Managing Pakistan's failure

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Prem
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Prem » 06 Sep 2010 08:08

Lets keep few Millions on the side to buy all the Ghee to be put in Poak-Mouth. :wink:

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 06 Sep 2010 15:46

Advantages of Indo-Afghan Partnership

India should proceed to procure weapon systems, etc. to bolster our conventional military strength. One should however keep in mind, that if India moves into also waging asymmetric warfare or proxy war with Pakistan using our Afghan partners, then the costs would ultimately be far less and the benefits be far greater.

In fact the Pakistani Army and everything could be brought down by investing something like 5 to 6 billion USD within the next 5-6 years in asymmetric warfare against Pakistan.

If Pakistan can provide money and weapons to Kashmiri separatists and Maoists and the like, what stops us from adopting similar tactics by supporting Pushtun and Baluchi patriots.

We should also consider that with China being more assertive against India, India needs to neutralize any danger from our West. This is the most cost effective strategy.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Johann » 08 Sep 2010 01:48

RajeshG wrote:Johann,

There is a subtle difference in how i understand this. Pakistan doesnt have a choice on whether it can harness Global Jihad or not.

The term "Islamic Nationalism" has 2 parts to it. Islam and Nation.

Islam cannot but globalize (its not for somebody to harness) and Nationalism cannot but localize. "Islamic Nationalism" then gets caught in this contradiction of whether to globalize or localize. That is why i dont think the term "muslim chauvinism" or "muslim nationalism" really applies to Pakistaniyat. It may start out like that but then it gets a life of its own.

On top of it "Islam" being based on Koran and the word of God makes it interesting for Pakistan. The word of God is absolute and you have got to take the whole thing as-is. Ecumenism or Secularism wont help Pakistan at all. Both of those concepts will dilute the Islamic foundation and will result in failure of Pakistaniyat.

Pakistan's success or failure will depend on the success or failure of "Islamic Nationalism" as that is what Pakistan is -> an Islamic Nation.


Hi Rajesh,

The Muslim Brotherhood was one of the pioneers of Islamic Nationalism, even though they initially used the rhetoric of Pan-Islamism. The result is odd alliances, where the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (renamed Hamas) allies with the secular Syrian regime (run by Alawis, who are not even regarded as Muslims by many Sunnis), ignoring and screwing over the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which was bloodily suppressed by the same Syrian government. Palestinian national interests trumped the ideological requirement of supporting their Syrian brothers within the movement.

Similarly Pakistan's (largely PA-promoted) Islamic Nationalism ignores the suppression of both Uighur Muslims and Uighur Islamists in Xinjiang because it is not in Pakistan's *national* interests to p!ss off the PRC. The Global Jihad on the other hand did not privilege such national interests, which is why there were so many Uighur jihadis in their Afghan camps who then wound up in Gitmo and are the object of complex world-spanning negotiations.

Islamic Nationalists, whether Palestinian or Pakistani only deploy Pan-Islamism in a strategic manner that serves their *national* interests. They are never going to put the ummah first for its own sake.

Where they differ from their secular opponents at least in the Arab cases is how they define the identity of the nation. The PLO wants Palestinians to think of themselves as Palestinians and Arabs, while Hamas wants them to see themselves as Palestinians and Muslims, but being Palestinian is central in both cases. Palestine itself as an identity (distinct from the rest of the Levant/Bilad ash-Sham) is a relatively recent one, born out of conflict with Jewish settlers, but one that is very real today.

In Pakistan's specific case the PA is the home of Islamic Nationalism since Pakistan's national identity is relatively a new and weak concept.

Can the *idea* of Pakistan (as it stood from 1972 to present, rather than Jinnah's formulation), and thus Pakistan's Islamic nationalism survive should the PA collapse?

It is possible. Afghanistan as an idea didn't really exist before the 18th century and the rise of the Pashtuns. Despite being marked by Pashtun domination, despite a weak state and enormous instability, it hasn't gone away, even among non-Pashtun minorities who you might imagine would rather be part of Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan, or Hazaristan or anything else given half a chance.

There are structural processes that over time provide a basis for the emergence and survival of national identities, and we have to look at these. I am doubtful that Karachi or Peshawar will ever escape the gravitational pull of an independent Pakjab for example....just as its difficult to disassemble the economic and social relationships between Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul and Kandahar.

On the other hand Afghanistan's own internal contradictions which allowed for the survival of Afghan national identity have also left it open to direct and indirect intervention by other powers, so Afghanistan's fate may be shared by Pakistan as well.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby vnadendla » 08 Sep 2010 23:46

ramana wrote:Think why? Why the constant confrontation and why the constant dribblle of 'aid and advice" to keep them alive but not strong enough to damage elsewhere which is the right hunting grounds for them if they are Zarb-e-Momin?

Yes. I agree. My Point is that there is nothing inherent in the Pakistani State location that is unstable. It is in the choices that they are making (with some prodding and lot of day dreaming). The apprarent Indus River instability should make them be friendly to India (Just the direct access to Indian Ocean should have made Chinese friendly) .

Why do states make decisions that are not in their self interest?.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 08 Sep 2010 23:54

Maybe they view from a different angle? Due to culture, history etc.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Pulikeshi » 09 Sep 2010 12:48

ramana wrote:Can you write a short note on this idea?

Thanks, ramana


Here goes the draft - comments are welcome.

Pakistan’s “Chandrasekhar” Limit


The maximum mass allowed for a stable star is referred to as the Chandrasekhar Limit, so named after the eminent scientist of Indian origin who discovered it. Any star above this mass would explode as a supernova, become a Neutron star or degenerate into a Black Hole. Prominent British Astrophysicist Eddington’s obdurate incredulity, when faced with Dr. Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar’s meticulous mathematical proof of relativistic degeneracy that presupposed a Black Hole is now legend. You may ask what does this have to do with developing countries and the challenges they face. It would indeed be fanciful to compare nation-states to stars and find parallels in theories on stellar dynamics. However, in spite of solid proof of progressive degeneracy in the Pakistani nation-state, various global powers have expressed obdurate incredulity and refused to consider the obvious.

Nation-states are no less complicated than stars in that they can exhibit different degrees of success depending on the mass -- population, resources, geography, etc. They could be characterized as Strong, Weak, Failed, Nominal, Virtual, Rump or Collapsed. One could argue, at a point in time, the success of a nation-state is the result of intrinsic mass and external environmental conditions it is subject to. All states expend energy and must have sustainable resources and mass to ensure stability.

To begin, the success of a state can be characterized by measuring its ability to deliver politico-economic goods. This includes governance, security, infrastructure, health care, financial institutions, environment, etc. Strong states are good at the delivery of the said goods and Weak states have room for improvement. Failed states, are not beyond repair, but are at risk of becoming Nominal or Collapsed states. Collapsed states, similar to Black Holes, are beyond repair and require overwhelming measures. Virtual and Rump states form when either territory is partially or completed lost. Finally, Nominal states, are states that have either failed or collapsed, but are nominally held up by external powers to pursue realistic geo-political goals in a neighborhood.

What type of nation-state is Pakistan today? By most measure, commentators from Pakistan and the world over have concluded that it is a failed state, even if no one wants to say it out loud. Governance, healthcare, education, financial institutions, infrastructure, etc. all exist in various states of decay and degeneracy. However, it would be difficult to make the claim that Pakistan is a collapsed state, given the nature of security and civil society has not reached the levels we see in Somalia, Sierra Leone, etc. External military aid sustains and holds the security apparatus in place to give them an apparition of a nation-state to claim their own. The response of the civilian apparatus to recent floods, continuing sectarian and terrorist violence removes any doubt one may have on the nature of this state. The state today exists nominally, with fewer and fewer areas under its control, supported by external players who bend the state to pursue their geo-political interests in the region. Pakistan’s geography is more crucial to external powers than her citizens or their well being. We see evidence for this in the disparity between the aid and assistance provided to the military versus that provided to civil society.
What is Pakistan’s “Chandrasekhar” limit? The Chandrasekhar limit approximately determines that for a star to remain stable it ought to be less than 1.4 times the mass of our Sun. It is much more difficult to determine a crisp limit for nation-states. However, if we were to establish a limit based on the ability to deliver politico-economic goods, then where does Pakistan fall in terms of such a limit? What is the intrinsic mass and what forces should one consider in determining the eventual stable point?

Pakistan was set up hastily by the British as a Muslim homeland. Yet, today there are more Muslims in secular but Hindu majority India. It seems tenuous, given the evidence over the last 63 years, that we will see a well adjusted nation-state in Pakistan. If such a miracle were to occur, then what would the raison d'être be for a secular democratic Muslim majority state right next to India – a secular democratic Hindu majority state with an even larger Muslim population than Pakistan. The conundrum is deeper especially given the common culture and civilization that the two countries share. Thus religious and political ideology has not provided enough mass to sustain the state.

Writer Fatima Bhutto estimates that 27 families control Pakistan a nation of 170 million citizens. If this is true and even if one were to assume 6-7 people in each family, roughly one person controls the destiny of a million people in Pakistan today. The top ruling feudal elite includes generals and military brass. Indeed, the whole country today is run by rent-seekers who service the geo-political needs of the highest external bidder. Therefore, the final state of Pakistan is much more dependent upon the geo-political desires of external powers, such as the United States of America, United Kingdom, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia and India among others. Given the intrinsic nature and external forces acting on the Pakistan nation, one can see evidence for two distinct end states. One where the inherent contradictions in the state leads it to collapse, the other option is the support provided by external actors causes the state to stabilize and nurture itself back to Weak state.

Collapse, similar to Somalia or Sierra Leone is possible. However, major external powers, including India surprisingly, do not seem interested in this becoming a reality. A Black Hole in this region has large implications for wider regional stability. Further, the cost of recovery from collapse provides sufficient incentive to all parties, to work together, to prevent this very unpalatable option. India in particular seems too anxious in preventing this situation, given the possibility of a major refugee crisis and the subsequent need to provide economic aid and stabilize the region. India has outsourced foreign policy to other external players and wants to be left alone to pursue 8-10% economic growth for the next 15 years. It is uncertain if India will be allowed this luxury by the other external players, or by a belligerent Pakistan that uses terrorism as an instrument of state against India.

The other possibility is where Pakistan turns itself around using external aid successfully. The dictator cycles of Ayub, Yahya, Zia, Musharaff and perhaps Kiyani does not instill confidence in this eventuality. Given such dismal history, one other less considered option is a restructuring that enables a more stable solution. This requires us to look briefly at the Indian sub-continent prior to the Mughals and British arrival in India. Traditionally, since the very beginning, the Indus valley culture including the culture that dotted the Saraswathi river and the later culture that flourished along the Ganga have had strong linkages. The drying up of the Saraswathi River and the slow process of desertification that set in subsequently caused the Indus culture to become increasingly cut off from the Ganga and susceptible to foreign invasions from North and West. This has established a culture of love and hate that predates organized religion, governance structures, etc. Today, it is only further exacerbated with the rise of modern India. On the other hand, Pakistan today with a 2% GDP growth and a 5% fertility rate presents strong evidence for a further declining Indus culture.

Understanding these cultural undercurrents and the rivalry for scarce resources that has now morphed into a religious and geo-political problem gives us a different perspective. This could explain why India has hesitation in allowing a breakup of Pakistan, as India understands the nature of this rivalry which is going to increasingly evolve into a fight for scarce resources especially water, better management of arable land and demographic pressures. India, till date, does not seem convinced that the cost of managing a Pakistan broken down into Baloch, Sindh, FATA and Punjab as lower than an engagement of the whole. Even though, there remains some confusion on who to engage in the whole. The question remains open on India’s patience and how many Mumbai like challenges or worse it will tolerate into the future. The other external players view the breakup as a collapse, not a change for a more stable alternative. Further, even if there are some who could tolerate a loose confederacy of states, the external actors including India suspect that the cost of managing unified policy would be more difficult with multiple actors.

Finally, the evidence so far seems to suggest that Pakistan will disintegrate into ethnic components, but for the external scaffolding providing a veneer to maintain a nominal state. Indeed collapse is likely, in spite of the best efforts of external powers. India, better realize that the security of the Gangetic plain is assured only when they provide good governance and influence if not control over the Indus plain. Ultimately, India’s economic dream will come to a naught if a Black Hole emerges to the West due to cultural reluctance to do what is necessary to maintain stability. The external powers are welcome to utilize their scarce resources, as long as their taxpayers indulge them, to intervene on Pakistan’s behalf. However, like Eddington, they vainly hope that Black Holes are mathematical fiction. It may be too late by the time they realize a collapse is inevitable. The cost of resurrecting a collapsed Pakistan will be far greater than the cost to manage a loose confederacy of states in strong politico-economic alliance with India.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 09 Sep 2010 14:02

Pulikeshi,

STUPENDOUS post!!! Keep 'em coming!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby shiv » 09 Sep 2010 16:26

Pulikeshi wrote:
To begin, the success of a state can be characterized by measuring its ability to deliver politico-economic goods. This includes governance, security, infrastructure, health care, financial institutions, environment, etc. Strong states are good at the delivery of the said goods and Weak states have room for improvement. Failed states, are not beyond repair, but are at risk of becoming Nominal or Collapsed states. Collapsed states, similar to Black Holes, are beyond repair and require overwhelming measures. Virtual and Rump states form when either territory is partially or completed lost. Finally, Nominal states, are states that have either failed or collapsed, but are nominally held up by external powers to pursue realistic geo-political goals in a neighborhood.


That is an excellent and very usable classification. Serendipity at work here.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 09 Sep 2010 19:11

A Gem, so here!

X-Posting from TIRP Thread

shiv wrote:
SSridhar wrote:Just was watching the PCB Chairman's defence of the Pakistani cricketers. It is amazing to see how every Pakistani exhibits the same traits of perfidy, obfuscation, excuses, lies etc. What is it that makes them all behave in this fashion ? This is more a rhetorical question.


By coincidence I was mentioning something similar to someone else today. It seems to me that Pakistan has worked itself up to be an amoral, if not immoral criminal enterprise.

Why? One might ask. Isn't everyone equally immoral or amoral?

Somehow Pakistanis seem to have decided that if every man, woman or child can grab something by intimidation they will do it. If they fail they will beg, And if begging fails hey will steal. Everyone is doing it. The army dos it. The RAPE do it and mango Abdul sees no other route. If there is an electricity line - people will tap free power from it. If someone is giving aid - they will put up a show to make sure that more aid comes in.

One possible reason for this is something that nobody in the world outside of BR will believe. When Pakistanis rejected India they rejected everything related to Dharma. Dharma is non religious - but Pakis chose the route that said "If something is non Islamic it must be rejected whether it is religious or secular"

But does that mean that morality is non existent in Islam? Pakistanis have been unable to show that morality exists in Islam. They have tended to act as if 7th century Arabian morality is all that is needed. As long as Arabic texts are quoted as sources for justifying some act, Pakistanis have clung on to that. In the early year Pakistanis had enough innate Indian culture to take them forward for a few decades, but after that they have exhausted everything and created a basically morally bankrupt society.

My theories may all be completely wrong. I don't know - I don't have a full explanation of why Pakistan seems to be a deceiving criminal enterprise full of liars from top to bottom.


From saying Pakistan do more, we have reached Pakistan do morality (at least little bit). :D

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Hari Seldon » 09 Sep 2010 19:24

My fear is that the 3.5 sponsors of TSP may someday figure out that the bestest way to constrain/hobble Yindia on the world stage is to allow TSP to disintegrate and then try to merge that cancerous entity with Yindia using all sorts of noises - track II, lifafa media, Nobel hawards, blandishments such as the US secular council seat, browbeating such as equating casteism with apartheid and that sorta old games. Only.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby krisna » 09 Sep 2010 19:35

^^^^
hope part of what you say happens- disintegration of TSP, the other part we have to pick on the remains. :twisted: :evil:

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Lalmohan » 09 Sep 2010 19:37

if TSP balkanizes, then certainly afghanistan must too. the repurcussions must ripple through into Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Held-Uiguristan, which are all already individually simmering amongst themselves and with each other. Eye-ran will also see ripples flow through, which may or may not be damped/enhanced by its own internal situations. In the middle of this imbroglio lies the rabid nuke armed TSPA and rump Pakjab and Pakjabi Taliban super-cyclone. It behooves The Middle Kingdom to intervene more strongly and secure its western marches. oh, how history repeats itself!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RamaY » 09 Sep 2010 20:09

Pulikeshi garu,

good perspective. I have a question though. Are you looking for a chandrashekar's limit at which a nation state stops becoming a failed state or what is TSP's chandrashekar's limit?

If it is second, I think it would be when a TSPA brigade (or equivalent size) deserts and joins a militent Islamic group. Or TSPA disbandinds a brigade on such a reason.

I doubt that will happen as long as 3.5 fund TSPA and they pay the salaries. Or there should be a couple of lalmasjid scenarios.

JMT

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Lalmohan » 09 Sep 2010 20:11

or there should be the rise of independent barons... perhaps more autonomy for different corps, with their commanders doing things more independently. unfortunately, these nawabs are still very locked into the badshah

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 09 Sep 2010 22:17

Pulikeshi, Thanks for indulging me. I am glad you used the term Chandrasekhar* Limit and physics analogy to describe the various states of state failure. After we get some comments it should be blogged in the Pak watch blog.

RamaY, The whole uncle effort is to prevent that very event by 'educating' rising officers in US academies to profile them young and lots of baksheesh by way of visas to F&F etc. look even a vetrans aassociation is admitting Paki jihadis to get an early warning.

The cognisanti among them will catch the ref to Moon God and its connotation.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 09 Sep 2010 22:20

Can some one use the C Limit theory and run the Predictioneer's game on it? From Strong at Independence to Nominal at current stage?

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 09 Sep 2010 23:13

Another data point:

Nightwatch, 8 Sept., 2010, on the pak flood response and mutual statemetns from US and TSP


Pakistan-US: Pakistan's armed forces have continued the fight against Islamist militants in the country's west and northwest despite floods, a senior US officer in charge of U.S. military aid in Pakistan said 8 September, Agence France-Presse reported. According to the report, a very senior US military officer said some "aviation resources" have been dispatched for flood relief and rescue operations, but the Pakistani military has remained focused on operations against extremists.

Late on 8 September, the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States flatly contradicted the senior US military official. He said all the resources of the armed forces are committed to flood relief at the expense of the fight against terrorists. Flood relief and recovery are the highest national priorities..

NightWatch Comment: Agence France-Presse reported the strange American military statement and relayed it around the world. US and international media reported the Ambassador's statement. The issue begs for some perspective, if only for educational purposes.

The US military statement portrays the Pakistan armed forces as if they were irresponsible in the face of a national calamity. The Ambassador's statement clarifies that the US statement is flat wrong and the Pakistani armed forces are doing exactly the same tasks the US national guard undertakes to cope with natural disasters.

US personnel must come to understand that Pakistani Ambassadors, Generals and Admirals are the best sources for commenting on the uses of Pakistani military resources in support of national disaster relief in Pakistan.

The Pakistani leadership - civilian political leaders and flag officers - are in step, rather unusually, that flood relief, stabilization and recovery are exponentially more important as national security tasks than anything else. By some Pakistani accounts, a third of the population has been displaced by the flooding.

Even a novice should understand that all national resources must be committed to alleviating the effects of such flooding. No Pakistani leader is asserting that the Pakistan armed forces are continuing counter-extremist operations as usual. With a third of the population affected by the floods, every Pakistani in government and in uniform has a relative in trouble because of the floods.

Finally, there is the phenomenology of limited national resources. When a nation generates its armed forces to prepare for war, it distorts civilian normality and draws resources from the civil sectors to increase national military, combat power.

Increases in military power come at the expense of civilian normality. This is true even for small border skirmishes that only require civilian trucks to move forces to the border. It is uneconomical, inefficient and foolish to devote wartime levels of resources to the maintenance of the armed forces in peacetime. Thus, prudent leaders designate in advance those otherwise productive civilian resources that the government will commandeer in wartime and only in wartime.

The rule also works in reverse, in that the armed forces of a state are usually the only reservoir of manpower and organized technical resources that can be applied to alleviate a civilian disaster. The Pakistani response of using military assets to assist the civil sector during the flooding is typical of all nations. The draw down of military normality -- combat readiness -- is essential to stabilize a civilian disaster.

This is appropriate and typical. The most salient examples of the reverse flow of resources from the military into the civilian sectors occurred during the Chernobyl disaster, the North Korean famine and the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans.

In Chernobyl, containment of the nuclear disaster required the engineering resources of the entire Soviet armed forces for a year. The Korean famine in 1995 and 1996 resulted in the Korean Peoples Army guarding grain fields in addition to growing food themselves. In the US, the use of the national guard for civilian relief has become a routine feature of a state's reserve assets for civilian relief and recovery.

The operations of the Pakistan armed forces, especially the helicopter crews, are four-square in the mainstream of the proper use of military forces to support civil authorities. The Pakistani relief effort is another textbook example of how resources shift in support of national priorities.

For new analysts: The lessons are inerrant and unmistakable. Always watch the interface of civil and military resources to diagnose national behavior. Whenever civilian normality is disrupted and the direction of resource flow is towards the military so as to increase military power, real war preparations are occurring -- always and in every country.

Whenever military assets are being used to support civilian disaster relief, the activity is not a cover for war preparations. The direction of flow of military resources to support civil authorities is an unambiguous indicator of a genuine national disaster.

The Pakistan floods are an obvious case, but in many crises and countries in the past 40 years, the situation has not been so clear because natural disasters occur during war preparations. The most reliable discriminator for distinguishing war preparations from civilian relief operations is the direction of flow of the resources.



Interesting. It explains the TSP takleef about the word Cold Start.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Prem » 09 Sep 2010 23:28

ramana wrote:Interesting. It explains the TSP takleef about the word Cold Start.

Cold Start =Economic Cost=Real Takleef to3.5 Pitahs and Poak Puttar. Is this pain to them the real preassure india can apply> If So its gonna get mighty painful by the day/s. The new flood flog is just topping and come handy if it become reoccuring phenomenon with climatic changes in the area and the world. Soil erosion and importation foodgrain will unravel Pakistan faster and better than war.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby svinayak » 09 Sep 2010 23:32

ramana wrote:
For new analysts: The lessons are inerrant and unmistakable. Always watch the interface of civil and military resources to diagnose national behavior. Whenever civilian normality is disrupted and the direction of resource flow is towards the military so as to increase military power, real war preparations are occurring -- always and in every country.

Whenever military assets are being used to support civilian disaster relief, the activity is not a cover for war preparations. The direction of flow of military resources to support civil authorities is an unambiguous indicator of a genuine national disaster.

The Pakistan floods are an obvious case, but in many crises and countries in the past 40 years, the situation has not been so clear because natural disasters occur during war preparations. The most reliable discriminator for distinguishing war preparations from civilian relief operations is the direction of flow of the resources.



This is a keeper

Interesting. It explains the TSP takleef about the word Cold Start.[/quote]

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RamaY » 09 Sep 2010 23:41

Assuming that TSPA is busy with flood relief efforts for a month, it would provide sufficient space for the TTP to reclaim (of course overtly) the regions they were pushed out of in the past few months.

Perhaps that is the reason why we see more and more dronacharya attacks in pauqi land nowadays; unkil doing what he could to control the above scenario.

If this happens, we can see another round of TSPA action causing yet another round of internal displacement and soosai dhamakas. So Allah is setting the stage for next years holy month dhamaka...

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 10 Sep 2010 02:36


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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Pulikeshi » 10 Sep 2010 03:18

ramana wrote:The cognisanti among them will catch the ref to Moon God and its connotation.


This one was fun!
:mrgreen: :twisted:

Where is the link to the pak watch blog? There is another idea cooking want to read up first...

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 10 Sep 2010 03:55

Contact SSridhar!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 10 Sep 2010 16:28

Continuing from the post in Pak Occupied Kashmir News and Discussion Thread

Questions:
  • If Pakistan is fed Kashmir Valley by the Chinese, would it still fail?
  • Would it not give Pakistan a new lease of life?
  • Would the hearts of the Pakistanis not flutter again in the hope of making the thousand cuts with a deeper blade, in the shadow of Chinese hegemony?
  • Can India then keep the Islamists from spreading their wings into India?
  • Would the Chinese allow their whore, the Pakjabis to fail in controlling Pakistan, Chinese route to South-West Asia?

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby sarkar » 10 Sep 2010 17:46

RajeshA wrote:With money India can buy off the politicians and the junta leadership to an extent, that we could impose an arbitrary map, political system and arrangement with India as we like.


So can PRC also and Pak would love to get sold to Chinese, just like they gifted parts of Kashmir to PRC. Imagine a Shaolin Temple to Islamic Kungfu in lahoreziang. :lol:

The moment the world realize that "Pak bikau hai", everyone will try to get a piece of it and Unkil will be first in line.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 10 Sep 2010 18:58

sarkar wrote:
RajeshA wrote:With money India can buy off the politicians and the junta leadership to an extent, that we could impose an arbitrary map, political system and arrangement with India as we like.


So can PRC also and Pak would love to get sold to Chinese, just like they gifted parts of Kashmir to PRC. Imagine a Shaolin Temple to Islamic Kungfu in lahoreziang. :lol:

The moment the world realize that "Pak bikau hai", everyone will try to get a piece of it and Unkil will be first in line.


sarkar welcome to BRF Universe.

Pak is since long bikau!!!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby surinder » 10 Sep 2010 20:21

Prem wrote:... 3.5 Pitahs and Poak Puttar.


Prem, I remember you coining a term "3.5 Boyfriends". I loved that term. I should remember to use when I write about Packroachistan (another great term from you).

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 10 Sep 2010 23:10

X-Posted from Pak Occupied Kashmir News and Discussion Thread

shiv wrote:
RajeshA wrote:shiv ji,

What is the value of Lahore? What is the value of Peshawar?


Taken together
    The end of Pakistan as we know it
    Access to Afghanistan and CAR
    Control of trade routes
    Control over downriver water
    Control over Chinese access to Gwadar or Karachi



shiv ji,
You are quite aware that capturing and holding are two different things. Holding POK is easy, going from the difficulties of terrain rohitvats has explained. It is sparsely populated, that too with mostly Shia, who don't owe any loyalty to Rawalpindi. Holding Lahore and Peshawar reminds me of Green Zones with soldiers being taken down by IEDs and suicide bomibings.

We have discussed many aspects of 'Managing Pakistan's Failure'. Now I think a far more plausible scenario would be something we have not really discussed there.

If POK is in the hands of PRC, they have full access to Pakjab. Pakjabi Army would become an offshoot of PLA, and would be used for the services of securing the current Pakistani territory and transporting Oil and Gas from Iran and Gulf to Western China, and transporting goods manufactured in Western China (Tibet and Sinkiang) to the world through Gwadar, which becomes a Chinese town. China gets to finally populate its West with Han Chinese. With PLA in POK, even if Pakistan breaks apart with an independent Pushtunistan, Pakistan will survive. Sindh will hang on and Baluchis will be crushed with the help of Chinese.

From enhanced trade Pakistan too profits, and can avert its demise. With PRC in World Bank and IMF, they could even get them to write off Pakistan's debt. What happens is India gets an opponent to its West which will not go down, simply because the Chinese would have ensured that with nukes, weapons, money, and even PLA support.

Would that not be a heaven-sent opportunity for TSPA to increase terrorism in India, convinced that India cannot retaliate? From that point onwards India would always be on the back foot. With POK fully in the hands of Chinese, how long would it take for Kashmir Valley to break free?

I have not gone into economics, but our strategic situation would have been fcuked up thoroughly.

If PLA sits in POK, what are the chances of India taking Lahore and Peshawar from TSPA? None!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Johann » 12 Sep 2010 04:43

Rajesh A,

I'd largely agree.

- The threat from the Pakiban (specifically their violence, not their social policing) has kept the most of the Pakjabi public, and even large segments of the Pushtun public close to the PA despite its failures, and its overall responsibility for nurturing the violent movement. The PA seems to be enjoying good press even from the floods while letting the civil powers take the blame for failures.

- The Sindhi establishment in the form of powerful families like the Bhuttos/Zardaris, as well as its professional and middle classes have not broken with the idea of Pakistan yet, rather they want a larger share of power and the benefits of power.

- China's growing involvement in Pakistan's economy and its plans to turn it in to a Freightlinistan/Pipelineistan should not be assumed to include a complete commitment to preserving Pakistan's integrity or Islamabad's direct control. If the PA and Pakistani elite fall down on the job, the PRC will hedge its bets by making friends with powerful groups, both ethnic and religious. If the PA can not crush the Baluchis, the Chinese will do their best to buy their support and partnership - support for autonomy, restrictions on Pakjabi/Sindhi/Pashtun settlement, etc plus of course lots of money.


There are important questions however;

- If it is up to the Pakistanis, Sindh and Pakjab are likely to remain places where the economy is overwhelmingly dominated by agriculture. Issues of water management, land management, rural health and education, the global commodities market, internal rural-urban migration, climate change, access to capital etc will all have an enormous impact on the social and economic fate of Sindh and Pakjab. Will the elite continue to control the countryside and make real money off of it through things like textiles? Or will it become an enormous drag, unable to feed itself?

- Is China likely to contribute towards Pakistan's industrialisation and economic modernisation? Could it make sense for them to invest in the PA and the Pakistani elites for both agricultural and even certain kinds of industrial production given the low cost of labour and the lack of labour organisation, environmental controls, etc? The PRC has cultivated militaristic pariah regimes like North Korea, Pakistan and Burma for geopolitical reasons, but they offer economic potential as well, and one that goes beyond transit trade.

- Will deep-seated economic involvement give the PRC greater incentive to reign in the PA? The PA's traditional approach breeds both internal and regional conflict that would threaten production, transportation and the general flow of trade.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby shiv » 12 Sep 2010 07:14

Cross posting my own post from the PoK thread:

The US and the Soviet Union spent decades supplying arms and supporting insurgencies (and making "allies") with opposing sides in many conflicts. China started this game late and there were very few insurgencies it could "enter" in the manner that the imperialist powers of yore did. However China did cut its teeth (and have its ass chewed off) in the Korean war.

But the one country that met the requirements as slave/lackey/vassal of both the US and China was Pakistan. For the US it is likely that Pakistan was a "cold war ally". Opposing India may have been a secondary goal for the US. Having said that, just because opposing India was a secondary goal, it does not mean that the US wanted Pakistan to unravel or collapse or be defeated and was always there by Pakistan's side to prevent that.

China on the other hand has needed Pakistan specifically to oppose India. Pakistan sucked up to China right after the 1962 war and China provided Pakistan with 70 fighters just after the 1965 war.

But this cannot be taken to mean that China is the bigger threat using the specious argument that "China is only anti-India. The US is not specifically anti-India" When it comes to Pakistan's survival - the US needs it as much, if not more than China. The US too has a great interest in preserving its slave the Pakistani army and their fiefdom, Pakistan. It is a completely fallacious argument to say that a Chinese presence in PoK suddenly offers a new threat that was completely absent when the US parked itself in Pakistan.

Remember folks - when China entered Tibet - India at least protested feebly. When the US parked itself in Pakistan - initially in the late 1950s, later when the US re entered Pakistan for the cold war and again in 2001 there was not a chirp from an India worrying about foreign forces in Pakistan. How fraudulent is our worry about the Chinese in PoK? Anyone who has been following military events in the subcontinent knows that the US is in a position to provide satellite based intel to Pakistan about Indian movements and US AWACS aircraft can warn Pakistans of impending Indian attacks. They have actually done that on several occasions - certainly at the time of Parakram and perhaps during Brasstacks. And US advisers were actually involved in action against India in 1965 and 1971. Check Chuck Yeager's memoirs. So what is this extra threat that the Chinese in PoK represent?

As long as the US is sitting in Pakistan, China is not going to have a safe route for its supplies via Pakistan even if they finish building all those roads and Gwadar. Pakistan, (specifically the Pakistani army) has two sponsors who are looking for its survival. Both want "a stable Pakistan" for their own ends even if it is not merely to keep India down. Keeping India at bay is the return favor that the Chinese and Americans have to offer to the Pakis in exchange for ensuring that US and Chinese interests are met. The big "nightmare scenario" that has often been expressed on this forum is Chinese-American cooperation to "attack/take out India". While having nightmares is everyone's birthright the most likely scenario in which this nightmare can come true is if the existence of Pakistan as a state or the existence of the Pakistani army come under threat from India.

This is something we need to be prepared to face off if ever we need military action to break Pakistan. Neither China nor the US will be interested in worrying too much if nukes are used against India, and any dreams of US denuking Pakistan or nukes being shipped back across the KKH are just pipe dreams that need to be discarded very quickly. The one option that remains for India in the short to medium term is the "Mao option" - ie to say that India can survive despite taking 6-7 nuclear hits from Pakistan, but we will finish Pakistan off.

In the longer term. India can still come of with a win - seeing how Pakistanis feel about the US and letting the US and china have their own little competition inside Pakistan. It's early days yet.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 12 Sep 2010 11:57

X-Posted from Pak Occupied Kashmir News and Discussion Thread

US Patronship of Pakistan vs. Chinese Patronship of Pakistan

The feeling amongst some Indians including me is that for USA Pakistan is its condom, but for China Pakistan is its prick. USA can use the condom at some point of time, throw it away. China will however not cut off its prick.

The 90s, after Soviet Union was pushed back, Americans retreated from Pakistan, for which till this day, Pakistan still feels deeply hurt. In the 90s Pakistan found out, that American investment in Pakistan's wellbeing was only latex deep.

Even today, American involvement in Pakistan is mostly dictated by its current military deployment in Afghanistan. Like any deployment, where the mission is in a hostile territory, for which the Pakistanis are themselves responsible to a large extent, has an expiry date. Some day USA will draw back, and Pakistanis are not sure how much the Americans would really care about them after that. In fact, trust of America in Pakistan does not run deeper than latex either. The direction of Afghanistan's evolution made Pakistan extremely concerned.

Also it is true that America has caressed Pakistan's apprehensions about India and supplied them weapons. Again it is questionable whether those supplies were for the purpose of strengthening an ally or simply as America's part of the arrangement/bargain. Even if it was for the purpose of strengthening an ally, it is still questionable whether it was as a defensive means to ensure longevity of the ally, or if the purpose was to do harm to India. These question marks are there not only because Indians want to know US position, but also because Pakistan wants to know how fickle America's support is.

China however has delivered Pakistan much more than mere conventional weaponry. They have provided the Pakistanis with nuclear weapons technology and missile delivery systems. That is a strategic game changer. Nobody provides others with nuclear weapons, unless there are deep strategic interests in the other country. And what has Pakistan had to do till now for the Chinese for this largesse? It is not lost on the Pakistanis that while Americans did turn mostly a blind eye to its acquisition of nuclear weapons in the beginning, when the Americans needed the Pakistanis, it was the Chinese that broke the law in order to help the Pakistanis. Isn't breaking the law in order to help the other without making demands, a true sign of a deeper than ocean and taller than mountains relationship?

Whereas American interests in Pakistan have historically been to curb Soviet expansionism, jointly fight GWOT in Afghanistan and perhaps put sufficient pressure on India to make India come into the American camp, all of which were time-bound projects, Chinese interests in Pakistan have been definitely to contain India. So even as these projects of America have come or are coming to a conclusion, Chinese interests in Pakistan have only begun to bear fruit.

America did support Pakistan against India, first as a CENTO and SEATO ally to boost Pakistan's capacity against Communism, and after Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August, 1971 against India as a partner of Soviet-Union; in early 90s out of support-inertia and after Sep. 2001 as part of its bargain. All of this support for whatever reason has hurt India, and needs not be ignored. America has been opportunistic at the cost to India, but the general view is, that it has not been with a malevolent design and intent on India. India's existence and democracy is not exacting any costs on America, and is not against America's strategic interests.

The same cannot be said of China. China needs to keep India bogged down, because it neither trusts India's intentions on the question of Chinese territorial integrity (regardless of what India claims to the contrary), nor Chinas wishes to share geopolitical space with India in Asia and for all purposes allow Asia to become a duopoly. India's existence and prosperity IS against Chinese national interests as defined by them. For example,that is why the Chinese having been stalling border talks with India, questioning India's sovereignty on North-East India and J&K, and also exhibiting an aggressive attitude on the border.

Secondly if China wishes to exert major power in whole of Asia, it needs to show a presence in all the major areas of Asia - East Asia, South Asia, and West Asia. To West Asia, China can come only through POK. China would not risk just as yet, coming through Kirghistan or Tajikistan or even Kazakhstan simply because Russia considers it its backyard, it 'Near Abroad', and it is ex-Soviet-Union territory, and any military Chinese intrusion there for whatever purpose would not go down well in Moscow, and China does not feel it is the right time to run rough-shod over Moscow just as yet. The Chinese are also not interested in operationalizing the Wakhan Corridor either as it passes through the Taliban-infested bad-lands. Through China's border to Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistani-control (unless it is already in Chinese control), China can expand its presence all the way to Iran over the land route and Persian Gulf over Gwadar. Through SCO, China gets to share influence in Central Asia with Russia, and even if it cannot send in its soldiers there, or develop a strategic presence there, it still gets to extract all the mineral wealth there. Anything that China does in CARs is dependent on Russian approval.

For the development of Western China (Tibet and Sinkiang) POK access is indispensable. Only by getting more Han Chinese population into Tibet and Sinkiang can China project power deep into the heart of Asia. For that China would need an energy and trade corridor through POK. Otherwise China remains a Pacific Ocean country. China would also want to make this corridor as wide as possible, and not prone to India's tolerance, which can mean loss of Kashmir Valley and more for India. To that effect, China would make use of Pakistan's services.

So however one looks at China whether
  1. it is for power projection throughout Asia,
  2. it is for energy and trade corridor, or
  3. it is to keep India bogged down to facilitate a full Chinese domination of Asia
China would need Pakistan, especially POK.

Summarizing:
  • American support to Pakistan is project-based, and thus having a date of expiry, while Chinese support is continuous, steady and strategic.
  • American support to Pakistan is only indirectly harmful to India, while China wants harm to India.
  • India can hope to wean away America from Pakistan, or to at least minimize support to Pakistan when no joint projects are actively pursued, but India cannot wean away China from Pakistan (at least not with the current geography, with POK in the hands of Pakistan.

It is not Indians' emotionalism and sentimentality of common values that dictates India's laissez faire attitude towards America's involvement with Pakistan, and it is not India's deep seated pee-in-the-pants fear of China that dictates Indian alarm at Chinese intrusions into POK. That is like calling one's woman boss's outburst at one's sloppy work and negligence, a consequence of her periods and heightened hormonal levels. Indians are apprehensive about Chinese presence there because of their cold assessment of what it all portends.

There is no competition between US and China to be expected in Pakistan.

PRC understands that USA has been paying its whore and supporting her lifestyle, and frankly it doesn't mind, because the whore likes to buy too many shoes, and PRC cannot buy her all that; PRC is still not rich enough. PRC also knows that USA would someday move on, but hopes that it would be when PRC has a good job and enough change to buy her services. PRC knows, that should USA move on before PRC is ready to buy her services and support her lifestyle, the whore might simply go and marry the bania next door, and then it is curtains for PRC.

Even in CARs, China allows Russia to pay for the region's security but through SCO is first to claim the mineral wealth of the region.

PRC motto is simply: why pay for something, when others are paying for it, and it still gets to use it.

Someday USA will retreat from Pakistan, and then PRC will take over the whore. PRC earns enough now anyway to own her, and would also make sure that the whore gets a part-time job at the Walmart store, so that PRC does not need to pay too much. The whore will stay in business, and will keep on hurling her trash over into the garden of the neighboring bania angering him no end.

With POK in Chinese hands, Pakistan isn't going anywhere, except a lot more eastwards.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby svinayak » 12 Sep 2010 13:01

RajeshA wrote:

America did support Pakistan against India, first as a CENTO and SEATO ally to boost Pakistan's capacity against Communism, and after Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August, 1971 against India as a partner of Soviet-Union; in early 90s out of support-inertia and after Sep. 2001 as part of its bargain. All of this support for whatever reason has hurt India, and needs not be ignored. America has been opportunistic at the cost to India, but the general view is, that it has not been with a malevolent design and intent on India. India's existence and democracy is not exacting any costs on America, and is not against America's strategic interests.


This cannot be ignored anymore. A large population which is not Christian is an enigma for US and Americans. The historical capital held by India and it large influence in Asia is considered as a competitor and roadblock to full global domination by US elite.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 12 Sep 2010 15:50

Acharya wrote:
RajeshA wrote:

America did support Pakistan against India, first as a CENTO and SEATO ally to boost Pakistan's capacity against Communism, and after Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August, 1971 against India as a partner of Soviet-Union; in early 90s out of support-inertia and after Sep. 2001 as part of its bargain. All of this support for whatever reason has hurt India, and needs not be ignored. America has been opportunistic at the cost to India, but the general view is, that it has not been with a malevolent design and intent on India. India's existence and democracy is not exacting any costs on America, and is not against America's strategic interests.


This cannot be ignored anymore. A large population which is not Christian is an enigma for US and Americans. The historical capital held by India and it large influence in Asia is considered as a competitor and roadblock to full global domination by US elite.


That is yesterday's war. It is like the Pakistanis doting over various Ghazwas. The Christians have bigger things to fear.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Kanson » 12 Sep 2010 17:00

RajeshA wrote:here is no competition between US and China to be expected in Pakistan.

PRC understands that USA has been paying its whore and supporting her lifestyle, and frankly it doesn't mind, because the whore likes to buy too many shoes, and PRC cannot buy her all that; PRC is still not rich enough. PRC also knows that USA would someday move on, but hopes that it would be when PRC has a good job and enough change to buy her services. PRC knows, that should USA move on before PRC is ready to buy her services and support her lifestyle, the whore might simply go and marry the bania next door, and then it is curtains for PRC.


We may not know that for sure. When Pak is playing China against US, why not we should believe there is no competition, when thier interest crosses. Case in point is Gwadar. There are some reports & indications. We always believe that US is so amenable to Pak to play Pak as kind of counter weight in hurting India or so such things. Why not it should not be seen as gaining strategic space against China in Pak ( i know floating this idea is equivalent to floating on thin ice)? Have we explored this route?

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby brihaspati » 12 Sep 2010 18:30

I think it is better to make it a tri-partite alliance of thieves trying to pull of a heist. Each thief does not trust the others completely but feels that using the help of the others is not only necessary but inevitable since the other thieves may either pulloff the heist on their own or create problems in his solo target. So it becomes also a subtle game of keeping the other in check and under control. One of the ways to do this is to try and keep the other two at the neck of each other.

So USA may try to foster problems between PRC and Pak, Pak may try to do so between USA and PRC, and PRC may try to do so between Pak and USA. Each dreams of making profits of power, energy, and destruction of opponents in the region as a common heist. However, each will be jealous enough of the other to try and prevent a complete decimation of obstacles in the others' way.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby shiv » 12 Sep 2010 18:38

As I see it, the US is hated in Pakistan. China is loved. One way of changing this is to put Chinese on the ground in Pakistan. Having them in PoK is bad enough. In mainland Pakistan they will need the protection of the Paki army.

By fighting a militarily impossible war to get POK and "protect" Pakis from the Han we lose more than we gain. We talk so much about psy ops. The biggest psy ops exercise we could pull off is to find photographic evidence of Chinese settlements/bases in POK. This would really endear the Paki army and government with the mango Abduls. No wonder both Pakis are going out of their way to deny the story of Chinese presence, and the Chinese too have denied it. That story hurts both nations. What hurts them is right.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Kanson » 12 Sep 2010 18:48

Shiv saar,

China is loved


After lal masjid incident involving chinese --- workers; action of stick wielding sisters on them; resentment of Pak taliban towards this incident; south dive of relations between Pak talibans like Asian tigers with the ISI & Pak Army gives a different picture. We must pursue to see what is there beneath. Being press is controllable by state and given the China's sensitivities, any news about China in bad light might not be published. Atleast not in english media.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby shiv » 12 Sep 2010 18:52

Kanson wrote:
China is loved


After lal masjid incident involving chinese --- workers; action of stick wielding sisters on them; resentment of Pak taliban towards this incident; south dive of relations between Pak talibans like Asian tigers with the ISI & Pak Army gives a different picture. We must pursue to see what is there beneath. Being press is controllable by state and given the China's sensitivities, any news about China in bad light might not be published. Atleast not in english media.


This is in fact why Chinese settlements in Pakistan should be fun. Why should we stop the Chinese in POK?

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Kanson » 12 Sep 2010 18:59

^ The ways & means of doing that can vary. But nonetheless POK should not be left alone. If much hated US can stay in Pak, Chinese will have their settlements.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby NikhilB » 12 Sep 2010 19:00

In short - (1) Both US and China are using Pakistan against India either directly or indirectly. (2) We are in no position to take down US or China to counter this negative influence.

Can we think something completely lateral - may seem like impossible at this time. How about getting Pakistan in Indian camp ? I know this is hilarious. I myself know how deep is hatred in Pakistanis minds towards India, and how they would not settle with any peace with India, esp with TSPA and ISI at helm of affairs.

But if we have to think strategically, if we think we are going to clash with China sometime later in future (not strictly in military terms or wars but rather in geopolitics and economics) then wouldn't it be better to have Pakistanis on our side - on ground level, it's not that difficult with commonalities in culture in both countries. Problem is with TAFTA minds & TSPA.

Please don't get me wrong. I am no RAPE and know ground realties of Pakistan. However, if US and China are hell bent on keeping Pakistan alive and stable, why not use it for our benefit ! Time to think something out of the box, and not to leave this option as well.


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