Criticism from the West over what is seen as a lacklustre response to Islamic extremism continues to mount, especially from the U.S., which since the attacks of 9/11 has given Pakistan US$18 billion in civilian and military aid. Claims that the military’s all-powerful spy service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), is continuing to help the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan are further fuelling anger. Domestically, while the majority of Pakistanis struggle to survive, the military’s ostentation is fuelling discontent. As is its approach to Islamic extremists: why support some, and target others—ultimately with support from the hated U.S.—as the army did in the Swat Valley campaign in 2009? “There is a fundamental disconnect here,” says Aasim Sajjad, an assistant professor at the National Institute of Pakistan Studies in Islamabad. “The army claims to be the protectors of Islam in Pakistan but then they receive money from the U.S. to fight fellow Muslims.”
That it is providing aid to some Islamic extremists seems clear: in a damning report released by the London School of Economics (LSE) on June 13, the ISI is again accused of supporting the Afghan Taliban, something it has for years denied doing. Unlike past allegations, though, the LSE discussion paper, authored by Matt Waldman, an Afghanistan expert at Harvard University’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, specifically accuses the ISI of not only tacitly supporting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, but of being a major player in its execution, including helping Taliban commanders with planning and logistics as well as funnelling them arms and ammunition. “The ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the [Afghan Taliban] movement,” the paper bluntly states.
That support is, in part, intended to counter the increasing influence of Pakistan’s arch-rival, India, on the government in Kabul. But at home, the Pakistani military continues to target some Islamic groups, including Pakistan’s homegrown version of the Taliban in the country’s Tribal Areas. “They’ve used the religious card when it’s been convenient for them,” Sajjad says. “Now, they’re trying to create the illusion that there are good jihadis and bad jihadis. But the basic problem is the generals’ dependence on jihad ideology as a tool of foreign policy. That hasn’t changed.”
That none of this does anything to alleviate Pakistan’s deep-rooted social problems is something the militants have learned to capitalize on, and indeed use as a powerful recruiting tool. In a recent video message released by the Pakistani Taliban, its spokesman, Tariq Azim, referred to the “unholy army” and its wilful betrayal of Pakistan’s poor. Militants regularly point to government and military corruption as a basic reason for their insurgency. “The militants have caught on,” says one foreign aid worker, requesting anonymity for fear of an army backlash. “Their arguments strike a chord with the poor and disenfranchised. To be honest, they sound like Che Guevara railing against the American-backed elites in Cuba. They’re revolutionary and it’s just too bad that they are the only ones speaking out against the injustices entrenched in the Pakistani system.”
Hopefully our ******* singh and other CON party led Clueless get some clues on how to counter this RAPE army. Once US leaves, the PAki garbage with the help of China is coming back to old tricks of sending jihadis into Kashmir, Mumbai and India in general. The only way to keep peace in our country is to keep the ISI and army busy in their own backyard.
You are being cautioned. I don't know if you have any warnings yet. If yes, this will be added to that - JE Menon.