Airavat wrote:
Not at all. The Muslim sultanates in India drew their manpower from three sources:
1) Foreign immigrants (vilayatza).
2) Foreign settlers and their many descendants.
3) Local converts (Malik Kafur, Sultans of Gujarat, Ahmadnagar etc).
Expats and converts were a minor fraction of society, otherwise India today won’t be 90+% Hindu and less than 10% Muslim. If conversion was so high in those days to replenish manpower, then significant percentage of Indian population should have been Muslim. I don’t recollect a plague or genocide on Muslims that suddenly drove their percentage low in modern times. For that matter, even if we add the population of Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1947, the Muslims were still a low percentage of the population.
Airavat wrote:Secondly there was always a conflict among these clans for establishing or growing their separate kingdoms. In the Marwar region the Rathods fought the Bhatis, Parihars, Chauhans, Mohils, at the same time as they battled the Muslim governors of Jalor, Mandor, Nagaur, and Ajmer.
You mention Rajput attrition during Jauhar and inter-tribe warfare while you ignore that intra-tribe and inter-tribe warfare was much more in Turks and Mongols.
Airavat wrote:Now if manpower was all it took to win battles shouldn't it have happened in other parts of India as well? The Punjab had plenty of local warlike clans, not yet converted to Islam, yet the Ghaznavid sultanate was established and existed for nearly 200 years. Likewise the warlike clans in Haryana and UP rebelled and fought many times against the Delhi Sultans but could not destroy the sultanate. Similarly there were plenty of Rajput clans in Gujarat and Malwa, and yet these sultanates were established. In North India it was only in Rajasthan that the tide of Islam was held and hurled back in the 14th and 15th centuries, and neither numbers not attrition explains this victory.
This is a very good point, Airavat.
My understanding is that there is a difference in having a population and MOBILIZING it. By mobilizing, I mean MOTIVATING, TRAINING, ARMING across the spectrum of society so that a critical mass like nuclear fusion is achieved to SUSTAIN RESISTANCE across generations. Even after the INITIAL LEADER(S) is no longer available.
The areas that had long standing Muslim Sultanates, like Bengal had sparks like Protapaditya. He was a proud Kshatriya who along with his small band of other Kshatriyas fought and lost. He never bothered to MOBILIZE the masses.
However, the Rajputs were able to mobilize the general population across tribes (Sisodia against Mughal, Rathore against Sher Shah) et al, so that despite losses, a new army was ready in the next generation.
Same for Marathas, they mobilized all sections of society. Even after Sambhaji was captured, the fight continued. Even after generals died, fight continued.
Sikhs - even after Guru Gobind SIngh & sons died, fight continued. Because the populace was mobilized.
In the last two cases, even traditionally lower sections of society like Mahars and Mazhabis were mobilized, when Guru Gobind Singh embraced them. Even today, the Mahar Regiment and Sikh Light Infantry are an important part of Indian Army.
tsarkar - Off Topic wrote:On this note, when contributions of all sections of society to freedom are documented, it extremely angers me when Peter says Jats were peasants and kings of the domain on horses did all the fighting.
Hence Indians always numbered more than the Turks, maybe not during initial invasion. Like Napoleon or Hitler’s forces initially outnumbered the Russians but could not replenish attrition faster than the Russians could mobilize. The states that threw off foreign rule were those who MOBILIZED their masses.
Airavat wrote:What do we remember of Samudragupta's campaigns and battles? NOTHING. Neither tactics, nor any other details. And yet we have no hesitation in regarding him as a great all-conquering ruler simply from all his victories. Likewise I would certainly credit the Rajputs of the 14th century for all their victories over the Turks, and not put it down to attrition or courage. If you credit the Turks for horse-archery and maneuver warfare, their repeated defeats in Rajasthan could not have come without the Rajputs employing similar or superior tactics.
I had an earlier discussion with Rahul on Vikramaditya/Samudragupta and my point of view was very clear that mythical descriptions should not be used to glorify.
As a humble learner of the art of warfare, I would desist from glorifying either Rajputs or Samudragupta for tactics of which there are NO RECORDS, but SPECULATED to be present because they have won, and the victory could be possibly for many other reasons.
Whether Khanua or Haldighati or Dharmat or Maldeo’s wars against Sher Shah or engagement against Mahadaji Shinde, I find ZERO examples of any notable tactics exhibited by Rajputs.
I am sure if notable tactics were used in the unrecorded wars they won, then WHY WERENT THOSE TACTICS USED in any of these recorded battled? Why did Sanga not use the notable tactics used by Kumbha or Hammir during their wars against the Turks? Or Pratap at Haldighati?
The lesson that comes out of this discussion is that while weapons or tactics may help win battles, they may not win strategic campaigns once other factors kick into play. Like Napoleon and Germans in Russia.
Rahul M wrote:
chanakya on war, arthashastra.
I think it is erroneous to conclude that Indians had no idea of battle reserves, flanking or other battle maneuvers and fought like a herd of rampaging rhinos while these ideas have been applied by even the most primitive tribes elsewhere. even the stupidest general would understand that an enemy is vulnerable when attacked from more than one side.
Rahul – Arthashastra is like a manual that says what a ruler COULD or SHOULD do. It is not a record confirming that the practices were ACTUALLY followed. Like there are police manuals on marksmanship training and we know actual police performance vs Kasab & Co, or the naxals.
Hence examples to be quoted are not manuals but records of actual performance.
What usually happened was lack of long periods of warfare dulled studies in warfare, and in the heat of a fast emerging threat from the frontier, these lessons were never recollected.
Simple example - patrolling is basic infantry tactic, and very well documented, however the CRPF battalion at Dantewara did not follow them.