
'The death of the European dream' By Gideon Rachman
Image by Ingram Pinn http://tinyurl.com/37ab8cl
Financial Times Illustrations May 2010
And stops sitting on Indian land and stops funding insurgent groups.....yeah India-China rapproachement!Acharya wrote: All these things are doable once PRC stops funding and arming Pakistan with WMD.
They have to demilitarize Tibet, not merely the border. And allow Tibet full autonomy.D Roy wrote: In the himalayas, everybody keeps what they already have and just demilitarize the entire Indo-tibetan border with significant number of military observers stationed on either side and joint patrolling by .lightly armed border guards.
Couple this with direct overland trade and tourist exchange and presto - Sino-Indian rapprochement.
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"Though Islamo-Christian civilization may be a neologism, it is a creative key term that this book will make into a household word. Since 9/11 Americans have been subjected to a relentless parade of experts, from missionaries to historians to special interest advocates, all of whom warn about the difference and danger of Islam. Richard Bulliet reveals the flimsiness of their arguments. Against Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" and Bernard Lewis's "What Went Wrong?," Bulliet sees a future in which the screeds of American Islamophobes and the violent dreams of Muslim extremists both are eclipsed by respect and popular following for leaders of tolerant and peaceful conscience. They are the key to our collective future as members of Islamo-Christian civilization." -- Bruce B. Lawrence, Professor of Islamic Studies, Duke University
Back to my pet thread: I posted this in 2008.Paul wrote:Note that Caroe in his papers had referred to Burma as the easter buffer state.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1071005/a ... 398140.aspPaul wrote:
ROAD TO YANGON
- India is unable to wed economic self-interest to strategic vision
Swapan Dasgupta
It’s never easy to balance ethics and expediency in foreign policy. Throughout the month-long anti-junta stir in Myanmar, India was at the receiving end of domestic and overseas criticism for being indifferent to the struggle for democracy. The land of the Mahatma was taunted for suggesting a moral equivalence between Senior General Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi, the woman who has replaced Nelson Mandela as the living personification of Gandhi. Most damning of all, India’s attitude to the upsurge in Myanmar has been compared to the self-serving cynicism of China — a country with an impressive track of bolstering rogue regimes in North Korea and Sudan.
Viewed in terms of pure self-interest, India’s refusal to come out decisively in favour of the Buddhist monks and National League for Democracy is understandable. In the early-Nineties, New Delhi found itself cut off from the loop in Yangon for its open expressions of solidarity with the popularly-elected leader who was never allowed by the military to assume power. The collateral damage that arose from supporting democracy in Myanmar was profound. The Tatmadaw (as the junta is known) wilfully turned a blind eye to groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, which used camps inside Myanmar as springboards for operations in northeast India.
It took a great deal of patient diplomacy for Indo-Myanmar relations to be restored to a somewhat even keel. By 2000, India was successful in enlisting Yangon’s cooperation in meeting the threat of the northeastern insurgent groups. Not only did the Tatmadaw close down many of the camps inside its territory, it actually facilitated some cross-border operations of the Indian army. The camps that remained were in areas over which the writ of the Myanmar state did not run.
For a military regime that had become excessively dependent on China, it made sense to clutch India’s hand of friendship, if only as a hedge. India extended valuable assistance in upgrading the old Burma Road that links Manipur to Mandalay. Egged on by the state governments in Assam and the Northeast, India mooted a joint project to restore the famous 1,000-kilometre Stillwell Road which began at Ledo in Assam, ran through the Hukawng Valley in Myanmar, before finishing at Kunming in the Yunan province of China. Since a 300-km stretch of the road passes through an inhospitable Kachin belt, a subtext of the proposal was Indian assistance for Myanmar’s domestic anti-insurgency operations.
It is important to acknowledge that India’s engagement with the military regime in Naypyidaw, the new garrison town which is officially the capital, actually stems from a position of utmost weakness. Ideally, it would be in New Delhi’s interest to have an economically vibrant, democratic Myanmar headed by Suu Kyi, who has a deep, personal association with India. The deep involvement of China with the Tatmadaw in both the military and economic spheres has added to India’s fears of Chinese “encirclement”, fears that have grown with the turbulence in Nepal.
Yet, there is a recognition that the democratization of a society caught in a time-warp is unlikely to be trouble-free. Convinced that it is the sole guardian of the country’s traditional values, the Tatmadaw has so far resisted all moves to enlarge the decision-making process. It nurtures the belief that democracy will unleash fissiparous tendencies and undermine Myanmar’s existence as a united, Buddhist nation. In particular, it is fearful that the ethnic insurgencies along the borders will get out of hand with a federal, democratic constitution.
These are familiar concerns of self-serving cliques who believe they alone can safeguard national interests. That, however, does not mean that every fear is based on paranoia. India has reason to be grateful to the Tatmadaw for its success in containing the spread of the insurgencies, particularly those which blend sub-nationalism with Christian evangelism. A weakening of the central authority in Myanmar — unavoidable in the transition to democracy — will inevitably have a bearing on India’s internal security.
If India’s anxieties with the military junta stem from fears of growing Chinese influence, there is the corresponding apprehension that democracy could throw Myanmar into temporary chaos and lead to a free-for-all. The West genuinely wants democracy in Myanmar but this desire does not stem from the worship of ideals. It reflects a pragmatic desire to regain some influence in a country that has chosen to live in isolation from 1962.
For the Anglo-American alliance, the restoration of democracy is also the instrument to contain China’s “hegemonism” in Asia. Tarring China with the brush of encouraging human rights abuses is also a good way of deflating the hype around next year’s Beijing Olympics.
There is a happy convergence between Western designs and Indian wishes. Yet, the problem with Indian foreign policy is its inability to marry the pursuit of strategic and economic self-interest with a larger strategic vision. The mismatch is all the more pronounced since India acquired a new self-confidence rooted in the success of its private corporate sector.
The West, needless to add, would love India to take the lead in implementing a common agenda in southeast Asia — the other candidate, Thailand, has its own junta problems. But where does Myanmar fit into India’s larger scheme of things? If a stable Myanmar is all that India should hope for, it makes more sense to accept in the short-term the certitudes of the Tatmadaw rather than the uncertainties of the well-meaning Suu Kyi. However, if curbing China’s growing influence is the prime objective, how is that to be achieved?
It is interesting that many of these issues were discussed in considerable detail by the Viceroy’s Study Group, established in 1942 under the chairmanship of India’s foreign secretary, Sir Olaf Caroe, a man who combined his fascination for the Great Game with a Curzonian belief in the destiny of India. These deliberations have been dissected in detail by American historian, P.J. Brobst, in The Future of the Great Game.
Caroe envisaged a pivotal role for an independent India, strategically linked to Britain, “at the centre of an Asiatic system”. The defence of India, he argued, had to be based on an “outer ring” that extended to Iran, Tibet, Malaya and Thailand and an “inner wall”, which included Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, Nepal and the North-eastern hill tracts. In Caroe’s mind, the biggest threat to India in the east was a China that “makes no secret of its ambitions to reassert its sway over its former territories; it recalls that it once claimed suzerainty over Nepal and Myanmar… and though in the past it has…had little interest in India, today the shrinkage of distance… may well turn the attention of Chinese imperialists to new and dangerous paths.”
The containment of Chinese imperialism, he argued, depended on establishing buffers all along the “outer ring”. The first was Tibet which gave several hundred miles of depth to India’s frontiers. The second was Myanmar. According to him the neutrality of a small state like Myanmar was impractical. “Any conception of the future of Myanmar,” he wrote, “must be related to a larger international order, to be guaranteed by some greater powers or power.” The buffer roles of “Myanmar, Malaya and Indo-China will depend entirely on the prestige of the sovereign power set against the acquiescence of other powers”. In plain language, it would not do for India to submit meekly to China.
Some six decades later, despite regime changes and the topsy-turvy of frontiers, Caroe’s understanding of Indian imperatives hasn’t lost relevance.
www2.uakron.edu/OAH/Proceedings/2003/McGrath.pdfConclusion
Between 1911 and 1937, the Yunnan-Burma border comprised a warlord frontier. The Yunnan provincial militarists, Cai E and Long Yun, were at the forefront of the frontier dispute. Their handling of this critical foreign relations issue demonstrated their differing views on the role of the central government versus that of the provincial government and the emerging influence of provincial militarists on foreign policy issues. Long’s provincial administration crafted the only coherent frontier policy regarding the border. The Chinese Nationalist government simply lacked the political power to influence
this remote province and was preoccupied with other more pressing matters. As a result, Long sought to define the frontier in a manner designed
to enhance provincial autonomy and his control over the province. The nature of this frontier dispute and the role of provincial militarists in foreign relations and frontier policy is also a frontier of warlordism. Warlords have consistently been seen to either be the lackeys of foreign imperialists or not involved in foreign relations. The history of the Yunnan-Burma border dispute challenges both conceptions. Some militarists did indeed have extensive contact with foreign powers. Those militarists who ruled frontier regions, like Yunnan, had to maintain contact with foreign powers in order to manage a number of issues important to the preservation of the individual militarist’s base of operations. And when it suited their purposes, provincial militarists actively opposed western encroachment. To do otherwise, would have conceded potential resources that were vital to maintaining provincial autonomy and thereby the militarist’s political survival.
Swapan is unabashed in his desire to make India a coolie for western elite families.Paul wrote: However, if curbing China’s growing influence is the prime objective, how is that to be achieved? ...
Caroe envisaged a pivotal role for an independent India, strategically linked to Britain ... In plain language, it would not do for India to submit meekly to China.
Some six decades later, despite regime changes and the topsy-turvy of frontiers, Caroe’s understanding of Indian imperatives hasn’t lost relevance.
Sanku wrote:Okay folks, seeing Swapan regularly on tv and agreeing with his views, I would like to say just what Swapan said out there which is causing discomfort? He is uber nationalist on TV and expressed stronger views in person in front of Dutts and such of the world which we hardly say on BRF here, even behind handles.
I also read his piece on the need for buffer etc. I dont see whats the harm there? His saying Caroe's views were relevant? Yes I agree with him, Caroe was defending India for Brits, we need to defend India for ourselves but many of the geo-political imperatives continue to be same as are many of the needed tactics. Only the person who really benefits in the end has changed?
So what gives? I hope we are not, as JEM said, making enemies out of friends once again?
How? Which part of the statement makes you think that Swapan has supported an Anglophile agenda, the most he has said is the need to keep China at bay through buffer states etc. A natural fall out of this would be a assertive India and a autonomous Tibet at least (all of which are good things)Pranav wrote:Swapan supports an Anglophilic agenda - and that is inseparable from the "Anglo-American" Syndicate that Carroll Quigley talks about.
Sanku wrote:
How? Which part of the statement makes you think that Swapan has supported an Anglophile agenda, the most he has said is the need to keep China at bay through buffer states etc. A natural fall out of this would be a assertive India and a autonomous Tibet at least (all of which are good things)
Meanwhile -- personally I dont think EVMs had anything at all to do with BJPs losses, and will probably rubbish any such mentions in public too. Does that make me a anglophile as well ? (you know my views in general right)
While I do not deny there is a anglophile agenda, or there are Indians batting for it (CRM is definetly one) if you listen to Swapan's views in general on Anglophiles, you would probably not use those two data points to make the judgment that you have.
If so that would make me one, and I dont think anyone on BRF would attribute that to me
Pranav is right that Swapan is an Anglophile. Read all his article and he tried to create an impression for the western audience. He is similar to vir SingviSanku wrote: Swapan supports an Anglophilic agenda - and that is inseparable from the "Anglo-American" Syndicate that Carroll Quigley talks about.
How? Which part of the statement makes you think that Swapan has supported an Anglophile agenda, the most he has said is the need to keep China at bay through buffer states etc. A natural fall out of this would be a assertive India and a autonomous Tibet at least (all of which are good things)
You know I read pretty much everything that comes out of both and I DO NOT accept the above. Including watching Swapan on TV nearly every other night.Acharya wrote: Pranav is right that Swapan is an Anglophile. Read all his article and he tried to create an impression for the western audience. He is similar to vir Singvi
He uses some psy ops in his articles. He is nationalistic but there is a tendency to cater to what the west wants to hear. Western observers are critical of any anti western national commentator. So most of these folks tone down and make it a diplomatic.Sanku wrote:
You know I read pretty much everything that comes out of both and I DO NOT accept the above. Including watching Swapan on TV nearly every other night.
I do not think he has yet said anything which would label him a anglophile -- by far -- merely having different approaches to nationalistic issue does not make one an anglophile.
Let us agree to disagree.
Emerging
global powers such as China, India and Brazil are asserting their rising influence
in a peaceful manner.
...
In the Asia-Pacific, the major powers, which include Japan, the Republic of Korea,
China, India, and Australia, all view regional stability as in their interests and are
generally supportive of international norms. The two primary sources of instability
are longstanding -- the rivalry between India and Pakistan, and the dangerous
government of the People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK).
...
India, Indonesia, and the leading democracies of Africa and
Latin America share with NATO a commitment to global peace and the rule of law.
...
A new level of secure maritime
situational awareness is called for by changing risks around the periphery
of NATO and in the High North, Gulf, Indian Ocean and other areas. NATO
should harmonize investments in such surveillance platforms as unmanned
aerial vehicles, maritime patrol aircraft, land-based radars, surface and
subsurface vessels, and robotic systems. ...
Yes I agree.. he is doing some packaging to make himself heard. It is needed unfortunately.Acharya wrote:He uses some psy ops in his articles. He is nationalistic but there is a tendency to cater to what the west wants to hear. Western observers are critical of any anti western national commentator. So most of these folks tone down and make it a diplomatic.Sanku wrote:
You know I read pretty much everything that comes out of both and I DO NOT accept the above. Including watching Swapan on TV nearly every other night.
I do not think he has yet said anything which would label him a anglophile -- by far -- merely having different approaches to nationalistic issue does not make one an anglophile.
Let us agree to disagree.
There is no nationalistic media yet in India and hence the problem.
500 is just about adequate. But the more the better, obviously.JE Menon wrote:Who's the judge by the way?
And a 500 year perspective? Why not 600 or 400? Or is it just the spirit of the thing?
Carroll Quigley was a person who had a broad understanding of world history, from the inside of the forces shaping it. For example, if you want to understand the thinking of the people who were planning the partition of India, including support for Jinnah of Direct Action fame, then Quigley is an important resource. Highly recommended that people find out more about what he wrote, although he was a self-confessed supporter of what he called the "Anglo-American" syndicate.JE Menon wrote: And Carroll Quigley is from where? Bangalore, Kerala? Speaking of Anglophile ...
Swapan was talking about curbing the influence of China being a "primary objective", and was speaking approvingly of Curzon.>>In this specific instance I was criticising the idea that India should join, as a subordinate partner, any western agenda of containing China.
Where does Swapan say anything of the sort. Maybe I missed it. Not being sarcastic, I genuinely might have. But I can pretty much bet without reading the article that he says nothing of the kind.