Wikileaks Diplomatic Cable Dump - News and Discussion

arjunm · Post by **arjunm** » 01 Dec 2010 02:11

Ambar wrote:Our worst fears have come true..

US and UK diplomats feared Pakistan's nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists, the latest leaked classified US diplomatic cables reveal.
Another secret cable relating to a US intelligence briefing in 2008 said: "Despite pending economic catastrophe, Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world."
- BBC

I have heard that the Israelis asked permission to blow up the Paki Nuclear sites during Rajiv Gandhi's tenure, Why he did not allow that?

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 01 Dec 2010 02:15

You mean the White Man's burden?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Dec 2010 02:19

arjunm, this was discussed so many times its not funny.

The reasons are:

- TSP stuff is not their own and will get replaced
- It legitimizes TSP to attack Trombay where India's stuff might be shaping up. So you lose what you have for what TSP might not have!
- India is no banana republic to need some one else to take care of her problems.

Wish Chetan/Unknown was here!

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 02:33

Ramana

Lots of H&D injury is likely to occur. Note the one cable (yet to be released to public) that quotes Chinese FM He saying:

Nuclear weapons are crucial to Pakistan. Indeed, a Pakistani military leader said his army was no match for the Indian army

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 02:43

Some TSP cables will have information on Daood/Headley. Let's be on the lookout!

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 02:55

Here's the text of current US amb Tim Roemer's cable regarding Cold Start.

He's basically saying that India cannot do it and TSPA knows that Cold Start is not going to happen. He is also subtly pointing out that Manmohan may have delayed operationalizing Cold Start after the momentum it got under NDA rule.

Roemer also says that if India did not do it after 26/11, then US can be sure that India will not do it ever. Plus, despite TSPA's whining about Cold Start, they would not have done 26/11 if they were worried about Cold Start.

1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army's "Cold Start Doctrine" is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice. At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in the plan's existence than in any real world application. End Summary.

What It Is and What It Is Not

-----------------------------

2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the Indian Army's slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal 2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility, and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start's genesis).

3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army's slow and lumbering military mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation).

4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action against Pakistan. India's prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if the plan is never actually implemented -- and there is considerable question as to GOI intent to ever implement it -- news of Cold Start's existence has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.

Prospects for Cold Start

------------------------

5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the military's advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not clearly understood.

6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold Start's reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh.

7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response, GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys in its contentious relationship with Pakistan.

Comment

-------

8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which calls into serious question the GOI's willingness to actually adopt the Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since 2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled. This fact calls into question Cold Start's ability to deter Pakistani mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to USG officials. Cold Start is not India's only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear. ROEMER

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 01 Dec 2010 02:59

Rangudu wrote:Here's the text of current US amb Tim Roemer's cable regarding Cold Start.

He's basically saying that India cannot do it and TSPA knows that Cold Start is not going to happen. He is also subtly pointing out that Manmohan may have delayed operationalizing Cold Start after the momentum it got under NDA rule.

Roemer also says that if India did not do it after 26/11, then US can be sure that India will not do it ever. Plus, despite TSPA's whining about Cold Start, they would not have done 26/11 if they were worried about Cold Start.

26/11 was done to test if India will do Cold start. It was done right after the IUCNA agreement nuke deal and was to show Pakistan that no matter what even after the nuke deal India will not be able to take advantage and attack Pakistan.
Confidence was restored in the US Pakistan relationship with the Mumbai attack and this confidence was lower after 911. The new administration wanted to get good relationship with the Paki establishment. Many Mil officer had participated in seminars to discuss Cold start and the major worry for the visiting Pak mil officers was the cold start. Once this worry is lowered then Pak military would cooperate freely with US military.

This is all about US Pakistan relationship which is for the USG national interest. Everything else is side show

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Dec 2010 03:06

And recall the press report in the Mumbai thread that states the IA wanted one week after their chief came back from abroad. So if it was test for CS it sure didn't occur.

Ref:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 13#p985413

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 03:11

The wikileaks website is flaky. Here's a bit from one more TSP cable released today.

11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him. He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility of an attack on India.

12. (S) Ambassador asked about the likelihood for restarting the back-channel with India, noting that we had received a good readout from former Foreign Minister Kasuri, who was enthusiastic about the appointment of former Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan as the back-channel negotiator. Kayani said that Ambassador should talk to Zardari about restarting the back-channel where it "left off:" he was not sure that Zardari was quite willing to wade into these political waters yet. Kayani and Pasha both said that they wanted this channel to succeed, and Kayani expressed his confidence in Riaz Khan's integrity and intelligence.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Dec 2010 03:19

Most likely goat/lamb will be MKN once the dust clears.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 01 Dec 2010 04:06

There is ZERO chance of that. What MKN said is true. No bureaucrat or leader will endorse to an American anything of that nature. The Roemer commentary is lucid:

"Finally, several very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced."

The fact that several officials basically said the same thing confirms that. This does not mean they do not endorse or support CS. As far as I know, no political leader has spoken against it. The rest is assessment by Roemer. The Americans may or may not conclude what they want about our intentions/capabilities/propensity to act etc. This is probably the same thing they said on May 10th regarding our intention or willingness to test.

As for the "recently been replaced" part, it's laughable. MKN is very much in the thick of things, politically. And in other ways.

He is one of the best servants the state has had since independence.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 04:15

JEM,

I' m more interested in a couple of other aspects of Roemer's cable.

1. The view that MMS/UPA may have slowed down operationalization of CS
2. The logical conclusion that if 26/11 did not result in CS, nothing will. A corollary is that India will absorb an indefinite number of TSPA attacks.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Dec 2010 04:20

JEM my post was after the Pasha leak. If Pasha was givng details like that what was India doing?

R-man, I had said that in the mil acqusition thread that UPA seems to be reluctant to fund new buys to ensure Cold start is hot gas.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Dec 2010 04:25

Hats-off Mupalla!!!

Interpol issues wanted notice to Julian Assange

Meanwhile Yahoo reports it BOA that is the bank mentioned by WikiLeaks.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 01 Dec 2010 04:36

>> 1. The view that MMS/UPA may have slowed down operationalization of CS
2. The logical conclusion that if 26/11 did not result in CS, nothing will. A corollary is that India will absorb an indefinite number of TSPA attacks.

I find a strange and quiet obvious leap of logic in roemer's assesment.

on one hand he says Indian military was short of many critical items and couldn't have pulled off CS (which is true and we discussed this on BR as well) and then says that India will never react because it didn't react this time.

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 01 Dec 2010 04:56

Rangudu wrote:JEM,

I' m more interested in a couple of other aspects of Roemer's cable.

1. The view that MMS/UPA may have slowed down operationalization of CS
2. The logical conclusion that if 26/11 did not result in CS, nothing will. A corollary is that India will absorb an indefinite number of TSPA attacks.

Isn't this depressing? And you guys accuse me of fearing the worst. What is morally repugnant about US position is that it seems more worried about India's CS doctrin, which is self-defense, than it is about TSP proving the invocation of CS through terror. Its like a local sheriff worrying about an attractive woman taking precautions from being raped by a neighborhood rapist, than the presence of the rapist itself.

But the question I have is this. If TSP can continue to attack secure in the knowledge that there will never be any retaliation from India, does it mean that at some point, India will give in to its demands?

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 01 Dec 2010 05:02

No, it may actually lead to weakening of the GOI regimes. Actually more the apparent compromises that GOI makes, the greater is the possibility for a future break between the people and its regime. It may not be obvious for the current gov, but it can move the people gradually away from the political forces that support such regimes. USA is setting a current that may actually do exactly the opposite of what it and Pak desires - if that is how really USA thinks.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 05:09

CRS,

Do you believe that if we had similar access to messages from the Indian envoy in Rangoon on the question of Suu Kyi's status, we'll find his words more sympathetic to her plight vs. the likelihood of her release, for example?

Another example - assume that someone in your company had a family tragedy and his work has deteriorated. Do you think that any evaluation of him will focus more on his tragedy vs. how he his performing?

The role of an envoy is to focus narrowly on his country's interests and to make best efforts to advance them in the host country.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 01 Dec 2010 05:11

Ramana, I was referring to the possibility of MKN becoming the sacrificial goat after dust clears. No possibility of that. He is in his later years. Untouchable. He will retire gracefully, in all probability.

Rman,

>>1. The view that MMS/UPA may have slowed down operationalization of CS

Very possible boss. Probably they did not "slow it down" as much as - as our babus prefer to call it - let it "lapse". In other words, less enthusiasm. Unfortunate consequence of ideological, personal and party priorities I would say. But I don't know if it's a fact. Roemer's interpretation or assessment is just that.

2. The logical conclusion that if 26/11 did not result in CS, nothing will. A corollary is that India will absorb an indefinite number of TSPA attacks...

This is typical of much of American analysis of India over decades, one might say. They have consistently misread our ability to act decisively in our interests, or "will to power" as they call it. Many may not remember the guy, but Markus Johannes Wolf (former East German spymaster and a legend in his field) once made a pointed remark about the complete dunderheadness of the Americans in terms of "interpreting" data (as opposed to collecting it) - specifically with regard to India. That said, given our proclivity towards infinite patience, who can fault them? So it is what it is. I think we can state with some certainty that no one knows how India will react to another attack of this kind.

Rahul, there are other issues with the cable as well... but I suggest we can't really be that critical on that score because this sort of thing is done almost daily, reads almost like a "stream of thought" being transferred to paper. What I find unusual is that I haven't found a single spelling mistake in any of the leaked dox that I've read. I didn't expect these chaps to be quite so good

- maybe they're getting trained by the Paks, who after all are more fluent in English than the Queen...

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 01 Dec 2010 05:12

Fresh from NYT: Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance With Pakistan

What I absolutely admire about US politicians, diplomats, everyone is their unflinching commitement to national interests. Here is ambassador Patterson worrying about loosing support of Paki terrorists should India & US get closer.

In a rare tone of dissent with Washington, she said Pakistan would only dig in deeper if America continued to improve ties with India, which she said “feeds Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and Kashmir focused terrorist groups.”

I wonder if anyone reminded her in response that US is involved in a global war on terror, not to appease the terrorists. Oh, did I forget, she was only talking about appeasing terrorists who attack India. In her jihadi-like worldview, the fight against Al Queda is so paramount that India being the sacrifical goat would be her Lord's choice.

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 01 Dec 2010 05:16

Rangudu wrote: Another example - assume that someone in your company had a family tragedy and his work has deteriorated. Do you think that any evaluation of him will focus more on his tragedy vs. how he his performing?

I am a good manager onlee, and I take these kind of factors into account

.

The role of an envoy is to focus narrowly on his country's interests and to make best efforts to advance them in the host country.

Sure, but I doubt when it comes to Israel or its European allies, US will be more concerned about any response than the act that would provoke them. What this means is that trust but verify when it comes to India US relationship. Particularly when Roemer like clowns puke their used car salesman talk throwing DDM into a tizzy.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 01 Dec 2010 05:20

CRamS wrote:But the question I have is this. If TSP can continue to attack secure in the knowledge that there will never be any retaliation from India, does it mean that at some point, India will give in to its demands?

what makes you so sure that roemer's assesment is correct ?

arjunm · Post by **arjunm** » 01 Dec 2010 05:35

ramana wrote:arjunm, this was discussed so many times its not funny.

The reasons are:

- TSP stuff is not their own and will get replaced
- It legitimizes TSP to attack Trombay where India's stuff might be shaping up. So you lose what you have for what TSP might not have!
- India is no banana republic to need some one else to take care of her problems.

Wish Chetan/Unknown was here!

Thanks Ramanaji, now I get some idea.

ShivaS · Post by **ShivaS** » 01 Dec 2010 05:37

Unless Mossad protects him he is dead man.
Mossad has to protect him because what Israel could not convince the world about Iran he has.

negi · Post by **negi** » 01 Dec 2010 05:58

CRS boss Cold Start doctrine is plain BS, to me it's just like any other rag which babus publish for the heck of it, more than HOW the question which India needs to answer when it comes to confronting TSP is 'WHEN' i.e. what is that qualifies as an act of aggression which warrants a military strike the question which Jingos or anyone for that matter need to answer is under 'WHAT' circumstances will CS be employed ? If the doctrine does not answer above question then it's no different from our NFU policy which makes no sense in absence of a well defined and published nuclear chain of command (seriously does anyone know about it ?) .

I am sure none of the chanakians and their ilk would have a clear answer they can however write pages in Queen's english as to how to constitute a 'secular' JPC which would eventually write a classified report (to be read by the Rats) on how to respond to another 26/11 or Kargil type attack.

Today as the things stand GoI's stand on 'WHEN' to CS like on any other issue is unclear leave alone military if one is to go by our diplomatic response to 26/11 nothing has changed heck back in MH RR Patil has again become the Home Minister .

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 01 Dec 2010 06:02

Whatever the truth of India's Cold Start doctrine it suits US interests to say that it is not possible to reassure Packees.

It arguably suits Indian interests to be ambiguous about Indian capability to initiate Cold Start. In my view the idea of Cold Start itself is Chankian and once out of the bag the idea has a life of its own.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 06:06

Before we react piecemeal, I suggest that everyone takes some time to read the entire set of cables that came out today.

This link has all the documents referring to TSP as of today

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 01 Dec 2010 06:16

Rangudu wrote:Before we react piecemeal, I suggest that everyone takes some time to read the entire set of cables that came out today.

This link has all the documents referring to TSP as of today

6. (S) Zardari confirmed again at the end of the conversation that Pakistan would not allow non-state actors to dictate state policy, but that the GOP would respond if the Indians attacked. He recommended a report done in India which indicated that Indian Muslims are treated poorly and are among the least prosperous members of society. He said that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was trying to whip up anti-Muslim sentiment. Morever, there were plenty of extremist groups in India that could have assisted Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 06:17

CRS,

Like a State Dept spokesperson asked about LeT, you skipped my first poser

Hari Seldon · Post by **Hari Seldon** » 01 Dec 2010 06:53

Apologies if posted already.

US embassy cables: Pakistan's army is 'the problem' says India

5. (C) Turning to Pakistan, [SS] Menon observed that the mood there had deteriorated over the past year, saying it had gone from euphoria after the return of a civilian government to worries over security and the economy. The U.S. has influence, however, "where it matters most," Menon said, referring to the Pakistan Army, arguing that most of the problems in Pakistan can be traced to the capacity and intentions of Pakistan's military. Not only must Pakistan's army shift its attention from east to west, Menon asserted, but it must also cut its links to jihadi organizations, who have gone global over the past five years. Supporting Pakistan's army is not the answer, he said, suggesting that changing its operating assumptions would be more effective. Menon noted that the Indians had felt last week's meeting at the Munich Security Conference between National Security Advisor MK Narayanan and General Petraeus had been especially productive.

6. (C) Menon pointed out that in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, India had consciously not attempted to take any measures to destabilize Pakistan's civilian government, and had made every effort to continue trade and travel relations. However, Pakistan's Army continued to make things difficult for India, through ceasefire violations, infiltrations and continued support for terrorist groups.

Interesting. Pvt conversations between babus at that level almost mirrors BRF takes only, only in more erudite and refined language.

Nandu · Post by **Nandu** » 01 Dec 2010 07:01

Hari, the refined language is in the cable. It is not a literal transcription of what the babus said. Similarly, regarding JEM's comment on spelling, I am sure the cable is not directly send by whoever dictates it, but there is both secretarial and software intermediaries that correct spelling.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Dec 2010 07:22

Hari, The babus read BRF regularly, BRF is the platform for Indians views.

svenkat · Post by **svenkat** » 01 Dec 2010 07:53

Rangudu wrote:The wikileaks website is flaky. Here's a bit from one more TSP cable released today.

11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him. He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility of an attack on India.

Can the gurus throw more light on the nautanki by terrorists in uniform?

nithish · Post by **nithish** » 01 Dec 2010 08:22

US embassy cables: 'Reviewing our Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy'

Anne Patterson

Most importantly, it is the perception of India as the primary threat to the Pakistani state that colors its perceptions of the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan's security needs. The Pakistani establishment fears a pro-India government in Afghanistan would allow India to operate a proxy war against Pakistan from its territory.

Justified or not, increased Indian investment in, trade with, and development support to the Afghan government, which the USG has encouraged, causes Pakistan to embrace Taliban groups all the more closely as anti-India allies.

We need to reassess Indian involvement in Afghanistan and our own policies towards India, including the growing military relationship through sizable conventional arms sales, as all of this feeds Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and Kashmir-focused terrorist groups while reinforcing doubts about U.S. intentions.

Resolving the Kashmir dispute, which lies at the core of Pakistan's support for terrorist groups, would dramatically improve the situation. Enhanced USG efforts in this regard should be considered.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 01 Dec 2010 08:50

efforts are being made to shut down wikileaks. maybe he has copied and handed over materials to a network of hackers who will viral it if he is put behind bars.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 01 Dec 2010 08:53

The dataset is already out, so someone will put it up on rapidshare or torrent.

shynee · Post by **shynee** » 01 Dec 2010 08:54

WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange Tells TIME: Hillary Clinton 'Should Resign'

Hillary Clinton, Julian Assange said, "should resign." Speaking over Skype from an undisclosed location on Tuesday, the WikiLeaks founder was replying to a question by TIME managing editor Richard Stengel over the diplomatic-cable dump that Assange's organization loosed on the world this past weekend. Stengel had said the U.S. Secretary of State was looking like "the fall guy" in the ensuing controversy, and had asked whether her firing or resignation was an outcome that Assange wanted. "I don't think it would make much of a difference either way," Assange said. "But she should resign if it can be shown that she was responsible for ordering U.S. diplomatic figures to engage in espionage in the United Nations, in violation of the international covenants to which the U.S. has signed up. Yes, she should resign over that."

Pakistani officials are almost certain that more revealing documents focusing on their country will come out soon

Assange said that all the documents were redacted "carefully." "They are all reviewed, and they're all redacted either by us or by the newspapers concerned," he said. He added that WikiLeaks "formally asked the State Department for assistance with that. That request was formally rejected."

And the source or sources of all the diplomatic cables? Stengel asked Assange if U.S. Army PFC Bradley Manning, now detained in Quantico, Va., was the sole source of the megaleak. "We're a source-protection organization," Assange said, "so the last thing we would do is discuss possible sources. However, we do know that ... the FBI, State Department and U.S. Army CID [Criminal Investigation Command] has been going around Boston visiting a number of people there." He referred to "people who have been detained coming back into the United States" with connections to Manning. The U.S. soldier's "mother's home in Wales, in the U.K.," he said, was "visited, or raided, depending on how you want to describe it," by the FBI.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 01 Dec 2010 09:01

US embassy cables: Pakistan punishes US diplomats for 'siding with India'
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-emba ... nts/249966

5. (C) While we have had major successes in our military and law enforcement cooperation with Pakistan, cooperation has frequently been hampered by suspicion in Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment about U.S. intentions and objectives. Among other things, the Pakistanis believe that we have favored India over Pakistan -- most notably, by approving civil-nuclear cooperation with India -- and that we aim to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which, in light of their conventional military disadvantage vis-a-vis India, they consider critical to their national security. The military and intelligence establishment is also concerned that we are working with Pakistan's civilian leadership to limit the military's prerogative in determining Pakistan's national security policies. As a result of these concerns, the military and intelligence establishment has taken steps since Spring 2009 to hamper the operations of the
ISLAMABAD 00000416 002 OF 004

Embassy. These steps include holding up the issuance and renewal of Pakistani visas for permanent Embassy staff and TDYers; denying import permits for armored vehicles for Embassy use; sabotaging our contract with DynCorp International to provide enhanced protective support for Consulate General Peshawar personnel; slowing down importation of U.S. assistance for the Pakistani government, including equipment for Pakistani law enforcement agencies; shutting down our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training program at Pakistan's Sihala Police Academy; putting up roadblocks for our acquiring additional land for the Embassy's expansion; and harassing Embassy personnel by stopping and detaining Embassy vehicles. Some of these problems have recently abated in response to our repeatedly raising them with the highest levels of the Pakistani government. However, we expect we will have to continue to push back against such impediments for the foreseeable future.

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 01 Dec 2010 09:03

nice psyops to make India ullu-ka-patta are going on. Nice try and good for reading fiction if one has abundant amount of time. I wish I have money and energy. I can make Pulp Fiction-XX.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 01 Dec 2010 09:05

US embassy cables: Pakistan 'needs nuclear weapons because of inferior army'
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-emba ... nts/226567

21. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher outlined the problem caused by Pakistan in blocking implementation of the CD program of work. She said the U.S. was talking to Pakistan and arguing that Pakistan could make its points in the negotiations but should not block the beginning of talks. VFM He agreed that the Pakistanis "have concerns" regarding the FMCT negotiations. He said he understood Pakistani "hesitancy," as well as their "logic" and "illogic." The solution is to address the underlying problem, which is that India and Pakistan view each other as enemies. Nuclear weapons are crucial to Pakistan. Indeed, a Pakistani military leader said his army was no match for the Indian army. "India is the lynchpin" to assuaging Pakistan's fears and the U.S. could influence India. China has resolved all border issues except those with India, He observed. In response to Tauscher,s expression of appreciation for China's efforts in the CD with Pakistan, He said China would engage the Pakistanis.