Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[ramana]

Another way of putting it is for a strategy you first need an imagination. Strategy is a way to realise your imagination.

RajeshA, There are three types of imagination: Descriptive, Creative, and Challenging.

Descriptive Imagination describes the situation and is a left-brain activity. It leads to a linear progression. It will never imagine a caterpillar metamorphing into a butterfly as Shyam Saran said in his great speech in Jan 2009. Its useful for a steady progression of the situation.

Creative Imagination develops alternates of the siutation and is righ-brain activity. It could envison a butterfly emerging from teh caterpillar. Its a non-linear process. It is useful in times of chaos in order to see possibilities.

Challenging Imagination works in ensuring coherence and defying existing pradigms. This one is usefull in overcoming an existing hegemon or industry leader.

[ramana]

RajeshA, I didnt see your post before I posted the above one. Yes black eyes were given but there was balance of power then. Right now chor and kotwal are together and they will fall apart only when one of them becomes big enough. The wave is being directed towards us due to mis-perception and silence. All forces are irresistable at some time. Why do you think all that defiance is coming out? I submit its because the re is convergence of forces playing : PRC demographics, US decline in economic power and FSU getting out of the race.

[brihaspati]

Or FSU and India at a certain similar geopolitical state of ambition and capabilities. One has come down from its former hegemony and seeking to restore it. The other has come up from its state of dependence and looking to obtain hegemony. The silence of both and apparent timidity or restraint could actually make the other pair more and more anxious. This is one North-South axis that could cut the East-West (Panda-Sam) axis definitively - geostrategically, locationally, trade and energy wise.

[svinayak]

I have just read tid-bits of The Grand Chessboard. 1997 seems to be a long time ago!
About India ZBig writes:

In contrast, India is in the process of establishing itself as a regional power and views itself as potentially a major global player as well. It also sees itself as a rival to China. That may be a matter of overestimating its own long-term capabilities, but India is unquestionably the most powerful South Asian state, a regional hegemon of sorts. It is also a semisecret nuclear power, and it became one not only in order to intimidate Pakistan but especially to balance China's possession of a nuclear arsenal. India has a geostrategic vision of its regional role, both vis-a-vis its neighbors and in the Indian Ocean. However, its ambitions at this stage only peripherally intrude on America's Eurasian interests, and thus, as a geostrategic player, India is not—at least, not to the same degree as either Russia or China—a source of geopolitical concern.

I haven't read enough of the book!

This is old news. We dont know what his views are about India after 1998. Other books after that gives some details.
All these needs update 911 of 2001 and also after 2003 Iraq war and also after 2008 Mumbai attack. All are related to the geo politics of the central asia.

[shyamd]

Anyone noticing how Debka's assessment of Af-pak is coming true? They are building up a public case for strikes into TSP. CNN confirms OBL in TSP under ISI protection, something that is well known in afghan theatre. They are also saying pressur is on TSP. Bob Woodward's release was just the start.

[ramana]

We saw this play out so many times. At last minute TSP will do something like shooting themselves and US will rush in and provide band aids and give warm shoulder to cry against big bad evil India while taking India money.

Call me when they really start the fireworks and the ensuing coup takes palce.

[shyamd]

True. TSP will be forced to give up something to stop further hits on taleb or haqqani faction. Will giving up OBL and Ayman be enough for US objectivs in afghanistan to be achieved?
Will it enable a pull out?

[ramana]

They plan to offer TSP a new security pact before the Obama visit to India.

[RajeshA]

It could be some ploy by USA to placate Pakistan beforehand, before they get to see on cameras all the agreements USA would be signing with India, when Obama visits India.

Not pretty though.

Important is that Obama supplies everything he plans to supply India with at heavily subsidized prices, because otherwise India would be subsidizing American arms to Pakistan, which is not acceptable.

[Pranav]

... a TSP-China alliance which would control Afghanistan's mineral resources and co-opt Iran and Saudi Arabia is what will make western elites uncomfortable. That is a major factor in Af-Pak strategy. Let's see how this plays out.

Decline in Rare-Earth Exports Rattles Germany - http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/busin ... ?src=busln

“China runs a virtual monopoly. There is real need to develop new sources,” said a B.D.I. official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak about the issue.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has stepped into the fray, saying it was “urgently necessary” to step up European investment in Eastern Europe and central Asia in order to prevent China from expanding its dominance in raw materials and rare minerals.

$1 Trillion Mother Load Lithium, Gold, and Rare Earth In Afghanistan - http://www.lithium-stocks.net/1086/1-tr ... ghanistan/

[Kati]

Even though every loss of human life is sad and need to be avoided, for a
long term peace and stability in S Asia it is important to have high and
sustained western casualty in Af-Pak region. Only then the west will realize
its folly and Pak's double dealings. So as the western casualties mount let us
just watch the game from sidelines and occassionally cheer both sides......

[abhishek_sharma]

Petraeus is changing the Afghan war's intensity, not its overall strategy

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... an_war_s_i

[Rangudu]

Regardless of Unkil's morass, you have to give props to a man like Gen. Petraeus. This guy always gets the maximum outcomes under seemingly impossible constraints. He is clearly destined for politics, in the Eisenhower mold. Obama hates this guy yet he has to work with him and sometimes even cave in to Petraeus. The TSPA also hates him but cannot do much to avoid him.

When you have weak backboned CinCs, sometimes you need a political war General.

[Prem]

The road to peace in Afghanistan is blocked by Western ignorance
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/ ... 16u5m.html

The Afghan experience during the past years shows that an escalation of American and NATO fighting in Afghanistan, and promises from Pakistan to do more, have done little to bring a change on the battleground.
There are two reasons for this. First, the Taliban are predominantly a Pashtun movement. The Pashtuns, who have traditionally ruled Afghanistan, make up half the population.The power balance in the country was destroyed by the US-led invasion in 2001. Since then, there has been a growing sense among the Pashtuns that the foreign military presence is aimed solely at alienating and marginalising them. The Taliban manipulation of the situation, plus Western backing of the Karzai regime, has convinced them that their future is with the Taliban, regardless of whether they agree with the Taliban's mediaeval ideology.

It is undeniably true that Western forces continue to back a coalition of warlords that sprang from Afghan ethnic minorities known as the Northern Alliance. The warlords use the Western presence to undermine the Pashtuns' traditional status, politically and socially. That's why such tenacious antagonism on the part of tens of millions of Pashtuns towards the West remains an unending source of recruitment for the Taliban.

In the most recent example, President Hamid Karzai formed a High Council for Peace and made former president Burhanuddin Rabbani its chairman. Rabbani and many members of the council were on one side of the civil war in post-Soviet Afghanistan that left, according to the UN, about 80,000 civilians dead. His Northern Alliance was militarily defeated and ousted from Kabul by the Taliban in 1994. It is most likely that Rabbani would move the Taliban even further away from any negotiating table.

The Russians never isolated the Pashtuns during their occupation in the 1980s and, despite their tilt towards the Afghan ethnic minorities, they followed a policy of Pashtun fighting Pashtun. Even though most of Karzai's cabinet members are now Pashtuns, it is largely symbolic for they have no power.It should come as no surprise that the West is finding it increasingly difficult to manage the explosive issue of the Afghan internal power balance. We should not consider the Taliban to be merely an extremist religious entity such as Hamas or Hezbollah. Their religious conservatism is deeply interwoven with Pashtun nationalism.

The second factor is Pakistan's double-dealing. Pakistani leaders know the situation better than any stakeholder in the war in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military would never confront Pashtuns who are now able, militarily, to end Pakistan's control over its north-western tribal belt. So Pakistan's gesture about Northern Waziristan is just like its other empty promises.Many Taliban bases are in the tribal areas side by side with Pakistani police stations. The Pakistani military might at best transfer the Afghan Taliban forces to some other location and try to launch some mock operations in order to keep money flowing into the country from Washington.These two factors have been largely ignored by the West. And because of that, there is little hope that the strategy of fighting for peace is going to work in Afghanistan.

An estimated 50 million Pashtuns straddling both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border sympathise with the Taliban.In the months to come, we may see Western military successes, but we should not forget that the winter is a time of respite for the Taliban, and they bounce back in spring.The two narratives at work now in Afghanistan are unlikely to produce a favourable outcome for the Western coalition forces. The military pursuit to bring the Taliban to heel has failed in the past. Clearing Afghanistan of the Taliban, while their regeneration powerhouse is thriving, seems to be a lost cause.

Dr Ehsan Azari Stanizai, an adjunct fellow with the University of Western Sydney, is an Afghan of Pashtun descent.

[ramana]

Dr.Stanizai is confirming what BRF had concluded early on that there is Pashtun civil war going on and Talibanis the vehicle for it. The only discordant note is he is toeing the Pak supported Taliban line. Is he a Ghilzai for he finds problems with both Karzai and Northern Alliance.

[Prem]

The language/quotes look familiar! BR terms infilterating
http://shrinkwrapped.blogs.com/blog/201 ... um.html#tp

Meanwhile, we learn that Osama bin Laden, far from cowering in a cave with goats as his only friends, is holding court in northwest Pakistan and even supervising operations from his base -- while other al Qaeda operatives stream back into Afghanistan for new attacks. That puts still more pressure on a government that's on the verge of tossing in the towel to al Qaeda's old ally, the Taliban.
In short, the work of almost a decade of US counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations -- at a cost of thousands of US lives plus uncounted Pakistani, Afghan and Iraqi soldiers and civilians -- is coming unraveled. We're staring at the possibility of the entire region becoming a permanent al Qaeda base.How ironic that this comes under President Obama -- who during the presidential campaign excoriated George W. Bush for neglecting al Qaeda in order to invade Iraq.The reason is simple. This president has made it clear that his most urgent priority isn't victory or even regional stability, but getting every American out of there -- so that he'll be able to say at the 2012 Democratic Convention, "I brought our troops home."
In the process, he'll have left a disaster that will make post-Vietnam Southeast Asia -- boat people, "killing fields" genocide and all -- look like "Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood," because Pakistan's nuclear weapons are at stake. [Emphasis mine-SW]
Meanwhile, winning is only going to get harder. Bin Laden, al Qaeda and their allies have studied America's success in Iraq and adjusted their strategies across the region accordingly. They're confident that, before long, Obama will hand over all three countries to them -- along with Pakistan's nukes.Can anyone say, looking at this administration, that they're playing a long shot?Apparently I am not the only one who worries that renewed American isolationism (sentiments more closely associated with the Progressives since the Vietnam War) will lead to a disaster.

[RajeshA]

Dr.Stanizai is confirming what BRF had concluded early on that there is Pashtun civil war going on and Talibanis the vehicle for it. The only discordant note is he is toeing the Pak supported Taliban line. Is he a Ghilzai for he finds problems with both Karzai and Northern Alliance.

Pushtun Tribes

Stanikzai belong to the Shilmani Tribe.

[abhishek_sharma]

Smoke and Mirrors in Kabul

Don't believe the hype about reconciliation talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban -- this war isn't even close to over.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... s_in_kabul

[abhishek_sharma]

'Peace with Honor' in Afghanistan? The problem with historical amnesia

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/201 ... al_amnesia

So let me tell you what I think is going to happen. The United States is going to spend the next few months trying to clear out or kill as many Taliban as we can find,accompanied by a lot of optimistic reports about how well we are doing. This won't be about a "hearts and minds" approach or even a long-term strategy of nation-building;it will be about creating the appearance of momentum and success. At the same time, we're going to try to shepherd a political process that can be sold as "peace deal" between the Karzai government and somemoderate Taliban. If we're reallylucky and offer big enough bribes (oops, I mean foreign aid), we might get Pakistan to pretend to be on board too.And then Obama will claim "the Afghan surge worked" sometime in the latter half of 2011, and begin withdrawing U.S. troops.

As our numbers fall, the Taliban will regroup, Pakistan will help rearm them covertly, and the struggle for power in Afghanistan will resume. Afghanistan's fate will once again be primarily in the hands of the Afghan people and the nearby neighbors who meddle there for their ownreasons. I don't know who will win, but it actually won't matter very much for U.S. national security interests.

There are ample historical precedents for this sort ofoutcome. The Soviet Unionconcocted a peace deal before they withdrew in 1988, but their chosensuccessor, Najibullah, didn't last long once they had left. (Notice, however, that their enemies in Afghanistan didn't "follow them home" either). The United States achieved "peace withhonor" in the 1973 Vietnam peace accords, but then Saigon fell two yearslater. No matter; the United States ended up winning the Cold War anyway. And then there's Iraq,where the 2007 "surge" was hailed as a great military victory but is nowunraveling. In each case, thepeace deal was mostly a fig leaf designed to let a great power get out of acostly war without admitting it had been beaten.

Petraeus & Co. are trying to pull off something similar here, and it may well be the best that can be made of a bad situation. But there is a subtle, long-term dangerin this sort of sleight-of-hand. If we tell ourselves we won and then get out, we will end up learningthe wrong lessons from the whole experience. By portraying the Iraqi and Afghan "surges" as victories, we fool ourselves into thinking that this sort of war is something we are good atfighting, that the benefits of doing so are worth the costs, and that all it takes to win this sortof war is the right commander, the right weapons, and the right Field Manual. And if we indulge in this familiar form of historical amnesia, we'll be more likely to make similar errors down the road.

Update: According to McClatchey, those recent stories about the United States facilitating peace talks between Taliban leaders and the Karzai government are part of an elaborate "psychological operation" designed to sow dissension within Taliban ranks.

[ramana]

Dr.Stanizai is confirming what BRF had concluded early on that there is Pashtun civil war going on and Talibanis the vehicle for it. The only discordant note is he is toeing the Pak supported Taliban line. Is he a Ghilzai for he finds problems with both Karzai and Northern Alliance.

Pushtun Tribes

Stanikzai belong to the Shilmani Tribe.

The rabbis need to take back the early Jewish tribes who were forced to take up Islam in the early middle ages. Clearly the Stanikzai/Shilmani are not Afghans but dispalced ethnic Jews.

[ramana]

Nightwatch comments:

24 Oct.2010

Afghanistan: Four militants crashed a car bomb into the gate of the United Nations compound in Herat, in far western Afghanistan, Saturday. The attack was the most serious attack against a UN facility since the October 2009 attack on a Kabul guesthouse that killed several employees.

Two Afghan policemen were injured Saturday, but no UN employees, according to the UN. After crashing the car into the gate, the attackers attempted to detonate suicide vests hidden under the burqas the women's covering the men were wearing. A Taliban spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack.

Comment: Taliban targets this year include any vulnerable foreign or domestic group whose work benefits the central government, in the view of the Taliban. A suicidal attack of this nature in Herat, however, is closer to criminal behavior than anti-government work.

This attack does not mean Herat is less secure than previously thought. Criminal behavior of this type could be performed by any group in any city of Afghanistan, and has been. Perhaps more importantly, Herat is within Iran's buffer zone in western Afghanistan, and the combined protection of NATO forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies. It remains one of the safest cities in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan-Iran: Iran has been providing Afghan President Karzai's chief of staff, Umar Daudzai, with a steady supply of cash payments for the Afghan president to use to pay Afghan lawmakers, tribal elders and Taliban commanders, The New York Times reported 24 October, according to unnamed Afghan and Western officials.

The officials said Iran is providing the cash to Daudzai and Karzai to promote Tehran's interests within the Afghan president's administration. A spokesman for Iranian Ambassador to Afghanistan Feda Hussein Maliki, who officials said had provided the cash payments to Daudzai, denied the allegations, calling them lies by the West and foreign media organizations.

NightWatch Comment: It would be naïve for American Readers to think that Iran is not buying influence both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Iran does it on multiple levels, as does the United States and every nation that borders Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran and has an interest in what happens in those countries.

For now, the US is the highest bidder, so Afghan officials work mostly, but not exclusively, with the Americans. After the bidding war is over, geography will dictate relationships. Iran is next to Afghanistan and has been around much longer than the United States.

It is useful to remember that Afghanistan has been a cross roads of ancient cultures that predate the discovery of the Americas by about 2,000 years. Iran also will be Afghanistan's neighbor long after the American interlude is a memory.

Karzai is wise to accept Iranian support. Moreover, anything the Iranians pay for that reduces the burden of US taxpayer support looks like good business. That is what the Reagan Administration judged in the Iran-Contra affair.

The news is that the New York Times obtained admissions on the record about the fact of Iranian payments. An astute analyst would ask why would anyone disclose such information unless that person was not a beneficiary of the slush funds. And then one might ask how accurate are the details about the slush funds, considering the sources probably have a negative bias.

Note to new analysts: In international relations and in government, influence and information are commodities that are for sale. Nothing is free, especially intelligence, good or useless. Intelligence information in all of the so-called "INTs" fundamentally is a capitalist, free market product, fortunately. However, as with any purchased product, it always comes with bias attached.

When intelligence or influence are offered for free, they immediately are suspect, as driven by ulterior motives. The price of intelligence helps guarantee its reliability. The fact of an alliance or other relationship does not alter the requirement for money in exchange for cooperation. Demands for payment do not discredit allies, friends or proxies. They are just business.

Explains the US need for Rabinder Singh type operatives.

Even when India is offering its info for free its not believed. Hence the need for allowing sdspies to get out info that is available for free.

[sum]

Even when India is offering its info for free its not believed. Hence the need for allowing sdspies to get out info that is available for free.

Wonder if some SDRE currencies are also floating around in Afghan lawmakers pockets?

[abhishek_sharma]

Leak of this information shows that Karzai and US are not on the same page. There are other serious disagreements.

[ramana]

X-post from TSp thread....

FB Ali on Af-Pak

A "we've got America by the ...." post by retd. Brig. F.B. Ali.

Bottom line assessment from TSP is
- ~30 year Af_Pak war is over. Its really form late 1978.
- US is jockeying for post war settlement
- TSP will take US money but will act according to its interests
- Haqqani faction is TSP card to control the post war pashtun govt. They will be garunteors of TSP interests in Afghanistan.

I expect the US to devalue the dollar (to take care of PRC) and daisycutter the Talibs after the elections.
US cannot allow even a semblance of defeat in Af-Pak. Or else the post Vietnam malaise will kick in.
Obama cannot be seen as Jimmy Carter redux.

[ShauryaT]

X-post from TSp thread....

FB Ali on Af-Pak

A "we've got America by the ...." post by retd. Brig. F.B. Ali.

You have to credit the Pakis for such clear thinking and out foxing the US, the Pashtuns and India all at the same time. Kudos to them for clearly acting in their self interest as they see them.

What does that tell you about India's thinking and actions?

[ramana]

Nothing. When uncle puts his golas into hands of Pakis and says squeeze me its only natural for the Paki to appear very SAVY.

Meanwhile Karzai says all transfers took place with his and US knowldege rebutting/defusing the NYT leak.

Afghanistan-Iran: President Karzai confirmed on 25 October that his office has received "bags of money" from Iran, but said the payments have been transparent and a form of aid from a "friendly" country. He also said the U.S. has known about the Iranian assistance for years and that Washington also gives the palace cash payments.

"The government of Iran has been assisting us with five or six or seven hundred thousand euros ($700,000 to $975,000) once or twice every year, that is an official aid," said Karzai. "He (Karzai's chief of staff) is receiving the money on my instructions."

And note his == between US and Iran in regard to payments for disbursement.

[V_Raman]

X-post from TSp thread....

FB Ali on Af-Pak

A "we've got America by the ...." post by retd. Brig. F.B. Ali.

Bottom line assessment from TSP is
- ~30 year Af_Pak war is over. Its really form late 1978.
- US is jockeying for post war settlement
- TSP will take US money but will act according to its interests
- Haqqani faction is TSP card to control the post war pashtun govt. They will be garunteors of TSP interests in Afghanistan.

I expect the US to devalue the dollar (to take care of PRC) and daisycutter the Talibs after the elections.
US cannot allow even a semblance of defeat in Af-Pak. Or else the post Vietnam malaise will kick in.
Obama cannot be seen as Jimmy Carter redux.

and india should be prepared for a definite two-front attack. how convinient for the US!!!!!

[ramana]

Isn't that where all this was leading since 911?

After bluff and bluster US capitulates Oped by B. Raman

After bluff and bluster, US capitulates
October 27, 2010 2:55:46 AM

B Raman

The Pakistani Army has literally arm-twisted the US Administration into giving in to its demands. The new aid for Pakistan comes without any strings attached and the Americans have demonstrated they are paper tigers

The third US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue for 2010 concluded in Washington, DC on October 22. The two sides fielded high-power delegations for the dialogue as they had done for the first two rounds held earlier this year in Washington and Islamabad. The US delegation was headed by Ms Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, and included, among others, Mr Robert Gates, the Defence Secretary. The Pakistani delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and included among others Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff.

Apart from the formal talks at the delegation level, where hype pushed the cruel ground realities under the carpet, there were other opportunities for frank interactions which the Americans utilised to tell the Pakistanis what they really thought and expected of them.

To quote from the Dawn of Karachi (October 22): “Pakistan’s Ambassador Husain Haqqani later told the Pakistani media that President Obama’s decision to ‘drop in’ during a meeting of the ‘core group’ of Pakistani officials with the incoming US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon was ‘not pre-announced but it was pre-planned’.” He described it as “the best ever” meeting between a US President and a Pakistani delegation during which President Obama conveyed his “unequivocal support to Pakistan and its democracy”. President Obama, he said, regretted the mistakes the US had made in the past while dealing with Pakistan and assured the Pakistani delegation that Washington would not repeat those mistakes. The US media, however, gave a different version of this meeting. Foreign Policy, a prestigious online magazine for global issues, reported that President Obama “personally delivered the tough love message that other top administration officials have been communicating since the Pakistani delegation arrived”. Earlier, Ms Clinton dropped in unannounced at another meeting between Special Representative Richard Holbrooke and Gen Kayani. She delivered “the message that Washington’s patience is wearing thin with Pakistan’s ongoing reluctance to take a more aggressive stance against militant groups operating from Pakistan over the Afghan border”, the report said. “A similar message was delivered to Gen Kayani in another high-level side meeting on Wednesday morning at the Pentagon, hosted by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm Michael Mullen,” the magazine said. “The message being delivered to Pakistan throughout the week by the Obama team is that its effort to convince Pakistan to more aggressively combat groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba will now consist of both carrots and sticks,” the report added. “But this means that the US Administration must find a way to incentivise both the Pakistani civilian and military leadership, which have differing agendas and capabilities,” the report added. “The Obama side is calculating that Pakistan’s military can deliver on subjects important to the US but doesn’t want to, while the civilian leadership in Pakistan wants to, but isn’t able,” said one high-level participant who spoke with the magazine in between sessions.

It is apparent from the reports on the dialogue that came out of Washington, DC that the US has not been able to find a way of making Pakistan act to destroy the General Headquarters of Al Qaeda led and inspired terrorism located in the Pakistani territory. One is increasingly confused as to where this GHQ is located. Previously, one thought it was located in North Waziristan. The fierceness of the retaliatory action by the Pakistan Army in response to a recent strike by a Nato helicopter in the Kurram area has created suspicions that at least part of the GHQ may be located in the Kurram Agency. There have been other reports speculating about the possibility of its location in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa Province.

Wherever it may be located, one thing seems certain — the Pakistan Army knows where it is and is not prepared to act against it. The Pakistan Army uses the Punjabi Taliban against India in an attempt to force a change in the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir. It has been using Al Qaeda, the Pashtun Taliban and their global jihadi allies for extracting money out of the US by dangling the threat of another 9/11 over the US head if it does not pay protection money to the Pakistan Army.

Despite the blunt words reportedly used by Mr Obama, Ms Clinton and Mr Gates in more restricted interactions, more protection money was forthcoming in the form of a five-year commitment (2012-16) of $2.29 billion in military aid euphemistically called counter-terrorism assistance. This will be in continuation of the allocation of $1.5 billion provided by the George Bush Administration in 2005 and of the civilian aid of $7.5 billion over a five-year period already being provided by the Obama Administration since last year under the Kerry Lugar Act.

According to the Dawn, Pakistan also receives hundreds of millions of dollars a year from the so-called Coalition Support Fund, which reimburse Pakistan for its military operations against militants. The US reimbursed Pakistan $1.3 billion between January and May for Pakistani operations conducted in 2008 and 2009, but has not yet paid for operations in 2010. Announcing the military aid package, Ms Clinton said that the US had full confidence in Pakistan’s commitment to the anti-terrorist fight.

The ambivalence in the US policy marked by blunt speaking in restricted sessions and the failure to follow it up with punitive action to make the Pakistan Army act as it frequently promises to has convinced the Pakistan Army over the years that US leaders may warn privately regarding its transgressions but will not act against it. So long as this conviction does not change, Al Qaeda and its associates will remain where they are and will continue to plot and act against US nationals and interests.

More money was not the only carrot that Pakistan got during the dialogue. It made other gains in the form of the US commitment to uphold Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, the promise of a separate visit to Pakistan by President Obama next year and an invitation to President Asif Ali Zardari to visit the US. With the carrots continuing to flow from the US in spite of its inaction against Al Qaeda and co, why should it act against the terrorists?

Unless and until the US picks up the courage to tell Pakistan “thus far and no further. Either you act or we act”, things are not going to change. The pathetic apologies from the US for a recent raid by a Nato helicopter into Pakistani territory to neutralise terrorists who had attacked Nato positions in Afghanistan have shown to the Pakistan Army the Achilles Heel of the US — its dependence on Pakistan for logistic supplies to the Nato troops fighting in Afghanistan.

The confidence of the Taliban that the US would not act against it for sheltering Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders in Afghan territory contributed to the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US. The present confidence of the Pakistan Army that the US will not act against it for its inaction against Al Qaeda and its allies now sheltered in Pakistani territory will encourage more acts of terrorism against the US and other Nato countries in their respective homelands.

The Pakistan Army literally blackmailed the US before the Strategic Dialogue by stopping the logistic supplies to Afghanistan. Instead of teaching it a lesson for its blackmailing tactics, the US not only apologised, but followed it up with more favours for Pakistan. This is not the way the US is going to prevail over Al Qaeda, the Talibans and their allies.
-- The writer, a former senior officer of R&AW, is a strategic affairs commentator.

[ramana]

^^^ Similar assessment from MKB Kumar

US-Pakistan embrace a fillip for peace

The big news over the weekend is that the United States and Pakistan have kissed and made up. What was played up in the recent weeks as a nasty showdown between the two partners, with each side growling dangerously and scratching the other almost to bleeding, turned out to be deceptive feline foreplay.

The outcome of the three-day foreign minister-level US-Pakistan strategic dialogue that concluded on Friday once again confirms the reputation of the two sides as consummate partners: one moment snarling viciously, to the alarm of onlookers; and the next, locked in a perplexing embrace.....

The balance sheet of strategic dialogue has now visibly tilted in Pakistan's favor. What the Pakistani military has offered Uncle Sam in return remains for the present a nuptial secret, but it will become known. Most certainly, it has got to do with the Afghan endgame. Considering US accommodation of some of the big-ticket items on Pakistan's wish-list, it can be surmised that Pakistan has offered meaningful accommodation of the US game plan in Afghanistan.

United States President Barack Obama's White House meeting with the visiting Pakistani delegation (which included powerful army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani) has come as a political bonanza for Islamabad. ....

What is even more important is that Obama agreed with the Pakistani delegation on the "need for regional stability and specifically on the importance of cooperating toward a peaceful and stable outcome in Afghanistan".

.... In short, the US would appear to have recognized that the Afghan problem and Pakistan-India tensions are interlinked and need to be tackled simultaneously.

Equally, Obama made an open commitment that he would make a "stand-alone" visit to Islamabad in 2011 and also host President Asif Ali Zardari in Washington. The fact that he made the announcement on the eve of his visit to India ..... shows the high US dependence on Pakistani goodwill and cooperation over Afghanistan.

Conversely, Obama's proposed visit to Pakistan is also expected to "incentivise" the Pakistanis to "perform" convincingly in stabilizing the Afghan situation in the critical months ahead.

.....The US has openly, and ostentatiously, buried the hatchet, which was dramatized in large measure by US media reports, based on briefings by administration officials, over an alleged Pakistani double game in the Afghan war.

From Pakistan's point of view, the US also made an "enduring commitment to help Pakistan plan for its defense needs" and in this connection, Clinton announced that the Obama administration would ask the US Congress for additional military assistance for Pakistan of a whopping US$2 billion, spread over the 2011-2016 period.

Significantly, a charade that the US military assistance is to beef up Pakistan's capability to undertake counter-insurgency operations in the tribal areas that border Afghanistan has been set aside. The latest formulation is that the additional assistance is for planning Pakistan's "defense needs", which are indeed principally and paramountly vis-a-vis India. In short, the US stands committed to help Pakistan maintain reasonable parity with India in conventional military strength.

The US is making this commitment in disregard of strong Indian protestations ... that the US has been handing over to Pakistan weapon systems, .... that have absolutely nothing to do with hunting down Osama bin Laden or exterminating the remnants of al-Qaeda from the region.

In response to the Indian demarche, all that the US officials are maintaining is that the overall Pakistan-India military balance will not be upset. Clearly, the Obama administration has underscored the US's commitment to remain responsive to the Pakistani military's needs with regard to India even after an Afghan settlement has been worked out.

Clinton revealed that the Obama administration had taken on board Pakistan's request for concluding a civil nuclear cooperation agreement on par with what the US signed with India in 2008. .....

This also means that Pakistan has crossed the hump, finally, on the issue. Also, the US has decided to virtually acquiesce with China's move to set up two more nuclear reactors in Pakistan. So far, the US has been taking the position that given Pakistan's questionable track record in nuclear proliferation, Washington would have a problem in reaching a nuclear deal with Islamabad on par with its agreements with New Delhi.

The joint statement issued after the strategic dialogue underlines the US's determination to develop with Pakistan a "strategic, comprehensive and long-term partnership ... based on shared values, mutual respect and mutual interests".

It is an almost-identical formulation that the Indians, who considered themselves as "natural allies" of the US, would probably get. The two sides have also resolved to "promoting peace, stability and transparency throughout the region". In sum, the US has acknowledged that as a quid pro quo for the help and cooperation from Pakistan in settling the Afghan problem, the US will ensure that the latter's legitimate interests in Kabul are safeguarded and will remain mindful of the Pakistani concerns over India.

What emerges is a finely, intricately-balanced matrix of compromise whereby Pakistan will not torpedo the sort of Afghan settlement that the US is keenly seeking - ensuring the Taliban's acceptance of the US's and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's long-term military presence in Afghanistan - and in return the US will accommodate Pakistan's interest in having a friendly regime in Kabul and will remain deeply engaged with Pakistan on a long-term footing politically, militarily and economically. It is a signal success for Pakistani diplomacy that it has brought overall "regional stability" into the centerpiece of US-Pakistan strategic ties.

How this complex matrix of understanding translates on the ground is another matter. Several imponderables remain. What happens to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, whom the US reportedly wants to keep out of the Afghan settlement? Will the Haqqani network be brought in under credible Pakistani guarantees? Will there be a stepping up of the hunt for bin Laden, who senior US officials have pinpointed recently as being sheltered in relative comfort inside Pakistan by its security agencies? Will Pakistan settle for Afghan President Hamid Karzai's blueprint of a broad-based settlement that accommodates various non-Pashtun groups? How does the US ensure that the Indian influence in Kabul is kept below a threshold acceptable to Pakistan?

Karzai and the erstwhile Northern Alliance groups, too, will be watching how Pakistan goes about implementing the understanding reached in Washington. .... But the big issue is Karzai's own political future.

Of late, the US has made up with Karzai and placed itself manifestly behind his reconciliation plan with the Taliban. But his unhappy experience has also been that he comes under pressure the moment Washington revives its dalliance with the Pakistani military. The outcome of the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue in Washington is of existential importance to Karzai.

Similarly, the erstwhile Northern Alliance groups will be wary of the US-Pakistan framework of cooperation, which they might suspect will lead to a return of Pashtun dominance in the Afghan power structure. The political reality is that there is a deep trust deficit between these groups and the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence. The non-Pashtun perception will be that the Pakistani military will ultimately take the Americans for a ride as the pressure of time begins to work on the Obama administration to show "results" in the war in terms of the exigencies of US domestic politics.

What we may expect is that the Afghan peace talks could now accelerate and even gain traction. Obama may then be able to face the US's NATO allies at their summit in Lisbon next month with far greater composure. He may even find himself in a position to present a somewhat plausible Afghan peace plan that enables Western countries to heave a sigh of relief that there is light at the end of the long tunnel that has been their bloody "combat mission" in the Hindu Kush.

.......

The interesting thing is India experts are good at seeing everyone's role except India's.

[ramana]

An Indian POV is that before the India visit US gave to TSP large baksheeh and things of importance to the TSP point of view.

Karzai, NA have to watch out.

Same with Omar and others.

[V_Raman]

i thought the indian POV was for long-term NATO/US presence in AFG. then the threat of war significantly reduces and we have a successful deal for peace. all payment to uncle will be made of course.

[RamaY]

The interesting thing is India experts are good at seeing everyone's role except India's.

Lack of self-awareness a.k.a Hanuma syndrome

[RajeshA]

India should pump in 10-12 billion USD into Pushtunistan, paying off Pushtuns for taking down the Pakistani Army through asymmetric warfare.

Neither Pakistan, nor America, nor China, nor Pakistan's friends in Afghanistan get anything out of Afghanistan.

[ramana]

What do the US experts say about the US giveaways to TSP as part of Strategic Dialogue?

Where is all the tough love talk?

Or are they shell shocked?

[ramana]

Christine Fair seeks to explain Indian intrests in Afghanistan

....
Why India cares about Afghanistan


There are at least three principle reasons why India has direct interests in Afghanistan.

First, India has had to contend with many significant security chal­lenges that stem from the Taliban's regime in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Pakistan has raised and supported several militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen/Harkat-ul-Ansar, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami among others, which operate in India. However, all of these groups have trained in Afghanistan, with varying proximity to the Taliban and by extension al-Qaeda. Thus India is absolutely adamant that Afghanistan should not again become a terrorist safe haven.

Second, India is interested in retaining Afghanistan as a friendly state from which it has the capacity to monitor Pakistan and even, where possible, cultivate assets to influence activities in Pakistan. While India is keenly inter­ested in cultivating a significant partnership with Afghanistan, Pakistan busies itself trying to deny India these very opportunities.

Third, devel­opments in Afghanistan and Pakistan have important and usually deleterious effects upon India's domestic social fabric as well as its internal security apart from the well-known problems in and over Kashmir. Indian interlocutors have explained to me that Islamist militancy coexists with a burgeoning Hindu nationalist movement that seeks to re-craft India as a Hindu state. Hindu nation­alists and their militant counterparts live in a violent symbiosis with Islamist militant groups operating in and around India. Islamist terrorism in India and the region provides grist for the mill of Hindu nationalism and its violent offshoots.

How India can achieve these aims

India has sought to establish its presence in Afghanistan from the early days of its independence from Britain in 1947. In 1950, Afghanistan and India signed a "Friendship Treaty." India had robust ties with Afghan King Zahir Shah's regime. Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, New Delhi continued to formalized agreements and protocols with various pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul.

While India's role in Afghanistan was constrained during the anti-Soviet jihad, between 1979 and 1989 India reportedly expanded its development activities in Afghanistan, focusing upon industrial, irrigation, and hydroelectric projects. That India was able to sustain this presence attests to the importance that India attached to this relationship and India's willingness to persevere.

After the Taliban consolidated their hold on Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, India struggled to maintain its presence and to support anti-Taliban forces. However, Indian objectives in Afghanistan remained necessarily modest given the constrained environment. India aimed to undermine, as best it could, the ability of the Taliban to consolidate its power over Afghanistan, principally by supporting the Northern Alliance in tandem with other regional actors.

Working with Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan, India provided important (but not fully detailed) resources to the Northern Alliance, the only meaningful challenge to the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to journalist Rahul Bedi, India also ran a twenty-five-bed hospital at Farkhor (Ayni), Tajikistan, for more than a year. The Northern Alliance military commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, died in that hospital after he was attacked by al-Qaeda suicide bombers on September 9, 2001. Through Tajikistan, India supplied the Northern Alliance with high altitude warfare equipment worth around $8 million. India also based several "defense advisers," including an officer of a brigadier rank, in Tajikistan to advise the Northern Alliance in their operations against the Taliban.

Since 2001, India has relied upon development projects and other forms of humanitarian assistance. To facilitate these projects and to collect intelligence (as all embassies and consulates do), India also now has consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif, in addition to its embassy in Kabul. There also are a number of smaller-scale activities throughout Afghanistan. According to U.S., British, and Afghan officials I interviewed over the last several years, India's activities are not isolated to the north, where it has had traditional ties, but also include efforts in the southern provinces and in the northeast, abutting the Pakistani border.....

All I can say is her Indian interlocutors must be of the secular kind who see thru orange eyeglasses everywhere. Its very unfortunate that they told here these lies. The reason is most of the support to NA was during the NDA govt. Its moronic to think that rise of Tlaiban will give rise to Hindu extremism. On the contrary its the appeasement policy coupled with trampling the majoritythat the fake-seculars espouse in India that gives rise to the phenomena.

[ramana]

Mindmap of TSP should deal with its own terror

LINK


SwamyG see what is being done with MM software!

BTW click on the + to expand

[abhishek_sharma]

India in Afghanistan, part II: Indo-U.S. relations in the lengthening AfPak shadow

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... pak_shadow

[ramana]

The news about the Fed Ex parcel bombs is really Af-Pak related. Its like their own version of drone strikes.

Nightwatch, 2 Nov., 2010

Terrorism: Update. Update. Saudi intelligence reported that the U.S.-based parcel carrier Federal Express, also reportedly was used in the parcel bombing scheme, though details are sketchy. No source is providing information on how many packages were sent via FedEx or where those packages are located.

A Saudi intelligence source reportedly has provided tracking numbers for roughly 26 packages used in the plot, though it is unclear if all of those contain explosive materials, which were found in at least one of the packages in Dubai.

U.S. and British authorities have temporarily banned all incoming air freight shipments from Yemen while this plot is investigated, and UPS and FedEx have temporarily suspended their Yemen operations as well.

Comment: Many press analysts are calling this an intelligence success, which it is in that damage was avoided. That is an absolute good no matter how it was accomplished.

However, the details of the attack raise questions how the bombs moved so far without detection; whether other bombs are still moving in the parcel service companies' systems without detection; whether the plot is a long term attack in multiple phases; in short, whether the weekend success was just the result of dumb luck from Saudi intelligence work plus swift reactions by governments on the operations end.

Analysis seems to have played little to no role in warning or in preventing the movement of bombs out of Yemen. Saudi intelligence gets great credit, for at least the third time. It also warned France about al Qaida threats earlier this year. The British and UAE security forces also deserve credit for finding the two bombs.

This does not seem to represent the systemic improvement that Mr. Brennan attempted to correct in his January 2010 statements about intelligence. The open question is whether this success is replicable. Another implication is that attacks via maritime shipping are only a matter of time because every other mode of transit of goods and people already are being tried.

I still would like a clear statement on the origin of the explosives. All this talk about scraping the stuff from blasting caps or from det cord is humbug. That kind of work is not easy. The real clue is its sheet explosive or plastic rolled into thin sheet. So is the origin from TSP or US itself from its Afghan Jihad days? And who taught the bomb maker electronic circuit design and soldering skills?

[ramana]

B.Raman's analysis of the Fedex packages.

Courier packages

Didn't know its Chinese cell phone used for the packages.

[ramana]

Again Nightwatch frets

2 Nov 2010

Afghanistan: Special comment: a potentially troubling event. Two contradictory stories have emerged about fighting in Hogan District of Ghazni Province in eastern Afghanistan since Saturday.

The government version of the fighting is that a large Taliban force gathered and attacked the District Center under conditions of surprise, burned the buildings and kidnapped the 16 police on guard, taking their equipment and vehicles. The government announced it had recaptured the District Center on 1 November.

The other version is that the police detachment, up to 19 men, defected to the Taliban with all their equipment and supplies and burned the District Center buildings.

Some press commentators have stressed that Hogan is a hotbed of Taliban activity. The NightWatch data base of open source reports on fighting in Ghazni between January and June 2010 contains no fights reported in that district. A quiet district means one or the other side "owns" it. In districts the Taliban own, significant government police detachments are not present.

Ghazni Province is in the center of Taliban country. It is and has been one of the core 13 provinces of the insurgency. During the past five years, fighting has occurred in many districts, but not much in Hogan. Most fighting in 2010 has been in Ghazni City or near NATO bases and outposts.

The Taliban are prone to try to overrun isolated district centers, such as Hogan, as a show of force and demonstration of presence. The government recovers them as soon as it can assemble a rescue force and retrieves missing policemen. If that is what happened, this attack is like hundreds of others.

The more worrisome scenario is that the police detachment might have defected to the Taliban. The Taliban movement that came to power in Kabul in 1996 did not do so by conquest. It was too disorganized and poorly led. Its most sensational victories were the result of negotiated defections. Defending units would simply switch sides and the practice spread to most Pashtun units defending the government. If that is what happened in Khogiani, it will spread.