Pulikeshi wrote
We are talking in parallel. India, the nation-state and not any "undefined core" that exists in the corridors of power, today views the worries to its West as a problem of and between nation-states. In a sense, India wants Pakistan to become a responsible neighbor and no more. Similarly, India would like to see a stable Afghanistan, to ensure the safety and security of the citizens of India, but no more. The example of the Jews you gave does not apply. As even after a million persecutions the peoples of Bharat seem to be suffering from collective amnesia. The jingo minority, while important, is insignificant in terms of influence or impact. Bharat today remains as a tattered remnants of a once advanced civilization, the current nation-state of India is at best agnostic and at worst inimical to the civilization of Bharat. Not a very cheerful situation this.
Pulikeshi ji, yes we are perhaps going in parallels. But the reason for this "parallax" is that you are giving the "nation-state" as the single actor and the "commons" as apathetic - the greatest importance. I on the otherhand have always believed in the power of the idea to change and reignite a nation if the basic tradition/core philosophy is somehow retained. I have both practical/experiential as well as conviction reasons to trust the "commons" to rise under appropriate provocations and when they see leadership they can trust. I would earnestly wish you talk of "regimes" rather than equating them with "nation". What a certain regime does at the moment will definitely affect us in the future consequences - but a regime is not equal to the nation. A regime comes into power as the apparent optimal solution between a nations' aspirations at a particular time and the hostile conditions or forces it faces at that time. It is a two-stage game and not a one stage one as it is typically represented.
I am really not concerned about existing regimes. I cannot do much about changing them. I look to the future and think of what I can do to make a more appropriate regime happen in the future. That is where our efforts should focus on.
If you parse my argument. Historically, every incarnation of a nation-state built on Bharatiya civilization has been a reaction. A political ideological core never came about as from antiquity the gana-rajya system has always been in vogue. Whenever these cores arose it was invariably in response to an external threat. In this sense, I am arguing that even India of today is no different. This is a different view than one where we view Partition as a temporary state or a compromise or a malicious or otherwise solution the British condemned the sub-continent to in their haste to leave. I do not share your optimism that the current ideological core - whatever their political affiliation - offer much to either the civilization of Bharat or the nation-state of India. What is India? How can one change the world if one does not even define oneself in the simplest of terms.
The reactive nature of regimes you speak of, comes because we wrote out the term "initiative" and "active intervention" in our surroundings from our civilizational doctrine. It is a typical risk-avoidance syndrome masquerading under high-philosophical sophistry about compassion and abjurence of violence. I have pointed out many times that such behaviour in the elite and regimes in India coincide with the growth of the "mercantilist" behaviour - the idea that everything can be solved through and exchangeable against money. (the "mercantilists" could not grow however unless the risk-takers had created the conditions for them to flourish - before).
The phenomenon you speak of coincides with the strange interregnum of Buddhism, perhaps even Jainism. It worked for a time because there was no challenge to the doctrine through consequnces because of the effects of a long period of prior "active intervention" had pacified the disturbing elements. You can see that this pacifist, non-intrevntionist phase comes after the Mauryan experience - where Indian power was projected officially way beyond the heartland. This gave a false sense of security by default which allowed a reactive over-layer to develop among the regimes in power.
My point is that if this reactive nature was really an integral part of the "nation-sate" then it would have never fought back when the regimes and "nation-states" were formally lost. But the commons indeed fought back, without formally having any "nation" as per your definition, and they were not all coming from descendants of older top-dogs. The delay in the action shown by the regime and the commons is obvious - for the commons woiuld wait for the regime to lead and take action - that in fact would be the understanding that would result after generations of struggle between the ruler and the ruled. This gap in the reaction times between regimes which fail to keep the contract and the commons which take up the job in their own hands should not be seen as an overwhelmingly reactive approach.
I am an optimist about reversal of the Partition because I can sense that "my" people are basically active. They have simply lost sight of leaders they can trust and will not show that they are willing to suffer for a national cause until they see the leaders who are worth such sacrifices. I dont think of them as reactive but rather pro-active at this stage. I trust my people and not regimes.
) the armed forces were given a short shrift, like you outline. In retrospect, I thank god, what would have happened if he really wanted to build up the armed forces HIS WAY?
