Dr. Bharat Karnad: Guest Speaker at BRF NJ MEET Nov 13 2011

[Karan M]

Shiv,

I think Karnad has it the other way around. Its Indian Govt which has treated Pak., with kid gloves throughout starting with JLN who believed partition was reversible and Pak would return to Indian fold, sort of a state which was disgruntled, a super Kashmir in a manner of sorts and needed special handling. On the other hand, Pakistanis are simply supremacists. Self deluded into thinking they ruled India for 800 years and that they were naturally superior to Hindus, they just could not stand sharing power let alone be beholden to what the majority wanted. Their continued ambition is to return back as some sort of glorified conquerors with their honour and dignity intact, and the rest of Hindu India to acknowledge them as the rightful rulers. Killing Indians is just the same same old as employed by their heroes so what's wrong in that, per their view.

MMS etc continue to think of Pak as some sort of long lost brother who can be made to change his ways. At the end of the day, all these guys with many levels of security or whatever are not really affected by Pak terror anyhow and can afford to be extra liberal or whatever. Meanwhile Pakistan continues to revel in any importance given to them by India as proof of their importance. This includes idiot TV anchors of the liberal ilk who interview Musharraf and keep saying sir, sir. While of course, they'd treat fellow Indians with mocking disrespect. These group of Indians conflate Indian muslims with Pakistanis and hence treat them as some sort of misunderstood brothers who'll return to the proverbial fold, if only their fellow Indian citizens were a bit more understanding (otherwise, they are communal).

The best way to treat Pakistan is to shun it, ignore it, and adopt a policy of carrot and stick closely tied to watchable metrics. No pappi jhappi, no rubbish talk of shared future (like our PM loves to engage in) and such stuff. No hyperbole, no emotionalism, just a cold transactional approach with these people who openly support terrorism against India and so many others, including ISAF and Afghanistan (the latter message should be brought home to those who ignore what India has suffered).

All that Wagah stuff should also stop. We should just wall up that border crossing. No people to people contacts required, nothing required from a nation which sponsors terrorism as a matter of policy.

[shiv]

Heck why is this thread a sticky in the first place? Is it that important? Bharat Karnad in New Jersey, Alabama?

[chetak]

Shiv,

I think Karnad has it the other way around. Its Indian Govt which has treated Pak., with kid gloves throughout starting with JLN who believed partition was reversible and Pak would return to Indian fold, sort of a state which was disgruntled, a super Kashmir in a manner of sorts and needed special handling. On the other hand, Pakistanis are simply supremacists. Self deluded into thinking they ruled India for 800 years and that they were naturally superior to Hindus, they just could not stand sharing power let alone be beholden to what the majority wanted. Their continued ambition is to return back as some sort of glorified conquerors with their honour and dignity intact, and the rest of Hindu India to acknowledge them as the rightful rulers. Killing Indians is just the same same old as employed by their heroes so what's wrong in that, per their view.

MMS etc continue to think of Pak as some sort of long lost brother who can be made to change his ways. At the end of the day, all these guys with many levels of security or whatever are not really affected by Pak terror anyhow and can afford to be extra liberal or whatever. Meanwhile Pakistan continues to revel in any importance given to them by India as proof of their importance. This includes idiot TV anchors of the liberal ilk who interview Musharraf and keep saying sir, sir. While of course, they'd treat fellow Indians with mocking disrespect. These group of Indians conflate Indian muslims with Pakistanis and hence treat them as some sort of misunderstood brothers who'll return to the proverbial fold, if only their fellow Indian citizens were a bit more understanding (otherwise, they are communal).

The best way to treat Pakistan is to shun it, ignore it, and adopt a policy of carrot and stick closely tied to watchable metrics. No pappi jhappi, no rubbish talk of shared future (like our PM loves to engage in) and such stuff. No hyperbole, no emotionalism, just a cold transactional approach with these people who openly support terrorism against India and so many others, including ISAF and Afghanistan (the latter message should be brought home to those who ignore what India has suffered).

All that Wagah stuff should also stop. We should just wall up that border crossing. No people to people contacts required, nothing required from a nation which sponsors terrorism as a matter of policy.

+1

This is how we should deal with these beggars.

[archan]

Archan.I have NEVER recd. any warnings.Pl. don't make it up.You must be using some e-mail id that I no longer use.Secondly,If I compare Dr.wonderful Singh to a "mouse" it reflects his attitude on crucial issues.What was he doing all the time when China was making its moves in Tibet and on our borders? How many experts warned the GOI in umpteen fora? What is wrong with it? Is this a democracy or what? I haven't abused him using unparliamentary language whatsoever.If one cannot handle such simple criticism then we are welkl on our way to a "police forum"! So what if he is the Indian PM? So what if SG is the Cong.party leader or XYZ of another party? It is our fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution that freedom of speech is the right of every citizen-and by the way,I have checked with very eminent legal opinion on the subject,whether my caricature of him or Obama whoever,is within my rights or not and they have agreed with me that my depiction of certain characters is a harmless pursuit.

I would like some offical reaction and debate on the subject from Forum elders please.
Till then,not to hurt such acute sensitivities of Archan,I shall just not refer to him by name at all! satisfied?

Answer for you is in the OT thread. here: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 8#p1196928
Other posts moved there as well.

[ShauryaT]

ShauryaT, Their red lines are like Hiranyakashyap's conditions:neither man nor beast, neither day nor light, neither man nor animal and so on and they add new ones all the time.

You can manage only when the prospect of danda is there. If no danda, no manage. The appetite is not there as right now the cost benefit is not right. How can we say that in future? So we cant remove options due to indigestion.

The red lines at least in public and posture will always be fuzzy. Pretty much what the US did against the amassed armor of the Soviets. By spelling the red lines in clear terms they provide space to our conventional forces and it will not be in their interest to spell it out. However, one can deduce certain red lines with reasonable surety. Towards that CSD has it right, that there is room for action without crossing red lines, however, CSD as a doctrine does not serve a military or political objective.

The prospect of the danda with increasing asymmetry in fire power, PGM, mobility and C^4 integration will always be there and will be further accentuated in years to come.

If the danda is the way to go then, the danda has to be calibrated to achieve some meaningful ends. These ends are in the mountains and not south of Multan. If one takes a critical view of CSD, it is nothing more than a ruse to modernize and to minimize any time for a rethink by the political bosses. Every organization develops a certain behavioral profile and the IA also has one. This profile is heavily in favor of an organization structure to maintain the status quo, making changes difficult. I do not blame the IA for this. Parakram was frustrating to all. A military doctrine, with no lasting military and political objectives, let alone a grand plan? What does one get? Communal riots with tanks again? I would rather prefer Sunderji's all in approach and risk the TSPA bluff. War with some meaningful results cannot be a two week affair. Cannot wait for Narasimha/Kalki to be born, who will figure a way out in one clean stroke at the right time. 9-13 mountain divisions is the mantra for the danda.

[SaiK]

Heck why is this thread a sticky in the first place? Is it that important? Bharat Karnad in New Jersey, Alabama?

++1.
BK for PM?

[Sanku]

This thread has given me a right royal headache, without a hangover even.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>However, one can deduce certain red lines with reasonable surety. Towards that CSD has it right, that there is room for action without crossing red lines, however, CSD as a doctrine does not serve a military or political objective.

ShauryaT, with all due respect, this argument is like a broken record which is stuck on the same song.

I heard BK talk about doing away with Strike Corps but keeping 'some' (I) Armored Brigade? How much is some? How much armor do you think we require in face of 2 armored divisions, 2 mechanized divisions and 5-6 (I) Armored brigades with Pakistan Army? Can you please put a number to the number of tanks required and formations (Armored brigades/Divisions) by the IA to counter the above?

Do you know that the Pivot Corps in PA Center and south have Mechanized Divisions of their own?

I have asked counter-questions to your arguments and those of BK but am yet to get any concrete answers. You say CSD, or the present structure of Strike Corps, cannot meet political or military objectives - can you spell out which objectives these are which are not being met? And how the answer to these is to do away with present force structure?

The prospect of the danda with increasing asymmetry in fire power, PGM, mobility and C^4 integration will always be there and will be further accentuated in years to come.

All the above is very nice to say and amount to nothing but waving of the hand - can you quantify how the advent of above will allow for reduced force structure? How much addition in terms of capability and capacity will be, such that Strike Corps can be done away with? Or not have CSD in the first place?

If the danda is the way to go then, the danda has to be calibrated to achieve some meaningful ends. These ends are in the mountains and not south of Multan.

Can you tell me how much advance a Mountain Division is expected to make in mountainous terrain of Kashmir or Ladakh? I hope you do realize that mountains are a great leveler to negate the superiority of the attacker in terms of manpower and equipment. Given the fact that any future India-Pakistan match will not be allowed to go beyond 5-7 days courtesy the international pressure, what kind of advance do you think we can make in the mountains?

Let me add another angle to the above scenario – what prevents Pakistan to do to us, what we did to them in 1965? That is, what if ARN launches assault across IB and LOC to make a grab for Akhnoor or Sambha or Gurdaspur to relive the pressure in Kashmir? Along with above, imagine ARS launching pincer attack in southern Punjab to outflank our defenses in Punjab and between ARN and ARS pinch the forward districts of Punjab?

What makes you, or BK for that matter of fact, think that conflict is going to be linear? Will not any threat of mass Indian success in Kashmir be another red-line from TSPA perspective? I hope you do realize that any Indian success in central and middle Kashmir places IA so close to political heart of Pakistan that they are going to do everything to deny us this advantage. That by taking Kashmir, we will be in position to out-flank Pakistan completely. That it places us so close to Afghanistan and restive NWFP that any occupation of Kashmir by us will be Pakistan’s worst nightmare come true. That we will be cutting the umbilical cord between Pakistan and China and this is something they, or the Chinese, will try every to deny to us.

If one takes a critical view of CSD, it is nothing more than a ruse to modernize and to minimize any time for a rethink by the political bosses. Every organization develops a certain behavioral profile and the IA also has one.

Sir, you are super-imposing your lack of knowledge and flawed understanding on the IA.

If the idea is to go for head of the devil and yet, expect him not to do anything to save himself, then you need to point a sword at his abdomen and be ready to thrust it in.

IA has tried this before. And let me say this again – Operation Brass-tacks was not about dash to RYK and Hyderabad. It was about taking POK. The plan to take POK was codenamed Operation Trident and called for a two division attack on POK – with 6 Mountain Division and 4 Infantry Division. The show in the desert was to ensure that while we went for the head, Pakistan was not able to punch us in the balls.

Last time around the Americans informed the Pakistanis and PA re-enforced the sector. This time around – we’re trying to do the above with far more firepower and with lesser maneuver space for PA and western touts.

War with some meaningful results cannot be a two week affair. Cannot wait for Narasimha/Kalki to be born, who will figure a way out in one clean stroke at the right time. 9-13 mountain divisions is the mantra for the danda.

9 or 13 or 23 mountain divisions are going to come to a naught in mountains - for a simple reason that you don’t have real estate to deploy these assets. The lines of advances are pretty obvious to everyone and are well defended. And by concentrating only in mountains you play into Pakistani hands - PA can get away with spending fraction of resources to counter any Indian build-up in the mountains. Remember the 9:1 attacker to defender ratio? For your 12 Mountain Divisions, PA needs to raise 3 or 4. And mountains have fantastic ability to negate the technical superiority that best of weapons infer on any attacker. Now, let me add one more twist to the above tangle – if we fail to put pressure on the Pakistanis in the plains (south Kashmir and southwards), PA can transfer resources to further augment the troops in mountains. And remember, it has better lateral lines of communication than us.

On the contrary, pump the money into raising 4 mountain divisions/2 Mountain Strike Corps and give them ample helicopter assets – that is the only way to overcome the lack of maneuver in the mountains.

So, please look at the entire picture in a holistic manner and not in isolation.

[RajeshA]

We should first forget the mountains. We should coopt MQM and make a dash in the South all the way into Baluchistan, and cut off Pakistan's access to the Sea and monopoly over access to Central Asia, and we also completely cut-off their Oil imports. We don't even need a naval blockade. It suffices to get control over Oil offloading infrastructure. Those are the first objectives. Then we stay put and claim we will do so until

1. Pakistan vacates Indian land in PoK
2. Pakistan delivers on 1001 terrorist bosses.
3. Pakistan compensates for the full cost of the invasion, e.g. Tharparkar and Thatta Districts, as they have no money.

If they hesitate, we announce the Liberation of Mohajirstan and Baluchistan.

Then we continue to squeeze them until they give up Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral. Fighting in the mountains seem to be a difficult proposition and we may also face off the Chinese.

[SaiK]

even nukes don't eliminate roaches if the effect is not wide enough.
so, instead of elimination, we need to think about confinement policy.

[RamaY]

Creating right conditions for ideological death is the permanent solution. Until then, containment and tough love.

[Kartik]

I've tried to be factual and not added my reactions. This is definitely an incomplete list - I've compiled this from my recollection and this is not a transcript. My apologies if by poor recollection I have misrepresented BK.

On Pakistan

• An integral and sustainable Pakistan is in Indian interests. They keep the Islamic fundamentalist exports from the Arab world at bay, a buffer so to speak.
• Only 70% of Pakistani nuclear warheads have been mapped by the US, Israel and India. The remainder, according to Pakistan, will never be found. BK agrees. The notion of removing Pakistan's nuclear capability by force is not tenable.
• Their nuclear security is arguably better than India's.
• Without compromising border security, India should unilaterally let the Pakistani Army breathe easy by consolidating Indian Army resources on our side into [far] fewer units, not necessarily because these resources are needed elsewhere but because the Pakistani government has a good chance of gaining real control if the threat perceived by the Pakistani Army can be nullified.
• Liquid-fuelled nuclear-armed Prithvi missiles ought to be withdrawn unilaterally not only for the gesture but for the liability.
• Although an audience member suggested that it might be in Pakistani Army's interests to sustain their military industrial complex by hyping the Indian threat, he thought there was still a good chance of a viable peace between the two countries if India would relax. The ground for such on the Pakistani side is fertile. India, being the onerous threat, must make the first move.
• While their Navy might not win them plaudits, their air force is a professional unit by international standards.
• Their economy doesn't hold a candle to India's. That they have managed to keep themselves centre-stage in the Indian threat matrix despite this reflects immaturity on the Indian side and win of sorts for Pakistan.
• GoI needs to find the gumption to show generosity to India's smaller neighbours, all of whom India has managed to alienate but must now strive to win back. India has the financial means to show such generosity today and has no reason to fear. If Pakistan's economy is in doldrums, India can and should help. The benefits will be asymmetric.
• Cold Start is untenable in practice. Logistics will not be able to keep up with the advance units. Fuel for the tanks at battle speed [30~35 kph] will run out quickly. Advantages from early victories will be limited by the need to wait for more fuel from the support units, which will take time to catch up.
• Non-disputed territory won as a result of Cold Start will have to be returned sooner or later anyway in accordance to international law.
• Limited air-strikes are plausible for punitive measure. Cold Start isn’t.
• No idea if India is in Balochistan but splitting the country into many pieces, even if possible, won’t help India rather it will only cement the image of India as enemy.

Thanks for putting it together Pratik. If he really said the above regarding Pakistan, then with all due respect, I find it ridiculous. I don't agree with any of his suggestions regarding how India should behave wrt Pakistan. The best thing that can happen to India is if Pakistan breaks up into smaller pieces that can then be more easily handled than today.

On Indian Nuclear Deterrence

• From an international point of view, Indian nuclear deterrence is limited to 20 kT.
• India’s choice for 125 kT warheads is not out of some deep strategic thought but more an imitation of American norms.
• Thermonuclear warheads have been deployed but don’t yield any deterrence value
• India has admirably precise missiles and manoeuvring warheads [MARV]
• Indian scientists should be permitted by GoI to test MIRV, a capability available but in need of testing and validation for 6 years.
• Multiple 20kT or 125 kT missiles don’t amount to 1 MT missile from a deterrence point of view.
• Chinese megaton deterrence will make GoI pause for thought. Indian 20 kT deterrence will not make the Chinese government pause for thought. China challenged the US after the bombing of their Belgrade embassy by the US when they scavenged parts of the downed F-117. They are ready for war and willing to sacrifice population if that is what it takes. So 20 kT isn’t going to deter them.
• India has 11 device designs, for various purposes and yields, on the shelf waiting to be tested. These designs are creative and admirable. There is a clear need to test, not only for feedback to aid the designers, but to establish a greater deterrence.
• BK doesn’t see India testing further as long as R Chidambaram [RC] associated with the GoI.
• RC might be one of the best crystallographers in the world but that doesn’t mean he or any nuclear scientist for that matter understands strategy, deterrence, national policy, etc.
• Not only should we test but we shouldn’t even call a moratorium once we do.
• Ashley Tellis agreed with BK [on an occasion] that India might have a need to test. US reaction might not be vehement.

On the one hand he says that India should back off from Pakistan to make them less insecure, and on the other hand he wants us to test new nuclear designs..somehow the two ideas don't gel. He somehow presents a more valid argument for increasing the level of India's deterrence vis-a-vis China. Pakistan can go f**k itself. Bankrupting them by making them try to match India is the way to go.

On China

• Hypersonic Brahmos will give any enemy food for thought. China is no exception.
• Hypersonic Brahmos at Nha Trang might give them sleepless nights.
• PLA might have a superior top-end but the bulk of their strength is not superior to Indian Army.
• PLA will not be able to overrun us like 1962.
• Try as they might, they will not get Tawang.
• India’s Su-30 MKI is second only to the F-22 Raptor. IAF will not be overpowered by PLAAF.
• BVR air-to-air missiles are effectively useless. BK has personally advised GoI in the past to strengthen in other ways, not BVR.
• The notion of F-35 for IAF is only amusing and not going to happen; “Hangar Queen”
• China believes, as senior officials have stated to BK, that regardless of India having the capability to pose a threat [or not], GoI neither has the political will to threaten nor the political will to deliver on the threat if challenged. This gives them confidence.
• Support of Tibetan cause by GoI has been inconstant
• Tibetan fighters are trained and willing. They only need the support. There is no such support from GoI.

The last 3 points are quite well known, and unlikely to change anytime in the near future. The country has always lacked the kind of strong leadership that Indira Gandhi could provide. MMS (while a nice guy) is the most spineless PM we could ask for- why would China be worried if India is led by a peacenik like him?

On Indian Strategy

• Many opportunies for accumulating strategic assets in Maldives and Vietnam have been ignored by GoI in the past
• Chinese oil routes would already have been policed by now had these opportunities been availed.
• Vietnam is admirable for their steadfast resistance against several superior enemies and they prevailed each time. Vietnam has a 1000 year enmity with China. India should arm Vietnam
• India should accept the Vietnam’s offer to establish an Indian naval presence in their country near Nha Trang.
• Nha Trang will provide near line of sight to Hainan. China’s “James Bondian” submarine base there will be rendered less effective if India monitors from Nha Trang
• India should provide Vietnam with Hypersonic Brahmos when it is ready. This will counter the Chinese southern fleet. It could even pose a direct threat to Hainan island.
• India should not shy away from maintaining strategies with China as the likely aggressor instead of Pakistan
• Maintaining border positions 100 miles from the border with China is conceding 100 miles of Indian territory by default
• Border infrastructure is long overdue and finally getting some attention

[/list]

Agree with all of his points regarding Vietnam. I am quite disallusioned to read that the GoI is having second thoughts about Vietnamese requests for naval warships, Brahmos and other arms. This while Pakistan is armed primarily by China in every which way possible, including nukes. Why is there such an absence of gonads on the part of Indian leadership, when a smaller and more vulnerable Vietnam can look eyeball to eyeball with the Chinese?

[SaiK]

25 A4s needed to be ready by couple of years for chippanda strikes.. all will have a camouflage of desi huts and thatched roofs among various village setting along NE states., and have the b@lls to advertise this claim ahead of deployment.

[Rudradev]

Well, quite a furore Dr. Karnad's presentation seems to have caused on BRF!

A couple of things.

One, what he expressed was his opinion. The part about Pakistan surprised the hell out of me; and probably out of us all. I think that had we gone into a full-fledged discussion on whether Pakistan can ever be a buffer state against the Islamic Virus, when in fact the state machinery of Pakistan is the very nucleocapsid of that Virus... we would still be sitting at the venue! Unfortunately, a 2-hour Q/A session was all we had time for, and there were many other topics to cover, so we could barely scratch the surface of his Pakistan views.

I agree very largely with BK's opinions on many matters addressed that day. First, I am convinced that the yield of our nukes is very severely limited in comparison to China's... the TN test in 1998 was indeed a fuski, and if we want megaton weapons, we definitely have to test again. Whether we want megaton thermonukes or not is a different issue to be debated on grounds of deterrence requirement vs. opportunity cost. But if we want them, we have to test again, no question.

I agree, too, that we need to pay more attention to the Chinese threat in general, beef up our infrastructure along the northern border, increase our deployment and firepower ratios and everything else w.r.t. PRC, maximize our air and naval advantage over PLAN and PLAAF, and cultivate Vietnam very strongly as an ally. But those are things I have always believed; BK's views were just a confirmation of the magnitude of the problem, and the urgency of addressing it.

Now coming to Pakistan.

First let me say that I don't believe BK is a GOI mouthpiece, and in fact, any comparison to MMS is entirely misplaced. BK has not staked the country's sovereignty on "joint administration of Kashmir" talks with the likes of Musharraf; he clearly states that he is for an LOC=IB solution but no more compromise than that. BK has not hired "interlocutors" who are known to have been guests of the ISI at the Fai confabulation-fests, to represent the Indian Government's position with Kashmir Valley terrorists. While he is surprisingly dovish on Pakistan, there is no comparison between his position and the sellouts we have seen from Sharm el Shaikh to Thimpu. It may not be our position on BRF but it isn't MMS' position either.

He is also outspokenly critical of GOI positions on almost all other matters, from PRC affairs to the nuclear establishment under R. Chidambaram's influence to the IUCNCA. No, I don't think he is their mouthpiece at all.

Having said that, I think it would be useful if we engaged him at greater length on his views regarding Pakistan, and gave him a chance to respond in detail. Dr. BK has been very open about giving his contact info to people interested in strategic affairs.

I do not want to post his email address on the web, out of respect for his privacy, but here is what I suggest: let us jointly formulate a well-thought-out, dispassionate, articulate list of our concerns about his Pakistan views. We can come up with a collaborative letter to him, contributing through posts on this thread. Then Shaurya or I can forward the same to him by email, and let us see what his response is.

Hopefully he should recognize that, having dropped such a surprise in our laps regarding Pakistan policy, and we being no strangers to the history and nature of the Pakistan problem... it will be worth his time to address our concerns and explain his views more deeply in the light of our counterpoints.

Before we start banging our heads against the wall because he disagreed with our conventional wisdom on Pakistan... let us pause to appreciate something. Dr. BK took time out of his busy schedule to come and talk to us BRF-ites, as many of us who could make it to his presentation. Let's take this as an opportunity to begin a dialogue, rather than submitting to a knee-jerk response of categorizing him as "another B. Raman" or "another MMS." The gentleman gets paid to think about these things for a living; let us find out why he thinks what he thinks, how he sees his Pakistan vision becoming a reality, and see whether we agree with him or not.

What say?

If you agree, please post your questions on here, in as specific a manner as possible. Rhetorical and emotionally loaded questions are not useful, so try to keep them as objective as possible. When we have a few questions we can jointly edit them and forward them on to him.

[ShauryaT]

I have answered this to you earlier, attached below. The issue is the following. You are focused on the order of battle, I am focused on overall level of capabilities that can be used dynamically. You believe that that TSPA poses a conventional threat to India, I believe they are not capable of being a conventional threat today and will unlikely ever be in the future, even if they were to a degree in the past. I will try one last time. For either you simply do not accept the co-option template or we are talking past each other.

>>ShauryaT, with all due respect, this argument is like a broken record which is stuck on the same song.

I do not think you are willing to listen to the song at all but react to lines and words here and there. Look at the responses below and you will see what I mean. But, if you do not believe co-option can work, then no point in arguing further.

>>I heard BK talk about doing away with Strike Corps but keeping 'some' (I) Armored Brigade? How much is some? How much armor do you think we require in face of 2 armored divisions, 2 mechanized divisions and 5-6 (I) Armored brigades with Pakistan Army? Can you please put a number to the number of tanks required and formations (Armored brigades/Divisions) by the IA to counter the above?

Why are you limiting the counter force to armored forces only? Air and other PGM assets can be part of the mix to thwart such an armored thrust, no? What I expect is our pivot corps will have enough armor (more than a brigade) and mobility with dedicated artillery to thwart ANY TSPA conventional venture. Also, BK did not say "do away with Strike Corps" he said consolidate into one and disburse the assets of the others are independent brigades. It is a structural reorg. Certainly not a reduction in fire power but a reduction of force structure. Also, why are you presuming that such a reorganization will be unilateral and without any reciprocal reduction from the TSPA?

>>I have asked counter-questions to your arguments and those of BK but am yet to get any concrete answers. You say CSD, or the present structure of Strike Corps, cannot meet political or military objectives - can you spell out which objectives these are which are not being met? And how the answer to these is to do away with present force structure?

First the official political objectives are yet to be spelt out - officially there are none beyond not loosing territory, so a lot of these are to explore how a co-option template might work. If you follow the BK template of co-option, then that would mean there is no intent to destroy TSP as a state or destroy their forces. This would mean the force structures and doctrines that are specifically designed for the above purpose need to be done away with. CSD and massive strike formation to overwhelm TSP defenses will not match the co-option template. If you reject the co-option template then you can reject everrything else. But, do not reject the co-option template just because a particualr formulation is not to your liking. The formulations can be adjusted and in fact are not defined. co-option would also be based on reciprocal actions.

>>All the above is very nice to say and amount to nothing but waving of the hand - can you quantify how the advent of above will allow for reduced force structure? How much addition in terms of capability and capacity will be, such that Strike Corps can be done away with? Or not have CSD in the first place?

No, I cannot quantify as to what is the precise points at which strike corps forces can be reduced. These things are not overnight affairs and takes upto a decade to realize. What I do know is we maintain about a 1:5 fire power ratio against TSP. My expectation is this shall increase substantially, along with precision assets to make a magnitude of a difference.

I am sure you are plugged into the future acquisition plans of our forces. Is it your estimation, that this ratio of 1:5 can not be increased without strike corps?

The org structure that supports the invasion of TSP will be done away with. CSD will simply morph to what it really is, without an objective - a way for our forces to get more mechanized and increase fire power with modernization of mobility and communication assets. Call them IBG's or whatever. These holding forces will hold the line to provide a security guarantee against any misadventure, for the medium term until such CBM's are in place that can envision a reduction of even these forces - but, we are far, far from it.

>>Can you tell me how much advance a Mountain Division is expected to make in mountainous terrain of Kashmir or Ladakh? I hope you do realize that mountains are a great leveler to negate the superiority of the attacker in terms of manpower and equipment. Given the fact that any future India-Pakistan match will not be allowed to go beyond 5-7 days courtesy the international pressure, what kind of advance do you think we can make in the mountains?

With that kind of a time limit to capture and hold mountain territory, the game is over right there, is it not? Why even bother with the other parts of the question, if you believe the above as an iron clad rule. Many things have to align geo-politically (with the US, PRC and Afghanistan) to undertake such a venture in the mountains other than superiority of forces and fire power adjusted for terrain. The 1:9 ratio is an old one used for mountains, and has to be adjusted for mobility, C^4, PGM, air cover and overall fire power available against an adversary.

>>Let me add another angle to the above scenario – what prevents Pakistan to do to us, what we did to them in 1965? That is, what if ARN launches assault across IB and LOC to make a grab for Akhnoor or Sambha or Gurdaspur to relive the pressure in Kashmir? Along with above, imagine ARS launching pincer attack in southern Punjab to outflank our defenses in Punjab and between ARN and ARS pinch the forward districts of Punjab?

co-option will not allow TSPA to have the necessary forces to undertake such a venture, Indian asymmetry in fire power will be our conventional deterrent with air and sea assets.

>>What makes you, or BK for that matter of fact, think that conflict is going to be linear? Will not any threat of mass Indian success in Kashmir be another red-line from TSPA perspective? I hope you do realize that any Indian success in central and middle Kashmir places IA so close to political heart of Pakistan that they are going to do everything to deny us this advantage. That by taking Kashmir, we will be in position to out-flank Pakistan completely. That it places us so close to Afghanistan and restive NWFP that any occupation of Kashmir by us will be Pakistan’s worst nightmare come true. That we will be cutting the umbilical cord between Pakistan and China and this is something they, or the Chinese, will try every to deny to us.

First, this is a completely different template, that I will call forced submission and unrelated and unlinked with co-option. Ofcourcse, an attack on PoK invites red lines, threat to TSP rent seeking space, denial of land access to Chinese and opens up Indian access to CAR. It is TSP's worst nightmare. However, it is also a perfect solution, if the template of forced submission is applied. PoK/NA is not TSP heartland, it still allows TSP to function as a viable state, but with no strategic value. The population levels are not dense and can be managed. There is a healthy mix of non-sunnnis in Gilgit/Baltistant to offset the Mirpuris. It is not an easy solution but is the right solution for a forced submission strategy.

>>If the idea is to go for head of the devil and yet, expect him not to do anything to save himself, then you need to point a sword at his abdomen and be ready to thrust it in.

IA has tried this before. And let me say this again – Operation Brass-tacks was not about dash to RYK and Hyderabad. It was about taking POK. The plan to take POK was codenamed Operation Trident and called for a two division attack on POK – with 6 Mountain Division and 4 Infantry Division. The show in the desert was to ensure that while we went for the head, Pakistan was not able to punch us in the balls.

Last time around the Americans informed the Pakistanis and PA re-enforced the sector. This time around – we’re trying to do the above with far more firepower and with lesser maneuver space for PA and western touts.

Orbat.com has some mention of these, but I have not read much on Trident of 1987. However a two division attack on POK does not sound serious enough to capture and hold, while the rest of the army is mobilized in the desert.

>>9 or 13 or 23 mountain divisions are going to come to a naught in mountains - for a simple reason that you don’t have real estate to deploy these assets. The lines of advances are pretty obvious to everyone and are well defended. And by concentrating only in mountains you play into Pakistani hands - PA can get away with spending fraction of resources to counter any Indian build-up in the mountains. Remember the 9:1 attacker to defender ratio? For your 12 Mountain Divisions, PA needs to raise 3 or 4. And mountains have fantastic ability to negate the technical superiority that best of weapons infer on any attacker. Now, let me add one more twist to the above tangle – if we fail to put pressure on the Pakistanis in the plains (south Kashmir and southwards), PA can transfer resources to further augment the troops in mountains. And remember, it has better lateral lines of communication than us.

On the contrary, pump the money into raising 4 mountain divisions/2 Mountain Strike Corps and give them ample helicopter assets – that is the only way to overcome the lack of maneuver in the mountains.

So, please look at the entire picture in a holistic manner and not in isolation.

I am looking at the holistic picture, in which not only the army, but even air and naval forces, along with other assets in Afghanistan and the Pashtuns will have to cultivated in order to realistically capture and hold. They open up other access routes into PoK. IOW: It is actually far more complex than what you have mentioned. All I will way is the 9:1 ratio for mountains is suspect due to asymmetry of C^4, mobility, air and PGM assets that can be brought to bear along with increased fire power.

In a forced submission strategy, we will not be considering the same things as under co-option. Two different strategies and hence the structures needed to execute shall be different.

Below is response in another thread, before the BK talk. So, FWIW.

Rohitvats: Let us rewind and try again. Before we get to details on what happens to the 3500 tanks, we will have to take it top down for that is the only way I can be coherent to myself.

Prediction of future events and scenarios are unlike mathematical equations, hence by nature imprecise. Yet, we have to make certain presuppositions, in order to have a policy. These policies have far reaching consequences and take upwards of a decade and more to mature and translate to reality. To keep it focused, we will leave the shortfalls of current policy and its operational doctrines out of purview and not go into details of how we came to this place. You and many others are well read enough to understand current policy and doctrine and its results.

There are certain suppositions, that form the bed rock of a policy. Based on the policy, operational doctrines and capabilties are built. If the capabilties and doctrines are not achievable due to execution constraints then the policy has to be readjusted.

These are my views of the policy directions and suppositions thereof, so all deficiencies are mine only.

The policy being proposed are along the following lines:

1. India shall reduce its military threatening postures against TSP – in an attempt to have normal relations with TSP, with quid pro quos by TSP and TSPA. This will free up resources, primarily our strike forces and military personnel devoted to CI duties such as the Rashtriya Rifles.

2. India shall invest in building capabilities to increase fire power, mobility, C^4I, air, Naval, space, PGM with better integration – with a focus on the mountains and the Northern and Eastern sectors.

The reasoning for the above policy is that the current threatening posture against TSP has no political purpose. It does not serve purpose for the sub conventional threat that TSP poses. Neither does India desire and/or has the will to keep and maintain these lands and its peoples nor is a “destruction” of TSPA feasible due to nuclear red lines. At best under current doctrine, the military is now talking about using fire power, without crossing the border/LOC to deal with the sub-conventional threat. In all this, the military leadership itself is getting passive (not that it was ever aggressive, but if the message from the top is almost always passive, it filters down).

TSPA continues to embolden itself using the IA threat as an excuse. The increasing asymmetries between TSPA and IA will not allow the TSPA to field a deterrent force in the future. The US doles will peter out in the coming decade.

Suppositions:

- Quid Pro Quo deal with TSPA that results in reduction of sub conventional threat and a reduction in TSPA’s need to match Indian capabilities – bankrupting TSP in the process
- Minimum 2.5% of India’s GDP allocated to defense (I wish it was 3% at least, but unlikely)
- Increasing asymmetries between TSP and Indian forces
- Need to free up resources to reorient and face the challenge from China
- Cannot do it all and still seek to be a leading independent power (hard choices have to be made)

It is tempting to fall back into known adages of “cannot trust TSP”, “TSP negotiates with a gun to its own head”. The purpose of policy is to recognize certain facts and yet figure a way to move forward.

India has resolved and accepted TSP as a fact to live with, without accepting its ideological premise.

How do these policy directives, translate on the ground is a large unknown. We can only decipher the general trends, but is largely a very unexplored area. I will try to answer them as I see them.

Shaurya, again, I am not able to grasp what BK, and you, are trying to convey here? Are we saying that IA should have only one Strike Corps as against three or, consolidate - that is bring under one Corps, all the firepower under the three Corps? In case of latter, how does on consolidate 3 x Armored Divisions + 3 x RAPIDS under One Corps HQ? How does that alleviate the fear of Pakis? Another thing - What political realities are we talking about here which will not allow India to exercise its full military potential and, how having One Strike Corps is an alignment with the same?[/qouote]

First this particular suggestion is not from BK but from NSA SS Menon. I do not know, to what degree is it thought through but my understanding would be it would be a reduction in the number of strike corps and some increase in force levels of the remaining corp(s) with significant increase in capabilities and fire power across the board.

We have limited assets - even if we have ~3,500 tanks - and the principles of war suggest that the same need to be concentrated rather than spread them all around to maximize their effectiveness. That is why we have armored divisons and their placement in Strike Corps along with supporting firepower and engineering assets. The Pivot Corps have about enough assets to hold off PA attacks or carry limited assaults on supporting axis to Strike Corps.

There is the expectation that the fire power and mobility of the holding/pivot corps will increase through armor (more than a brigade), dedicated artillery and mechanization.

Same is the case with PA - their firepower is also concentrated in ARN/ARS with limited armor/mechanized assets with their Pivot Corps. Between us and them, the game has always been of cat and mouse - each waits to see how the other commits its Strike Corps before revealing its hand. Then, there is the geographical angle to the deployment. Given the peace time location of these Strike formations and their main assets-armored divisons, they are likely to be deployed in certain geographical area.

The expectation is the asymmetries in capabilities that are already diverging at ALL levels will increase further, making this cat and mouse game played so far irrelevant for the future and TSPA will no longer be able to compete and field a deterrent conventional force to Indian fire power.

These asymmetries will be in the form of

- Dedicated attack helicopter resources
- An artillery division dedicated to each pivot corp
- PGM based fire power (arty/Missiles)
- C4, leverage space assets and air control
- Increase in CAS capabilities
- Not to forget, the fire power available through the Navy
- (current army doctrine has a subservient role for air and naval power and this aspect will be corrected)

In all this there is a common theme - ours and theirs Pivot Corps lack proper offensive firepower. And this is what we're trying to correct - by adding teeth to our Pivot Corps through IBG. It is important to note that IA did not simply try to transfer assets from Strike Corps to Pivot Corps on IB - like transfer assets from XXI Corps to XII Corps and make the latter a Strike Corps. There are two main reasons for the same - (a) IA wanted to ensure that by not deploying the full might of its Strike Corps, it does not give chance to Pakistan to claim crossing of its nuclear redline (b) It has reserves to counter any escalation by PA after the objectives are met by IBG.

In the above calculus, IMO, it was assumed that because PA has limited assets to counter IBG at their Pivot Corps level, PA will have commit their Reserves - that is, ARN and ARS. Because PA would have committed its premier strike formations to counter gains by IBG, IA would have a hands up and can then do two things - control the escalation and deploy its own Strike Corps at is own choosing of time and space. .

True, the expectation is that each of India’s holding/pivot corps will have enough armor, fire power and mobility along with superior command and control over communications and enough air assets to thwart any such design of PA strike corps – in the future.

In the light of the above, if IA was to spread out its assets with Strike Corps to Pivot Corps - what reserves will it have left to counter PA Strike Corps?

The view is PA will not be able to overcome the fire power, C^4, mobility of our holding corps along with other air based assets due to the asymmetries gained. Also, it is not a reduction in overall numbers of strike corps per se, but a reorientation – one from plains to mountains.

A massive counter strike force will not be necessary in such a policy and doctrine with these asymmetries.

In order to truly understand, current doctrine, you have to link it with current policy. Maybe, you can make a post on the merits of the current policy and doctrine as you understand them and we can then see, what happens when you game them, 5, 10, 15 years out.

To me there is a simple choice to be made. Do we continue to focus on TSP for the next decade and loose out on competing with PRC or do we come to a realistic policy and doctrine for TSP, in order to devote greater resources to the PRC challenge. We cannot do both.

I am attaching some reference material, which lays out the current state and reasons why they do not work and the need to change policy and doctrine.

Of India’s Pakistan policy
Is Delhi chasing its own tail?
by Zorawar Daulet Singh

Hiamlayan Task Ahead - Bharat Karnad

RECONCILING DOCTRINES : PREREQUISITE FOR PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA

Firepower India 2009

[rohitvats]

ShauryaT, your hypothesis is full of contradiction.

On one hand, you say that we need to do away with 'threatening posture' towards TSP and yet, you talk of Pivot Corps equipped with Arty Divisions, integral attack and support helicopter assets, strong C4I integration, couple of armored and mechanized brigades and backed by strong involvement with IAF. In effect, acheive strong Air-Land Battle concept. On top of this, you expect PA to reciprocate by winding down their core strike assets as quid-pro-quo for us doing the same to our strike corps. With IA Pivot Corps as good as strike corps, what comfort level do you think PA will have to play by your game and "Co-opt"? When it also knows that IAF is going to get into a shape where it will be a serious overmatch for PAF and PA will have all the more reason to beef itself to take on IA as well as hae some insurance against IAF capabilities? After all, a rose by another name still remains a rose.

And as for me concentrated on Orbat and BK/You talking about strategy - well, unless you, or BK, tells me how that strategy plays out and how things evolve on the ground, it is nothing but hot air.

Take some examples - An arty division will most probably consist of following: 1xMissile Brigade+1xRocket Brigade+2xGun Brigades. And two armored brigades have same level of armored regiments as an armored division. How do you think PA is going to react to Pivot Corps armed with above+helicopter assets+strong IAF cover?

I will post detailed analysis later.

[Rudradev]

BK has a pretty abrasive style of speaking, and he sounded quite dismissive about a number of things: CSD, armour in general, and the institutional structure of IA that (according to him) prevents a serious change in focus from Pakistan to China.

I don't necessarily agree with him that CSD is an unworkable doctrine. I think it is a pretty good doctrine: if the objective is to end the TSPA's capacity to wage conventional war or exercise authority over a united Pakistan. For any objective more nuanced than that, it is like a sledgehammer against an eggshell: the plate and the table underneath will also break. The question then becomes: what is the value of this objective, in strategic terms?

IF we accept BK's overarching strategic philosophy that Pakistan does not matter, China is the threat of the present century: then there are serious problems with the value of it. Because any way you game it, you end up with Game Over: China Wins. In fact, we on BRF come up with endless scenarios about a two-front war but we fail to see that from Beijing's perspective, it is better to fight a one-front war against India with the front being on the Pakistan border!

Let's see. CSD, as I understand, is a doctrine whereby, in response to some provocation: IBGs will consolidate out of mech inf and armoured elements of the pivot corps and advance into Pakistan. Per BK this advance is likely to be across the Rajasthan border because north and central Pakjab are criss-crossed with canals and irrigation ditches that will slow down any armoured thrust to unacceptable levels.

IBGs will occupy pockets of territory in Pakistan and engage the TSPA. They will clear a path for the follow-up advance by our Strike Corps. At this point there are two choices:

A ) Strike Corps push ahead to cut off the Karachi-Peshawar axis, chopping TSP in half.
B ) They do not push ahead to that extent.

Let's take the second instance, B, first. Let's say that in cognizance of Paki nuclear redlines, there is no thrust to RYK etc. What do we gain? At best, several thousand sq km of Pakistani territory (mostly desert) on the far side of the International Border. Not the LoC, but the International Border... not disputed territory. Per the UN charter we will have to withdraw from this when hostilities end. If we do not withdraw we face sanctions at best; or at worst, Desert Storm East. I don't know to what extent we can count on Vladmir Chacha's veto to bail us out of that, given his recent enthusiasm for including Pakis in the SCO.

So in scenario B: India gains no territory in Pakistan. India loses a significant number of lives and military assets. Pakistan army gets a jhaapad and loses many military assets.

Gain for India: jingoes feel happy that something was done to punish Pakistan. Whatever military assets Pakistan lost will be quickly replaced with more modern ones, in addition to lots of aid, by the 3.5 Friends plus China. Whatever H&D loss is incurred by TSPA will be quickly papered over, given the Paki tendency to "Islamic historical revisionism"... they didn't lose in 1948, 65, 71 (except to Bengali Muslims) or 99, they scared us off in 2002 etc. Paki aam junta will soon be convinced, or convince themselves, that IA had to withdraw not because of UN pressure but because IA was beaten back by Pakistani mards. TSPA will come out politically stronger in the medium term.

Loss for India: everything we lose in war; no 3.5 friends lining up to give us daan. We paid for our own army with hard-earned cash, we will have to replace the losses with more hard-earned cash. India's credibility will also take a beating: we were unable to resolve our Pakistan problem by conventional means (like Israel in Lebanon, 2006.) Equal equal will be back in full swing. We will now be a power that fought another inconclusive war with the rival Pakistan.

Net effect: Game over, China wins.

Ok, now consider Scenario A.

The first thing to consider is the Paki nuclear redline. If we're serious about advancing to RYK and cutting Pakistan in half, we have to first conduct some sort of strike (possibly conventional but probably nuclear) against the 70% of Pakistan's nuclear assets which, according to BK, are mapped. Pakistan will probably retaliate with as much of the remaining 30% as possible. Losses to India will be huge.

Even if we stop right here: Game Over, China Wins.

But let us say for some reason the Pakistanis are unwilling or unable to use their nukes to reinforce this redline. Our strike corps chop Pakistan in half.

This will result, sooner rather than later, in the collapse of the Pakistani state. India will face heavy losses, but TSPA will be ultimately decimated. With no central power capable of enforcing authority, Pakistan will go to pieces, in the most chaotic and unpredictable manner possible.

The big fear that most people have in this situation is the nukes getting into the hands of terrorists... but as far as I am concerned, the nukes have been in the hands of terrorists since 1987. What we cannot ignore is the political aftermath. 180 million Pakis of whom some vast proportion will try to cross into India. An ungovernable, jihadi-ridden mess all along the Western border. Years and decades of gruelling urban warfare against literally millions of motivated jihadis, if we try to occupy it. And then there are the TTP and other merry bands further northwest. WTF are we going to do? If a nuclear strike enters the picture... even if it is a purely one-way strike by India against Pakistan... this political aftermath gets even more exponentially aggravated. Is India in any position whatsoever to deal with the implications of this?

No, we are not. Game Over, China Wins BIG TIME. PLA will rush into Northern Areas and sit tight while we are running from pillar to post fighting off jihadis, dealing with refugees, counting our losses, like a bear covered by a swarm of angry bees after destroying the hive.

In strategic terms, there are no good options; even though in operational terms, CSD is a damn good instrument. But that instrument has one utility only... threatening the TSPA with loss of power. It is like a nuclear deterrent. Once we fire it... there are no good options left.

The only thing to do is, as dispassionately as possible, ponder the Pakistani paradox.

1) Pakistan Army is the ultimate source of all central authority in Pakistan.
2) Pakistan Army derives this authority by creating and sustaining a Pakistani state, population and national culture which defines itself as anti-India and "not India."
3) Destroying the Pakistan Army leaves India with an untenable, unmanageable, chaotic situation of Pakistani state collapse... where India loses and China wins, across all scenarios.
4) Not destroying the Pakistan Army leaves India with a neighbour that defines itself as anti-India and "not India", and for whom finding ways to harm India is a state policy.

If we do not destroy the Pakistan Army, we concede control of Pakistan to the one institution whose very survival depends on being anti-India. If we destroy the Pakistan Army, we remove the only institution which can possibly prevent a Pakistani collapse that would be disastrous to India.

I call it the "Catch 72"

Note that this paradox is not a new thing in the age of uberjihad and nuclear enabled terrorism (though these factors have compounded the difficulty.) Catch 72 has existed at least since the '65 war, when the GOI did not provide air support to 3 Jat which could otherwise have taken Lahore. Taking Lahore would have meant (again, per BK) a total unraveling and collapse of the Paki state, then newly under military domination. Evidently Sri Shastri's cabinet saw the continuing existence of a TSPA- dominated Pakistan as a more manageable evil than India having to absorb or be responsible for the corpse of Pakistan. Maybe they were even right.

How to get around this paradox, is what I'd like to hear Dr. BK explain in detail.

[member_20292]

Rudradev, this is an excellent post of yours and I am a big fan. The other post of yours that I really liked was the one that explained how Osama Bin Laden was a positive force for India. Fantastic.

Attempting to answer your question, “how to destroy the Pakistani army without having a mess left in our fingers” . My proposal is that this is already being answered by Bharat Karnad Manmohan Singh and all. How?

By the peace process MFN status, trade and all. We are going to be influencing the aam junta of Pakistan, and in the coming years they will themselves put pressur e on the army to reduce its viciousness. When you have people across the border working for the same company, Tata Pakistan and Tata India. McDonalds and all……you will not go to war. As Tom Friedman said in the world is flat, the 2002 parliament standoff was broken down by wipro and tcs, as they could not afford to go to war and lose the revenues. Peace was brought to you not by General Schwarzkopf, but by General Electric, was the phrase friedman used.

I’ve been reading BRF and lurking fhere for a while and it seems to me that a lot of junta is against WKKs. To me this seems misplaced and I think that the WKKs , MMS and BK are right that we need to encourage positive behavior from Pak, and ignore the negative behavior from it….like dealing with a recalcritrant child.

Doing an Israel will not help us…and luckily for us, we can afford to be patient and kind and nice…..we have the luxury of a large, peaceful prosperous populace.

See how the US deals with China and Iran. I have lost count of the number of Iranians I have met in the US. The US would not be able to deal with Iran, if it ignored it and barred its citizens from dealing with the US forever. Chinese , the same.

What prevents us from behaving like the US? Nothing but our own pettiness. Screw Pakistan, in bharat karnads own words. Screw their terrorism and fanatacism.

Right now, lets focus on selling their junta , alooo and anday, and tamatar and bhindi and Tata trucks and Nanos, while avoiding allowing too many Pakistanis entering our soil. Lets just trade with them.

No need to have Paki grad students in IIT and other such close dealings with Pakistan...as the potential for mischief is ginormous. Lets just see how much we can trade with the buggers and incorporate them in our economy. Lets put pressure on them to do MFN and lower tarriff barriers and lets have even more Veena Malliks of theirs and Adnan Samis working in Mumbai.


{ Ab sab milkar Aloo Anday Becho ! }

[RajeshA]

Let's take the second instance, B, first. Let's say that in cognizance of Paki nuclear redlines, there is no thrust to RYK etc. What do we gain? At best, several thousand sq km of Pakistani territory (mostly desert) on the far side of the International Border. Not the LoC, but the International Border... not disputed territory. Per the UN charter we will have to withdraw from this when hostilities end. If we do not withdraw we face sanctions at best; or at worst, Desert Storm East. I don't know to what extent we can count on Vladmir Chacha's veto to bail us out of that, given his recent enthusiasm for including Pakis in the SCO.

So in scenario B: India gains no territory in Pakistan. India loses a significant number of lives and military assets. Pakistan army gets a jhaapad and loses many military assets.

Rudradev ji,

the assumption is being made that we have to return territory as per U.N. Requirements. I don't think that would be the case. If India moves in it would be for good reasons.

We have Kenyan and Ethiopian troops sitting in Somalia fighting Al-Shabaab. The U.N. is in no haste to see them leave. Similarly we can justify our presence in South Sindh, as our efforts to bring some order in Karachi, (which we need not necessarily do), we justify our presence in Baluchistan as preventing a genocide of the Baluchis by the Paki fauj, we justify our presence in Bahawalpur as fighting terrorism, etc, we can justify our presence as securing rogue nuclear weapons. The problem is not finding a justification. The issue is for America and Russia to accept those justifications and give us the necessary leeway to bring order.

Now I am not a fan of putting Indian troops in Pakjab, and let them be taken down one by one in an inhospitable environment. So our excuse to fight terrorism, and securing nuclear weapons which we may not be able to find, at least not all of them, is just that an excuse. The real agenda for us in Pakistan should be to cut off Pakjab from the rest of Pakistan - to liberate the other regions.

We can give away parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and FATA to Afghanistan and ANA forces to manage. We can support the liberation of Baluchistan and Mohajirstan, much in the same way Russia did with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia.

Now the others may not necessarily like the prospect of Pakistan's break-up. But we can sweeten the deal. How about giving Russia the permission to build Oil and Gas Pipelines from Russia through Central Asia and connecting them to the Indian Grid. That would allow Russia to get a stake in all three huge markets on the Eurasian Continent - Europe, China and India. How about offering to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence?! How about telling the Russians that once Afghanistan gets a direct route to India, through Baluchistan and South Sindh, India would be promoting totally different crops in Afghanistan other than poppy, and that Russian drug problem may subside.

Similarly we can provide Americans with a direct route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, finally opening up trade between Central Asia and the rest of the world.

Even if all the countries of the world are dead-set against India and do pass UN Resolutions against India, etc. we can afford to ignore them. Our instantaneous response should be testing of our Megaton nukes, and become recalcitrant until they try to make peace with us again.

We cannot really hope to eradicate Islamism in Pakjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, etc through occupation and our "secular" polity. So I am willing to give up the areas we capture in Pakjab after we have an arrangement there, Islamist as it might be, and nuclear armed as it may be. The only things of interest should be cutting off Pakistan from access to sea and Liberation of Baluchistan. If Northwest can be taken over by ANA and Afghanistan Pushtuns, all the better.

Then we can retreat from Pakjab!

If we want to punish Pakistan, then it has to be 1971 style.

Let's not forget that the world accepted Bangladesh as a new country in 1971. Why should the world similarly not accept Mohajirstan and Baluchistan as new countries too?

[PratikDas]

I’ve been reading BRF and lurking fhere for a while and it seems to me that a lot of junta is against WKKs. To me this seems misplaced and I think that the WKKs , MMS and BK are right that we need to encourage positive behavior from Pak, and ignore the negative behavior from it….like dealing with a recalcritrant child.

Doing an Israel will not help us…and luckily for us, we can afford to be patient and kind and nice…..we have the luxury of a large, peaceful prosperous populace.

It is this mental weakness that Pakistan exploits. Try telling this to the families that lost loved ones in the Mumbai bombings and the Taj hotel terrorist attack. Why are the lives of their lost beloved any less precious than the lives of the hijacked on flight IC814? To spare the lives of the hijacked on IC814 we let loose some of the worst animals Pakistan has exported to India. Yet we do nothing to avenge the lives of the victims of bombings and the Taj attack? I don't understand the bloody difference. What we're essentially saying is that for as long as you keep an Indian alive, I'll give you anything you want and the moment you kill that Indian then, well, too bad, we'll move on, we're strong, we're generous, and we're ******* idiots.

The day you grow a pair of balls and are willing to chop off a pair of theirs is the day they'll think twice about putting their balls in harm's way. We did it in 1971 when neither of us had nukes but ours was a third world poor beggar country then. We STILL did it. The US came to the Bay of Bengal and we still did it. China had "thrashed" us in 1962 and we still did it. The stakes are much higher now but, without apology to the lives that will surely be sacrificed in vengeance because no apology will ever be enough, we'll have to do it again regardless.

This is why:

(A) If every time we experience Pakistani terrorism we strike punitively, conventionally, as an assured response, then I'm willing to bet they won't use a nuclear weapon on us because if they do they'll be sent back to the dark ages in response. If the thought of retaining some little power amongst the ruins was a satisfactory conclusion for them, andhon main kana raja style, they wouldn't wait for an Indian punitive strike to go down this path. They would've nuked India already because the end result for them would be the same but the damage to India would be much greater because of the element of surprise.

(B) If we don't attack them and if we let them go down the path of economically bankrupting themselves, I bet their strategic telebunnies will sense an existential threat anyway, albeit of a different kind - an economic threat, i.e. a poor Pakistan without the funds to sustain the lifestyles of the rich and uniformed in their Army, ISI, or SPD. What glamour would there be in wearing their presently starched uniforms if there was no money left to pay for the starch? And if their fate is to marshal a tribe of beggars then they might as well bring poverty on in their own terms by nuking India for the glory, with the element of surprise, and proceding down the path to poverty in option (A).

I don't think their generals like either option because the end result, being poverty, is the same and one thing BK did get right was that their Army is run like a [corrupt] business, a business that enjoys profits, and "CEOs" [generals] who enjoy the comforts and luxuries those profits afford them. They're not going to sacrifice this good life. Rather, they'll only try to retaliate to Indian punitive strikes with more "non-state" adventurism and we'll simply have to build better defences. It is in their military's interest to retain power and keep plotting the ultimate vengeance forever, with Kargil and Taj like attempts every now and then as progress-reports to those who fund them.

The short answer is that India needs to exercise the military strength it has built painstakingly, in limited punitive strikes, with the predictability of a Swiss watch. The only response our exercise will elicit is another limited exercise. There will be no mutually assured destruction but the sacrificial goats they send across the border will realise the irrelevance of their sacrifice.

[Kanson]

We cannot really hope to eradicate Islamism in Pakjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, etc through occupation and our "secular" polity. So I am willing to give up the areas we capture in Pakjab after we have an arrangement there, Islamist as it might be, and nuclear armed as it may be. The only things of interest should be cutting off Pakistan from access to sea and Liberation of Baluchistan. If Northwest can be taken over by ANA and Afghanistan Pushtuns, all the better.

while Rudradev made many assumptions, Sir, I think you are setting yourself into the mould of post Independence India leader mind set - giving away, and its OK to leave/ give up some area.

How Islam captured India ? How it converted all the area to Islam ? How British captured India? Everything is done one by one, bit by bit, inch by inch. From military point of view CSD does that exactly. Blow by blow. In few more years, only country which can come to Pakistan's help will be China. Only thing we should have is the political will and tenacity. We should take only area which we can chew. Then some more. Then some more. We should use not only one such tool. We should employ many tools as British did. It is doable. Nuclear threat can be easily neutralized with technical advancement and strategy. What we need is a Chanakiyan, a leader like Patel, Bose. It won't be possible in few months, but say 10 years. But once momentum is set it creates its own set of motions, unstoppable motions. This is not for a weak hearted chair occupying leader who can't able to administer his own country.

People create own illusions by repeatedly saying stable Pak is good. Becoz, they can't come up with any doable plans. And further, they think if we disturb Pak it will create more trouble. They fail to see, Pak is in irreversible slope. If it goes further down, we have to face the music which will be much more severe than what it is now. This is catch 22. If we take action we have to face the burnt. If we don't take action then again we have to face the burnt. Now or later? depends on how fast we are capable enough to safe guard ourselves.

Some believe, current opening of Trade is one such tool.

[RajeshA]

Kanson ji,

I'm glad you brought this up.

I am fully in agreement with you, when you express your wish that Pakistani lands be liberated from Islam(-ism).

However I am in favor of that in some subsequent action/circumstances. I would prefer the military intervention in Pakistan to have a very clear set of goals, and once those goals are achieved, that we get out.

We can manipulate a landlocked Pakjab far more easily than an "Indian-occupied" whole of Pakistan. First we have to separate the various parts away from Pakjab, and get Pakjab isolated, so that when we try our "experiments" in Pakjab subsequently it does not invite the same extent of cooperation from other regions, and from Islamists elsewhere.

There is no use frittering away our energies, our strength the same way USA has done so in Afghanistan. We don't want to get bogged down! Let's not chew off more than we can handle. We take small bites, one at a time.

[Philip]

Look,at the moment,the Pakis are chewing themselves splendidly,without our help.To attack Pak first would invite a coming together of the jihadi/fundoo elements ,invite international condemnation-and the west would just love such an opportunity,plus spur the PRC to an invasion to "teach India another lesson" as in '62.Where we should work focussed intensely is to widen the cracks in the Paki identity,engage them in Afghanistan by proxy (coordinating our strategy with the Central Asian states and Russia along with the Afghan govt.) keeping them off balance,forcing them to maintain a two-front posture,and unable to carry ourt a major offensive.This will allow us to build up our defences in the Himalayas against China,improve our infrastructure there,and increase our Navy's strike/power projection potential with large all-round increases in the fleet ,especially nuclear subs and LRMP aircraft including Backfires.

Stall the Pakis at the border,conduct overt an covert action against anti-Indian Paki entities,support fissiparious elemenets within Pak,so that holding the nation together becomes the main occupation of the Paki army,not training for a fight with India,and let its internal contradictions grow and consume it.ASs in '71,we should aim for a "holding posture" in the West and hone our strike capability in the East,rembering how the vastly outnumbered Vietnamese gave the PLA a severe hiding a few decades ago.

[ShauryaT]

After all, a rose by another name still remains a rose.

I have been crying hoarse saying that capability asymmetry of forces will increase. There is no doubt about that. Just like TSP nuclear weapons are not up for negotiation, modernization, increased fire power, C^4, integrated air assets for battle groups of Indian forces is not up up for negotiation. A larger and more powerful India with many times more the capabilities of TSP is a fact for TSP to live with. Their only choices are try to destabilize us and play a futile attempt to match our capabilities, bankrupting themselves in the process and waste their youthful energies in an animosity ridden nation or co-opt and accept a large and powerful India with a demonstrated intent to let TSP exist in its own space (our end of the bargain).

And as for me concentrated on Orbat and BK/You talking about strategy - well, unless you, or BK, tells me how that strategy plays out and how things evolve on the ground, it is nothing but hot air.

Take some examples - An arty division will most probably consist of following: 1xMissile Brigade+1xRocket Brigade+2xGun Brigades. And two armored brigades have same level of armored regiments as an armored division. How do you think PA is going to react to Pivot Corps armed with above+helicopter assets+strong IAF cover?

The expectation of an arty division for each of our pivot corps is the expectation of someone like Gurmeet Kanwal, by 2022. If that is hot air to you, then I cannot help it. As I said above, modernization of Indian forces and a powerful India is a fact that they will have to live with. What we can do is to express the intent of letting TSP have its own space by adjusting our doctrine, force org structure and maybe location of forces. The expectation would be to have a more normal state-state relationship, without all issues necessarily resolved. That is the bargain.

[ShauryaT]

Look,at the moment,the Pakis are chewing themselves splendidly,without our help.To attack Pak first would invite a coming together of the jihadi/fundoo elements ,invite international condemnation-and the west would just love such an opportunity,plus spur the PRC to an invasion to "teach India another lesson" as in '62.Where we should work focussed intensely is to widen the cracks in the Paki identity,engage them in Afghanistan by proxy (coordinating our strategy with the Central Asian states and Russia along with the Afghan govt.) keeping them off balance,forcing them to maintain a two-front posture,and unable to carry ourt a major offensive.This will allow us to build up our defences in the Himalayas against China,improve our infrastructure there,and increase our Navy's strike/power projection potential with large all-round increases in the fleet ,especially nuclear subs and LRMP aircraft including Backfires.

Stall the Pakis at the border,conduct overt an covert action against anti-Indian Paki entities,support fissiparious elemenets within Pak,so that holding the nation together becomes the main occupation of the Paki army,not training for a fight with India,and let its internal contradictions grow and consume it.ASs in '71,we should aim for a "holding posture" in the West and hone our strike capability in the East,rembering how the vastly outnumbered Vietnamese gave the PLA a severe hiding a few decades ago.

I am with you conceptually and do think that this can be done and the logical end of this would be dissolution of the durrand line to create a greater Afghanistan and opens up space to retake PoK by India. However, such a "forced submission" strategy needs A LOT of hard work, real poitik and a long term focus and goal to a achieve these end results. There is simply zero appetite in our political establishment to undertake such a venture. We cannot even seem to be able to support the Baluchs or other dissenting groups on PoK properly.

[ramana]

X-posting my ruminations from the Managing TSP thread:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 8#p1194758

X-post...

I have been thinking about TSP quite a bit. From all indices (UNDP etc.) its a failed state and normally would be forced by the world to shape up. Yet the world doesn't do that. Most indices assume that the world is normally distributed.

I have also been reading Taleb's Black Swan and Mandelbrot statistics and Gladwell's What the Dog Saw and power law distribution vs normal curve distributions which have central tendencies. In other words non -linear states.

I then realized that TSP is not a normal state. Its a power law state. Just as only a very few recalcitrants, contribute to making the homeless problem very bad, so does TSP contribute to making global terrorism, nuke proliferation and drugs distribution very bad. Its a basket case of wrongs.

Gladwell writes about some successful programs that manage power law issues like homelessness, polluting cars and other egregious cases on principle of least expense. And this appears to be contradictory to normal distribution cases where solutions that apply to all cases are prescribed. Power law cases need appeasement to keep them from becoming a more expensive problem. It goes against normal solutions and appears morally bankrupt.

Does this make sense? It can explain the molly coddling of TSP and its elites by US and India to manage to keep it going and not become a become a bigger problem for others.

----

Add to this Shiv's pisko analysis that the inner core of < 2% in TSP contributes to this radical and egregious behavior which confirms the power law fit of TSP society.

and

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 8#p1195398

If you map the human development indices on the vertical and countries on the horizonal what you get is a bell curve of countries with the extreme left as good and extreme right as bad. Of the countries that would be in the extreme right are TSP, NoKo, Syria, Somalia etc. Of these TSP is most egregious as it has nukes, has proliferated nukes to NoKo, Libya, Iran etc, has drugs smuggling, is under Army control, failed political leadership, jihadi madrassas and export of terrorism. Its truly the poster child of Mad Max world. Its the single most contributor to problems in the world.

Now such countries follow the power law of extrema. Regular solutions to increase the development potential don't apply to such basket cases. What is needed is manage the country to avoid spillover.

This could explain the support that India is giving to Gilani etc.

To complicate this picture we have US, UK, PRC doing their best to direct the TSP recalcitrance towards India. We dont have such issues with the homeless in Denver.

Rudradev, Does this give any insight into MMS-BK congruence?

Its about managing a power law state vs a normal state. We are flummoxed as we think TSP is a normal state.

It has head of state, an internationally recognised boundary, its a UN member, elite shops for Hermes bags, and has all the trappings of a modern nation state.

Yet it also has a parallel universe where the military is supreme, which backs madrasas which train extremists, carries out nuclear blackmail, proliferates nuclear technology to other power law states, carries out terrorist attacks on neighbors and sends terrorists to far away states all across the world including South America!

As the Sound of Music song goes " How do you solve problem like Maria!"

You dont. You manage it.

Other power law states are invaded and transformed: Saddam's Iraq, Libya etc or color revolutionized : Former CIS states.

However with its nukes the TSP has to be handled differently.

The TSPA needs to understand its survival depends on its managing the mess.

Hence all those IBGs etc in my humble opinion.

[ShauryaT]

As the Sound of Music song goes " How do you solve problem like Maria!"

You dont. You manage it.

Other power law states are invaded and transformed: Saddam's Iraq, Libya etc or color revolutionized : Former CIS states.

However with its nukes the TSP has to be handled differently.

The TSPA needs to understand its survival depends on its managing the mess.

Hence all those IBGs etc in my humble opinion.

Not just the nukes but a huge socio-economic, cultural and political disconnect along with geo-political realities demand that TSP cannot be managed by India the way the US managed Iraq, etc. Not only one has to manage it as there are no clean solutions. One has to manage it within the constraints of our own capabilities and political aptitudes. The current dispensation is decidedly neo-liberal. Although, there is no formal national security doctrine, observers (watch what the NSA says) and facts on the ground give away our approaches and appetite.

There are very few and limited options to build a security architecture for the region - in a given time frame. The congruence of views on TSP of BK and MMS do not come from a shared perspective. The MMS one is rooted in neo-liberalism, the BK one is rooted in great power ambitions.

Sorry ramana ji, you asked the question to RD, but I shared my thoughts.

[RajeshA]

ShauryaT ji,

Co-option Strategy with Pakistan has its downsides, and that is that they would live to fight another day. It is in fact good that they feel threatened and have increased their military budget by leaps.

We need to increase both our fire-power and our military threat posture towards them to an extent where they simply seem unable to keep catch-up. At some point they would have sucked up all the resources of the country to keep up and still would be severely under-equipped. It seems that USA has lost its appetite to finance Pakistan's military acquisitions. China may help to some extent but we can still outrun them.

We should go for an armaments race with the Pakis. Even if we increase our potential against China, Pakistan would still see it directed against them.

At some point they would have to give up and accept that they can neither attack India conventionally nor can they hope to withstand an Indian attack. But before this awareness comes to them, they should have hollowed out their economy completely.

The reason I am saying this because it is a question of the quality of co-option. Right now their assessment would invariably be "it is temporary. When we are healthy again, we start again!". However when they lose the arms race and are economically dead, then their assessment would be, "it is hopeless to compete with India!"

I think it would be a mistake to give Pakistan the opportunity to retreat without the stink of defeat over them - a defeat in the arms race! They should be begging us to improve our relations with them, as animosity proves too costly! They should unilaterally surrender! Only then would their surrender, retreat and co-option have some meaning!

[ramana]

ShauryaT, One way of looking is:
- MMS appears to want to manage the TSP civlians and
- BK the TSPA military so India can concentrate on PRC
So each wants to manage one group
- US wants to manage the TSPA to keep
- the "civilian" facade intact to manage the US public outrage and
- single POC for poison jewels

Am not endorsing but trying to put rationale for the behavior. To me this is what fits the situation.

RajeshA, Its not an arms race but protecting your options and hedging for the future. After POKII in order to keep the threshold high India has to invest not spend in upgrading its conventional military. I wrote that in 1999 (in BRM) after Kargil.

[GopiD]

By the peace process MFN status, trade and all. We are going to be influencing the aam junta of Pakistan, and in the coming years they will themselves put pressur e on the army to reduce its viciousness. When you have people across the border working for the same company, Tata Pakistan and Tata India. McDonalds and all……you will not go to war. As Tom Friedman said in the world is flat, the 2002 parliament standoff was broken down by wipro and tcs, as they could not afford to go to war and lose the revenues. Peace was brought to you not by General Schwarzkopf, but by General Electric, was the phrase friedman used.

Mahadevji and others,

All this trade and MFN status is all good on paper where we HOPE that by helping these terrorists in their most dark hours, we can help them see light. But, what do you think that the Pak Army will do?? sit by the side and patiently watch its own people reduce its influence and its power? Won't they react. Will our trade and aid create so much influence in the already deeply indoctrinated paki, more than the TSPA/ISI combined influence??

okay, answer one simple question please....

Supposing we get the MFN and our trade with these terrorists jumps into some 10 billion or more and then suddenly there is a non-state actors sponsored terror attack (as it always happens whenever GOI and Pak civilians get closer, as kargil when ABV was in Pak and 26/11 when the relationship was improving)?? Can GOI sit quiet and dwindle their thumbs ?? or will we allow another attack unpunished. If that happens and supposing we sit quiet, the very viability of INDIA as a nation state will be questioned and rightly so.

Or do you think that Kargil, parliament attack and Mumbai attacks are some accidents as our MMS thinks??

Those acts are deliberate acts to show the paki civils who is the boss and show them and us the middle finger that whatever we or their civilians try, our whole relationship can be reset to stage zero with just one push of a non-state-actor terrorist attack button. That is the power of Pak army in the Indo-pak context and they will fight until eternity to keep up the military supremacy and that influence as long as possible and they will play too dirtily that no sane person/country can match their dirtiness.

The WKKs, some of our members, BK and MMS just are deliberately trying not to see the big large TSPA elephant in the room when they deal with the paki civis as if ignoring them will just make them and their influence in paki society vanish.

Please be realistic people. The paki army will take whatever it can in the form of trade and business and will bolster itself, but will never let the INDIA ENEMY notion in the minds of pakis fade away, coz thats their only way of survival.

Do we really think that this indo-pak dialogue is being built on friendship and fraternity and not due to the realization in TSPA that some economic growth is needed to give the aam paki abduls something to eat?? This relationship is developing coz TSPA is allowing it to develop and when it's survival is at stake, all bets are off and the indo-pak relationship will be back to square one........

I bet, a terror attack is going to happen sooner or later, on a scale of mumbai with some telltale signs to point fingers across border (otherwise, GOI will just make it another hindu terrorist attack). My guess would be in the 2012 end to mid 2013 timeframe or sooner depending on the speed on which indo-pak relationship develops/as soon as US-PAK comes to some compromise on Afghanistan.

I again state that THIS RELATIONSHIP IS HAPPENING COZ ITS BEING ALLOWED TO HAPPEN by TSPA....and that will happen until the paki army wants it.....

[rohitvats]

Been listening to BK recordings, yet to complete the set.

I'm surprised that the proponents of Co-option strategy failed to notice that he mentions that as part of co-option, we need to let go of any desire to take back POK and NA. So, what are we going to do with those additional mountain divisions? Organize eco-tourism tours in the area?

So, we the aggreived party, need to give up all our aspirations in the hope pakees will behave and no more "accidents" like Mumbai will happen? Wah re wah...

[Austin]

We need to first bring to justice all the criminals and perpetrators of all acts of terrorism that killed so many innocent life and devastated their family based in Pakistan to justice and hold them accountable , without fair justice there is no sense of fair end to it, first let them hand over all the criminals who have bled our people in all acts of terrorism , specially the known ones who stay there as official state guest and all the 26/11 masterminds.

I think all this talk of China strategy and Pakistan strategy is just a futile exercise pure intellectual discourse , if you cant do small things right in life , you can never do big things right. As they say you can only trust a man with big things if you trust him doing small things well.

[rohitvats]

Let me put my opinion on record - BK's comments on CSD are as off the mark as they come.

[RamaY]

I do not think BK and MMS/INC are on the same page w.r.t pak-strategy even though the end goal looks similar:

my fun-the-mentalist piskology behind INC lovefest with pakis is as follows

There is a realization that current Indian/global dispensation cannot destroy the ideology that sustains Pakistan. Fighting Pakistan in the gambit of nation-state is waste of time as India will be left with a toxic corpse (BK was very clear about that - do we want 180 million enhanced beards/caps in our midst?).

So the current compromise seems to be to put an end to cross-border terrorism as that would rake up many skeletons in Indian closet. Every cross-border terrorism has a potential collateral damage of a religious riot. So far the (sic) secular dispensation is able to distinguish between internal religious riots and cross-border terrorism. I think they learned the lesson after 1993 mumbai blasts. There is also a theory that Godhra was planned to divert IA presence in the border areas. We can see the big picture if we connect the dots.

But it will get difficult as more and more terror attacks will start erasing the distinction between LET inspired terrorism and IM executed terrorism. Sooner or later it will come out and we will see another round of religious riots as the LET/IM will try to find exotic targets in India.

So India must compromise on Pakistan to save INC system, including the Christianity-without-church secularism.

[RajeshA]

Those who propose a China-Only strategy look like people who **** up one sacred duty and to divert attention from their miserable failure take up still another bigger project.

This is like okay, we can't handle Islamic expansion in India, so let's make our primary threat the Naxalites. Okay we can't deal with Naxalites, so let's make Pakistan our major threat. We can't handle Pakistan, so let's make China our primary threat.

Other threats are not going to go away, not even if a bigger threat comes around. If we don't solve these threats, then minor threats link up with other upcoming threats, and become even more threatening. Because we did not solve our Pakistan problem in time, now we are facing a two-front nuclear threat - ChiPak!

If BK is saying, let's forget the Pakistan threat and concentrate on the Chinese threat, and obviously the establishment is saying they have no strategy of how to deal with Pakistan.

Only in the rare case when we intend to give China a bloody nose, and make it as an example to all others who threaten us, can one consider BK's advice as sound. But we are not doing that. All we are trying to do is to stop China from invading us. And if that is all the whole agenda with China, then we have not solved our Pakistan problem in any way, but we have only made Pakistan more enthusiastic to take it out on us.

[nachiket]

What we can do is to express the intent of letting TSP have its own space by adjusting our doctrine, force org structure and maybe location of forces. The expectation would be to have a more normal state-state relationship, without all issues necessarily resolved. That is the bargain.

Shaurya ji, if you would care to indulge me, I have a question. Do you (or Dr. BK) hope to achieve this: "more normal state-state relationship, without all issues necessarily resolved" just by doing this : "express the intent of letting TSP have its own space by adjusting our doctrine, force org structure and maybe location of forces" ?

Do you sincerely believe that TSP's angst against India and their consequent sponsorship of terrorism is really due to them feeling "threatened" by us?

"TSP will behave if India appears less threatening" is a line peddled by Washington on behalf of its munna. I am surprised there are takers for this in India.

[yantra]

....

There is a realization that current Indian/global dispensation cannot destroy the ideology that sustains Pakistan. Fighting Pakistan in the gambit of nation-state is waste of time as India will be left with a toxic corpse (BK was very clear about that - do we want 180 million enhanced beards/caps in our midst?).

So the current compromise seems to be to put an end to cross-border terrorism as that would rake up many skeletons in Indian closet. ....

Another interesting point BK made was that of the Joint/Unitary Security architecture where in Indo-Pak forces work together to protect joint interests in South Asia. That sounded too outlandish to me, at least...

[RamaY]

^ I think that is where BKspeak became too 1-Dimensional to me (to quote stanji).

It sounds very American thinking - to think it is sole Super Power so TSPA will listen to it; and we know the result of it.

India cannot make that mistake - to think TSP/TSPA will become a partner in subcontinental security architecture (this is the extreme WKKisq dream, IMHO). Even after making eternal peace with India, TSPA will be dependent upon and have more options out side powers.

That is the whole history of Pakistan (geographical area) since time immemorial. Everytime it is treated as a (even junior) partner (and not a subservient part of India), Pakistan region became the first region to fall away (even when the asuric force comes from within India) and go asuric.

[shiv]

Been listening to BK recordings, yet to complete the set.

I'm surprised that the proponents of Co-option strategy failed to notice that he mentions that as part of co-option, we need to let go of any desire to take back POK and NA. So, what are we going to do with those additional mountain divisions? Organize eco-tourism tours in the area?

So, we the aggreived party, need to give up all our aspirations in the hope pakees will behave and no more "accidents" like Mumbai will happen? Wah re wah...

Lovely Lovely. Karnad has lost it.

I am starting a collection fund for a memorial to Dawood Ibrahim near his Mumbai grave after he dies.

[Cain Marko]

We need to first bring to justice all the criminals and perpetrators of all acts of terrorism that killed so many innocent life and devastated their family based in Pakistan to justice and hold them accountable , without fair justice there is no sense of fair end to it, first let them hand over all the criminals who have bled our people in all acts of terrorism , specially the known ones who stay there as official state guest and all the 26/11 masterminds.

I think all this talk of China strategy and Pakistan strategy is just a futile exercise pure intellectual discourse , if you cant do small things right in life , you can never do big things right. As they say you can only trust a man with big things if you trust him doing small things well.

+1. At the very least - this should come unilateral from their side. Either hand em over or string em up and then hand em over.

BK's approach to TSP can only be responded to with Rajnideva's famous words, "Thoo iski Maaki ..."

His ideas on looking east and arming possible allies in the SE Asia region are far better. They (BK and MMS) seem to be toeing a US line even without having a truly pro-India GOTUS/POTUS in power - astonishing. The China part is fine, but mollycoddling TSP is just begging for more trouble. 60 years of being stabbed, cut and bled - but not enough for these heroes. Thoo iski maaki ankh.