telephonic talks took place between the Vice Chiefs. On 14th May Chandrashekar met the Air Chief and told him the Army could throw out the intruders if the Air Force provided Mi-17 attack helicopters in support of the Army to hasten the matter.

May 11 - By May 11, the extent of intrusions were becoming clear even in the Dras sector further south. By May 12, the number of battalions in contact with the enemy were more than 5 and casualties were already taken. Lt. Kalia's patrol went out on 14 May in the Kaksar subsector and was captured on May 15.

May 16 - 6 choopers discovered in Kargil sector

May 24 - First report of infilterators.At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on May 24, 1999, General Pal insisted that there "were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes."
May 24/25 - Tipnis went public on the reasons for delay in actions taken to meet the Kargil intrusion with air support. He bared names and conversations peppered with details of all the secret parleys that took place between the Chiefs and Vice Chiefs of the Armed Forces for many days and with others including their interaction with the NSA Brajesh Misra and the former EAM Jaswant Singh till 24th May.

The matter appears to have finally been discussed with PM Vajpayee for the first time in a CCS meeting that was held only on 25th May, and he decisively gave his approval on that day to employ air power along the Line of Control in Kashmir to remove the Pakistani aggression in the words, “Theek hai, kal subah se shuroo karo “ (All right, start tomorrow morning). Before that date there were ad hoc meetings. The MOD seems to have been sidelined.

May 26 - India unleashes two waves of air strikes to flush out guerrillas on its side of a Kashmir ceasefire line, sharply raising temperatures in the region. The next day India confirms it has lost two fighter jets which Pakistan says they shot down.

May 26 – The Air Chief was reluctant to accede to this request without a Government approval as he wanted air power to bear and the CBM (confidence building measures) agreement with Pakistan did not permit flying within 8km of the borders. In a COSC meeting on 16th May, called at the behest of the Air Chief and which irritated the Navy Chief, it was decided not to approach the Government but maintain status quo. In another meeting with the Defence Minsiter and NSA in the Army Ops room on 17 May, the NSA said status quo to be maintained on the use of air power. In the CCS meeting on 18 May , where it seems the PM was not in attendance, the EAM Jaswant Singh suggested status quo be maintained on the use of the Air Force as he was also to travel abroad, and this would internationalize the issue. Finally, it was only on 25 May that the PM gave the okay to use air power, after a delay of more than three weeks. The Army has always contended that had air power been provided earlier there may have been less loss of lives on our side and the whole skirmish could have been wrapped up quickly.

May 28 - In Kashmir, a stinger missile brings down an Indian helicopter killing all on board. Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal, GOC 15 Corps, had accomplished the task of inducting 3 Bde HQ, 19 Inf. Battalions, 4 Regts of Field Arty, 2 Regts of Medium Arty into the sectors within a span of 26 days.

June 1999

June 12 - India and Pakistan hold "businesslike" talks over their Kashmir dispute but fail to resolve it; India says Pakistan tried to infiltrate the Turtuk Sector and puts the death toll at 267 Pakistanis and 86 Indians.

June 16, 1999 -The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh has said his visit to Beijing has led to better understanding between India and China on regional and global issues, including the security perceptions of the two countries. Speaking to newspersons in Beijing at the end of his two day visit, he said new initiatives are already on the anvil.

July 1999

July 4 - India says it has recaptured the strategic Tiger Hill on its side of a military line of control in Kashmir.

July 9 - In Kashmir, the Indian army reports that it has all but ousted the infiltrators from the Batalik zone on India's side of the ceasefire line.

July 17 - India signals the end of the flare-up with Pakistan by announcing that all infiltrators have withdrawn from Indian-held Kashmir.

July 26 - India says its troops have cleared all infiltrators from their side of the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Apr 2010 03:35

Thanks can we add the Tipnis revelations on the multiple conferences between May 9th and May 25th meeting with ABV?

Can we go back to the record and see if the Paki infiltration increased after April 26th? We know the Lt Kalia patrol went missing on May 6th.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 16 Apr 2010 04:10

Updated

JimmyJ · Post by **JimmyJ** » 10 May 2010 14:15

Kargil: An IAF Perspective

Revisiting Kargil: Finding alibis for failures serves no purpose
Articles from IndianDefenceReview

RKumar · Post by **RKumar** » 10 May 2010 16:52

RAW had repeatedly warned the highest levels much ahead about Kargil but no one listened to them. All the reports were thrown to bin.
- Poltical leaders had too much faith in the dialog.
- army was not able to confirm it so gave negative feedback to higher command.

For this I can not provide any link and more details.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 11 May 2010 09:15

JimmyJ wrote:Kargil: An IAF Perspective

Revisiting Kargil: Finding alibis for failures serves no purpose
Articles from IndianDefenceReview

Makes pretty sad reading as to what happened in 1998.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 11 May 2010 18:37

This is the original article on which Gen Bhandari has commented:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010 ... ctive.html

Lt Gen Mohan Bhandari has proposed a new theory that the IAF failed to advise the govt. The general seems to say; "instead of asking Army to take govt approval, the IAF should have suggested the same directly". The Army leadership took time to formulate the request and present the case to govt in light of the Air Chief's objection - even as the situation deteriorated on the ground.

I think gen bhandary may have a point, but he does not realize that the whole reason for IAF reluctance might be the high threat perception to helicopters. Ultimately when choppers were pushed in, they were in action fr merely 2 days before one was shot down.

Had the helicopters been employed earlier - what difference would it make?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 11 May 2010 20:32

Early on I used to think the Army types were deficient in asking for resources/forces from other services. I am completely wrong. I believe they truly understand air-land and sea battle having worked on it for so long. Its that the other services are not yet aligned to this concept of using all resources/forces to respond to aggression. The IAF Chief thinking its an Army problem is evidence of this. Escalation is a political problem and should be left to the politicians to deal with.

After the intelligence failure local and strategic level, the primary task was to vacate the aggression. If there is unwillingness to use all tools to vacate the aggression then there is a political loss in the end.

IAF chief when he was the acting Chief of Staffs should have thought as the top most military commander and not just the chief of the Air Force.

I think this is one lesson needed to be drilled down after Kargil in the forces. Civilian lessons are also to be learnt from this recounting but for a latter post. For example the PM might have to ask for the others to speak their mind as service discipline in prevents them from speaking out of turn. How this will impact the chain of command is to be studied.

If the chiefs are not willing to work as the "Chief" then they will always be sub-ordinate.

I think this is an excellent occassion to study the command decision using the methods of "Thinking in Time".

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 12 May 2010 10:20

ramana wrote:Escalation is a political problem and should be left to the politicians to deal with.

Ultimately it is the forces that have to bear the brunt of the escalation.

I think we need to understand why the IAF has always been so cautious - even in the recent 'air power in naxal coin' episode, the IAF took explicit permission from govt leadership - why?

Till date only ACM Krishnaswamy has said that air power is less escalatory than a land offensive. I agree with him - but not sure why this view was restricted only to him.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 12 May 2010 11:37

Some points we miss when we read these articles

1) Army chief was on foreign tour and he comes back late, cause no one asked him to return

2) Army (like IAF), refuses to take this seriously till many of its men are butchered. IAF too had its fair share of loses till it woke up. When COAS initially refuses to play ball with RM, its ok. When IAF Chief refuses to pay ball, its a sin. See how that have defended their own while berating the IAF for same mistakes.
3) IAF aircrafts were getting downed and Army talks about helicopter strikes. At one point one of the authors claims that artillery fire could have neutralized the SAM threat. wow!

I have been reading Army literature for sometime on Kargil.

A) Paki mistake to topple the apple cart.

Intelligence failure.
C) Political failure

Army is more pure than the Most pure from the pure land.

Army is as competent as the Pindi Brothers when it comes to blame games.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 12 May 2010 11:52

chackojoseph wrote:Some points we miss when we read these articles

1) Army chief was on foreign tour and he comes back late, cause no one asked him to return
2) Army (like IAF), refuses to take this seriously till many of its men are butchered. IAF too had its fair share of loses till it woke up. When COAS initially refuses to play ball with RM, its ok. When IAF Chief refuses to pay ball, its a sin. See how that have defended their own while berating the IAF for same mistakes.
3) IAF aircrafts were getting downed and Army talks about helicopter strikes. At one point one of the authors claims that artillery fire could have neutralized the SAM threat. wow!

I have been reading Army literature for sometime on Kargil.
A) Paki mistake to topple the apple cart.
Intelligence failure.
C) Political failure

Army is more pure than the Most pure from the pure land.

Army is as competent as the Pindi Brothers when it comes to blame games.

Care to explain the bolded part? ANd I would be interested to know the literature that you've been reading up. And what is IA Literature? Account of Kargil War written by ex-Army Officers? Care to point out which one has not pulled up their own when describing the IA role or lack thereof, in the initial intrusion and error of judgement?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 12 May 2010 11:59

RKumar wrote:RAW had repeatedly warned the highest levels much ahead about Kargil but no one listened to them. All the reports were thrown to bin.
- Poltical leaders had too much faith in the dialog.
- army was not able to confirm it so gave negative feedback to higher command.

For this I can not provide any link and more details.

The only detailed account of build-up on PA side that I've read comes from Capt. Amrinder Singh's book - A Ride too Far. Where is shows how the PA deliberately created an impression that major militant push was being planned in the Kargil Sector. And something that MI/RAW/IB took hook, line and sinker. And there were warning by Intelligence Agencies to the effect.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 12 May 2010 13:46

ramana wrote:Early on I used to think the Army types were deficient in asking for resources/forces from other services. I am completely wrong. I believe they truly understand air-land and sea battle having worked on it for so long. Its that the other services are not yet aligned to this concept of using all resources/forces to respond to aggression. The IAF Chief thinking its an Army problem is evidence of this. Escalation is a political problem and should be left to the politicians to deal with.

<SNIP>

I just had light bulb moment after reading this piece of the post couple of time. But I must admit that I've not done any reasearch to answer the questions at I write:

-- When did the intrusions across the LOC become Kargil 1999? As in, when did it dawn on the main protagonist in the Kargil Saga that what they were dealing with is not some rag-tag bunch of Mujahideen or an isolated case of land grab but well planned operation across the entire Sector to alter the LOC?

--Was the Army cognizant of the situation in it's complete ramification when it asked for gunship support? Or was gunship support asked as the threat was concieved to be localized and use of gunships could have helped expedite the matter? Is that the impression IA gave (localized matter - knowingly or unknowingly) and hence, the comment from Tipnis, "It is their problem"? Remember the input from ACAS(Intelligence), "Army was in some sort of difficulty in the Kargil area"? Would not have IAF been reluctant to get into tangle to sort out "border and localized" conflict and hence, the caution of escalation? And did not IAF use Mirage-2000 post Kargil to evict PA from one of the left over posts after Kargil? Was that not because there was more understanding of the ramifications of such "border & localized" issues and no chance could be taken? How come that one peak become India versus Pakistan and not IA versus PA?

--How do the timelines of IA build up after initial mauling conincide with request for, permission and employment of air power? This queation is actually in tandem with the 1st one.

--Finally, after asking for gunships, when and how was the requirement of fighters drawn up? what happened between asking for gunships and deployment of fighters in terms of sizing up the entire game plan and understanding the gravity of the situation?

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 12 May 2010 14:08

rohitvats wrote: Care to explain the bolded part? ANd I would be interested to know the literature that you've been reading up. And what is IA Literature? Account of Kargil War written by ex-Army Officers? Care to point out which one has not pulled up their own when describing the IA role or lack thereof, in the initial intrusion and error of judgement?

Definitely. I could. Can I have your email Id or you want my email id? Although its nothing secret, just that I don't want unpleasant situation with certain people I know.

IA literature i used as a generic term.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 12 May 2010 14:49

chackojoseph wrote: Definitely. I could. Can I have your email Id or you want my email id? Although its nothing secret, just that I don't want unpleasant situation with certain people I know.

IA literature i used as a generic term.

You already have it - rohitvats29atgmaildotcom.

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 12 May 2010 19:24

in retrospect , everyone is wiser ( including us armchair commandos) ... isnt their anything like fog of war ?? ... i am ok if lessons have been learnt and assimilated. In india it is not a good idea to fix responsibility.

RAW had lot of intelligence that something is afoot but could not piece it all together ( fuse the information).. anybody saying anything else is crap is something i can say with 100% certainity. Its easy to blame RAW etc but all had some black marks againt their name. Why were army foot patrols walking the valleys only?? what were the army aviation or was it IAF chopper reco sorties doing..?? it was a collective failure redeemed by the blood of the soldiers..

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 13 May 2010 08:18

You got a mail rohitvats

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 May 2010 08:37

Chacko, You may post here. Unless we air all points we dont learn lessons or get to root cause.

I urge you to post here.

ramana

Kargil a very serious matter and needs to be understood.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 13 May 2010 17:41

ramana wrote:Chacko, You may post here. Unless we air all points we dont learn lessons or get to root cause.

I urge you to post here.

ramana

Kargil a very serious matter and needs to be understood.

Can I have your email ID too?

peter · Post by **peter** » 14 May 2010 23:55

ramana wrote: [..]
Kargil a very serious matter and needs to be understood.

Are we ignoring other wars? Were they any different?

1) 1947 attack of tribals in Kashmir. Indian army or the administration had no idea about Pakistan's intentions to attack India. The British General in Pakistan phoned Mountbatten that is how Indians came to know about the incursion.

2) 1962 chinese attack. Chinese were inside for months and India was still hoping for the NAM etc to do the magic. Indian army and govt was again caught with its pants down.

3) 1965 Pakistan again tried to sneak in army and millitants and local kashmiris did not inform Indian administration of their presence.

4) 1971 was one where India knew that it is going to help Bangaladeshis.

5) Kargil

Out of 5 wars for 4 of them (1,2,3 and 5 in the list above) India did not know about people sneaking into its borders. So what is so surprising about Kargil? Is it because the other wars took place when TV was not rampant or were they far back in time that people just don't remember about them?

Peter

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 15 May 2010 00:03

peter wrote:
<SNIP>

2) 1962 chinese attack. Chinese were inside for months and India was still hoping for the NAM etc to do the magic. Indian army and govt was again caught with its pants down.
<SNIP>

Please explain the bolded part of the statement.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 May 2010 07:00

Chacko, ramana_56 at yahoo com

peter, Kargil was under open nuclearization by both parties.It puts all theories of modern war on head.Why did it happen is the big picture.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 15 May 2010 07:35

ramana wrote:
peter, Kargil was under open nuclearization by both parties.It puts all theories of modern war on head.Why did it happen is the big picture.

Was it a test to find out if the Indian leadership had the b**ls under a nuclear backdrop.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 May 2010 07:39

No because Indian leaders think with their brains unlike elsewhere.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 15 May 2010 08:18

ramana wrote:No because Indian leaders think with their brains unlike elsewhere.

How do you explain the vote of no confidence on the govt when there is a large threat to the govt.

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 15 May 2010 14:21

ramana wrote:
peter, Kargil was under open nuclearization by both parties.It puts all theories of modern war on head.Why did it happen is the big picture.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... PUB963.pdf From Second Article "THE INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR
CONFRONTATION:LESSONS FROM THE PAST, CONTINGENCIES FOR THE FUTUR"E By Neil Joeck

A somewhat further worrisome outcome of the war is that Pakistan convinced itself that India was deterred from escalating because of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. In short, nuclear deterrence allowed Pakistan a certain freedom of action while it constrained India’s response. This is a troubling conclusion if it inspires reckless actions in the future. It is doubly troubling in that the danger of nuclear escalation apparently did not affect the planners. If this betrays a belief that nuclear deterrence has an automatic character, it suggests that future conflicts may also be planned without due consideration of how the other side may utilize its nuclear and conventional capabilities.

A lesson that both sides seem to have drawn from Kargil is that although nuclear weapons do not prevent war, they do keep it controlled. Reason and hope suggest that this will always be the case, and the logic of nuclear deterrence supports such a conclusion. But people often act unreasonably and illogically, while wars have a way of turning out quite differently thaninitially planned. Therefore one cannot confidently cite the Kargil war as an example of how wars will be fought and whether nuclear weapons will remain in the background.

Did we see this working in our response to Parliamrnt attack and 26/11.?

If so, could Pk be war gaming during Kargil conflict to assess extent of Indian response post POK-II.

Another interesting observation is on US response

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif grew increasingly nervous. He consulted with the United States and was told in no uncertain terms that his country had started the war, and it was his responsibility to end it.Strobe Talbott, then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, later wrote that the United States “put the blame squarely on Pakistan for instigating the crisis, while urging India not to broaden the conflict.”8

The article make several intersting arguments on Nuclear deterrence in the context of IN-PK but that would be OT here.

Kargil war may have been a success from Pk point of view. Army installed its rule in Pk for a very long time. It could assess Indian response on provokation by Pk. PK kept maintaining that Kargil was primarily fought by Mujahideens, despite concrete proof emerging of Pk Regular forces involvement. Same argument was used by PK Kabayalis invading Kashmir in 1948. This was refined by PK on 26/11 operation as "Non State Actors". PK did not lose any territory since IN troops were under strict orders of not crossing LOC. While India had to fight to regain its territory.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 May 2010 01:01

Please summarize the lessons on deterrence here.
Thanks, ramana

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 18 May 2010 09:58

There is a new book reviewed in The Hindu, "ASYMMETRIC WARFARE IN SOUTH ASIA - The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict: Edited by Peter R. Lavoy; Cambridge University Press".

Excerpts

The Kargil conflict, initiated by Pakistan within a year of the nuclear tests, provided a testing ground for these deterrence theories. One of the better known axioms of nuclear deterrence was termed the ‘stability-instability paradox,' wherein nuclear weapons contributed to stability by acting as an effective restraint on a full-scale war, but encouraged conflicts or wars at lower levels. There were enough examples of this during the Cold War era.

Robert Jervis, who coined the term ‘stability-instability paradox', described it thus: “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.” After Kargil, Jervis has chosen to rephrase his formulation. He says, “Strategic stability permits, if not creates, instability by making lower levels of violence relatively safe because escalation up the nuclear ladder is too dangerous.”

The book is quite informative on the way Pakistan's small military coterie, led by General Pervez Musharraf, launched what was considered a small operation, which India will not find worth responding to powerfully due to risks — as Jervis puts it — of escalating up the nuclear ladder. The failure to anticipate the strategic consequences of a limited military adventure proved catastrophic.

It is difficult to visualise another misadventure of the Kargil kind by Pakistani military. But it has not stopped playing the same game at another level. Apparently there has been no change in its mindset. This and the real risk to Pakistan's nuclear assets from that country's own and international terrorist elements have changed the nuclear deterrence field in wholly unpredictable ways.

peter · Post by **peter** » 19 May 2010 12:38

rohitvats wrote:
peter wrote:
<SNIP>

2) 1962 chinese attack. Chinese were inside for months and India was still hoping for the NAM etc to do the magic. Indian army and govt was again caught with its pants down.
<SNIP>

Please explain the bolded part of the statement.

Well this is a figure of speech implying that Government of India at the highest levels did *not believe* that they would be attacked by the chinese as just a few years before the war "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" was the slogan at the NAM convention.

Kennedy supplying arms to Indian forces, Chinese infiltrating deep into Indian borders, leadership of Kaul etc. are also relevant.