Waging war for geopolitical gains

[Pratyush]

What I am saying is let's talk of "little wars" first before talking big about big wars. If you look at the history of wars - little campaigns doing little things against weak foes in a short time are easier and more doable than big campaigns against powerful foes over long periods of time. No guarantees in any case, but it is generally correct. It is one thing to chase away some ship hijacking coup leaders in the Maldives than saying "Let us take Tibet". Or even POK.

Shiv,

If your are going to contemplate the use of force, then use that force for ends which cannot be attained through diplomatic means. Also if I understand you correctly you are suggesting the Paki way of waging war. (I could be wrong).

The small scale war for small scale end is not worth the effort, when it comes to the international opportunity costs associated with the effort.

If war is to be contemplated then it must be for aims that cannot be attained through diplomatic means. In India's case it means goning the whole hog. As today or even 10 years from now, it will not posess the kind of disparity in military force over worthwhile foes. That it can engage in punitive actions for ends that can be achieved through the limited use of military force. As the counter escalation by the enemy may not be containable by India.

For lessor adversories, diplomacy along with geographical realities will be the deciding factors.

In closing I would like to say, if you are going to fight a war for worthwhile geopolitical goals, do it with the Intent of total domination. Over a long period of time of say 10 to 15 years. With the intent of saping enemys will to resist. As any thing else will not get you the result that you are seeking.


JMT

[shiv]

Shiv,

If your are going to contemplate the use of force, then use that force for ends which cannot be attained through diplomatic means. Also if I understand you correctly you are suggesting the Paki way of waging war. (I could be wrong).

The small scale war for small scale end is not worth the effort, when it comes to the international opportunity costs associated with the effort.

If war is to be contemplated then it must be for aims that cannot be attained through diplomatic means. In India's case it means goning the whole hog. As today or even 10 years from now, it will not posess the kind of disparity in military force over worthwhile foes. That it can engage in punitive actions for ends that can be achieved through the limited use of military force. As the counter escalation by the enemy may not be containable by India.

For lessor adversories, diplomacy along with geographical realities will be the deciding factors.

In closing I would like to say, if you are going to fight a war for worthwhile geopolitical goals, do it with the Intent of total domination. Over a long period of time of say 10 to 15 years. With the intent of saping enemys will to resist. As any thing else will not get you the result that you are seeking.


JMT

Pratyush I appreciate your thoughts on this. But I have seen too many people talking about the type of wars you speak of on BRF. I do not see a single shred of credible information that suggests that India might be able to fight that kind of war against any of the adversaries who need that kind of war to get them. Particularly Pakistan and China Oh yes India might dominate Nepal, Sri Lanka etc. My first thought is to see whether any of the other smaller "South Asian" countries needs diplomacy or dominating war.

[RajeshA]

Chinese government has announced an additional package of USD 7.31 million to Nepal, increasing its annual financial assistance to the Himalayan nation to USD 21.94 million.

The question is how much of the aid flows directly to the Maoists. Official aid figures say very little. The amount of Saudi aid to Pakistan's various factions can hardly be that what the official figures state.

Is war necessary?

TSPA has its 3½ Friends. TSPA is the strongest of groups in Pakistan and they have a monopoly on power. They have indoctrinated the whole of the population to hate India, and they have been snapping at India's heels since 1947 and earlier, and since early 1960s using China's help.

Do we really want something similar to evolve in Nepal? Do we want to give Prachanda and his Maoists the leeway and time to consolidate their hold over Nepalese Army and Nepali politics? Let's not forget that after being appointed President, Prachanda went first to Beijing before coming to India. That can be ignored with a wave of hand, but it shows the inclination of the Maoists in Nepal. PRC is not a friend of India, and neither are the Maoists in Nepal.

Nepal is the lowest hanging fruit. If we don't enter into wars with adversaries who are armed to the teeth because of considerations of mushroom clouds, and if we don't enter into wars with those who are still weak but on their way to becoming adversaries because they are not yet there, then I don't know if we need to talk about wars at all? Those who are still weak or do not have sufficient security cover of the Chinese, will talk pretty to India until the time is ripe.

We have been seeing signs of that all around. The Indian Subcontinent countries are freely talking about a balance of power between China and India, and equidistant relations to the two powers. So if even in the countries where once the Indian Civilization called home, we cannot expect a privileged status, then something is foul. In fact our neighbors are already looking for Chinese security cover to ward off some imaginary threats from India.

The Pakistanis support the jihadis to do mayhem in India. The Bangladeshis are doing a total demographic makeover of East-India. The Nepalis are supporting the Naxalites in India, their brothers in arms (all of course supported by Beijing). The Sri Lankans have given their Tamils a bludgeoning, with whom Indian Tamils naturally sympathize, and India had to take in many refugees. So each country in our neighborhood is cause of some problem.

Looking for reasons to attack some neighbor is not a big issue. There are plenty of reasons.

But from all these countries, the country which would be the weakest as well as the one, which can be accused of causing immense harm (Red Menace, regardless of the truth factor) is Nepal. It has a faith compatible with India, but politics averse to Indian interests, so we just need to change the politics of the country. The main advantage of invading Nepal is of course the signals it would send to China, to other countries of the Indian Subcontinent and to the West.

[Pratyush]

Shiv,

In that I have no disagreement with you in the first part. WRT part 2 Diplomacy with the threat of force ought to get most of what it seeks from them. Punctuated with robust & visible "police" actions in diffrent parts of the world to demonstrate our willingness to use force.

[Lalmohan]

not all participants are adversaries
not all adversaries require force
we seem to be going too quickly towards a one size fits all strategy

[shiv]

Rajesh what would you think of Maoists in Nepal as a resistance force against Indian occupation?

Do you have any ballpark figures on the force structure for India to occupy Nepal? Overrunning Nepal should not be difficult.

Also politically how do you see India's Hindus viewing a military attack on Hindu Nepal while we shy away from Pakistan because it is too strong.

[RajeshA]

Rajesh what would you think of Maoists in Nepal as a resistance force against Indian occupation?

Do you have any ballpark figures on the force structure for India to occupy Nepal? Overrunning Nepal should not be difficult.

shiv saar,

I am not knowledgeable of military issues, as such I wouldn't want to lean too much out of the window.

But from a report, I found out the following:

The main base of the Maoists' military strength is the People's Liberation Army Nepal (PLA). Its strength is hard to estimate. At the lower end, some analysts suggest that the Maoists have only a few thousand hardcore fighters. One military expert and retired RNA lieutenant general put their strength at 4,000 armed guerrillas, 5,000 militia who have received guerrilla training and 20,000 armed militia. The Maoists themselves claim they have more than 10,000 armed guerrillas in their nine brigades, a figure that many close observers tend to accept. Indeed, the RNA has offered a similar estimate: some 9,500 guerrillas and 25,000 militia. Other experts are more cautious, suggesting a range of core fighters anywhere from 5,000 to 8,000 or so.

Also politically how do you see India's Hindus viewing a military attack on Hindu Nepal while we shy away from Pakistan because it is too strong.

Well basically the Hindus in India would have to be on the forefront to rally the Royalists and other Hindus in Nepal and to sell them the proposition that Nepal should become part of India and in fact lead the Hindu renaissance of India. The Hindu Rashtra in India is in dire straits and need an infusion of Nepalese Hindu traditions. The Maoists would finish off Hinduism in Nepal if they were allowed to continue at the helm of power.

The mission objective ought to be to neutralize the Maoists in Nepal, who have been supplying Indian Maoists with weapons and logistics. The unofficial mission objective of the Hindu supporters of such a move would be to bring back the Hindus into power in Nepal and to eliminate any threat to Hindu primacy there from the Maoists. To ensure a continuous rule of the Hindus in Nepal, Nepal would be merged with India, after a period of nation-building in Nepal after the Maoist insurgency and Maoist mismanagement and political dysfunction in Nepal.

Perhaps one should ask someone close to RSS how they feel about it!

[RamaY]

RajeshA ji,

Any move outside current Indian Borders, except in JK theater would have to satisfy certain conditions IMHO

1. Indian secularism has to be correctly defined from its current form. This will automatically solves the leadership issue to most extent.

2. Maoism has to be tackled conclusively within Indian borders (AP has done this and other states can do it within 5 years)

3. JK Theater has to be addressed to Indian satisfaction - at least Cashmere valley.

4. Any external movement, such as unification of Nepal should be initiated from the other side (At least symbolically at the beginning)

The main reason for this is to ensure that other small nations of sub-continent are not overwhelmed and jump into opposition camp, making the unification difficult.

[Altair]

Cross Posting from "Managing Chinese threat" dated 15th October

The only meaningful way to deal with chinese bully is to be a bully. Show some brinkmanship and they might backdown.There is no smooth way to deal with this situation.

Exactly, the only thing stopping us is our psychology. We are our own worst enemies.

A few things India has not done, which any power should do are:
Why are we defensive on issues from Kashmir, to anti-Christian disturbances in India, to our dealings with our neighbors, to water issues, to our strategic defense? We should be doing the attacking on Baluchistan, Tibet, Western Imperialistic History, Dictatorships, etc. We should be bribing dictators, and politicians and strong-men the world over and turning them against our enemies. We should have a special budget for corrupting the world, because that is the only way to make the world go round.[/list]

RajeshA
1.Start IAF overflights over PoK and those islands in Bay of Bengal with Chinese listening posts to start and then slowly expand Sukhois to make some passes over Tibet.
2. India should Quarantine Pakistan in the next 3~5 years. It MUST start preparing to treat Pakistan as a BioHazard and all Pakistanis as infected zombies. Let chinese play with this whore,the more paki whore plays with free money the better. Dont worry about the duds the chinese supply. What can pakis expect to get for a price of a chinese vibrater? A mizjhile?
3. Bangladesh must be made an "economic slave". All Chinese influence must be neutralized from all spheres. If need be, make some sacrifices.you know what I mean.
4.Nepal must be integrated into India.This should be made a priority.I am not kidding man! Nepal must be in India if we have to talk any sense to the Chinese.
4.Srilanka should be made a friend and partner.Make economic and defense deals with them. It should be a launchpad for India into SE Asia challenging Chinese in their sphere. Sri lanka is a potential goldmine for India 10 years from now.

Once India does these things,rest of things will start falling in place. Respect is earned not "gifted".Something our politicians never understand.
JMT
Altair

[AKalam]

As far as "little wars" are concerned, let's see the "opportunities"!

1. Pakistan - nuclear cover, jihadi mess
2. Bangladesh - quasi-friendly government at the time, India should let Bangladesh know, that India would not take lightly if Bangladesh were to let China build a railway to Chittagong and develop the port. China should not be allowed into the Indian Subcontinent. Should there even be rumors about Bangladesh willing to give Chittagong over to China for use, India might intervene to stop it.
3. Sri Lanka - tell the same thing to Sri Lanka. We should start preparing an Eelam Regiment in the Indian Military from former LTTE soldiers, or organize them at least, under a more India-friendly leadership.
4. Maldives - Lots possible here. India should make clear, that no Chinese would be tolerated on Maldives, either as tourists or otherwise. But also give incentives to Maldivians.
5. Bhutan - offer the king a union with India. The position of His Majesty can be perpetuated.
6. Nepal - Nepal is the most appropriate state to attack and bring under Indian yoke. India has friends there. If we do not do it in the next few years, Nepal would certainly go to the Chinese. If India finishes off the Maoists, then that would be a clear signal to the Chinese, that India means business. Nepal is also far easier to get under control than say Pakistan. With Nepal, India has a clear issue - support to Indian Naxalites. Also US is on board with this one, meaning the West would support Indian intervention. Let our Army stretch their legs there a bit. An invasion of Nepal would send a firm signal to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives to not test India's patience.

RajeshA ji,

I kind of like this thread, at least there is some talk of action.

But before any of this, one needs to be clear about the ultimate goal of all this, is India willing to take all its SAARC neighbors in and create a greater India (just as it is hinted for Bhutan), is Indian SD following population OK with becoming a slim majority from being the current overwhelming super majority, where things may not be firmly under their control as they seem to be today - but which solves all its geographical and geopolitical problems and allow it to spread wings - or does India want just to ensure that its neighboring states are firmly under its control, while they remain as independent states.

It just makes me think what subcontinental leaders were thinking when they agreed to the Partition, because all the problems all of us in the subcontinent are dealing with today go back to that fateful incident. How is it that they could not do a proper cost benefit analysis? Or was it that some actually wanted to cut off and get rid of the unwanted part, which still seems to be a popular prevailing sentiment.

Except for Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Afghanistan, all remaining SAARC members are vulnerable to a military take over, notwithstanding some worldwide outcry, which has to be skill fully managed with PR.

Regarding Bangladesh, we are a size-able state, despite being poor and backward. Its govt. will do what is deemed as beneficial for its population, Muslim, SD followers and others. I think it has taken a reasonable course recently, that is ensuring no space for troublemakers and also providing transit. But please do not take it for granted.

As a sovereign and democratic state its govt. has the support of its population for China's over land route and usage of Chittagong for non-military trade purposes, as it will not create any military threat for any neighboring nations. It will not accept any outside interference on this issue, military threats or otherwise.

If India wanted a SAARC integration process and people see some hope of becoming citizens of a great and powerful country or group of countries in economic Union, that would be a different story. As for now, the track record does not suggest that.

In other words, it is as simple as saying that there is always a price to pay, you cannot get something for nothing. With sovereignty of Westphalian nation states system, all states are open to play with whomever they like, even more so, if it is for survival.

Bangladesh is willing to play nice, like myself Bangladesh is confident and firm about its Indic identity (in fact Bangladeshi immigrants in NE India might be good for Indic security in the long term if you think about it deeply), but it will never be a push over. We know we don't have New Clear cover, I believe we don't need to have it, we are quite confident that we can make it very painful if things get nasty and we will prevail in the long run, even if we may take some beating initially.

[AKalam]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwanggaeto_Stele

The current situation of the subcontinent reminds me of another of China's neighbors history, Korea. Although the situation is not exactly the same, but there might be some analogies that can be drawn.

Gwanggaeto of Goguryeo is today a similarly popular historical figure like Ashoka for the subcontinent.

The three kingdoms of Korea (Goguryeo, Baekje and Silla) were quite powerful and were a peer power to Han Chinese successor states of Sui and Tang. Their internecine fights and an alliance of Tang-Silla, brought down the other two and reduced the domain of Korean civilization from its extant spaces to what it is today.

Indic civilization is vastly greater in scope and power than the Korean kingdoms, but the partition and behavior of Pakistan, specially its Western part after 1971 is analogous to Silla.

In my view, it is self defeating behavior to betray one's own mother civilization and we don't want to be like Silla, the betrayal of which brought down ruin for entire Korean civilization, but we shall refuse to be bullied about our rights of free trade and over land linkage.

[RajeshA]

Any external movement, such as unification of Nepal should be initiated from the other side (At least symbolically at the beginning)

The main reason for this is to ensure that other small nations of sub-continent are not overwhelmed and jump into opposition camp, making the unification difficult.

Actually India has a very good case for going to war with Nepal - support to Maoists in India. Evidence of this is immaterial and can be fabricated at will if not readily available.

Nepal's merger should be carried out in phases

1. Wiping out of Maoists by Indian Forces, valiantly supported by Royal Nepal Army and other groups, perhaps some splinter groups from the Maoists themselves.
2. Installing of a friendly government in Nepal.
3. Massive 'Nation-Building' and more massive propaganda about it, financed by India. Winning of hearts.
4. Plebiscite on Merger with India amongst the Nepalese people. Use of religious leaders to influence the people. Even ex-Maoists who can be bought or convinced can also support the merger.

So in fact, the impetus would come from the Nepalese for union with India.

Other than the obvious advantages of a Nepali merger with India, the signal of an Indian muscular move would send clear signals to other neighbors. It should be a clear signal that India is leaving its straitjacket.

[RajeshA]

AKalam ji,

The question of SD and BMs is thus. I do not object to whatever religion Bangladeshis follow. It is their prerogative. I wouldn't show green flag or red flag depending on the specific religion.

My issue with Muslim majority countries merging with India is just that it has not been proven that Muslim countries in the Indian Subcontinent can manage themselves well and establish a mature society. I concede and to much satisfaction that Bangladesh is far ahead of Pakistan on this question. I fear that politics of religion would again rear their ugly head should such a merger take place.

A separation of people allow both societies to progress unhindered (or less hindered) by religious issues. We can both develop together. I am fully in favor of India doing its most to see to it, that Bangladeshis too develop along with India.

What the inheritors of the Indian Civilization, India and Bangladesh and others in the Indian Subcontinent, need to do is to develop a consensus around the civilization interests of the people of the Indian Subcontinent - equitable upliftment of our people, law and order, technological development, environment, better management of our water resources, infrastructure, single market, single currency, etc. but also other issues as well. The Indian Subcontinent ought to have a single foreign policy and joint defense, where we maximize the profit ensuing from international cooperation but we do not allow any outside power to hurt any country in the Indian Subcontinent.

I am in favor of some EU type arrangement, but without Pakistan, because with Pakistan inside, nothing would move forward, and with India out, there would be little glue. However it is not just up to India to build this family. Family means one stand for each other and do not allow some enemy to take advantage, or create friction in the family.

If something like this comes up, I too will be happy. But as things stand today, Bangladesh has pushed millions of Bangladeshis into India against our wishes. India can claim a right to have this redressed by Bangladesh. If Bangladeshis do not leave India, India should retain the option of claiming land as well from Bangladesh and not just the population. By this demographic invasion of so many economic refugees into India, Bangladesh has given scant respect to India's sovereignty and territorial integrity. India is under no compulsion to make one sided concessions.

It is like this. China is India's enemy. My enemy's friend is my enemy also. It is - you are with us or you are with them. Mind you, this is neither India's official position, nor is it really a realistic position. But for the sake of our argument, the issue can be assumed to be so formulated. Bangladesh has nothing to fear from India by itself, but inviting China in, make Bangladesh a target for Indian wrath.

So the question is one of: should we allow Bangladesh to invite an enemy into our family house or should we not? Bangladesh does not take India's concerns into consideration in giving Chittagong to China, then India can choose to take a harder position and claim compensation for the demographic invasion, perhaps by invading Chittagong.

Earlier I suggested a sort of Indian Subcontinent Doctrine:

India considers herself as the caretaker of the cultural, political and demographic heritage of the Indian Civilization, which has prospered in the Indian Subcontinent and its periphery. This civilization has been ruled by the Mauryas, Guptas, Mughals and Britain, among others. Even as India understands that multiple states can be the inheritors of a civilization and India accepts the sovereignty of the current ones, India would not allow that any political enemy of India or of the Indian Civilization gains a foothold on the Indian Subcontinent, either through deceit or through some agent. India retains a veto in this regard. Also any efforts of any other inheritors of the Indian Civilization to undermine the security interests of India, the main inheritor of the legacy, will not be tolerated.

The ball is in Bangladesh's court, because Bangladesh is precipitating the issue by giving Chittagong to China (for use). Bangladesh is changing the status quo existing on the Indian Subcontinent.

As I mentioned earlier, I would certainly support some EU type solution, but I think the power elites in the neighboring countries are already in China's pockets, especially in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives, not to speak of Pakistan, so they would not allow this confederation. I don't know how much influence the Chinese have in Bangladesh, but I think it is not little.

[shiv]

One opening I see for military action against small neighbouring states is (as others have indicated) the allowing of foreign (big power) military bases or listening posts. The threat of complete destruction of that base by military action should never be far below the surface.

We did not ask for our neighbours to be the way they are and they should not expect anything more from us. If you live in the neighbourhood you are safer having a local community rather than inviting outside goons. This hegemony should be imposed. You all know that even without actively imposing such hegemony India is accused of doing that. Heck if you are a saint and accused of rape no matter what you do - might as well do some raping.

[JwalaMukhi]

Bangladesh is willing to play nice, like myself Bangladesh is confident and firm about its Indic identity (in fact Bangladeshi immigrants in NE India might be good for Indic security in the long term if you think about it deeply), but it will never be a push over. We know we don't have New Clear cover, I believe we don't need to have it, we are quite confident that we can make it very painful if things get nasty and we will prevail in the long run, even if we may take some beating initially.

Well, this chutzpah is very interesting. If Bangladesh musters so much chutzpah, was there any pause in the thought of what India could do. Probably, IMVHO ,my guess would be it will not be very painful, because an entity has to have an identity, to feel the pain.

[shiv]

it will never be a push over. We know we don't have New Clear cover, I believe we don't need to have it, we are quite confident that we can make it very painful if things get nasty and we will prevail in the long run, even if we may take some beating initially.

I have no doubt about this and I think anyone who wants to make war also understands this. In fact that is why it makes sense to resort to either very limited military action, or non military moves backed up by the threat of military action. That idea in fact was what I had in mind when I started this thread.

Like a couple after a passionate bout of lovemaking asking each other "How was it for you?" - there are always two stories relating to any conflict - "How was it for me?" and "How was it for you?"

Like diplomacy, armed conflict is a "process of negotiation" in which each party wants to come out with advantages. The only problem with "negotiation by war" is that someone dies. Typically the people who die are not the people who actually ordered the commencement of war. The ideal victory is where everyone on the other side dies or gives up and nobody on your side dies. This almost never happens, and as more, and more, and more people die on both sides the "recruitment base" - the population from which soldiers are recruited start asking why people are dying and have been dying for years.

This is where "leadership" matters. I don't think this has much to do with identity. "Identity" is a bogey when it comes to willingness to die in war. Indoctrination and training can always change identity. If the recruitment base from which soldiers are recruited are indoctrinated to feel that they are fighting for their survival - they are likely to accept more deaths among their people and fight for a longer period of time. And that is so well known that warfighting technology has always aimed to make it "more painful" for the other party by inflicting more deaths on them while mimimizing deaths on ones own side so that there is more political pressure on the leaders of the side that "feels the pain" to a greater extent to end the war. Eliminating the leadership of the other side is a valid tactic in this regard.

Because of these reasons it is possible to start thinking of warfighting scenarios in which there is very little loss for oneself, while the other side loses much more, combined with military or nonmilitary moves to get the leadership of the other side to comply with your wishes without war. The US does this regularly. China too appears to do this.

There is an impression (among Indians in general) that India does not do this and this is a question that I would like to look at in some more detail.

Do Indian leaders fail to use all the tactics available to them short of a devastating war in which even Bangladesh (or Nepal) could "make it very painful"? Or do they use them but ineffectively? Or have Indian leaders used up all that is possible without war and need to fight war?

[naren]

As a sovereign and democratic state its govt. has the support of its population for China's over land route and usage of Chittagong for non-military trade purposes, as it will not create any military threat for any neighboring nations. It will not accept any outside interference on this issue, military threats or otherwise.
...
Bangladesh is willing to play nice, like myself Bangladesh is confident and firm about its Indic identity (in fact Bangladeshi immigrants in NE India might be good for Indic security in the long term if you think about it deeply), but it will never be a push over. We know we don't have New Clear cover, I believe we don't need to have it, we are quite confident that we can make it very painful if things get nasty and we will prevail in the long run, even if we may take some beating initially.

Unfortunately, "gratitude" is too much to ask for these days. Where was the knight in shining armour China when 3 million Bangladeshis were slaughtered ? Oh yeah, they were giving their full blessings to those who did it. And what did the "push overing" India do - took 10 million refugees, lost few thousand soldiers in her effort to protect them. Yep, it needs to be made "very painful" to India. Stupid India, the land of Gandhi and Buddha and ahimsa.

May Bangladeshis, Chinese, Pakistanis and all those assorted folk live long and prosper. I guess this world is no place for India.

[JwalaMukhi]

^Narenji,
Forget about gratitude. Every two bit country, who were part of Indian civilization, suddenly feels empowered to actually threaten India. And also conveniently forgets reality and laments about lack of "New clear" tools. Well, wet dreams are good, but if it gets into ones head, and actually threaten India with what one could do, there is still lot of paki logic embedded in the thoughts. Well, pakiness is a rare form of disease, which would take sometime to get rid of. Till then it is important for India to keep the two bit countries, in quarantine and hopefully, when the grip of paki logic is lost, then India can see about dealing with them.
Till then it is important to let them feel the breeze of arabian logic and TFTA postures.

[Hari Seldon]

^^^ Err, no. AKalam has been more reasonable than most and IMHO, is a person whose perspective and thoughts the forum could actually use. He's quite clear, upfront and level-headed about his views, and is not some cheeni trolley out on a disruption-only spree.

I suspect the questions AKalam raises have easily understood answers that are not articulated for good reason. Let me try some articulation only.
1. No, India's Yindus, the last of their kind on Earth would not be comfortable with diluting their majority with an influx of mohamaddens however reasonable-looking at the time of ingress.
2. Sure, BD and TSP and all our neighbors have spoiler value.
3. While an offer to merge or semi-merge (as in free movement of labor and capital) as partners with the full rights and privileges that go an Indian passport might be made to the nominally Dharmic countries - Nepal, Sri Lanka, Burma perhaps - there's no way in hell or highwater such can be made to BD or TSP. Its an existential issue. It won't happen, no can do.

Hope that clarifies. Oh, and its entirely IMVVHO, my 2 cents etc.

[RamaY]

^ +1 Hari Seldon garu.

I too agree with AKalamji's assessment of BD at this juncture. For BD to feel safe and comfortable to join Indic civilization, ROP has to evolve first. It is not happening in next 50yrs to the least.

India on the other hand better chance integrating other Indic nations such as Bhutan, Nepal, SL and Myanmar. BD can only be a friendly neighbor even if TSP dismantles. BD will find its Indic roots only when situation changes in ME.

[naren]

AK ji's proposals were discussed before in Future scenarios thread about few months back.

Interesting thing to note is that he proposed BD must integrate with India in order to counter China's rising threat.

Now read the interesting choice of words used here: "sovereign and democratic state", "support of its population for China", "will not accept any outside interference on this issue, military threats or otherwise", "will never be a push over", "New Clear cover, I believe we don't need to have it", "very painful", "we will prevail in the long run".

[RamaY]

^

I will have to and read those posts again, but I think the cotext is different. In this thread we are talking about Indian proactive action including war. In the other thread the context was evolution of BD and it's journey toward it's indic roots.

[shiv]

One premise that I am trying to explore in this thread is as follows:

Big, widespread and prolonged wars for gaining and holding territory are costly. But small wars with limited aims are doable. By its very nature a "small, localized war" can be fought more cheaply by almost any country and the outcome may be surprising. For example the Mogadishu encounter was between the Somalis and the US. Despite a larger number of Somalis killed it was the US that came off worse because the US decided that it was no longer interested in staying in Somalia.

This has some very interesting consequences.

A country like North Korea or Pakistan can hold much larger foes at bay by fighting and threatening small wars, while being ready to "make it costly" for the foe to fight a big, prolonged war". In other words a minor or medium power can fight small battles and wars and get away with local advantages while "making it too costly" to fight them in a major conflict. This in fact is merely an extension of the same principle that AKalam mentioned in his post about Bangladesh being able to "make it costly" for India.

Unless you have overwhelming military superiority backed by surprise and a weak foe, the possibility of overrunning an entire land is no longer something that can be "planned" with casual nonchalance. I believe we have to look at the way the world has changed.

• The industrial and scientific revolution have populated the world with more people than ever before.
• Automatic weapons and small arms are available to anyone in any country
• The most powerful nations on earth have been fought to a stalemate by large numbers of people with small arms fighting guerilla wars.

What does this mean to a huge nation with vast armed forces? It means
1) No longer can that big nation be defeated "just like that" in a war
2) But that big nation can get into an endless low grade asymmetric war with a population armed with small arms until the big, powerful nation has to decide to pull out, or just keep on and on and on with that war. The choices are stalemate or "defeat" by pulling out. Their MKIs and F 22s are no use.

This is as true for the US and China as it is for India. Under the circumstances, big powers have few choices. Some, like America will still use brute force against small powers, and win some wars. They will lose others because they reach a stalemate and have to pull out.

Some like China may understand the uselessness of getting into a big war like 200 MKIs versus 400 J-10s. PLAN versus Brahmos. US Carrier battle group versus Chinese antiship missiles. They may opt to arm guerillas to fight an adversary into a stalemate.

For a big nation - I believe it is difficult to lose outright to a largely guerilla force. But that guerilla force can keep a nation tied down for a long long time - "forever" if you like.

So what is the way forward?

1) If you can impose guerilla war by proxies and prostitutes on your adversary. Go ahead. That is your best bet. But you can only bleed him and irritate him. You cannot defeat him. And unless you have overwhelming superiority you cannot defeat him in a big war anyway.

2) If someone imposes guerilla war on you, most likely you cannot defeat him. You can either keep fighting a low grade war forever or pull out. But if the guerilla war is being waged in your land against your people - you cannot pull out. You have to ready yourself to fight that guerilla warfare forever and never stop. Never give up. Because you will, in any case, never ever be able to defeat and control a huge population armed with small arms. You can insulate. You can quarantine. But you cannot totally control. Just build up the force requirements to keep on fighting the guerillas and killing them.

You can dream of a big war to wipe out your low grade, asymmetric adversary. But such an adversary is too costly to overrun and subjugate. So protect yourself as best you can, arm yourself not to be too weak against the big boys and carry on.

[Lalmohan]

you need to distinguish further, a large army can defeat another large army quickly if it has all the bells and whistles and the opponent does not. it can still not occupy that space (e.g. iraq) successfully. the alternative is to hit and run, allow the other to stew in its own juices

[AKalam]

AKalam ji,

The question of SD and BMs is thus. I do not object to whatever religion Bangladeshis follow. It is their prerogative. I wouldn't show green flag or red flag depending on the specific religion.

My issue with Muslim majority countries merging with India is just that it has not been proven that Muslim countries in the Indian Subcontinent can manage themselves well and establish a mature society. I concede and to much satisfaction that Bangladesh is far ahead of Pakistan on this question. I fear that politics of religion would again rear their ugly head should such a merger take place.

A separation of people allow both societies to progress unhindered (or less hindered) by religious issues. We can both develop together. I am fully in favor of India doing its most to see to it, that Bangladeshis too develop along with India.

What the inheritors of the Indian Civilization, India and Bangladesh and others in the Indian Subcontinent, need to do is to develop a consensus around the civilization interests of the people of the Indian Subcontinent - equitable upliftment of our people, law and order, technological development, environment, better management of our water resources, infrastructure, single market, single currency, etc. but also other issues as well. The Indian Subcontinent ought to have a single foreign policy and joint defense, where we maximize the profit ensuing from international cooperation but we do not allow any outside power to hurt any country in the Indian Subcontinent.

I am in favor of some EU type arrangement, but without Pakistan, because with Pakistan inside, nothing would move forward, and with India out, there would be little glue. However it is not just up to India to build this family. Family means one stand for each other and do not allow some enemy to take advantage, or create friction in the family.

If something like this comes up, I too will be happy. But as things stand today, Bangladesh has pushed millions of Bangladeshis into India against our wishes. India can claim a right to have this redressed by Bangladesh. If Bangladeshis do not leave India, India should retain the option of claiming land as well from Bangladesh and not just the population. By this demographic invasion of so many economic refugees into India, Bangladesh has given scant respect to India's sovereignty and territorial integrity. India is under no compulsion to make one sided concessions.

It is like this. China is India's enemy. My enemy's friend is my enemy also. It is - you are with us or you are with them. Mind you, this is neither India's official position, nor is it really a realistic position. But for the sake of our argument, the issue can be assumed to be so formulated. Bangladesh has nothing to fear from India by itself, but inviting China in, make Bangladesh a target for Indian wrath.

So the question is one of: should we allow Bangladesh to invite an enemy into our family house or should we not? Bangladesh does not take India's concerns into consideration in giving Chittagong to China, then India can choose to take a harder position and claim compensation for the demographic invasion, perhaps by invading Chittagong.

Earlier I suggested a sort of Indian Subcontinent Doctrine:

India considers herself as the caretaker of the cultural, political and demographic heritage of the Indian Civilization, which has prospered in the Indian Subcontinent and its periphery. This civilization has been ruled by the Mauryas, Guptas, Mughals and Britain, among others. Even as India understands that multiple states can be the inheritors of a civilization and India accepts the sovereignty of the current ones, India would not allow that any political enemy of India or of the Indian Civilization gains a foothold on the Indian Subcontinent, either through deceit or through some agent. India retains a veto in this regard. Also any efforts of any other inheritors of the Indian Civilization to undermine the security interests of India, the main inheritor of the legacy, will not be tolerated.

The ball is in Bangladesh's court, because Bangladesh is precipitating the issue by giving Chittagong to China (for use). Bangladesh is changing the status quo existing on the Indian Subcontinent.

As I mentioned earlier, I would certainly support some EU type solution, but I think the power elites in the neighboring countries are already in China's pockets, especially in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives, not to speak of Pakistan, so they would not allow this confederation. I don't know how much influence the Chinese have in Bangladesh, but I think it is not little.

RajeshA ji,

I understand your points why India would be unhappy with this situation.

Bangladesh had been vacillating between a pro-India and anti-India see-saw since 1971. Awami League led by Mujib and his daughter Hasina, had been leading the pro-India faction, while Zia and his wife Khaleda leading the anti-India faction. Both are powerful and have deep roots among the population. When one comes to power and displays its nepotism, corruption and incompetence, the other waits till the silent majority gets tired and throws the incumbents out of power just to start this cycle again. A third alternative to break out of this cycle has not yet materialized for Bangladesh.

What Hasina govt. is doing is some balancing act, after providing transit facility to India, by also enthusiastically working on the Chinese link road, to show that it cares for the future of Bangladesh and its economy, even if it makes India unhappy.

It is alright to play hypothetical war games in web forums, but any serious moves by India for invasion of Chittagong will have tremendous consequence within the political scene of Bangladesh. Some of the scenarios that might develop:

- anti-India camp will finally come out with the convincing argument that India broke Pakistan into pieces so it can weaken both parts and then swallow them whole (an outcome I would like very much, but obviously India does not want it, which BD aam janta's will not understand anyways, as ironically to them its big bad India wants to revive Ram Rajya in Akhanda Bharat)

- Hasina and AL will be defeated and the others will come to power with a land-slide

- there will be increasing common security alignment with PRC and in the worst case scenario with Pakistan as well

Please note also, that Shanti Bahini disturbance in Chittagong hill tracts had the end result of settlement of Bengali population in those areas and making them a numerical majority, as after all Chakma's are migrants as well to these areas, I believe not too far back in history, so for them to claim a territory is not considered legitimate.

Most part of Chittagong were a part of Arakan and was taken over during Mughal times to stop Mogh pirates intrusion to neighboring areas. One remnant of that era are the indigenous Rohingya (Indic Arakanese Muslims) population in Rakhine state of Myanmar (Burma) who the Burman majority rulers consider as Bengali's and not Burmese citizens, hence the periodic purges by the Burmese army and the resulting spillover into Chittagong, across the Naf river.

Bangladesh and Myanmar are not friendly neighbors, lately we had a tense situation in the sea about gas exploration on disputed space that both countries claim as their exclusive economic zone.

The link road is happening at PRC insistence and the end result is by no means guaranteed, because of unstable situation within Myanmar. So we will have to wait and see what comes of it eventually.

But it is a potential political hot patato within Bangladesh and it seems for India and India-Bangladesh relations as well.

[AKalam]

One premise that I am trying to explore in this thread is as follows:

Big, widespread and prolonged wars for gaining and holding territory are costly. But small wars with limited aims are doable. By its very nature a "small, localized war" can be fought more cheaply by almost any country and the outcome may be surprising. For example the Mogadishu encounter was between the Somalis and the US. Despite a larger number of Somalis killed it was the US that came off worse because the US decided that it was no longer interested in staying in Somalia.

This has some very interesting consequences.

A country like North Korea or Pakistan can hold much larger foes at cay by fighting and threatening smal wars, while being ready to "make it costly" for the foe to fight a big, prolonged war". In other words a minor or medium power can fight small battles and wars and get away with local advantages while "making it too costly" to fight them in a major conflict. This in fact is merely an extension of the same principle that AKalam mentioned in his post about Bangladesh being able to "make it costly" for India.

Unless you have overwhelming military superiority backed by surprise and a weak foe, the possibility of overrunning an entire land is no longer something that can be "planned" with casual nonchalance. I believe we have to look at the way the world has changed.

• The industrial and scientific revolution have populated the world with more people than ever before.
• Automatic weapons and small arms are available to anyone in any country
• The most powerful nations on earth have been fought to a stalemate by large numbers of people with small arms fighting guerilla wars.

What does this mean to a huge nation with vast armed forces? It means
1) No longer can that big nation be defeated "just like that" in a war
2) But that big nation can get into an endless low grade asymmetric war with a population armed with small arms until the big, powerful nation has to decide to pull out, or just keep on and on and on with that war. The choices are stalemate or "defeat" by pulling out. Their MKIs and F 22s are no use.

This is as true for the US and China as it is for India. Under the circumstances, big powers have few choices. Some, like America will still use brute force against small powers, and win some wars. They will lose others because they reach a stalemate and have to pull out.

Some like China may understand the uselessness of getting into a big war like 200 MKIs versus 400 J-10s. PLAN versus Brahmos. US Carrier battle group versus Chinese antiship missiles. They may opt to arm guerillas to fight an adversary into a stalemate.

For a big nation - I believe it is difficult to lose outright to a largely guerilla force. But that guerilla force can keep a nation tied down for a long long time - "forever" if you like.

So what is the way forward?

1) If you can impose guerilla war by proxies and prostitutes on your adversary. Go ahead. That is your best bet. But you can only bleed him and irritate him. You cannot defeat him. And unless you have overwhelming superiority you cannot defeat him in a big war anyway.

2) If someone imposes guerilla war on you, most likely you cannot defeat him. You can wither keep fighting a low grade war forever or pull out. But if the guerilla war is being waged in your land against your people - you cannot pull out. You have to ready yourself to fight that guerilla warfare forever and never stop. Never give up. Because you will, in any case, never ever be able to defeat and control a huge population armed with small arms. You can insulate. ou can quarantine. But you cannot totally control. Just build up the force requiremenst to keep on fighting the guerillas and killing them.

You can dream of a big war to wipe out your low grade, asymmetric adversary. But such an adversary is too costly to overrun and subjugate. So protect yourself as best you can, arm yourself not to be too weak against the big boys and carry on.

Very well thought out, Vietnam and Afghanistan are two perfect examples. If a population and all its kins cannot be wiped out from the face of the earth completely (possibly due to the after effect of loosing the moral high ground and its future consequences), I believe the only way to win them over is through their hearts and minds. Sharpening knives, liquidating some unwanted and deviant parts which have not caused direct harm or planning for such actions against enemies, perceived as such because of their belief system, as some like to promote in this forum will only work to harden the hearts and minds.

[AKalam]

^^^ Err, no. AKalam has been more reasonable than most and IMHO, is a person whose perspective and thoughts the forum could actually use. He's quite clear, upfront and level-headed about his views, and is not some cheeni trolley out on a disruption-only spree.

I suspect the questions AKalam raises have easily understood answers that are not articulated for good reason. Let me try some articulation only.
1. No, India's Yindus, the last of their kind on Earth would not be comfortable with diluting their majority with an influx of mohamaddens however reasonable-looking at the time of ingress.
2. Sure, BD and TSP and all our neighbors have spoiler value.
3. While an offer to merge or semi-merge (as in free movement of labor and capital) as partners with the full rights and privileges that go an Indian passport might be made to the nominally Dharmic countries - Nepal, Sri Lanka, Burma perhaps - there's no way in hell or highwater such can be made to BD or TSP. Its an existential issue. It won't happen, no can do.

Hope that clarifies. Oh, and its entirely IMVVHO, my 2 cents etc.

Seldon ji, thanks for the clarification. Why not consider just free flow of goods and capital and exclude the labor part, which may be the eventual fate of Turkey-EU relations. I think we Muslims should learn to behave, get whatever we can get and also learn to stand on our own, as we are unwanted everywhere.

[RajeshA]

AKalam ji,

My response to your post is here.

[AKalam]

As a sovereign and democratic state its govt. has the support of its population for China's over land route and usage of Chittagong for non-military trade purposes, as it will not create any military threat for any neighboring nations. It will not accept any outside interference on this issue, military threats or otherwise.
...
Bangladesh is willing to play nice, like myself Bangladesh is confident and firm about its Indic identity (in fact Bangladeshi immigrants in NE India might be good for Indic security in the long term if you think about it deeply), but it will never be a push over. We know we don't have New Clear cover, I believe we don't need to have it, we are quite confident that we can make it very painful if things get nasty and we will prevail in the long run, even if we may take some beating initially.

Unfortunately, "gratitude" is too much to ask for these days. Where was the knight in shining armour China when 3 million Bangladeshis were slaughtered ? Oh yeah, they were giving their full blessings to those who did it. And what did the "push overing" India do - took 10 million refugees, lost few thousand soldiers in her effort to protect them. Yep, it needs to be made "very painful" to India. Stupid India, the land of Gandhi and Buddha and ahimsa.

May Bangladeshis, Chinese, Pakistanis and all those assorted folk live long and prosper. I guess this world is no place for India.

Naren ji,

Bangladesh and its people (including myself) are grateful to India for helping us in our time of need, nothing will change that.

My words were meant to describe a scenario which shiv ji has understood and explained in detail in his posts, which is what might happen if India invaded Chittagong or entire Bangladesh.

[JwalaMukhi]

Well, the best case from Indian perspective would be: BD does not go into anti-India camp. That doesn't necessarily mean that it should be in pro-India camp. That's is ok. The real question is: does BD being neutral or being in anti-India camp benefit it?
At the end of the day, if BD dreams of riding the anti-India camp, based on china or some other god father's support, it will be in for a rude awakening. Based on its geo-political placement, BD would have very limited choice in the matter. But being a nuisance, by trying to highlight the pain that could happen to India, it is enormously shooting itself in the foot.
For example, with all the help from China, Unkil etc., the best that Pakistan can do is negotiate with a gun to its own head. The question is will BDs follow the example of pakis, or are they going to be much wiser?
But from the subtle and not so subtle indications, the threat of anti-India camp being brought to the table, highlights Paki way is still being romanticized.

[putnanja]

Our NSA's talk on wars/use of force ...

'Terrorism Is The Derivative Of Nuclear Deterrence', NSA At NDC's Golden Jubilee In Manekshaw Centre

[shiv]

Our NSA's talk on wars/use of force ...

'Terrorism Is The Derivative Of Nuclear Deterrence', NSA At NDC's Golden Jubilee In Manekshaw Centre

Thank you Putnanja-avare. I think that was a a great talk. If I can find the speech in any source other than the one you have linked - I will reproduce it in full on here.

[shiv]

OK, reproduced in full from the following 2 sources
http://www.isria.com/RESTRICTED/D/2010/ ... 10_144.php
http://www.indiablooms.com/NewsDetailsP ... 11010n.php

New Delhi, Oct 21 (IBNS) Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs”

Rashtrapathiji,
Your Majesty, the King of Bhutan,
Raksha Mantri,
Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force,
Lt-Gen. Prakash Menon, Commandant NDC,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am deeply honoured to have been asked to deliver the keynote address before the seminar on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs” to celebrate the golden jubilee of this prestigious institution. The NDC has made outstanding contributions to the spread of strategic thought and the integration of civil and military thinking in India. You have today assembled a galaxy of experts and authorities to discuss this important question. We await your deliberations with great expectations.

Rather than trying to anticipate what your seminar will throw up, I thought I would look at two issues that you will probably consider in much more detail. Is there in an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? And, how have recent changes in the world and strategic affairs affected the role of force in today’s world?

Is there an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? This is not a question that one normally expects to ask about a power that is a declared nuclear weapon state with the world’s second largest standing army. But India achieved independence in a unique manner; through a freedom movement dedicated to truth and non-violence, and has displayed both ambiguity and opposition to classical power politics. In the circumstances posing the question is understandable and legitimate.

To answer the question let us look at traditional Indian attitudes to force and the lessons India draws from its own history, and at Indian practice since independence in 1947.

Attitudes to Force and Lessons from History

While India may have achieved independence after a non-violent struggle, it was a struggle that Gandhiji described as non-violence of the strong.

As far back as 1928 Gandhiji wrote, “If there was a national government, whilst I should not take any direct part in any war, I can conceive of occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the military training of those who wish to take it.... It is not possible to make a person or society non-violent by compulsion.”

During the Partition riots at his prayer meeting on 26 September 1947 Gandhiji said that he had always been an opponent of all warfare, but that if there was no other way of securing justice war would be the only alternative left to the government.

Faced with the tribal raiders sent by Pakistan into Kashmir in October 1947, Gandhiji said that it was right for the Union Government to save the fair city by rushing troops to Srinagar. He added that he would rather that the defenders be wiped out to the last man in clearing Kashmir’s soil of the raiders rather than submit.


In saying so, Gandhiji was entirely in keeping with a long Indian tradition which has regarded the use of force as legitimate in certain circumstances, namely, if there is no alternative way of securing justice. This is in essence a doctrine for the defensive use of force, when all other avenues are exhausted.

Our two greatest epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana are about wars, and treat rivalries as natural and normal. And the two classical expositions on the use of force, the Geeta and Bhishma’s death bed lecture on statecraft in the Mahabharata’s Shantiparva are extended explanations of a unique point of view.

The clearest description of the uses of force in statecraft is in the Arthashastra by Chanakya, which deals with both internal and external uses of force.

The lesson that comes through very clearly in both the major Indian epics, which deal with wars of necessity, is also apparent in Kautilya, the original realist, and in Ashoka, the convert to idealism. Ashoka and Kautilya were both products of a highly evolved and intricate tradition of statecraft which must have preceded them for centuries. A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how evolved Indian strategic culture was as early as the third century before Christ, and how the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations. This was not a doctrine of “God on our side”, (though that helped, as Krishna proved in the Mahabharata). Nor is it about just wars. In the Indian tradition the use of force is legitimate not just if it is in a good cause and its results will be good. Instead, this was a doctrine that saw force as necessary in certain circumstances, to obtain justice, when all other means are exhausted, and which also recognised that force was not always the most effective or efficient means to this end.


The other lesson that Indian thinkers have consistently drawn from history is of the perils of weakness. The colonial narrative of India’s history, stressing “outside” invasions and rulers had as its corollary the conviction that India must avoid weakness at all costs lest that history be repeated. The Indian quest after 1947 for strategic autonomy and for autonomy in the decision to use or threaten force has a long tradition behind it.

What I am trying to say is that Indian strategic culture has an indigenous construct on the role of force in statecraft, modified by our experience in the last two centuries. War and peace are continuing themes in Indian strategic culture. While not celebrating war the culture treats defensive war as acceptable when good fights evil to secure justice. Indian strategic culture has been comfortable with this contradiction. While Gandhiji shunned the use of force and opposed violence in politics he was politically steely and unyielding, and accepted violence as unavoidable and justified in certain circumstances.

As a result of this acceptance of contradictions, Indian strategic culture supports ethical views that dovetail easily with international norms of conduct, whether legal or on human rights. It is a culture that tends instinctively to pluralism, tolerance of different views and positions, and a reliance on argumentation, diplomacy and law before recourse to the use of force. It is therefore no surprise that it seeks a rule based international order to limit the anarchy among states that is sometimes evident.


This aspect of Indian strategic culture is common to what Kanti Bajpai described as the three streams of Indian strategic culture, namely, “Nehruvians”, neo-liberals and hyper-realists. They might differ on the best means but not on India’s strategic goals . To summarise Bajpai, all three streams agree on the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations and recognise no higher authority; see interests, power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore; and think that power comprises both military and economic capabilities at a minimum. Beyond this they differ.

Interestingly all three streams, “Nehruvians”, neoliberals and hyperrealists, believe that nuclear weapons are essential for India’s security in a world that has shown no signs of moving to their abolition and elimination.

In other words, there is substantial agreement on values, on goals and even on means in our policies, despite marked and rapid changes in the external environment in which we have operated. That is why the core traits of our foreign and defence policies have persisted since independence, irrespective of the parties in power.

The Indian Practice since 1947

Let us look at this aspect of Indian strategic culture in action, in other words at Indian practice and policy since independence.


• The defence budget has only exceeded 3% of GDP in one year of the last sixty-three.

• There have been clear limits on the use of force internally. The use of military force for internal security functions has been severely circumscribed, limited to those cases where there is a strong correlation to inimical forces abroad such as Nagaland and J&K.

• The armed forces of the Union have only been used defensively against external aggression in the sixty-three years of the Republic.

• India has never sent troops abroad except for UNPKO or at the express request of the legitimate government of the country concerned. This was true in the Maldives in 1987, in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Bangladesh in 1971.

• India has also never retained territory taken by force in the wars that she has fought. This is so even for some Indian territory taken back from Pakistan in the Indian state of J&K which was returned to Pakistani control after the 1965 and 1971 wars.

India as a NWS


The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament. We have made it clear that while we need nuclear weapons for our own security, it is our goal to work for a world free of nuclear weapons, and that we are ready to undertake the necessary obligations to achieve that goal in a time-bound programme agreed to and implemented by all nuclear weapon and other states.

In sum, there is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force. We do not claim that it is better or worse than any other way that other nations adopt. It is a result of our own history and experience, and we feel it best suited to our goals and situation. And it too is evolving, both consciously and unconsciously, as is the world around us. It is time now to consciously build our own concepts and strategic thinking, adapted to today’s realities and India’s environment, including on the role of force.

Force in Today’s World


The other issue that you will be considering is how changes in the world and in strategic affairs have affected the role of force.

It seems to me that the changes we see in world politics and the effects of technology are the two factors that have most affected the strategic calculus of those in the international system who might seek to use force for political purposes.

Consider the global political situation first.

With global and regional balances of power characterised by unequal distributions of power; the interdependence between major powers created by globalisation; the state losing its monopoly of violence in contested hegemonies both internally and externally; and the diversity of values espoused by states, world politics today is in an unprecedented state of flux. It does, however seem that the cost to the major powers of using force in their dealings with each other could prevent the emergence of direct conflict between them.

The effects of technology are harder to describe and predict. In the early fifties, there were those who hoped that the unprecedented power of the atom bomb had made war unthinkable and therefore abolished it! Unfortunately, we now know better. In fact we have seen technology place increasingly lethal power in the hands of non-state actors. Terrorism is technologically enabled and knows no boundaries today, even drawing on support from within state systems. After several centuries, once again the state is not the sole or always the predominant factor in the international system. In some cases, it is businesses and individuals who now determine our technological future and it is these units that a successful policy must now increasingly deal with.


We have also seen technology create new domains for contestation, such as cyber space, where the speed of manoeuvre, premium on offense, and the nature of the battle-space make us rethink traditional concepts of deterrence. As technology has expanded the spectrum, the line between conventional and non-conventional warfare has blurred. The definition of force, the classic marker of power, has now expanded, thus changing the utility of force as traditionally configured.

As we enter a world of multiple powers, with rapidly shifting balances, change alone is certain. Unfortunately, force is the hedge chosen by several powers against heightened uncertainty in the international system. The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We therefore need to develop a new and different statecraft.

If change alone is certain, and if the utility of force in statecraft is itself changing in fundamental ways, it is all the more necessary that we return to the values in which the use of force must be embedded. Ultimately it is not just the logic of politics or technology but the values and purposes of the state and society that determine the choices that we make of the uses and nature of force.


What India seeks is a new security architecture, an open, balanced and inclusive architecture, to correspond to the new situation that is emerging. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are radically different from those of the twentieth. Nuclear confrontation or war between major powers is not as likely as the threat from derivatives of nuclear deterrence, namely, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, which are being used to subvert the emergence of a plural, secular and democratic international order in the twenty-first century. The challenges of a globalised world cannot be handled by twentieth century military alliances or containment strategies.

Conclusion

So in effect my argument is that in India’s experience the use of force must be governed and circumscribed by the values of state and society. I have also tried to suggest that there may be value in studying the Indian way, the Indian view and Indian practice in the use and role of force in state-craft.

It also seems from recent experience that the utility of force, as traditionally configured and conceived, is of limited value in protecting a society or achieving some policy goals. But one can hardly jump to conclusions about the futility of force when limited war under nuclear conditions remains possible, and when adversaries need to be deterred. This debate will continue.

I wish you success in continuing the debate and in your deliberations.

[Pulikeshi]

Putnanja, thanks for posting that article....

Couple of quick points:

1. Our two greatest epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana are about wars, and treat rivalries as natural and normal. And the two classical expositions on the use of force, the Geeta and Bhishma’s death bed lecture on statecraft in the Mahabharata’s Shantiparva are extended explanations of a unique point of view.

Incorrect. This is a longer topic, but what comes into play is called 'Apaddharma' (Dharma during times of exceptional conditions) is not the same as the duty to wage war and procure Artha - the Dharma of a Kshatriya.

2. A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how evolved Indian strategic culture was as early as the third century before Christ, and how the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations.

So what? Highly evolved but ineffective strategic culture is great if one is an academic tinkering with different ideas.
On the ground what works is what is highly evolved...

3. While not celebrating war the culture treats defensive war as acceptable when good fights evil to secure justice. Indian strategic culture has been comfortable with this contradiction.

This is what I have termed defensive realism
The real question is has this been effective historically, it seem not.
Thought out history, India (her empires) has waiting for someone to come knocking...
There was never an interest to provoke, march to the roots and take the fight to them.
India will have a foreign policy when India has manufactured her 'dacoits' that loot others.

4. As we enter a world of multiple powers, with rapidly shifting balances, change alone is certain. Unfortunately, force is the hedge chosen by several powers against heightened uncertainty in the international system. The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We therefore need to develop a new and different statecraft.

If change alone is certain, and if the utility of force in statecraft is itself changing in fundamental ways, it is all the more necessary that we return to the values in which the use of force must be embedded. Ultimately it is not just the logic of politics or technology but the values and purposes of the state and society that determine the choices that we make of the uses and nature of force.

The choice is not between force and other, unnamed, instruments of statecraft. The idea is that new instruments of statecraft ought to be available in the set of tools in the toolbox when instrumenting strategy to use in conjunction or individually.

This needs a longer exposition, but suffice to say a defensive realist strategy was perhaps relevant when Indian subcontinent was a resource rich area of the world. Even that would be a rather tenuous argument at best.

With a increasing population and depleting natural resources and blessed with a geography that brings the burden of an empire, revisiting the traditional idea of defensive use of force seems to be ignoring the changing internal and external realities.

Power is the ability to instrument change with impunity. So who is powerful?
Change is the only constant, but who instruments change?

[RajeshA]

Our NSA's talk on wars/use of force ...

'Terrorism Is The Derivative Of Nuclear Deterrence', NSA At NDC's Golden Jubilee In Manekshaw Centre

India as a NWS

The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament.

I think I had misunderstood the NFU Doctrine.

The NFU is limited only to non-nuclear weapon states, which basically means we do not have a NFU against China and Pakistan.

[rohitvats]

Gentlemen, What is the definition of limited war? How does it apply to India?

[Lalmohan]

the right strategy (lowest cost and highest gain) w.r.t. both nepal and bangladesh is economic integration but political separation. that will ensure friendly relations and the right sort of buffer against the PRC. a similar relationship is possible with a new pashtunistan and azad-balochistan. sindhustan must first be cleansed and the limited war of regime and societal change (but not holding territory) needs to be fought in pakjab. No other hot war needs to be fought.

[RajeshA]

Shivshankar Menon's speech has got me thinking. So here is some thoughts on it.

China and Pakistan have been afraid of India for good reason. India's cultural assimilatory capacity is worth noting. However India's foremost weakness has not been on the battlefield, or even in the arena of strategic space expansion though is has been found severely lacking, but in global media manipulation.

All the good work and the noble policies that GoI has followed since Independence have failed to translate geopolitical idealism, philanthropy, restraint, 'principled stands' and sainthood into geopolitical popularity. Indian Leadership seems to think that if India's halo is brilliant enough, the world would recognize India as the Moral Leader that we are. They can't be further from the truth.

So the first war to win is to get total control over how India's image is presented to the world. This means investing in tomorrow's journalists the world over; make them sympathetic to India's cause; buy in into the Media Empires the world over and influence their presentation of India; intervene in their hiring practices and try to get journalists sympathetic to India into those media houses.

The key is not to increase our Halo's brightness, but rather to improve the people's ability to see it in the dark.

[brihaspati]

A limited war can be started but not guaranteed to end as such. More than limited war, the key question becomes whether India can manage the network of military dominance that say USA currently has, to ensure that external military powers do not intervene even politically to cut short the progress of Indian arms. So more than limited (what is limited - objectives, timeframe?) it is better to consider what objectives are to be secured, and how fast could they be attained before intervention happens or what simultaneous steps need to be undertaken so that intervention is forestalled [politically infeasible given current overt "international" values - like a quick retribution for 26/11 not a long delayed one].

When one needs to hit, there is no point in being shy and covering the fist in cushion - so that the enemy feels less pain on impact. Certain hostile forces around India need to be taken out. Military history is not just now seeing the concept of a total war - in fact many of the current proselytizers of "ethical war" actually can dictate their terms as to how others should behave simply by not following their own preaching in the past. If military action becomes necessary it has to have clear target of destroying not only formal combatants (in such a way that they can never again return to action) but also the structural basis for that hostile force to have risen in the first place. if it means destroying livelihood - so be it, destroying the economy so be it, destroying all propaganda/educational structures that regenerate hatred for India - so be it.

Objectives cannot be limited - it is about total destruction of the entity in a part or whole of its geographical extent, in a way that will prevent any uprising from there in the next hundred or more years. Whether that objective is attained by parts or at one go depends on context and situation. But once started, it cannot be engaged in half hearted, halting steps that feels pity at the "suffering" of the hostile society.

[brihaspati]

By the way - no power that now dominates regionally or globally - militarily - started out from their birth as such dominating powers. Neither did they completely shun the path of military expansion and capacity building and short forays and adventures and encounters - in favour of "pure economic development" onlee while they were at it. it was always a combination of both where military power projection helped and shaped the economy, expanded markets and innovation and productive forces and the economy in turn helped sustain the military drive.

Most such powers developed their muscle in the backdrop of pre-existing dominants in their own backyards or in target zones, under the threat of possible interventions from the previous big-daddies. So pre-existing dominants and supposed lack of economic development should not be the tired excuses so frequently being repeated now.