Deterrence

[Shankk]

I don't think that is a bad idea. Let us start talking tough. But I think it is a good idea to start planning on what to do next if tough talk does not work and the Pakis and Chinese are not deterred by Indian talk and posturing. Should we not have to actually use nuclear weapons at some stage?

Deterrence is like beauty...one is in eyes of the beholder and the other is in mind. Pakistan and China have correctly analyzed Indian psyche that India will not resort to using nukes unless the very existence of India is threatened.

It takes convincing of a billion people that their existence or at least their identity is at stake and India should resort to nukes. Without this convincing ordinary Indians are busy enough to meet two ends or get their children better education or get them married or innumerable other challenging chores. This convincing billions or at least a majority requires enough time to actually implement the decision of using nukes or even cross Pakistani red lines that could eventually lead to use of nukes. In the event of a sudden war policymakers will simply take the decision about nukes if required.

This is where the catch is. Neither Pakistan nor China will resort to full scale war unless their core interests are threatened. At the same time they will not stop bleeding India as they are convinced well enough that Indian government simply can't convince a billion people to accept nuclear war as a response to thousand cuts strategy. In fact I agree with their assessment and would call Indian policy makers prudent rather than coward to not take the bait. However it still does not solve the problem of making deterrence effective.

What is required is educating Indians about the effects of nuclear weapons and later on expand this with effects of nuclear war. A repeated discourse on this topic with some of the nuances reaching at least educated population of India will cut down the time needed to rallying Indians for crossing Pakistani red lines if deemed required. Despite of joking on this forum Pakistanis are smart enough to sense the preparation and will have to factor this in their assessment of fallout of terrorist attack. The mere fact that India has created a virtual red line in their mind goes a long way in bolstering the deterrence. Of course this is a double edged sword and needs to be wielded carefully but if done with solid control on narrative it can be used effectively.

Now the practical problems of this solution is that such a preparation will send a very serious message to not only Pakistan and China but others too. A mere glimpse of this narrative will send shock waves through world capitals resulting in massive pressure on India to stop such preparation. Obviously Indian government cannot be officially involved in this. Also if the narrative is built carelessly then it will simply end up scaring the Indians of the results of nuclear war and will defeat the whole purpose. Hence this discourse SHOULD BE STRICTLY DISPASSIONATE AND SCIENTIFIC IN NATURE. The only aim of this narrative should be to EDUCATE Indians about the fallout of nuclear weapons and the effect of their use in limited or full scale was scenario. Once again this whole thing needs to be managed extremely well to achieve the goal and not let it turn into a Bhasmasur.

[ShivaS]

Deterrence works till it fails.

only surgical introspection of the elite in India and BRF can tell if it still works or failed.

read the points above. the deterrence hasnt deterred pakis or chinese to stop their war against us. was the deterrence even there??

If one is alive today deterrence has worked, If one is dead deterrence does not matter,
If one had near death experience he is terrorized, if one reads news papers he is agonized, If one reads BRF threads he is sanatized.


Hey hey

Deterrence is like beauty...one is in eyes of the beholder

Thats copy righted by Spinster ask Shiv

[shiv]

If we pussy foot on taking the hub across the border , we will just stand taller over more slaughtered Indian bodies.

The big myth here is that nuclear weapons will deter conventional war. Obviously it will not. We are looking for ways to deter conventional needling and terrorism which is going on despite nuclear weapons on all sides.

[Shankk]

Thats copy righted by Spinster ask Shiv

My apologies to Spinster to copy him without giving due credit. It was not intentional. First of all I had not read Spinster's quote and second although I read fair bit of BR it is simply beyond my time limits to keep on top of it.

[Austin]

The big myth here is that nuclear weapons will deter conventional war. Obviously it will not. We are looking for ways to deter conventional needling and terrorism which is going on despite nuclear weapons on all sides.

It wont and even if it does it certainly does not deter terrorist , on the contrary i feel the terrorist have gone more bolder as they now operate under a nuclear umbrella. { exactly the fear Israel is talking about if Iran goes nuclear }

The only way to deter terrorist and its sponsor is to hit them at their place of origin , that is something I feel we should have done in 93 when India experienced its first major terrorist attack and most of the brains and sponsors till date have gone Scot free

We should really stop worrying about this nuclear conventional war and take it as it is and do the right thing ,the more you worry about such things the more it deters us in taking out the terrorist incubators and effectively we end up with more body counts on our home ground.

After all we have been spending money on the Defence Service,DRDO and SFC to fight such kind of war , that is what they are trained for and that is what they are suppose to do if called for.

[Vril]

Thanks Austin, Kanson, Ramanna.

The deterrence can be obtained through two means. military & diplomacy.

through military we should have the necessary means and more importantly intent to inflict pain ( not necessarily nuclear) on the aggressor.

diplomacy would be giving back in kind. if pakistan can raise issue of human rights violation in kashmir, why has there not been a single word from us on HR violation in POK, baluchistan, KP etc.why dont we raise the stakes for them??

similarly when china is issuing stapled visas, organising incursions in AP, debating war with India in leading papers etc..why do we remain silent on Tibet, Taiwan, Uighers etc.

It is our silent suffering which is emboldening them. we need to start hitting them on their ears (diplomacy) with adequate warning that we are ready to hit on your knees as well (military).

how this can be done.may be media psy ops and counter propaganda. will post my points in that thread.

Many people seem to be perfectly clear in their minds that we (India) are deterred by Pakistan and China and that Pakistan and China are not deterred by us.

can you enlighten to the contrary??

But will tough statements start deterring them when the actual presence of nukes in the Indian arsenal does not deter them?

Or are you trying to suggest that we try the "tough posturing" approach first and then see what happens.

We atleast have to try,no? you are giving an impression that tough posturing is already a failed idea without even trying it out? tough posturing does seem to have done wonders for US, cheena, pakistan. why not for us??

I don't think that is a bad idea. Let us start talking tough. But I think it is a good idea to start planning on what to do next if tough talk does not work and the Pakis and Chinese are not deterred by Indian talk and posturing. Should we not have to actually use nuclear weapons at some stage?

yes lets start but plan for failure?
if need be, we will use nook bums, insha allah

After all Pakistan started Kargil predicting that India would hesitate to punish Pakistan for fear of a nuclear backlash. And the Pakistanis were right. So clearly the contempt with which Pakis and Chinese hold Indians is well known. What next?

Many people indeed seem to be perfectly clear in their minds that we will loose even before trying, so why try? lets start planning for failure because we are sdre onlee, how can we talk leave alone fight tough even to defend ourselves.

[ShivaS]

Our concern at this time should not be nuclear war.
Build predestrian crossings on road or under ground, build toilets underground or over ground. Deter people from dis obeying the laws, take away corruption from common man (mango admi).
Restrict corruption to only few elite (like in America) central cabinets and sate cabinets. They are best suited to lock up the skeletons in the cabinet.
Hey we are jerking Indian hips like the hip hop dancers of USA, and our youth are grappling and groping but cant find anything in MTV like M jackson. No different in our leadership as downstairs is empty.

Be happy dont worry

[shiv]

Thats copy righted by Spinster ask Shiv

My apologies to Spinster to copy him without giving due credit. It was not intentional. First of all I had not read Spinster's quote and second although I read fair bit of BR it is simply beyond my time limits to keep on top of it.

It's OK Shankk. Spinster never said that. This is a false claim. But you are guilty of using the same 26 letters of the alphabet that spinster has used before you. Spinster used a lot of combinations of those letters in innovative ways before he changed his name to John Umrao, to John Snow to ShivaS

[shiv]

Many people seem to be perfectly clear in their minds that we (India) are deterred by Pakistan and China and that Pakistan and China are not deterred by us.

can you enlighten to the contrary??

Many people indeed seem to be perfectly clear in their minds that we will loose even before trying, so why try? lets start planning for failure because we are sdre onlee, how can we talk leave alone fight tough even to defend ourselves.

No I cannot enlighten to the contrary. I am one of the people who is deterred by Chinese and Pakistani weapons. I think it is perfectly sensible for me (and others) to be deterred by Pakistani and Chinese nuclear weapons.

But that is beside the point. What is important is that the Chinese and Pakistanis are apparently not deterred by Indian nuclear weapons.

You have stated that is we take a tough stance they might get deterred. I agree

You have stated that we should at least try to take a tough stance. I agree.

The only thing I am thinking about is, what if we take a "tough stance" and make tough statements and there is still another terrorist attack?

What do we do? Or would you prefer that India should wait for a few years and and see what happens after talking tough words ? Maybe allow another 1-2 terrorist attacks to occur just to make sure that the tough words have not worked.

I have stated that we should nuke China and Pakistan as one possible solution rather than simply allowing tough words to fail. I don't think tough stance and tough words mean anything to nations who are not afraid of our nukes. Only we are deterred. They are not. How will tough words deter them? Do you agree?

Also I am afraid that after nuking these countries we will get nuked back and for many Indians it will not be any different whether India survives intact or not. But still - it is better than simply talking tough words and being insulted again and again, don't you think?

[RajeshA]

Deterrence works when one shows the willingness to get into a fight, and to give the other a bigger punch than one has taken!

Willingness to fight can be shown only if one really gets into small fights every now and then and escalates it to some extent. Otherwise threats of a shock and awe, mother of all wars simply do not cut it.

The weakness of threats comes from unwillingness to get into a fight. If you don't get into a fight every now and then, people take you as weak. One needs to have a way to display how tough one is.

The Chinese attacked India in 1962. They showed a willingness to fight. So we are deterred. Pakistani Deterrence is much more effective than Indian Deterrence. Proof is that they keep on sending terrorists, making Kargils, etc. and we do not respond. So our deterrence is not working.

With just having nukes, we can't really frighten anybody. We have to show over and above that, that we don't shy away from a fight, and sometimes we are willing to start our own fights.

Peaceful coexistence blah blah should be reserved for peaceful countries only. The rest should know we are a military power, who love to test our military hardware and tactics in actual warfare.

[Vril]

Deterrence works when one shows the willingness to get into a fight, and to give the other a bigger punch than one has taken!

Willingness to fight can be shown only if one really gets into small fights every now and then and escalates it to some extent. Otherwise threats of a shock and awe, mother of all wars simply do not cut it.

The weakness of threats comes from unwillingness to get into a fight. If you don't get into a fight every now and then, people take you as weak. One needs to have a way to display how tough one is.

The Chinese attacked India in 1962. They showed a willingness to fight. So we are deterred. Pakistani Deterrence is much more effective than Indian Deterrence. Proof is that they keep on sending terrorists, making Kargils, etc. and we do not respond. So our deterrence is not working.

With just having nukes, we can't really frighten anybody. We have to show over and above that, that we don't shy away from a fight, and sometimes we are willing to start our own fights.

Peaceful coexistence blah blah should be reserved for peaceful countries only. The rest should know we are a military power, who love to test our military hardware and tactics in actual warfare.

RajeshA

+1

Thanks. i could not have said it better.peace is for people who understand peace. sub humans like pakis and chinese only understand language of power, intimidation or willingness for disproportionate response

[L Ram]

gurulog,

any guesses on our present n.weapons stockpile keeping in mind the required no of weapons for the 40 strategic bombers to be acquired in future????

[shiv]

China has not fought a war since 1979 when it tried to slap Vietnam and got slapped back. An 18 year old Chinese who saw action against Vietnam in 1979 will now be 59 years old - a PLA genelar rooking fol letilement. This fact was in a paper linked off this forum about the US having continuous battle experience.

But Indian men too have been facing live fire continuously so it is a sort of specious self delusion to say that "China is willing to fight" and perhaps India is not. Not true.

Off topic

[ramana]

RajeshA, True China attacked Indian in 1962 and gained the upper hand in public perception. They declared casefire and withdrew just as th Indian couter offensive was buidling up viz. Chusl etc. The main advantage they have was they exploded their bum in 1964. This gave them the advantage of having grabbed Indian territory in 1962 and then present a fait accompli of the bum so that Indian efforts to recover the territory would be challenging due to the potential for escalation. India gradually built up the conventional strength but faced the assymetric issue of PRC nukes.

It was in this context that Sundarji developed the idea that nukes deter nukes in order to keep the fight conventional. The NFU and the limited testing was to advance this concept of minimum deterrence. The unstated corrollary is "Minimum deterrence is one that dters the challengers maximum."

[krisna]

^^^^

Willingness to fight

Indian has fought wars with TSP and China, also has sent forces to UNO missions.
India has been fighting small wars if you wish to name it that way in J&K and NE for years. Had Punjab problem for few years and numerous one small ones since independence.

The weakness of threats comes from unwillingness to get into a fight.

The question of fighting arises from military being in civilian control in India. civilian govt also checks the costs and benefits before going out to fight. There are numerous balances in this. first of all is always peace at all costs. Only when threat comes which is considerable than the losses will it allow war. recall 26/11 and numerous others events in the past.
Our neighbourhood is dangerous with TSP and dragon because of military being in control of their war machine not civilians. This does not mean ours is bad. It is just the bad neighbourhood.China does not have such dangerous neighbours which are military controlled-- Japan/SoKo and the rest are weaker. SU was a special case and it had uncle backing.
The civilian govt in India does not display bravado or brinkmanship. Yes they can do better mature diplomacy which they are doing at present. They seem to have got some fire in their rear the way things having moving for some time.

The Chinese attacked India in 1962. They showed a willingness to fight. So we are deterred

.

Scars of the 1962 take sometime to heal. It is more of a political thuggery and cowardice from panda, listened to albeit foolishly by JLN. It is already a more than a generation old now.
Armed forces are ever ready to deal with panda. Strategic planners have been informing of the dangers however the civilian govts have not been doing enuf for the defence. Recall Operation Falcon which has had fit and starts due to the belief in panda border talks and assurances. This time for the first time the defence budget has gone under 2% of GDP( similar to 1962).(please correct me if I am wrong)

Pakistani Deterrence is much more effective than Indian Deterrence

.

It is not. Proof is the TSP is committing suicide. Any person with suicidal mentality- his deterrence is always better than the person who does not want to commit suicide. Once you allow the person to commit suicide where is the deterrence. Deterrence is living longer intact with minimal damage to India. Compare the developments in India and TSP overall in the lifespan of both nations. It is pointless to see some events like 26/11, bum blasts in various parts of India, J&K troubles etc. India has solved numerous problems which is unbelievable since independence. we still have a long long way to go. It depends whether one sees the rose or thorn.

Proof is that they keep on sending terrorists, making Kargils, etc. and we do not respond. So our deterrence is not working.

It is again hamstrung by the civilian govt response. we follow agreements to the spirit. hence we gave special treatment to J&K. TSP did not do it. we still maintain it. China grabbed Tibet despite agreeing to make it autonomous zone. we have not claimed that china has not maintained its side.We have to give back in kind. We can do the same on TSP and china. But the thinking in the GOI circles I don't have a clue.
My speculation----
1) TSP will join India sometime later(view around independence). We are of same people, we are bigger country and we don't mean harm to TSP. So we gave a kid glove treatment. Recall the events at independence and
WRT china JLN had feeling of peace peace without any commitment from panda.
2) Nowadays the feeling may be the same in some gerontocracy politicians who are frozen in time due to the good old fuzzy feeling days. This will continue till the politicians of 1940-60s are eased or die out.
How things can change-----
1) wait for time for current ones to die out. Meanwhile hold onto what we have.
2) Some new generation group of young politicians think differently. TSP is different and would have to be dealt differently.
3) It may take some more time with younger politicians of 70s and 80s to think radically.


Question is why are the present gerontocratic politicians and in some in the media think like that-

when they were young and in impressionable age, giants like MKG, JLN had a profound influence on their psyche which is difficult to erase it. Hence they have not changed a bit.
ex- many wkks, peace activists gandhians are of older generation and have profound influence on the new comers. It is perpetuated. Good thing is the younger ones are not that susceptible to them as the older ones as there are no giants as of today like JLN or MKG.
For younger generation like us we dont care- we are more realistic and see the things as they are.

I am not too sure if last parts are OT, however the context overall I feel is relevant here about the thinking of the civilian GOI and the deterrence issue.

[Kanson]

Ok Austin...as you say, we carry out strikes on terrorist camps....you think Pak wont retalitate? Will that not increase the civilian casualties?

What if terrorism continues even after our strikes? How you will proceed after? You, order more strike?

If you want we can take this to another thread.

[RajeshA]

civilian govt also checks the costs and benefits before going out to fight. There are numerous balances in this. first of all is always peace at all costs. Only when threat comes which is considerable than the losses will it allow war.

The cost of peace against an enemy is lowest when it is at the cost of a small war. It becomes higher as the costs of unchallenged enemy aggression rise, and it escalates exponentially with an all-out war when the enemy oversteps the red lines you didn't teach him to respect.

This is logic. It doesn't matter whether it comes from the civilians or from the military. Without the proper deterrence, the slogan "peace at all costs" becomes "peace at the cost of a costly all out war"!

Deterrence is not about having red lines. It is about teaching the enemy to respect them.
Deterrence is not about having a big military. It is about letting it taste some fresh air.

[ShivaS]

PRC embarked with unequivocal devotion to attain Nuclear capability during the Korean war 1950 to 1953. This was as a result of US Generals thinking of Nuking PRC and or N Korea to quickly reverse the rapid advance of N Korea & PRC troops into south. So unlike India PRC with in eleven years of a threat became Nuke power. India while on other hand facing continous escalation on Tibetian front since late 1950s and also after 1964 dithered on the decision to go nuclear even though Homi Babha promised a device in 11 months...
even after our friend the greatest democracy sent USS Enterprise into Bay of Bengal in 1971 we wer pussy footing till IG came to know that TSP was going full steam to get nukes from PRC with the wink wink from Unkil after Nixon & Kissinger were brown nosing Mao while agreeing to encircle USSR and India... PRC to check mate USSR (who had fallen out by 1972) and TSP to check mate India, so we went overt partially in 1974 and sat on our butz as usual till 1998 rest all is well known to repeat here...

The good thing is we continue to snooze and still deter so dont worry be happy, people and territory was never our ambition only money for me is.

[ShivaS]

A defence of murder can be argued as momentary insanity, or not being pre meditated,
But flashing a sharp blade is clear cognisant intent to attack, thwart, and or deter any aggression or intent of aggression.

Deterrence in the context of protecting a nation should be understood as that which values pride, principles, population, societal values and land mass is to proactively display its capabilities, capacity and the will to preserve its interests at any cost.
Only such a display will ensure deterrence as it promises to delivers and inflicts disproportionate costs on the adversary.

[Klaus]

Spinster used a lot of combinations of those letters in innovative ways before he changed his name to John Umrao, to John Snow to ShivaS

[shiv]

gurulog,

any guesses on our present n.weapons stockpile keeping in mind the required no of weapons for the 40 strategic bombers to be acquired in future????

May be this will tell you something
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/ ... litary.pdf

Another theme, though, is this recurring suggestion that there are potential
disconnects between basic strategic principles and the sort of decisions or
non-decisions that occur vis-à-vis individual development programs. And
as new technological opportunities arise in this particular field, whether
cruise missiles, ballistic missile defense, MIRVing, some of these may
have stabilizing or destabilizing effects on this goal of deterrence. The
panel’s thoughts?
MR. COHEN: I’ll say a word or two, then Ashley might want
to follow up on this.

I think that the Indians -- for India to have a major nuclear
weapons program, MIRVs and, you know, sophisticated program, they’re
going to have to do more testing. Laboratory work only gets you so far.
And if they do more testing, then I think the roof falls in in terms of the
relationship with the United States and other countries. So, I think the
challenge for India is to have -- grow their nuclear program, but without
testing.
The danger is, in fact, that the Pakistanis may -- are racing
them and the Chinese are, also. So India’s faced with the de facto nuclear
arms race with both Pakistan and China, two countries with -- especially in
the case of the Chinese, have no problem testing. So, I think the testing is
a big barrier for the Indians.

Ashley, would you like to --

MR. TELLIS: Well, I would just say that if -- this is a very
peculiar race in South Asia because the evidence shows that the Indians
are not racing, which can mean one of two things: either they are, in fact,
racing and nobody else knows about it because they’re doing it so
efficiently in terms of their ability to do denial and deception, or they
actually believe in a minimal deterrent even if others don’t believe it.

And so if you look at some of the indicators, like, for
example, fissile material for military purposes, the ballistic missile
production, it’s biased heavily towards the low end of the spectrum. And
there doesn’t seem to be any discernable signs that they want more if they
can get away with less.

Now, how do you explain this? There are two explanations.
One is they are truly strategically messed up, that is they don’t understand
the relationship between requirements and what they actually have to do.

The other is a bureaucratic explanation, that the drivers of
their program are essentially part of the civilian nuclear establishment who
consider nuclear weapons to be second rate things compared to other
civilian applications of nuclear energy and so, when faced with a tradeoff,
will continue to put most of their resources in civilian applications,
(inaudible) cycle, what have you, rather than go out and build bigger and
better bombs. There are more details to this story, but that’s a second
hypothesis.

And the third is simply that India’s civilian leadership just
believes that nuclear weapons are such powerful deterrents that you really
don’t need too many of them as long as you are convinced that your
adversaries don’t know what you have and where you have them. The
assumption being that these devices are such nasty things that even
having a handful of them buys you all the deterrents you need in most of
the conceivable scenarios that Indian policymakers think is relevant.

Now, whether this changes in the out years will be
interesting to watch. But today what I find most surprising is the Indian’s
reluctance to race, even though there is enough evidence in the West that,
as Steve points out, the Chinese and the Pakistanis are moving at a fairly
rapid clip.

[ramana]

Even Ashley Tellis has forgotten his roots.

"Why go for more when less is enough?"

What India has is deemed enough for the MCD and the NFU.

The problem is PRC and TSP are going for expanded deterrence that is to deter all wars while India is for core deterrence ie to deter use of nukes.

[shiv]

Even Ashley Tellis has forgotten his roots.

"Why go for more when less is enough?"

What India has is deemed enough for the MCD and the NFU.

The problem is PRC and TSP are going for expanded deterrence that is to deter all wars while India is for core deterrence ie to deter use of nukes.

Setting aside the truth or otherwise of the article - the whole thing sounded rather mealy mouthed and insincere to me in too many ways for me to mention.

India buys a lot of weapons and they say - "Hey no aim"
India does not "race ahead" with nukes and they say "Why are they not racing?"

There are explanations but there is no use talking about them. The fact remains that India has not done much to advertise its nuclear force levels. Under the circumstances the only way deterrence can occur is if the people who know have conveyed that to the adversaries who matter.

[ramana]

That may be so.
What I am saying is Indian response is not to participate in arms race when there are adequate assets. Its clear the 'expertatti' expect India to ramp up and are flummoxed.

[shiv]

The following post was made in the missiles thread of the mil forum

. Quietly built up Nuke Arsenal and pile up long range Missiles covering each and every nook of the enemy, what do you think can China do, If India points 1000 Missiles at each & every corner of china. They will come to the negotiation table, realizing the situation they are put up in.

The hypothesis here is that if India builds and points 1000 missiles (presumably with nuclear warheads) at China - this will make China come to the negotiating table.

Could anyone speculate as how why China would do that? After all if China "negotiated" because we have 1000 missiles - we could then build 1200 missiles and ask China to vacate Tibet or make even bigger demands.

To me there seems to be a cognitive bias that creates this unsupportable hypothesis - "I would be scared of 1000 missiles pointed at me and i would capitulate. Therefore I expect the Chinese to think like me and capitulate if I had 1000 missiles pointed at them"

After all you are saying "Come to he negotiating table or I will bomb the crap out of you". Personally, if I had to fact that situation I would say "Go ahead and nuke China if you have the guts. You can negotiate over my dead body"

How useful would those 1000, 10,000 or 100,000 missiles be then? As long as the fairy tale (Chinese get scared and talk) works all is well. But if they don't?

[neeraj]

^^^^^^^

Panda relationship with India is largely based on the military imbalance in favour of china.

If the chinese knows that India has the capability of sending them back by atleast 100 years in the event of a war it may not bring them to a negotiation table but it certainly will allow India to respond in kind. Panda only respects power and nothing else. If we are to stake our claim as a regional superpower we must back it up with serious military capability.

[koti]

I would be scared of 1000 missiles pointed at me and i would capitulate. Therefore I expect the Chinese to think like me and capitulate if I had 1000 missiles pointed at them"

It is not to scare them alone. We will be in a position to stand up to defend our national interests.
If we have 10 missiles instead of say a thousand, wont it make any difference during negotiations?

Also, we are surrounded my hostilities. We should keep the other hostile neighbors at check when dealing with another folly.

Else it wont be superfluous to predict four front attack on us by China, Pak, Balgla and Myanmar.

The existence of Sizable quantities of nukes and Missiles will be deter the plans for any such hostile misadventures.

[shiv]

I would be scared of 1000 missiles pointed at me and i would capitulate. Therefore I expect the Chinese to think like me and capitulate if I had 1000 missiles pointed at them"

It is not to scare them alone. We will be in a position to stand up to defend our national interests.
If we have 10 missiles instead of say a thousand, wont it make any difference during negotiations?

<snip>

The existence of Sizable quantities of nukes and Missiles will be deter the plans for any such hostile misadventures.

No No sir. This is a completely erroneous judgement

The effect of nukes you have is totally dependent on whether you are willing to risk using even ONE nuke. If you have 10000000000000 nukes but you do not have the guts to use even one - your arsenal is more of a fartenal.

For a bold leader of a country (such as China) it would be easy to play a game of brinkmanship and say "OK - go ahead. use your nukes. We are ready to nuke you back and we are not going to negotiate" By doing that the leader is firmly playing the ball back into India's court. So if India has made the first threat to use a nuke - we will have to carry out that threat and start nuclear war. At this stage - if India does not carry out the threat and nuke China - and instead merely bleats that we will nuke you if you don't talk - the Chinese leader will know instantly that the Indian leader is unwilling to use his nukes and that he is making empty threats. You can have 250 billion warheads but they count for nothing if you cannot use even one of them after being dared to do so.

I think the psychology of a streetfighter comes in handy here. If you pull out a knife - you must be ready to use it. It you don't - you are bluffing.

Now why do you feel that a person who has 10,000 nukes is more likely to use them that one who has 10 nukes? It's just a "high hopes feeling" that this will happen.

In fact the leader with 10 nukes may know that he must use them or lose them. The leader with 10,000 nukes may allow himself to get hit by 25 nukes and say "I can still win - but please come to the negotiating table or I will use my remaining 9000 warheads"

[Kanson]

Good description shiv ji. When you NFU whats the point in having 10 or 100. Anyway we are not going to start the fight.

[shiv]

Good description shiv ji. When you NFU whats the point in having 10 or 100. Anyway we are not going to start the fight.

The real point of deterrence for any nation is "Who will use them first?" Which national leader will have the guts to use them first and expect to get away. Alternatively, the leader who uses nukes first has to be prepared to risk himself, his leadership and perhaps his nation.

Under what circumstances would a leader do that? Would a Chinese leader be more likely to do that or a Pakistani leader?

[Thomas Kolarek]

You got it wrong. 1000 missiles is just to maintain status quo and not to threaten or attack. When China can point 100's of missiles at you, and can make you feel threatened, why don't you do the same and hit back at the same coin.
Even Dog has to bark, to deter thieves. If it sits quiet, its not a dog and no use having it.
Offensive and Defensive build up should be 3:1 than we can avoid any war for generations to come.

If you become wealthier and powerful than we are right now why will they not come to negotiation table ? Convince me.

The following post was made in the missiles thread of the mil forum

. Quietly built up Nuke Arsenal and pile up long range Missiles covering each and every nook of the enemy, what do you think can China do, If India points 1000 Missiles at each & every corner of china. They will come to the negotiation table, realizing the situation they are put up in.

The hypothesis here is that if India builds and points 1000 missiles (presumably with nuclear warheads) at China - this will make China come to the negotiating table.

Could anyone speculate as how why China would do that? After all if China "negotiated" because we have 1000 missiles - we could then build 1200 missiles and ask China to vacate Tibet or make even bigger demands.

To me there seems to be a cognitive bias that creates this unsupportable hypothesis - "I would be scared of 1000 missiles pointed at me and i would capitulate. Therefore I expect the Chinese to think like me and capitulate if I had 1000 missiles pointed at them"

After all you are saying "Come to he negotiating table or I will bomb the crap out of you". Personally, if I had to fact that situation I would say "Go ahead and nuke China if you have the guts. You can negotiate over my dead body"

How useful would those 1000, 10,000 or 100,000 missiles be then? As long as the fairy tale (Chinese get scared and talk) works all is well. But if they don't?

[shiv]

You got it wrong. 1000 missiles is just to maintain status quo and not to threaten or attack.

Boss. Tell me you are joking. The Chinese will die laughing. Maybe this idea is a winner after all

When China can point 100's of missiles at you, and can make you feel threatened, why don't you do the same and hit back at the same coin.

You still haven't understood what I said have you? Let me say it differently.

You say you are scared of Chinese missiles? I am not. So I believe that the Chinese would think like me and not be scared of our missiles.

[koti]

Point noted Shiv ji, but I can only agree in part.

How can one ensure that there will be credible deterrence if we are at a quantitative disadvantage? Quantity not necessarily relative to the enemy stockpile but to the number of targets(TSP+Chinese).

Also, since we abide to the no first use policy, how can one assume that we still posses credible second strike capability if our delivery platforms are minimal.

[RamaY]

I think the psychology of a streetfighter comes in handy here. If you pull out a knife - you must be ready to use it. It you don't - you are bluffing.

Now why do you feel that a person who has 10,000 nukes is more likely to use them that one who has 10 nukes? It's just a "high hopes feeling" that this will happen.

In fact the leader with 10 nukes may know that he must use them or lose them. The leader with 10,000 nukes may allow himself to get hit by 25 nukes and say "I can still win - but please come to the negotiating table or I will use my remaining 9000 warheads"

The question is when you really ready use your nukes, will you have enough nukes to destroy the enemy to the extent that their 2nd strike force is near zero OR they don't have any purpose for 2nd strike.

The ABM will help us only as a security umbrella from the 2nd strike NOT the first strike w.r.t PRC.

[Rajdeep]

Very interesting topic. Also, if we repeal the no first use policy, that it self should make some countries take note of us immediately.
I am not sure if we will ever be able to get to a scenario that we all would be comfortable with. However, I think its important to know if India can keep the war going long enough for our leaders to make an informed decision if we ever decide to reply in nuclear. With so many hostiles around us, its just a matter of time before one of them is bound to get in to a war with us which could escalate quite badly.

[shiv]

The question is when you really ready use your nukes,

When do you think any national leader will be ready to use nukes against a nuclear armed adversary?

[shiv]

Very interesting topic. Also, if we repeal the no first use policy, that it self should make some countries take note of us immediately.

It gets easier for a "brinkmanship state" like Pakistan or China to test India's will and call India's bluff if India drops NFU. Pakistanis who are accustomed to negotiating with "a gun held at their own heads" can very easily challenge India to use her nukes first and promise nuclear retaliation. Every 26/11, Kaluchak and other atrocity will be followed by the taunt "What the fug are you going to do about it? Nuke us?" After 3-4 attacks if India has still not nuked them India's bluff will be called.

On the other hand India's nuclear policy is not just NFU, but based on the plan to maintain adequate conventional defence to thwart attack without escalation to nuclear war. The last step before nuke war will be ABM cover. In a way this is a challenge to a state like China or Pakistan to go ahead and use nukes first. There are some actions that India takes that are considered "provocative" by China and Pakistan (although many of us see India as weak and non provocative). Perhaps China and Pakistan see India's existenc as a functioning state as a provocation. So what the fug are they going to do about it? Nuke us? What has their first use policy got them. You can have 10,000 missiles and bombs and back it up with a "We will nuke you first" policy but if all you can do is send in a bunch of non state actors and while fretting and fuming and issuing "staped visas" and other meaningless pinpricks - then your "first use" bluff is being called every day.

"You (China and Pakistan) are threatening first use - but where? You talk of so much provocation - so where's your nuke attack? What are all those bums doing? LOL"

In fact it was the ridiculousness of first use policy that made China do a partial downhill ski on that policy. This is where India's ABMs augment NFU. Let them attack first. We will prepare to defend. Our attack will not be first. A nuclear attack is so serious that a rational leader would not use it lightly because the consequences to everyone - including himself is too serious. That is why it becomes difficult and inconvenient to nuke "non state actors" or even non nuclear armed nations. But if non state actors do use a nuke on you - your only hope of some protection is an ABM shield.

In fact ABM's are not the only route to semi-protection. Non proliferation and FMCT were all designed by the nuclear haves to protect themselves while maintaining their arsenal. Nothing pacifist there. It was India that had to call that bluff. But having acquired an arsenal, developing effective ABM cover would be one way of later applying the same "NPT/FMCT tool" on other states like Pakistan.

[Rajdeep]

Explained very well. I hadn't thought of it sir. Thank you.

I do have a followup question. In a case where there are non-state actors carrying out the nuclear strike and our ABM's do come through for India, Are we really going to wait and determine if the missile strike was done by state actors or non-state actors or just go after the point of origin.

Standing back and thinking about it till its rots and stinks is exactly what we have seen happening time and time again. I hope there is some change on this stance in New Delhi.

[RajeshA]

Some thoughts on Deterrence

There are three aspects of Deterrence:

1. Credible military capability to go to war
2. Credible political willingness to go to war
3. Credible societal preparation to go to war

1) Where as we have often given some thought to how many missiles and nuclear warheads a deterrence make, one has to give just as much thought to the defensive infrastructure, i.e. whether there are hardened underground facilities for preserving the strike-back capability, whether the strike-back capability is sufficiently distributed to allow a second strike capability. India's infrastructure on the borders is also an aspect of military preparedness and capability, which we have to build up. Delayed procurement and induction of military hardware, even though the funds are available does not impart much confidence either. It shows that the country is not serious about defense. This image can be disastrous for deterrence.

2) Here is where India fails the test. The worst policy a government can make is "Peace at all costs". Far more anywhere else, it is here that deterrence is established. If the Govt. shows it is willing to escalate tensions for the smallest of issues of national importance, some border issue, some terrorist attack, some capture of fishermen, some aggressive interference in our internal matters, etc., and that too to a large extent and you force the other party to call for peace and 'sanity', to apologize, to free the fishermen, in general to yield, then the political leadership has won the country the peace. It means we can avoid a bigger, costlier war, because the other party would think twice on poking at us in a bigger way. The political leadership in India, with their "War is not an option" is making "War a certainty".

3) Preparation for war is also to be shown at the level of society. If the state does not show that they expect a war, and are prepared to deal with the consequences of war, there is no credibility in the eyes of the enemy that you will go to war upon some provocation. That means your deterrent is gone. A society needs to trained in a systemic way how to deal with the fallout of an attack - a chemical, biological or a nuclear attack. The education needs to be imparted across the society. Secondly India should have built nuclear bunkers and have made contingency plans to save Indian society after a nuclear exchange - to save our administrators, engineers, scientists, doctors, our women and our kids, to save our data, and our cultural riches. None of that seems to have taken place. There should have been bimonthly drills in all schools for that.

Another aspect of societal preparedness for war, is to give some training to all physically capable men (and women) to take up arms and fight as resistance, should the enemy infiltrate into the land or conquer it. The second layer of defense should be prepared amongst the society. This too doesn't take place in India on any credible level.

So India's deterrence is crap on so many levels. Calling it Minimum Deterrence is trying to put up a brave face.

[shiv]

I do have a followup question. In a case where there are non-state actors carrying out the nuclear strike and our ABM's do come through for India, Are we really going to wait and determine if the missile strike was done by state actors or non-state actors or just go after the point of origin.

One problem that I see here is how do we know if the missile destroyed by an ABM had a nuclear warhead? If the launching entity admits publicly to launching a missile strike then in can be presumed that it was nuclear. If not - it would be a technical violation of NFU if we retaliated with a nuke. Or we would have to look for missile debris with evidence of a nuke warhead.

But I do think a good ABM shield would be useful in helping to take care of non state nukes. Most states have too much to lose by starting nuclear war. That is why the US, despite having a FU policy has chosen to lose several wars rather than use nukes and win.