Deterrence

[SSridhar]

That was indeed a fine speech from the NSA. Well articulated.

I am not too sure if the reference to use of nukes is a shift in policy or simply loose formation of a sentence. Anyhow, even if it is the latter, it creates an ambiguity that should be welcomed.

[Anujan]

NFU should be understood in context. It was always my understanding that NFU is not a lakshman rekha: Let me explain. Let us assume Pakis have mated warheads, and are fueling their missiles and there is 100% reliable information about that. Will India wait till attacked? More importantly, will any adversary *depend* on NFU statement by India to get reassured that any nuclear mischief will not attract a nuclear retaliation in the process of committing that mischief ?

NFU on the other hand serves a different purpose. An articulation that we will not rely on our Nukes to commit blackmail. Like the Pakis do now. Using the threat of Nuclear first strike to deter Indian retaliation against provocative terrorist attacks. In this sense FU is destabilizing and causes two problems (1) The ability of the weaker adversary to threaten FU while simultaneously devolving into a cycle of bigger and bigger provocations (like terrorist attacks) (2) The stronger adversary to look at other (non-military) means of ending the provocation. Left unchecked, it will just spiral out of control.

In this sense NFU is the least destabilizing, and is in like with India's "Status-quo" philosophy about her territorial ambitions and methods through which she pursues her foreign policy.

[Raja Ram]

I have no access to the Draft Nuclear Doctrine that was first framed post Shakti Tests. I do not remember reading in any of the articles discussing that, where it said that the No First Use doctrine was only for non-nuclear powers. Is there anywhere where the GOI has published the DND so that we can cross check? Is it still "Draft" or an approved "Nuclear Doctrine"?

That is why I found that this qualification on the position interesting.

Anujan,

I do understand the rationale behind the NFU as an articulated policy. I also acknowledge the fact that policy may say one thing but the intent could be different. However, if the NFU is qualified like the statement made by the NSA suggests, then it has ramifications in terms of operationalising the doctrine. I believe that it would mean significant changes to Command Structure, Delivery Platforms, Stockpile Monitoring, Force Readiness thresholds, Targeting, Weapon Options etc.

That is why normally there is a lot of attention to these sort of policy documentations, I am told. Hence the need to check back. On the other hand I could be entirely wrong and from the day one it may have been the same position as what the NSA has said in his speech.

[negi]

Well I was always critical of the NFU specially when our TRIAD is not in place even as we speak; the need to reassure the rest of the world about our intentions and nuclear stance is appreciated but it should be done only once a CMD has been established by actually operationalising the nuclear TRAID for only then our NFU policy would have any meaningful significance.Finally given the competence and past performance of our intelligence network I don't think one even knows if Paki nukes are free fall type or missile deliverable so lets not even talk about us catching bakis mating nukes with missiles on field.

[SSridhar]

I have no access to the Draft Nuclear Doctrine that was first framed post Shakti Tests. I do not remember reading in any of the articles discussing that, where it said that the No First Use doctrine was only for non-nuclear powers. Is there anywhere where the GOI has published the DND so that we can cross check? Is it still "Draft" or an approved "Nuclear Doctrine"?

This is what the latest IND says

India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against states which do not posses nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers

RR, pl also see this.

[Raja Ram]

Sridhar

thanks sir. This is interesting indeed. Would love to get a copy of the current version of the Doctrine. I have not seen any links that can give that.

[RajeshA]

Shivshanker Menon said the NFU is only for non-nuclear weapon states. Against Nuclear Weapon States there is no NFU.

[SSridhar]

Raja Ram,
I also do not have the 2003 version of the ND. I have the 1999 version. The 2003 version was a brief PIB statement which is available here. Bits and pieces of the 2003 version have been culled out by various authors. Apart from the 'no guarantee' to NNWS who align with NWS (thereby partially withdrawing the Negative Security Assurance to NNWS) and nuclear retaliation if chemical/biological weapons are used against India (even if nukes per se were not used), the 2003 ND also referred to 'massive' punitive retaliation which is a refinement since the 1999 DND.

By the way, it has been reported that a previous NSAB had recommended doing away with NFU altogether. It was reported in an article in IDSA. So, we may not know for sure what Shri SS Menon actually meant, an ambiguity I welcome.

[dinesha]

Revision of NFU policy has been a live issue in Indian strategic community .. last year Gen. Deepak Kapoor had made an statement that if Piggyland keeps on expanding their n-warhead then the India will have to change its stance.. constant news flow pertaining to accelerated stockpile might have led to change in the GoI policy..

[dinesha]

^^^^May have to revisit nuclear no-first use policy: Army chief
Sep 6, 2009

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 977129.cms

NEW DELHI: Army chief Gen Deepak Kapoor may have opened a fresh discussion on India's nuclear posture and preparedness with his recent remarks that if reports of Pakistan's expanded arsenal are correct, then New Delhi may well have to reconsider its strategic stance.

The Army chief's latest remarks with regard to a report by Federation of American Scientists which said the Pakistani arsenal could be as large as 70-90 warheads — he had earlier said if true this went beyond deterrence — has further spurred the debate in the strategic community.

Kapoor's implied suggestion that India could have to revisit its no-first use policy in case the strength of Pakistan's nuclear was close to what had been claimed, will challenge a long held position. The need to think afresh is also linked to Pakistan deliberately blurring its red lines to maintain a nebulous doctrine.

Security expert Brahma Chellaney feels there there is need to review India's "deterrence posture" while another analyst Bharat Karnad says no-first-use is not a substantive declaration. But they agree there is a need to plug gaps in India's posture with regard to both Pakistan and China.

Though India's doctrine has been touted as an indication of New Delhi's peaceful intentions, Pakistan's aggressive nuclearisation may mean that India needs to take a second look at its doctrine.

A number of eminent scientists in the past few weeks have made a case for India strengthening its nuclear capabilities and Kapoor's remark that ''India shall take a look at its stance'' has added to the growing perception that the Indian nuclear arsenal needs refurbishing, if not the need to carry out more tests, to maintain its nuclear programme's cutting edge.

The FAS claim is further buttressed by a report of the US Congressional Research Services, an independent bipartisan research wing of Congress, which has now said that Pakistan is not just making ''qualitative and quantitative'' improvement to its nuclear arsenal but has also added to the list of circumstances under which it would be willing to use them against India.

It said the number of warheads Pakistan had could be much more than the official figure of 60 and that this had been indicated to CRS by none other than the US government.

[dinesha]

Another dated article (Circa 2003) about NSAB recommendation about the NFU policy shift..
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/09ia.htm

THE National Security Advisory Board, India's top panel of national security experts, has asked the government to review its no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy in ‘light of the history of the last four years.'

In an exclusive report published in India Abroad, the weekly newspaper owned by rediff.com, the third Board's final report recommended, 'India may consider withdrawing from this commitment as the other nuclear weapons state have not accepted this policy.'

The third NSAB submitted its final report, the National Security Review, to National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra December 20 in New Delhi. Former ambassador to China C V Ranganathan, convener of the 15-member board, presented the report that takes a deep look at India's internal and external security aspects, and recommends short- and long-term measures to strengthen India's security.

The first National Security Advisory Board two years ago had supported the government's stand that India would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. But the latest report wanted this policy overturned, pointing out that India is the only nuclear weapon state that has committed itself to a ‘no-first-use' policy.

The United States had at no stage agreed to such policy and Russia abandoned the posture, which had been adopted by the Soviet Union. Though China has asserted it would not be first to use nuclear weapons, in recent years there has been some confusion on their stand, especially vis-à-vis Taiwan.[/b]

[Kanson]

SS Menon speech didn't come as surprise to me as myself several times talked in this forum about the difference between NFU policies and our capabilities and their implicit ambiguity in the NFU. Here again, SS Menon is not explicit about FU. He only talk about NFU for NNWS without commenting on the policy for NWS.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 79#p860279

On the other hand I could be entirely wrong and from the day one it may have been the same position as what the NSA has said in his speech.

On January 2, Defense Week quoted an Indian defence official as acknowledged that active consideration was being given to the creation of a Nuclear Air Command backed by a "first-strike capability". A Foreign Ministry official, quoted in the same report, commented: "'No-first strike' policy does not mean India will not have a first-strike capability. The foundations of the policy of deterrence, of which the Nuclear Air Command will be the key component, is based on having overwhelming superiority over the enemy to launch nuclear strikes. I would say we are working towards having a first-strike capability, but how to exercise this option within the 'no-first strike' policy will be the subject of political decision-making."

http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd53/53sasia.htm

Of the P-5 +2, there are only two countries that explicitly have NFU policy - India and China. It will be entertaining to see how China moved away from the unconditional NFU to NFU riddled with lot of conditions.

[abhik]

Imagine as a thought experiment that war erupts between NoKo and SoKo, and NoKo drops a 3 kiloton nuke on Seoul. 3 kt would probably kill 10,000 in one go and put Seoul out of action for a couple of months.

What would that do for deterrence?

First off "deterrence" would be dead. NoKo is obviously not deterred by the threat of US nukes being used on behalf of SoKo. The question is what would that act do to the US?

Would the US use nukes in retaliation or not?

I would appreciate thoughts from others who might be interested. I will post some of my own thoughts later.

What would stop US from using nukes in retaliation? Why will it weight for even a moment before it retaliating? Weight till Guam gets nuked or let it go so that it could nuke the mainland later?
You shouldn't give China more credit than they deserve. One has to consider the massive disadvantage they are at against America w.r.t. strategic weapons, and one cant stress this enough. You can Imagine that the Americans could even get away relatively unscathed if they are lucky and obliterate China by doing a massive first strike. So what can China do to help NoKo , try to deter retribution by threatening the use of its own nuclear weapons against SoKo and USA? Or provide conventional forces in a war that has already gone nuclear? Neither IMHO.

[ramana]

A landmark article on deterrence posture of India.

X-post....

Botched calculations: K. Subrahmanyam
Read in full, very good info, some old news to us jingos, but enhanced thanks to newly declassified material.

I read the recently declassified account of former US Ambassador Robert F. Goheen’s interview with Morarji Desai on June 7, 1979, as a person then involved with the Indian side of decision-making (‘US ’79 memo: Let’s sell Pakistan F-16s and prevent n-proliferation,’ IE, December 24). I wonder whether this was an input sought by the US national security establishment before the issue of the infamous national security presidential directive of July 3, 1979, authorising joint US-Pakistan operations in Afghanistan, which, in due course, triggered the Soviet intervention in December 1979. In retrospect, it would appear that the presidential directive instigated by national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski led to the biggest-ever setback to American national security. First, it led to the rise of jihadism, as a result of the combined strategy adopted by the CIA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This has recently been admitted by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It also resulted in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to Pakistan, which enabled Islamabad to develop the nuclear deterrent derivative of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, to be used not only against India but the US as well. The link between the CIA and Dr A.Q. Khan, even before he arrived with all his purloined documentation in Pakistan, has been exposed by the disclosures of Ruud Lubbers, the former Dutch prime minister. The fact is that in spite of his known record, not only was he allowed to move freely between China, Pakistan and Europe, but he was also rescued for the second time from Dutch authorities in 1986 by CIA intervention. That would indicate that the CIA had an interest in Khan throughout the period. The issue that has not so far been explored by American as well as Indian scholars of proliferation was, firstly, the connection between the CIA and Khan and, secondly, the US interest in permitting nuclear proliferation to Pakistan. Brzezinski has since come out with the disclosures that permissiveness of nuclear proliferation was the price to be paid to obtain Pakistani support for the anti-Soviet campaign. In 1982, in discussions between Alexander Haig, the US secretary of state, and the Pakistani team led by Agha Shahi and General K. M. Arif (referred to in General Arif’s book, Serving with Zia), Haig agreed that the Pakistani nuclear programme would not come in the way of US-Pakistan collaboration. The extensive proliferation activity by China to Pakistan during this period has been disclosed in Khan’s letters to his wife, when he feared that he was going to be proceeded against, copies of which have been made available by the correspondent Simon Henderson. Most of the information on Khan being set up with a Manhattan Project-type exclusive military programme under an engineering general, and data on the imports, were all available even in India at that time. The Indian Joint Intelligence Committee chaired by me concluded in January 1979 that Pakistan was on its way to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The intelligence-gathering effort at that time was ably headed by K. Santhanam as deputy director of R&AW. The JIC’s report was considered by the cabinet committee on political affairs in March 1979. During the course of the discussion, I was told by the then cabinet secretary, Nirmal Mukarji, that while Morarji Desai and Atal Bihari Vajpayee were against any immediate action, the other three cabinet members — H.M. Patel, Jagjivan Ram, and Charan Singh — were clearly in favour of initiating appropriate action. On the basis of the information given to me, I wrote out a manuscript minute, in my capacity as additional secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, that appropriate directions were issued to the chairman. Morarji Desai approved this minute and the cabinet secretary asked me to deliver it in person to Homi Sethna in Bombay, which I did. The meeting itself was attended by the five ministers, the cabinet secretary, the secretary to the prime minister, V. Shankar, and Sethna. All the other secretaries were kept out of the meeting. Therefore, there are unlikely to be any records on those events in the Cabinet Secretariat. Reflecting over those developments in hindsight, and with the wisdom and information of the last 30 years, I am left with a number of very puzzling questions on US policy and conduct. The enormous amount of material available on Chinese proliferation help to Pakistan has been referred to in the Santhanam’s deposition to the Kargil Review Committee. We have so far been speculating on Chinese proliferation to Pakistan. If we take into account the Cold War situation then, and the policies pursued by people like Carter and Reagan, it is today a legitimate issue to investigate whether A.Q. Khan and Pakistan were used by the US as a conduit to deliver centrifuge technology to China. Centrifuge technology was developed by Gernot Zippe, a German prisoner of war in Russian hands, in the 1950s. After his release, it was developed by the Germans and transmitted to Almelo where Khan was employed. Were the Americans interested in improvising and increasing the efficiency of the Chinese nuclear weapons programme as one of the countervailing elements in their Cold War against the Soviet Union? Just as they used Catholicism in Eastern Europe, Islam in Brzezinski’s “Arc of Crisis”, and the Star Wars programme to increase the burden on the Soviet Union, were they also trying to strengthen the Chinese nuclear programme vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by using Khan and Pakistan as conduits? It is to be recalled that there was–– major debate in the US establishment at that stage. Already by 1977, views emerged in sections of the CIA that the Soviet economy was declining and the Soviet Union was heading for a crisis. At that time, the deputy director of the CIA in charge of the Soviet Union was Robert Gates. This view was challenged by hardliners — including Brzezinski — who then set up a “Team B” which included people like Paul Wolfowitz, who came to a different conclusion: that the Soviet Union did constitute a very serious and major threat. The US has committed strategic blunders like mistaking Vietnamese nationalism as an extension of Chinese communism, not understanding the risks in the use of jihadism, and being permissive of Pakistani proliferation. Could there have been yet another major US blunder in trying to convey centrifuge technology to China using Pakistan and Khan? The US may have calculated that Pakistan and Khan would be under their effective control, just like these other previous miscalculations. This is an issue that needs to be pursued.

[SSridhar]

Brilliant article by Bhishma Pitamah.

[ShauryaT]

x-post
Pakistan's "Second" Nuclear Arsenal

It seems that Pakistan is underwriting Saudi Arabia’s nuclear potential and that some kind of understanding/agreement exists between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on the issue. Pakistan is likely to keep a stockpile of nuclear weapons for Saudi Arabia, paid for by the latter. This will be used as a deterrent against any Iranian or third party threat to the Saudis.

Saudi Arabia is replacing CSS-2 with the CSS-5 missile which could be nuclear tipped. Iran’s nuclear programme hence raises the demand in Pakistan for stockpile material to cater to the defence requirements of the Saudis. With respect to nuclear deterrence, Saudi Arabia has three options: -
• Seek a US nuclear umbrella
• Develop indigenous nuclear capability
• Use Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as proxy.

Saudi Arabia will be most comfortable with the last of these propositions. There is also a geopolitical dimension in supplying nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. As neither Saudi Arabia nor Pakistan is comfortable with Iran’s growing quest for nuclear capability, this could in turn fuel a nuclear arms race in the region with the Saudis pitching in with Pakistan to deter the Iranians thus impacting on stability in the Middle East.

[shiv]

x-post
Pakistan's "Second" Nuclear Arsenal

An interesting quote from the above link:

Another terrorist attack on Indian soil which can be traced back to Pakistan will lead to Indian retaliation which could very well lead to a full scale conflict. It is unlikely that such a conflict will lead to exchange of nuclear weapons at the initial stage though it could progress to that level at a later stage. While Pakistan may advocate the use of nuclear weapons at the stage of conflict initiation to deter Indian conventional response, India would need to call the bluff. At the worst case, while the cost to India will be heavy, the damage to Pakistan will be such that the state will no longer exist.

[Pranav]

Pakistan's "Second" Nuclear Arsenal

An interesting quote from the above link:

Another terrorist attack on Indian soil which can be traced back to Pakistan will lead to Indian retaliation which could very well lead to a full scale conflict. It is unlikely that such a conflict will lead to exchange of nuclear weapons at the initial stage though it could progress to that level at a later stage. While Pakistan may advocate the use of nuclear weapons at the stage of conflict initiation to deter Indian conventional response, India would need to call the bluff. At the worst case, while the cost to India will be heavy, the damage to Pakistan will be such that the state will no longer exist.

One should assume that TSP will have at its disposal the entire Chinese thermonuclear arsenal.

[shiv]

^^^
IOW one should dhoti-shiver?

[Pranav]

^^^
IOW one should dhoti-shiver?

One finds it strange that the author suggests that India should call Pak's bluff but does not say why China will not be able to call Indian bluff while backing Pak to the hilt. Especially in view of the disparity between Indian and Chinese nuclear weaponry.

[shiv]

^^^
IOW one should dhoti-shiver?

One finds it strange that the author suggests that India should call Pak's bluff but does not say why China will not be able to call Indian bluff while backing Pak to the hilt. Especially in view of the disparity between Indian and Chinese nuclear weaponry.

Same thing no? We need brown our langotis.

[Pranav]

One finds it strange that the author suggests that India should call Pak's bluff but does not say why China will not be able to call Indian bluff while backing Pak to the hilt. Especially in view of the disparity between Indian and Chinese nuclear weaponry.

Same thing no? We need brown our langotis.

If getting a proper nuclear arsenal is not an option, then yes, we absolutely need to brown our langotis.

[JE Menon]

Pranav, one could say that nobody knows what India has or does not have - except for a very very select group within India itself. It is hard in such circumstances to say that "getting a proper nuclear arsenal is not an option". We simply do not know. We can only hope that we are at least as hard headed as the smallest nuclear power, and which is that one? I would say nobody knows for sure ... Welcome to the nuclear club

>>"while the cost to India will be heavy, the damage to Pakistan will be such that the state will no longer exist"....

As one of our former army chiefs, I think Gen. Padmanabhan, put it beautifully: "in any form of fray"...

[ramana]

Looks like PRc is changing its NFU:

NFU games

NFU games
In line with its new assertiveness, China will abandon its no-first-use policy, says N.V.Subramanian.

New Delhi, 7 January 2011: China has denied a Japanese news-agency report of abandoning its no-first-use (NFU) policy. The agency quoted a secret PLA policy paper about launching a nuclear strike against a WMD power if it attacked China's strategic assets with superior conventional weapons. What's to be made of the Chinese denial, and what are the implications for India?

Since its nineteen sixty-four nuclear test, China has professed a NFU policy, contained in a high-sounding declaration that it "will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances". In the seventies and eighties, there was intelligence that China would respond to a conventional Soviet attack with nuclear weapons. This robbed China's NFU stance of much of its credibility.

China's NFU policy grew out of the initial relative technical backwardness of its deterrence. Thereafter, it campaigned hard for all the four other NPT-nuclear powers, but especially the US, to embrace NFU. It succeeded only with Russia in the nineties, with which it signed both an NFU and a detargeting agreement. China's attempts to link NFU with both detargeting and CTBT failed with the US, which conceded no ground on no-first-use while winning on the two other issues.

In a sense, therefore, there was enough background for China to cease pretending to adhere to NFU, but it did. This way, it gained and retained the moral high-ground, while maintaining ambiguity about its nuclear posture. Ambiguity also assisted with China's professions of a peaceful rise.

But internally in China, the divisions over NFU have been long apparent, and may have exacerbated in recent times. The PLA has no use for NFU, particularly since the advent of American missile defence systems and the growing threat from chemical and biological weapons. The PLA usually faithfully replicates the American opposition to NFU, while the political leadership tries to mask the military's stridency.

But there could be changes coming, which is what leads this writer to suspect that the Japanese may be right that China is abandoning NFU. It is important to note that China is no longer defensive about its "rise", giving the entire concept of "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development", over which it has agonized so much, short shrift, as it aggressively pursues its agenda in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

With new assertiveness, the shredding of NFU goes hand in hand. It is also conceivable that the Chinese deterrent has reached a level of sophistication where the NFU may have outlived its earlier necessity. But old habits die hard. The Chinese Communist Party leadership may still see virtue in NFU, if only to sustain the surging growth, but the PLA probably is chaffing at the restraints placed by a no-first-use policy.

Which takes us to the latest leak about China abandoning its NFU policy. It is coming, at least formally. If and when it happens, the world should not be surprised, not least India. But India should strengthen for another set of reasons. China has already added a caveat to its NFU, saying it would use nuclear weapons on its own territory. "Own territory" means lands it makes historical claims on, like Arunachal Pradesh, Tibet and Taiwan.

All in all, there should be no surprises if China goes back on NFU. Only Russia pays lip-service to its NFU treaty with China. The US, on the other hand, is aggressively pursuing its non-NFU policy, and its new interestedness in the Asia-Pacific region is churning China, and the latest disclosures may be part of it.

[ShauryaT]

Del.

[ramana]

del...

[ShauryaT]

Del.

[ShauryaT]

What is Pakistan’s nuclear threshold

Brigadier (Retd) CS Thapa

Does WikiLeaks give any indication of the location of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold? Its cables have only confirmed our fears and have nothing new to offer to the Indian Government. The Pakistani establishment continues to double-cross the Americans who, knowing that the dollar cannot buy everything as aptly expressed in The Beatles’ timeless hit Can’t buy me love, cannot help dropping greenbacks as its only purported solution to the debt-ridden economy.

Has WikiLeaks brought to our thinking any new aspects? Some facets of Pakistan’s nuclear thinking do emerge but Pakistan’s nuclear threshold remains distant, yet debatable. India remains Enemy No. 1 which is not very flattering and Pakistan going ahead and making tactical nuclear warheads at a greater pace than its requirement is an interesting development which has always been factored in any Indian plan. Tactical weapons require a delivery system and an overarching concept of employment.

One of the strategies being discussed is that of a cold start by Indians who have denied the existence of this doctrine. This however, brings to fore the fact that, as per the disclosures, Pakistan is more trigger-happy regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Tactical strikes have to be backed by integrated tactical plans. Thus what is clearly emerging is a counter force strategy against an Indian force, at a time and place of Pakistan’s choosing. The use of the bomb in one’s own territory with the heavy cost of collateral damage and civilian casualties involved will not be very prudent.

It also clearly reinforces the international opinion that South Asia is the world’s most dangerous place. While India has a mature democracy, civilian supremacy and a stated no first use policy, things are entirely different for Pakistan. The difference is on account of two reasons: Its control of the bomb, which was initially built as an Islamist bomb, being in the hands of the Army and, as being increasingly indicated, even by WikiLeaks, that this bomb can fall into jihadi hands. There is this aspect of a large number of personnel working their security and easy access to technology to make the threat of a dirty bomb even greater.

Pakistan is the only country in the world where the army and not a civilian democracy controls the nuclear trigger. The National Nuclear Command Authority works through the army’s Joint Operation Centre. A perusal of all available interview records of all Prime Ministers and Presidents of the country who have occupied the top post clearly indicates that they never possessed full knowledge of all the nuclear weapons in the land which, ipso facto, implies that these were not under their control. This fact is known to the international community.

While Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was built with India as their specific target, its leadership has also never clearly stated a no-first-use policy. Its nuclear policy is, at best, ambiguous in nature. In such a situation, our apparent lack of concern is most disconcerting.

The question that arises is - what is Pakistan’s nuclear threshold? Is the nuclear threshold territory a given line crossing which will cause the Pakistani Army to use the bomb? Or is the bomb a political weapon? It is not always risk-free to interpret correctly a single action but going by its record of repeated betrayal at the bilateral level as well as by the WikiLeaks’ disclosures, there is enough evidence available of a trigger-happy nature as well as behaviour on its part.

The Pakistan psyche is that the bomb brings equality with a greater power and is thus a combination of a political weapon at the international level to be used for the purpose of arm-twisting as well as an instrument of achieving parity with India in the eyes of the world.

The bomb is, therefore, likely to be used in pursuance of military objectives. The nuclear threshold is going to be lower than that of any mature democracy as the military objectives are fast changing and strategic goals remain distant.

The Indian state judges Pakistan’s nuclear threshold based on Indian conditions but the circumstances are entirely different. As a democracy, India’s belief in the nuclear threshold is far different from other nations.

As long as the Army controls the bomb directly or indirectly, its centre of gravity will remain high. India has to find answers through excellent surveillance and international deterrence. India will also have to ensure that the costs of using these by a trigger-happy general are prohibitive. An all-out conventional war will not be allowed or will be very short-lived.

The forces must, therefore, train, arm and be ready to fight in a nuclear environment while taking special care not to present itself as a lucrative target for a counter force strategy.

This is the road to take if one chooses to take seriously - as one must - the revelations by WikiLeaks.

[ShauryaT]

Nuclear C2: The balance agenda

Currently, the seeming shortfalls in India’s NC2 have the advantage of conveying India’s ‘relaxed’ nuclear posture. It is of a piece with the NFU. The posture is in India’s interest in that India has no interest in extending the nuclear overhang. India’s self-denial in giving itself responsive NC2 reinforces India’s threat of counter value response amounting to unacceptable damage. This helps with deterrence.

However, in the remote worst-case scenario of deterrence breakdown, India, not having the flexibility for a nuanced response, would lay itself open to like retaliation of unacceptable levels. It is therefore in India’s interest to contemplate a GOM II restricted to the nuclear complex, bringing together the technical, intelligence, operations and executive components of the civilian and military domains.

Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)

Nice, detailed article. A diagram of NC2 would have made it excellent.

[ramana]

So he wants to move from deterrence to post deterrence. Wonder why?

[RamaY]

The point I am making is that if we decide to say "damage an enemy urban area" in some way tomorrow - we could (in theory) find a mechanism of raining 500 million arrows on the population and somehow achieve - say 100,000 deaths and injuries. Or we could inflict those same 100,000 casualties by carpet bombing, or with a few nukes. Whatever the modality of killing, deterrence is a function of when the party that has been hit feels "Enough is enough. The damage I am having to take is too heavy to make the future enjoyable for me despite my winning the war I started 2000 km away"

So one could ignore the method of causing deaths - arrows, conventional or nuclear bombs and decide whom you want to kill and how many people you want to massacre based on your judgement of what is precious and important to the enemy leaders you are fighting. What is it that sustains them and whose deaths will cause such severe pain that winning the war becomes secondary to recovering from the pain inflicted. This kind of deterrence DOES NOT MEAN that you will escape damage or win the war. It only ensures that nobody wins. The meaning of "deterrence" here is an assurance that anyone who starts a war is presumably starting that war to win some advantage. He will not win that advantage.

...

Cheers. JMT

USA wouldn't have nuked Japan in WWII (the only time a nuke was used) if Japan could be made to think "enough is enough" by other means till that point.

Hell, Afghanistan has seen the mayhem equivalent of 10 nukes since 2001 but the taliban doesn't feel the pain and say "enough is enough". USA could have put Taliban to rest if it used those 10 nukes along the Pak-Af border.

Deterrence is a communication mechanism that shows what to expect if not heeded.

[ramana]

It was the Nagaskai, second hit that convinced Imperial Japan to surrender. Not the first one. It showed more were to come.

[Johann]

Deterrence is a communication mechanism that shows what to expect if not heeded.

It was the Nagaskai, second hit that convinced Imperial Japan to surrender. Not the first one. It showed more were to come.

Please read this on the crucial role of the Office of War Information (OWI) in turning the atomic bombings in to the surrender.

Their actions also tipped what was a violent struggle between factions within the Japanese government.

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... cle07.html

It is important to note that strategic bombing, of which nuclear weapons are an outgrowth *always* involved psychological warfare as an essential component.

The goal of strategic bombing was to break the will of the opponent from the air, which they assumed would be easier and quicker to destroy his means to wage war.

There was a similar gamble with Japan - there was a third bomb available, but that was it. If War Minister Korechika Anami had won out after the first two bombings (and managed to hold through a third one on Sapporo), there would have been no alternative than to the invasion of Kyushu in November 1945.

The Japanese war faction's plan was to make the invasion as bloody as possible while the Imperial government disappeared in to this massive complex; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsushiro ... adquarters

The hope was that the Allies would sustain so many casualties that they would then agree to a negotiated armistice instead of the unconditional surrender they had demanded.

Of course all of this changed in the 1950s with thermonuclear weapons, and even large fission arsenals mounted on missiles. It meant for the first time nations and militaries had the physical means to destroy another's means *before* they could destroy their will.

"Sufficiency" and nuclear minimalism concentrates on the capacity to destroy will, while the maximal approach is to seek to completely destroy means. Both superpowers pursued the maximal approach, but no one else did. Arguably however Israel's arsenal may be capable of that with its local foes. In the 1960s and 1970s they feared Soviet intervention - an arsenal capable of deterring the Soviets was enough to wipe out most of urban Egypt and Syria.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

Some points of historical clarification are needed at this point in the thread, regarding the WWII American atomic bombings of Japan:

1. Japan was already prepared to surrender prior to the first atomic bombing. They were offering the Americans their total submission, meaning that a land invasion of Japan was wholly unnecessary, except for the one stipulation the Japanese had: that their Emperor should remain untouched, on his throne. For the Japanese, according to their predominant Shinto faith, Hirohito was the living embodiment of God, the foundation and the guiding light of the Japanese people.

2. The Americans were intent on demonstrating their new atomic weapons in a live test on living people. They chose Hiroshima as their first target for two reasons. First, although Hiroshima had no military significance whatsoever, without a single ordinance factory, military garrison or other militarily important installation; it was the seat of the Shinto faith – essentially the Japanese ‘Vatican’, if you’ll permit the analogy. An atomic strike on Hiroshima was calculated to be maximally demoralizing. Secondly, the city of Hiroshima is ringed with a mountain range, and the Americans were interested on the interaction between atomic blast forces and the topography. The Nagasaki bombing a few days later was done to test a different weapon design. The Americans didn’t even entertain peace entreaties after the first strike, because they were determined to bomb Nagasaki, no matter what the Japanese were to offer.

3. After the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, the Americans accepted Japan’s ‘Total Surrender’. However, they didn’t force Hirohito from his throne and into a noose, because they realized that doing so would completely disorder Japanese society, making them impossible to occupy. Indeed, at the very thought of their Emperor coming under the grasp of the Americans, many Japanese committed suicide. So, in the end, the one Japanese surrender stipulation that the Americans seemed to find unacceptable, they accepted as a necessary tactic of their occupation.

FURTHER READING:
http://www.doug-long.com/quotes.htm
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n3p-4_Weber.html

[Johann]

Ravi,

- First of all we can not speak of the Japanese state as a monolithic entity. There were different factions in the Japanese government. While some were in favour of surrender, they were unable to carry the day.

- the War Minister in August 1945, Korechika Anami was utterly against surrender, and believed he could fight the Allies to a draw on the beaches of Kyushu. This was the most powerful figure in Japanese government.

Total surrender was absolutely rejected by him until the end - in fact he was involved in the violent coup attempt that aimed to prevent Hirohito from surrendering. He committed suicide when it failed.

- The Americans modified their opposition to the Emperor when it became increasingly clear that the locus of militarism within Japan was not Hirohito, but rather the generals that spoke in his name. If Hirohito had been a Hitler or Tojo like figure there would have been no quarter given under any circumstances.

The goal became to separate Hirohito from the generals, and this produced an internal struggle within the Japanese military and government. Please read the above links. Hirohito had lost confidence in his military earlier, but he would not have summoned the courage to circumvent them until the actual invasion and millions of Japanese casualties that would have followed. Whether it was the bombings or the invasion, only the most severe losses would have given him the impetus to speak out directly to the masses who supposedly served him.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^^^
Johann, please follow the two links I added at the end of my preceeding post. They address your thoughts with many quotes from the Americans who were actually involved at the time of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

IN BRIEF: An American invasion of Japan was never a foregone conclusion. The Americans might more easilly have firebombed the entire country, without setting a single pair of boots on mainland Japan.

Secondly, a 'coup against the Emperor'? I've never heard of that, and forgive me for being incredulous, but that would have been tantamount to a coup against God and a total abrogation of 'Bushido' -- I just can't imagine it.

From what I understand, there were a number of peace entreaties that were absolutely ignored by the Americans. They are well documented (please follow my above links).

[shiv]

cross post

Wrong. First and foremost - enough stockpile is needed to destroy military assets, which is then followed by destruction of industrial capacity and infrastructure which makes the cost of war expensive economically and politically.

Let me ask you a rhetorical question Mort Walker.

You are giving a "structure" to nuclear war. I don't mean to be sarcastic - but "structure" is usually reserved for stories - for example a love story in which the structure is first exchanging glances, then a furtive holding of hands, being escalated to a first kiss followed by lovemaking/marriage/whatever.

But in the case of nuclear war who is going to follow the structure that you have defined. Who sets "rules" of nuclear war where someone attacks military assets first, then industries and then population centers?

Imagine that India follows this structure and nukes a military installation. That may cause so little pain that the other side retaliates with a massive attack on population centers. It is unwise to assume that rules will be followed in nuke war. There is only one rule. If you launch your nukes - launch everything you have to finish the other guy off s far as you can manage given your stockpile. Anything less than that would be mistake of humongous proportions.

[Mort Walker]

Shivji,

The structure or rules of war are straightforward and if you do not destroy the enemy's war fighting capacity and capability, you are asking for retaliation and your own death. If your military assets are directed toward population centers, then the enemy still has the capability to fight back. For TSP all they have to do is throw a few ding-dongs over the border and if some bums go off and kill a few million kaffirs, then they declare victory. If India hits their city centers in retaliation, the TSPA RATS will be very happy that someone else has cleaned their cities and can now consolidate their political power all the while keeping the military intact and the west intervenes by forcing peace. The pain is felt by destroying their army, air force and navy, then followed by bridges/railways/roads, fuel depots, ports, power plants, factories and finally city centers. The use of nuclear weapons simply means it will take less time and ordinance to carry out this objective. Since TSP is so close to India, I am confident the military in India have planned with enhanced radiation weapons to limit the fallout, but a sufficient blast radius to achieve the military and political objectives. You don't need thermonuclear bums.

Nuclear munitions are an asset for the armed services and because of its destructive power it needs political approval. The use of nuclear weapons on a country does not necessarily mean that said country will politically cease to exist unless there is an unconditional surrender and is occupied.

[shiv]

Mort I think we are going to differ in our views on this. I believe that what you say can never work and will explain why I say that

You said:

The pain is felt by destroying their army, air force and navy, then followed by bridges/railways/roads, fuel depots, ports, power plants, factories and finally city centers.

You have not stated how many days or hours or weeks we will take between destroying their army, air force and navy before we hit their city centers.

Why is this important?

It is important because once they start losing their military assets they will not wait to see if we can do anything more. They will launch their nukes at our cities and reduce our will to fight and simultaneously inflict great pain on us. We will then have to retaliate and do the same thing to them. If we don't do the same thing to them, they will call it victory. But if their cities are destroyed - the political ability to control a population to do as they are told is destroyed. You are wrong in saying that the military can "consolidate political power after cities are destroyed". When people are dead an dying and injured - you cannot organize political support for anything. That is true for us and for them.

What we must do is to destroy their cities before they destroy ours. We must not give them an open invitation to attack our cities by dilly-dallying, hesitating and attacking airfields and military formations with nukes. Those assets will anyway be protected. Finish off the cities first and then mop up the military. After we finish their cities the military has to fight knowing that the relatives of soldiers and officers are dead or dying in the cities. That is the time to start nuking the military if we have anything left. At this time our military too will be intact and able to take them on. It should be over within days.

If two militaries reach a "gentleman's agreement" that they will not hit civlian centers then your doctrine of "counter force" against military assets alone might work. The last time India had a "gentlemen's agreement" with pakis was Kargil peaks in winter You cannot reach any "ageements" in war, certainly not with Pakis.

Forget counter force (hitting military targets). Go straight for the jugular - counter value targets - the cities and population centers. Punish the nation and millions of innocent people in a massive act of mass murder. If they are willing to risk that - they are welcome to start nuclear war against India.

Any trained military will laugh at threats of being destroyed. They are designed to be willing to be destroyed. Threatening their military or punishing their military is no use. Punish the population for the misdeeds of their leaders.

[Mort Walker]

^^^Historically, Hitler thought this after the start of the Battle of Britain and began the blitzkrieg on London. It left the RAF to reorganize and rearm with American help. In any full-fledged conflict with TSP, it will have to be won in a few days or both China and the US will resupply their military even if millions of civilians are eliminated, but if they have no command structure, aircraft, ships, ports or fuel, then resupply/rearm is futile.