Managing Pakistan's failure

[shiv]

Cross post because it is more relevant here

Weeping /arguing with USA about Pakistan is of no use since they do not have much control. As a declining power they can maximum bribe Pakis to protect their Times Square. The real powers with influence--on current terror state-- are KSA and China and both will be more affected by Taliban govt in Pakistan than India.
India should not fall in to the trap of-- Talibun more dangerous than current Pak rulers. That is the main blackmail point of the current terror State. Talibun may focus on domestic issues of veiling and law and order and corruption and masjids. India should not unnecessarily get worked up that all Paki wimmen are getting veiled.That is all
R vaidya

Well said Vaidyagaru. Many years ago I had felt that a fundamentalist Islamic government should come to power in Pakistan and thought that India would be able to deal with such a government. The reason for my saying that was based on thoughts that can be controversial - but since most on here already know my view I will state what I had felt boldly.

Islam at its core is not exclusively about killing kafirs - although, as a kafir that is the part you will find out about best. There are aspects to Islam that made it popular - for whatever reason - there is no use arguing and saying that its popularity can be removed by argument. That popularity of Islam comes from the humdrum day-to day aspects of islam - the strict, even draconian rules that create stability and constancy in society. The argument that this stifles creativity and freedom is a pointless one in a society that is full of strife, militancy and death. In such a society the constancy of islam serves as a calm oasis towards which people will move. And the converse is also true (and utilised well by Islamists).

That means if you take a society and rip it apart by disorder mayhem and murder, you can them bring in calm by introducing Islam and saying that only Islam will serve as a calm oasis that shelters everyone equally. So you find both methods working. Unhappy disordered societies have people ripe for conversion or reaffirmation of faith, and societies that are deliberately disordered can then be converted as a route for settling them.

In Pakistan we have a pre existing Muslim society where disorder has come from mismanagement, greed and a military that has garnered all the wealth. Such a society is ripe for getting Islamized because Islamists are not just talking about fighting India (like the military) but they also talk education, food for the students and social service.

What the Pakistani army has done over the years is to leverage Islam on one side to fight kafirs (India, USSR) while pretending to be moderate and wholehearted supporters of the "free world" - so that the US was suckered into believing that it had a great ally. The US too has consistently shown its weakness by grabbing the support of all sorts of dubious entities that has backfired on the US. It is the US support of the Pakistani army that keeps the moderate appearance of the Pakistani army alive. Without US support the Pakistani army has no reason to go in any direction but Islamic. The Pakistani army, after having grabbed most resources is not in a position to improve Abdul Paki lives and can do nothing about the fact that that job is being done by Islamists.

I see the US role as extremely negative in Pakistan. They are supporting an anti-India Pakistani army that pretends to be moderate. The anti-India part is not a problem for the US as long as the Pakistan army as an "ally" and fighting the US's current foes. In the meantime th human condition of Pakistanis is getting worse and the society is gradually getting Islamised. As long as the military is in power and subservient to the US, this is not a problem for either the military or the US. The US pays the Pakistan military to use its people to fight someone. Fighting India is one option that they have. The US only wants the Paki military to keep Islamists off the US's back.

The US plan is bound to fail because islamists will take over as society gets more and more screwed up. So, as I see it, an ultimate defeat for the US and victory for the Islamists in Pakistan is inevitable. The real problem will be what the US does to delay or prevent this.

And here is where there is real danger to India - i.e in what the US and its pseudo allies in the Pakistani army are doing. The Paki army is milking the Americans and arming themselves to the teeth promising to keep the Islamists at bay, while the US looks the other way with regard to Paki army actions against India. But strife and mayhem in Pakistan are partly because the people are so screwed up and partly because of US policies that have "used" the Abdul Paki people. The Islamists in Pakistan are gradually getting support of the Paki people in this chaos. And the Paki people are being perfectly honest in hating the US.

A US exit from Pakistan is necessary, but such an exit in my view will be the first step in the fall of the US as a superpower. Superpowers do not fall without a fight and they can make it very difficult for India as they grab and manipulate to retain their power over the Pakistan army.

I feel that an Islamist takeover of Pakistan is inevitable. Whether that will be a Taliban style government or a democratic Islamic government I cannot say.

The other big questions to my mind are:

1) What will the relationship of the Islamist government be with the US?
2) What will the relationship of the Islamist government be with India?

I have included the US and put it first because the US is a major make or break player in Pakistan. The US, for all its buster about Islamism does not really care as long as a government is friendly and compliant. An Islamist Pakistani government in Pakistan is likely to be anti-US in the Iran mould because it appears to me that the Paki people and Islamists are anti-US. The Paki army too is covertly anti US, but knows which side its bread is buttered. For this reason the US will fight tooth and nail to keep the pro-US sentiment in the Paki army happy and do everything in its power to stop and anti US Islamist government from coming to power in Pakistan. To see the effect of this we will have to wait for the next Paki elections if at all they are held.

But one thing is certain. If an Islamist government takes over, it is likely that the US will get the boot, or the US will be given strict conditions for staying involved - i.e to provide support against India. This is already happening covertly. It could become open for all to see if an Islamist government comes to power. The US will be asked to choose between Pakistan and India. What the US does in such a situation could be crucial to future India-Pakistan relaitiosn with an Islamist government.

There is a small possibility that an Iran style Islamist government in Pakistan could kick out the US altogether. But one thing is certain if that happens - Pakistan cannot survive without US support and oppose India at the same time. If the US is kicked out, Pakistan will have to mend fences with India. Even tarrel than mountain fliend will not be able to support the whole of Pakistan any more than the US.

So the answer to the question "What sort of relationship will and Islamist Paki government have with India?" is dependent on how the US manages to leverage its influence. The US's support has been the most significant factor in the long term survival Pakistan's anti-India stance.

In the long term it is in India's interest to see the US kicked out of the region and Pakistan coming under India's economic influence. There is an outside possibility of that with an Islamist government, but no possibility of that with a nationalist Pakistan government.

JMT

[RajeshG]

foll is my list of inevitables

- islamization of TSP is a continuous process until islamic nirvana is achieved. without this process pakis cannot exist.
- india can never work with any flavor of pakis
- whether tough love or true love there will always be US-paki love

- added : nationalist paki is just a suited/booted/whiskey-drinking islamist paki

[svinayak]

foll is my list of inevitables

- islamization of TSP is a continuous process until islamic nirvana is achieved. without this process pakis cannot exist.
- india can never work with any flavor of pakis
- whether tough love or true love there will always be US-paki love

- added : nationalist paki is just a suited/booted/whiskey-drinking islamist paki

Also moderate paki is just a suited/booted/whiskey-drinking islamist paki

[ramana]

x-post...

The scenarios as depicted earlier and the responses from India wrt pakis can occur when both sides are sane.
IF pakis are sane they would have competed with India in non violent means-economy, improving living conditions of its people, jockeying for influence from nations etc etc.

But are pakis are insane and rabid animals. They have one point agenda of destruction of India even if they eat grass at the end of the day.

In effect India is using responses of a saner nation vs an insane rabid nation.
In this India will be affected more in the exchange short of new clear one.

The possibilities of attacks on India is increased with each calamity---
Likely scenario could be that the JuD and the ilk will get a good name in helping the distressed people. There is no civil authority to help people in calamities. PA will help to get a good name and continue its hold on people. They will give support to JuD for recruitment against India.

1) There is little economic activity.
2) Brain washing Abduls is more easy as the families have nothing to eat or live.
3) Food shelter and clothing will be provided to families in exchange for potential recruits to inflict maximum damage on India.

What India has suffered “by thousand cuts” pakis are enjoying with multiple IEDs, quakes floods etc all with “1000% interest” in the last few years.

The heat should be increased regarding the version of “the heat and frog” to reduce the time for boiling the frog.

Caution--Currently there is lull in terrorism across the borders save for stone pelting. Things can change soon.
---Vinaasha Kaale Viparitha Buddhi.

[shiv]

I want to try and explore the idea of how a Pakistani nuclear bomb in the hands of a so called "non state actor" might be leveraged by various sides - the users and the potential targets. But let me start with a related topic.

First I want to point out that the expression "non state actor" is itself a tool of deniability. It is as useful an expression for Pakistan and its 3.5 as "cross border" is for India.

"Non state" implies "It's not Pakistan. Its someone else. Criminals or djinns"
"Cross border" implies "From Pakistan". Could be the state. Could be non state. Could be djinns. But it's from Pakistan.

The second point I want to make is the word "rational". "Rational" can be a completely meaningless word. As I had pointed out elsewhere if, say the LeT wanted a nuclear bomb for the specific purpose of using it against an Indian target, its use might be called "rational" for the LeT and the LeT may be able to quote a long list of reasons why India should be nuked - which would be the "rationale" for such nuking. They would certainly have a fairly substantial following of people who agreed that they were rational. However, if they were (by some magic) to come under attack immediately after such a JDAM and a whole lot of their leaders and infrastructure eliminated in an Indian nuclear counter attack, then some people might argue that the LeT were irrational in thinking that they could escape and that the had lost everything in exchange for one serious but survivable blow against India.

But there is a third layer of rationality/irrationality here: Let me call it the Vikram Batra/Sandeep Unnikrishnan factor. Why keep attacking a terrorist camp or an enemy bunker when one is already seriously injured? The rationale is "If I am going down, I will take him down with me". Is this rational or irrational? Pakistan and sundry terrorist groups have shown this type of "rationality".

The important point here is that a nuclear weapon may not be used for world domination or victory, but merely as a tool of punishment as revenge for some earlier grievance in the full knowledge that one may be committing suicide by doing that. As I see it, many of the terrorist actions being carried out against India can be classified as rational or irrational depending on what aims are attributed to those acts.

1. If the aim is to overwhelm and dominate India as stated very often by Pakis and jihadis, then it is irrational because those terrorist acts are pinpricks on a national scale. They have not managed to, and will not bring India down.

2. If the aim is merely to take revenge and hurt Indians and gain some satisfaction out of being able to have a presence in Indian minds - then terrorism is perfectly rational.

3. If the aim of terrorism is to provoke war between India and Pakistan it is irrational because Pakistan will lose

4. But if the aim of terrorism by "non state actors" is to provoke war, threaten nuclear war and then halt the progress of a war to its logical conclusion, then terrorism can have the rational aims of dubbing India an aggressor state that is out to capture and subjugate Pakistan.

5. But if war is provoked and goes out of hand and goes nuclear and India happens to devastate Pakistan leaving none of the leaders alive or capable of ruling, then the terrorism that sparked war could be dubbed as irrational.

6. However if Pakistan emptied all its nukes on India causing widespread devastation in India even as Pakistan itself got destroyed we once again have rationality of the "If I am going down, I will take him down with me". type

The equation between India and Pakistan are a stepwise escalation where an act that is seemingly irrational, actually becomes rational from a different perspective further down the road to escalation. For each and every one of these steps India has to examine what its options are.

I have listed 6 scenarios above. 3 are rational for Pakistan. 3 are irrational. All 6 steps arise from the same single "root cause" - terrorism from Pakistan.

What should India's responses be if faced with each of these escalatory steps to ensure the best possible outcome for India?

[shiv]

I would like to go one step further with the above line of thought:

I have described 3 escalatory steps as planned by Pakistan - each of which has a rational angle and an irrational angle.

1) Terrorism being conducted to bring India down, punish Indians or provoke war
2) War provoked to be halted before defeat or escalated to nuclear war
3) Nuclear war threatening to devastate India badly at the cost of Pakistani national suicide

At each of these steps Pakistan can choose to be rational or irrational - but in the final step "rationality" would be mutual destruction.

In other words a "rational" Pakistan that seeks destruction of India would have to be willing to see itself destroyed. However suicidal behavior in which a national oligarchy allow the deaths of vast numbers of their own people is irrational in my dictionary, no matter how rational Pakistanis may be in wanting to commit suicide for the nuclear devastation of India. In other words what might seem like a rational way (to Pakistan) of guaranteeing destruction of vast areas of India in exchange for Pakistani nuclear suicide is irrational.

So what can India do faced with a set of chess moves like these?

Starting with the first: how should India respond to "Terrorism being conducted to bring India down, punish Indians or provoke war"?

If we sit back an take the punishment using the excuse that it is minor and that it will never bring India down, there is no limit to the terrorism that Pakistan can commit. Any moves that we can make against Pakistan (outside of war) would be avoiding tade, talks and concessions, asking for international pressure to be applied on Pakistan and covert ops in Pakistan.

I we want to make war against Pakistan we come face to face with the next escalatory steps: "War provoked to be halted before defeat or escalated to nuclear war".

Interestingly - Pakistan attempted direct war with India in an earlier era - up to 1971.

Pakistan's calculus in 1999 was that "mujahid" action on a demoralized India would achieve successes, but would not provoke military retaliation because of Pakistan's over nuclear threat, leading to India's capitulation. But when push came to shove - Pakistan chose denial of Paki army involvement rather than attempting to push this plan through and hold the heights by escalation. Like the 1965 conflict, the 1999 plan fizzled.

The terrorist acts from 1999 to 2008, including Kaluchak, IC 814, Parliament attack, multiple city blasts/attacks culminating with 26/11 and Feb 2010 German Bakery were never direct military assaults on India but fell in the category of "Terrorism being conducted to bring India down, punish Indians or provoke war"

In the aftermath of Kargil 1999, India attempted a standard military mobilization (Parakram) in 2001-2. While this led to a temporary lull from terrorism, the larger lesson was that terrorist acts could be conducted with impunity but quick "surgical" military options were not available to India. The time lag between a heinous terrorist act (such as the attack on parliament) and a military mobilization gave Pakistan the political space to deny that terrorism came from Pakistan and garner support against India.
In any case any hot war between India and Pakistan would be constrained by "War provoked to be halted before defeat or escalated to nuclear war".

So the only way to punish Pakistan militarily would be to do it quickly after a terorist attack, before it could its international political act together and terminate the military action long before any nuclear threat could be commissioned. Cold start was described by Dr. Subash Kapila as follows:
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpap ... er991.html

On another plane that is at the politico-strategic or politico-military level this new war doctrine seems to be aiming at the following:

* Cutting out long drawn out military mobilization running into weeks.

* The above results in loss of surprise at the strategic and military level.

* The above also gives time to Pakistan's external patrons like USA and China (The 3.5!!) to start exerting coercive pressures and mobilizing world opinion against India as witnessed in Operation Prakaram.

* Long mobilization time also gives the political leadership in India time to waver under pressure, and in the process deny Indian Army its due military victories.

* The new war doctrine would compel the political leadership to give political approval ab-initio and thereby free the Armed Forces to generate their full combat potential from the outset.

Cold Start Strategy is Aimed at Pakistan and is Offensive Oriented- The Pakistan Army, (not the Pakistani people) has a compulsive fixation for military adventurism against India, notwithstanding the Islamabad Accord January 2004.

India in the past has been hamstrung in cutting Pakistan to size due to a combination of United States pressures coming into play in the run-up to decisive military action and the hesitancy of India's political leadership. Military surprise was lost due to long mobilization times. The " Cold Start Strategy" can be said to be aimed militarily at Pakistan and is offensive-operations specific.

What this policy does is to aim to punish Pakistan militarily before it can build up a case to say how a terrorist attack on India was not sponsored by Pakistan and get the support of its 3.5 friends to pressurize India.

This leaves Pakistan with three choices:
a) To risk military punishment under cold start by more terrorism
b) To "challenge and test" Indian politicians readiness to initiate cold start once a terrorist attack has been pinned on Pakistan
c) To escalate the game further and bring nuclear war closer.

I will try and deal with the last point in the next post.

[RajeshG]

First of all I am not convinced if a military defeat is what is going to lead to the failure.

But since coldstart was mentioned I think the most important part of that paper to me has always been the "declaratory" part. Specifically Dr Kapila observes..

India has in declaratory tones enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold

and

India has declaratorily implied that in such offensive operations against Pakistan it will not cross the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it. Should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold the onus lies squarely on Pakistan.

The declaration IMO has to be specific if it has to preempt any "irrational" behavior. IOW there cannot be any implied declaration. There has to be explicit declaration. An implied declaration seems like a contradiction and leaves room for rational and irrational interpretations.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

This leaves Pakistan with three choices:
a) To risk military punishment under cold start by more terrorism
b) To "challenge and test" Indian politicians readiness to initiate cold start once a terrorist attack has been pinned on Pakistan
c) To escalate the game further and bring nuclear war closer.

I will try and deal with the last point in the next post.

Shiv, TSPA has initiated steps to counter the Cold Start Doctrine - in terms of raising new formations to ensure that ARN/ARS are not sucked in - and these formations can absorb/counter the CS Formations.

I can post the military calculus if it helps (I did post some of it in the past).

[RajeshA]

shiv ji,

Great that you have started these posts.

I think there is great scope for India between the 1st and 2nd steps of escalation.

The 3.5 Friends of Pakistan can be used by India to play a different game.

I refer back to my argument that I made when I started this thread.

Suppose there is a terrorist attack on India, and for a change, India retaliates with the obvious aim to put pressure on Pakistan to change its policy on terrorism.

Now this has been tried many times using different tactics, and it hasn't worked. Pakistan is not willing to dismantle its terrorist network. It is not even clear, whether considering the pressures on GHQ, whether that is at all possible. I refer to the case, that it is not easy to replace a militant's rifle with a plough.

So how to make it work?

The problem is that India does not have any pressure point with Pakistan, so all we do is send our pleas and dossiers, which is not going to work. In fact, it is Pakistan, that follows the policy of creating pressure points on India, e.g. the terrorism level in India, the social disturbance in Kashmir, cross-border terrorism, the firing on the LOC and the border, the help to Maoists, taking up the 'cause of Kashmir' at each and every venue, demanding support from its 3.5 friends on Kashmir, etc.

So how do we create a pressure point? My suggestion was to attack Pakistan after a terror attack on India and grab some land across the international border in Pakjab. Why Pakjab?

• If we do it in Kashmir, it would bring in the whole issue of Kashmir into the equation, and 'international community' may see Kashmir as a flash-point and demand a resolution of it. This is something we do not want right now and certainly not according to the terms which will be on the table then.
• If we do it in Sindh, then in fact we are bringing solidarity between Sindhis and Pakjabis. Again something we should not be too keen on.
• If we do it in Pakjab, only then would we get maximum attention from the power-brokers in Pakistan. Only Pakjabi land would accrue to us the maximum leverage.

The question is how do we control an escalation of this war. I don't think the Pakistani Army would really want to lose everything they and their families have. Except for some Pakistani Generals, who for some reason or another are feeling too depressed by either the troubles in their own families or by the state of Pakistan, assuming some have some such feelings, there would hardly be anybody in the upper echelons of power, who would want a total escalation. But in the heat of war, many pressures can arise, which can spin things out of control. So one has to be careful. So if the general feeling is that it is not desirable for Pakistan to escalate, then one still needs breaks on the other urge.

Some breaks would be

• Minimizing Potential for Panic - Should India try take down Pakistan's Air Force completely, or take down their radars, or attack their nukes, or disable their command & control, or cut down their communications, then I think, there is scope for panic among the ranks, and the chance for escalation increases.
• Maximizing Non-Existential Tactical Losses - Major losses, which register on tactical freedom, but hardly causes panic. Losing half the Pakistani Navy could be considered in this category. The Pakistani military has a somewhat step-childly attitude towards Pakistani Navy, AFAIK. If they lose half of their armada, the COAS will still be able to sleep. Secondly all fuel supplies can be blown up. Thirdly all roads, bridges, railroads, ports are fair game. Also taking down all power stations would create anxiety but not panic.
• Restricting the geographic reach of war - Major losses to the Pakistani Army around the area of Indian offensive. The Pakistani Army needs to be hit anyway, to give the impression that the Pakistani Army has registered substantial losses. However the mauling should not be done everywhere, to give the impression that the Indians want a localized win and not an all-out war.
• Minimizing Civilian Casualties - In case India attacks civilian centers like Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi, Hyderabad, or some other big population centers, then the chances increase that all the civilians are also sucked into the war. Attacks like these would cause many Pakistanis to conscript themselves with either the Army or with the Militants. This is something India can do without. Let the civilians feel the anxiety of living without electricity, especially in the evenings. It would have the necessary psychological impact, the anxiety, but no rage to push mango abduls to pick up the gun.
• Token Attacks on Terrorist Camps - Indian Attack on the some terrorist camp should not go beyond token. Any wide spread retaliations could cause collateral damage, civilian deaths, and it would be in any case difficult to attack many camps in populated areas. However this still needs to be done, to underline that India is after terrorists.
• Retaliate against all Military bases that attack - This includes all army, navy and air force bases. If this is done in reaction, then India establishes a certain behavior, which would be useful later for the deescalation.

This is a level of war, which has escalated into the conventional from the sub-conventional but has as yet not reached either a decisive outcome either at the conventional level nor has it pushed the Pakistanis to take the war to the non-conventional, the supra-conventional, the nuclear level.

At this point, the Pakistani Army still retains its strategic assets, the nukes. Also its Air Force is intact, and the Pakistani Army has only been mauled in one localized region, unless Pakistan opens a different front and makes progress there. The Pakistani Army can still control the country.

This is the moment when USA, one of the 3.5 friends butt in, and tells Pakistan, that Pakistan still has not lost everything, and USA could try to stay India's hands and ask her to cease hostilities, if Pakistan is also willing to opt for a cease-fire. Of course, the Pakistanis would have started getting on the phone with Americans from the starting itself, but the Americans should offer mediation, then when Pakistan has lost land to the Indians. USA may even try to give comfort to Pakis, that the Indians would probably return the land anyway in the future, so no need to fight.

Pakistanis would willingly take the offer. In the end, when hostilities stop, India would be in possession of a nice chunk of Pakjabi territory, with most Pakistanis from these territories pushed back.

Now this loss of territory would act as a lightening rod, perhaps even pushing the 'core' issue of Kashmir to a second place. At every venue, Pakistan would be crying hoarse, that India should return Pakistani Land.

To that India should say 'No', 'Not until Pakistan's terrorist network has been dismantled. This chunk of land would always rub like a stake in Pakistan's heart. The international community would see that India is using control of that chunk only to pressure Pakistan to deliver its terrorists, something the international community also wants. In any case, after Mumbai, it would be easy to make the blame on Pakistan stick.

USA involvement is critical in seeing to it, that any war between India and Pakistan does not escalate. USA should be there to ease Pakistani Army's anxiety and impress upon them

• that India's aims are simply to punish Pakistan in the aftermath of a terrorist attack,
• that Pakistan would not be carrying any lasting harm,
• that Pakistani Army may still be able to put up a brave face and tell Pakistanis that they won the war,
• that Pakistani Army should try to minimize its losses, especially strategic, and stop the war as soon as possible
• that USA would help Pakistan to reconstruct
• that USA would try and help Pakistan to recover lost ground and put pressure on India through the international community
• that Pakistan should not escalate the level of war, e.g. to a nuclear level

Should Pakistan agree to give up some terrorists for the land, let's say the first 20 on the list, India could give Pakistan a small piece of land back, perhaps with some fanfare even. This exchange could take place with Pakistan's civilian leadership. The rest of the confiscated land, India should keep and keep on pressurizing Pakistan to close down the whole terrorist network.

However it would be naive to think, Pakistan would really give up any terrorists. However there would be a lot of pressure on Pakistani Army from many sections to discontinue the policy of sponsoring terrorism in India as such a policy could lead to further war, and even more loss of territory and H&D. Too many losses could even destabilize the Pakistani Army & Pakistani State, something even the 3.5 friends may not want. However the pressure from 3.5 friends would not be any more on India but rather on Pakistan to behave.

With Pakistani Army having been forced to discontinue its terror policy towards India, India can proceed to develop and Pakistan can continue to stew in its own juices.

[KrishG]

Rajeshji, Pakistan at present is more divided than ever in it's short history. Ethnic divisions, divisions within Pakistani establishment are widening at a rapid pace and TSPA in itself would be worried over this widening gap. The two things that has united Pakistan since it's inception are Islam and Hate for India. The divisions within the different sects of Islam has become more and more prolific with Shia v/s Sunni, Deobandis v/s Barelvi and in a way has weakened the very ideology of Pakistan. Although hate for India is natural for Pakis and continues to be so, but somehow it is being sidelined.

It has previously been pointed out that a short conflict with India maybe what the TSPA itself wants as uniting factor for Pakistan. As has been discussed many times before why should India by going into any kind of direct conflict with Pakistan and let that sense of Anti-India hate come back to forefront and unite a crumbling country ?

[RajeshA]

KrishG ji,

I am aware of the common thinking here that letting Pakistan stew in its own juices and let it break up would be the right policy and India should not give Pakistan an excuse to unify against India. In fact I've always supported that view.

However there is a different dynamic also in the game. With more terror attacks in India, the TSPA and its affiliates generate support for it in Pakistan. If TSPA is not weakened and demoralized, then TSPA will just transform into a slightly different more Islamized India-hating gang, but still lord over the region of Pakistan, and would still be the keepers of their nukes. Pakistan breaking apart on its own, is as yet, simply a theory, even as I consider myself a strong proponent of this theory. But the storms that would be raging in the region, are hard to predict. It is hard to predict, whether India would be out of danger, or under a different danger.

India's security would not be established in our West by a magical wand. We will have to intervene, and the theory of gravity and entropy, should not become another excuse for us to do nothing when our loved ones are mauled down on the streets of India and elsewhere. The theory should not become the new excuse of the jingo for inaction. Does every shade of India's political opinion need a different theory for inaction?

Any consolidation of unity in the wake of a short and limited Indo-Pak War in the future would also be short lived (4-5 years). The problems in Pakistan are too big and cannot be covered up by some anti-India chanting. However a land grab in Pakjab would be like a wooden stake through Dracula's heart and would pain long and acutely.

If the Pakistani Army does not stop terrorism towards India even after an Indo-Pak War that goes in India's favor and where we get something to blackmail them, then the Pakistani people would be up in arms against the Pakistani Army for having lost land to the Hindus through their ill-conceived strategies and endangering them anew with more war. If the Pakistani Army puts a stop to terrorism, then they stop being in the vanguard of Muslim chauvinism, and they are laughed at by their Islamic peers without uniform. The Pakistani Army grows weak through its defeat and subsequent inaction, and the militants grow stronger. Hopefully before they take over, the international community can reach some agreement with Pakistani Jernails to denuke the country.

We must also understand about India's position in the world. If we do not find an answer to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, we would indeed be losing business, but also our self-respect, our confidence, our sense-of-security, and most of all, our lives. That too is an important consideration.

[shiv]

Why would Pakistan want a nuclear war?

Who would want nuclear war?

And what for? For what gains, if any?

The Pakistani establishment has clearly stated its threat of using nuclear weapons against India if they judged that Pakistan's survival was at stake. As a snide remark, let me state that Pakistan's survival is at stake right now. So why hasn't India been nuked yet? Perhaps the reason is that the Pakistan army sees itself as representing Pakistan and a threat to its survival from India would (as per PA statements) provoke nuclear war.

Now this opens up a chink for stability. As long as India tolerates everything that the Pakistan army throws at us without threatening its survival, we will not have nuclear war, in this version of "stability". On the other hand, India can punish Pakistan the nation in many ways, if it should so choose, but as long as the Pakistani army's survival is sure, there will be no nuclear war. More stability, at the expense of terrorism against India and Pakistan the nation going down the drain.

It appears to me that entities apart from the Indian government have decided that stability means ensuring the survival of the Pakistani army. And so the US too pays the PA to survive to help ensure nuclear stability. The Pakistani army leads a charmed life where they can sponsor terrorism while they get paid because any action against them is met with a threat that jihadis will take over, and perhaps take over the nukes. And the Pakistani army uses those very jihadis for terrorism.

Why does the Pakistani army not directly involve itself in terrorist acts? Why does it seek "deniability" while assorted (and sometimes anonymous) Islamic groups are blamed for terror? There are at least three possible reasons for this. The first is that the army leadership and ethos know from experience that they will not be able to successfully take on a more powerful foe (such as India) directly without being harmed seriously. Secondly, their survival is based on payments from abroad which come with the demand that they should not be sponsoring terrorists. Third, the Pakistan army has projected itself as the protector of Pakistan among its own people. A direct military confrontation leading to defeat could lead to needless difficulty for the army's survival and privileges. So the Pakistani army uses proxies for its wars. But the need for "survival of the Pakistani army" gives a very important clue to their motivations. The army wants to survive. They are not suicidal. That means that their actions - which may sometimes appear suicidal or irrational are based on the calculus that they will eventually survive. They ae studiously avoiding threats to their survival.

Why does the Pakistani army use Islamic proxies for its wars. Why can it not use secular proxies? After all so many governments use proxies to do dirty work- why Islamic proxies? Why does the Pakistani army choose get Muslim zealots to do dirty work and then say that the dirty work is clean because Islam demands dirty work and Islam cannot be dirty. The answer do this may simply be what is locally available. If you have Islamic zealots in excess nearby you are hardly likely to want to search for Hindu-Zionists for your dirty work, especially if they are thin on the ground. If you have bricks, you use bricks. If you have wood, you use wood.

The Islamic proxies of the Pakistani army are willing to be the foot soldiers who actually die. But the Islamic leadership itself offers a mixed picture when it comes to taking responsibility for an action. For example, when a successful terrorist attack that cannot be pinned on anyone is conducted, you will find some terrorist group taking responsibility. But when the terrorist act is busted, or evidence of involvement of the Islamic leadership is found - they tend to deny involvement and claim they are pious Muslims who merely speak up for Muslims and are not involved with terror. That means that the Islamic group leadership are also looking for deniability. They are not the bold warriors who confront opposition with swords drawn (which is the hallmark of a regular army) . The Islamic leadership are sewer rats who will gnaw at roots in the dark and will scurry away if exposed.

So we have two layers of people that are behind terrorist acts:
1) The deepest layer are the Pakistani army who completely deny all involvement with terror and even deny any involvement with Islamic terror groups. They are willing to see the terror groups blamed and taking hits, but will only protect them covertly, not overtly.

2) The leadership of the Islamist groups who are willing to be the face of terror, but who deny their involvement with terrorism, choosing to term acts of terrorism as individual heroic acts by the suicidal foot soldiers of Islam. That means the leadership of the Islamist group, whether he is Hafiz Saeed, Masood Azhar, Osama or that one eyed bandit Mullah Omar are all rational. They want to survive, They do not want to be caught and made to pay for the actions of their jihadis.

This gives us the framework upon which it is possible to examine the issue of nuclear bombs and nuclear terrorism from Pakistan. I will do that in a later post.

[shiv]

<SNIP>

This leaves Pakistan with three choices:
a) To risk military punishment under cold start by more terrorism
b) To "challenge and test" Indian politicians readiness to initiate cold start once a terrorist attack has been pinned on Pakistan
c) To escalate the game further and bring nuclear war closer.

I will try and deal with the last point in the next post.

Shiv, TSPA has initiated steps to counter the Cold Start Doctrine - in terms of raising new formations to ensure that ARN/ARS are not sucked in - and these formations can absorb/counter the CS Formations.

I can post the military calculus if it helps (I did post some of it in the past).

Yes, please do that Rohit

[ramana]

Folks a lot of books are being written in India about this very topic. One example is a book by Maj Gen G.D. Bakshi titled" The Paradox of Pakistan:Collapse or Caliphate", published by Manas Publications, New Delhi. Will read an review for BRF. The cursory look is like reading BRF all the scenarios!

[ramana]

What will be the impact of Do Ustad type shows on evolution of TSP?

[Pratyush]

Rajesh / Shiv/ Rohit,,

One can look at it as a war of attrition. Sort of the Guadalcanal campaign in world war two. Do one thing at a time. Using overwhelming local superiority. I.e it may not be possible to take down all of Pakistani war fighting capability in a 7 day period. But it will be possible to destroy one part of it completely. Eg Aim for the destruction one army corps, or the Entire PAF, or the Navy at one time.

The idea is to keep the length of action small and also restrict the aim to the total destruction of the specific part of the Paki capability. Once accomplished prepare for the destruction of the next part of Paki capability. Do it repeatedly for 3 to 5 years and you will see that the TSP conventional fighting ability is diminished considerably.

The model is teach a lesson rather then complete annihilation of TSP. It will force the 3.5 to increase military aid to TSP. Which in the current economic climate they may not be able to do.

Also, if the TSPA is unable to protect it self then we may see it shed the liberal face and take on a more pious face. That in turn should put off at least one of the 3.5. Add to that the resource crunch the potential for the complete collapse of TSP is much closer to realization.

[shiv]

Nuclear weapons now form the core of survival of the Pakistan army.

Let me use an analogy.

If I think I am Mickey mouse, my survival=survival of Mickey mouse
If I think I am Bill Gates, my survival=survival of Bill Gates

So it does not matter what the Pakistani army believes itself to be. Whatever that is, the survival of that is thought to be ensured by nuclear weapons. So if the Pakistani army represents Pakistaniyat or a Caliphate, or a protector of Islam - all these are being protected by nuclear weapons.

Another way of looking at the issue is to ask if Pakistaniyat, a Caliphate or Islam will survive without the Pakistani army. Clearly, Islam will survive. Dreams of a Caliphate could well survive without the Pakistan army. Pakistani nationalism and the anti India stance may not survive the disappearance of the Pakistan army.

So we come up against two issues that impact on nuclear weapons and Islamists
1) To what extent are the Pakistani nationalists in control of the weapons?
2) The technical competence required to maintain and use nuclear weapons in the absence of a functioning state if the state itself were to become dysfunctional.

Looked at in this way the answer pops out loud and clear.

Whether you are a Caliphate mujahid seeking global domination, a mere Islamist or an India hater and Pakistani nationalist, those nuclear weapons will not work unless there is a functioning Pakistani state with the industrial infrastructure and the foreign supplies that are needed to run a complex system that is needed to make, store and deliver nuclear warheads. That is not cave-man business. It is the business of a functioning medium industrial power. Any number of readings of the Quran or beheading of kafirs will not get you nukes in the absence of that sort of industrial complex. So there is a very clear reason for Islamists to unite and show a united face with the Pakistani nationalists no matter how much they may oppose each other ideologically.

So the survival of Pakistan the state is the first prerequisite for nuclear weapons, whether you are an Islamist or some other brand of Paki. Ultimately, even if you hate the Pakistani army and establishment, you will need them and you will need a functioning Pakistani state to keep the nuclear weapons well oiled, functioning and deliverable. If the Pakistani state becomes dysfunctional, it does not mean that the nuclear threat to other wil vanish, but the dysfunctionality will definitely impinge on the complex of systems required to fashion, maintain nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. A functioning, thriving Pakistan with great industrial and trade relations is essential for the manufacture and maintenance of nuclear weapons, whether they are required to attack India, or Israel or bring about a Caliphate.

This leads to the question:
"What will happen if the industrial infrastructure that Pakistan needs for nukes is destroyed in a series of attacks?"

The obvious consequence is that Pakistan's ability to make and deliver nuclear warheads will be hampered, but the existing warheads will not be harmed.

Where are the existing warheads?

Nobody knows exactly. But two things are absolutely certain:
1) The warheads are probably hidden beyond the reach of even America's eyes and military might
2) The warheads are in control of the Pakistan army and the Paki army and Islamists are united here.

I have stated in an earlier post that both the Pakistani army and the Islamist leadership are looking for survival. They are not looking at suicide.

What would be suicidal for them? Perhaps the worst thing would be loss of Pakistan. Control of Pakistan is essential. Afghanistan is icing on the cake - a place where proxies can be trained and those proxies can be blamed, attacked, killed or made to fight forever. Afghanistan is a bogey - it diverts attention from Pakistan which is the key to opposing India, the Caliphate, nuclear weapons, whatever. It is Pakistan that is being protected by the Pakistani army and their allies, the Islamists and global jihadis.

What would trigger a "war for Pakistan"? Under what circumstances would an overwhelming combination of powers and forces be used to "take out" Pakistan? The most likely trigger for anyone to want to punish Pakistan with a heavy hand, perhaps nuclear is an irrational nuclear attack with a Pakistani nuke on a western target or India. On BRF people like to argue that India would not retaliate, but if an irrational entity actually used one or two nukes on India after reading BRF views on Indian weakness and it turned out to be wrong - all could be lost. It is a very serious risk to nuke anyone and one or two nukes on India could be as bad as total nuclear war in terms of outcome for Pakistan. Suffice it to say that even one or two irrational nukes on India would clearly be seen as Pakistani nukes and even if India did not retaliate with nuclear weapons (abrogating its own nuclear doctrine) the consequences of such weakness against a power willing to use nukes would not be ost on Russia, the US and France.

So an irrational random nuke attack would be seriously detrimental to both Pakistaniyat as well as the Caliphate by putting Pakistan itself at risk.

On the other hand, if there was no nuclear attack from Pakistan on anyone, the chances of anyone trying to take Pakistan down are reduced. So the Pakistani army and their allies the Islamists have everything to gain by not using nukes to spark off an unwinnable war. The survival of Pakistan and the Caliphate are better served in the long term by not committing suicide. Pakistan the state has to survive.

From this stems the question: "Of what use are nuclear weapons to the Pakistani army if they cannot use them?"

Perhaps the best use for nukes that cannot be used as weapons is for blackmail. Threaten that jihadis will take control of weapons unless the Pakistani army is paid, Pakistan is rescued and helped to survive, given trade concessions and made into a stable state. This is perhaps the biggest bluff being played out by the Pakistani army - the pretence that "jihadis" are somehow separate from the Pakistani army and that the Pakistani army is moderate and secular and the last organization before jihadis get nukes.

The jihadis already have nukes. They can be assumed to be out of reach of destruction. In my view any attempt to run after "lost nukes" would be a misplaced wild goose chase. If a Pakistani nuke is ever reported lost the best action would be to forget about the lost nuke and bomb the crap out of Pakistan's nuclear facilities so that no more nukes can get "lost" at a later date.

The threat of Pakistan can be reduced by allowing Pakistan to fail, if that is possible - so that its industry and communications become unstable and dysfunctional and the use of existing weapons becomes more and more difficult as time passes. Perhaps the best outcoem would be, once again an overt Islamist takeover that threatened Xinjiang too, so that China would be less enthusiastic about Pakistan's nuclear capability.

[Lalmohan]

could survival be constituted of 'rump pakjabistan plus nukes'?
could there be 'rump pakjabistan' coexisting with 'rump pakhtunwa'?
both with nukes?

[A_Gupta]

Impending systemic collapse in Pakistan?
http://jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2010-week ... pol1.htm#1

[A_Gupta]

In the 1930s the world stood by as the German Wiemar Republic collapsed, with fateful consequences to the world.

Germany was a highly industrialized country, that was already held responsible for a World War.

So Pakistan should be no comparison. But, unlike Germany, Pakistan has W.M.D.

We tend to think of Pakistan failure as a weakening of the parts and hence the whole. What about a radical reconstitution of Pakistan (similar to Hitler's restructuring of Germany) that makes it a far more potent threat? Is that a possibility?

[shiv]

We tend to think of Pakistan failure as a weakening of the parts and hence the whole. What about a radical reconstitution of Pakistan (similar to Hitler's restructuring of Germany) that makes it a far more potent threat? Is that a possibility?

Well "Nazi Germany" is always an emotive argument. But ideologically Pakistan is as far right as Germany and from the viewpoint of persecution of minorities, Pakistan is right up there with Nazi Germany. So Pakistan is already a Nazi Germany that has been allowed to survive. The only thing is that Nazi Germany overran Poland and France in short order but later faced difficulty in advancing across the channel and into Russia, Pakistan faced initial problems advancing intoIndia but temporarily overran Afghanistan.

So Pakistan is Nazi Germany that has evolved in a slightly different way in a different world.

[rohitvats]

[

Shiv, TSPA has initiated steps to counter the Cold Start Doctrine - in terms of raising new formations to ensure that ARN/ARS are not sucked in - and these formations can absorb/counter the CS Formations.

I can post the military calculus if it helps (I did post some of it in the past).

Yes, please do that Rohit

Here is a brief analysis of developments in the TSPA and implications with respect to the CSD:

To start with, we go back a bit in time to Operation Parakram. During the latter and final stages of Op. Parakram (May-June), IA had arrayed the three Armored Divisions in parallel across the Lower Punjab-Upper Rajasthan-Middle Rajasthan Sector. This force consisted of the might of two of the three Strike Corps (one of the Armored Division was switched from another sector) backed by two Pivot Corps. Bulk of Indian Mechanized might was in this sector.

Facing this were two PA Pivot Corps plus ARS plus re-inforcements from their western sector. Needless to say, this gravely exposed the soft under-belly of PA and sent alarm bells ringing in the GHQ. There was no way in hell that they could have stopped such a large concentration of IA from achieving considerable results. This is the main reason Musharraf came on PTV with the piss speech. And why the movement by Lt. Gen. Vij created the stir it did. PA was shit scared.

Cut to the announcement of CSD and plans of IBG. A doctrine which not only will lead to creation of powerful Strike Assets with Pivot Corps but create serious assymetry in the balance of power. PA Pivot Corps would have limited Counter-Strike potential to take on/absorb these IBG equipped IA Pivot Corps...this will entail the involvement of PA Reserve formations - ARN/ARS. Post such committment of reserves by PA, IA can choose the deployment of Strike Corps in time and space and inflict maximum damage on the PA.

What PA has done is raised Armored Divisions - which go by the name of Mechanized Divisons - with Bahawalpur based XXXI Corps and Karachi based V Corps. V Corps-Karachi was always suuposed to have 2-3 Independent Armored Brigades and these could have been given a higher Formation HQ. In case of XXXI Corps, additional raisings (at least an Armored Brigade) would have been required. This could have been merged with existing (I) Armored Bde. with the Corps HQ to raise a Mechanized/Armored Division. The Corps (I) Armored Bde. can/could have been re-raised. In addition, the Infantry Divisions are being Mechanized. PA has been in market to purchase 2nd-hand M113 plus domestic production of M113 variant in under way. Though, I cannot comment on the scale of this Mechanization.

What this does is, it gives PA Pivot Corps to react localy to the IBG lef offensive in their AOR - without the recourse to ARN/ARS. Not only can these formations handle the CSD but also initiate limited counter-offensive. Now, the strength and weaknesses of these Armored/Mechanized Divisions is another matter. But, PA at least has capability on the ground. And it does not face a situation similar to Op. Parakram.

Hope this helps.

[A_Gupta]

So Pakistan is Nazi Germany that has evolved in a slightly different way in a different world.

Not trying to be emotive; not getting into treatment of minorities, etc.

The point with Germany is that a state with a systemic failure reconstituted itself to become a threat to the world and the chief cause of World War II.

I was thinking of Czarist Russia too, as another such - a state with a systemic failure reconstituted itself into the Soviet Union.

The post was purely to point out that we need to keep in mind the small probability that what emerges from a systemic collapse of Pakistan need not be easy to handle or less dangerous.

[ramana]

Rohitvats, The assumption is that India will replay Op Parakaram. Which it wont.

[rohitvats]

Rohitvats, The assumption is that India will replay Op Parakaram. Which it wont.

Sir, an Op. Parakaram but with reduced timelines for PA to react to? Courtsey the CSD?

[KrishG]

Not trying to be emotive; not getting into treatment of minorities, etc.

The point with Germany is that a state with a systemic failure reconstituted itself to become a threat to the world and the chief cause of World War II.

I was thinking of Czarist Russia too, as another such - a state with a systemic failure reconstituted itself into the Soviet Union.

The post was purely to point out that we need to keep in mind the small probability that what emerges from a systemic collapse of Pakistan need not be easy to handle or less dangerous.

Even during the Weimar Republic (right from the mid-twenties) there was significant signs of the rising influence of Nazis and similar was the case with Czarist Russia (Bolsheviks). It is not that such a change happens overnight without any sort of signature. The inference is that before any such major change of guard takes place, there will be signs of what is in store and where the country would be heading.

Even Pakistan is showing such signs. In case of Pakistan, it is the hardline islamists (Talibunnies etc) that are gaining power and political might. From these pointers we can assume with some amount of certainty that Pakistan, if it remains in tact, is heading for a hardline Islamist regime (maybe the Taliban for all we know).

[RajeshA]

There is a possibility that the regime in Pakistan would turn everyday a bit greener, and the outside world will not notice the difference.

I am still perplexed, as to how would one notice the change, unless there is some pivotal battle where the 'moderate' Pakistani Army loses to the 'radical' Taliban and Lashkars and the latter storm the government buildings beheading all the members of the National Assembly, the Cabinet and the Army Chief with his crore commanders!

Nothing like this must happen to signal that the regime is a hard-line Islamist regime with a sheen of Taqqiya for interfacing with the patrons in Washington and Beijing.

So what are the 7 signs of apocalypse? What would be written on the signboard saying that I've reached Talibanistan and that Pakistan is long dead?

[ramana]

With just a few figurehead changes TSP can turn suddenly into a fundamentalist state. By same token by getting rid of few faces it can turn the otherway. Its this single janus faced ability that fascinates and scares.

Total "Dr. Jekyll and Hyde" syndrome in a nation.

[Kamboja]

The post was purely to point out that we need to keep in mind the small probability that what emerges from a systemic collapse of Pakistan need not be easy to handle or less dangerous.

Sort of tangential, but FWIW:

The Nazis were dangerous because they inherited from the Weimar Republic a highly industrialized infrastructure (more or less intact after WWI) and a highly educated populace, not to mention popular mandate for rearmament and plenty of capacity to build weapons and fight again; i.e. they had the teeth to back up their snarling.

The Bolsheviks were not dangerous after 1917, because of purges in the army and civil society that more or less decapitated the Russian elite (no pun intended ), and they had to work to rebuild Russian industry and re-grow an elite class to administer and rule. That took them over twenty years.

Point being, any administration can only flex the muscle that it inherits, or work to build the muscle to flex it. In Pakistan's case, would-be Islamic revolutionaries will inherit a basketcase of an economy that is heading down the toilet. Whatever trickle of aid they receive today will reduce if they turn a shade greener, as the greenbacks recede (essentially they trade one type of green for another ). The Greener Pakistan might, miraculously, decide to work to establish economy, education, and military, but even if they demonstrate such resolve (sounds pretty kufr to me) it will take them decades to build momentum. In the meantime they fall even further behind us.

So IMHO, a post-collapse Pakistan will almost certainly be less equipped to inflict damage on India, even if they have the will to do so, and they will almost certainly never be able to catch up with us to the point of being a more significant threat to us than they are now...

With each passing day that India's GDP (absolute and per capita) growth exceeds Pakistan's, Pakistan becomes less dangerous to us. In other words, every day is Pakistan's worst day ever.

[ramana]

Folks a lot of books are being written in India about this very topic. One example is a book by Maj Gen G.D. Bakshi titled" The Paradox of Pakistan:Collapse or Caliphate", published by Manas Publications, New Delhi. Will read an review for BRF. The cursory look is like reading BRF all the scenarios!

I found an on-line review:

The state of Pakistan today presents a dangerous Paradox. The indiscriminate weaponisation of its civil society has eroded the very basis of a modern state premised upon a monopoly of violence. Its economy has twice reached the brink of collapse in the last ten years (1998-2008) yet the Military-ISI Complex in Pakistan is conjuring visions of a new Caliphate centered in Islamabad. Since 2006 it has been convinced that the USA and NATO do not have the stomach to stay on in Afghanistan. It has now sold the thesis of a Moderate Taliban to President Obama. The Americans and their friends have promised/given a staggering 30.8 Bn US$ to Islamabad. What is Pakistan doing with this bonanza? Satellite photographs indicate a dramatic expansion of Pakistani nuclear facilities at Dera Ghazi Khan (DGK) and Khusab. Pakistan is using the financial aid to rapidly increase its nuclear stockpile. What is lesser known is that terrorists have already attacked the Dera Ghazi Khan complex. In Feb 2009 a Talibani suicide bomber killed 30 people in the mosque in DGK. Pakistan is using the gifted dollars to buy Swedish AWACs, Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft, F-16 fighters, Chinese frigates, JF17s Jets and Tanks. With this weapon buying spree the Pak economy could well head for a third economic crash landing because the basic flaw of their economy remains unaddressed. The number of people below poverty line in Pakistan has risen beyond the 50 per cent mark. It is this which forces the poor people to send their children to the Madrasas for two square meal a day. It is this which perpetuates Zia's ideology of Jihad in Pakistan. Even as the US pours in its billions, counter insurgency experts like Kilcullen are predicting a systemic collapse of Pakistan in six months. The Caliphate is about to crack under the weight of its own contradictions. Therein lie the makings of a monumental tragedy. ISBN - 9788170493617

Link:
Paradox of Pakistan by GD Bakshi


Sort of sums up this thread doesn't it?

[svinayak]

With just a few figurehead changes TSP can turn suddenly into a fundamentalist state. By same token by getting rid of few faces it can turn the otherway. Its this single janus faced ability that fascinates and scares.

Total "Dr. Jekyll and Hyde" syndrome in a nation.

But this is a message for somebody. But it is for whom. Its masters were UK and US and it still is.
This show of janus and a blackmail strategy with US/UK of becoming a religious fundamentalist state is to get the concession. Few comments in the youtube talk about that - If US attacks Pakistan then they will fire missiles at India. This part of taking revenge at US by attacking India is part of the larger dialog going on between US and Pakistan with India as a target for the last 20 years.

[RajeshA]

Kamboja ji,

good post.

It is possible that the Taliban/Islamists too would to some extent try to keep the industrial base and the utilities running. May be Taliban would have difficulty finding new investors, but those factories and utilities that are already there would be running, even if they change hands.

So one aim for India would be to see, that a Greener-Pakistan has very little left as industrial base before it turns greener. Less power plants, less factories, etc. would be good. The current industrial base can be dismantled by military strikes, internal sabotage, purchase as scrap metal, brain drain from these factories, etc.

Secondly, it would be good if Pakistan becomes a country where it is difficult for any one player to get full control. Other than ethnicity-based separation from Pakistan, one could adopt new strategies as well. Increase in small-arms production would be one such positive step. The small arms are to be distributed among the civilian population. The more weapons there are in Pakistan, less is the chance that any stakeholder can claim to consolidate his power over whole of Pakistan. A million armed mutinies in Pakistan would be quite desirable.

[A_Gupta]

Kamboja has it right that it will take a decade or two minimum, for a Pakistan that undergoes a systemic collapse and then reconstitutes itself to become an industrial power capable of arming itself. So there will be sufficient time for India to spot the trend.

A reconstituted Pakistan could Islamize itself on the line of the Taliban or on the somewhat more sophisticated lines of Iran. Again, not sure I can rule out the latter. The latter would be more dangerous, IMO.

A weak Talibanized Pakistan might seek a North Korea type of stand-off with India as the South Korea. While South Korea has much greater military potential than No.Ko., IMO, the threat of great damage to Seoul is what keeps South Korea in check. India, of course, is much larger than South Korea and will have N large cities. Also the threat to Seoul by No.Ko. is there even if nukes were not in the equation - this will not apply to Indian cities from Pakistan, where the conventional threat will be contained.

[A_Gupta]

I don't think you'll like what I have to say.

IMO, if a country in normal financial shape suffers a natural disaster like the one Pakistan is undergoing, it undergoes a mini-economic boom afterwards because of all the reconstruction work. Of course, Paksitan was not in reasonable shape even before the disaster.

There will be a tremendous need for manual labor for reconstruction work after the flood waters recede. Fortunately for Pakistan it has a huge number of mango abduls who can do this work.

IF the 3.5 friends bankroll Pakistan, Pakistan can have a post-flood economic boom. Reconstruction work can absorb all the unemployed abduls. There are bridges, roads, dams, canals, etc., to repair or rebuild. All can be done with manual labor. Employment in reconstruction will inject cash and give a boost to the buying power of the poor. It is just a matter of having the money, AND....

Not having Dus Percenti and his clan eating up the reconstruction money; having competent and reasonably honest people running the reconstruction; keep the Taliban in check, etc., etc.

[shiv]

I don't think you'll like what I have to say.

IMO, if a country in normal financial shape suffers a natural disaster like the one Pakistan is undergoing, it undergoes a mini-economic boom afterwards because of all the reconstruction work. Of course, Paksitan was not in reasonable shape even before the disaster.

There will be a tremendous need for manual labor for reconstruction work after the flood waters recede. Fortunately for Pakistan it has a huge number of mango abduls who can do this work.

IF the 3.5 friends bankroll Pakistan, Pakistan can have a post-flood economic boom. Reconstruction work can absorb all the unemployed abduls. There are bridges, roads, dams, canals, etc., to repair or rebuild. All can be done with manual labor. Employment in reconstruction will inject cash and give a boost to the buying power of the poor. It is just a matter of having the money, AND....

Not having Dus Percenti and his clan eating up the reconstruction money; having competent and reasonably honest people running the reconstruction; keep the Taliban in check, etc., etc.

Arun, the conditions for a "construction boom" have existed in Pakistan for decades. The Pakistani paradigm is to get money flowing for a particular job and then skim off the money after which the project fails, or is completed at a greatly increased cost. This is how you find that Pakiland in the source of way out ideas like Maglev trains and the world's tallest building that never happen.

Pakistan could, of course have built schools and universities, repaired canals and desilted them. What is happening now is probably going to be a vast overestimation of damage. On day 7 of the flood how can anyone come up with a precise figure "13,000 bridges washed away". On the next day the aid demand is 15 billion dollars.

So what is likely to happen in Pakistan is that the money will come in and a sizeable proportion of that money will be diverted to private pockets. Some will go for reconstruction. An inflated figure of the damage will ensure that both the aims - of filling pockets and repair work will get done.

I think we may be overestimating the cost of these floods.The trouble will pass in a few weeks but not the demands. The main issues will be food, shelter and medical care for Abduls. This was always in short supply anyway.

You may have observed from the commonality of names in certain blogs and in the media that Pakistan has a fairly small elite educated community. You can expect the number of civil engineers in Pakistan to be similarly small. They will get a lot of business, and mango can go to hell as usual. You cannot create them out of nowhere. You can also expect the army to be dead quiet about infrastructure damage that affects its transport/logistics. These will be repaired first and made even better than before - certainly flood proof. The army's engineers will certainly busy themselves with aid money.

I would be looking for social unrest in the aftermath of the floods. If there is overestimation of the damage now, the unrest too will be minimal. Just my thoughts. Pakistan are inveterate liars and the floods are an invaluable opportunity to lie themselves into more wealth.

[shiv]

There is a possibility that the regime in Pakistan would turn everyday a bit greener, and the outside world will not notice the difference.

I am still perplexed, as to how would one notice the change,...

Rajesh - there is one more possibility. The world, especially the 3.5 friends do not think the change is harmful in any way.

[shiv]

I have tried to assess Paksitan's industrial capability for some years now. Of course Pakistan has Uranium separation facilities and metallurgy to fahion Uranium and Pu into warheads. They have an ability to assemble aircraft - particularly the K8. They also manufacture small arms and munitions.

But it is still dificult to get a grasp on Pakistan's real industrial prowess. I still have not figured out how many engineering graduates come out of Pakistan every year.

Pakistan's export and imort figures tell their own story eg:
http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/ ... ts_imports
Pakistani Exports to U.S.

• 1. Cotton apparel & household furnishings …US$2.6 billion (70.6% of Pakistani to U.S. exports, up 18.6% from 2005)
  2. Cotton cloth & fabrics (threads, cordage) … $351 million (9.6%, down 5.6%)
  3. Other textiles apparel & household furnishings … $138.3 million (3.8%, down 11.6%)
  4. Textile floor coverings including rugs … $122.1 million (3.3%, down 2.1%)
  5. Non-textile apparel & household furnishings … $81.4 million (2.2%, up 7.2%)
  6. Sporting & camping apparel, footwear & gear … $61.2 million (1.7%, up 4.7%)
  7. Other scientific, medical & hospital equipment … $37.9 million (1%, up 10.4%)
  8. Toys, bicycles and other sporting goods … $34.4 million (0.9%, up 16.5%)
  9. Synthetic cloth & fabrics (threads, cordage) … $23.7 million (0.6%, down 39.1%)
  10. Cookware, cutlery, house & garden wares including tools … $21.4 million (0.6%, up 10.2%).

Check the imports from the US

• 1. Civilian aircraft (complete) …US$753.1 million (37.9% of Pakistani to U.S. exports, up 1,739% from 2005)
  2. Generators & accessories … $132.3 million (6.6%, up 135.7%)
  3. Cotton … $117 million (5.9%, down 20.6%)
  4. Computer accessories … $308.4 million (4.5%, up 7.2%)
  5. Chemical fertilizers … $87.3 million (4.4%, down 51.6%)
  6. Telecommunications equipment … $64.1 million (3.2%, down 24.6%)
  7. Tanks, artillery, missiles, rockets, guns & ammunition … $61.7 million (3.1%, up 150,368%)
  8. Civil aircraft (parts) … $53.2 million (2.7%, up 5.5%)
  9. Military parts … $43 million (2.2%, up 27.3%)
  10. Engines & turbines for military aircraft … $40.9 million (2.1%, up 2,186.4%).

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm#econ

Industry
Pakistan's manufacturing sector accounts for about 25% of GDP. Cotton textile production and apparel manufacturing are Pakistan's largest industries, accounting for about 51.4% of total exports. Other major industries include food processing, beverages, construction materials, clothing, and paper products. Manufacturing sector growth has slowed in the last two years due to energy shortages and capacity constraints. However, the sector is forecast to grow 5.5% for FY 2010. Despite government efforts to privatize large-scale parastatal units, the public sector continues to account for a significant proportion of industry. The government seeks to diversify the country's industrial base and bolster export industries. Net foreign investment in Pakistani industries is only 0.5% of GDP. Pakistan's search for additional foreign direct investment has been hampered by concerns about the security situation, domestic and regional political uncertainties, and questions about judicial transparency.

About 28% of Pakistan's total land area is under cultivation and is watered by one of the largest irrigation systems in the world. Agriculture accounts for about 21% of GDP and employs about 42% of the labor force. The most important crops are cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, fruits, and vegetables, which together account for more than 75% of the value of total crop output. Despite intensive farming practices, Pakistan remains a net food importer. Pakistan exports rice, fish, fruits, and vegetables and imports vegetable oil, wheat, cotton (net importer), pulses, and consumer foods.

[A_Gupta]

What is happening now is probably going to be a vast overestimation of damage. On day 7 of the flood how can anyone come up with a precise figure "13,000 bridges washed away".

Shiv, I agree with your assessment of what is likely to happen in Pakistan. But though it is improbable, it is possible that Pakistan can enter a virtuous cycle of economic growth when reconstructing.

Regarding flood damage in Pakistan - I'm quite sure the satellites of several nations are busy cataloging the damage.

Also, loss of a road route from Karachi into Afghanistan will hit the US war efforts in Afghanistan - I suppose the Americans are keeping a close tab on the damage to roads and bridges.

[A_Gupta]

X-post
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world ... pstan.html

The regions suffering most from the crisis are far more likely to breed militancy, according to a study by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, based in Islamabad. It found that the 20 districts with the worst food insecurity were also home to the worst militancy. In many of those places, hard-line Islamic charities have stepped in.

“It’s the mullah-Marxist nexus,” said Abid Suleri, the head of the institute and one of the nation’s leading experts on food insecurity. “It’s a class conflict exploited by mullahs who say, ‘If you are living in misery, it’s better to at least kill the infidels.’ ”

[A_Gupta]

Shiv,
ADB 2004 assessment of Pakistan's industrial/technology levels.
http://www.adb.org/Documents/PRM/Workin ... s/wp03.pdf

Chapters 5 and 6 may be of interest.