Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/arti ... south-asia
Beijing Sees Window of Opportunity in South Asia
Iain Mills | 22 Jun 2010
World Politics Review

Xi has visited Bangladesh, Laos, New Zealand and Australia, with a separate visit to Myanmar promised in the near future.
[...]
China overtook India as Bangladesh's largest trading partner last year, and Dhaka was the first stop on Xi's itinerary. There, the Chinese delegation finalized a series of infrastructure, defense and trade deals, including components of a road, rail and port network that will give China direct access to the Bay of Bengal. Alongside the recent agreement to redevelop North Korea's Rajin port, which allows Chinese access to the Sea of Japan for the first time in more than 100 years, Beijing has substantially reduced its logistical dependence on a small number of Indian Ocean shipping lanes (.pdf) -- long seen as a vulnerability by Beijing's strategists.

China's interest in Bangladesh and Myanmar is also heavily influenced by a desire to secure its southwestern border, and an effort to control water and other resources in southern Tibet. Economic ties with the two states also help create strategic buffers with India, and the most eye-catching deal announced last week -- plans for China to launch two Bangladeshi telecommunications satellites -- will have been duly noted in New Delhi.

Xi's second stop was Laos, a small neighboring state that serves several strategic functions for China. The exploitation of Laos' own resources is becoming economically viable for Chinese companies. The country also occupies a key position in China's trade routes with Southeast Asia, particularly in terms of access to the Mekong River. The retreat of traditional investors in Southeast Asia, above all South Korea and Japan, due to the financial crisis has been exacerbated by Vietnam's ongoing currency devaluation and political instability in Thailand. China seems well-positioned to take up this slack, and is becoming increasingly economically embedded in the region.

The next leg on Xi's tour, New Zealand (NZ), meets Beijing's needs for coping with another major domestic priority. NZ has one of the most productive agriculture sectors in the world, and food security is an issue of huge concern for China, as it struggles to support a growing population on farmland that is decreasing in size and quality.
[...]
Xi's last stop was Australia, where an enlarged Chinese delegation discussed areas of cooperation, such as infrastructure, resource exploitation (including the proposed Australian mining "super tax"), and energizing the recently resumed discussions for an Australia-China FTA. As evidence of China's attempts to increase its international "soft power," Xi was keen to stress "people-to-people" ties. The two countries signed $8.8 billion of economic deals, which will result in a greater presence for Chinese telecoms and mining companies in Australia, the acquisition by China of significant energy and mineral resources, and yet another port-access deal in Oakajee, Western Australia.

Last year's Rio Tinto corruption trial does not seem to have had a lasting impact on either governmental or business relations. Beijing is said to be pleased with the non-confrontational way Canberra handled the episode, and even before the trial began, Rio was negotiating a huge deal in West Africa with Chinese metals conglomerate Chinalco. China is already Australia's largest trading partner, and the mutual benefits of expanding this relationship are clear to both sides.

The results of Xi's tour yield benefits for China, as well as genuine economic opportunities for partner nations, and suggest the strengthening of new patterns of interaction throughout South Asia and the Asia-Pacific. China's steady accrual of strategic advantages is the result of a clear policy agenda and reflects a growing sophistication in Beijing's diplomatic and economic missions. Xi's agenda reads almost like a nation-state version of a survival checklist: secure territorial integrity; secure food, water and other natural resources; secure routes of access; seek both to cooperate with and hedge against powerful neighbor.
[...]
Evidence suggests China's expanding regional influence is creating wide-ranging benefits, from its controversial but seemingly decisive intervention to stabilize Sri Lanka -- a move primarily motivated by maritime interests -- to the new economic possibilities it brings to the table. South Asia is a key strategic arena for Beijing due to its diversity and richness of resources as well as its vital geographical function in China's trade and security concerns, and the Chinese are in for the long haul.

Moreover, with India failing to outline a comprehensive response and U.S. strategy complicated by its presence in Afghanistan and questions over its credibility in the region, when Beijing looks south, it must surely see a window of opportunity.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

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http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/re ... -3134.html

Here is an interesting attempt at "revision" and quite useful to look at strategy again:
The latest, if muted, storm in the military’s tea cup has been the destruction of documents relating to India’s 1971 victory. Apparently, Eastern Command made a search for the documents in order to interact with erstwhile Mukti Bahini fighters as part of a forthcoming observance of the event. It turned out that the documents in question had been destroyed on orders. This was confirmed by Lt Gen Jacob, architect of the famous victory, recalling that this was done before he took over as the Eastern Army commander soon after the war. Promptly, it surfaced that the records of the great naval action – the sinking of the Pakistani naval submarine, PNS Ghazi – were also missing.
So far this article is not doing much : but he has placed this "order for destruction" at the very beginning to insinuate that India had serious things to hide from "gemocidic angle".
It is now widely known that the decision to go to war was taken sometime in mid April of that year, after the extreme brutality of the crack down on Bengalis in East Pakistan the previous month. Late Field Marshal Manekshaw recounted how he had stood up to his political masters insisting on postponing the date to a more opportune time later in the year for which his army would be better prepared. (It is perhaps his retelling of this ‘legend’ that led to India’s political elite inexplicably keeping away from his last rites.) The interim gave India ample scope for interfering in East Pakistan, by supporting the Mukti Bahini.

While state terrorism that occurred in East Pakistan is inexcusable, it bears mention that in the Third World context of state weaknesses, dealing with foreign interference is usually done through greater violence than is otherwise the case. Therefore, India’s earlier role in sponsoring irregulars and later in conducting operations alongside them prior to the outbreak of war contributed in some measure to the brutality of the Pakistani state and its army. There is also a question mark in history on the hijacking of and blowing up of the ‘Ganga’ Air India flight in Lahore. This enabled India to terminate over-flights between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan as early as February 1971, accentuating its problems of access and heightening its security dilemma. Therefore, to an extent the final figures of three million dead and ten million refugees can also be attributed to India’s strategy. It is no wonder that the records held with the Army are missing.
This gets even better in the following para:
The costs of India’s strategy are easy to discern. It could have been anticipated that Pakistan’s paranoia would heighten due to the Indian angle to the crisis. Was it perhaps that Pakistan’s despicable behaviour provided India the casus belli? Was the strategy to provoke just such a response? At the UN, India initially alluded to the humanitarian consequences of Pakistani action as the casus belli, swiftly its UN officials retracted and attributed India’s action to self-defence instead; brought on, incidentally, by Pakistani attacks after a fortnight of Indian ground force presence in East Pakistan.

Where this gets most interesting is the toying with the idea of alternatives to the 1971 territorial issues :
K Subrahmanyam, doyen of India’s strategic community, won his spurs then by making a case for dividing Pakistan. He records insisting with YB Chavan that India also take the war to West Pakistan to dictate the agenda of peace. In the event that India’s aims were limited to taking some territory in the East and being defensive in the West would Subrahmanyam’s case have led to a better outcome? The USS Enterprise was enroute to the Bay of Bengal leaving India with enough time to revert troops from the West to East. Operational level ingenuity resulted in the stunning victory. However, factoring in the entirely predictable human cost preceding it and that continues to rack the subcontinent today, makes it much less so.

The criticism today is that the gains to the east were not exploited adequately at Shimla to force Bhutto’s weak hand. The usual argument is that holding onto prisoners would have been a useful pressure point. This is ignorance of the Third Geneva Convention which requires the return of prisoners at the earliest. In the event India chose to return even the 150 prisoners pointed out by Bangladesh as war criminals. Perhaps returning them, after getting Bangladesh to acquiesce, would have closed the chapter. War crime trials would no doubt have brought out the Indian angle to the internal crisis.
This again is an interesting aspect : political control over the military is a standard modern wisdom for most democracies. What is the need to highlight this for India again in a 2010 article? Has the military shown any signs of not accepting such control?
Lastly, the telling lesson of 1971 is that continuing political control over the military is required, even over action seemingly in the military domain. War aims formulated in Calcutta by Eastern Command’s Chief of Staff keeping Dhaka as the center of gravity were not those of Delhi, as elaborated by the General Jacob himself in his surrender at Dhaka. In today’s nuclear environment –a consequence of political inattention then– such a situation cannot be allowed to replicate.
What the strategic aspect of '71 issue brings up again and is releveant for the future is again the territorial question. To a certain extent, we won a short term victory and a spectacular one at that but in return we created one more nation where Islamists can hide and grow under cover of nationalism [The Muslim percentage of BD population has been steadily growing at the cost of Hindus primarily]. This also provides independent bases for China, various terror outfits trageting India, and India forced to remain vulnerable because of lack of access to the sea from NE becuase the Chittagong corridor does not belong to India.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

I have had some recent communications about what was and is going on in Baraeli. There appears to be an intensification of a territorial war between the Barelvis and the Deobandis over mosques and attached properties. Apparently there are mosques now under control of Barelvis which put up signs forbidding Deobandis+Ahle Hadis+Kaffirs from entering. The Deobandis have been growing in following and taking over Barelvi mosques. The Baraeli riots actually started off apparently over exactly such a Barelvi-Deobandi fight, but all three of Cong+BSP+SP are trying to buy Barelvi Raza's support. The whole district is estimated by the unofficial source to have almost 37-38 percent Muslims and mostly Barelvis. Baraeli town itself apparently has 40 or > percent.

Lucknow based or Baraeli based BRFites, can you give any confirmation or otherwise?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Pranav »

x-post from Pakistan failure thread:
All Kayani's Men
by Anatol Lieven

Anatol Lieven, a senior editor at The National Interest, is a professor in the War Studies Department of King's College London and a senior fellow of the New America Foundation in Washington, DC. He is author of America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2004). His next book, Pakistan: A Hard Country, is to be published in 2011.


There is an understanding in Washington that while short-term calculations demand some kind of success in Afghanistan, in the longer run, Pakistan, with its vastly greater size, huge army, nuclear weapons and large diaspora, is a much more important country, and a much greater threat should it in fact succumb to its inner demons. The collapse of Pakistan would so vastly increase the power of Islamist extremism as to constitute a strategic defeat in the "war on terror."...

The Pakistani military is crucial to preventing such a disaster because it is the only state institution that works as it is officially meant to. This means, however, that it also repeatedly does something that it is not meant to-namely, overthrow what in Pakistan is called "democracy" and seize control of the government. The military has therefore been seen as extremely bad for Pakistan's progress, at least if that progress is to be defined in standard Western terms.

Yet, it has also always been true that without a strong military, Pakistan would probably have long since disintegrated. That is truer than ever today, as the country faces the powerful insurgency of the Pakistani Taliban and their allies. That threat makes the unity and discipline of the army of paramount importance to Pakistan and the world-all the more so because the deep dislike of U.S. strategy among the vast majority of Pakistanis has made even the limited alliance between the Pakistani military and the United States extremely unpopular in general society and among many soldiers. Those soldiers' superiors fully understand the importance of this alliance to Pakistan and the disastrous consequences for the country if it were to collapse.

The Pakistani army is a highly disciplined and professional institution, and the soldiers will continue to obey their generals' orders. Given their basic feelings, however, it would be unwise to push the infantrymen too far. One way of doing this would be to further extend the U.S. drone campaign by expanding it from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to Baluchistan. Much more disastrous would be any resumption of U.S. ground raids into Pakistani territory, such as occurred briefly in the summer of 2008.


AS THE military has become more egalitarian, the less-secular have filled its ranks. This social change in the officer corps over the decades has caused many in the West to fear that the army is becoming "Islamized," leading to the danger that the institution as a whole might support Islamist revolution, particularly as the civilian government falters. More dangerously, there might be a mutiny by Islamist junior officers against the high command. These dangers do exist, but in my view, the absolutely key point is that only a direct attack on Pakistan by the United States could bring them to fruition.

It is obviously true that as the officer corps becomes lower-middle class, so its members become less Westernized and more religious-after all, the vast majority of Pakistan's population is conservative Muslim. However, it is made up of many different kinds of orthodox Muslim, and this is also true of the officer corps.


... AMERICAN OPERATIONS in South Asia, however, are threatening to upset this fragile balance between Islam and nationalism in the Pakistani military. The army's members can hardly avoid sharing the broader population's bitter hostility to U.S. policy. To judge by retired and serving officers, this includes the genuine conviction that either the Bush administration or Israel was responsible for 9/11. Inevitably therefore, there was deep opposition throughout the army after 2001 to American pressure to crack down on the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani sympathizers. "We are being ordered to launch a Pakistani civil war for the sake of America," an officer told me in 2002. "Why on earth should we? Why should we commit suicide for you?"...


For in 2007-2008, the battle was beginning to cause serious problems of morale. The most dangerous single thing I heard during my visits to Pakistan in those years was that soldiers' families in villages in the NWFP and the Potwar region of the Punjab were finding it increasingly difficult to find high-status brides for their sons serving in the military because of the growing popular feeling that "the army is the slave of the Americans" and "the soldiers are killing fellow Muslims on America's orders."



... Nonetheless, if the Pakistani Taliban are increasingly unpopular, that does not make the United States any more well liked; and if Washington ever put Pakistani soldiers in a position where they felt that honor and patriotism required them to fight America, many would be willing to do so.

And we have seen this willingness before. In August and September 2008, U.S. forces entered Pakistan's tribal areas on two occasions in order to raid suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda bases. During the second incursion, Pakistani soldiers fired in the air to turn the Americans back. On September 19, 2008, General Kayani flew to meet U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, and, in the words of a senior Pakistani general, "gave him the toughest possible warning about what would happen if this were repeated."

Pakistani officers from captain to lieutenant general have told me that the entry of U.S. ground forces into Pakistan in pursuit of the Taliban and al-Qaeda is an incredibly dangerous scenario, as it would put both Pakistan-U.S. relations and the unity of the army at risk. As one retired general explained, drone attacks on Pakistani territory, though humiliating for the ordinary officers and soldiers, are not the critical issue. What would create a military overthrow takes more:

U.S. ground forces inside Pakistan are a different matter, because the soldiers can do something about them. They can fight. And if they don't fight, they will feel utterly humiliated, before their wives, mothers, children. It would be a matter of honor, which as you know is a tremendous thing in our society. These men have sworn an oath to defend Pakistani soil. So they would fight. And if the generals told them not to fight, many of them would mutiny, starting with the Frontier Corps.

The discontent of sections of India's Muslim minority (increased by ghastly incidents like the massacres of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, and encouraged by the Hindu nationalist state government) gives ample possibilities for recruitment; the sheer size of India, coupled with the incompetence of the Indian security forces, give ample targets of opportunity; and the desire to provoke an Indian attack on Pakistan gives ample motive. ...

... if the United States were perceived to back India in such a war, anti-American feelings and extremist recruitment in Pakistan would soar to new heights.

http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/sho ... e_id=18304

This article shows calculations of the western elites with respect to Pakistan. They realize that this Frankenstein has to be supported and kept oriented against India otherwise it will turn on its creators as it goes down.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Anti-American feelings can be important for America only if the Pakis are too important or too scary for American survival. Now where is the honour of the American military in that case? People like the above commentator should be pointed out to the reading public as abject appeasers - who imply that Americans should be afraid of Pakis and do Paki bidding!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by surinder »

I am not totally sure where to put this news item, but this will have long-term impact:

Sikhs are building mosques in Punjab.

http://www.sikhchic.com/partition/punja ... in_sikhdom
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

It is a long term attempt to revive Khalistani projections, even if not all the "builders" are aware of the underlying aim. It is a kind of trying to build a "base" that spans both sides of the border, and create the fundamentals of bolstering the claim of a separate identity. It would be important to know the Ulema or Mashaiks who are assisting and will be involved in managing the mosques. I can analyze that info to give a clearer outline of the possible tactical outline behind the move.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Sanku »

Another of your prediction comes true eh Bji. I guess we will have to wait till Talibization of Pakjab is complete and they start making overt calls to faith across borders to see which of our preconditions comes true.

In any case we are due for blood bath and churn, in about 20-30 years? Whats your time line?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

The Talebjabis do not have that long a time (20-30 years). China can get too powerful by that time to become less of a condescending "provider". West could get too weak and irrelevant to milk sympathies. Russia could be growling more and more. At the moment they only have the Afghan drugs money and the "jazyia" extracted from western presence in AFPAK. Once west withdraws this line of supply will dry up. They need Indian resources since Paki occupied western India is not economically sustainable - one more reason the Pakjabis need a finger in the "drugs" pie and hence control/presence/share in southern AFG.

I would hazard an earlier timeline of the next 10 years by which the underlying structure of "weakness" will emerge.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Sanku »

Great, that gives me hope, in 10 years Indians would have still not moved away too much from the current position that I know of (in terms of appeasement with a short sighted goal of merely material values and loss of societal rawness) for me to worry.

I would have worried far more if they had waited till 20-30 years. In 10 years they would still find the core of India "hard" and will kick in the revival, because if the current trend goes uninhibited, we would see a complete dissolution in 20-30 years.

Goody-good.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Sanku ji,
numerical strength is not always proportional to effective strength. Determined minorities can carry the day if they have prepared and are decisive in times of confusion. I am not that confident of the automatic conversion of the numerical strength, roughly 60-65% into effective "barriers".
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by satyam »

brihaspati wrote:Sanku ji,
numerical strength is not always proportional to effective strength. Determined minorities can carry the day if they have prepared and are decisive in times of confusion. I am not that confident of the automatic conversion of the numerical strength, roughly 60-65% into effective "barriers".
That is not 60-65% but 6 for every 1.

Do you think christianity will also try a war on India?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

The 6:1 ratio comes from official figures. Where it matters- regions of effective contiguous Islamist occupied regions- it is more 3:2. The Christians as a whole are not in a position to try a war. But obviously there will be elements which will try to use the cover to destabilize by supporting whoever is available to do so locally. there have been alleged accusations of such connections throughout South India, Orissa, WB and Assam and NE states. significantly there is a lack of "christian" overt condemnation of jihadi violence in India.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by satyam »

brihaspati wrote:The 6:1 ratio comes from official figures. Where it matters- regions of effective contiguous Islamist occupied regions- it is more 3:2. The Christians as a whole are not in a position to try a war. But obviously there will be elements which will try to use the cover to destabilize by supporting whoever is available to do so locally. there have been alleged accusations of such connections throughout South India, Orissa, WB and Assam and NE states. significantly there is a lack of "christian" overt condemnation of jihadi violence in India.
Which are those regions having 3:2 ? I think you are little bit paranoid. I don't think minority will try anything garbage till 2040. They will be overwhelmed. Moreover i think there is a more chance of Saudi arabia being wiped out than Mughal India formed again.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Abhi_G »

^^^
Who will wipe out Saudi?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Parts of UP for example, Bihar and WB. It is better to be paranoid than not even be able to say sorry. As for minority or majority, they have always started off as minority and gained majority or been able to carve out a territory for themselves where they become the absolute majoirity and clear off what ever remains of the "other" over a few generations.

We were not talking of a Mughalistan becoming a reality or not. But the attempts and consequences of trying to make that a reality. In the 1930's most "conscious" Indians laughed away the possibility of a Pakistan. Hence they did not take the appropriate steps to reduce the possibility of such a -stan. They believed that the "minorities" could not behave so - having been brainwashed by a century of Brit reconstruction of Indian history, and leading intellects like that of JLN - who erased out all the fundamental driving factors behind Islamist violence.

They made the same blunder as some of us are claiming today - that there is no inherent lasting factor in the "minority" that will periodically promote separatism and Ghazwas. JLN type ideologues have separated out the basics of the faith and abolved it of all responsibility and constructed all violence and separatism/barbarism on ethnicity - and that too of the non-Indian Central Asian variety. Therefore over generations of brainwashing, the "majority" turns to disbelief about the possibility of recurring attempts at genocidic clearing attempts preceded by elaborate psychological warfare to emasculate and lull the "majority" into sleep - since none of the factors claimed by the "ideologues" appear to exist. These are after all "Indian" and not Central Asian or "Turk", moreover their faith system has not any foundation for such "violence" and violent clearing of land for "territory".

The best we can expect is passivity towards Jihad and not an active resistance against such measures sponsored and sourced from outside. A section will join the Jihadis citing imagined atrocities or real ones - suppressing the retaliatory nature of such atrocities for their own earlier actions. This has been the history of every conflict situation wherever large contiguous Islamist populations have existed side by side with non-muslims. This is the history in ME, in BD, in Pakiland. There has never been any exception.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by satyam »

Abhi_G wrote:^^^
Who will wipe out Saudi?
Israel
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Abhi_G »

^^^
Good to hear that. But you must have given some thoughts on the build up scenario for that. Could you enlighten as to how that scenario comes into being? Maybe in the West Asia thread?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Sanku »

brihaspati wrote:Sanku ji,
numerical strength is not always proportional to effective strength. Determined minorities can carry the day if they have prepared and are decisive in times of confusion. I am not that confident of the automatic conversion of the numerical strength, roughly 60-65% into effective "barriers".
No I did not mean numerical strengths. I meant mental attitudes.

But yes, let us see.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by munna »

brihaspati wrote:It is a long term attempt to revive Khalistani projections, even if not all the "builders" are aware of the underlying aim. It is a kind of trying to build a "base" that spans both sides of the border, and create the fundamentals of bolstering the claim of a separate identity. It would be important to know the Ulema or Mashaiks who are assisting and will be involved in managing the mosques. I can analyze that info to give a clearer outline of the possible tactical outline behind the move.
Just a cautionary note!

The cited farticle is from Outlook a known PS rag that seeks to tom tom anything and everything in Indian from the angle of sekoolarism. The number of revived places or constructions is barely 200 and is indicative of the migration of Bihari labour to rural Punjab. These workers and labourers belong to two categories (a) seasonal (b) permanent. Uptil now there was little trend of the latter migrants in rural Punjab. But now the trend has formalized and solidified. Prior to 1980s all ROP-ers in Punjab had to hide their names and used to pledge their alegiances to certain borderline sects of Punjab in order to escape the wrath of society. However this trend has reversed in 1990s and 2000s whereby certain sections of antagonized Jat Sikhs started to hedge their bets. But make no mistake demographics of the locale tell you that 37% of Punjab is Hindu and 61% is Sikh and both these communities are vehment and remember things for a long long time. I am more concerned about something I mention below;

In my talks with a certain junior level dandawala I was shocked to know that wide section of a "certain" community are now openly espousing their lack of faith in the "system". The majority community on the other hand is too busy with economic pursuits so much so that entire situation resembles the NYSE/LSE or 1995-2007 era. Wide section of our population barring the ROP-ers are high on "kool aid" of some kind of manifest destiny of India. The whole myth of "India the next shooperpowaah" is so strong in the public psyche of believers that they are failing to observe the massive pitfalls ahead. Although the growth and development of nation should be a priority we also need to ensure that our governance systems should catch up with it and fast.

In fact the India of today represents in some ways the India under Rajiv. During those days India was increasing its international profile on issues like disarmament, we had about 4 consecutive years of 5-6% growth (unheard of stuff), quelled the disquiet in some NE states, were taking the fight to Khalistanis and enjoyed fair bit of conventional superiority over peeland. The INC had won the biggest ever majority for a single party in history of independent India and there was no challenger to the might of the great Kangress on the horizon.

Then, Rajiv over reached by engaging in things that would have been best handled by the bureaucrats and ministries concerned. To compensate for his lost friends and sagging image he was ill-advised to overturn the "Shah Bano" verdict. He realized his folly later and tried to open up the Ram Janmabhoomi gates and also initiated a debate on Uniform Civil Code (on record in Lok Sabha). It was cruel fate that took him away from his intended path. After that we had the tumultous Ram Janambhoomi movement that catapulted the representatives of Dharmic constituency to the seat of power first time after the demise of Maratha empire. This ascension to power led to migration and drain of dharmic forces from other parties to BJP and Shiv Sena. Thus INC and other parties were left with almost no representatives of such interests.

After the tie between BJP and INC in 2004 was broken by the Communists in favor of INC, the left-commie interests have come to dominate the Indian mainstream. A complex interplay of booming economy and pliable media has created the perfect Kool-Aid whereby all vestiges of opposition view points in the media discourse have been rendered non-sequitor. This is just like the statements "cycles have finally been tamed in world economy", "what imbalances?", "Greenspan is God!!" or "the end of risk in finance".

We all know where that decade long drama led us! India as of now is full of bubbling enthusiasm about its future and urban middle classes have come to believe in certain amount growth and propserity as their god given right. Any problem on that front may make them reconsider their decision to defect to INC from BJP in the mid-2000s. The battle for control of India lies in the Urban India if BJP wins Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore (done), Hyderabad, Kolkata and assorted tier-II cities in 2014 we have a fight at our hands.

The key here is to counter the media and destroy the Kool-Aid induced stupor! Rest will happen rather quickly.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RamaY »

Good one Munna-ji. But it looks like you contracted your initial point (it is only 200 mosques yaar) with the follow-on summary of events (we are failing to see upcoming pitfalls as we are submerged by the koolaid).

You might be right that this is nothing but ROP migration from heart-lands to Punjab. We know how these ROP sections behaved/are-behaving in the heart-land for the past 20-30 years and how they are exploited by center-left parties.

The media is getting louder and murkier day by day. We need to spin them on their head with respect to national interests....
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by munna »

RamaY wrote:Good one Munna-ji. But it looks like you contracted your initial point (it is only 200 mosques yaar) with the follow-on summary of events (we are failing to see upcoming pitfalls as we are submerged by the koolaid).
What I meant was that the threat lies very much within the country and it is we who are neglecting it! Pee-land or its talibunnies are short work any day, its just that our mechanisms in the core gangetic areas are backstabbing the security apparatus. The demographics and history of NW India is too entrenched to allow for pappi-jhappi in a realistic way.
You might be right that this is nothing but ROP migration from heart-lands to Punjab. We know how these ROP sections behaved/are-behaving in the heart-land for the past 20-30 years and how they are exploited by center-left parties
I am concerned with rising extremism in sections of our society as much as you. However I know that the lay of the land in Punjab, Himachal and Haryana makes it nearly impossible for any funny tactics such as in UP or Bihar. And track record of the region is not something to be taken lightly :wink:
The media is getting louder and murkier day by day. We need to spin them on their head with respect to national interests....
Actually the more they spin the better it is because the consequent fall from grace would be so violent and loud that a lot of the useful idiots will stand discredited forever! But counter media strategies need to be evolved in order to capture political power.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by svenkat »

"certain"
?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by surinder »

Munna and Brihaspati, good analysis.

As I mentioned, I am at a loss to explain this phenomena. When partition happened the Hindus/Sikhs of Punjab did somethign which was rather unique: they cleared the entire region of ROP. This was a retaliatory move, obviously, because they had opposed partition, but when the atrocities of Rawalpindi and Lahore were undertaken, they undertook their own retaliations.

In punjab the ROP had always faced a sort of cold disdain hidden under a sheath of indifference. ROP (as one of them mentions in the article) would not even ask for a place of worship, lest it spark of overt hostility. Many house helps in Punjab were conveniently named "Raju", "Ramesh", and not their ROP name. I remember reading a comment by Shahi Imaam of a Masjed in Amritsar, he would face questions pretty much routinely which said "if paakestaan has been created, why are you here?"

The problem is that while people's reaction has not changed, but something has changed. This masjid building is not a people driven local phenomena, it is too coordinated and has all the marking of blessings from higher ups. I think Sarpanch's, local MP's, Congress, SGPC, the Khalistanis are all in the game. By extension the Jamaat's and TSP also has penetrated by forming alliances and some quid-pro-quo deals. There is some official sanction and thought process behind it. It is true that thanks to Indira and Bhindarawale, Hindu-Sikh and GOI-Sikh relations are not healthy, but still at people-to-people level psyche has not changed to the extent it is suggested by the news item. This is the puzzling part.

Recently I went to a major central Punjab city and right smack in the center of the market is a new masjed. I was told that this was a masjid before partition and then after partiton when M's left for their paradise land, it was made into a Gurudwara. Recently it was given back to ROP and reverted. Why would the Sikhs abandon a good functioning Gurudwara? i walked by and saw some 5-10 Punjab Police guys (turbans, trimmed beards, pot bellies, machine guns in their laps) sitting at the entrance guarding it. Number of worshippers were few, if any. In India, if you have permanant security of this kind, something is fishy, really fishy.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Pranav »

surinder wrote: The problem is that while people's reaction has not changed, but something has changed. This masjid building is not a people driven local phenomena, it is too coordinated and has all the marking of blessings from higher ups. I think Sarpanch's, local MP's, Congress, SGPC, the Khalistanis are all in the game. By extension the Jamaat's and TSP also has penetrated by forming alliances and some quid-pro-quo deals. There is some official sanction and thought process behind it. It is true that thanks to Indira and Bhindarawale, Hindu-Sikh and GOI-Sikh relations are not healthy, but still at people-to-people level psyche has not changed to the extent it is suggested by the news item. This is the puzzling part.

.... Why would the Sikhs abandon a good functioning Gurudwara? i walked by and saw some 5-10 Punjab Police guys (turbans, trimmed beards, pot bellies, machine guns in their laps) sitting at the entrance guarding it. Number of worshippers were few, if any. In India, if you have permanant security of this kind, something is fishy, really fishy.
It could well be coordinated from the top. On several regional language Doordarshan channels, they regularly show a televangelist program by some American organization called "Joyce Meyer Ministries". On what basis these people are given Doordarshan facilities I don't know.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Jarita »

^^^ Ambika Soni
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by satyam »

Jarita wrote:^^^ Ambika Soni
Why ?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Prem »

x-post

Growing up In Punjab till i did my graddduation ( any doubt ) i had not had the luck and blessing of seeing, meeting any ROPER and hard time to make mental distinction between Roper and Poaker when settled in Delhi for shortwhile . And i was not alone going through the similar confusion: Our parental given gyan regarding 47 helped to burn through the veil of maya. WKK are queered exceptions and not the norm. If any spark ever start and spread Gyan- Parkash in North , 600% probability it will be Sriganeshed from this region. There are numerous special places in every nook and corner to hang and store the "reason" for shortwhile while dealing with "unreasoned" ones. Apprehensions ok, caution ok, wait and watch ok but fear naa as crossing lines trials will end tragically as GOI will loose control for sure .
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by munna »

The problem is that while people's reaction has not changed, but something has changed. This masjid building is not a people driven local phenomena, it is too coordinated and has all the marking of blessings from higher ups. I think Sarpanch's, local MP's, Congress, SGPC, the Khalistanis are all in the game. By extension the Jamaat's and TSP also has penetrated by forming alliances and some quid-pro-quo deals. There is some official sanction and thought process behind it. It is true that thanks to Indira and Bhindarawale, Hindu-Sikh and GOI-Sikh relations are not healthy, but still at people-to-people level psyche has not changed to the extent it is suggested by the news item. This is the puzzling part.
The Hindu-Sikh relations have strengthened but there are fears within the jat Sikh community that political power has been slipping out of their hands due to demographic changes borne out of out-migration of Punjabi youth and the in-migration from other states. A major example of such a change was evident in 2007 elections whererby Dera Sacha Sauda was able to fight the Akali Dal to a standstill in Malwa (the traditional Jat Sikh belt and politically most important region of Punjab, it has been a traditional Akali bastion) on account of its support base in backward castes. The Dera inflicted such a himiliating defeat on Akalis in certain constituencies that there was some major soul searching within the SGPC and SAD. As a result we saw some opportunistic elements entering the fray, who wanted to re-ignite the fires of communalism by attacking all sorts of deras and babas. The real trouble lies in the profound demographic changes undergoing in Punjab not deras and their following.

The Jat Sikh representatives need to come to terms with the rise of backwards caste sikhs and Hindus in Punjabi polity.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by surinder »

The other setback to Jat Sikhs was during the ramdasi Baba killed in Austria. The resulting violence in Jullendher and capitualtion by Akali dal leadership was palpable. The problem is that Jat Sikhs do not want their domination in Punjab & SGPC to go, nor do they want to form alliances. They lack the imagination and vision to create a viable future, but also lack the resignation to let more capable leadership come up. The pull from jat ROP'ers from Paki land is too enticing when faced with impossible dreams.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by munna »

surinder wrote:They lack the imagination and vision to create a viable future, but also lack the resignation to let more capable leadership come up. The pull from jat ROP'ers from Paki land is too enticing when faced with impossible dreams.
Exactly! Recently a ROP-er from UP had the temerity to suggest that only Jat Sikhs are real "Punjabi Puttars" rest are all SDREs and unworthy of being called Punjabis. He tried to establish some "Jat-Jat bhai bhai and rest all go to Hawaii" type of BS. A few facts and stats about the land brought him back to ground but the incident did set me thinking.

Truth be told I do feel concerned, not about the people and their prowess in dishing it back in equal measure but the leadership...
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Prem »

Again, Kangress alwyas wanted to weaken the Sikhs by creating divisions and BJP from Jan Sangh dins always opposed it and stood with Akalis. Indian future scenarios gets sold fuel lift if Kangres Allah ko Piyare ho jayee. these buggers mentally live in 40s or 50s and never grew up.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Sanku »

Well the problem is that Congress continues due to TINA factor, is there a well established robust POV, clearly elucidated and well spread which could take its place?

BJP cant figure out whether it wants be congress by other name or follow Dr Shyama Prasad Mukhrjee.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

I guess I will post the same way in all the three threads where this question has come up.

First I do not think of numerical majority as an automatic pillar of strength. That conversion into strength requires planning and preparation. Prepare for what? Now that requires a vision about the future in regards to territory, community, a national ideology, faith systems allowed and tolerated. I think even that vision is not clear within the majority, and hence is not reflected as social pressure on the political process.

Second, I also think that determined minorities can carry the day if they are focused enough, prepared and had planned enough, and most importantly are decisive enough. With these qualities even a minority can subjugate the majority or win substantial advantages from them. This was how the Jihadis under Jinnah scored. If we go into the history and buildup of the Partition, there are the well-known steps - construction of victimhood at the hands of non-Muslims, attribution of loss of rule over non-Muslims to departure from the path of Jihad and "purity", alternate aggression and conciliatory approach to fool non-Muslims, exploit all channels of influence within the non-Muslim to carry out time-tested methods of "dhimma", secretly prepare for militant and violent action and Jihad [in the the case of ML, this was achieved by using demobilized BIA Muslim soldiers], and when appropriate take audacious, and surprise attacks that practically wipes out resistance where it matters.

Third, even historically, the Sikhs and Hindus of Punjab could not prevent the Partition and loss of more territories and people to the Islamists than they could retain. This was because of unpreparedness, and perhaps even a disbelief of Islamists intent and allowing themselves to be duped by JLN and MKG propaganda. This factor is crucial - the incapacity to believe that Muslims living side by side, or having generations of friendly and humane interactions, could be capable of the most heinous atrocities - so unexpectedly, and suddenly. Moreover the incapacity to understand the mechanisms by which JLN or MKG type mentalities act as instruments of mass delusion in favour of Islamophile objectives.

Fourth, a plethora of identities among the potential resistance. The mutual distrust and attempt at holding "distinctions" to their fatal conclusion - Jat Sikhs against non-Jat Sikhs, [soon we will have Dalit Sikhs and Muslim Sikhs maybe even Christian Sikhs], Punjabis against Biharis or UPites, Hindus against Sikhs, alphabet-soup organizations from within the "Panth".

At least there should be recognition of the wisdom in MKG's words - that the Brits should go first, and what happens to Indians they will decide themselves. Similarly, the common enemy has to "leave" Indian political space. Until this is achieved, forget all other fights, forget the fatal tempting call to use the Jihadis as hedging bet in case your co-fighters prove unreliable after all. Once that objective is achieved - go fight to decide which one gets to be the most colourful peacock parading as the emperor.

All the above mutual distrust, jealousy, anxiety should be shelved until one goal is achieved - the complete destruction and dissolution of the entity called Pakistan now occupying Indian land to the west. Complete destruction of all the bases for regeneration of Jihad and Islamism so that the horrors that Jinnah unleashed would never again raise its head. Even the memory of that entity and its leaders and ideologues should be erased from all history. In Kashmir, one Sufi "peace" activist actually dug up even the foundation stones of a Hindu temple - to destroy all traces of "Qufr". The eventual outcome of that has been Pakistan.

Even greater thoroughness will be required. Think of it as the PunyaKarma - the first and foremost holy task. All fights shelved until the holy task is completed.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by surinder »

brihaspati wrote:This was how the Jihadis under Jinnah scored. If we go into the history and buildup of the Partition, there are the well-known steps - construction of victimhood at the hands of non-Muslims, attribution of loss of rule over non-Muslims to departure from the path of Jihad and "purity", alternate aggression and conciliatory approach to fool non-Muslims, exploit all channels of influence within the non-Muslim to carry out time-tested methods of "dhimma", secretly prepare for militant and violent action and Jihad [in the the case of ML, this was achieved by using demobilized BIA Muslim soldiers], and when appropriate take audacious, and surprise attacks that practically wipes out resistance where it matters.

Very good one paragraph summary of the modus operandi used by Jinnah and ROP to creat TSP. This should go in the keeper thread.

This factor is crucial - the incapacity to believe that Muslims living side by side, or having generations of friendly and humane interactions, could be capable of the most heinous atrocities - so unexpectedly, and suddenly. Moreover the incapacity to understand the mechanisms by which JLN or MKG type mentalities act as instruments of mass delusion in favour of Islamophile objectives.
There seems to be an Indian trait, it seems to me, to always underestimate danger and be lulled into complacency too quickly. This complacency has resulted in not one, but multiple shocks at what those ROP'ers can do. Even after one thousand years of suffering at their hands, we still cannot fully and clearly articulate the threat and its dimensions. What JLN and MKG did was take this trait and add a "moral legitimacy" to it. They gave morphine to an already half-asleep man. What that practically means is that whenever you have a person or group who will stand up and warn people, he/she will be blamed to be communal. After the next round of "unexpected" massacres, we will then proclaim him to be a visionary. The cycle continues. I am not sure we can ever trule wake up in time.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Manny »

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/2 ... l#comments

VATICAN CITY — Pope Benedict XVI is creating a new Vatican office to fight secularization and "re-evangelize" the West – a tacit acknowledgment that his attempts to reinvigorate Christianity in Europe haven't succeeded and need a new boost.



My comment: So the Christians do not want secularism in India eh? Pope says Secularism is bad!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by chaanakya »

The concept of secularism that Pope is talking about is different from what is commonly understood in India and made out to be virtue.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Carl_T »

Manny wrote:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/2 ... l#comments

VATICAN CITY — Pope Benedict XVI is creating a new Vatican office to fight secularization and "re-evangelize" the West – a tacit acknowledgment that his attempts to reinvigorate Christianity in Europe haven't succeeded and need a new boost.



My comment: So the Christians do not want secularism in India eh? Pope says Secularism is bad!

Read up on the history of secularism. Who is it directed against?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

European secularism was essentially about factional infighting within the then prevailing totalitarianism - that by the Church during the middle and late middle ages. The church was formed as a compromise between the Roman empire and its disgruntled elite. So Constantine gained the input by intellectual and other elite towards imperial stability, and the disgruntled in the form of bishops and "Christians" gained vicarious power.

This foundational fight has remained within Christian Church from the beginning. The "empire" tries to impose a common set of beliefs which is however not indigenous and has lots of elements derived from a completely different socio-geo-political root. Therefore various region and subgroup components of the empire cannot adjust easily, and they form "reinterpretations" of the dogma as an ideological reflection of the underlying political struggle. Germans chose Arianism [or even if Arianism was by accident they insisted on maintaining the distinction in contrast to the "Roman"] against Italian Roman. Italian Roman Church fought against Greek-Byzantine Church.

Many try to see in Renaissance-Reformation a break with the Church. Not really. This was again primarily a factional fight started by regional powers against other European powers trying to use the mantle of the Church-empire to centralize power and resources into their own hands. The Northern rim - Germany, Netherlands, and their extensions England were being marginalized by the Mediterraneans - Spain and France - who had greater power over the Papacy. This was reflected in the schism led by Luther and the whole Protestant ring of fire.

The so-called "scienctific revolution" and "secularism" arose out of this struggle [okay there were other happy coincidences that helped - like the fall of Moorish Spain, and Constantinople - displacing and disseminating a lot of knowledge previously prohibited] as a tool to discredit the pre-existing ideological faction in power - the then Catholic Church. You can see, that in essentials the basic attitudes towards society and humanity in fact did not change much in its philosophical basis - there are wonderful nuggets of "racial conceptualization" or underlying superiority of the "faith" itself to all others - in the "rebels", including Luther. Even the "enlightened", liberal, Protestant Anglicans in the early stage show extreme prejudice racially and otherwise, and found nothing wrong in the most brutal forms of slave trade.

Communism or Marxism was the latest in the long line of this intra-"Church" conflict. It rose primarily within the frontier conflict zone of Catholic-Protestantism in Germany and England. When the Protestant factionalism was well-established, those of the elite/intellectuals who felt marginalized even within that world-view would be forced to look for a new "interpretation" - something even more radical that gives them the political inheritance distinct from Catholics or protestants.

But the drive remains the same : its is all about justifying imperialism in newer forms, creating distinctions in identities that give higher status to being European, and thereby ensuring or justifying one-way or net flow of global resources back into Europe.

The irony is that with each factional deviation, the message gets both diluted as well as found to be more attractive and adaptable by non-European disgruntled elite in non-European societies. Ultimately therefore even more deviations happen according to the needs of the imperial vision of regional elite in other parts of teh globe. That was how Soviet Communism evolved and from which Maoism under the label of Sinification of Marxism deviated out further.

The Pope should have recognized the ideological vacuum that has developed in Europe, when Europe constantly needs a reinvention of its basic racial/identity based claims towards global domination and imperialist extraction of resources. There has been too much deviation, and too many factional reinterpretations. In the process the ideology has lost its original purpose and function - that of unification to support renewed imperialism. Moreover, the danger is that alternative frameworks for imperialism - sharing similar claims of origins and memes - like Islamism - can fill up the vacuum. Where does it leave the factiosn of the pre-existing Churches?

I would not be surprised if there are attempts at convergence between the various "factions".

In India the reflection of this is going to be different. Here it is about competing with other factions for the "harvesting" of souls - all the more important because India shows signs of economic resurgence. Imperialist ideologies will be increasingly active and hostile towards the indigenous - because they need to weaken the indigenous to prepare for the next phase of imperialist revival.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Old news : but what is interesting is that this is being reported from a site primarily catering to the Turkish interests.
100 million more Indians now living in poverty
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=57297
India now has 100 million more people living below the poverty line than in 2004, according to official estimates released on Sunday.
Monday, 19 April 2010 13:58


India now has 100 million more people living below the poverty line than in 2004, according to official estimates released on Sunday.

The poverty rate has risen to 37.2 percent of the population from 27.5 percent in 2004, a change that will require the Congress-ruled government to spend more money on the poor. The new estimate comes weeks after Sonia Gandhi, head of the Congress party, asked the government to revise a Food Security Bill to include more women, children and destitutes.

"The Planning Commission has accepted the report on poverty figures," Abhijit Sen, a member of the Planning Commission told Reuters, referring to the new poverty estimate report submitted by a government panel last December. India now has 410 million people living below the U.N. estimated poverty line of $1.25 a day, 100 million more than was estimated earlier, officials said.

India calculates how much of its population is living below the poverty line by checking whether families can afford one square meal a day that meets minimum nutrition needs.
Now a 5% increase in poverty rate is a significant factor for wide strategic implication. Moreover it is being picked up and highlighted by all the "usual suspects".

Number crunchers here, can we have a map showing regional distribution and changes in poverty rate on a map?
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