Kargil War Thread - VI

[peter]

peter, Kargil was under open nuclearization by both parties.It puts all theories of modern war on head.Why did it happen is the big picture.

Well two things:
a) Why did pakistan do it.
b) Why did India let it happen.

Answer to a) is a political tussle between Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif as the aftermath of Kargil war confirms.

Answer to b) is un-understandable. Though in most every war India has fought, post independence, Indian borders proved to be porous and they continue to be even today. Every few weeks one can hear of terrorists in kashmir engaging the Indian forces. The number that infilitrate succesfully are probably lot higher.

Indian media is splashing stories of Chinese troops infiltrating into Indian borders for last many months but Govt Of India is denying that. Is the situation any different from 1962?

Leadership has a domino effect.

[ramana]

Eleven years after the war:

Military tribunal slams Kargil war leadership

http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/27/stories ... 911200.htm

Looks like the Brigadier was wronged by petty leadership who maligned him for being right.

[chackojoseph]

Eleven years after the war:

Military tribunal slams Kargil war leadership

http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/27/stories ... 911200.htm

Looks like the Brigadier was wronged by petty leadership who maligned him for being right.

You beat me to it. I wanted to point that out to you and rohitvats.

[anirban_aim]

Eleven years after the war:

Military tribunal slams Kargil war leadership

http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/27/stories ... 911200.htm

Looks like the Brigadier was wronged by petty leadership who maligned him for being right.

You beat me to it. I wanted to point that out to you and rohitvats.

I also got beaten by Abhishek to it, drive to office did me in.

Cross Posting from the IA thread.

Military tribunal slams Kargil war leadership

http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/27/stories ... 911200.htm

The order is pretty damning. Brass will have to do a lot of explaining. Well its not unknown that there is very little love lost Lt Gen KP but admitting mistakes is not going to be easy.

Old festering issue. I'm intrested to see how it unfolds. I'm even more intrested to see how Gen VKS reacts to this.

[Philip]

For those of us who might remember during the tense days of the Kargil War,the reports emanating from "the mess" was that gallant sacrifices were being made by young officers and jawans to "cover up for the blunders of their seniors".Some of the accounts of the entire fiasco of Gen.Bandicoot's surprise attack that backfired upon him devastatingly,sounded fishy too.It is good that at last the truth is coming out,better late than never and that justice will be done to those who suffered from false accusations and charges.

[chackojoseph]

You can mail some of the fauji folks who have their son's memorials on internet. They will tell you that the young ones were sent to be butchered. Top brass was simply non existent. If it was not for the young ones, we would have had different outcomes. After war, top brass wrote reports and stories, blamed one and all and are clogging think tanks and libraries.

[ramana]

Chacko, Why do you have to point out to me?

You beat me to it. I wanted to point that out to you and rohitvats.

[sum]

Sad to see such senior officers ( Brig Pal and Gen Singh) wash their dirty linen in public on almost all the major news channel on primetime...

[manjgu]

Sum... while it is depressing but its a sign of the times.

assessment is a very subjective thing really ...

[Sid]

it is really sad. ACR reports are becoming kind carrot-n-stick used by seniors to keep junior officers in line now.

[ramana]

There is something more rotten in Hq.

Even if Lt. Gen Pal's report was not too flattering of Brig. Singh, knowing the facts why was he overlooked? If Gen Malik knew about Brig. Singh's service then, who was one contradictory remark by Lt Gen Pal was used to deny the promotion? Was Brig. Singh under direct command og Lt gen Singh? Looks like not for there should be a Maj Gen who is miising? So someone used Lt Gen Pal's remarks in an adverse manner even though they and their superiors knew his service.

[rohitvats]

^^^ Sir, iirc, the said GOC testified in front of the Tribunal that Brig. Singh did command the 70 Infantry Brigade during the said operation.

Reading on the net tells me that 70 Infantry Brigade is part of 3rd Infantry Division but was placed under 8th Mountain Division during the conflict. So, the GOC would have been Maj.General Mohinder Puri.

Captain Amrinder Singh's book - A Ridge Too Far, clearly mentions Brig.Singh as Brigade Commander 70 Infantry Brigade. I think the said operation where Brigadier got injured and got nominated for MVC, was assault on Pt 5203. No less a person than COAS Malik had stressed on the need to capture Pt 5203 during his visit on 23rd May. When initial assault on 7-8 June failed, he moved his Tac HQ forward and planned the successful assault on 19-20 June.

The book details the operations of 70 Brigade in some detail and commends Brigadier Singh for superb handling of operations. He is mentioned as Brigade Commander during this entire account. It also mentions that the Infantry Brigade during Kargil had under it's command no less than 11 Infantry Regiments and 4 Artillery Regiments - Division worth of troops. Captain Manoj Pandey got his PVC while fighting under 70 Infantry Brigade. Maj.Sarvanan of Jubar Hill fame was also martyred in this sector.

[ramana]

So Brig. Singh was more like a division commander.

Meanwhile Pravin Swami writes:

Kargil cases point to disturbing command failures

I know KRC went into the non-Army related matters as the Army had their own probe. The mess was kept hidden for 11 years and is now turned putrid. Looks like whenthe Tribunal takes up the other cases a lot more dirty stuff will come out.
Initially I wasnt too supportive of Brig Surinder Singh, for he should have sent out patrols in his immediate area, but now am not sure he wasn't scapegoated.

I mean look at time line even by Jan 1999 there was firing incidents but brushed under.

and from Tribune, 27 May 2010...

Kargil: More skeletons may tumble out
Performers allege they were overlooked for promotion
Vijay Mohan/Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, May 27

While the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) called for rewriting portions of the Kargil conflict history, opening the doors for a fresh introspection into the 1999 episode, there could be more skeletons in the Army’s cupboard waiting to tumble out.
------------
To pass the judgement on the entire Indian Army and to suggest that complete war history was fudged and the Kargil Review committee report be rewritten, I think this is unfair. This does not take away the entire good work done by the Army. This is an aberration

— Former Army Chief Gen V P Malik

I have not fudged any war report: Lt Gen Pal

After being indicted by the AFT for showing bias against a Brigadier and falsifying the accounts of the Kargil war, Lt Gen Kishan Pal today said he had “not fudged any war reports” and whatever he wrote about the battle was “unbiased”. “I have not fudged any reports or records, I have written one confidential battle performance report about Brig Devinder Singh and as a Corps Commander, the report I wrote about him was totally unbiased and true,” he said here. — PTI

-------------------------------

Apart from questions being raised over a series of material procurements, including those from foreign vendors, during and after operations, a large number of instances have come to light where officers and field commanders, who had performed well in battle, have alleged that they were given a raw deal. Many such officers opted out of the service prematurely after being overlooked for promotion.

The most notable case, now pending before the AFT, is that of Brigadier Surinder Singh, the then commander of the 121 (Independent) Brigade at Kargil. He was unceremoniously removed at the height of the conflict and later his services were terminated on charges of mishandling classified documents and not seeking proper permission for vacating the Bajrang post in the Kaksar sector under his jurisdiction.

While blaming the military leadership for lapses that led to the conflict in which over 540 Army personnel, including many young officers, were killed, Brigadier Surinder Singh has claimed that he had personally briefed the then Army Chief, Gen VP Malik and the then Director General Military Operations, Lt Gen NC Vij (later Army Chief) about the enhanced threat perceptions in that area, including artillery and missile deployments, on the other side. There had been reports of infiltrations in the south of Siachen Glacier as early as January and February 1999 which were conveyed to the top leadership, he said.

Another officer, Col Nehra, who was the Commanding Officer of 22 Grenadiers, too, had moved the Bombay High Court against adverse remarks in his annual confidential report.

A junior officer, Maj Manish Bhatnagar, who was dismissed by a General Court Martial for professional impropriety has moved the AFT challenging his court martial and seeking an independent inquiry into the whole episode. While the case pertaining to his court martial will come up for hearing in July, the AFT had dismissed his plea for inquiry on the grounds that it does not have the jurisdiction over the matter. He said that he is now contemplating approaching the High Court or the Supreme Court.

‘Disillusioned ‘over not being promoted despite showing good results during the operation, Col Lalit Rai, who had commanded 1/11 Gorkha Rifles and was decorated with the Vir Chakra, opted for premature retirement.

Of the 17 infantry battalions awarded Battle Honours and Honour Tittles for exceptional performance during the conflict, the commanding officers of most of these units have opted for premature retirement, as they had been overlooked for promotion. Col OP Yadav, who commanded 1 Bihar and Col JS Bawa, of 17 Jat, were approved for promotion in review boards in 2007. CO 18 Grenadiers, Col K Thakur picked up his rank a year later. Of the main three brigades in the centre of operations --- 192, 70 and 56 — the commander of just one was promoted.

The figures imply that the Army found less than 20 per cent of commanders who did well in battle fit for promotion. Commanding officers of a number of other units who performed e have also been superseded. On the other hand, all generals associated with the planning and conduct of operations, either at Army Headquarters or formation HQs, walked away with one award or the other.

Among the seven Brigade commanders involved in operations, four moved up the ladder. After Brig Surinder Singh was moved out, his successor, OP Nandrajog who took over at the fag-end of the conflict, later became GOC-in-C Central Command, while Commander 102 Brigade in Sub-Sector Haneef, PC Katoch became a Lieutenant General. Then Commander of the Para Brigade, P. Bhardwaj is presently the Army’s Vice Chief. Noticeably, none of the battalions under their command got a Battle Honour.

Along Dras-Mushkoh, 79 Brigade commander, RN Kakar, tasked with capturing Point 4875 became Major-General, while Brig Amar Aul, commander of 56 Brigade that captured Tololing, become Lieutenant General. Three and two units under their respective command got battle honours. Commander 192 Brigade, MPS Bajwa, who captured Tiger Hill, perhaps the most celebrated feature of the conflict, retired on the same rank.

Maybe there were other factors in the promotions but the Tribunal finding sure has bringing out a lot of bad stuff.
If battle hardened vetarans throw the towel and quit how will the Force get stiffened?

[ramana]

Editorial in Tribune, 28 may 2010

Honour restored
Remembering Kargil War

The Armed Forces Tribunal’s order to expunge adverse annual confidential reports against a brigadier who commanded a brigade during the Kargil war after discovering that the corps commander had fudged reports of the conflict and showed bias towards him raises several important issues related to both the Army and the higher defence management. The brigadier, who was overlooked for promotion, has since left the Army. But the verdict has at least restored his professional honour.

The judgment also comes as a reminder of the collective failure of the country’s defence management system 11 years ago when Pakistani troops surreptitiously occupied portions of Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir after violating a clearly demarcated Line of Control (LoC). The Army units deployed along the LoC were caught completely unawares as were senior commanders thus reflecting poorly on the calibre of a section of the Army’s leadership at that time. Military assessments warning of such a possibility offered by some officers prior to the detection of the intrusion were ignored. The intelligence gathering, management and coordination system similarly came in for question. The Military Intelligence, which is authorised to conduct intelligence gathering operations up to a limited distance into foreign territory, failed to detect the intrusions. The RAW reported a Pakistani military build up but fell short of detecting two extra battalions that had been inducted into the area by the Pakistanis. The Intelligence Bureau’s information was more specific. But then, as the Kargil Committee Report brings out, there was little coordination among the intelligence agencies.

What is crucial is that both the Army and those responsible for running the country’s higher defence management apparatus should have learnt appropriate lessons from the Kargil War. Some progress has been made at effecting better coordination such as creating a Defence Intelligence Agency, empowering the National Security Council and creating the post of National Security Advisor. The government has also created a weapon-specific Strategic Forces Command and the island-specific Andaman and Nicobar Command. However, the government is yet to create a Chief of Defence Staff or tri-service Theatre Commands to effect better coordination between the three services. Indeed the lessons of the Kargil war are yet to be fully translated into action.

[putnanja]

The batalik battle

...
The point of contention, for many years, remained on who should to be credited for operations in the sector that resulted in the killing of over 300 enemy personnel. While most records and written accounts of the war have given the credit to Brigadier Devinder Singh, the commander of the 70 Infantry Brigade, the official war history till now also credited another officer, Brigadier Ashok Duggal for managing a part of the operations in the sector. Interestingly, Duggal’s name was added only by Lt Gen Kishan Pal in his post-war report.
...
...
Brigadier Devinder Singh, an officer with an outstanding record who had topped most courses during his years at the academy, was commanding the 70 Brigade. But with all his battalions deployed for counter-insurgency operations in the Valley, it was designated as the Corps reserve. When reports of intrusions at Kargil came in, Brig Singh asked for battalions to be deployed under his command as he feared that more than 600 fighters had intruded into Batalik.


However, Lt Gen Pal kept downplaying reports of intrusions in Batalik and contended that only 45 militants had come into the area. Operations in Batalik began in May 1999 after Brig Singh was given the 1 Bihar battalion to carry out operations. By that time, reports pointed to intrusions by the troops of the 5 Northern Light Infantry of the Pakistani Army in the unheld area. Regular Pakistani Army soldiers had moved as much as 8-10 km in the sector and occupied several abandoned bunkers and created defences. Pakistani troops, aided by militants, had trekked for several days in deep snow to occupy four major ridge lines that dominated the area.
...
...
Even though Singh was able to mesh together the string of different units he was given, his inter-personal relations with Lt Gen Pal remained strained. One of the reasons, old timers recall, was the initial period during which Singh insisted that there was heavy intrusion in Batalik while Pal played it down repeatedly.


Things came to a showdown when the then Army chief General V P Malik visited Batalik in June and was told by Singh that more than 600 regular Army fighters were present. However, Pal countered this by saying that only 45 militants were holding the heights.
...
..
Throughout the period, Brig Singh led his troops from the front. While he came under some criticism for unnecessary bravado, his leadership skill was appreciated by the Army chief. In his book on the war, General Malik says Singh was injured while directing operations at a forward position, but he ‘merely went in for some first aid and carried on with his duties till the end’.


Assaults were carried out on the Stangba-Khalubar ridge line by troops of the 70 Brigade that were supplemented with the entry of the 22 Grenadiers and the 1/11 Gorkha rifles. The first Pakistani prisoner of war, Naik Inayat Ali, was captured on the Khalubar ridge line after troops from the 12 JAK Light Infantry captured Pt 4812.
...
...
While Brig Singh was commanding the troops, in the post-war records, Lt Gen Pal noted that the Brig Duggal — the deputy GOC of 3 Div — was in charge of the sector.


The tribunal has now set the record straight by ruling that Singh was in charge of the entire sector throughout and has asked the Army to ‘moderate’ the paragraph in the official history that mentions Brig Duggal as the man in charge.


Insiders say that one of the fallouts of the strained relations between Singh and his superior was that Lt Gen Pal tried to play down Singh’s role in the victory at Batalik. As the tribunal has noted, Dugal was, in fact, temporarily deployed for 72 hours to assist and coordinate operations in the area.
...
...
In his book, General Malik notes that he gave a ‘well deserved pat’ to Brig Singh along with a bottle of Scotch whisky, as a ‘small personal gesture of appreciation’ after the operations in Batalik virtually came to an end by July. This personal gesture and appreciation by the Army chief notwithstanding, in three years time, Singh had to file a statuary complaint after he realised that he would be overlooked for promotion as his annual report reviewed by Pal showed him in poor light. While most of the notings by Pal have been expunged by the Defence Ministry in past years, the fact remains that Singh was not only overlooked for promotion — he retired as a Brigadier even after leading his troops to victory in Batalik — but was also awarded only the Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM), a peacetime medal, instead of the Maha Vir Chakra, the second highest wartime gallantry award that he was recommended for.

[arnab]

Ghost unit spiced up Kargil lies
- Fictitious formation to belittle officer

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100528/j ... 496456.jsp

The military tribunal’s judgment for a rewriting of the army’s official history of the Kargil war has thrown up questions on generalship during the conflict, especially after it was found that a general established a fictitious formation — a ghost brigade — up front to devalue the role of Brigadier Devinder Singh.

More questions are likely to be thrown up when the petition of Brigadier Surinder Singh, who commanded the 121 Kargil-based brigade and was sacked in the middle of the hostilities, is heard. This afternoon, Brigadier Surinder Singh told The Telegraph that his tell-all book would be published shortly. He has detailed his communications with his superiors and with higher headquarters in his account

In his reports on the war, Devinder Singh’s (15) corps commander, Lt Gen. (also retired) Kishan Pal, stated categorically that “success in operations, particularly in the last 10-12 days came about by superimposing Brigadier Ashok Duggal, deputy general officer commanding 3 Infantry Division, who positioned himself at Ganasok (up front) and helped in conduct of operations”.

Pal’s doctored “battle performance report” on Devinder Singh was approved by the then Northern Army commander, Lt Gen. H.M. Khanna, without any questioning, and passed on to the Military Operations Directorate in Army Headquarters then headed by Lt Gen. N.C. Vij who reported to the then chief, Gen. Ved Prakash Malik.

[manjgu]

a) what is the composition of the Tribunal

b) LT Gen K Pal was not called before the AFT to testify , which is quite funny IMHO

c) usually there is no direct corelation between promotions and gallantry awards, more so at higher ranks...

[arnab]

a) what is the composition of the Tribunal

b) LT Gen K Pal was not called before the AFT to testify , which is quite funny IMHO

c) usually there is no direct corelation between promotions and gallantry awards, more so at higher ranks...

From the Telegraph link:

But the documents presented during the proceedings that finally convinced the tribunal, comprising former Supreme Court judge A.K. Mathur and former vice-chief of the army Lt Gen. Milan Naidu, show just how generals pulled rank to mask their own failures and pass the buck on field commanders like Devinder Singh.

[ramana]

The Kargil War is getting politicized.

[chackojoseph]

Chacko, Why do you have to point out to me?

You beat me to it. I wanted to point that out to you and rohitvats.

Oh, its because you and rohitvats interacted with me on the prior posts. So I thought you would be interested.

[anirban_aim]

http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/ ... epage=true

Less than a week after an Army patrol in Kargil vanished into thin air, top Jammu and Kashmir officials met to discuss the looming crisis on the Line of Control.

The senior-most military commander in the region, XV Corps Commander Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal, reassured them that there was nothing to discuss.

Minutes of the meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on May 24, 1999 show he insisted that there were “no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes.”

Major’s complaint

Key among those cases is a complaint filed by Major Manish Bhatnagar. In January 1999, troops commanded by him on the Siachen glacier began coming under heavy fire.

Major Bhatnagar concluded that Pakistani soldiers had occupied Point 5770-metres, threatening Indian positions lower down the glacier as well as logistical supply lines to the southern Siachen glacier.

He says his immediate superior, Colonel A.K. Shrivastava, responded to the threat by asking him to stop sending written reports.

Long journey

On June 10, 1999, Major Bhatnagar was ordered to make a three-day journey to the headquarters of the Batalik-based 70 Infantry Brigade along with four junior officers and 80 men from the 5 Para Regiment. They were ordered to immediately assault Point 5203-metres. Major Bhatnagar demurred, saying the men were worn out by the journey and inadequately equipped.

In November 1999, the military authorities prosecuted Major Bhatnagar for cowardice — an allegation the officer says was intended to discredit his early warning on the Point 5770 intrusion. This charge was later dropped and replaced with the offence of having disobeyed orders from superiors.

No orders given

But during the court-martial, Commander Devinder Singh said he gave Major Bhatnagar no orders in the first place. Finally, the latter was convicted of having “improperly stated” the condition of his troops.

The Bhatnagar case has thrown up credible evidence that the XV Corps leadership was willing to risk the lives of under-prepared troops to cover up its operational failures.

In a January 30, 1999 letter, 16 Grenadiers’ commanding officer Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi informed his superiors of a war game that suggested that enemy action could make several Indian posts unsustainable. He called for stationing of troops on Point 5165 metres, Point 4660 metres and Pariyon ka Talab.

Later, the 16 Grenadiers’ commander was accused of having vacated a key position known as Bajrang Post. His superior, 3 Division Commander V.S. Budhwar, was found to have, in fact, ordered that troops from the post be pulled out — but was never punished.

The full consequences of the XV Corps’ misreading of the intrusion have never been investigated.

KP & his buddies of yore sure aren't just fading away.....

[atreya]

But during the court-martial, Commander Devinder Singh said he gave Major Bhatnagar no orders in the first place. Finally, the latter was convicted of having “improperly stated” the condition of his troops.

Is this the same Brig Devinder Singh earlier referred to? Who is currently involved in the case against the Lt. Gen?
And what rank is "Commander" in the IA?

[anirban_aim]

But during the court-martial, Commander Devinder Singh said he gave Major Bhatnagar no orders in the first place. Finally, the latter was convicted of having “improperly stated” the condition of his troops.

Is this the same Brig Devinder Singh earlier referred to? Who is currently involved in the case against the Lt. Gen?
And what rank is "Commander" in the IA?

Yes he is the one.

Commander refers to the commander of the brigade in question. I've only the quoted to what my mind was most relevant portion. It will be more clear to you if you read the complete article, I believe

[manjgu]

well now we have the benefit of hindsight... and I am sure not holding the can for Gen KP but

a) firstly, Gen Kp should have been called to defend his position before the tribunal.. this is looking like a ex parte ruling.. i think Gen KP and Brig DS shuld have been allowed to cross examine each other.

b) i am really curious to know based on what facts/intelligence did Brig DS conclude that there were 600 intruders or Gen KP conclude there were 45. this point is being brought up in a big way on the TV...

c) war by its very nature is dynamic in nature with each hour unfolds new facts/situations .... Gen Kp was saying on the TV that his assessments were based on intelligence available with him and assessments changed as more intelligence was made available.

[atreya]

Commander refers to the commander of the brigade in question. I've only the quoted to what my mind was most relevant portion. It will be more clear to you if you read the complete article, I believe

Yes, I read the complete article. My point, when it is written in uppercase, it seems like it is the "rank" of the person. Anyways, its simply nitpicking on my part, when we have far more important issues to discuss.

It seems the Brigadier will be visiting the AFS for many long years. First, he has to get his name cleared in the matter of changing war history records against Lt Gen K Pal, where he has been made the scapegoat by the latter. Ironically, he has been accused of a similar charge by Major Bhatnagar, i.e. covering up his shortcomings by blaming the Major! In the 2nd case, it look like the Brigadier himself is the alleged villain of the piece!

[rohitvats]

Major’s complaint

Key among those cases is a complaint filed by Major Manish Bhatnagar. In January 1999, troops commanded by him on the Siachen glacier began coming under heavy fire.

Major Bhatnagar concluded that Pakistani soldiers had occupied Point 5770-metres, threatening Indian positions lower down the glacier as well as logistical supply lines to the southern Siachen glacier.

He says his immediate superior, Colonel A.K. Shrivastava, responded to the threat by asking him to stop sending written reports.

Long journey

On June 10, 1999, Major Bhatnagar was ordered to make a three-day journey to the headquarters of the Batalik-based 70 Infantry Brigade along with four junior officers and 80 men from the 5 Para Regiment. They were ordered to immediately assault Point 5203-metres. Major Bhatnagar demurred, saying the men were worn out by the journey and inadequately equipped.

In November 1999, the military authorities prosecuted Major Bhatnagar for cowardice — an allegation the officer says was intended to discredit his early warning on the Point 5770 intrusion. This charge was later dropped and replaced with the offence of having disobeyed orders from superiors.

No orders given

But during the court-martial, Commander Devinder Singh said he gave Major Bhatnagar no orders in the first place. Finally, the latter was convicted of having “improperly stated” the condition of his troops.

The Bhatnagar case has thrown up credible evidence that the XV Corps leadership was willing to risk the lives of under-prepared troops to cover up its operational failures.

Major Bhatnagar's company was involved in the initial assault on Point 5203 (detailed in my earlier post) which had failed. Another thing: IIRC, this officer had written directly to COAS General Malik on the non-preparedness of the troops and lack of proper equipment/clothing. While he bypasses the chain of command, again, iirc, General Malik took a sympathetic view and asked for his compalaints/issues to be addressed and asked that he should not be "touched".

[anirban_aim]

well now we have the benefit of hindsight... and I am sure not holding the can for Gen KP but

a) firstly, Gen Kp should have been called to defend his position before the tribunal.. this is looking like a ex parte ruling.. i think Gen KP and Brig DS shuld have been allowed to cross examine each other.

Well, this is just the begining. I'm intrested to know how the IA as an institution reacts to this. Will they appeal in the HC.

[rohitvats]

The problem with Indian media and especially with Praveen Swami is that they tend to quote things in bits and pieces.

India had first said that Point 5203 was captured by troops under the command of Captain Amod Kalia on June 10, 1999. Major Bhatnagar was asked to commence an attack on the peak five days after victory was claimed. Point 5203 was eventually captured by troops led by Captain S.S. Bisht on June 19.

For example, the part above - IIRC (And I'll check this up again), Captain AMod Kalia did manage to take the position but was beaten back in counter-attack and martyred. For those who don't know, Amod Kalia and Saurabh Kalia were fist cousins - talk of scarifice.

Major Bhatnagar's company was part of three pronged assault on 7-8 June which had come under very heavy fire and failed. So, Major Bhatnagar was part of 70 Brigade during the assault on Point 5203 and Brigadier Devinder Singh was his Commander.

[manjgu]

[/quote]

Major Bhatnagar's company was involved in the initial assault on Point 5203 (detailed in my earlier post) which had failed. Another thing: IIRC, this officer had written directly to COAS General Malik on the non-preparedness of the troops and lack of proper equipment/clothing. While he bypasses the chain of command, again, iirc, General Malik took a sympathetic view and asked for his compalaints/issues to be addressed and asked that he should not be "touched".[/quote]


rohit. i dont think it was this officer.. i will try to dig out the name.. i think it was a Lt Col...

[Philip]

Why did Kargil take place?

Firstly,it was a massive shock to the GOI of the time,which had invested heavily in ABV's "Bus diplomacy",which was reciprocated well by Nawaz Sharif.That Gen.Bandicoot he infamous "Commando" and the Paki military establishment (mainly the Paki Army which has always called the shots over the other two services) had their own agenda and would carry out such a bold gambit ws never contepmplated by the GOI and Indian military establishment.So when first reports started coming in of large infiltration they were viewed indifferently.The political establishment was taken completely by surprise,also due to the fact that this was not picked up by the entiore intelligence establishment.Last night on one of the TV channels,it was revealed that ARC told the top brass that 6 Paki helos had landed on Indian soil and this was a complete shock to Uncle George and Co.He on the advice/info given to him by the IA made his infamous 48 hrs. statement.

Secondly,the COAS was in Europe and perhaps was not briefed properly by his HQ about the seriousness of it all.We do not know what communications he had with Delhi too.Senior officers on the ground who ignored their juniors' information initially,when realising the gravity of the situ then tried to pass the buck and the responsibility for being caught napping onto the shoulders of others,which is why we are seeing the washing of dirty linen now in public.Another warning at that time from many sources in the valley,told the IA that they had info that the "Taliban was coming to Kargil", was also ignored.

In retrospect,the civilian,military and intel. establishments were caught napping,not expecting such a diabolic Paki move when peace talks were on and a new initiative was in full swing.WE underestimated the venality and evil minds of the Paki army who wanted to destroy any peace between India and Pak.We are today in the same situ where a weak trusting PM is tilting dangerously in Pak's direction ignoring the very visible security threat.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

Another warning at that time from many sources in the valley,told the IA that they had info that the "Taliban was coming to Kargil", was also ignored.

<SNIP>

Philip, on the contrary, from what I gathered from reading of Captain Amrinder Singh's Book - A Ride To Far, this was precisely the intention which PA wanted to get across to the IA and intelligence agencies - albiet it talks about terrorist intrusion. The plan had been concieved and executed with single minded focus on secrecy.

[ramana]

Philip good comments but less emphasis on venality etc. Such terms obscure own short comings.

Yes it was a strategic surprise and what boggles the mind is that lessons were not learned based on the lack of reform after that.

For me I am still not convinced the TSP came up with this on their own after the nuke tests and LKA's provicative remarks after the tests. Let me clairify. The plan was theirs, but the implementation is not their own.

Some day it will also come out.

[manjgu]

rohitvats.. the name of officer who sent the letter to COAS was Lt COl Amul Asthana and not Maj Manish..

[Luxtor]

Philip good comments but less emphasis on venality etc. Such terms obscure own short comings.

Yes it was a strategic surprise and what boggles the mind is that lessons were not learned based on the lack of reform after that.

For me I am still not convinced the TSP came up with this on their own after the nuke tests and LKA's provicative remarks after the tests. Let me clairify. The plan was theirs, but the implementation is not their own.

Some day it will also come out.

Ramanaji, are you implying that Uncle or Chicoms put TSP up to Kragil? If it was Uncle then right after Clinton's "help" in talking some sense into the Pakis, didn't the Indo-U.S. relationship really start to blossom? Kargil could have been a setup by the Americans with unwitting Pakis. You know the old saying .."pinch the baby and make it cry and then rock the cradle" -saying "...there, there baby, don't cry"

[manjgu]

ramana.. you must be kidding..this is beating some of the wildest conspiracy theories.. pray what leads yu to believe this?? and evidence??

[chetak]

ramana.. you must be kidding..this is beating some of the wildest conspiracy theories.. pray what leads yu to believe this?? and evidence??

ramana ji,

Your thoughts would be most enlightening.


Pray do tell.

[rohitvats]

rohitvats.. the name of officer who sent the letter to COAS was Lt COl Amul Asthana and not Maj Manish..

thank you for the information. I'll edit my post.

MODS: I cannot edit my post above where I have quoted Major Bhatnagar as officer who qrote to COAS General Malik. Request you to kindly remove that section of post.

[svinayak]

ramana.. you must be kidding..this is beating some of the wildest conspiracy theories.. pray what leads yu to believe this?? and evidence??

This was discussed many times. Ramanaji talks about a panchatantra story - an Old man with a young wife and a thief coming to the house at the night making the wife come back to the husband.

[ramana]

start looking at time line from the POKII tests till Kargil Intrusion as detected. Draw three columns one for TSP, one for India and the other for world. Ad another for comments/remarks/inferences.

[Airavat]

Strategic loss

Lt Gen (retd) Kishen Pal, who headed the Srinagar-based 15 Corps during the 1999 conflict, told television channel NDTV in an interview broadcast on Sunday that he had never been convinced that India had won. “We did gain some tactical victories, we regained back the territories we lost, (but) we lost 587 precious lives,” he said.“I consider this loss of war because whatever we gained from the war has not been consolidated, either politically or diplomatically, it has not been consolidated militarily.”

Has this been his viewpoint for the last 11 years? In this interview a few months after the victory in Kargil, Lt. Gen Pal said:

There is no doubt that our younger officers have done a great job. They led the attack from the front. But has anyone paused to ask why the morale is so high in 15 Corps, and why the soldiers are bubbling with enthusiasm? On Tiger Hill, my commanding officers, some of whom are quite old, were right there with the boys. Ravinder Nath, Joshi, Chakravarty, Bajwa, these officers climbed up the mountains with my boys. This was generalship unparalleled in the history of warfare. Talk to people who know what this kind of warfare is all about.

The amount of fan mail I am getting from retired Generals is an eye opener. My officers did an outstanding job in strategy and planning, in giving direction to the operations. Look at the innovative use of the Bofors gun. It is unknown in military history for 155-millimetre guns to have been used for direct firing at a 12 km range. Who thought of this? What I will say is that this effort by some journalists to drive a wedge between junior and senior officers is misplaced. Why were the youngsters putting their life on the line? Because they knew that they were working to the best plans. Those plans succeeded.