Bharat Rakshak

Rony wrote:Nice catch Christopher !

Here is the follow up Q&A session video

Of the many stories about Chinese arrogance, two are pointed. The ruling CPC’s official magazine has warned countries on China’s periphery, including India, that it is prepared to go to war to safeguard national interest. The more entertaining story is of a Chinese seminarist who, while in Washington, DC, said that “India was an indisciplined country where plague and leprosy still exist. How a big and dirty country like that could rise so quickly has amazed us.” Taken together, they reflect the astonishing decline in India-China relations when our diplomats who were posted in that country continue to paint a rosy picture.

The operational directive to the services has not come a day too soon and was well timed to coincide with Monday’s Defence Budget which has made no additional provisions for operational enhancement on the China front. In December 2009, the previous Army Chief, Gen Deepak Kapoor, at a seminar had said that the Army has to be ready to fight on two fronts — Pakistan and China. This created ripples in Pakistan followed by China, both all-weather allies whose strategic collusion is historic. Officers joining the Army were told that while Pakistan is the immediate threat, China is the long term challenge. This threat perception has survived for six decades. One scenario envisioning a joint or simultaneous offensive called ‘Operation Brass Board’ was to have been war-gamed in the late-1980s but its author, Gen K Sundarji, left office before it could be tried out.

India would find itself severely compromised if called upon to handle a border war with China and put down a staged Egyptian style uprising in Kashmir simultaneously, says Vivek Gumaste

Drawing an exaggerated, distorted and incongruous parallel between Egypt and Kashmir with the diabolical intent of craftily exploiting the burgeoning global goodwill for democratic uprisings, People's Democratic Party president Mehbooba Mufti declared recently that her party would launch a protest campaign for 'Azaadi' along the lines of the Egypt mass demonstration.To dismiss this gesture, as just another routine up tick in the constantly oscillating vagaries of Kashmiri politics would be a gargantuan mistake: for there is more to it than meets the eye.

First, the fact that Kashmir boasts a democratic government demolishes the validity of such a move. And second, even the modicum of propriety that this call entails at the outset withers away when one meticulously dissects Mehbooba Mufti's pronouncement to unearth the ulterior motive underlying this ostensible cry for self-determination.

In a power point presentation that embellished this seditious exhortation, the PDP tauntingly exhibited a refigured map of Kashmir that endorsed China's suzerainty over Aksai Chin and the Karakoram region of Kashmir in direct contravention of India's claim.Then in an attempt to give a secular and modernistic cloak to what is basically a fundamentalist religious movement, the PDP chief invoked the historical Silk Route that was once the hub of commercial activity in the region to demand that Srinagar be linked to the Chinese-built Karkoram highway via Yarkand in China to enhance economic progress.Neither was the map an accidental oversight and nor was the demand an innocent entreaty. Both underlined a sinister agenda: a ploy to curry favour with China and draw that nation directly into an internal dispute so as to pit India against a stronger adversary as opposed to a crumbling, ineffectual Pakistan.Or from another perspective: Could this antic be the initial salvo of a larger game plan being carried out at the behest of China with the PDP acting as the proverbial pawn?

Fuelling this suspicion is China's aggressive posturing on Kashmir in recent times, which raises legitimate concerns of China exploiting India's quandary in Kashmir to stamp its geo-political dominance in the region and further its economic interests; a win-win situation from the Chinese standpoint that kills two birds with one stone.Acutely conscious of India's growing economic clout that poses a significant challenge to its vision of global domination and extremely wary of India's increasing proximity to Washington, China sees in the Kashmir impasse an opportunity to 'put India in its place'; an action that would send an unequivocal message to both Washington and its aficionados in China's neighbourhood that China will not brook any interference in what it considers to be its geo-political sphere of influence.And to achieve this end, China considers war to be an acceptable option to counter emerging US alliances in the region as a recent article in the Qiushi Journal, the official publication of the ruling Communist Party of China indicates: "We must send a clear signal to our neighbouring countries that we don't fear war, and we are prepared at any time to go to war to safeguard our national interests."

The PDP's pronouncement assumes an ominous significance when viewed against the backdrop of a strategic commentary that appeared on a semi-official Chinese website in 2009 (International Institute for Strategic Studies) wherein a case was made for the balkanisation of India by stoking simmering sub national aspirations that included Kashmir: "China in its own interest and the progress of Asia, should join forces with different nationalities like the Assamese, Tamils, and Kashmiris and support the latter in establishing independent nation-States of their own, out of India."What is especially concerning is that while India has long been aware of clandestine Chinese support to Maoists and separatist elements in the North East, this incident is the first sign of a possible nexus, purely verbal though it maybe, between anti-national or quasi separatist elements in Kashmir and China.The PDP despite being a registered political party often espouses policies that smack of separatist tendencies like advocating the free use of Pakistani currency.

Additionally China has another axe to grind in Kashmir: a pressing economic interest as delineated by the South Asia policy wonk Selig Harrison (China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands. International Herald Tribune, August 26, 2010): "China wants a grip on the region to assure unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan. It takes 16 to 25 days for Chinese oil tankers to reach the Gulf. When high-speed rail and road links through Gilgit and Baltistan are completed, China will be able to transport cargo from Eastern China to the new Chinese-built Pakistani naval bases at Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, just east of the Gulf, within 48 hours."India is the fly in the ointment in this Chinese grand design for these crucial links traverse through disputed territory that India claims as its own, including the 5,180 square kilometers of land illegally ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963 to build the Karkoram highway. With an independent, malleable Kashmir, China would resolve this problem once and for all.

China subscribes to a characteristic modus operandi that involves a calibrated escalation of hostilities, which culminate in a violent military coup de grace as demonstrated by the debacle of 1962.The last two years have witnessed a mounting Chinese diplomatic offensive like the issuing of stapled visas to Kashmiris and the current phase may represent intensification of this strategy by making common cause with disgruntled elements within India (Kashmiris) -- all in preparation for an all out war that may follow. India should take heed.India would find itself severely compromised if called upon to handle a border war with China and put down a staged Egyptian style uprising in Kashmir simultaneously.India must take all measures to ensure that such a predicament does not come to pass by promptly nipping in the bud the subversive activities of China and its minions in Kashmir.

Hours before the first planned protest in Beijing in support of a “Jasmine Revolution”, Zhou Yongkang, China’s security boss, gave instructions to his colleagues. “Strive to defuse conflicts and disputes while they are embryonic,” he said in a speech.In the end the protest movement amounted to little, but that has not stopped Mr Zhou from putting in place a sweeping crackdown of “embryonic” dissent. Dozens of activists and lawyers have been detained or put under police supervision, while internet censorship has been tightened.The police have started to put heavy pressure on foreign journalists in Beijing and Shanghai. Although most received only mild warnings, at least one reporter was pushed to sign a document promising not to write any more stories about the “Jasmine Revolution”.While the most visible politicians in China are premier Wen Jiabao and Bo Xilai, the party boss in the centre-west city of Chongqing with a knack for attracting headlines, the man who has seen his influence rise the most over the past three years is Mr Zhou. He occupies the ninth and last position on the politburo standing committee, the Communist party’s top body.
What we see is a government in deep fear of being challenged for power and a security apparatus highly confident of its powers and capabilities,” said Wang Songlian, senior researcher at China Human Rights Defenders, a rights group.“Ever since the Tibet uprisings in early 2008, we have been moving from one ‘sensitive time’ to the next. The security forces have kept the country almost in a constant state of alert.”A report by Tsinghua University last year, showed the official budget for internal security was Rmb514bn ($78bn), not far short of the headline figure for military spending. Chinese media have reported that Yunnan province in the south-west doubled security spending last year, while Liaoning in the north-east spent 15 per cent of its budget on security. Mr Zhou’s growing influence has been apparent in other areas, such as foreign policy, where analysts say he has helped to push a more conservative line. While Mr Wen made a number of speeches in the summer and autumn that appeared to push the case for political reform in China, Mr Zhou wrote an article criticising “erroneous western political and legal ideas”.

jagga wrote: says Vivek Gumaste[/b]

Please note that the Akula submarine which India is leasing from Russia will not be useful against PRC as it is rumored to involve some significant Russian personnel.

Army chief briefs PM on China’s role in POK

May 09, 2011 8:55:54 PM

Rahul Datta/Mohit Kandhari | New Delhi/Jammu

Alarmed at the increasing Pakistan-China nexus, which has seen growing presence of Chinese security forces in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Army Chief General VK Singh has taken up the matter with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

In a detailed presentation, the Army chief has apprised the Prime Minister of the ground situation and its implications for Indian security. Gen Singh visited Leh a few days ago to take stock of the situation.

Disclosing this here, sources said the 750-km-long LoC is a disputed boundary between India and Pakistan. China, over the past few years, has increased its presence in POK, thereby effectively forming a military nexus with Pakistan and coming close to the LoC and posing a possible threat to Indian security interests.

Given this background, the Army chief visited Leh early last week to take first hand account of the ground situation and review operational preparedness before meeting the Prime Minister.

Sources said Gen Singh urged the political leadership to speed up the process of modernisation of the armed forces, besides improving infrastructure — including roads and airstrips — in the strategically important region of Jammu & Kashmir.

In fact, the first caution was sounded over the increasing Chinese footprint close to the LoC by Northern Command chief Lt General KT Parnaik in a seminar in Jammu last month. Expressing concern over the emerging scenario, he had said, “China is actually present and stationed on the LoC and it facilitates Pakistan armed forces to complement China’s military operations. Its footprints are too close to India and this presence of China in PoK has to be taken seriously.”

The senior Army officer had also made mention of the fact that China had gained a substantial foothold in Gilgit and Baltistan by infrastructure development and its considerably increasing presence, lends strength to China-Pak nexus which is of great security concern to India.

‘China has also strengthened its presence by building sea links and the increased Chinese presence around India is jeopardising the strategic interests of the country,’ Parnaik said while speaking in a seminar on ‘Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir Internal Dynamics and Externalities’ at University of Jammu.

The Army Commander said China had made inroads around India thus posing substantial challenges not only along the China-Indian border but also along the Line of Control (LoC).

He said ‘a great game is being played by Chinese expansionism and by mushrooming terror networks,’ adding that it was imperative to take control of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and find a viable solution to internal problems of the State without interference from Pakistan.

The Northern Command chief said ‘unless overt and covert interference of Pakistan is neutralised, no political or economic solution will be implemented.’ He also said Pakistan having ceded trans-Karakoram part of Gilgit and Baltistan to China in 1963, Karakoram highway was built to link Pakistan with China.

New Delhi: Even as India struggles to match its eastern neighbour’s infrastructure along the border between the two countries, reports claimed Wednesday, that China now has the capability to deploy and maintain more than five lakh troops for over a month on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in case of a threat scenario with India.

As per a newspaper report, Indian Army has apprised Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the threat perception emerging out of China’s assertive stance.

The Indian military's top brass had last month given a presentation on the developing scenario in South Block to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Defence Minister AK Antony, National Security Adviser SS Menon, Principal Secretary TK Nair and Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar, the report said.

Concerns about China’s plans are well founded as Beijing has been carrying out a major infrastructure upgradation in Xinjiang and Tibet bordering India. Its assertiveness over Arunachal Pradesh and active role in the Ladakh region has also been a cause of worry for New Delhi.

The report said that the PM has been informed that Chinese People’s Liberation Army, with a defence budget estimated at $150 billion, can rapidly deploy 34 troop divisions (23,000 soldiers form one division) along the LAC by pulling t troops from Chengdu and Lanzhou regions.

In comparison, India is said to only have the capability to the hold nine divisions along the northern borders.

China has been, notwithstanding the treacherous terrain, quietly but resolutely building infrastructure along its border with India

There is now 58,000 km of roads in Tibet region besides the plan to build 11 new rail lines in Tibet and Xinjiang, which will ensure rapid deployment of troops by PLA.

To the south of Tibet, the railway is being extended to Shigatse (close to Sikkim).

Moreover, China has announced plans for a rail link to link Kathmandu, Myanmar, Bhutan, Pakistan and Central Asian republics.

In terms of air power, China now has many air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang from where India is well “within the range”.

Not to forget China’s all-weather friendship with Pakistan and Beijing’s greater involvement in the Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Surely, Indian security planners have a tough job at hand.

Use of soft power in East Timor largely for China’s energy security and strategic reach may have long term implications for Australia. In terms of China’s energy security goal its state-dominated companies are involved in oil and gas exploration in East Timor. China was also responsible for compiling a geological survey of that country.

China may be strengthening military links with East Timor with the eventual aim of firm military ties in the distant future. The prospect of a Chinese naval base or air base in East Timor may sound bizarre at present but both countries have proven surprising and unorthodox. Chinese bases on East Timor would throw Australia’s best laid strategic expectations way out of kilter.

On April 12, 2008 East Timor signed a $28 million deal with China to buy two advanced patrol boats. The contract for the patrol boats provides for 30 East Timorese defence force personnel to be trained in China. The patrol boats, however, may come with strings attached. They may prove too expensive for East Timor to operate without continuing Chinese financial support and in any case East Timor may require Chinese technicians to maintain the boats. The offer of weapons is a potent way to massage East Timor’s desire for prestige and military independence.

Australia may have been reluctant to supply patrol boats because it may see East Timor’s Defence Force as a politically disruptive element. Substantial weapons aid might worsen this situation. East Timor’s army already has a record of mutiny and attempted coup. Its politicisation is in a sense understandable given its long guerilla struggle against the Indonesians. Australia, unlike China, lives close to East Timor and so puts a premium on stable government.

China has deepened East Timor’s sense of gratitude by constructing that country’s Foreign Ministry building, Presidential Palace and future Defense Force headquarters. To have a foreign power build such key national security buildings is unusual. It is therefore important that these buildings are checked or “swept” for hidden bugs as China may also be expecting some electronic intelligence for its generosity.

CHINA recently tried to establish a spy base in East Timor, according to leaked US diplomatic cables.

The Chinese proposal to build and operate a surveillance radar facility on East Timor's north coast was made in December 2007, but was viewed with suspicion by senior East Timorese officials who consulted with the US and Australia before rejecting the project.

The Chinese initiative, described as ''a strategic threat'', is revealed for the first time in US embassy cables leaked to WikiLeaks and provided exclusively to The Age.

While Chinese diplomats insisted to their American counterparts that East Timor was ''strategically unimportant'' to Beijing, the US embassy in Dili reported to Washington in February 2008 that Deputy Prime Minister Jose Guterres had called in then US ambassador Hans Klemm to advise that Chinese defence firms had approached East Timor's government with an offer to establish a radar array to monitor shipping in the strategic Wetar Strait.

Although anxious to secure assistance to crack down on illegal fishing in East Timorese waters, Mr Guterres was suspicious of the Chinese offer to build and operate the radar facility free of charge.

''The only catch was the facilities were manned by Chinese technicians,'' Mr Guterres told the US embassy. He was concerned ''the radars could be used for purposes other than those touted by the Chinese. They could instead be used to extend China's radar-based intelligence perimeter deep into South East Asia.''

Young Vietnamese, spurred by calls on Facebook and other social media, marched through Hanoi to protest China’s recent actions in disputed territories in the South China Sea.

Holding signs that read “Stop Chinese Invasion of Vietnam Lands” and singing the national anthem, a crowd of mostly Vietnamese college students demonstrated on Hanoi’s streets yesterday after police blocked their path to the Chinese embassy.

The protests, announced on Facebook, blogs and chat forums, highlight growing tensions in the South China Sea as Vietnam, the Philippines and China are unable to agree on renewing joint exploration in the disputed area.

For the Vietnamese demonstrators, it was an unusual public opportunity to engage politically. Most said they heard about the protest on Facebook, which is routinely blocked in Vietnam. The marchers were often flanked by security police.

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs last week formally protested a recent incident in which Chinese naval ships threatened Vietnamese fishermen with weapons in the area of the Spratly Islands, according to a statement on the government website. Vietnam also protested Chinese ships cutting survey cables of a boat operated by Vietnam Oil & Gas Group, or PetroVietnam, last month.

“I’m marching for peace,” said Nguyen Ly Nga Hien, a 21- year-old university student. “If we allow China to continue its bullying behavior, it will upset world peace. This dispute needs to be solved through foreign affairs channels not with Chinese boats provoking us.”

Don wrote:

chackojoseph wrote:Growing security concerns due to natural resources demand led by China and India : SIPRI

Here is an example :

I think the next battle ground is economic not military. Leaders of any country who fails to understand this will miss the boat.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110606/ap_ ... a_moves_in

China shops for Latin American oil, food, minerals
..."

China: People's Liberation Army Chief of General Staff General Chen Bingde said the 300-meter (990-foot) refurbished Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag was being built but has not yet been completed, Hong Kong Commercial Daily reported 8 June. Chen's assistant, Qi Jianguo, said the aircraft carrier would not enter other nations' territories in accordance with Chinese defensive military strategy. Qi added an aircraft carrier was a symbol of a great nation.


Comment: NightWatch has reported the recent progress of China first aircraft carrier. There is no new information in the report, but it Qi's statement reinforces the assessment that this first Chinese carrier has significant symbolic value in supporting China's emergence as a military as well as an economic power.


The Chinese are following their interpretation of the US model of a great power. It includes possessing an aircraft carrier or two. They are arriving at a capability that Western navies and the Japanese Navy developed more than 70 years ago.


It is important that they consider it a symbol because the most visionary naval strategist in the US describes aircraft carriers as big targets for small missiles.


Nevertheless among the riparian states of the western Pacific and the South China Sea, Chinese leaders will be unable to resist the temptation to use aircraft carriers to show the flag and assert hegemony. Expect a great Chinese fleet to circumnavigate the world in coming years.


In the next two decades China will be launching more carriers when India will be sailing a fleet of newer generation carriers of its own. Then the competition for dominance in Asia will reach a new level.

The planned naval base at the Gwadar port is aimed at getting a foothold in the great-power maritime game

The announcement that China’s first aircraft carrier is ready to set sail as early as this month-end has refocused attention on the larger Chinese naval ambitions. So also has the Pakistani defence minister’s disclosure that his country recently asked China to start building a naval base at the strategically positioned Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. More important, the dual revelations underscore China’s preference for subterfuge in making strategic moves.

Subterfuge is also apparent in China’s additional plans at Gwadar, where a Chinese-built but still-underused commercial port opened in 2007. From the time it began constructing the port, Gwadar was widely seen as representing China’s first strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and being part of its strategy to assemble a “string of pearls” along the Indian Ocean rim. It was known that Gwadar, which overlooks Gulf shipping lanes, would eventually double up as a naval base. Yet all along, Beijing continued to deny Gwadar had any role other than commercial.

NEW DELHI: In the backdrop of the ever-deepening Pakistan-China military and strategic nexus, PM Manmohan Singh on Wednesday held a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) to take stock of the security situation in India and its extended neighbourhood.

The need to rapidly modernize the Indian armed forces, with special focus on development of military capabilities on the eastern front with China, as well as the turmoil in the Af-Pak region is understood to have figured in the meeting.

Defence minister A K Antony, finance minister Pranab Mukherjee, home minister P Chidambaram, national security advisor Gopal Pillai and the three Service chiefs, among others, participated in the meeting.

The three-tier NSC consists at the apex level of Cabinet ministers, headed by the PM, with subordinate entities like the Strategic Policy Group, the Joint Intelligence Committee and the National Security Advisory Board.

As reported earlier by TOI, India is now taking steps to counter China's massive build-up of military infrastructure all along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC).

They range from deployment of Sukhoi-30MKIs and spy drones in the North-East to the raising of two new mountain infantry divisions (over 35,000 soldiers), with their HQs in Zakama (56 Div) in Nagaland and Missamari (71 Div) in Assam.

New Delhi, June 8
India’s leading strategic affairs think tank has recommended a change of ‘discourse’ on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and suggests a multi-pronged approach to counter Pakistan. Besides, it is of the view that the growing influence of China in the region too needs to be tackled.

The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in a study “PoK: Changing the discourse” released last week warns against China’s growing designs in the vital Gilgit-Baltistan area that borders the Kargil-Drass region of India. “If the current pace of Chinese penetration is sustained then China may completely take over Gilgit-Baltistan by the year 2020”, says the study. The study had a sharp focus on the mountainous region of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Explaining the Chinese interest, it says the Gilgit-Baltistan region is contiguous to China’s Xinjiang province where Muslim separatist feelings are strong. Therefore, China seems to be preparing to take over control over Gilgit-Baltistan, should the central authority in Pakistan becomes ineffective. “China has a strategic intent to dominate PoK in general and Gilgit-Baltistan in particular”, the 54-page study report says, while adding that Pakistan has ignored the resentment of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan against the increasing Chinese penetration into their area.

There is a suspicion that the Sunni majority state of Pakistan along with China may exterminate the Shia minority in Gilgit-Baltistan in order to silence all opposition.

According to one of the recommendations, “A message needs to be conveyed to China telling it that its role in PoK is totally unjustified in line with China’s stand that Kashmir is a ‘disputed territory’. China should be made to explain as to why it is engaging itself in developmental works in a region, that is claimed by India, without its consent”. The IDSA opines that the International community is waiting for India’s response to the presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan.

Suggesting an approach towards Pakistan, the IDSA study says: “There was greater need for India to take a more proactive approach on PoK, not only because it is a part of its territory but because of the high strategic stakes.” India should openly claim PoK in international fora. Also mentioned is how the discourse on autonomy in J&K needs to be dove-tailed in the context of what is taking place across the LoC in PoK. The study highlights how in PoK the term ‘Azadi’ does not go beyond the name ‘Azad Kashmir’.

The IDSA wants that the Indian government should provide scholarships to students from PoK and engage them in including the diaspora, especially those based in the West, in discussions. “Special documents should be issued to PoK residents. They may be allowed to visit India after a proper check of their antecedents. India must engage with the new emerging political leadership in PoK which is disillusioned with Pakistan’s approach”.

The IDSA had also conducted a round table in August last year on the subject by inviting global experts. IDSA started its research project in October 2009. It tracks developments in PoK and conducts in-depth research on the region.

A policy of playing the China threat in a low key makes sense if it is supplemented with a marked build-up of deterrent conventional military capability. But when India has no mountain divisions for offensive warfare on the Tibetan plateau worth the name and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can marshal as many as 28-35 divisions inside of a month, courtesy the Qinghai-Lhasa railway connecting the Chinese mainland with its western periphery, then we have a problem. We need a minimum of nine offensive mountain divisions — stalwart commanders deem 13-14 such divisions as barely adequate for the mission of credibly fighting the Chinese PLA on their ground. According to the general officer commanding one of the two new Army divisions expressly raised for offensive operations in the mountains, his formation is at present reduced to “protecting newly built border roads”. What is the guarantee that these minimal additions to the extant force, or even the full complement of 9-14 mountain divisions, equipped with light howtizers, light tanks (to debouch from the Demchok Triangle), and assault helicopters whenever these are obtained, will actually be deployed for aggressive action against China, rather than as a strong backup for the defensively arrayed formations along the border, given that the Indian armed services as a whole have, over the years, grown as passive-defensive and risk-averse as the Indian government?

Reorienting the Army to take on the PLA, however, involves much larger issues than merely raising new strike divisions for the mountains. It requires transformative ability which, in turn, depends upon organisational agility — something the Army — the senior service and a habitual laggard in these matters — is simply not good at, having undergone just two major restructurings in the last 60-odd years even as the methods and nature of war, and India’s threat reality changed radically. The first transformation happened after the shock of the 1962 war with China; the second in the late-Eighties with Gen. K. Sundarji pushing to make the Army mobile warfare capable. Assuming the government cannot increase defence spending beyond 2.5 per cent of the gross domestic product level, the manpower and financial resources necessary for an offensive capability in the mountains will have to be freed up by finessing the Army’s armoured might into a consolidated strike corps plus. There’s no way to escape making hard choices.

These and other issues were discussed at a June 3 seminar hosted by the HQ Central Command in Nainital with the Army Chief, Gen. V.K. Singh, present. One hopes Gen. Singh will initiate measures to make the Army relevant for tomorrow’s contingencies, otherwise a bigger military humiliation awaits the nation in the Himalayas.

It is often stated that at the strategic level, one requires a long memory and a longer foresight and vision. There are many people in India who have a tendency to overlook the Sino-Pak strategic nexus in the dialogue over India’s boundaries with these two countries. Boundaries are a manifestation of national identity. Disputed boundaries are often trip-wires of war.

It is, therefore, necessary to place this issue in its historical and futuristic perspective.

Soon after its Independence in 1949, China set out consolidating its historic frontiers and placing administrative authority and military boots on the ground in Tibet and Xinjiang. India did not do so and rues till date this Himalayan blunder in strategic terms. India’s northern boundary from the Sino-India-Afghanistan tri-junction to the Sino-India-Nepal tri-junction on the maps remained marked with the legend ‘Boundary Undefined’ till 1954. No serious attempt was made to establish administrative authority or place military boots on the ground in this area.

On July 1, 1954, Nehru ordered, “All old maps dealing with the frontier should be… withdrawn… new maps should not state there is any undemarcated territory… this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody.” By then, China had placed its military boots in Tibet and Aksai Chin and started the construction of a strategic road connecting Tibet to Xinjiang (China National Highway 219). Construction of this strategic road, started in 1951 but not noticed by India till 1955, was completed in 1957. It was seen in the Chinese maps published in 1958.

Nehru tried to justify the loss of Aksai Chin by calling it ‘a desolate area where not a blade of grass grows’. Nevertheless, it became one of the triggers for the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

Soon after the war, China began Xinjiang boundary negotiations with Pakistan. This was a period when both China and Pakistan were upset over the post 1962 war US military assistance to India. They signed the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement in 1963 in which Pakistan ceded Shaqsgam Valley of the Northern Areas (J&K territory, under occupation of Pakistan) to China. This agreement described the eastern termination of the Sino-Pakistan boundary at Karakoram Pass. Pakistan promptly delineated NJ 9842 on the Soltoro Range towards the North East to Karakoram Pass, ignoring “thence north to the glaciers” statement of the 1948 Karachi Agreement between India and Pakistan. The result: Karakoram Pass, till then on the boundary between India and China, now had a third party access and claimant.

China maintained a studied silence over the Pakistani cartographic manipulation. It continued to show the area north of Karakoram Pass as being under China. Meanwhile, Pakistan and China started building the Karakoram Highway, linking Xinjiang to Pakistan through the northern areas.

Pakistan’s cartographic manipulation was followed up in international mountaineering journals and Western atlases. It started sending civil and military mountaineering expeditions to the mountain peaks and glaciers in this area.

It would be noted that the Chinese were willing to negotiate and settle the boundary issue of J&K (west of Karakoram Pass) with Pakistan. But they have refused to discuss that boundary with India on the ground of its being ‘disputed’. That ‘dispute’ did not come in the way of their negotiations with Pakistan.

In April 1984, India reacted to these developments and intelligence reports about Pakistan Army plans to deploy troops in the Siachen glacier area by occupying the Soltoro Ridge (now called the Actual Ground Position Line or AGPL) to secure the glacier and the territory to its east. This deployment (a) dominates Pakistani positions in the valley west of Soltoro Ridge (b) blocks infiltration possibilities across the Soltoro Ridge passes into Ladakh (c) prevents Pakistani military adventurism in Turtuk and areas to its south. Its northernmost position at Indira Col overlooks the Shaqsgam Valley, illegally ceded by Pakistan to China, and denies Pakistani access to Karakoram Pass and beyond that to Aksai Chin.

In 1987, China and Pakistan signed the protocol to formalise the demarcation of their boundary. Its termination at Karakoram Pass and Pakistani recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin clearly indicated an understanding between them. In the late 1980s, China started assisting Pakistan on the development of nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and in large-scale sale of conventional weapons and equipment.

In 1997, China agreed to send its military commander opposite Ladakh to meet his India counterpart in Leh as a confidence-building measure. Near the date, it was proposed that the meeting be held in New Delhi instead of Leh. It had to be called off. After the Kargil war, military attaches from all countries except Pakistan were invited for a conducted tour of the battle zone. The Chinese attaché declined that invitation.

Three years ago, China started issuing “stapled visas” to visitors from J&K, thus bringing into question its status as part of India. It refused a visa to the GOC-in-C, Northern Command, who was to make an official visit to China as a part of ongoing military-level exchanges. It has now increased its civil and military presence in the northern areas, purportedly to improve infrastructure there. Among the infrastructure reconstruction projects to be given priority are those related to the repair and upgradation of the Karakoram Highway, which was damaged in 2009. China also plans to construct railway tracks and oil pipelines from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar port in Pakistan.

In December 2010, while addressing a joint session of the Pakistan parliament, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated: “To cement and advance the all-weather strategic partnership of cooperation between China and Pakistan is our common strategic choice…The two neighbouring countries are brothers forever. China-Pakistan friendship is full of vigour and vitality, like a lush tree with deep roots and thick foliage. China-Pakistan relationship is strong and solid, like a rock standing firm despite the passage of time.”

Recently, India and Pakistan resumed talks over the Siachen glacier issue. As in the past, Pakistan refuses to authenticate the AGPL and the existing troops’ positions and demands the Indian troops’ withdrawal to the pre-1972 position i.e. to the east of the line joining NJ 9842 and Karakoram Pass. Pakistan had formally authenticated the line of control in 1949 and 1972 but has consistently refused this position. The strategic consequences of a deal without such a formal authentication are obvious. Besides, it will re-introduce China into the end game because of its illegal control over the Shaqsgam Valley.

Without formal authentication of the AGPL, how does one detect any future encroachment into this area? It must be stated categorically that no amount of existing technology can have fool-proof surveillance and capability to detect small-scale infiltration, which is sufficient to hold and defend a tactical feature in this terrain. Can India afford to forego the strategic significance of the Soltoro position due to the financial cost-benefit ratio analyses? Or because not a blade of grass grows in the area? (Then why put up the Indian flag at Gangotri in South Pole?) Can India trust Pakistan to the extent of foregoing formal authentication of the AGPL after what Gen Pervez Musharraf did across the formally delineated LoC in Kargil? Our negotiators must keep all these points in mind in their discussions with Pakistani counterparts.

In his latest book On China, Henry Kissinger states that China’s strategy generally exhibits three characteristics: meticulous analysis of long-term trends, careful study of tactical options and detached exploration of operational decisions”. He describes the Chinese style of dealing with strategic decisions as “thorough analysis, careful preparations, attention to psychological and political factors, quest for surprise, and rapid conclusion.” There is much that our political leaders and officials can learn from China’s strategic thinking.

The bonhomie at the Hainan BRICS summit notwithstanding, China’s massive infrastructure build-up in Tibet is causing concern to the government of India. Defence minister A K Antony has spoken in parliament of the rapid development of rail, road, airfield and telecom infrastructure and military camps being undertaken by the Chinese authorities in Tibet. He assured the MPs that ‘necessary steps’ were being taken to counter these developments.

Antony acknowledged that a road network stretching across 58,000 km coupled with five operational airfields at Gongar, Pangta, Linchi, Hoping and Gar Gunsa have come up in Tibet. Besides, extension of the Qinghai Tibet Railway (QTR) line to Xigaze and another line from Kashgar to Hotan in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is also in progress.

Effectively controlling the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is crucial for China’s security as Tibet comprises approximately one-fourth of China’s land mass.

Control over Tibet forms part of the larger concept of Chinese national integration under President Hu Jintao’s dictum of ‘going down the road of development with Chinese characteristics and a Tibetan flavour.’ In the wake of ethnic violence in Tibet in 2008, increased force levels of the paramilitary people’s armed police, Chinese frontier guards and the garrison duty forces have been stationed in the region.

Mobile PLA

China has chosen to upgrade the infrastructure and logistics system in Tibet to enhance the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to become a more mobile and better-equipped fighting force that can be deployed faster and sustained over a longer period of time.

The concentrated expansion of infrastructure in Tibet has improved the PLA’s capability to rapidly induct integrated forces.

The QTR railway line is being further extending westwards from Lhasa to Xigaze. Along with the rapid development of the lateral road network in Tibet and a large numbers of axial roads leading to passes bordering India. The roads are being constructed to military specifications in order to be turned over to the PLA in the event of war or an internal disorder. The logistics build-up opposite India’s eastern theatre is a cause for concern since it augments the PLA’s ability to deploy rapidly from the mainland.

Construction of new airfields and the upgradation of advanced landing grounds (ALGs) and helipads in and around the TAR, coupled with the acquisition of new transport aircraft, will enhance China’s strategic airlift capability resulting in faster induction and concentration of field formations in comparatively shorter time-frames and, consequently, over shorter warning periods. The construction of airfields and ALGs closer to Indian borders boosts the PLA Air Force fighter aircrafts’ striking range and provides it the ability to strike and engage targets in India on a broad front and in depth.

Another major infrastructure development is the construction of new missile bases in Tibet. According to recent reports, China has placed advanced Dong Feng-21 medium-range ballistic missiles along the borders it shares with India. During a future conflict with India, the PLA could easily move 500 to 600 mobile ballistic missile launchers to bases close to the Indian border from their current deployment opposite Taiwan.

Complexities of the Tibetan terrain, vagaries of climate, and sustenance capacities of the thrust lines chosen, are all factors that influence the depth of operations that are planned to be undertaken. To address this aspect, the PLA is reportedly constructing Hyperbaric Chambers to facilitate the rapid acclimatisation of troops brought in from lower altitudes. It is also building the first batch of oxygen-enriched barracks using plants for troops in the TAR at the Nagchu Military Sub-Command at an altitude of 4,500 metres.

It is in the Indian interest to upgrade the logistics infrastructure in the states bordering Tibet so as to facilitate the rapid reinforcement of sectors threatened by the Chinese during any future conflict. Simultaneously, India should enhance its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to maintain all round vigil on the border. The army and the air force must also upgrade their firepower capabilities by an order of magnitude so as to engage and destroy PLA forces at a distance. It needs to be remembered that effective defence does not come cheap.

The authors are with the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi (http://www.claws.in)
Date: 06/06/2011.

The announcement that China’s first aircraft carrier is ready to set sail as early as this month-end has refocused attention on the larger Chinese naval ambitions. So also has the Pakistani defence minister’s disclosure that his country recently asked China to start building a naval base at the strategically positioned Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. More important, the dual revelations underscore China’s preference for subterfuge in making strategic moves.

After it bought the Soviet-era, 67,500-tonne Varyag carrier— which was not fully complete when the Soviet Union dismembered— China repeatedly denied it had any intention to refit it for naval deployment. For example, Zhang Guangqin, vice-director of the Chinese State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, said in 2005 that Varyag was not being modified for military use. However, work to refit Varyag had already begun earlier in Dalian, China’s main shipyard.

Yet, to deflect attention from the real plan, the idea to turn Varyag into a “floating casino” off Macau was put forward through the state-run media. And to lend credence to this idea, the smaller two of the three Soviet-era aircraft carriers, including Varyag, bought by China during 1998-2000 were developed into floating museums—one of them briefly before the carrier itself was scrapped. The first official acknowledgement that China was turning Varyag not into a floating casino, but into a fully refurbished, deployable aircraft carrier came this week, just when it became almost ready to set sail.

Subterfuge is also apparent in China’s additional plans at Gwadar, where a Chinese-built but still-underused commercial port opened in 2007. From the time it began constructing the port, Gwadar was widely seen as representing China’s first strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and being part of its strategy to assemble a “string of pearls” along the Indian Ocean rim. It was known that Gwadar, which overlooks Gulf shipping lanes, would eventually double up as a naval base. Yet all along, Beijing continued to deny Gwadar had any role other than commercial.

So Pakistani defence minister Ahmed Mukhtar’s public comments on a naval base at Gwadar deeply embarrassed Beijing. Mukhtar accompanied Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani during a recent trip to Beijing. At the end of the visit, Mukhtar reported that whatever requests for assistance the Pakistani side made, the Chinese government was more than happy to oblige, including agreeing to take over operation of the Gwadar port upon expiry of an existing contract with a Singaporean government company. Beijing also decided to gift Pakistan 50 JF-17 fighter jets.

More important, Mukhtar disclosed that Pakistan had asked China to begin building the naval base. “We would be…grateful to the Chinese government if a naval base is…constructed at the site of Gwadar for Pakistan,” he announced in a statement. He later told a British newspaper in an interview: “We have asked our Chinese brothers to please build a naval base at Gwadar.”

After Pakistan spilled the beans on the planned naval base, Beijing responded with equivocation, saying, “this issue was not touched upon” during the visit. Given China’s proclivity to make strategic moves by stealth, even its work on the Gwadar port was launched quietly. So how can work on a naval base be publicized in advance?

China also does not wish to deepen the concerns it aroused in Asia last year by openly discarding Deng Xiaoping’s dictum, tao guang yang hui (conceal ambitions and hide claws). On a host of issues, including its territorial claims on the South China Sea and against India and Japan, China spent 2010 staking out a more-muscular position.

No less revealing was the gap between China’s words and the reality. For example, it persisted with its unannounced rare-earth embargo against Japan for seven weeks while continuing to blithely claim the opposite in public—that no export restriction had been imposed. Like its denials last year on two other subjects— the deployment of Chinese troops in Pakistani-held Kashmir and its use of Chinese convicts as labourers on projects in some countries too poor and weak to protest—China has demonstrated a troubling propensity to obscure the truth.

The Chinese Communist Party’s hawkish mouthpiece, Global Times, however, has not been shy about advertising China’s interest in setting up naval bases overseas. In a recent editorial titled, “China needs overseas bases for global role,” the newspaper urged the outside world to “understand the need of China to set up overseas military bases”.

The insurrection in the mineral-rich, southern province of Baluchistan against Pakistani rule may impede Beijing’s plan to turn Gwadar into an energy trans-shipment hub transporting Gulf and African oil to western China by pipeline. But the protracted insurgency is no barrier to China’s plan to use Gwadar to project power in the Gulf and eastern Africa and against peninsula India. Indeed, to get into the great-power maritime game, it needs Gwadar to plug its main weakness—the absence of a naval anchor in the Indian Ocean region, where it plans to have important military presence.

In fact, with a second and larger aircraft carrier currently under construction, it may not be long before China shows off its naval prowess by dispatching a carrier battle group to the Indian Ocean.

Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi.

ShauryaT wrote:

In fact, with a second and larger aircraft carrier currently under construction, it may not be long before China shows off its naval prowess by dispatching a carrier battle group to the Indian Ocean.

VN condemns Chinese intrusion

Many Vietnamese Internet users have used pictures of naval soldiers as their avatars on Yahoo Messenger and Facebook, accompanied with the text “Truong Sa (Spratly) and Hoang Sa (Paracel) belong to Vietnam”.

Vietnamese Internet users have expressed their attitude against China’s intrusion into Vietnam’s waters and its distortion of the history about Vietnam’s sovereignty over Truong Sa and Hoang Sa archipelagos on forums and social networks.

They have opened many fan pages on Facebook to discuss and call for people to support Vietnam’s sovereignty over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. These fan pages are named “Hoang Sa – Truong Sa belong to Vietnam”, “I love Vietnam”, “Fans of Vietnamese Flag”, “Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh”, etc.

These fan pages have had hundreds of thousands of members. These pages are updated with information about the East Sea. Fan pages also hold events to confirm Vietnam’s sovereignty in the East Sea, for example the event to collect 87 million signatures protesting China’s intrusion into Vietnam’s waters, the call to change avatars, etc.

Members believe that changing avatars with the picture of Vietnamese naval soldiers who are defending Vietnam’s sovereignty in the sea will make a domino effect in the online community, which will attract the attention of international friends.

“This is a small action but it shows the youth’s patriotism. We are proud to partly contribute our effort to defend our country,” a member wrote on his blog.

Besides topics about Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, topics on patriotism, lessons from history in defending the country are also discussed enthusiastically.

Tension in the East Sea has become the common interest of the nation. The online community, which is said to be only interest in entertaining issues, is now very serious with politics. Many people post their deep analysis about the East Sea issue.

One wrote on his blog: “The East Sea dispute will continue more complicatedly. We have to be watchful and skilful to struggle in all aspects, especially in the diplomatic field to take advantage of the unity of international community. We also have to show our determination and our firm standpoint: Hoang Sa and Truong Sa belong to Vietnam’s sovereignty”.

MANIILA, Philippines – Albay Governor Joey Salceda, a political ally of President Aquino, urged Filipinos on Sunday to band together and boycott China-made products in retaliation to Beijing ’s “bullying’’ in the country’s territory.

“Let us boycott ‘Made in China’ products, buy Filpino. Let us hurt them where it counts. We also protect our children and communities from the pervasive and persistent risks of various types of contamination and poor quality of their products,’’ said Salceda in a speech during an Independence Day ceremony at the Albay provincial hall.

Salceda said retaliation through trade against China’s repeated intrusions in Spratlys Islands and the West Palawan Sea has become the only viable alternative to ordinary Fiilpinos since military provocation was not an option.

The governor said the country could not depend on other countries in fighting off “not only threats to our national sovereign territory” but also actions that bring “shame to our dignity as a race and as a nation.’’

The Philippines posted a $900-million trade deficit with China in 2010, said Salceda. The country imported $7 billion worth of goods from China while shipping a little over $6 billion goods to China, but Salceda reckoned this was actually bigger as he estimated that another $3 billion worth of goods were being smuggled from China and were sold in Divisoria.
Salceda said that boycotting China-made goods would force exporters to seek alternative markets for their products and prompt industries to get their inputs from other sources. He said that China has placed little foreign direct investments and soft loans to the country. Most of the Filipino workers are deployed in Hong Kong and Macau, not in the Mainland, according to Salceda.

“The consequences of a China economic reprisal are offset by the strategic benefits of national unity and dignity, which by themselves are priceless. The risks of China boycott are reasonable and affordable when compared to the costs to national well-being of other options or of doing nothing,’’ said Salceda.

“Sure, it will not bring mighty China to their knees but it would make loud and clear to the imperial mandarins of Beijing that all Filipinos are united in their sentiment: enough to the bullying that tramples upon our dignity as a nation,” he said.
“This should send a strong signal to the Chinese people who shares kinship in our humanity that their rulers are committing these infringements in their name,’’ added Salceda, a former top stock market analyst and economic adviser of the previous Arroyo administration.

Of all the territorial claims in the South China Sea, the Sino-Vietnamese dispute is the most likely to lead to armed conflict. First, both countries have engaged in naval skirmishes in the South China Sea before. In 1974, the Chinese navy gained complete control of the Paracel islands after routing the South Vietnamese navy. In 1988, China and Vietnam fought a brief naval battle in the Spratlys. Second, Chinese claims in the Spratlys are generally considered weak under international law because, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, China would have difficulty proving the reefs it currently occupies meet the standards of self-sustaining and inhabitable islands (which then will have a 200 miles exclusive economic zone, or EEZ). But that isn’t the case with the Paracels, which China has effective control over, but which Vietnam continues to claim. The 200-mile EEZ of the Paracels and the 200-mile EEZ extending from Vietnam’s coastal line overlap. According to reports, the incident in which a Chinese patrol boat severed the multi-million dollar seismic survey cable operated by a PetroVietnam research vessel took place in this disputed zone.

shyamd wrote:Guanbu (PRC state intel) and Mongolia's GIA (General Intel Agency) are fighting it out in Ulan Bator. PRC thinks the GIA organised farmer and school children protests.

shyamd wrote:Guanbu (PRC state intel) and Mongolia's GIA (General Intel Agency) are fighting it out in Ulan Bator. PRC thinks the GIA organised farmer and school children protests.

BEIJING, China — Amid the escalating dispute over territorial waters in the South China Sea, China’s rivals are toying with a simple idea: change the name of the sea.

A petition drive from Vietnam to change the South China Sea’s name to the Southeast Asia Sea is gaining followers. Meanwhile, the Philippines has another proposal.

“When people keep referring to the South China Sea, there is a subliminal message that this sea belongs to a country whose name appears in the name,”