Historical Battles in Ancient & Medieval Bharat

[ramana]

Sir Jadunath Sarkar would have been proud o you! So how about writing chater oulines and get collaboration from jambudvipa, Atri and Bji?

Not more than 250 pages.

I am there to critique them with Pullikeshi.

[peter]

You are missing the point. Crux of the matter is that can a horse mounted archer shoot to kill a fast moving target and the answer is that if you can kill a wild boar with an arrow, shot from a fast galloping horse, you can surely kill another cavalry or infantry man with the same skill.

Individual skill, yes. Collective skills for 120 chaps to form a horse archer company? No. When 120 mongols hunt a hurd down, they gain that collective skill.

Please read on how mongols fought. Your claims of equating hunting herds to mongol strategy is non sequitir.

That is rather unfair criticism of Dr Sharma's work. Chauhan army in the second battle of Tarain was attacked at pre dawn in their camps. It was a general slaughter. Prithviraj Chauhan was trying to get away from the battle field because the day was lost and he was killed near the river sarsuti.

Then, as per Dr Sharma's work, the Chauhan Army was even more stupid for not posting pickets on access routes to camp and sentries, that are basic techniques. For that matter, in war, like Kargil, soldiers sleep with their personal weapons and wake up at first scream/shout of alarm.

My opinion would be to rate Dr Sharma's poetic opinion of "midnight immoral attack" as stupid. I still respect the Chauhan Army.

Alright it is clear you have not read Professor Sharma's book. Your knowledge about Second battle at terrain is scanty. You need to read more. And night attacks were difficult to deal with even with earth embankments all around the camp. See shershahs battles in rajasthan for example. Forget simple mindedness of sentries and pickets.

Please enumerate battles fought by jats against invaders and then we will see who is, to use your phrase, bullshitting here.

Peter - The Jats are recorded to have given a given a hard time to Mehmud of Ghazni, fought Taimur, Gokula resisted Aurungzed and Suraj Mal's exploits are well known.

Some dates: Ghazni: 10th century. Taimur 14th century. Aurangzeb 17th century. Are you suggesting these were the only three battles they fought? This does not amount to much.

Let me remind you that emotional belittling a community is punishable under the Indian constitution, as well as a violation of forum norms.

Huh? Asking you on the battles jats fought is "emotional belittling" a community? How?

And for the record, I have elaborately explained to Airavat the concept of mobilization to explain strategic victory despite tactical reverses with loads of examples.

Nope. What you need to understand is if the invaders really had "advantages", be it "fast moving horses which outran indian horses", "horse archers", "artillery" which mowed down the cavalry, "better tactics", or "beef eating steppe dewellers who were far stronger then Indians", how come many of these invaders were hounded out of many parts of india? Do you think indians were able to practice their perfected art of bribing on these fellas to leave their lands ?

Why dont you answer the following question?

WHY DID RANA SANGA NOT USE THE SO CALLED UNDOCUMENTED SUPERIOR BATTLE TACTICS AGAINST HORSE ARCHER COLUMNS SAID TO BE DEVELOPED BY HIS ILLUSTRIOUS ANCESTORS RANA HAMMIR AND RANA KUMBHA AGAINST TURKISH HORSE ARCHER COLUMNS? Surely had his ancestors developed superior tactics against horse archers, then Sanga would have known them and used at Khanua? Yet he doesnt and his army suffers from the same fate.

As said earlier wikipedia is plain wrong. Baburs artillery did not mow down the opposing cavalry and nor did his archers have much of an impact. Just inept historians spreading falsehoods. Have you read relevant portion of Baburnama? How about Dale's book, snippets from which I posted above?

[peter]

For the medieval era they drone on about Khaljis, Tughlaqs, Sayyids, Lodis, and have Babur winning Panipat to establish a new Muslim empire. A footnote follows on the Battle of Khanua, but most people outside of Rajasthan are left wondering who this Rana Sanga fellow was and how did he become strong enough to challenge Babur, while all this time they had been reading only about the Muslim dynasties?

Problem is that every historian thinks of Delhi as the capital of India since ancient times. This is obviously untrue. Sure during Mahabharata Indraprstha was the pandava capital but delhi was not the capital of Ashoka (3rd century BC) or the Guptas (first few centuries AD) or Harshvardhana (7th century A.D) or Imperial Pratihars (Last few centuries in the first millenium A.D) or Chauhans (first few centuries second millenium A.D).

The "false assumption" of delhi being the capital of India since Mahabharata needs to be broken solidly because every inept historian thinks that whoever ruled Delhi was the ruler of entire India!

[peter]

I absolutely agree Ramana, and following from my previous post:

1350-1550 New Indian Kingdoms.

1550-1650 Mughal Empire.

1650-1750 Maratha Supremacy

1750-1850 East India Company

1850- Indian Nationalism

What about the sikhs? What about before 1350? What is the significance of 1350?

[Airavat]

Sir Jadunath Sarkar would have been proud o you! So how about writing chater oulines and get collaboration from jambudvipa, Atri and Bji?

Not more than 250 pages.

I am there to critique them with Pullikeshi.

Don't have the time and am not qualified to write history. Just have an interest in military history. Besides the books have already been written by Jadunath Sarkar, RC Majumdar, KM Munshi, and others. Particularly the comprehensive and voluminous "The History and Culture of the Indian People" from the Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan. They were written in the 1950s so the volume on the Vedic Era continues with the Aryan Theory but also provides space to alternative viewpoints. It's a great piece of scholarship and referenced research on all aspects of history: polity, military, religion, language, arts.

What about the sikhs? What about before 1350?

Sikh rise included in the Maratha Supremacy, which by the way is the title of Volume VII of "The History and Culture of the Indian People".

The other volumes and the time periods are:
1) Vedic Era (up to 600 BC)
2) Age of Imperial Unity (600 BC to 320 AD)
3) The Classical Age (320-750)
4) Age of Imperial Kanauj (750-1000)
5) Struggle for Empire (1000-1300)

Please do read the snippets I have posted and see where does Padmanabha mention infantry archers.

You are right that no infantry archers are mentioned. But from the use of bows on horseback you have concluded that separate horse-archery columns were present. However the text also talks of Rajputs using their khandas, bhalas, and katars on the enemy......can one therefore conclude that there were separate cavalry units armed with only khandas, another unit purely with bhalas, and a third unit only using daggers?

[peter]

Please do read the snippets I have posted and see where does Padmanabha mention infantry archers.

You are right that no infantry archers are mentioned. But from the use of bows on horseback you have concluded that separate horse-archery columns were present. However the text also talks of Rajputs using their khandas, bhalas, and katars on the enemy......can one therefore conclude that there were separate cavalry units armed with only khandas, another unit purely with bhalas, and a third unit only using daggers?

I think what Padmanabha is saying is that the same warrior used all the weapons at different points in time during the course of the battle with U. Khan. The efficacy of any strategy was not consistent throughout the medieveal world. Even the mongol warriors carried long and short range bows and swords and used these weapons based on where in the battle they were.

So in other words I am not saying that horse-archery coloumns were used by the jalore army. I am just saying that according to the snippet from Kanhade Prabandh Jalore cavalry used bows and arrows to inflict damage on the mongol army.

BTW any chance you could re-consider writing the medieveal war history book? As ramana mentioned lot of people on this board very happy and eager to help!

[jambudvipa]

Airavatji Namo namaha
I bow down to your knowledge.
I concur with Peter & Ramanaji.it would be fantastic if you can reconsider your decision.would be happy to assist in any way.
I agree that stalwart historians have already written about these periods of our history,but there is always scope for a fresh perspective.Lot of people will read your articles but will not touch those volumious books!!
For greater dissemination knowledge has to be made accessible to the masses.

I have three volumes of the History & Culture dealing with the vedic age,the classical age and Kannauj.will buy the rest on this trip. Thanks to my parents my house is packed with books on buddhist/Jaina/Sanatana dharma philosophy and sanskrit,but i have not read most of them!
as they say pandita putra param suntha!

Peter can you further elaborate on why night attacks were difficult to oppose? i would like to know more about that.

i read in KAN Sastris book that Vianayaka Deva (a general of Prataparudra ) conducted a night attack with his cavalry on Malik kKafurs camp during the first siege of Warangal fort.So night attacks seem to have been favoured even by Hindu kings.

[Atri]

I am available for any sorts of help any time in my capability. It is an extremely noble endeavour. Please reconsider the decision, Airavat Mahoday..

[skganji]

It is good to see that correct History of India is presented by so many contributers in this thread. What is really disturbing as a person to me who had studied scrutinizingly some sections of Sanskrit Puranas which cover ancient History of India before 600 B.C to some extent, is that India's pre-History before 600 B.C is now given a euro-centric view by so called pseudo-scholars ( especially Indologists from reputated universities) through their latest version of AIT, the Aryan Migration theory. I don't know if this is the right place to bring up this topic. Mods, please guide me if I am in a wrong thread. Can some body shed light on India's ancient History before 600 B.C too.

[skganji]

XXXX

[Rahul M]

skganji sahab, there is a general history thread where such things are discussed in addition to a distorted history thread that addresses the very issue you mention.
this thread is restricted to the military side of things.

on topic, is anyone aware of any artist's impression or detailed descriptions of ancient Indian siege engines ? like catapults, ballista type weapons etc ? these have been mentioned at many places but never detailed.

[skganji]

Thanks Moderator. I will try to use that thread.

[peter]

Peter can you further elaborate on why night attacks were difficult to oppose? i would like to know more about that.

i read in KAN Sastris book that Vianayaka Deva (a general of Prataparudra ) conducted a night attack with his cavalry on Malik kKafurs camp during the first siege of Warangal fort.So night attacks seem to have been favoured even by Hindu kings.

Some of the major problems were:
a) Putting the harness on horses. It took finite amount of time and in a night attack the receiving army did not have enough time to properly put stirrups etc on horses.

b) Donning armour, chain mail helmets etc took time and was sometimes difficult to do if you were attacked in the night. Without such protection soldiers fell more easily by the blows of the attacking army.

c) Dsitribution of weapons to soldiers also posed a problem.

Some medieval kings were paranoid about night attacks. Shershah Suri was one such king. Wherever he camped he made sure the entire perimeter of his camp had a high earthern wall and he made all his army dig including his generals (though the generals did not like digging ditches!). When battle of sumelgirri was fought between Maldev and Suri about 6000 cavalry of Maldeo ran amock in Sher Shah's camp by making their marwari and kathiawari horses jump over these earthern walls and despite being outnumbered 6:1. This was a night/pre-dawn attack by the cavalry. Sherwani, an afghan general, came at the nip of time with fresh re-enforcements in full battle gear and turned the tide.

[Lalmohan]

i picked up an osprey book on seige engines purporting to be indian, but it was mostly arabic sources which claim to have learned from india, so the pics etc., were of much later arab or european manuscripts. again, sandhu goes into textual descriptions based on the ancient texts

[Rahul M]

LM ji, would be awfully glad if you can quote some of it from sandhu's book. the stupid oxford bookstore doesn't have a copy.

[Lalmohan]

i bought it from rediff, but sandhu doesnt provide any real tangible details other than to say that there were various types of siege engine that did various things and they had different sanskrit names

[tsarkar]

Strategy and tactics depend to a large degree on the prevailing geopolitical situation. The Rajput armies under Hammir and Kumbha were potent units of cavalry formed of Sesodias, while at Khanua, Sanga was leading a coalition that included other Rajput clans as well as Indian Muslim and Afghan armies. These different and mutually hostile components, particularly the last two, had never fought side by side with the Mewar army before. And when such a diverse coalition is brought together, each component loses the freedom to maneuver and operate in its traditional way, because they are hampered by unfamiliar allies at their flanks and rear.

Airavat,

Even in a coalition, contingents remain cohesive, and no proof exists any notable maneuvering by the Mewar contingent. A coalition doesnt mean companies and battalions distribute their manpower. Hence this explanation does not hold good.

So that is why Sanga could not have repeated Hammir's or Kumbha's tactics. Or so we assume because we actually don't know the details of the Battle of Khanua from Mewar sources.......thanks to the burning of the great library in Chittor by Akbar half a century later. All that we have are patchy descriptions by Babur. Despite his new weapon of artillery and matchlocks, the defence works of carts and towers, as well as horse-archers, Babur admits that the battle lasted ten hours. And despite all the maneuvers on the battle-field the Mughals failed to take a single prisoner. There was also no pursuit of the defeated army and Babur took an astonishing three days to reach even the nearby fort of Bayana!

And similarly geopolitics also explains Prithivraj's difficulties at Tarain and those of the Marathas at Panipat.

Airavat, the point I am making here is absence of facts does not mean presence of capabilities. But anyways, responses to my points are becoming more jingoistic than factual, and militarily absurd and impractical.

The Maratha strategy at Panipat was so poor that Suraj Mal declined to join Sadashiv Bhau. However, post defeat, he assisted the Marathas, and his forces provided a bulwark against further Durrani expansion.

And night attacks were difficult to deal with even with earth embankments all around the camp.

Peter - your post is completely romantic jingoism, without an iota of military understanding. In brief, throughout history, household infantry & cavalry (and these regimental names still exist in modern times, though roles have changed) had the role of protecting camps and logistic supply routes. I would rate defeat in a night attack even more stupid than defeat in the field of battle.

Nope. What you need to understand is if the invaders really had "advantages", be it "fast moving horses which outran indian horses", "horse archers", "artillery" which mowed down the cavalry, "better tactics", or "beef eating steppe dewellers who were far stronger then Indians", how come many of these invaders were hounded out of many parts of india?

Now you're blatantly lying, falsely bringing in points no one made, like "fast moving horses which outran indian horses" and "beef eating steppe dewellers who were far stronger then Indians".

The reason invaders, including British were hounded out of India was persistent resistance by a mobilized populace. The reason 1857 failed is because only the sepoys and ruling classes fought. The reason Quit India movement succeeded is because all of India was mobilized, and it didnt matter if the leaders were immobilized in jails.

[Lalmohan]

coalition clan warfare doesnt make for good battle tactics. each clan fights in its own units, but does not coordinate well with others and has its own priorities. in such situations, C2 is difficult (already difficult since its done by flags and riders). they would not have trained together or had a lot of trust and confidence in each other's abilities. this leads to fairly conventional battles where the more coherent side will win

[ramana]

RahulM and Lalmohan, There is a 13 page thread in India-Forum on this very subject. Maybe you can cull the relevant posts from there.

Pre-Modern Warfare in India and elsewhere

It has quotes from Arthasastra and Slippadikarm and comments on possible meanings of the weapons described.

[peter]

Strategy and tactics depend to a large degree on the prevailing geopolitical situation. The Rajput armies under Hammir and Kumbha were potent units of cavalry formed of Sesodias, while at Khanua, Sanga was leading a coalition that included other Rajput clans as well as Indian Muslim and Afghan armies. These different and mutually hostile components, particularly the last two, had never fought side by side with the Mewar army before. And when such a diverse coalition is brought together, each component loses the freedom to maneuver and operate in its traditional way, because they are hampered by unfamiliar allies at their flanks and rear.

Airavat,

Even in a coalition, contingents remain cohesive, and no proof exists any notable maneuvering by the Mewar contingent. A coalition doesnt mean companies and battalions distribute their manpower. Hence this explanation does not hold good.

Absurd. Do you really know anything about history or warfare? Let me give you just one counter example: Study Battle of Dharmat.

So that is why Sanga could not have repeated Hammir's or Kumbha's tactics. Or so we assume because we actually don't know the details of the Battle of Khanua from Mewar sources.......thanks to the burning of the great library in Chittor by Akbar half a century later. All that we have are patchy descriptions by Babur. Despite his new weapon of artillery and matchlocks, the defence works of carts and towers, as well as horse-archers, Babur admits that the battle lasted ten hours. And despite all the maneuvers on the battle-field the Mughals failed to take a single prisoner. There was also no pursuit of the defeated army and Babur took an astonishing three days to reach even the nearby fort of Bayana!

And similarly geopolitics also explains Prithivraj's difficulties at Tarain and those of the Marathas at Panipat.

Airavat, the point I am making here is absence of facts does not mean presence of capabilities. But anyways, responses to my points are becoming more jingoistic than factual, and militarily absurd and impractical.

No. Airavat is crystal clear. Simple question: Did or did not turks/arabs get hounded out of rajasthan and other parts of India before the mughal period? If you say no then you have no idea about history of this period. Since the answer is yes please tell us how could this have happened and do chuck the small number of boots theory.

And night attacks were difficult to deal with even with earth embankments all around the camp.

Peter - your post is completely romantic jingoism, without an iota of military understanding. In brief, throughout history, household infantry & cavalry (and these regimental names still exist in modern times, though roles have changed) had the role of protecting camps and logistic supply routes. I would rate defeat in a night attack even more stupid than defeat in the field of battle.

Time to back up your "knowledge claims" with some facts. Give us an example of a medieval war in which a night attack was easily handled.

Nope. What you need to understand is if the invaders really had "advantages", be it "fast moving horses which outran indian horses", "horse archers", "artillery" which mowed down the cavalry, "better tactics", or "beef eating steppe dewellers who were far stronger then Indians", how come many of these invaders were hounded out of many parts of india?

Now you're blatantly lying, falsely bringing in points no one made, like "fast moving horses which outran indian horses" and "beef eating steppe dewellers who were far stronger then Indians".

Do read some history books by JNU, Aligarh school and Western historians. All these reasons have been ascribed as the causes for defeat of Indian armies. Lack of fast horses was supposedly the reason for Chauhan defeat at second battle of Tarain according to Ms Romila Thapar. Since you sound like a JNU type you should be aware of these points.

The reason invaders, including British were hounded out of India was persistent resistance by a mobilized populace. The reason 1857 failed is because only the sepoys and ruling classes fought. The reason Quit India movement succeeded is because all of India was mobilized, and it didnt matter if the leaders were immobilized in jails.

Clueless. The reason India won independence is because Britain was broke after World War 2. Anyway this is a ancient/medieval Indian history thread so I don't want to be drawn into modern History.

[tsarkar]

Mohan & Airavat,

Mongols constituted not just Mongols, but tribes like the Tatars, Merkits, Keraits, and Naimans, of what I could remember. Bin Kasim used Syrian troops. Alexander used Persian troops. Nadir Shah had Heraklius of Georgia, a Christian chap with him at Karnal.

These chaps were able to coordinate troops from different ethnicity and religions and language or illiterate troops, and with different tactics, and were able to leverage them successfully, while our chaps were unable to coordinate different Rajput clans, speaking the same language and fighting the same way.

With regards to unfamiliar Muslim and Afghan troops, surely Sanga & his generals could have studied their strengths and weaknesses in the run up to Khanua and then decided how to employ them. I am sure the Muslims and Afghans didnt join exactly on the date of battle.

Inability to coordinate different contingents is even WORSE generalship.

Now, the role of Household troops – like UK Household cavalry, Indian Viceroy’s Bodyguards and Abdali’s “personal slaves and servants” at Panipat is not just guard the general, but also to guard supply lines, act as a rearguard and defend the camp at night.

Defending the camp at night was important. It not just protected against the enemy but prevented defections, mutinies, coups and murders as well. This was very important in those times.

Some of the major problems were:
a) Putting the harness on horses. It took finite amount of time and in a night attack the receiving army did not have enough time to properly put stirrups etc on horses.

So, you think horses were unharnessed and roamed free at night like American Mustangs or Black Beauty, eh?

Firstly, harness is used only by draught horses for pulling wagons and cart. Warhorses used by cavalry use a saddle, stirrup, surcingle and cantle. Now, in wartime, draught horses stay harnessed while warhorses stay fitted with surcingle and cantle while watering and feeding.

Now it takes seconds to put a saddle, and the stirrup is attached to the saddle, so NO effort is required to “properly put stirrups”.

Anyways, so much for your knowledge (or lack of it) about horses.

b) Donning armour, chain mail helmets etc took time and was sometimes difficult to do if you were attacked in the night. Without such protection soldiers fell more easily by the blows of the attacking army.

The rationale behind posting pickets and sentries is to buy enough time for the main army to mobilize.

c) Dsitribution of weapons to soldiers also posed a problem.

Ah, so Peter thinks soldiers deposited their swords and other accoutrements in the armoury before sleeping. In those days or today, soldiers on the frontline eat, pee, shit & sleep with their weapons. The soldier is responsible, in those days and today, to maintain his sword or SLR. No one stays naked on the frontline. Any soldier considers himself naked without his weapon.

Guys, think logically, your comments are becoming more unrealistic and more jingoistic.

As per your logic, our chaps could execute complex battle maneuvers with horse archer columns but could not organize basic camp defenses at night or coordinate among different contingents.

Peter, I am not the JNU types, I am ex-Navy, and studying war is a passion with me. What is your background?

I have given very credible examples of Napoleon being forced out of Russia despite using superior tactics and never losing a single battle on the offensive, and similar reasons apply to Rajputs regaining their homeland from the initial Turk invasion.

If you do read better books than poetic works in veer ras, you'll understand the concept of mobilization, and how chaps like Mao used it to grab power. Your saying useless and irrelevant isnt going to reduce importance of these concepts for those who realize and leverage them for advantage.

No matter how jingoistic you get, fact remains that during pivotal battles, our chaps lost, and they lost because they did not learn earlier lessons, or practice and hone those lessons.

No amount of jingoism is going to re-write or change history. What we can realistically do is to learn from history, so that it doesn’t repeat itself.

[Airavat]

Mongols constituted not just Mongols, but tribes like the Tatars, Merkits, Keraits, and Naimans, of what I could remember.

These chaps were able to coordinate troops from different ethnicity and religions and language or illiterate troops, and with different tactics, and were able to leverage them successfully, while our chaps were unable to coordinate different Rajput clans, speaking the same language and fighting the same way.

There is a vast difference between steppe tribes inhabiting no fixed territory, constantly migrating to fresher pastures and hunting grounds, and the Rajput clans who ruled well-defined separate kingdoms. In tribal warfare the defeated were sold into slavery or assimilated among the victors but neither could ever happen in warfare among Kshatriya clans. The defeated paid tribute and at the first sign of weakness of the overlord resumed independence

With regards to unfamiliar Muslim and Afghan troops, surely Sanga & his generals could have studied their strengths and weaknesses in the run up to Khanua and then decided how to employ them. I am sure the Muslims and Afghans didnt join exactly on the date of battle.

Eh? Generals....what generals? In clan armies the head of each clan is its general. There were no staff officers to coordinate among the different elements.

And while the Mongols fought for decades against other tribes before Chingiz was accepted by all as their Kha-Khan, all of Sanga's wars were against the sultanates. He dismembered the Malwa sultanate [another Indian victory], invaded and sacked the Gujarat sultanate [another Indian victory], and defeated the army of the Lodi Sultanate. The coalition with the other Rajput clans was formed through matrimonial alliances, and with the prospect of making gains after defeating the Mughals.

In the case of Afghan and Indian Muslim elements it was a case of late enemies reluctantly joining with infidels to free themselves from the Mughals. Their figurehead was Mahmud Lodi, the brother of Ibrahim, and they rallied around him. Since there is no contemporary record of what actually transpired from the Rajput sources, it's pointless to speculate on what could have/should have happened. In Babur's word the coalition was hastily cobbled together because: "the rajas and rais of high degree, who obeyed him [Sanga] in this battle, and the [Muslim] governors and commanders who were amongst his followers in this conflict had not obeyed him in any earlier fight."

Even in a coalition, contingents remain cohesive, and no proof exists any notable maneuvering by the Mewar contingent.

Until we get an account of the battle from contemporary Rajput sources it's pointless to say "no proof" exists, and equally pointless to claim "Indians never learn". And if Mughal maneuvering was so superior why did the battle last ten hours? And why could they take no prisoners?

I have given very credible examples of Napoleon being forced out of Russia despite using superior tactics and never losing a single battle on the offensive, and similar reasons apply to Rajputs regaining their homeland from the initial Turk invasion.

You seem to have a fondness for comparing apples and oranges .

Napoleon's 1812 campaign in Russia, through the endless plains stretching from Germany to Poland to Russia, was bound to end in failure from the long lines of communication and the appearance of the greatest enemy leader in October: General Winter.

And the Turks, from their nearby base of Delhi, failed to conquer next-door Rajputana despite the territory being divided into several states and despite the smaller Rajput clan armies, whose ranks had been thinned through jauhar and continuous battles!

[peter]

Defending the camp at night was important. It not just protected against the enemy but prevented defections, mutinies, coups and murders as well. This was very important in those times.

You still have not provided a single reference where a night attack was easily handled in medieval ages. Being an arm-chair historian is fine but at some point you do have to corroborate your wild claims. Let us not forget you claim that Dantidurga did not fight Arabs was easily overturned.

Some of the major problems were:
a) Putting the harness on horses. It took finite amount of time and in a night attack the receiving army did not have enough time to properly put stirrups etc on horses.

So, you think horses were unharnessed and roamed free at night like American Mustangs or Black Beauty, eh?

Now you are showing your dim understanding of how horses moved and who took care of them. Their was a separate set of people called saees who took care of all the horses and helped in harnessing them just before the start of the battle. Are you making a laughable suggestion that when armies camped for months staring at each other the horses were harnessed for all this time?

Firstly, harness is used only by draught horses for pulling wagons and cart. Warhorses used by cavalry use a saddle, stirrup, surcingle and cantle. Now, in wartime, draught horses stay harnessed while warhorses stay fitted with surcingle and cantle while watering and feeding.

Now it takes seconds to put a saddle, and the stirrup is attached to the saddle, so NO effort is required to “properly put stirrups”.

Anyways, so much for your knowledge (or lack of it) about horses.

Nope. Read padmanabha again. Man you cannot show your cluelessness so openly. Horses even had plated armour and sometimes their heads had special helmets. All these things took time and they are described in lots of book which you havent read.

c) Dsitribution of weapons to soldiers also posed a problem.

Ah, so Peter thinks soldiers deposited their swords and other accoutrements in the armoury before sleeping. In those days or today, soldiers on the frontline eat, pee, shit & sleep with their weapons. The soldier is responsible, in those days and today, to maintain his sword or SLR. No one stays naked on the frontline. Any soldier considers himself naked without his weapon.

Guys, think logically, your comments are becoming more unrealistic and more jingoistic.

No your comments are becoming more and more un-informed with every post. As said often either you are a marxist (JNU) or AMU type historian who just keeps tooting what is written on wikipedia.

As per your logic, our chaps could execute complex battle maneuvers with horse archer columns but could not organize basic camp defenses at night or coordinate among different contingents.

Hear about Battle of Summel?

Peter, I am not the JNU types, I am ex-Navy, and studying war is a passion with me. What is your background?

If you talk like a duck , walk like a duck ........

I have given very credible examples of Napoleon being forced out of Russia despite using superior tactics and never losing a single battle on the offensive

Just in your imagination. Have you tried comprehending the role of geography in napoleans defeat? Retreating deep into russian tundra was a *superior strategy* of the russians. What is the relevance of this here? Non sequitir.

, and similar reasons apply to Rajputs regaining their homeland from the initial Turk invasion.

What do you mean?

If you do read better books than poetic works in veer ras, you'll understand the concept of mobilization, and how chaps like Mao used it to grab power. Your saying useless and irrelevant isnt going to reduce importance of these concepts for those who realize and leverage them for advantage.

No matter how jingoistic you get, fact remains that during pivotal battles, our chaps lost, and they lost because they did not learn earlier lessons, or practice and hone those lessons.

No amount of jingoism is going to re-write or change history. What we can realistically do is to learn from history, so that it doesn’t repeat itself.

Apples and oranges dear. You talk in air without specific examples. This is called being an arm chair historian. Bring specificity to your argument by reading primary sources.

[tsarkar]

Peter, its useless discussing with you. Keep going strong with your fantasies.

Lastly, the 733 battle was fought between the Arabs and Chalukyas. Had Dantidurga participated and/or played a major role, his inscriptions would have mentioned it.

I am unable to refer to my books right now, but if I remember right, Dantivarman's inscriptions found in Ellora speak of victories against Karnataka Chalukyas and not Melchchas. Now, if he participated and fought that battle, he surely would have highlighted that in his Ellora and other inscriptions.

Oh, and I cite internet sources simply because I cannot type or scan books from my personal collection. And these internet are indeed accurate, rather than your stupid logic of extrapolating of pictures of bows and arrows on walls to deduce horse archer columns.

[Lalmohan]

'and so did the Princes of Hindustan dissipate their energies amongst themselves whilst the dark storm clouds gathered beyond the far horizons...'

[peter]

Peter, its useless discussing with you. Keep going strong with your fantasies.

Lastly, the 733 battle was fought between the Arabs and Chalukyas. Had Dantidurga participated and/or played a major role, his inscriptions would have mentioned it.

I am unable to refer to my books right now, but if I remember right, Dantivarman's inscriptions found in Ellora speak of victories against Karnataka Chalukyas and not Melchchas. Now, if he participated and fought that battle, he surely would have highlighted that in his Ellora and other inscriptions.

Have you read the sources I pointed out earlier about Dantidurga? Or do you think you know more then anyone else on the planet? And coming to the topic how do you think arabs lost since they were the master archers and knew the best strategies and poor Indians were deficient in both? Or did the Indians bribe the arabs too as they later bribed turks in rajasthan ?

Oh, and I cite internet sources simply because I cannot type or scan books from my personal collection. And these internet are indeed accurate, rather than your stupid logic of extrapolating of pictures of bows and arrows on walls to deduce horse archer columns.

This takes the cake! But on a serious note what you are saying is a joke. Everyone knows it. Wikipedia is full of errors.

[peter]

'and so did the Princes of Hindustan dissipate their energies amongst themselves whilst the dark storm clouds gathered beyond the far horizons...'

Not quite!

A very nice description of the medieval period:

William Wilson Hunter describes in Chapter X of his book, The Indian Empire, Its People, History And Products, the organization of Indian kings and how they fought these invaders.

Within a hundred years after his (Muhammad's) death, his followers had invaded the countries of Asia as far as the Hindu Kush. Here there progress was stayed and Islam had to consolidate itself during three more centuries before it grew strong enough to grasp the rich prize of India. But almost from first the Arabs had fixed eager eyes upon that wealthy country. Fifteen years after the death of prophet, Usman sent a sea expedition to Thana and Broach on the Bombay coast (647 ? AD). Other raids towards Sindh took place in 662 and 664 with no results.

The armies of Islam had carried the crescent from the Hindu Kush westwards, through Asia, Africa and Southern Europe, to distant Spain and Gaul, before they obtained a foothold in Punjab. This long delay was due, not only to the daring of individual tribes, such as Sindh Rajputs, just mentioned but to the military organization of the Hindu Kingdoms.

Each of these groups of kingdoms, alike in the north and in the south, had a certain power of coherence to oppose to a foreign invader; while the large number of groups and units rendered conquest a very tedious process. For even when the overlord or central authority was vanquished, the separate units had to be defeated in detail, and each state supplied a nucleus for subsequent revolt. We have seen how the brilliant attempt in 711, to found a lasting Muhammedan dynasty in Sindh, failed. Three centuries later, the utmost efforts of two great Musalman invaders (Mahmud of Ghazni and Mohammed Ghori) from the north-west only succeeded in annexing a small portion of the frontier Punjab Province between 977 and 1176 A.D. The Hindu power in Southern India was not completely broken till the battle of Talikot in 1565; and within a hundred years, in 1650, the great Hindu revival had commenced which under the form of Maratha confederacy, was destined to break up the Mughal Empire in India. That Empire, even in the north of India, had only been consolidated by Akbar's policy of incorporating Hindu chiefs into his government(1556-1605). Up to Akbar's time, and even during the earlier years of his reign a series of Rajput wars had challenged the Muhammadan supremacy. In less than two centuries after his death, the successor of Akbar was a puppet in the hand of the Hindu marathas at Delhi.

The popular notion that India fell an easy prey to the Musalmans is opposed to the historical facts. Muhammadan rule in India consists of a series of invasions and partial conquests, during eleven centuries, from Usman's raid, circ.647, to Ahmad Shah's tempest of invasion in 1761 A.D.

At no time was Islam triumphant throughout the whole of India. Hindu dynasties always ruled over large areas. At the height of the Muhammadan power, the hindu princes paid tribute, and sent agents to the Imperial court. But even this modified supremacy of Delhi lasted for little over a century (1578-1707). Before the end of that brief period the Hindus had begun the work of reconquest. The native chivalry of Rajputana was closing in upon Delhi from the south; the religious confederation of the Sikhs was growing into a military power on the north-west. The Marathas had combined the fighting powers of the low-castes with the statesmen ship of the Brahmans, and were subjecting the Muhammadan kingdoms throughout all India to tribute. So far as can now be estimated, the advance of the English power at the beginning of the present century alone saved the Mughal Empire from passing to the Hindus.

Source Hunter's Analysis

[Lalmohan]

no peter, i was talking about you, tsarkar and airavat
please end this futile discussion

i was just rereading Sandhu this morning on the rajput military system. he talks of traditional organisation being along arthashasthra lines built around a strong feudal societal core. this has advantages of loyalty but weaknesses of not being a meritocracy or where initiative is encouraged. battle being fought along traditional one-one contest lines with little scope for the commander to be creative

he later talks of a remodelling along turkish/mughal lines once they are established as a power, particularly cavalry - which does not appear to be specialised, but certainly more prestigious compared to infantry. the major success of rajput cavalry he suggests are the ability to cut and harrass turushka supply lines and logistics, which probably played a signficant part in their ability to sustain campaigns

he describes rajput cavalry as being armed with everything, but there is no talk of specific cavalry functions in battle. he does talk about different specialist infantry roles though.

[ramana]

Peter and Tsarkarji, Please cut it out. You both have your views and are now getting personal..

I got Lalmohan's admontion right away.

Peter, Yiou once posted a Syrian/Aramic account of Alexander's raid into Punjab. Can you link it again?

[peter]

i was just rereading Sandhu this morning on the rajput military system. he talks of traditional organisation being along arthashasthra lines built around a strong feudal societal core. this has advantages of loyalty but weaknesses of not being a meritocracy or where initiative is encouraged. battle being fought along traditional one-one contest lines with little scope for the commander to be creative

Perhaps not. If one reads medieval rajasthani history (written in Dingal ) what one comes across is a form of jagir (called mundkatya) which was given to the person who showed most bravery or died fighting in the battle. Their were instances when a sixteen year old died fighting and his wife who was pregnant got the jagir using which she looked after her kids and these kids presumably joined the forces of the king. So a war meant lot of rewards. Loyalty was to a brave king. Every major state had commanders from multiple clans. If you look at Mewar some of they commanders were solanki, chauhan, rathore, Dodiya etc. Similarly at Jodhpur Bhatis, Songaras, Khichis played a very important role. I think Sandhu is stretching if he is saying arthashastra was followed to a fault in medieval ages. Their was lot of adaptation. Though bunch of things like treating the adversary honourably was followed.

he later talks of a remodelling along turkish/mughal lines once they are established as a power, particularly cavalry - which does not appear to be specialised, but certainly more prestigious compared to infantry. the major success of rajput cavalry he suggests are the ability to cut and harass turushka supply lines and logistics, which probably played a significant part in their ability to sustain campaigns

Harassing the supply lines is incorrect. If you study how the goods were transported in medieval India it was done on bareback oxen. People who had these oxen were called banjaras. The origin of banjaras is uncertain but according to modern descendants of banjaras they were originally charans and supply business was started by them to make money. Killing a charan and a Banjara was not possible. Infact these people sometimes were also used as security for transactions. Mughals were smart because they realised that due to local customs banjaras would not be killed so they employed them in huge numbers. Even in modern Andhra Pradesh a large number of banjaras were settled in the times of last great moghul Aurangzeb. Their origin is from Marwar. A fascinating book on this tribe is written by Prof Bhukya of Osmania University called "Subjugated nomads : the Lambadas under the rule of the Nizams".

[peter]

Peter, Yiou once posted a Syrian/Aramic account of Alexander's raid into Punjab. Can you link it again?

Here you go. Infact I have done lot more research on this topic and I will post them soon.

"Alexander the great" by Wally Badge which is a Syriac edition, with English translation, of the folk-lore and legends connected to Alexander the Great. This ancient text represents a Greek text that is much older than any text that has been known before. This text shows that alexander was actually defeated (though perhaps a later layering of the text confuses the issue).

a) Darius's call to help from Porus



b) Porus's letter to Alexander and the reply and the ensuing fight

[Karan M]

Wow, a cliffhanger, would you have the follow on pages

[peter]

More evidence has been unearthed by modern historians on Porus and alexander:

Peter Green's (Professor at university of Iowa) : Alexander of Macedon , Page 413:

Despite the legendary wealth of the Indians, Alexander did not acquire much loot ......Yet by the end of his Indian campaign there are definete signs that he was hard pressed for ready cash.

A victor is not pressed for cash as Indians in general had good amount of gold!

So to sum up:
a) Alexander left india hard pressed for cash. (Peter Green Page 413) (Definetely not a sign of a victor). Alexander also found it difficult to pay his army and Porus gets lots of Gold. Now how in the earth would a looser get alexander's gold?

b) Porus increased his territory manifold after this war. (Peter Green Page 412). (As a contrast whoever opposed Alexander bitterly , had their lands taken away and their treausure taken over by alexander.).

c) Alexander showed no mercy to any opponent who opposed him yet we are supposed to believe Porus was pardoned.

d) Badge's translation of syriac work which represents perhaps one of the oldest greek work describing the battle which shows alexander lost. It was written by Callisthenes who was in Alexander's army and this fellow was related to Alexander's guru Aristotle.

e) Also telling is that Alexander had to find a new route to return home. The provinces he captured were up in arms and would have made return miserable. When he decided to sail down Indus no one from Porus's kingdom helped him to:
i) Navigate Indus
ii) Fight against the Malli clan. Fighting them Alxander's lung was pierced.

f) From http://www.livius.orgsite: The Roman author Quintus Curtius Rufus describes how the Babylonian women were raped by Alexander's army on his orders;

and although he describes their behavior as voluntary, we need not doubt that in fact it was not. Greek and Roman authors nearly always blamed women for being raped.

In other words alexanders' troops caused great destruction, pillage of all the places (Persepolis, Babylon etc) and rape of people they attacked. Not a single instance of such behaviour is recorded in Porus' territories. It just points to perhaps that Greeks could not enter the territory held by Porus. Also to connect the letter of Darius written to Porus was perhaps after the harem of Darius (his wife, daughters and mother) fell into the hands of Alexander.

My conclusion is that the claim that Porus lost is dubious. If you study the letters of Ptolemy on Hydapses campaign they are not much. Plutarch a few centuries writes that alexanders army's courage was blunted by fighting Indians.

Wow, a cliffhanger, would you have the follow on pages

I will try to find it.

[wig]

http://www.allempires.net/alexander-the ... page1.html

this is a link to a interet forum wherein a similar discussion took place on the outcomes of the clash of the macedonian king Alexander son of Philip and Porus .
Marshal Zhukov of the USSR seems to have stated in a lecture delivered in the IMA, observed; that as per Russian Historical sources Alexander had lost to Porus.

the e forum has some interesting information with relation to this topic.

[Lalmohan]

sandhu does talk of the banjaras as being vital parts of the supply chain. i read a bit more over the weekend, and i am summarising so don't take everything as precise in terms of timing, e.g. arthashastra in medieval times, he does say descended from... (i'm not trying to score academic points, merely summarising for general interest, sandhu is a brigadier so is one of the few military analysts of the ancient texts, and i am no historian either)

overall he says that the rajput system has strengths and weaknesses. the strength is that its a very strong clan based organisational system, with loyalty to your clan leader, but not necessarily the 'king'. each warrior is trained for personal profiency and is praised on his personal courage and unflinching devotion to his duty. he is well armed and well able to use his arms. courage is highly prized, to the extent that mughals start to refer to rajputs as 'stupid' due to their reckless courage in later texts.

and so weaknesses...

the clan structure means also that it is hard for clans to unite against a common invader, so each gets picked off one by one. 'hindu traditions' mean that no policy of forward defence on the west of the Indus is followed and invaders are allowed to enter the homeland before being engaged. in battle each clan leader wants to claim his own clan's share of the glory, so despite whatever formation was started off with, each clan advances into the thick of the fight and fights to the end - prefering 'manly 1-1 combat' full of chivalrous rules. this often leads to fatigue and late in the day smarter opponents bring in reserves and without any of their own, rajput armies are pushed back. there is little heed paid to manouever once battle has started, and almost no scope for command and control and therefore in-progress generalship was not much practiced. so in terrain where the opponent cannot go around you, rajputs stand a very high chance of success

specifically on horse archer formations, sandhu says that the rajputs do deploy these but only in the 17th century after being closely involved with mughal armies for many years before then. however, by this time, gunpowder starts to dominate the battlefield. there is also a change from commanders using elephants to horses around this time since it was getting easier to shoot a man on an elephant's back

lots of proficiency in sieges and mining/countermining, but less so in seige engines - since all out destruction was not high on the priority list

on the supply chain issue, perhaps what he means is not attacking banjaras but attacking turushka columns on the move, particularly infantry and baggage trains/seige engines, etc.

anyway, interesting stuff

[Lalmohan]

read a bit more of sandhu, his main criticism of the rajputs is their failure to evolve and learn, i.e. honour and courage alone only gets you so far. also he suggests that by a long term alliance with the mughals they ultimately weakened their own abilities and were left vulnerable to marathas and pindaris, eventually seeking 'protection' from the EIC. also saw the ultimate warrior doc last night - rajput versus roman centurion - lots of problems with the different theses, but impressed to see the khanda in action. i can now believe that the maharana of mewar sliced a turk and his horse in half!

just read the chapter on panipat I. more than artillery he talks of clever positioning of muskets and archers in enfilade to prop up the centre, hold up the afghan advance and cause them to become disorganised, whereupon the traditional mongol flank cavalry attacks can be brought to bear and deliver babur the victory. he reiterates that artillery had already been in use in india for some time, but in seige warfare and never before in support of cavalry

tellingly he speaks of the afghans and turks having forgotten their own traditional tactics after years in hindustan and falling victim to it from the mughals

[skanda gupta is credited with the development of a highly mobile indian army which achieved great success, but this was then forgotten over time and more static elephant based tactics predominate (repeating pattern according to him)]

[peter]

the clan structure means also that it is hard for clans to unite against a common invader, so each gets picked off one by one.

But Wilson, as given above, has contradicted this point well.

'hindu traditions' mean that no policy of forward defence on the west of the Indus is followed and invaders are allowed to enter the homeland

Again contradicted well by Wilson:

Within a hundred years after his (Muhammad's) death, his followers had invaded the countries of Asia as far as the Hindu Kush. Here there progress was stayed and Islam had to consolidate itself during three more centuries before it grew strong enough to grasp the rich prize of India. But almost from first the Arabs had fixed eager eyes upon that wealthy country. Fifteen years after the death of prophet, Usman sent a sea expedition to Thana and Broach on the Bombay coast (647 ? AD). Other raids towards Sindh took place in 662 and 664 with no results.

The armies of Islam had carried the crescent from the Hindu Kush westwards, through Asia, Africa and Southern Europe, to distant Spain and Gaul, before they obtained a foothold in Punjab. This long delay was due, not only to the daring of individual tribes, such as Sindh Rajputs, just mentioned but to the military organization of the Hindu Kingdoms.

before being engaged. in battle each clan leader wants to claim his own clan's share of the glory, so despite whatever formation was started off with, each clan advances into the thick of the fight and fights to the end - prefering 'manly 1-1 combat' full of chivalrous rules. this often leads to fatigue and late in the day smarter opponents bring in reserves and without any of their own, rajput armies are pushed back. there is little heed paid to manouever once battle has started, and almost no scope for command and control and therefore in-progress generalship was not much practiced. so in terrain where the opponent cannot go around you, rajputs stand a very high chance of success

Think the reasons might be different. One big reason was getting out numbered both in men and resources.

specifically on horse archer formations, sandhu says that the rajputs do deploy these but only in the 17th century after being closely involved with mughal armies for many years before then. however, by this time, gunpowder starts to dominate the battlefield. there is also a change from commanders using elephants to horses around this time since it was getting easier to shoot a man on an elephant's back

The key here is that for the invaders this supposed trump card of cavalary archers was neutralised in rajasthan when Turks were driven out during the 13th - 15th century. Ability to shoot arrows on horseback by Hindus is well attested in this time frame. Whether this ability is what caused them to neutrailise turk archery columns is unknown.

[Lalmohan]

peter i cant help feeling you're missing the point about the tactical deployment of horse archer formations and the style of feint/attack that the turko-mongols utilised. we're really spinning our wheels on this issue.

you dont need other horse archers to counter them

as stated before, the rajput style of fighting was about individual courage and performance, not the combined effort of a disciplined formation. therefore whilst individual rajputs were probably highly proficient at horseback archery, there was no tactical doctrine on their usage for specific actions in battle

and yes - there were from say 800 AD to 1200 AD lots of different Rajput kingdoms, those that were strong and unified did throw out any invaders. those that did not - failed. particularly khilji's temporary subjugation of rajasthan is attributed to this failure.

as always we are dealing with a long period of time during which many things change. few things remain constant

[peter]

peter i cant help feeling you're missing the point about the tactical deployment of horse archer formations and the style of feint/attack that the turko-mongols utilised. we're really spinning our wheels on this issue.

you dont need other horse archers to counter them

Ok so then how do you think the turks were thrown out of Rajasthan?

Secondly mughals threw out Afghans and not the turks. Lodis were afghans. They were never proficient in archery. If you read Baburnama great praise is showered on archers in the battle of Panipat against Lodi ( I have posted snippets from Baburnama above). Same praise is not showered on archers against Sanga at Khanua pointing to that archers were not useful.

[Lalmohan]

individual skills versus formation tactics
lets stop this fruitless discussion please