Deterrence

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Re: Deterrence

Post by Gerard »

xpost from the Intl nuke thread

American Credible Minimum Deterrence?

Despite new START, the U.S. and Russia still have too many nuclear weapons
But in the latest issue of Strategic Studies Quarterly, three Air Force thinkers offer a surprising estimate. James Wood Forsyth Jr., Col. B. Chance Saltzman (chief of the Air Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division) and Gary Schaub Jr. conclude that "America's security can rest easily" on a comparatively small nuclear force.

The United States, they write, could "draw down its nuclear arsenal to a relatively small number of survivable, reliable weapons dispersed among missile silos, submarines, and airplanes." They said such a force might number only 311 nuclear weapons. They point out that China has already moved to a minimum deterrence strategy with an estimated 400 warheads, and 200 deployed.
The Strategic Studies Quarterly article is here:
Remembrance of Things Past
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/spring ... schaub.pdf
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

shiv wrote:
These are just my thoughts on how the US might see the issue of nukes globally. No claim that my views are correct. Just conjecture.
The issue of nukes and US policy has to be looked at from the prism of "Global Dominance", to make any sense of it. It is the ultimate weapon of hard power. Hard power being a requisite to further the agenda of global domination.

But when it comes to the sustained ability to dominate world affairs, another dimension one of cost, comes into play. So the question becomes, what is the least costly and the most effective way to dominate global affairs?

MAD was a response to a perceived or real existential threat by an opposing power, with the ability to threaten the US with the ultimate weapon of hard power. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this ideological based existential threat, no longer exists, to a large degree, even though the capability exists. Hence the focus has shifted from an over reliance on hard power only to a far more complex set of tools, but at the end of the day measured by the cost and effectiveness of these tools to further the agenda of global dominance.

Since the past two decades the focus has shifted to more tools in the form of various treaties, global and regional summits on all types of topics, which at the end of the day, keeps the US in a dominating position or at least a first among equals.

Even the START treaties are less about reduction of US and Soviet arsenal, as both get what they want - without a serious dilution in their capabilities, but act more as a message booster to China, India and Pakistan to rein their weapons in. The message is look even we are doing reducing so there is no reason for China to panic as both US and Russia are reining it in, which in turn gives a message to India that look China is not expanding, and then to Pakistan that look India is not expanding. The IUCNA being a specific example to bolster the argument.

To sum it up, it is in US interests to give the message to the nuclear haves to rein it in and in turn also to show to the have nots that look, all are reining their weapons in, so no need to worry. It is a strategy to lower the costs of global dominance through the use of other tools (treaties, globalization of markets, etc). This strategy will work, until such time, another power with the ability to either threaten such dominance, through the exclusive use of hard power (like the SU) and/or someone with a far more sophisticated wherewithal to lay a counter web of treaties and other tools, threatens this US global dominance agenda. This is where the potential of PRC comes in. The SCO is its first salvo. JMT.

Added: The above strategy then leaves out only "rogue" powers, unwilling to play by the minimum set of rules, as laid down by the US, to be managed. Today, they are namely: N. Korea and Iran. Hoping that both can fall into line, through a combination of carrots and sticks, and hope that they do not cross a line (such as threaten direct US interests). If they do that then the US has to increase its costs to manage the situation again, as evidenced with the case of Saddam's Iraq (even if the actual reasons on Iraq were debatable, perceived threats are enough to justify this escalation) and the Taleban led Afghanistan.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Gerard wrote: American Credible Minimum Deterrence?

Despite new START, the U.S. and Russia still have too many nuclear weapons
It is interesting to find an American source "officially" discarding MAD in favor of a future "Minimum Credible Deterrence" "Minimum deterrence" was an expression that appeared to come only out of Indian sources, while most on BRF used to and still advocate MAD as the option to follow.

New US thoughts on deterrence can be read in a link off the above source
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/spring ... schaub.pdf

Clearly, "Mutually Assured Destruction" is going out of fashion among the most powerful and nuclear powers in the world who also have the largest "proven" capacity. The second paper also mentions China as being confident and satisfied with an arsenal of about 400 warheads.

So what is the future for India? Are we really going to build 2000, or 20,000 warheads to deter Pakistan and China?

Apart from the excuse that "weak leadership" prevents India from doing that, I would really like to know if a "powerful leadership" in India would find the need to go down the route of MAD as the US and USSR did. One could argue, "It's all very well for the US to give up something, but does India have to follow them?"

I think there are no clear answers to this question. The pdf I have linked above has a very interesting statement at the end that is relevant here
In the final analysis, security is the problem; weapons one solution. The
spread of nuclear weapons is derived from the relative insecurity of some
states in the world. So long as war remains a finite possibility, we have to
be concerned with outcomes, and while some would be bad, others would
be worse. In the age of minimum deterrence, the world will have to stand
for a few more nuclear states; the majority of them will not pursue nuclear
weapons. Pursuit of such weapons is contingent upon security. If states
can achieve it without them, they have no need for them, which is another
way of saying a nuclear-free world hinges on a more secure one.
The number of weapons India develops is dependent on how secure India can reasonably expect to be. If India needs X weepaons to achieve a "satisfactory" balance with China, we need X plus something for Pakistan.

The size and nature of that "plus something" is dependent on Pakistan's actions and Pakistani actions are dependent on Chinese and US actions.

China has played a destabilizing role in this regard and India's nuclear arsenal is rightly being suited to hit China although there is no indication that a MAD policy is being envisaged. What China supplies to Pakistan will necessarily have an effect on Indian actions. India is accused of being a reactive power, but if India does not react to its environment its only option is to sit back and take what comes. Being reactive is the basic minimum that is required. Being "pro-active" is praised as an ideal, but with nuclear weapons I would like to know what being "pro-active" means? Does it mean developing MAD capability and making it public? Does it mean threatening nuclear war at some pre-defined red line? What is a pro active nuclear stance?

The US again has played a role that it sees as "stabilizing" in Pakistan. But because of the nature of Pakhanastan, US "stabilizing" of Pakistan has meant funding and arming the Pakistani armed forces with nuclear delivery capability. Indians know that US reassurances on arms to Pakistan are worthless. US arms have always been used against India - as recently as 1999. It is possible at all for the US to behave in a reassuring manner towards India. Indian capability has been built up with near zero official help from the US and will continue to be so. The US can only either punish India or choose to negotiate with India about nuclear arms. And direct negotiations with India will not work as long as the US chooses to upgrade Pakistan's capability vis a vis India.

India's best option might be to detach itself from what the US or China might do and just build up a huge capabiity that endangers everyone. Punishment of India has not worked and will not work. What can anyone do about it if India were to go down that route?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by negi »

shiv wrote: It is interesting to find an American source "officially" discarding MAD in favor of a future "Minimum Credible Deterrence" "Minimum deterrence" was an expression that appeared to come only out of Indian sources, while most on BRF used to and still advocate MAD as the option to follow.
Firstly the idea that Unkil or even the P-5 are discarding MAD is a FARCE ; the START/SALT or whatever one may wish to call so called arms control treaties are desperate measures taken by Unkil and Russia to actually bring their stockpiles under manageable proportions nothing more nothing less .

Btw it is not even funny to talk about India's MCD in the same vein as Unkil's or any of the P-5's nuclear doctrine .

We need to take into account the fact that there is a difference in testing nuclear devices vs deploying ballistic missiles with armed warheads , lastly as long as there is a CAP on the range of our delivery platforms we will still be playing amongst the group of so called rogue nations i.e. TSP, IRAN and NoKo as far as global politics is concerned.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

negi wrote: Firstly the idea that Unkil or even the P-5 are discarding MAD is a FARCE ; the START/SALT or whatever one may wish to call so called arms control treaties are desperate measures taken by Unkil and Russia to actually bring their stockpiles under manageable proportions nothing more nothing less . .
Negiji - did you actually read the articles posted?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by NRao »

Gerard wrote:xpost from the Intl nuke thread

American Credible Minimum Deterrence?

Despite new START, the U.S. and Russia still have too many nuclear weapons
The United States, they write, could "draw down its nuclear arsenal to a relatively small number of survivable, reliable weapons dispersed among missile silos, submarines, and airplanes." They said such a force might number only 311 nuclear weapons. They point out that China has already moved to a minimum deterrence strategy with an estimated 400 warheads, and 200 deployed.
Wonder where they got such LOW numbers (for China) from.

ALL of them 200, I bet, are in Tibet!!!!!

Why even have "credible"? We all believe the US, RU and China.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by negi »

^ Nope I only read what Gerard posted , the other one does not work . That 1500+ figure again only proves what I was trying to imply i.e. cutting the arsenal size to manageable limits for it still ensures MAD as far as Unkil and Russia are concerned .

My point is why try to link and discuss India's MCD with Unkil's ostensible proposal to limit nuclear arsenal (this is infact is Unkil's ploy to suck everyone into global disarmament nautanki ) ? And this when we have no official announcement with regards to deployment of ballistic missiles with armed 'nuclear warheads' . Lastly if deterrence is to be based upon an estimate of approximate number of POK-1 sized bombs which can be made from India's Plutonium stockpile then everyone in duniya (Japan , Israel and everyone with weapons grade Uranium or Plutonium ) has MCD :lol:
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

negi wrote:
My point is why try to link and discuss India's MCD with Unkil's ostensible proposal to limit nuclear arsenal (this is infact is Unkil's ploy to suck everyone into global disarmament nautanki ) ? And this when we have no official announcement with regards to deployment of ballistic missiles with armed 'nuclear warheads' . Lastly if deterrence is to be based upon an estimate of approximate number of POK-1 sized bombs which can be made from India's Plutonium stockpile then everyone in duniya (Japan , Israel and everyone with weapons grade Uranium or Plutonium ) has MCD :lol:
Who has tried to link the two? Unkil is now using Indian words. India can use unkil tactics. But why is unkil using Indian words? Why is India not using unkil tactics? MCD is an Indian tactic and many people disagree with MCD and want MAD. Many people want India to link with unkils old tactic (MAD) which unkil is claiming that it is giving up. Why is unkil claiming that it is giving up a tactic (MAD) that everyone admires so much? Does unkil think people will be fooled? Or was unkil fooling itself and everyone else with the earlier tactic?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

negi wrote:^ Nope I only read what Gerard posted , the other one does not work . That 1500+ figure again only proves what I was trying to imply i.e. cutting the arsenal size to manageable limits for it still ensures MAD as far as Unkil and Russia are concerned .
START only deals with strategic weapons ICBM/SLBM, Bombers, not tactical weapons, such as cruise missiles or other fighter craft delivered or artillery delivered . Also, the "reduced" arsenal means that only the vehicles are destroyed or converted not the warhead itself. How much time would it take to commission them again or retrofit on another type of vehicle, if the situation demands. Let us not even talk about the fissile material that US and Russia have. It has all type of loopholes on how it counts a bomber and MIRV missiles.

While it may be fashionable to talk about MCD and there are dime a dozen such papers of all types of ideas available, the net reality is - START has done little to actually reduce the stock piles of strategic weapons that can be made available in relatively short order to the US and Russia. It allows US and Russia to step away from the high costs of maintaining MAD, when no such ideological intent exists on either side. Yet, at the same time, retain the near capability to do so.

Also, Shiv, unfair to say most on BR advocate MAD. I do not recall many saying such a thing. Have not heard of ANY Indian analyst advocate such a policy.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

ShauryaT, Cruise missiles were de-nuked as part of INF treaty in mid 1980s. As a result they were armed with conventional weapons.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by arun »

X Posted. Michael Krepon in Arms Control Wonk on the work of K. Subrahmanyam:

Exceptional India
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

X-posted...
Ravi Karumanchiri wrote:This post may seem to start OT, but I do bring it back on-topic before the last paragraph.

It has been said that the first casualty of war is the truth. Surely, the second casualty must be the war plan. Indeed, it is also said that no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy. I believe that India’s NFU policy may be an example of this. Let me explain why.

The strategic and tactical value of India’s stated NFU policy is to forestall a nuclear arms race that could be sparked in non-nuclear weapons states that are or may become fearful of India’s nuclear arsenal. The point is that India does not want to provide a threat that would encourage further weaponization in the region. The NFU policy is meant to reassure non-nuclear weapons states that they don’t need their own nuclear weapons in order to counter India, because India also pledges not to use her nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.

Vis a vis nuclear weapons states – namely China and Pakistan – the NFU posture is meant to raise the threshold of first use by both of these countries, to help contain the possibility of a nuclear conflagration, particularly an accidental one. But, I would suggest that a careful reading of this NFU policy – which also promises ‘punitive counterstrikes’ – and with due consideration given to India’s proclamation of her mastery of sub-kiloton devices (as tested during Pokhran II; the Shakti III, IV and V devices, all of which were sub-KT); gives strong indication that India’s stated NFU policy probably has a disclaimer attached, reading that India would not use nuclear weapons in an initial attack *on Chinese or Pakistani soil*.

This raises the possibility that India might be the first to use nuclear weapons in a war with Pakistan or China, if the target were large formations of Pakistani or Chinese forces occupying Indian soil. For one, such a first use on one’s own (sparsely inhabited, and underdeveloped) soil during a state of war with an occupation under way, would seem to have inherent defensive legitimacy. Secondly, if the weapon used were small, sub-kiloton, it could conceivably destroy an invasion force and not much else. Third, such a first use would in all likelihood put an end to the invasion and the war, and so could be seen as a viable option, all things considered (including radioactive fallout – which would be of greater concern for Pakistan-facing sectors, than for China-facing sectors, due to prevailing winds). This outlook may offer an additional explanation for the lack of development in the border areas near China, in particular.

Therefore, I believe, if Indian soil were invaded, and that soil was deemed to be of significant strategic value, for the protection of access or resource (particularly high ground or water); and if that invading force were large enough to represent a substantial deployment of the enemy’s conventional forces such that its destruction would alter the overall balance of military power between India and her adversary, that India would probably consider using a small nuclear weapon on her own soil, to achieve a tactical victory and favourably alter the balance of power.

On the other hand, if the invading force was too small (in number of soldiers) or too lightweight (lacking armour), India would probably prefer a conventional response, if this was available to her -- countering a 'pin prick' with a 'stitch'.

Of course, China knows all this, and doesn’t really want a hot war with India, unless it could help direct Chinese public opinion against an external power (such as India), rather than the internal power that actually oppresses them on a day-to-day basis.

Furthemore, my reading of the current situation in China indicates that there is no factional advantage to be gained by any power center in China, to start a hot war with India (unlike in 1962, when war with India embarrased and fatally undermined the visiting Chinese Premier, Chou En-Lai). JMT

All emphasis is mine. I asked Ravi to develop this thoughts into an essay and publish.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by NRao »

I asked Ravi to develop this thoughts into an essay and publish.
True. Very well written.

Specially since i did not see a "MT" out there. :)

Seriously this is a different and a very refreshing view (at least one that I have not read anywhere else).
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Re: Deterrence

Post by svinayak »

NRao wrote: Seriously this is a different and a very refreshing view (at least one that I have not read anywhere else).
Assam type invasion by PRC forces in 1962 will never happen with this kind of doctrine and policy. This is one of main reason for Indian nuclear posture. It should be extended to Tibet plateau also. No large PRC forces can even form in Tibet unless it becomes a target.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

NRao wrote:
I asked Ravi to develop this thoughts into an essay and publish.
True. Very well written.

Specially since i did not see a "MT" out there. :)

Seriously this is a different and a very refreshing view (at least one that I have not read anywhere else).
He is a lawyer and you can see how he develops his rationale. Us engineers cant write like that.

BTW, ABV did say after Parakram (~2004) that if enemy forces are massing India is unlikely to stick to NFU. The implication is on Indian side of border. Unfortunately it got drowned out in the press. Its the DDM, WKK, Track Pee and NPA mullahs who propagate a benign view of the NFU and emasculate the thinking and induce regular paroxysms of fear.

They are truely the fifth columns masquerdaing as the Fourth estate.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by NRao »

I am most impressed with his thinking than the sequencing of his thoughts. Perhaps others have come across such thinking, I have not.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by vera_k »

This interpretation of the NFU where India is not restricted to second strike when it comes to Indian territory, including PoK and Aksai Chin, was indeed provided by ABV's government. But this is the UPA in power now, and they may not subscribe to the same views.

Further, assuming that the sub-kilotons work, and considering that PoK is sufficiently strategic these days in that it can provide a supply route to Afghanistan, what explains the reticience to clear the occupation forces?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

I think the post by Ravi would be in line with GoI thinking. Cautious and deliberate but reactive. A question would be would not, PRC itself be inclined to escalate in such a scenario, instead of backing down on such a first use by India, even if on its own soil? Can a PRC leader survive at home and not react to such an event? Would not also mean that if things have come to such a state that the ONLY option for India is to use nuclear weapons on its own soil to evict the enemy means that the overall defense capability of India was low in the first place? Why would PRC not choose to crush India in such an event? Will it not be better to threaten Beijing than a PRC infantry column? Does it mean that India somehow lost the capability to threaten Beijing?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

ramana wrote:ShauryaT, Cruise missiles were de-nuked as part of INF treaty in mid 1980s. As a result they were armed with conventional weapons.
About the only nuclear treaty which actually achieved something, in terms of taking the tactical nukes out of the picture from Europe. On Cruise Missiles, US and Russia are still allowed some numbers for Global use AND the bombers may still launch ALCM's - at least that is what I read. But no doubt, a big reason why cruise missiles are generally not nuclear armed is partly due to INF.

My issue is not with START or what it seeks to achieve, it is when folks try to use that as a direct correlation to what India should do or extrapolate the other way that India should go MAD.

Shiv's question, still begs an answer. What should be India's pro active stance?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by NRao »

ShauryaT wrote:I think the post by Ravi would be in line with GoI thinking. Cautious and deliberate but reactive. A question would be would not, PRC itself be inclined to escalate in such a scenario, instead of backing down on such a first use by India, even if on its own soil? Can a PRC leader survive at home and not react to such an event? Would not also mean that if things have come to such a state that the ONLY option for India is to use nuclear weapons on its own soil to evict the enemy means that the overall defense capability of India was low in the first place? Why would PRC not choose to crush India in such an event? Will it not be better to threaten Beijing than a PRC infantry column? Does it mean that India somehow lost the capability to threaten Beijing?
Ravi states (and I have always subscribed to this thinking) that "China" is "factional". I am not sure which "faction"s he is referring to, but my painting consists of the PLA and non-PLA (mostly economic driven). My view is that the PLA is the one that writes those anti-India articles in their news papers and causes problems along the border. While the other faction is more inclined to deal with ND in a more polite manner. These two factions really do not get along too well (my opinion)(mostly because of their priorities and not because they think too differently).

So, I feel it is sufficient to threaten the PLA faction or actually promote the non-PLA one. A similar balancing act that we witness more openly in Pakistan too.

I think Ravi's article addresses most, if not all, of your concerns. (I guess being a lawyer he has built-in defensive language - but that is great IMHO.)
Last edited by NRao on 22 Apr 2010 06:38, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by negi »

Shaurya ji those changes were made to suit Unkil's military doctrine for it allowed Unkil to deploy and use tomahawk and similar systems as and when it required without risking a nuclear escalation.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

NRao, who says MT and ICBM are not being talked about :)
One missile to rule them all
Developing intercontinental ballistic missiles is crucial if India is to have a credible deterrence and power-projection force as it aspires to become a global power
Brahma Chellaney

With China engaged in ambitious missile force modernization and the US building new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as part of its “Prompt Global Strike” programme, the question we need to ask is: When will India develop its first ICBM? Without such capability, India has little hope of emerging as a major power.

ICBMs are the idiom of power in international relations. Even as economic might plays a greater role in shaping international power equations, hard power remains central both for national deterrence and for power-projection force capability. For example, all countries armed with intercontinental-range weaponry hold permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council, and all aspirants for new permanent seats have regionally confined military capabilities.
India has glaring deficiencies on both the deterrence and power-projection fronts. It urgently needs a delivery capability that can underpin its doctrine of minimum but credible nuclear deterrence. The current heavy reliance on long-range bomber aircraft is antithetical to a credible deterrence posture.

Such a posture bereft of long-range missile reach only helps typecast India as a subcontinental power. In fact, in the absence of “strategic” or long-range missile systems, India’s deterrent capability remains sub-strategic.

If India seriously desires to project power far beyond its shores in order to play an international role commensurate with its size, it cannot do without ICBMs. Indeed, the only way India can break out from the confines of its neighbourhood is to develop intercontinental-range weaponry. With its current type of military capabilities, India will continue to be seen as a regional power with great-power pretensions.

To embark on an ICBM programme, India needs to shed its strategic diffidence. The National Democratic Alliance government told Parliament: “India has the capability to design and develop ICBMs. However, in consonance with the threat perception, no ICBM development project has been undertaken.” That policy inexplicably remains unchanged under the United Progressive Alliance government, even as India faces a growing threat from the new ICBMs in China’s increasingly sophisticated missile armoury.

An ICBM has a range of 5,500km and more. Rather than aim for a technological leap through a crash ICBM programme, India remains stuck in the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) arena, where its frog-like paces have taken it—more than two decades after the first Agni test—to Agni III, a sub-strategic missile still not deployed. Even the Agni V project, now on the drawing board, falls short of the ICBM range.

No nation can be a major power without three key attributes: (1) a high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; (2) a capacity to meet basic defence needs indigenously; and (3) a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through intercontinental-range weaponry.

India is today the world’s largest importer of conventional weapons, ordering weapons worth at least $5 billion per year. Far from making the nation stronger, such large arms imports underscore the manner in which the country is depleting its meagre defence resources and eroding its conventional military edge. The Indian military today can achieve many missions, including repulsing an aggression and inflicting substantial losses on invaders. It can even carry out limited pre-emptive or punitive action and fend off counteraction. But it cannot do what any major military should be trained and equipped for—decisively win a war against an aggressor state.

The reason is not hard to find: Modernization outlays mainly go not to develop the country’s own armament production base, but to subsidize the military-industrial complex of others through import of weapons, some of questionable value. None of the weapon mega deals India has signed in recent years will arm its military with the leading edge it needs in an increasingly volatile and uncertain regional security environment.

Its military asymmetry with China has grown to the extent that it has fostered disturbing fecklessness in India’s China policy, best illustrated by external affairs minister S.M. Krishna’s recent Beijing visit. And in the absence of a reliable nuclear deterrent, India has become ever more dependent on conventional weapon imports. Among large states in the world, India is the only one that relies on imports to meet even basic defence needs.

Last year’s launch of the country’s first nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant, for underwater trials received a lot of media attention. A nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarine (known as SSBN) is essential for India to bridge the yawning gap in its deterrent force against China. But even if everything goes well, India’s first SSBN will be deployed in the years ahead with a non-strategic weapon—a 700km submarine-launched ballistic missile now under development. That would further underpin the regional character of India’s deterrence.

Without hard power, India will continue to punch far below its weight and be mocked at by critics. One well-known India baiter, journalist Barbara Crossette, claims: “…today’s India is an international adolescent, a country of outsize ambition but anemic influence.” That India still does not have an ICBM project—even on the drawing board—is a troubling commentary about the lack of strategic prudence. China built its first ICBM even before Deng Xiaoping initiated economic modernization in 1978. A generation later, the Indian leadership has yet to grasp international power realities.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by NRao »

Yeah yeah. I read that (muck?). :) (Sorry.)

I was referring to the very well written article/email by Ravi.

But, I can live with a few of them mizziles and phatakas. Does not hurt. India is rich anyways.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Ravi Karumanchiri is certainly an original and out of box thinker.
ShauryaT wrote:I think the post by Ravi would be in line with GoI thinking. Cautious and deliberate but reactive. A question would be would not, PRC itself be inclined to escalate in such a scenario, instead of backing down on such a first use by India, even if on its own soil? Can a PRC leader survive at home and not react to such an event? Would not also mean that if things have come to such a state that the ONLY option for India is to use nuclear weapons on its own soil to evict the enemy means that the overall defense capability of India was low in the first place? Why would PRC not choose to crush India in such an event? Will it not be better to threaten Beijing than a PRC infantry column? Does it mean that India somehow lost the capability to threaten Beijing?
Shaurya - the Chinese will certainly require to save face if their attacking column gets hit. That face saving can come in two ways

1) Reacting aggressively as you have suggested
2) Lying to their population and claiming that the aims of war have been achieved and that Chinese forces have punished the enemy and will now pull back victoriously.

Note that both Pakistan and China have done that in the past.

Should India, in such a situation wait and see what China would do? I think yes. Attacking Beijing would be a good excuse to say we have been hit, we will hit back. But if China is defeated on Indian soilc the onus of escalation will be on China - which means that China has to make the decision to escalate. That raises the cost of decision making in China as Ravi points out. they can get out by lying, or they can lose a lot more by nuking India. Why should India help them make that decision easily, assuming that the scenario described by Ravi does come to pass?

But I believe that the stated d Indian intent is to maintain adequate conventional superiority. Whether we have really been meeting the requirements for that I don't know. Hence Ravi's scenario becomes the only possibility of "saving India"
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Kanson »

Depending upon the weapon that the country posses or under development, the posture & warfare strategy, the country willing to take can be ascertained. Example: Developing Carrier Battle Group, gives the notion that the nation is preparing for the power projection beyond it shores. Same way the acquisition of SSN tells a story.

In the same sense, what *could* be the strategy & posture of the nation which is willing to develop and field, highly accurate long range ballistic missile whose accuracy is such that sometimes it is described as "pin-point" accuracy - a notation reserved only for PGMs and Cruise missiles ? The answer probably is Counter-Force which is deemed as pro-active strategy not just as reactive in nuclear warfare.

To use Sub-KT nukes on the our own soil against the invading forces doesn't need long rage highly accurate nuclear missiles; a bomber or a tactical missile like Shourya or Prithvi is enough.

What is the likely scenario for the use of first strike by India? From Saag.org
India`s First Strike Nuclear Option ? : India has adopted a Draft Nuclear Doctrine of `No First Use ` of nuclear weapons. Would it be fair to assume that India despite concrete evidence of Pakistani deployment of nuclear assets for a first strike would remain impotent and await a Pakistani first nuclear strike before it hits back, just to adhere to it’s ` No first use doctrine? `. Rather unlikely and a suicidal option for India.
ShauryaT wrote:Shiv's question, still begs an answer. What should be India's pro active stance?
That is the India's answer to the question of India's pro active stance in Indian style.

Added later: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 66#p852366
Concurrently more accurate and precise modes of delivery of nuclear warheads are being explored to avoid the large collateral damage, inevitable in less accurate delivery. The maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV) is one such technology that is likely to dramatically increase the ability to deliver nuclear weapons with pin-point accuracy. The Earth-penetrating nuclear warhead design is another example of militarily usable nuclear explosions.
After achieving the former, it is a logical step to proceed to get the latter. What is the use of earth-penetrating nuclear warhead ? :)
What are the likely scenarios which envisage the use of use of nuclear warhead to avoid large collateral damage? :) One of it is ofcourse Counter-Force.
Last edited by Kanson on 22 Apr 2010 07:39, edited 1 time in total.
ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

shiv wrote: But I believe that the stated d Indian intent is to maintain adequate conventional superiority. Whether we have really been meeting the requirements for that I don't know. Hence Ravi's scenario becomes the only possibility of "saving India"
Reality is somewhere in the middle, as you would know well. No way I think a 62 can be repeated. The events of 67 and again in 84 itself have proved it. The reality is PRC is sitting pretty with the buffer state of Tibet in its control. All it has to do and is doing is act the aggressive bully to keep India in check and keep her occupied in a narrow region with the help of other client states.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RamaY »

Many assumptions are being made here to justify Indian inaction.

First of all, India can spend a portion of the money allocated for defense modernization on improving its nuclear posture. It could have operationalized a few ICBMs and a few dozens of IRBMs and yes 100+KT patakas. India has this capability today, however crude it might be.

Please note that we are not talking about India's lack of technology or resources. It has both in this scenario.

START II treaty negotiated in 1997 allowed USA and USSR to hold upto 2500 nuclear weapons. Now, after 13 years these two nations are talking about START III; that too not to the levels that can be called CMD. It is self deception at best to think that USA/USSR with thier proven delivery systems will come down to India's CMD levels.

Now what level of CMD India desires. It depends on India's threat perception. One of our nuclear adversary calls us its only and mortal enemy and maintains 50-100 nuclear weapons stockpile (It is a different matter that a joke called Paki-nude-nukes has been maintained on this forum). The second adversery on India's east has a history of backstabbing India at the wrong time. One should analyze the validity of a reasoning that thinks that the wanna-be super power would not escalate a nuke attack on the sublime principle that the nuke-attack happened on Indian soil.

Yes, one article from massa mentioned Indian approach as optimal for US to follow. Does it mean US is going to change its nuke policy to CMD from MAD. It took 13 years for USA to think about another reduction in its arsenal. From MAD to CMD will take minum 25-50 years to realize. That too if US continues to elect presidents like ombaba. Yey we want to put all our "national security" hopes in someone elses acceptance of our idea in a news paper.

It all looks like the jhollawallah brigade is trying to hold on to any/every excuse it can; to justify CRE of Indian nuke arsenal.

Even gods cannot save such a nation.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Kanson: The SAAG quote, refers to the draft nuclear doctrine, I believe the draft was accepted without much modification around 2004. So, it is not draft anymore. It is the doctrine.

On the doubt, if India will really adhere to NFU, when tested, is like saying it is bluff, that many allege and our enemies will call our bluff and take it into account. Do not know many, who get ahead being too clever by half, maybe except in India politics or bureaucracy.

To the best of my knowledge, the only country that our NFU seeks to pacify is TSP, for PRC could care less, with the levels of their arsenal and I do not think TSP is buying the story - and preparing as such.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Kanson wrote:
In the same sense, what *could* be the strategy & posture of the nation which is willing to develop and field, highly accurate long range ballistic missile whose accuracy is such that sometimes it is described as "pin-point" accuracy - a notation reserved only for PGMs and Cruise missiles ? The answer probably is Counter-Force which is deemed as pro-active strategy not just as reactive in nuclear warfare.

Kanson, without denying that you may be right - there is one more reason for "pinpoint" accuracy - i.e nukes of lower yields.

The ICBMs of the 60s had low accuracy and hence megaton yields were essential in case you missed a target by 30 Km. Later missiles were more accurate and lower yields were acceptable. Extrapolate that to India (without restarting any controversies :mrgreen: )
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Kanson »

:mrgreen: yes, yes, no controversies Shiv saar.

For a weapon to be used as a deterrent, as a city buster, what is the *desired* accuracy ? 300m or 100 m CEP probably will do for 10 kt Hiroshima type destruction ?
So what is the need of pin-point accuracy for a deterrent weapon ? Anyother possibilities ?

What difference will that make for a Hirsohima type destruction if the bomb is dropped off 300 m of the target...
The radius of total destruction was about one mile (1.6 km), with resulting fires across 4.4 square miles (11 km2).[29] Americans estimated that 4.7 square miles (12 km2) of the city were destroyed. Japanese officials determined that 69% of Hiroshima's buildings were destroyed and another 6–7% damaged
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Ok I get your point.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Kanson »

ShauryaT

Action speaks louder than words.

Hope you were aware of the deliberation of Indian officials on the first use within the NFU deliberately leaked and reported & discussed by another SAAG paper.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Kanson »

K. Sub in one of the rare occasions indicated the number of the weapon needed is 562. Does anyone aware of this ? Thats all behind the 3 digit number of the Indian arsenal.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Michael.
While you have drawn attention to General Sundarjee having rubbished a thermonuclear requirement, you should have followed his thought process in the last four yeard of his life.

The General and I were fellow students when we researched our doctrate thesies. Initially he had advocated that India’s ‘deterrent’ requirement could be met by fielding roughly 60 nuclear warheads and that this could be achieved by abjuring thermonuclear capabilities.

However, in the last few years of his life we met regularly – over a bottle of good Indian whiskey – and had long discussions on India’s strategic deterrence compulsions. We analysed who has to be deterred, what would deter the leadership of that entity, the target analysis and levels of punishment that those leaders would believe Indian Strategic Forces could mete out, etc. etc.

It is interesting to note that General Sundarjee had had revised his opinion on quantity and quality of the Indian nuclear arsenal. He concluded that India required approximately 135 warheads – which he published in an op-ed piece in the Indian Express. In our discussions he had also concluded that India required a certain number of 150 KT – 200 KT warheads!!

- Magoo

— Magoo · Apr 20, 10:18 PM ·
from comments section in the Michael Krepon article on K. Sub Link X Post from India Nuclear Thread.
Link

Mark Hibbs then makes a further comment, indicating "Magoo" is known to him.
Last edited by ShauryaT on 23 Apr 2010 01:20, edited 3 times in total.
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Who is Magoo?
ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

ramana wrote:Who is Magoo?
Do not know, he signed that name to the comment, let me edit and update with a link. A further search on express site, did not yield anything.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by BijuShet »

ramana wrote:Who is Magoo?
Ramanasaar I think I can with high certainity point you to Magoo's Identity. Please advise if it is ok to post it here or send it via email.
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

I dont need that. What I want to be sure is he isn't a cartoon character Mr. Magoo!
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Re: Deterrence

Post by muraliravi »

BijuShet wrote:
ramana wrote:Who is Magoo?
Ramanasaar I think I can with high certainity point you to Magoo's Identity. Please advise if it is ok to post it here or send it via email.
Biju Sir,

Are you sure,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krishnaswamy_Sundarji

Did Sundarji ever get a PhD. How can Magoo claim that they researched their doctorate theises together??
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

The Magoo name is linked to this site
http://www.sasfor.com/

This is their core group
http://www.sasfor.com/index.php?option= ... 2&Itemid=8

Includes Santhanam
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