Please elaborate. Am confused onlee. How would not having nukes prevent a holocaust. East Pakistanis did not have nukes and that did not help them.shiv wrote: This explains why India has not made more than 60 warheads. They are of no use to India. It is clear that India does not need nuclear weapons. Especially the 4 kt fizzles we have.
Please don't take my words as the truth. I might be wrong. I merely stated one view to hear other views. I am sure manufacturing "tens of thousands of thermonuclear 200 kt x 6 MIRV ICBMs" would have its uses.Pranav wrote:Please elaborate. Am confused onlee. How would not having nukes prevent a holocaust. East Pakistanis did not have nukes and that did not help them.shiv wrote: This explains why India has not made more than 60 warheads. They are of no use to India. It is clear that India does not need nuclear weapons. Especially the 4 kt fizzles we have.
The logical response would be to manufacture tens of thousands of thermonuclear 200 kt x 6 MIRV ICBMs.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel_and ... estructionPranav wrote:Please elaborate. Am confused onlee. How would not having nukes prevent a holocaust. East Pakistanis did not have nukes and that did not help them.shiv wrote: This explains why India has not made more than 60 warheads. They are of no use to India. It is clear that India does not need nuclear weapons. Especially the 4 kt fizzles we have.
The logical response would be to manufacture tens of thousands of thermonuclear 200 kt x 6 MIRV ICBMs.
If you count future planned systems, then yes we have many delivery platforms including mobile ballistic missile launchers and also a nuclear ballistic missile sub. Perhaps someday these platforms will become operational.Karna_A wrote:That's wrong information that India can only deliver by planes.
Actually, I think I will get that book because it sounds like it's got a lot of good specifics, something hard to find in the mainstream press. My impression of our nuclear deterrent consisting almost entirely of non-deployed nuclear warheads that can only be delivered by plane, is not something I pulled out of thin air. This is the prevailing wisdom out there. But I welcome any new info, assuming it's credible.ramdas wrote:You should read Bharat Karnad's book about the exact situation. You are completely mistaken. The systems that will come in the coming years are A-III's and beyond. For TSP, the main syatems are A-I's and Prithvis. The A-I has never had a failure.
Bharat Karnad says that around 200+ warheads are expected in the 2010-12 timeframe with sizaeble numbers of A-I, A-II (even A-III) by 2012. He clearly points out that in a nuclear war with pakistan, TSP will lose because its core pop. centers will be destroyed.
Don't do that you sound like a Paki.Claiming TSP superiority is ignorance, or worse, anti-national behaviour.
You may be forgetting that most of our Prithvis are designed to carry conventional warheads. Mating a nuclear warhead to one of these missiles is no simple matter; this isn't something you just slap in and go. A credible nuclear deterrent requires dedicated missile squadrons - mobile missile units equipped with Prithvis and Agnis fitted and regularly tested to carry specific nuclear warheads, hardened underground silos with functional missiles and warheads ready to fire on short notice. This is the bare minimum for a survivable nuclear "second-strike" capability (a submarine-based nuclear deterrent can come later).ramdas wrote:Even by the most minimal estimates, there are at least 25-50 (say, 35) A-I's and 200 prithvis. (see Bharat Karnad's book for the prithvis). Even if 35 Prithvis have nukes, there are 70+ missile based, TSP specific warheads. These are mobile platforms.
TSP creates 20* our casualties only if they deliver 70*20=1400 warheads. No way TSP has anything like that. HAVE COMMON SENSE. I do not count A-II's even though they are deployed. Will count them once successful tests resolving quality control probs are done- hopefully by may this year. That will add another 30 or so warheads even by the most minimal estimates. A careful study of Bharat Karnad's book is an ABSOLUTE MUST for anybody to understand which way the deterrent is headed.
Check also K. Santhanam's statements about the TN controversy. He claims that the 25 kt fission weapon is WIDELY DEPLOYED ON A NUMBER OF PLATFORMS". 20-30 nukes is clearly not "widely deployed".
What is true is that against China, there is no deterrent till Agni III is deployed in sizeable numbers. This according to Bharat Karnad, is to happen by 2012......other dates BK gave regarding Nuke subs etc seem to be accurate- this means the same is true about this as well.
Kanan ji,Do you honestly believe that right now, at this moment, there are Prithvi and\or Agni missiles hidden out there in our nation's countryside, ready to fire? I'll bet money there isn't a single one actually deployed
Shiv jishiv wrote: What could be the reason/s for Pakis wanting to keep their nuke numbers secret when exactly the opposite action is required for real deterrence? I can think of a few reasons - all of which can explain the current situation wrt Pakistan
1. indeed. BK points out that there is a specific nuke warhead designed for Prithvi. Just like A-I/A-II/A-III were tested with dummy nuclear warheads (every component except fissile core), the same has been done for Prithvi as far back as 1994. For a long time, this was deemed sufficient for TSP according to BK.You may be forgetting that most of our Prithvis are designed to carry conventional warheads. Mating a nuclear warhead to one of these missiles is no simple matter; this isn't something you just slap in and go. A credible nuclear deterrent requires dedicated missile squadrons - mobile missile units equipped with Prithvis and Agnis fitted and regularly tested to carry specific nuclear warheads, hardened underground silos with functional missiles and warheads ready to fire on short notice. This is the bare minimum for a survivable nuclear "second-strike" capability (a submarine-based nuclear deterrent can come later).
just FYI, this is from 2004 :Y. Kanan wrote: Actually, I think I will get that book because it sounds like it's got a lot of good specifics, something hard to find in the mainstream press. My impression of our nuclear deterrent consisting almost entirely of non-deployed nuclear warheads that can only be delivered by plane,{..is wrong to put it mildly} is not something I pulled out of thin air. {fine, do present the source}
You may be forgetting that most of our Prithvis are designed to carry conventional warheads. {as well as nuclear warheads} Mating a nuclear warhead to one of these missiles is no simple matter; this isn't something you just slap in and go. {why do you think was the dhanush missiles deployed on certain patrol boats and INS Rajput ?} A credible nuclear deterrent requires dedicated missile squadrons {ever heard of the 333rd, 334th and 335th missile groups ? in addition there are the units with IAF} - mobile missile units equipped with Prithvis and Agnis fitted and regularly tested to carry specific nuclear warheads, {by your own admission you don't visit the mil forum in years, if you did you might have known that such tests are carried out on a regular basis} hardened underground silos with functional missiles and warheads ready to fire on short notice. {that would be stuck in 1960's thinking. no modern ICBM is launched from silos. all modern land based designs are mobile ones.} This is the bare minimum for a survivable nuclear "second-strike" capability {incorrect assessment}(a submarine-based nuclear deterrent can come later).
Do you honestly believe that right now, at this moment, there are Prithvi and\or Agni missiles hidden out there in our nation's countryside, ready to fire? {oh yes.} I'll bet money there isn't a single one actually deployed. {you will lose that one, many times over} Do you really think that even with advanced warning, we could deliver more than a handful of nukes using our ballistic missiles? {may be, may be not. how do YOU know ?} Do we even have a large # of lightweight atomic warheads already assembled and functional, ready to be quickly mated to Prithvi or Agni missiles? {above question repeated here}Just because we've tested or envisioned these capabilities doesn't mean we have fielded them, indeed there's no concrete indications we've done so. {till 11th may 98 there was NO evidence, let alone concrete ones that we had weaponisable designs. I know what you would have said on 10th may 1998.
I hope I'm wrong and India is hiding a vast secret from the world. But nuclear deterrents are supposed to, well, DETER. If we have these capabilities it would be nice if we made it known, even in a subtle fashion. You can't very well deter with ambiguity...{it's working quite fine thank you. if our condition was half as bad as you make it out to be we would have been nuked by now in 2001 and in 2008.
the ambiguity is only for the ill-informed}
the IAF nuke assets are in addition to this. by now the prithvis have probably been replaced in this role by the agni-1.At present, it can be assumed that India ’s land-based missile deterrent is based around:
*
Agni-II IRBM (3,500 km range, 200 kT warhead) – 18 to 36 missiles in service.
*
Agni-I MRBM (900 km range, 200 kT warhead) – 8 to 16 missiles in service.
*
Prithvi-II SRBM (330 km range, 15 kT warhead) – 150 to 180 missile produced (12 nuclear armed).
)It is a fact that China provided the blueprints for a missile warhead to Pakistan. The blueprints for this warhead were recovered by the US and IAEA from Libya. They had been supplied by AQ Khan. They were still wrapped in plastic from a Rawalpindi dry cleaners.Gagan wrote:One major question regarding Pakistan's capabilities is weather their bums are ballistic missile deliverable?
-If their bum is a CHIC-4 implosion derivative, then it is.
-If their bum is a gun design, then only an aircraft or a cruise missile can deliver it.
The packet of documents, some of which included text in Chinese, contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. They also included technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device, the officials and experts said.
"It was just what you'd have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts," one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. He described the designs as "very, very old" but "very well engineered."
Sir,Certainly the prithvi, A-I and A-II are deployed with the forces (there are missile groups specifically raised for each type of missile 334, 335 for A-I AFAIK...and so on..). They are obviously not lying around as puja articles or decorations. Operational testing of these by the SFC has been going on. The last such test was as recent as March 28 (it was an A-I). Should the govt. come and inform you/ NPA's about precise details ? BK's book has the closest one can get to such details. It is a must read.
I admit, I may be somewhat guilty of that...Manu wrote:Maybe Kanan has decided to play contrarian/Devil's advocate...not necessarily bad, subsequent discussion clears the air for many people here (including any Baki lurkers).
This is a clash of civilizations and not mere India-Pakistan war.shiv wrote: 1) Pakistan is going to be deterred by India promising to nuke the crap out of Pakistan by virtue of wielding more warheads that will survive a first strike to do more damage
2) That Pakistan is magically aware of the number of warheads India has, and India in turn is magically aware of the number "X" - which is the number of warheads Pakistan possesses so that India can make X times some number of warheads so we have enough to destroy Pakhanasatan.
We want to deter Pakistan and Pakistan wants to deter India. Assume Indian leaders are cowards and traitors, and assume that Pakistanis are all militaristic, courageous and patriotic. They want to deter India and are willing to go all the way to deter India. If Pakistan wants to deter India. Pakistan must prove that it has a large enough arsenal to comprehensively defeat India. If it takes Indian 500 bombs to devastate Pakistan, then surely Pakistan will need at least 1000 or more warheads to deter and scare India.
1) Pakistanis know that Indians are cowards and will be deterred by just a handful of Pakistani nukes and so they will declare only 100 while they actually have 1000
2) The Pakistanis don't have any nukes at all. They are bluffing.
3) The concept of MAD is outdated and deterrence can be achieved with a small and effective nuclear arsenal
4) It is not politically expedient in this day and age to appear to be producing tens of thousands of warheads.
Now folks if you have read this far please put me on your ignore list and move on if you wish, but if you prefer to explain why my reasoning may be wrong I would like to know which one or more of the above 4 possibilities regarding Pakistani calculations may be the most likely scenario.
Kanan has raised some legitimate practical questions which are akin to asking pre 26/11 following questions:Altair wrote:Kanan ji,Do you honestly believe that right now, at this moment, there are Prithvi and\or Agni missiles hidden out there in our nation's countryside, ready to fire? I'll bet money there isn't a single one actually deployed
Our country tested Nuclear weapons without anyone getting a hint. Do you think it happened just like that? We have some rules in place which makes sure our prized assets are in capable hands. Our nukes are moved around the country more often than you think. They are never kept at the same place for more than a xxx days. Without any leakage.Again, do you think it happens just like that?
With all due respect, I believe 1971 Indian Air Force's complete air superiority after just a few days in the eastern sector (not to mention complete rout of enemy within less than 2 weeks) was superb too... but your point remains validIn 1967 the Israeli Air Force rendered Egyptian air bases ineffective in a tactic that nobody had used before in the history of air warfare. The war lasted only 6 days and the tactic worked. Even the Israelis were never able to repeat that
IAF taken out in 5 minutes or 1 day is just wishful thinking. So is the thinking that TSP is nook nude. These are 2 extremes none of which bear any discussion relevance.shiv wrote:
But in an India Pakistan war, Indian air bases are sure to be knocked out and rendered ineffective in the first five minutes. This is not about Pakistani competence. It is about believing that Indians are incompetent. It falls well in line with another observation I have - which is totally OT. Some other time. Some other place.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... pub832.pdfPakistan’s Ghauri ballistic missiles greatly increase
the reach of its ballistic missile forces, though the
missile is assessed to have a circular error probability
(CEP) of 2,500 m.This is larger than the lethal radius
(1,500 to 2,000 m) of a 10 kt warhead against most
targets, and therefore this missile would likely also be
used to attack large cities where its CEP would have
little consequence.
Pakistan has not indicated what its targeting
strategy would be in the event of nuclear use, but one
can make some inferences based on its nuclear arsenal.
Its arsenal is not large enough to allow comprehensive
strikes against India’s conventional military forces. For
example, there are approximately 20 Indian military
airfields within 300-400 km of the Pakistani border.
With a 10 kt warhead, it might take three warheads
per airfield to destroy all of the aircraft on these bases.
This would run to 60 weapons, which might be as
many weapons as are contained in the entire Pakistani
stockpile. Similarly, attacks on army divisions might
require nine weapons per division. Indeed, if one of
the grave situations described above occurred and
Pakistan felt it necessary to launch initial nuclear
attacks, it is not clear that the conventional military
balance would be of much interest. Given that the
numbers of weapons on each side could be roughly
equal, attacks on India’s nuclear forces would only be
of interest if India configures its forces so that strikes
with a small number of Pakistani weapons have the
ability to eliminate a large number of Indian nuclear
91
weapons. If India is reasonably prudent in configuring
its nuclear forces, a Pakistani nuclear attack on them
would be unattractive, since more than one Pakistani
weapon would have to be used for every Indian
weapon eliminated.
Therefore it is likely that Pakistan will target
mainly Indian cities. Pakistan’s heavy reliance on the
short-range Ghaznavi/M-11 indicates that its nuclear
targeting strategy’s object is principally to destroy
Delhi. Given Delhi’s large size and the relatively limited
destructive power of 10 kt weapons, it would take at
least 10 and perhaps up to 20 such weapons to destroy
or damage enough of the city so that it would cease
to function.2 This statement may come as a surprise
to those accustomed by the Hiroshima experience to
think that one nuclear weapon will be sufficient to
destroy an entire city. However, Hiroshima was a city
of about one quarter million people and 24 km2 in area.
In contrast, Delhi is a city of 12.8 million people with
an area of 1,055 km,2 which means that Delhi today is
about 50 times larger (in population and area) than was
Hiroshima in 1945. A single 10 kt weapon, which was
airburst at a near optimal height, would have a lethal
area of about 6 km2 (this is also approximately the area
in which most structures would be destroyed). Even
if one considers the area where structures suffer some
significant damage (as opposed to being destroyed, i.e.,
where the blast effects are 2 psi or greater), the damage
area of such a weapon would be around 20 km2. An
attack on Delhi using twenty 10 kt airburst weapons
would kill approximately 1.5 million people and injure
perhaps another 3 million.
Very good article with lot of things to think about. Essentially it grapples with how to deter a non-state actor which acquires nukes. This is a current problem. His line of thinking is to deter the state that hosts the non state actor and make it reponsible for the safety of its weapons. Loose nukes is not a fig leaf.EDITS | Wednesday, April 28, 2010 | Email | Print |
Onus is on Pakistan
Ashok K Mehta
Nobel Peace Prize winner US President Barack ‘No-Bomb’ Obama has taken several initiatives in nuclear diplomacy. Earlier this month, he hosted the first ever Nuclear Security Summit — which some call nuclear theatrics — to ensure that no nuclear device or nuclear material falls into terrorist hands and that all fissile material is secured within four years. Without naming Pakistan, during his presentation at the summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh highlighted the threat of terrorist groups accessing weapons of mass destruction. It is around this incubator of nuclear terrorism that intentions and resources of non-state and state actors intersect.
While Mr Obama considers Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as secure and sees “no nuclear crisis anywhere in South Asia”, US experts are not so sure. Presidential adviser Bruce Reidel cites the nightmare scenario of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba acquiring a nuclear device —no guesses who the No 1 target is. Mr Bob Graham, head of US Commission on WMD, Proliferation and Terrorism, testifying before a congressional hearing last week, said that Pakistan may slip over nuclear weapons to the Taliban for use against India in the event of escalated tension between the two countries. British counter-terrorism expert Shaun Gregory has said that Pakistan’s nuclear complex has been attacked thrice between 2008 and 2009.
The US has spent $ 100 million in augmenting the security of Pakistan’s nuclear capability and, despite denials, has contingency plans for responding to 15 crisis scenarios by its Northern Command, including the employment of the Conventional Prompt Global Strike Weapon capable of pinpointing its target within 60 minutes. Located next door to the terrorist launch site, one hopes that India, the most likely victim of a nuclear attack, has suitable contingency plans in its Strategic Nuclear Command. To start with, how does New Delhi deter a terrorist group, ostensibly a non-state actor, from doing what it has vowed to do — annihilate India using the ultimate terrorist weapon? Fundamentally, a non-state actor is existentially non-deterable.
After 26/11 and other cross-border misadventures, Pakistan has lost the fig-leaf of deniability vis-à-vis state linkages with terrorist groups it calls strategic assets. India and other potential victim states of nuclear terrorism must hold the state responsible for the actions of its non-state groups. Obtaining a UN convention or resolution on culpability of states harbouring terrorist groups will be as difficult as securing an acceptable definition of terrorism. Saner and responsible states must keep trying to find links between terrorist groups and the host state, and create conditions of traditional deterrence.
Since 26/11, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram has been periodically stating that another major terrorist attack will invite a swift and decisive response (provided it is categorically established that it was launched from Pakistan is unstated). Another Kasab may not fall into the bag. Ultimately, it is Pakistan that has to be deterred through a clear declaratory policy outlining the consequences of actions by a non-state actor.
The Nuclear Security Summit was another opportunity for India to prove its bona fides as a responsible state with nuclear weapons outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty but yet following the rules of the non-proliferation regime. While Mr Singh announced the establishment of a global centre for nuclear energy partnership in New Delhi, Chinese President Hu Jintao said that his country would set up a centre for nuclear security. Not to be left behind, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani offered to host an international fuel cycle service facility in Pakistan. A Pentagon study is examining the universalisation of ‘No First Use’ and a world without nuclear weapons.
In one of the ‘Global Zero’ models, delegitimisation of nuclear weapons and getting the US and Russia to reduce their weapon stocks to 1,000 each, and implementation of NFU are seen as pre-conditions for arriving at a start point aiming for ‘Nuclear Zero’. At some stage, all states with nuclear weapons will be required to reduce their stocks to 100 bombs each. The alternative to numbers, the megatonnage of weapons, is also being considered, but numbers are likely to trump yields.
The ‘Nuclear Zero’ concept is not a bolt from the blue. Its illustrious pathfinders include Rajiv Gandhi who had put forward an ambitious action plan in 1988 for nuclear disarmament by 2010. Its more recent votaries are the ‘Gang of Four’: Former US Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defence Secretary William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon with his five-point action plan. Just as chemical weapons were delegitimised, it is theoretically possible for nuclear weapons to be declared taboo.
The Australia-Japan sponsored International Commission on Disarmament has recommended that the US and Russia’s stock of 23,000 nuclear weapons be scaled down to 2000 by 2025. It suggests that all nuclear weapon states declare NFU and reduce their weapon stocks proportionately when the US and Russia reach 1,000 each. As for the three elephants — India, Pakistan and Israel — outside the nuclear tent, it recommends that they be made to join the NPT but not as nuclear weapon states. As India will never get to enter the nuclear club as a nuclear weapon state, it must join the party bypassing the NPT but conforming to its non-proliferation regime.
India still has some time to review its position on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty till the US and China ratify it. Revisiting its nuclear policy of credible minimum deterrence in light of the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgently required. Iran held its own parallel summit with a catchy title: ‘Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapons for None’. The next Nuclear Security Summit is to be held in South Korea in 2012. States are required to comply by an action plan that will make the world safer against a terrorist nuclear attack. Al Qaeda for a long time and Lashkar more recently are seeking nuclear weapons for use against the US, Israel and India. The threat of loose nukes or dirty bombs must be taken seriously by New Delhi, especially after Lashkar chief Hafiz Saeed’s latest jihad over river waters.
Since the attack on Parliament House in 2001 and despite several pledges by Pakistani leaders that their soil will not be used for terrorist attacks on India, Mumbai happened. New Delhi has failed to get Islamabad to rein in the jihadis. The challenge for India is to thwart the ultimate preventable catastrophe by holding Pakistan responsible for any nuclear misadventure by so-called non-state actors.
Hari Seldon wrote:Islamic bomb-makers? Islamic bomb-seekers? Has Sri Bahukutumbi Raman gone off his rocker? Am sorry to say that this is indeed the brazen display of fascist thinking, of blatant communal scare-mongering, of right-wing islamophobia that paints islam in a negative light, that learned commentators have previously warned this forum about.Juggi G wrote:The Islamic Bomb-Makers and The Islamic Bomb-Seekers ?
By B Raman
......
How times change and return to square one. Jai ho, I guess.
North Korea: The JoongAng Daily reported 27 April that, according to a high-ranking source, North Korea's military recently decided to do away with the so-called "Five-to-Seven" military plans dating from the 1980s to adopt a new plan, In the new plan, North Korea would try to occupy Seoul early, the source explained, adding that Seoul believes North Korea made the change to better deal with the upgraded weapons systems of the U.S. and South Korean forces.
...
Comment: Among intelligence warning specialists, this is called the Sadat Gambit. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat started the 1973 War with Israel to win the peace, not the war. The result of that is that Egypt is second only to Israel as a recipient of US military assistance of all kinds.
Old hands who worked the North Korean warning of war problem will recall that a bid to take Seoul only, while serious, always was factored into warning estimates and was considered a lesser and included intermediate stage of a war for control of the peninsula. If the North stopped or could be stopped at Seoul, the North would lose the war.
For the US, a North Korean halt at Seoul would allow time for a massive and country-breaking three-dimensional, non-stop counterattack against the North. The South Koreans never accepted this reasoning and always required a strong forward defense of Seoul in the short distance between it and the Demilitarized Zone. The UN Command long ago made provision for defending Seoul from this kind of attack, but that does not mean that improvements are unnecessary.
Note to non-warning analysts: The problem with the Sadat Gambit is that the attacker does not control the end game. It is a form of limited war in which the attacker can never be sure the other side will not counterattack, envelope the attacking forces and press the counterattack to its fullest. It is a high risk use of military force to achieve a political breakthrough after the shooting stops.
Sadat gambled correctly that international intervention would bring about a ceasefire which he leveraged to rebuild Egypt and make peace with Israel. His calculation would have been disastrous had Israel retained the capability and the will to counterattack.
On the Golan Front, Syria almost lost everything. After making initial gains, the Syrian Army failed to capture the Golan Heights owing to a heroic defense by the Golani Brigade and the Paracommandos. Once reinforcements arrived, the IDF defeated the Syrian Army and had a down-hill, unobstructed drive all the way to Damascus.
Pakistan repeatedly has used a more limited and less risky form of the same gambit to grab Indian territory just across the border while waiting for international intervention to stop the fighting. In two general wars with India, the Pakistanis executed such operations to create negotiating leverage while avoiding head-on fighting and certain destruction by the much larger and more capable Indian Army.[/b]
On the other hand, Indian strategists have deliberated the feasibility of limited war as away to avoid an escalation to an exchange of nuclear weapons with Pakistan that must occur in every future general war. The limited war plans always founder on the near certainty that Pakistan simply will not accept Indian terms for limited war and will shoot nuclear missiles at Indian cities.
....
The obvious riposte to this equally obvious propaganda ploy is for the UN Command to announce that once it appears that the North is making war preparations, the UN Command will attack on tactical warning and that the North's surrender will be unconditional.
On balance, without additional evidence, it is difficult to accept the Joongang Daily report at face value as a "new" North Korean strategy. North Korean leaders have proven time and again that they do not lightly risk the national patrimony. They fritter away resources on the fringes at low risk, but this strategy involves risking everything on a UN response that is far from certain without complex and redundant back channel communications between the warring sides.