Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[svinayak]

The top layers of Pakistan care about only money and power, the mango-abduls only about survival and 72-raisins. As long as these two parties get what they want, Pakistan survives (which is a victory in their opinion).

It looks like that but there is good coordination at the geo political level to keep Pak stable.

[CRamS]

TSPA calculates they will win either way: if US stays, they get money as the "indispensable ally". If US leaves they can move in more directly into Afghanistan.

I would say that if US stays, the India TSP equal equal (or parallel parallel as Brahma Chellaney postulates) will continue with slight benefit to India. TSP for sure gains because of all the moolah as you point out. India gains to the extent that TSP cannot be so brazen as to use its LET with impunity against India which will most surely be the case if US leaves. Furthermore, depending on how long US stays, there will be some amount of pressure on TSP to crack down on what they consider as "good Taliban". And any pressure on TSP to crack down on any form of terror is good for India.

[darshhan]

TSPA calculates they will win either way: if US stays, they get money as the "indispensable ally". If US leaves they can move in more directly into Afghanistan.

India has to make sure no matter what happens India wins in the end.

Absolutely.Taliban should never be allowed to set foot in Kabul even if and when US withdraws without completing its mission.If need be India should make sure that the taliban opposing warlords are well funded and equipped so that they can beat back any sort of Taliban advance.

[darshhan]

America plans to send Tanks to Afghanistan.Seems like part of psy ops.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11 ... and-shock/

Behold the U.S.’s new counterinsurgency tool in Afghanistan: the M1 Abrams tank, your ultimate in 30-year old precision firepower.

Increasingly distant are the days when Defense Secretary Robert Gates worried aloud about replicating the Soviet Union’s failed heavy footprint in Afghanistan. Under the command of General David Petraeus, the military’s leading advocate of counterinsurgency, an unconventional war is looking surprisingly conventional.

NATO planes are dropping more bombs than at any time since the 2001 invasion. Special Forces have been operating on a tear since the summer, to the point where Afghanistan’s president is saying enough is enough. The coalition is using massive surface-to-surface missiles to clear the Taliban out of Kandahar. And now the tanks are rolling in.

In an excellent piece from the Washington Post’s Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. military officials brag that they’ve “taken the gloves off” in Afghanistan, just as they’re sending 16 lumbering Abrams tanks into Helmand Province. That’s pretty much the opposite of Petraeus’ famous “Get Out and Walk” guidance for troops in Iraq.

What do the tanks add to the fight? There’s some attempt at spinning their 120-millimeter guns as precision weapons, but one military official bluntly tells Chandrasekaran, “the tanks bring awe, shock and firepower.” Because “shock and awe” always works.


What’s more, in the experience of non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the tanks are more a measure to protect troops than to battle insurgents. The Canadians sent their Leopard tanks to southern Afghanistan after getting pummeled in lighter vehicles by insurgent fire. If U.S. troops in the south still feel that the military command’s Tactical Directive on how to fight in Afghanistan ties their hands, the first wave of 16 Abrams tanks will probably tamp that concern down.

Chandrasekaran reports that Petraeus feels his reputation as a counterinsurgency guru can overcome the optics of a heavily armored force rolling through Afghanistan’s south, reminiscent of the Soviet occupation. But any reporter who spends time in Afghanistan will hear stories from surprised U.S. officers about how many Afghans don’t know the Soviets ever actually left. And chances are the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual isn’t required reading in Kandahar or Marja.

What’s far more noticeable to Afghans is NATO blowing up at least 174 booby-trapped homes around Kandahar since September. Commanders may have cover from local government officials to do that, as NATO officials tell Chandrasekaran. But if the point of the Kandahar campaign is to get the locals to support that government instead of the Taliban, presuming that the officials are a proxy for local support is a dicey proposition.

In April 2009, Gates cautioned in a CNN interview, “The Soviets were in there with 110,000, 120,000 troops. They didn’t care about civilian casualties. And they couldn’t win.” Sixteen tanks do not remotely approach what the Soviets sent to occupy Afghanistan. And the proportion of civilians killed by the Taliban vastly dwarf those killed by NATO forces.

But now NATO, all combined, has 130,000 troops in Afghanistan. The numbers of civilians killed in the war is at an all-time high, despite a U.S. strategy predicated on protecting Afghans from violence. And starting today in Lisbon, NATO will endorse a strategy that will keep troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, even while it holds 2014 out as the new date for foreign forces to cease combat.

If the purpose of repurposing tanks, missiles and air strikes for unconventional conflict is to pummel the Taliban into suing for peace with the Afghan government, Mullah Omar still rejects any negotiations with President Karzai. From his safe haven in Pakistan, can he really be “awed and shocked” into changing his mind? It’s almost as if a different superpower has tried this before.

[ramana]

Those IEDs are getting powerful.

[wig]

U.S. wants to widen area in Pakistan where it can operate drones

The U.S. appeal has focused on the area surrounding the Pakistani city of Quetta, where the Afghan Taliban leadership is thought to be based. But the request also seeks to expand the boundaries for drone strikes in the tribal areas, which have been targeted in 101 attacks this year, the officials said.

Pakistan has rejected the request, officials said. Instead, the country has agreed to more modest measures, including an expanded CIA presence in Quetta, where the agency and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate have established teams seeking to locate and capture senior members of the Taliban.

But Pakistan places strict boundaries on where CIA drones can fly. The unmanned aircraft may patrol designated flight "boxes" over the country's tribal belt but not other provinces, including Baluchistan, which encompasses Quetta.

"They want to increase the size of the boxes, they want to relocate the boxes," a second Pakistani intelligence official said of the latest U.S. requests. "I don't think we are going to go any further."

He and others spoke on condition of anonymity, citing the clandestine nature of a program that neither government will publicly acknowledge.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... id=topnews

[Ashoka]

U.S. wants to widen area in Pakistan where it can operate drones

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... id=topnews

Yeah I came across this too. Finally something from US that makes sense. Mullah Omar is royally living in Quetta & must be dealt with. More than half of Quetta Shura is still at large.

Also I dearly hope some Baloch civilians get killed too. We need more & more resentment in Balochistan. If this really happens, there is practically a chance of Balochistan getting liberated considering everything else that's already happening there.

[Rangudu]

Mullah Omar and his primary lieutenants are all in Karachi.

[Pranav]

Also I dearly hope some Baloch civilians get killed too. We need more & more resentment in Balochistan.

Resentment in Balochistan is a natural result of the way Balochis are treated by Punjabis. Calling for the deaths of Balochi civilians is condemnable.

[Ashoka]

Also I dearly hope some Baloch civilians get killed too. We need more & more resentment in Balochistan.

Resentment in Balochistan is a natural result of the way Balochis are treated by Punjabis. Calling for the deaths of Balochi civilians is condemnable.

I am only calling out what is surely going to happen if drones strike Quetta. It is a densely populated area. Terrorists are invariably going to take shelter in busiest parts of that area. When they eat hellfire, invariably some civilians will too.

And I wouldn't be sad. More resentment only serves for the betterment of that area as it will help get it liberated.

[Aditya_V]

Wishing for the Deaths of civilians is condemnable, besides deaths of civilians killed in American action will unite Balochis with the Taliban and Paki Army

[RajeshA]

U.S. wants to widen area in Pakistan where it can operate drones

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... id=topnews

Yeah I came across this too. Finally something from US that makes sense. Mullah Omar is royally living in Quetta & must be dealt with. More than half of Quetta Shura is still at large.

The Quetta Shura does not reside in Quetta.

Also I dearly hope some Baloch civilians get killed too. We need more & more resentment in Balochistan. If this really happens, there is practically a chance of Balochistan getting liberated considering everything else that's already happening there.

Nobody should ever wish for the death of innocents! It is the dividing line between Civilization and Barbarism.

[Singha]

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10 ... -and-rout/
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11 ... and-shock/

Danger Room What's Next in National Security
Previous post
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New U.S. Plan in Afghanistan: ‘Awe and Shock’

* By Spencer Ackerman Email Author
* November 19, 2010 |
* 10:21 am |
* Categories: Af/Pak
*


Behold the U.S.’s new counterinsurgency tool in Afghanistan: the M1 Abrams tank, your ultimate in 30-year old precision firepower.

Increasingly distant are the days when Defense Secretary Robert Gates worried aloud about replicating the Soviet Union’s failed heavy footprint in Afghanistan. Under the command of General David Petraeus, the military’s leading advocate of counterinsurgency, an unconventional war is looking surprisingly conventional.

NATO planes are dropping more bombs than at any time since the 2001 invasion. Special Forces have been operating on a tear since the summer, to the point where Afghanistan’s president is saying enough is enough. The coalition is using massive surface-to-surface missiles to clear the Taliban out of Kandahar. And now the tanks are rolling in.

In an excellent piece from the Washington Post’s Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. military officials brag that they’ve “taken the gloves off” in Afghanistan, just as they’re sending 16 lumbering Abrams tanks into Helmand Province. That’s pretty much the opposite of Petraeus’ famous “Get Out and Walk” guidance for troops in Iraq.

What do the tanks add to the fight? There’s some attempt at spinning their 120-millimeter guns as precision weapons, but one military official bluntly tells Chandrasekaran, “the tanks bring awe, shock and firepower.” Because “shock and awe” always works.

What’s more, in the experience of non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the tanks are more a measure to protect troops than to battle insurgents. The Canadians sent their Leopard tanks to southern Afghanistan after getting pummeled in lighter vehicles by insurgent fire. If U.S. troops in the south still feel that the military command’s Tactical Directive on how to fight in Afghanistan ties their hands, the first wave of 16 Abrams tanks will probably tamp that concern down.

Chandrasekaran reports that Petraeus feels his reputation as a counterinsurgency guru can overcome the optics of a heavily armored force rolling through Afghanistan’s south, reminiscent of the Soviet occupation. But any reporter who spends time in Afghanistan will hear stories from surprised U.S. officers about how many Afghans don’t know the Soviets ever actually left. And chances are the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual isn’t required reading in Kandahar or Marja.

What’s far more noticeable to Afghans is NATO blowing up at least 174 booby-trapped homes around Kandahar since September. Commanders may have cover from local government officials to do that, as NATO officials tell Chandrasekaran. But if the point of the Kandahar campaign is to get the locals to support that government instead of the Taliban, presuming that the officials are a proxy for local support is a dicey proposition.

In April 2009, Gates cautioned in a CNN interview, “The Soviets were in there with 110,000, 120,000 troops. They didn’t care about civilian casualties. And they couldn’t win.” Sixteen tanks do not remotely approach what the Soviets sent to occupy Afghanistan. And the proportion of civilians killed by the Taliban vastly dwarf those killed by NATO forces.

But now NATO, all combined, has 130,000 troops in Afghanistan. The numbers of civilians killed in the war is at an all-time high, despite a U.S. strategy predicated on protecting Afghans from violence. And starting today in Lisbon, NATO will endorse a strategy that will keep troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, even while it holds 2014 out as the new date for foreign forces to cease combat.

If the purpose of repurposing tanks, missiles and air strikes for unconventional conflict is to pummel the Taliban into suing for peace with the Afghan government, Mullah Omar still rejects any negotiations with President Karzai. From his safe haven in Pakistan, can he really be “awed and shocked” into changing his mind? It’s almost as if a different superpower has tried this before.

[shyamd]

IOL:The USAF has invited tenders for the training of PakistaniFrontier Corps in sniper techniques. Pakistani soldiers will be taught how to handle the new 7.62mm-calibre Remington M24 and 12.7 mm-calibre M107 rifles. Training will take place in Warsak, a few kliks from the border with Afghanistan where U.S. Special Forces have a forward base. Several private security firms are in line for the contract.

[darshhan]

Now pakis will learn how to down American helos and kill american troops from a distance courtesy training provided by America.Sometimes I really wonder at the shortsightedness of American strategic leadership.

[shyamd]

Its because drones aren't that effective any more.

[darshhan]

Its because drones aren't that effective any more.

Actually drones have been fairly effective but yes there is only so much that they can do.Anyways I seriously doubt if frontier corps is going to be effective at anything other than giving cover fire to the taliban militants crossing over to Afghanistan.

[ramana]

Nightwatch, Nov 19, 2010

Afghanistan: Special NightWatch Essay. Readers might wonder about the significance of comments about a new deadline for transferring security to Afghans, about the announcement that a squadron of Abrams M-1 main battle tanks is to be shipped to support the Marines in Helmand Province and the news report that combat air support has increased. These indicate significant decisions have been made that promise to change the Afghan fight into more of a war.

(Note: This essay is an analysis of developments this week and their implications, based on open sources. It is neither a criticism nor an endorsement.)

Change of focus. The repeated US and NATO public references this week to the year 2014 as an "aspirational" date for transferring security to the Afghans have been accompanied by an absence of substantive commentary about drawing down forces. This pattern invariably means a policy review has taken place and a significant change has been decided.

The focus is now on transferring security duties, not on drawing down forces. No official statements this week mentioned when the surge will end and the soldiers brought home. The vocabulary of the conflict has changed.

Clearly western forces will not begin drawing down in 2011 in any consequential numbers, as in Iraq. Any pullout would be for demonstration purposes, because combat operations are now set to continue for four or more years. President Karzai appears to be aware of this, according to new coverage from the NATO summit in Lisbon.

New deadlines. At the start of the week, officials described the transfer of security as occurring by 2014, which conventionally means by 31 December 2013. At mid-week, a spokesman clarified the intent as "by the end of 31 December 2014." By Thursday, a further clarification described 2014 as a goal, a desirable target or an aspirational date, with the proviso that the real date for ending the combat mission might be 2015 or thereafter.

The repeated mention of 2014 by State and Defense Department officials was not accompanied by an explanation for the change from 2011; a statement of new or changed goals; or a definition of what constitutes transferring security duties and, especially, how much the costs will rise. Apparently some of the details will be worked in Lisbon and are likely to be announced after the summit.

The transfer of security duties always has been a goal, but not the primary goal in the sense with which it was treated this week. It seems to absorb the other goals that have had primacy in the past two years: breaking the momentum of the Taliban, building the Afghan forces, creating secure conditions for development, improving governance, win hearts and minds and so on. It seems to be broad enough to cover them all, but still lacks definition for the public to measure progress or know what to expect in the next four years.

Heavy armor. The announcement of the heavy armor commitment informs implies that some of the Marines will be permitted to fight like Marines in warfare. Main battle tanks bring to mind the images of the US armored forces dashing up the west bank of the Euphrates River in Iraq seven years ago.

This signifies another policy shift about the nature of the war. The long overdue introduction of heavy armor portends that tactics in some areas must continue to drift farther from the announced hearts and minds strategy.

More air power. The third announcement was a statement, en passant, that this month US and NATO forces have increased their use of airpower against the Taliban. One commentator said this means that US and NATO tactics are now aimed at exterminating the Taliban, not just breaking their momentum, a goal stated on multiple occasions. Defeating the Taliban is an included task in a mission to transfer security to Afghan forces.

The broader implication appears to be that US and NATO forces appear to be returning to some of the tactics that worked earlier in the Afghan War. One condition that the fighting data in 2009 and 2010 establish is that the Taliban are not afraid of US and NATO forces, unless they are backed by air power. Conversely, their collective memory of defeat in 2001 by a significantly smaller US force is that they had no defense against US air power. That remains the case today.

Cumulatively, the announcements and actions appear to point to an escalation and prolongation of the Afghan War. If so, they should have a strongly discouraging effect on the Taliban leadership in Pakistan who persist in boasting that they will wait out the Americans.

A second consequence should be a reduction of coalition losses. The Afghans are not stepping up to the fight much more than before, based on casualty reporting in the Afghan media. Coalition forces should start cutting losses by rebuilding the aura of invincibility, which they had in 2001 and which rested on effective use of air power, but can now include tanks.

A third consequence should be gradual demoralization of the Taliban fighters in two respects: less hubris and more losses. Taliban web postings boast about attacking coalition forces in their bases. The reports of fighting often bear out the boasts. That hubris should diminish as losses increase.

As for Taliban casualties, during the summer and autumn offensive between June and November 2008, the Taliban sustained more than 1,000 killed a month every three months in a 90-day cycle. After a month of increased operations in June, they went to ground, reduced operations, regrouped, rearmed and recruited. After 30 days of down time, they again increased operations in August and lost another thousand fighters. They repeated that cycle once more in October and stretched it into November 2008, before they ended what appears to have been a premature and disastrous attempt to seize and hold ground. They have never tried that again.

In 2009 and in 2010, they have not been willing to take such losses. A thousand dead a month over a combat season represents the threshold for breaking the back of the Taliban and reducing it to banditry. In part, their aggressive operations in 2009 and 2010 may be attributed to restrictions on the use of air power. If those are easing, the Taliban can be defeated for a time.

A fourth consequence is that the coalition might begin to start making its own luck. Diligent prosecution of the fight in a more warlike fashion is more likely to shorten the conflict than the mixture of fighting with development projects to win hearts and minds. Under the pressure from no withdrawal date and increased losses, the Taliban inside Afghanistan might be more receptive to negotiations.

If the changes are implemented consistently, and are not just piecemeal, spot fixes, they should improve security conditions. However, they also are likely to produce significant negative consequences in property damage, civilian and militant casualties and bad press, all consistent with a war. On the other hand, the stalemate will continue if the most important change is a longer conflict.

[Murugan]

Kids safer in Afghan cities than in NY: Nato envoy

Kabul: Children are probably safer growing up in Afghanistan’s major cities, including the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, than in London, New York, or Glasgow, Nato’s top civilian envoy to Afghanistan has said. Mark Sedwill’s comments were made during an interview on Children’s BBC Newsround, a popular British daily current affairs programme aimed at children.

Children living in the Afghan capital Kabul had told the show’s presenter they felt unsafe on the streets because of the risk of bombs. But Sedwill dismissed their fears. “Here and in Kabul and the other big cities, actually, there are very few of those bombs,” he said. “The children are probably safer here than they would be in London, New York or Glasgow or many other cities,” Sedwill added.

“It’s a very family-orientated society, so it is a little bit like a city of villages,” Sedwill said.
His remarks, which will feature in a two-part series exploring the lives of children in Afghanistan, were rejected as misleading by an official from the aid group Save the Children.

“One in five children die before they get to the age of five. So to say it’s safer to live in London, New York or Glasgow is daft,” said the representative from Save the Children, who requested anonymity so he could speak freely.

“Sedwill’s overall message that life is village-like gives a sense of comfort or of a safe environment. It is not like that in Afghanistan, it is dangerous for children, it’s an insecure place,” he said.

Sedwill said he had been trying to explain that violence was not at the same level in every part of Afghanistan and that in cities like Kabul, where security had improved, violence was comparable to what many Western children might experience.

“Any comment you have to clarify obviously wasn’t very well put and the comparison I made with Western cities distracted attention from the important point that I was seeking to make,” Sedwill said in a statement later on Monday.

UN figures show Afghan children are often the victims of a worsening conflict, with 1,795 children killed or injured as a result of the war from September 2008 through August 2010.

Violence across Afghanistan is at its worst since the Taliban were overthrown by US-backed Afghan forces in late 2001, with civilian and military casualties now at record levels.

A report from the United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef) in November 2009 said
Afghanistan was the most dangerous country to be born in. It has the highest infant mortality rate in the world and two-thirds of the population lacks access to clean water.

Forty-three percent of the country was virtually off-limits to aid agencies due to poor security, the Unicef report said, making it difficult to carry out health campaigns for children.

Another UN report on Afghanistan in September said casualties among women increased 6 percent, while those among children jumped by 55 percent. A total of 74 children were killed in the first half of the year by homemade bombs or in suicide attacks, an increase of 155 percent for the same period in 2009.

While insurgents normally target foreign and Afghan forces, civilians are often caught up in the attacks as bystanders.

Last month, at least nine people, including eight children, were killed when a school bus carrying female students was hit by a roadside bomb in Nimroz province in southwestern Afghanistan.

Kabul has been relatively quiet over the past three months but two bombings targeting the Indian embassy in 2008 and 2009 killed around 75 people, including children. Girls have had acid thrown in their faces while walking to school by hardline Islamists who object to female education, which was banned under Taliban rule.

Several girls’ schools, including some in Kabul, have also been hit by mysterious gas poisonings blamed on Islamists. Some children, especially those from wealthier families, are also kidnapped for ransom. Such kidnappings often go unreported and children have been killed if ransoms were not paid. REUTERS (TOI*** 23 Nov 10)

[Prem]

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162- ... 03543.html
Pakistan Irked By Being Left Out of Peace Talks

Pakistani officials in public have remained quiet on the reported talks but in private have criticized the U.S. for its support to the reported discussions. "The Americans believe they can support a process without Pakistan's involvement. This is all wrong", one senior Pakistani government official told CBS News in a background interview in August this year.
On Tuesday, a Pakistani intelligence official speaking to CBS News on condition of anonymity said the New York Times report confirms "what we have believed for long. You can't exclude Pakistan and have a workable plan to bring about a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Pakistan's long history of dealing with Afghan groups makes us the best equipped to know exactly which group to talk to and with what effect."
Pakistan's main counter-espionage intelligence agency known as the ISI or Inter-Services Intelligence has kept contacts with the main Afghan warlords, since the 1979 invasion of the central Asian country by the former Soviet Union was followed by Pakistan's emergence as the main U.S.-backed conduit to build up an armed resistance against Moscow. Since the 9/11 attacks however, Pakistan's government says that it has abandoned all support to the Taliban after establishing close ties with the clerical regime during its rule over Afghanistan. But on Tuesday, a Western official in Islamabad who spoke to CBS News on condition of anonymity said: "There is still concern among Western countries over Pakistan's past contacts with Islamic zealots continuing to remain intact. I believe, Pakistan has enormous clout in Afghanistan to help in a political process. But 'can we trust Pakistan fully?' is a major unresolved question

[suryag]

has this been posted before ?
Fooled! US, Afghan officials talked to fake Mullah

[Pratyush]

They send fake Taliban for talks and have the gall to say that they are annoyed at being left out of the talks.

[CRamS]

I did a bit of sampling of the US media, incuding by NYT reporter Dexter Filkins which broke this story. Interesting thing is that given these reporters gets their cues from govt, their only passing mention of ISI for this fraud, and making the bogus speculation that its equally likely that any number of players could have misled US, leads me to believe that US govt is protecting ISI as usual.

[Philip]

Great record! Great cock-up my gen.McChrystal and MI-6 too!

Nato mission in Afghanistan as long as Soviet occupation
The Nato-led mission in Afghanistan has now lasted as long as the Soviet army's doomed occupation during the 1980s.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... ation.html

US general McChrystal approved peace talks with fake Taliban leader• American Nato commander asked MI6 to develop contacts
• News contradicts Hamid Karzai's attempt to put blame on UK

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/no ... n-impostor

Peace talks conducted with an impostor who posed as a Taliban leader, and which led to a meeting with Hamid Karzai in Kabul and thousands of dollars in "goodwill payments", were started by the Afghan government and approved by the former American commander, Stanley McChrystal, the Guardian has learned.

This account sharply contradicts claims made by the Afghan presidency, which has put the entire blame on Britain, apparently supported privately by US officials.

In fact, the overriding desire to find a negotiated end to the conflict, particularly on the part of David Cameron, appears to have generated credulity on all sides, and led to an embarrassing debacle that has lessened trust and set back hopes of meaningful negotiations in the near future.

Sources close to the contacts said the impostor, who claimed to be Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the Taliban's deputy leader, was originally introduced by an insurgent commander in Kandahar to the then Afghan interior minister, Hanif Atmar.

This Taliban commander, Muhammad Aminullah, is close to the movement's overall leader, Mullah Omar, and has led some of the fiercest Taliban fighting in the Zhari and Panjwai districts of Kandahar province. When he was picked up and held in a Nato raid in January this year, the Afghan government complained that he was a longstanding channel of Atmar's to the Taliban, and asked for him to be freed. In return, Aminullah offered contacts with Mansour, suggesting he might be open to political talks. The deal was approved by McChrystal, then the commander of Nato and US forces in Afghanistan, and a supporter of reconciliation efforts.

McChrystal asked MI6 to develop the contacts, rather than go to the CIA, which was not empowered by the necessary White House directive to enter into direct talks with Taliban officials. The absence of such a "presidential finding" is seen by many diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic as an obstacle to progress towards a political settlement.

At this point, MI6, delighted to have been given the mission, appears to have got carried away with enthusiasm for the "breakthrough", and brushed aside doubts raised by both US and British officials about "Mansour's" credibility. "Our friends got very excited," one official involved in the discussions recalled. "I remember everyone being very pompous and secretive about this." McChrystal's successor, Gen David Petraeus, is believed to have had doubts about Mansour's identity, but ultimately encouraged the contacts and discreetly publicised them.

Last night the head of the US military, Admiral Mike Mullen said the US had suspected the self-described Taliban leader was an imposter. "There were very early initial suspicions. And it took a little while to verify who he was or who he wasn't. And, in fact, it turns out he wasn't the guy he was claiming he should be."

After the coalition took office in May, both Cameron and William Hague were briefed about the talks with Mansour. The prime minister's eagerness to pursue a negotiated settlement contributed to an echo chamber in which more cautious voices were drowned out.

A series of meetings at a Nato military base in Kandahar culminated in the supposed Taliban leader being flown to Kabul in a British military plane to meet Karzai just over three months ago.

In that meeting, and at some of the preliminary meetings, the impostor (reported by the Washington Post, citing Afghan intelligence, to be a grocer from Quetta), was given tens of thousands of dollars as a reward for attending and as encouragement to develop the dialogue.

It is unclear how much of that money was paid by Britain and how much by Karzai, who keeps his own fund, partially financed by Iran, for such purposes. The US has insisted no American money was used.

It was at the meeting with Karzai that "Mansour's" identity was definitively challenged, leading to his unmasking earlier this week.

McChrystal, who has retired from the US army, could not be reached for comment and Atmar, who was in London this week, did not reply to emails seeking comment.

Interviewed in today's Washington Post, Karzai's chief of staff, Mohammad Umer Daudzai, squarely blamed the British for the fiasco. "This shows that this process should be Afghan-led and fully Afghanised," Daudzai said. "The last lesson we draw from this: international partners should not get excited so quickly with those kind of things … Afghans know this business, how to handle it."

Another Afghan official echoed that account, telling the Guardian: "Generally speaking, British intelligence has been the main director and architect of the peace plan; and in this particular case the mediators were British."

The official also blamed the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, which he said introduced the fraud to MI6. The Guardian, however, could find no confirmation of any role played by the ISI, which is frequently blamed for setbacks by the Kabul government.

British intelligence is conducting an inquiry into the episode, in part to uncover the motive. One theory is that it was an exercise in kite-flying by the Taliban, to discover what Kabul and the British were offering, without risking a senior figure in the movement. Taliban leaders have been wary about attending meetings with would-be mediators, fearing they are on a Nato hit-list, known as the Joint Priority Effects List. A Nato source said: "If you look at it from their point of view, as soon as they turn up for a meeting, they give us an eight-digit map reference of where they are. This, on the other hand, is no risk."
Printable version

[shravan]

Shia deal gives militants new Afghan access

PESHAWAR: Shia Muslim militias in Pakistan’s tribal regions are helping some of Natos fiercest enemies evade missile attacks from US drones to cross safely into Afghanistan, a tribal activist told The Associated Press.
....

The deal in Kurram was brokered two months ago during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. A delegation of Shia elders and Shia militiamen from Kurram met representatives of the Haqqani network and laid the groundwork for the deal, said Bangash, who is the chairman of the Community Rights Program, an independent organization trying to broker peace between Kurram’s Shias and Sunnis while bringing development to their areas.

Under the agreement, the Shias gave the Haqqani network safe passage through Kurram from its Pakistan strongholds in neighboring North and South Waziristan across the border to its Afghan bases in Khost and Paktia provinces, Bangash said.

In return, the Haqqanis intervened with the Sunni Muslim militants to get them to agree to a truce with the Shias in Kurram. The two sects have been engaged in brutal tit-for-tat killings, although most of the dead have been Shias Muslim. Rival Sunni Muslims have also blocked the only highway connecting Kurram to Pakistan’s Khyber Pukhtunkhwa provincial capital of Peshawar.

[Yagnasri]

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-emba ... nts/245980

[ramana]

Nightwatch hopes:

LINK

Afghanistan: Follow-up finding. Continuing analysis of fighting data reinforces the NightWatch assessment that the Taliban have peaked. In fact, they peaked in 2009, based on a review of districts under stress. NightWatch calculated the average number of districts under stress for each of the 34 provinces to obtain a measure of sustainability for anti-government forces. The data is presented below.


2007 2008 2009 2010

Average number of districts with clashes 70 99 180 133

Percent of total 17.6% 24.9% 45% 33%


(Note: The 34 provinces of Afghanisan contain 398 districts)

The data show a moderate increase in the number of districts with clashes from 2007 to 2008 and a significant surge in 2009, followed by a significant drop in 2010. the drop exceeds the margin of error and reporting variations. The drop means the Taliban and other anti-government forces retrenched in 2010, apparently by falling back to safer districts.

The above findings are inconsistent with mainstream news reporting so that NightWatch undertook a detailed examination of every district in every province that reported any kind of security incident in the press in 2009 and 2010. That examination confirms a wholesale contraction of operating areas by anti-government forces in 2010, compared to 2009.

Using the average number of districts experiencing clashes as a measure, only 2 of 34 provinces registered a statistically measurable increase in the average number of districts experiencing clashes between 2009 and 2010 to date. Those provinces are Baghlan in the north and Nimruz in the west. Neither is in danger.

Eleven provinces showed no change in the average number of districts with clashes in 2009 compared to 2010. This number includes 4 provinces that have never experienced significant anti-government violence since 2001.

Twenty-one provinces showed a substantial decline - from 7 to 50% - in the average number of districts experiencing clashes in 2010, compared to 2009.

This result coincides with increased combat operations following the surge in US combat forces. These data, which require continuing study, indicate 2010 is the first year since 2001 in which the geographic area of operations of the anti-government forces contracted. This fact is camouflaged by the overall high number of clashes and other security incidents.

This finding does not mean either side is winning or losing. It does mean that something -- probably a combination of lots of things, including supply and finance shortages for the Taliban and increased Allied power -- forced the anti-government forces to retrench. The retrenchment is significant, but not yet outcome determinative. For example, the contraction may be as much as Allied forces can compel because the force ratios continue to favor stalemate. Data compilation and analysis continue.

[Amber G.]

President Obama in Afghanistan on unannounced trip

[ramana]

Must be fallout of the wikileaks and to review the situation persoanally.

[Amber G.]

^^^ may be a factor but from the sources -- the trip was planned about a month ago (prior to Dec 12 deadline for the progress report). Bad weather (according to reliable sources, weather is really bad) canceled mtg with Karzai. Video conference is also canceled - just a telephonic conference.

[Satya_anveshi]

WOW! President of one country visits another and does not meet the president of the host country. These shits think it is all nice and macho.

Barack Obama fails to meet President Karzai in Kabul

[ramana]

AmberG, if the trip was planned earlier they would have Karzai at Bagram. Even otherwise its not a diplomatic move to visit Afghanistan and not meet the head of state KArzai. Emphasises the banana republic image. More like republic on banana peel. But then the duo Eikenberry and Rocky are not known for diplomacy.

I guess Ben Rhodes is no Rhodes scholar!

[svinayak]

WOW! President of one country visits another and does not meet the president of the host country. These shits think it is all nice and macho.

Barack Obama fails to meet President Karzai in Kabul

It is a client state

[abhishek_sharma]

As U.S. assesses mission, Karzai is a question mark

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... 04164.html

Afghan President Hamid Karzai had heard enough.


For more than an hour, Gen. David H. Petraeus, U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry and other top Western officials in Kabul urged Karzai to delay implementing a ban on private security firms. Reconstruction projects worth billions would have to be shuttered, they maintained, if foreign guards were evicted.

Sitting at the head of a glass-topped, U-shaped table in his conference room, Karzai refused to budge, according to two people with direct knowledge of the late October meeting. He insisted that Afghan police and soldiers could protect the reconstruction workers, and he dismissed pleas for a delay.

As he spoke, he grew agitated, then enraged. He told them that he now has three "main enemies" - the Taliban, the United States and the international community.

"If I had to choose sides today, I'd choose the Taliban," he fumed.

[Pratyush]

'No success in Afghan war unless Pak hunts down insurgents'

If only the words could be translated into action.

[Philip]

Until the B-52s usher in an early monsoon to Af-Pak,the Taliban/ISI will continue their attacks against the US/NATO forces.What the cretins in charge of US def/foreign policy have yet to acknowledge despite reams of print about their duplicitous and dastardly deeds,is that the Paki military/ISI is the real fountainhead of global Islamist terror and that it is not Af-Pak that should be targeted but Islamabad and Pindi,if the US truly wants a quick end to the Afghan imbroglio.

[ramana]

Nightwatch fulminates 12/15/2010

Afghanistan: Heavy fighting, with a 15-20 percent increase in attacks, is predicted in Afghanistan as more Taliban insurgents are expected to remain in country rather than crossing the border into Pakistan, according to U.S. Major General Campbell.

According to the Washington Post, the White House report on Afghanistan is expected to show increased reliance on counterterrorism operations as part of the overall war strategy, and will identify insurgent safe havens in Pakistan as a persistent problem Pakistan has done little to address.

Comment: NightWatch is evaluating the data from the fighting in November 2010, in preparation for another special report. The data show the Taliban and other anti-government forces surged their attacks significantly and tried to expand into previously quiet districts. They sustained a high level of daily attacks in traditional stronghold districts.

Attacks tapered off somewhat at the end of November, which is usual. The claim that fewer Taliban moved to winter quarters in Pakistan is not a good indicator of winter fighting. Most anti-government fighters in Pashtun provinces in the south, fight where they live.

The NATO command's statement implies that the fighting is waged mostly by anti-government groups that are based in Pakistan. That is simply not true, is grossly misleading to the American public and whoever came up with that nonsense should be dismissed. The anti-government forces in Afghanistan are not foreigners, but are supported from Pakstan. Thus even without support from Pakistan there would still be a fight against outsiders in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is the origin of and channel for all supplies that support the anti-government forces. Afghanistan has no arms or explosives industries. Everything that explodes comes from the US or Pakistan. Thus, if IED events reached a new high in November 2010 -- as they did -- that means the US and Coalition forces utterly failed to stop the supply of fertilizer, explosives and detonators from Pakistan or stolen from or sold by US and Coalition forces.

{He is sounding Rahul Mehtaish!}

The most powerful country in the history of the world cannot seem to seal a border, in Mexico or Pakistan. This is curious because it indicates that this 2010 generation of hi-tech US soldiers and generals have been enormously less able to disrupt the supply line from Pakistan than an earlier generation of American war fighters did to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

Means all is not well.

[brihaspati]

The fundamental problem is that USA cannot shore up a strong government of Afghanistan independent of the Islamists and Taleban framework. A regime requires a certain social basis to survive. USA has ensured that no democratic, modernizing social forces survive in Afghanistan - out of Cold War theory of intensifying Islam as an antidote to "communism".

In the absence of any such base for sustaining a progressive and stable regime, how long can USA keep the Talebs away? Talebs after all can easily use all the retrogressive memes of Islam as practised in Afghanistan to re-emerge again and again. In the now almost 25 years of covert involvement in AFG politics, USA and the West has never ever given any thought to what they were creating for themselves.

There should have been a dual consideration to broadening the democratic and liberal education framework to create a sustainable "west friendly" political base. Now they can continue a "war" but they will not win it.

Winning such wars requires a long struggle to undermine the older social power basis, destroying the mullahs and their educational apparatus in this case, forcing modern education if necessary replacing islamist ones.

[ramana]

Bji, Dont mind lekin US did the same to TSP so much so that civil society suffocates under the weight of the three A's. It was the support to the Nazariya-e Pakistan types that has brought the situation to this level. An average TSP is not like this. Only the elite (not all RAPE) and those living of 3.5 friends are.

I wonder if they were worried after 1971 that TSP could merge back into greater India and thus supported this process.

[brihaspati]

ramana ji,
the society of Pak was more non-Islamic with closer proximity to India's heartland. Hence it was more difficult a prospect for the west. So they decided to strengthen the mullahs and the feudal elite and perhaps had to nurture a violent partition. In AFG they had to simply encourage the mullahs to be more "proactive" since it was far more homogenized as to Islamism.

But a much better strategy would have been to let the Afghan communists and the Soviets to fight it out with the Mullahs. The leftists are ideologically committed to at least some aspects of western "progress" like modernizing education, more of science, women's participation in education and labour etc.

Over time the two would have exhausted each out and some elements of liberal values and Islam-diluting memes would ahve taken root. Then do a "coloured revolution" and bring in representative democracy.