Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II

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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

negi ji,
e-khat sent. You can remove address. Regards.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by negi »

^ Boss you have mail.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Yemen will descend into civil war again. It is critical that India chooses sides carefully around the Gulf. No one there is a permanent friend or enemy of India. Even Iran may not continue for a very long time under its current form of mullahcracy.

It is also crucial not to just see at the temprorary or immediate gains based on apparent strengths. Supporting the hereditary rulers/sheiks/emirs may seem lovely for the moment. But the social dynamics of the area is changing. If India repeats the mistakes of the West which supported reactionary and feudal regimes in the hope of crushing liberal/democratic/"leftist" within the Arab world - then India will suffer just as west is now suffering.

Indian Marxists are already proving their fantastic incapacity for looking into the future by opposing intervention in favour of the anti-Gaddafi forces. It only shows that just a theorteical commitment to progress and "popular democracy" may not be able to maks feudal attitudes.

The future trend shoudl be clear. There will be radical opposition to the older feudal or dynastic regimes within the Arab world. If the more modernizing or liberal apsects of this movement are not nurtured and protected, the radicalism will be used by the Islamists.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

From the overall reaction of GOI towards the ME and North African dissent and movements against long established and dynastic regimes, it appears that those in power in the rashtra are not quite comfortable with what is happening. The main external assault that will have a long term effect on internal political thinking is the continuous international highlighting of the issue of "corruption", especially among political leadership of India.

What the pro-Congress media does in general is to make an equal equal between every highlighted case of corruption against the Congress, with some allegation against the BJP. It is possible that the "Hindu" group decided to come out with trying to save at least one contingent of the Indian political spectrum by taking the overt stance of "against corruption irrespective of party" - and leaving out any allegation of corruption of the "Left". But in general what the media has been successful in doing is that both major blocks of political forces in India have been tarred and feathered by the same brush.

This could have been a tactic dictated by the perceptions of the Congress think tanks. Problem is that in trying to keep the dynasty pristine clean, the whole exercise becomes suspect - because how can incorruptible dynastic leadership be sitting around on their bums at the top of a shark pyramid of power and privileges and control, where not a single leaf in the Congress tree moves without the grace of the supreme leader, and corruption is rampant at all levels below the topmost one!! Over time this is bound to fuse the entire Congress, including its dynasty, into one single public image of lack of integrity.

Where does it leave the next and upcoming tech savvy generation of bloggers and web-addicts of India, who like every generation disillusioned by the fall of all idols and all icons fed them by media and society, may turn to an idealistic expression of a desire to "change" it all? I think the political masters are already thinking of this and we may see increasing surveillance and attempts at suppressing such tendencies. That in itself in turn prepares the way for "revolutions"! Interesting times ahead!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by devesh »

^^^problem is that there are Congress think tanks. no national think tanks. no think tanks that deal with India as a whole, not as as the gate keepers of Congress. bodies like the FINS forum are a good start. the next step for FINS and like minded people would be to organize some kind of a think tank like institution with regular periodicals being sent out, say once every quarter. later they can increase it to monthlies.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

What do you think we are?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by devesh »

ramana,

BRF is unparallelled as a bastion of Bharatiya thought. but it would also be good to have some kind of a magazine or periodical that is focused on Indian thinking. major magazines and print media are all under influence of other factors. it would be good to make an entry into print media.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Klaus »

^^^ Devesh ji, please check this link: viewtopic.php?f=24&t=4667&hilit=open+source+intelligence.

There is also Security Research Review as a sister project of Bharat Rakshak. Of course, one idea which I've had for a long time is to completely revamp a newspaper like the Pioneer, given that it suffers from a lack of funds and is basically being run as a hand-to-mouth enterprise. A refurbished platform like Pioneer could give us an entry into MSM.

IMO, any such move needs to be low-key as there are other forces who are keen on compromising the integrity of the project from Day 1, not to speak of the loss of anonymity that any such nationalist voice would face.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by somnath »

^^^Its an interesting thought - converting BRF into something more than a blog, something more "mainstream"...

There are multiple angularities:
1. What medium of "mainstreaming" do you want to adopt? Print or Internet? The former is horrendously expensive, and to be sure for a strategic affairs sort of platform, its not a sine qua non..Internet is good enough..This is a relatively easy one..

2. The trickier piece - what level of "mainstreaming" do you want? The level of Force, or India Strategic? Or at the level of Project Syndicate or Edge? Or even above that, at the level of Nature? The first option is well populated IMO - there are tons of outlets focused on India now pretty much on the same issues that BRF would be interested in...Plus, the level of funding required for such initaitves would be typically high, as you would need a reasonably large team of full time staff..#2 and/or #3 would be more plausible - especially #3, I dont think there is any peer reviewed journal in India looking at strategic issues (something like Brookings), or even non-peer reviewed collaborative efforts like Edge and Project Syndicate..The issue with this is there needs to be a core team of people laying down editorial guidelines and most importantly a core group of contributors who regularly contribute! And these guys, at least some of them, need to have credibility...Something in the lines of Pragati to a certain extent...

3. Trickiest issue..Funding...Even for a collaborative effort, it helps to have a small group working full-time, which will need funding...Sometimes, op-ed pieces will need to be paid for as well, which too requires funding...It cant be on the basis of donations/subscriptions - not sustainable...There needs to be an anchor angel investor who puts in some seed capital to start off...
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

BRM and SRR never had any paid articles. The idea of publishing in an India first e-zine was novel and had its marquee value. In fact in one Aero India we had printed copies given out.
I don't mind if people set up blogs and follow the gist of threads in the forum.
Each one reach out.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

I know that a whole subforum is devoted to military capability analysis. It is also a minefield of opinions. But what I have remained curious about is the lack of a debate on the strategic importance of indigenous military hardware and capability development. I have tried to raise the discussion on this from time to time, but we appear to be more focused on the technical finesse aspect only.

Indigenous capacity development is a key to political independence and projection of Indian interests beyond current spheres. It is also a stimulant for many aspects of the economy. In fact a large part of the opposition from upwardly aspiring sections of population to "military development" or any international or political steps that can be seen to increase chances of "war" - could lie in their fear that such situations could lead to diversion of investments into defense sectors, from which they cannot profit. Indigenous military capacity development could be used to rope this section in also.

What can be done?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by kittoo »

I experienced something a few days back that might be of relevance here. Had my GD-PI session at one of the best MBA schools in India (hint: Non-IIM, one of the top 10). Before GD-PIs, we had to get our docs checked. All the docs were being checked in one hall by 4 different panels (different for every category). Each panel was announcing the name of the next student to come. I noticed that in the SC/ST group, a lot of Christians were there, far far above than the national average. Almost 50% of them were Christians. I personally never been to south so have little idea how much conversion has been done but if that was any indicator, a lot of conversion has taken place it seems. Looks like more than half of dalits in south have been converted.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ManuT »

RD, from Libya thread.
What you are saying here is a version of the narrative that was very often repeated by CNN and the New York Times as justification for "US compulsion to keep India out of any Afghanistan solution." It is a very convenient justification for the US, which was no more willing than Pakistan to have India play a military or political role in any Afghan solution. It would have thrown all of Washington's geostrategic calculations out of whack if India gained influence in Afghanistan as a result of Op Enduring Freedom... something far more important in the long term than "catching Bin Laden."

We know that Armitage threatened Mush with Pakistan being bombed back to the stone age if he did not comply. Add to this the fact that Pakistan's economy was, as always, in the toilet and could only stand to gain from any sort of economic and military aid from the US. Does that seem as if Pakistan was in any position to be dictating terms or "imposing conditions" on the US for its GUBO? I don't believe that for a minute. It is all very well for the US to say "oh, we kept India out of Enduring Freedom because Pakistan wanted it that way," when in fact the US also wanted it that way, at least as much as the Pakistanis did.
No sir, my narrative is driven by the question a I have often wondered (in my spare time) "Soviet Union decides to invade Afghanistan. US decides to back *mujahideen*. How many Indians die?" (hint: K2. K2 one of the stages of TOPAC known better by its other name)
IMO, i.e. because the 'last known position' of US policy upto that point was in TSP's favour. It was based in US belief in TSP's ability to deliver.
Again, I have heard too many times about how the US was ignorant, delusional, naive, stupid, far too trusting and bhola-bhala in believing that Pakistan would be its loyal friend and ally against the Taliban.

Unkil did not become Unkil by being naive or ignorant. The US knew, and observed, and attempted to influence events in Afghanistan right since the end of the Soviet occupation... even though it is their popular media narrative (propaganda) that they had just forgotten all about Afghanistan and "ignored the region until 9-11." They were in fact very much present, setting up Kekmatyar against Mojadeddi, blessing (if not actively helping) the Benazir/Aslam Beg program to bring Afghanistan under Pakistani influence via the Taliban, inviting the Taliban for TAP pipeline talks in the US under the Clinton Administration, and carrying on a dialogue with the Taliban via a team of State Dept. interlocutors headed by Robin Raphel, even after OBL had been given shelter there as a wanted fugitive from US law following the African Embassy bombings.

The US went along every step of the way, and every step was calibrated to maximize Pakistani influence via the Taliban in Central Asia. Even terrorism against US citizens and economic interests was not allowed to risk or compromise this larger goal in any way. Today they say "oh, we ignored the region from 1989-2001", because that sounds like a far less damning mistake than "oh, we relentlessly and continuously supported the same people who came back and bombed our world trade center, and will continue doing so in the name of geostrategy."

There is absolutely no way the US did not know what it was going in for by forming an alliance with the TSPA in 2001. Any notion that they imagined having full and honest support from the TSPA/ISI... whom they knew so very well... simply does not hold water.

That we choose to believe this hogwash about poor ignorant US being taken for a 10-year, 18 billion dollar ride by the wily Pakis, ignoring ground realities, forgiving nuclear proliferation, and absorbing terrorist attacks on their own interests shows only one thing. It's not the US, but we who are still delusional about this.
Like you I took have followed these event and the rise of Taliban, because of the visible hand of TSPA mil adviors.

Ignorant. I am comparing it to the general awareness of people based on their awareness of IA-814 hijacking, USS Cole bombing. For 911, obviously public had no clue, where as people like you and me there was not doubt. The state department also had no clue - Saddam or Timothy McVeigh or ....OBL.
When I compare it to now, when a subway bombing Moscow happens, the man on the average joe is much more aware. (Also, UK after the London bombings have also become more aware of the threat from their 'we know so much better' attitude. So that pretending ended there)
Ignorant. example OBL's escape from Tora Bora. If experts US state dept and Pentagon had any real understanding of how the area functions they would have never trusted the Afghan militia to do the job. They would have never allowed the remants to get santuaries in TSP and regroup (because otherwise it means they themselves were abetting in providing santuaries to AQ-Taliban leftovers and that OBL is in one of the CIA safehouses).
If today AQ-Taliban has become what it is, because it has been nursed back by the ISI-TSPA combine. There is ample evidence to support this WRT to LET. If TSPA is really not cracking down on AQ-Taliban it is because it can't.
State Dept does to things that are at a varience of US's truer interest. There is a historical momentum of culture of lobbism that allows it to happen. The amount of this varience is proportional to the ignorance of the average joe in the past, partly to blame. That ignorance has reduced now, still a long way to go, but potentially it gives less leverage to State Dept to act against its truer interests.
They were always aware of it, and always preferred it to any chance of India having a role in the military-political dispensation of post-Taliban Afghanistan. No matter how bad or costly the duplicitous game, it was preferable in their geostrategic worldview.
Nothing is cast in stone, Sir, for the future. Only limitations are what Indians can think off.
Drones are a palliative measure designed to inflict harm on specific proxies who are undermining the US' mission in Afghanistan. They are only controlling a symptom. Nothing is being done against the "cause" of the disease, because it is still an article of faith in US foreign policy making circles that this "cause" is necessary to sustain and support for long-term geopolitical purposes.
IMO, it is being done because it is cheaper. I do not see a role for TSP's, for US POV, in the region beyond stabilizing Afghanistan.
Why are you disappointed? State Dept with CIA input formulates US foreign policy, and backing TSPA/ISI as a geopolitical proxy for West and Central Asia is an absolute cornerstone of US foreign policy. You are only disappointed because you assumed otherwise to begin with.
This is because, if anything, it puts State Dept at a disadvantage, becuase everyone else is reading it and learning from it. The lessons learned will be used against, guess who, State Department. SD could have made it be a learning exercise, because there is pretty valid criticism of it in places.
In the matter of a few weeks since the RD affair you expect things have changed? I'm afraid you are going to be disappointed again.
RD is not the only straw in the wind. Outing of station chief and before that bombing of CIA team in Afghanistan are the other two.
I don't see how this has any relevance to my original point, which is that India was not invited, and its participation was not encouraged, in any military enforcement of a NFZ in Libya... so on what basis were we going to go in? Were we going to ask to join, and then be told "no thanks?" For all you know this might have been exactly what happened, even before the UNSC vote. End result, we're not invited and we're not there... so it makes eminent sense for us not to have committed ourselves politically in favour of the whole adventure.
I guess, now we will never know. BTW, UAE just joined. Some of those, I suspect, ex-TSPAF, but that is another game.
India *always* had more credibility and appreciation among Afghans than the Pakis or the US. We have tried to play our cards there as well as we can, following the removal of Taliban. Thanks to our friends in Karzai's regime we have been able to maintain a presence with economic, humanitarian and developmental aid which has enhanced our goodwill.

But we do not have any influence on the military-political dispensation in Afghanistan, and in that sense we play a negligible role in the "Afghan solution". We were relegated to the back-bench during the London conference on Afghanistan, and kept entirely out of the Turkey summit. I simply can't believe that this was only because of the demands of a third-rate beggar nation like Pakistan. It was because this suits the geopolitical priorities of the West... period.
As long as India shows up, call it investment.
Not sure what you are saying here. Yes, I agree it is P3 out of P5 who are leading the Libyan operation, but where does wikileaks come into the picture?
Wikileaks as the starting point of the domino effect we are seeing now.
It seems that what you are saying is that Indian foreign policy only succeeds if India punishes TSP with US help. If India punishes TSP by itself, or US punishes TSP without India on board, then India has somehow "failed"?

Well, if what you say is true, we should reconcile ourselves to failure. The US will never, ever, ever allow India to benefit from any punishment of TSP that the US undertakes unilaterally. That is, unless something occurs to drastically alter US geostrategic calculations at the most foundational level. I cannot even imagine what that might be (even Paki nuclear proliferation to Iran/Libya/North Korea and the loss of NYC's twin towers were not enough.)

Likewise, if the US punishes TSP with any Indian help of any kind, it will STILL insist on complete control of whatever happens in Pakistan afterwards. Any cursory glance at history reveals that the US has no use for allies... only subsidiaries, and subsidiaries don't get any say in dividing the spoils. The only way we will be able to assert our influence in Pakistan in that situation will be to oppose the US once the job is done, as the Soviets did following the end of WW2. Do we have the "dum" for this?

In fact the only way at present, that we have any guarantee of controlling the post TSPA/ISI dispensation of Pakistan is to do the job ourselves, and without the US having any locus standi in the matter.
Yes, that should be role of the Diplomatic Corps/Foreign Policy. That should be its job because today we are learning to survive a nuclear strike. (Today it should be opposing the invitation of Gilani to Mohali, as there is no institutional support for this. A PM is not supposed to act on his personal preferences.)

What I am sayig is:

The then US envoy, wikileaks, has reported that he was sure that India would never allow Pakistan to develop a nuclear weapon. Morarji Desai was categorical that India would declare war if it came to know. Did we?

Who tipped Zia that Israelis were planning to bomb Kahuta? Any why (for the fear of a conventional war! That seems were appealling now in the shape of cold start doctrine)?

If 99 was the wake up call, what was 62?
If 62 was the wake up call, what was 99?
If 99 was wake up call, a decade hence, what did India learn?

Let me put this thought forward.
There would have been no Kargil if Haji Pir had not been returned. There would not have a need to return Haji Pir had before that IA had not been paused and a reference to UN not been made.

From the Dec 71 to Dec 08, what strategic game India has played other than to say today that we were never preferred or blame colonialism.

My opinion is, play the game.
Last edited by ManuT on 26 Mar 2011 21:37, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ShauryaT »

brihaspati wrote:I know that a whole subforum is devoted to military capability analysis. It is also a minefield of opinions. But what I have remained curious about is the lack of a debate on the strategic importance of indigenous military hardware and capability development. I have tried to raise the discussion on this from time to time, but we appear to be more focused on the technical finesse aspect only.

What can be done?
It is not that people are not interested. Indeed many here know the real situation. We celebrate the successes, even little ones to keep our morale high. The truth is the politicians know that without indigenous military industrial capability, we can never occupy our rightful place.

But, when the focus of the structure is not on governance but to perpetuate loot then even this will suffer, making the core hollow protected by an iron fence. How long the iron fence will hold is only a matter of time.

Among many things, the first thing is to create an awareness that at least 3% of the our budget should be spent on defense.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

All the logic that I find being given, ultimately reduces to two basic ones :
(a) The development time/risk/uncertainty versus sure result if bought from outside
(b) Buying and external collaboration helps in indigenous research, and is actually cheaper than costs of R&D.

There are millions of debates on both sides of these two points. Question is different though. Those who developed stuff and from whom we buy, actually did so by both copying and furiously investing in technologies of war with a specific aim of making it a national project. For these powers, military capacity to overwhelm neighbours and distant non-neighbours was crucial part of their economic upliftment. At the time they invested in tech for war, their economies were actually far behind the economies that they managed to colonize [or dominate supply chains sufficiently to control export and production and the market/trade] and exploit for ultimate growth - in economic terms.

So why is the failure to see this fundamental logic of indigenous capacity development by furious investment in R&D - accepting that there will be a hundred failures before a success, while "copying" and "appropriating" others' stuff at the same time - but all essentially aimed at gaining military dominance of as many regions as possible? This is not an economic or hardware question - its all about the strategic thrust of the nation!

Preparing for war, technologically even - leads to some positive effects on the domestic economy and drives innovation and skill. It frees us from a lot of compromises that we have to submit to diplomatically. If we never go to war, or don't ever plan to - why try to keep up in the arms race at all by trying to buy the latest "offerings" from the usual suspects? Is not that also a waste in economic terms - investing in pricey things you say you never intend to use? So why not do it properly - and in a way that also benefits the economy!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Klaus »

B ji, what is the likelihood of a retrogressive ideology taking root in a society owing to the effect of linguistics and geography shaping a certain type of reptilian mindset/behavior and/or cannibalistic ideology?

Specifically, what I want to know is that if the Arabic language itself, through its semantics, phonetics and speech patterns influenced a retrogressive lifestyle amongst the population of the Arabian peninsula during the 3rd to mid-5th century AD. Modern neurological research and related empirical studies has proved that Arabic is a language that stimulates the least number of neurons in the left-hemisphere of the brain (which is the analytical side) as compared to English or other Germanic/Latin family languages. Compare this with Hebrew and Japanese which is known to stimulate the highest number of neurons/nodes in the left-hemisphere alongwith showing significant activity in the right hemisphere too (which is the intuitive hemisphere).

Given that fewer nodes being stimulated implies that a smaller percentage of brain potential being used, this would mean that such a society would obviously find it difficult to compete in a world which is looking to take off technologically, thus they start looking out for the easy way out which is misappropriation, jihad, loot, rape and plunder. The 6th century AD just gave them a suitable outlet in the form of a sect called Islam and the plunder started in earnest from then onwards. The 6th century was also the time when this ideology fed off other competing ideologies in the Arabian peninsula and started hunting for kufr.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

^^Possible to explore - but GDF perhaps? :)
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Is the Saudi-India friendship facilitated by US interests?
http://m.thehindu.com/news/the-india-ca ... 47976.ece/
A stronger Saudi-Indian relationship can bolster U.S. interests insofar as it enhances regional stability, supports political moderation, and advocates for more open investment and economic development.
[...]
8. (C) India also remained concerned that Saudi funding for religious schools and organizations contributed to extremism in both India and Pakistan. ""Indian Islam is a tolerant Islam, and we cannot abide by the spread of extremist views."" The GOI remains concerned about charitable contributions from Saudi sources to South Asia.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

A brief but good outline of what it may mean to do business with official, clean, and state linked financial institutions from KSA:
http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/27/04/news1.shtml
When the reports surfaced, Haifa bint Faisal, wife of Saudi ambassador Bandar bin Sultan, acknowledged that she sent nearly $150,000 to the wife of a Saudi living in San Diego. The recipient, Majeda Ibrahin Dweikat, signed over some of the checks to a friend whose husband, Omar al-Bayoumi (with Dweikat’s husband), helped hijackers Khalid Almidhar and Nawaf Alhazmi find housing in San Diego, open bank accounts, get Social Security cards, pay expenses and arrange flying lessons in Florida.

U.S. authorities suspected days after September 11 that al-Bayoumi, by then in Birmingham, England, had helped the hijackers. The British arrested him and, in a search of his house, found phone records showing calls to two diplomats at the Saudi Embassy in Washington. Lacking conclusive evidence, they released him, and he is now believed back in Saudi Arabia.

U.S. authorities continued to investigate his connections. FBI spokesman Ed Cogswell told In These Times that the bureau had discovered the bint Faisal money transfers when it examined al-Bayoumi’s accounts. (Records would have included the check endorsed to al-Bayoumi’s wife.) Bint Faisal insists she did not knowingly aid the terrorists—that she did not even know the woman—but was only giving charity to Dweikat, a thyroid patient, whose husband had written seeking funds to pay medical bills.

Yet the revelation again raises questions about U.S. policy, which has consistently supported the Saudi oil monarchy in spite of its refusal to cooperate with the United States in investigations of terrorist attacks against Americans.

The links between bint Faisal’s powerful Saudi family and financing of terrorism are even more extensive, however. The trails of both Omar al-Bayoumi, the man who aided the hijackers, and that of the financial network of bint Faisal’s family each lead to Osama bin Laden.

According to a 1996 U.S. State Department report, al-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum, Sudan, was capitalized by bin Laden and wealthy members of Sudan’s National Islamic Front. Bin Laden invested $50 million in the bank. Mohammed al-Faisal, bint Faisal’s brother, is an investor and board member at al-Shamal.

Al-Shamal appears to have been a bin Laden bank of choice. Al-Qaeda members had accounts in al-Shamal, according to testimony during U.S. trials surrounding the 1998 attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. One al-Qaeda collaborator, Essam al-Ridi, recounted how bin Laden transferred $230,000 from al-Shamal to a bank in Arizona to buy a plane to fly Stinger missiles from Pakistan to Sudan.

One of the bank’s three founding members and major shareholders is Saleh Abdullah Kamel. A major financial and media power in the Arab world, he is in addition the chairman of the Dallah al-Baraka Group (DBG). Al-Bayoumi was assistant to the Director of Finance for Dallah Avco, a DBG company that works with the Saudi aviation authority. The Wall Street Journal has reported that the United States believes the Dallah al-Baraka Bank, another DBG company, was also used by al-Qaeda.

Mohammed Al-Faisal is president of Dar al-Mal al-Islami (DMI), the House of Finance of Islam. This Geneva-based bank is charged with distributing subsidies of the royal family in the Muslim world. DMI, founded in 1981 and with assets of an estimated $3.5 billion, also has connections to the bin Laden family: Its 12-member board of directors includes Haydar Mohamed bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s half-brother, and Khalid bin Mahfouz, whose sister Kaleda is one of Osama bin Laden’s wives. (Bin Mahfouz was indicted by the United States in the notorious BCCI banking scandal, which defrauded depositors of $9 billion, and in 1995 paid a $225-million fine.)

DMI and al-Shamal are not the only banks that link al-Faisal to Osama bin Laden. Al-Faisal’s DMI is also a major shareholder of al-Taqwa, the bank registered in the Bahamas and based in Switzerland that was shut down last November after Washington blacklisted it as a centerpiece of bin Laden’s financial network. The United States has not, however, blacklisted al-Shamal.

These banking connections are compounded by long-standing questions about the function of some Saudi charities. At a December press conference in Washington, Saudi adviser Adel al-Jubeir said, “We have not found a direct link or support from the Saudi charities to terrorist groups.”

Despite al-Jubeir’s claims, one major Saudi charity—the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), which directs millions of dollars a year to fundamentalist movements—has strong connections to bin Laden. A 1999 Jordanian intelligence report, obtained by In These Times, said that Islamic Relief, “used by bin Laden’s men,” was active in the Balkans, Chechnya, Azerbaijan and Kashmir.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

An interesting sequence to ponder about Prince Bandar and his recent visit to India - even if it is from Iranian views [with compilations from other sources :

LINK
Press Tv
September 27, 2010

The whereabouts of Saudi Arabia’s former US envoy Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz remains unknown nearly two years after his mysterious disappearance.
He was last spotted following a meeting with King Abdullah in Jeddah on December 10, 2008.

The prince was appointed secretary general of the National Security Council by Saudi Arabia’s sixth monarch King Abdullah in October 2005. In September 2009, he was reappointed to the post, but he failed to arrive for the official pledge of allegiance to the king. Surprisingly Prince Bandar’s absence did not garner much media attention.

Known as “Bandar Bush” because of his close relations with former US president George W. Bush, the 61-year-old was born in the western city of Ta’if, in Mecca Province. He is the son of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz. Dr. Sabri Anousheh, an expert on Middle East and Saudi affairs, links the disappearance of Prince Bandar with Saudi arms deals.

The prince’s father played a crucial role in Saudi arms acquisition and was previously in charge of overseeing the country’s military expenditure and arms deals, Anousheh notes. He was elected as the Saudi ambassador to Washington in 1983, and held the position for over two decades. Prince Bandar became so intimated with US government officials that he was deemed an insider.

Bob Woodward, the renowned US journalist who played a key role in revealing the Watergate scandal, demonstrates Bandar’s influence in his book Plan of Attack. Woodward says Bush informed his Secretary of State Colin Powell of his plans for launching the 2003 invasion of Iraq only after discussing the scenario with Prince Bandar.

Iraq’s Buratha News Agency has recently said it has evidence proving that that the Saudi national security chief was responsible for arming terrorist organizations in the Middle East. The agency claims Prince Bandar has assumed leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq, financing and equipping the terrorist group. In August 2009, Saad al-Faqih, the head of the opposition group Islamic Reform Movement, told Arab-language Al-Alam channel that Prince Bandar was placed under house arrest after his plot to stage a coup against King Abdullah was discovered and foiled.

In September 2009, British daily the Independent reported that the prince, who was staying in Britain at the time, had not appeared in public for several weeks. The report triggered rumors that Prince Bandar is seeking to ascend to the Saudi throne. Semi-official reports say the prince is running secret underground operations in France, while other repots say he has been spotted several times across the European country.

Speculation about his whereabouts may differ, but all analysts agree that regardless of his current location, Prince Bandar is enjoying the US government’s full support and is running, equipping and financing terror organizations in Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan.
He then "reappears" :
http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/102313.html
Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the kingdom's former ambassador to the United States, is reportedly under house arrest over a conspiracy against the monarch.

Saad al-Faqih, head of the opposition group Islamic Reform Movement, told Arab-language TV al-Alam that Prince Bandar has been disappeared and the media has published no word from the ex-diplomat's whereabouts since nearly three months ago. According to al-Faqih, the prince first disappeared in Britain but he returned to the kingdom shortly afterwards.

He added that after Saudi officials discovered that he had provoked 200 agents working for the Saudi security service to stage a coup against King Abdullah, he was put under house arrest. Al-Faqih said people close to the king had disclosed Bandar's plots and foiled them.

He said Saudi sources believe that intelligence provided by some Arab countries help the Saudi monarch foil Prince Bandar's conspiracy. Power struggle between members of the Saudi royal family has been common as power is shared among some 200 princes out of the estimated 7000 family members.

Known as Bandar Bush because of his close relations with former US President George W Bush, the prince is son of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz.
What is interesting is the link to the US, and what the Iranian news agency is not highlighting - is the role of the next posible heir - Nayef, who is reputed to be an ultra-conservative and heads the Interior Ministry.

It is interesting to note that the recent demos from Saudis in KSA was also against the Interior ministry. So the US role [or a gov independent longer term secret services role] in the current bonhomie between current GOI and GCC representatives very likely - especially given that Prince Bandar has been activated on this.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by svinayak »

Good article to understand how they think in the west about India and its challenges.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/internatio ... 585388.ece
Top analyst outlines possibility of India abandoning “strategic restraint” doctrine

NARAYAN LAKSHMAN
A top analyst in Washington has described India’s possible abandonment of its “strategic restraint,” or reticence to use force as an instrument of policy, as potentially “revolutionary.”

However he has argued that the doctrine’s roots are too strong and India’s “survival despite failures, including against China and Pakistan, suggest that it will endure.”

In a recent paper entitled, Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine? Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution in Washington, along with Sunil Dasgupta of the University of Maryland, noted that India has shown strategic restraint historically towards aggressive neighbours such as Pakistan and China.

In this light, they argue, “Linear projections of current trends do not predict India abandoning its strategic restraint; for that, it will require a major and unforeseeable disruption at home or abroad.”

The authors suggest that while a strategically and militarily assertive India could be “revolutionary,” perhaps even end India’s 60-year strategic equivalence with Pakistan and precipitate a more competitive relationship with China, it is unlikely to abandon strategic restraint with each of its neighbours for specific reasons.

Regarding China, Mr. Cohen and Mr. Dasgupta suggest that the India-China bilateral relationship has been as cooperative as it has been conflicting, and a number of Indians “including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” who would prefer to avoid an expensive arms race with China that will detract India from its primary task of economic development.

In the context of Pakistan, the paper leans more towards the case for India abandoning strategic restraint, arguing, “The potential of a failed Pakistan would have horrendous consequences, and India seeks to be strategically active in limiting the fallout of a collapse.”

Yet, they note, India has not moved to abandon strategic restraint and “develop the institutional capacity to deal with such an eventuality.”
http://www.twq.com/11spring/docs/11spri ... _Cohen.pdf
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

But is not that article based on a study of the current crop of leadership that they have opportunity to study and keep under surveillance? How can they really compute anything about dark horses, unexpected or unforeseen leaderships, groups, etc? For a country as complex intellectually and politically as India, such simplistic Cohenisque projections are not really predictive. Calculation based on a certain brother is likely to be trumped in the long run - and I have projected that long before Wikipee speculation about it. Whereas the sis would be the more likely candidate. But even there, there are problem for the very long run. So the dynasty and the Congress is nearing its end - even if it seems to be at the peak of its power. Will BJP rise to fill up the gap? It might, but it might not be allowed to. Does that guarantee a continued following up of external interests? Yes, perhaps for a short time. But such an attempt at ensuring continued subservience or fear of foreign interests about Indian behaviour might also backfire. Giving rise to forces beyond foreign control. So the future is not predictably as simple as Cohen pretends.

It seems that they are swallowing, hook line and sinker - the impressions created and claimed by the top rung of the Congress or the BJP. The latter party leaders themselves could be wily and slippery as the eel where they know they are being observed. I would suggest that it would be impossible to guess what really is in the inscrutable Indian "mind" and Cohen and others of his persuasion should probably start doubting their own conclusions - to start with. Only by doubting constantly what you seriously want to believe can you get closer to the objective behind that belief. Because then it subjects the objective to the severest drubbing down and one begins to see the weaknesses and errors that need to be corrected.

America can only see in the short term up to the memory of Potsdam. UK cannot see beyond a lost empire. China only sees a Long March. Each country is partly hung up in its dreams of a glory already gone past, and hence cannot see the potentials for radical changes in the direction of nations it looks down upon towards upsetting international power equations.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by svinayak »

brihaspati wrote:But is not that article based on a study of the current crop of leadership that they have opportunity to study and keep under surveillance? How can they really compute anything about dark horses, unexpected or unforeseen leaderships, groups, etc? For a country as complex intellectually and politically as India, such simplistic Cohenisque projections are not really predictive. So the future is not predictably as simple as Cohen pretends.
The fact is that the article is to push Indian leadership towards some action since they have reached a limit on their control over TSP and a distorted PRC leadership. They want change and they want it their way and control it.
I would suggest that it would be impossible to guess what really is in the inscrutable Indian "mind" and Cohen and others of his persuasion should probably start doubting their own conclusions - to start with. Only by doubting constantly what you seriously want to believe can you get closer to the objective behind that belief. Because then it subjects the objective to the severest drubbing down and one begins to see the weaknesses and errors that need to be corrected.
This is precisely the reason - since they dont know the Indian mind that they had created the monster of PRC and assorted players to keep a check on Indians for 60 years. But it has taken a turn out of their control.
America can only see in the short term up to the memory of Potsdam. UK cannot see beyond a lost empire. China only sees a Long March. Each country is partly hung up in its dreams of a glory already gone past, and hence cannot see the potentials for radical changes in the direction of nations it looks down upon towards upsetting international power equations.
THey dont want change in the international power equations
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Prem »

Even Indians dont know Indian mind then how will Co-han know what goes inside Indian mind? Indian thinking will remain mystery for these so called scholars. The study of Indian concept of time might provide them few clues how Indian mind is at ease with complexity than indulging in linnear thinking process.
For start,Some one send Co-han Patanjali's Yoga sutra and ask him to do 3 month of rigorous study in summer vacation .
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by somnath »

^^^It is almost impossible to do crystal gazing for the long term, but the article really says noting really more than what is pretty well known already...India has always been a bit of a "status quo" power, and with the advent of economic liberalisation the "status quo-ism quotient" has only increased..The close brush, and now embrace of the Indian elite with elements of first worldism has meant that there is little patience for things that disrupt the progress towards prosperity...We saw that during Ops Parakram, when travel advisories by the US triggered a whole chain of reactions percolating primarily down from the middle class of the country...We alo saw that during 26/11, when despite widespread anger, there was really no great clamour for "military action" by anyone - Left, Right or Centre...For that matter, even the Mumbai middle class vented its anger more on the ineptness of the state politicians rather than baying for military blood...

It will remain a challenge for Indian policy makers, especially vis a vis Pak (not so much China, which is not really itching for a "bloody" fight)...The space for strategic manoeuvre has shrunk not just in the military space (thanks to nuke deterence), but also in the doemstic space...More so because seemingly, there are no tangible political objectives that can be realistically met through political action...If we initiate a limited action along the Indo-Pak border and (say) re-occupy Haji Pir pass, does it minimise the dangers of Pak-sponsored Islamist terror in the Indian heartland? Not really, salami slicing of Pak territory does not really hurt the Paki military elite, it enables them rally the rest around the green crescent..Do we bomb the terror training camps? Again, this has been done to death - it will serve no purpose barring taking out a few huts...

What Cohen and Sengupta dont cover is the options that India does have, they are strategic alright, but not necessarily overt miltary...these options can be exercised in the political, diplomatic and intelligence levels...Whether its keeping the Pak polity divided - between civil and military, between Islamists and Army, between civilians and Army...Or about retaining influence in Afghanistan...Or on the "Baloch" options....

Fact that India has limited appetite for military action, and limited strategic space? It ws well known - didnt really need Cohen to re-articulate it...
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RajeshA »

somnath wrote:If we initiate a limited action along the Indo-Pak border and (say) re-occupy Haji Pir pass, does it minimise the dangers of Pak-sponsored Islamist terror in the Indian heartland? Not really, salami slicing of Pak territory does not really hurt the Paki military elite, it enables them rally the rest around the green crescent..
Three intangible strengths of any military is
1) Pride of the people in its military
2) Soldier's faith in the intellect of its generals
3) Victories to boast about

All three get hammered in the Land for Terror strategy!

India needs to send a clear message of cause and assured effect!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by somnath »

RajeshA wrote:1) Pride of the people in its military
2) Soldier's faith in the intellect of its generals
3) Victories to boast about
There is enough in Pak's history to erode all of the above to less than zero, and then some more! But fact is that the Pak military's role has not diminished yet...Its not as if "salami slicing" hasnt happened.We did that with Siachen, at least psychologically speaking...It simply got converted to another frontier of national security for the Pak military to rally the hoi polloi around...

The issue with complex societies, and Pak is an incredibly complex one, is that entrenched eliites are difficult to displace...And the Paki elites, even the non-military ones, are deeply entrenched with the military...What we can do is to sharpen the divides within...the Islamist terror within Pak is doing that for example...But a sliver of territory in faraway Haji Pir pass doesnt hurt the general in Pindi personally, or his mill-owner friend he plays golf with...It however gives the general ideological ammunition to rally the Islamist horde to his "cause"...
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by devesh »

what happened at Siachen was not "slicing." if one really wants to see what slicing looks like, look into American bombings of Japan. that's what i call slicing. the entire infrastructure and land of enemy was so thoroughly destroyed that it struck fear. of course, the Japanese wouldn't surrender short of nuke, but Paki mentality would tremble if India ever showed that kind of guts.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by abhischekcc »

The Cohen article appears to be kite flying - making a provocative statement and see the reactions coming from different quarters, and then judge the 'balance of forces' in the Indian defence/security decision making apparatus.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by somnath »

devesh wrote:what happened at Siachen was not "slicing." if one really wants to see what slicing looks like, look into American bombings of Japan. that's what i call slicing. the entire infrastructure and land of enemy was so thoroughly destroyed that it struck fear. of course, the Japanese wouldn't surrender short of nuke, but Paki mentality would tremble if India ever showed that kind of guts.
Devesh-ji, you misunderstand.."Slicing" here refers to slicing away of territory through limited actions...BTW, the term "salami slicing" was first used in the context of Ops Parakaram...I think I have posted an article somewhere in BR before..
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by kittoo »

Seems some census results are out-
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ind ... story.html
NEW DELHI — India added more than 181 million people to its swelling population in the past decade, growing to over 1.21 billion people, according to the latest census data released by officials on Thursday.

“We are now over 17 percent of the world population, and India is 2.4 percent of the world’s surface area,” said C. Chandramauli, India’s census commissioner. “We have added the population of Brazil to India’s numbers this time.”

The total population grew from 1.02 billion people in 2001 to 1.21 billion this year, according to the preliminary calculations of the massive census exercise that ended in February, costing over $492,000. The population of India now is almost equal to the combined population of United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Japan.

But the census’ most alarming finding is the continuing preference for sons over daughters in Indian society. In the past decade, girl-boy ratio has plunged to 914 girls for 1,000 boys in the age of 6 and below. It was 927 girls to 1,000 boys in the previous census.

“This is a matter of grave concern. This is the lowest ever in the demographic history of the country,” said Chandramauli. “The last census in 2001 had warned us about this, the tendency has worsened.”

In many parts of India female fetuses are either aborted or female infants killed soon after birth by families that look upon daughters as a financial burden. The trend is worse in the states where people are prosperous and educated, including the northern state of Punjab and the western state of Gujarat.

The trend has continued despite the government forbidding ultrasound tests from revealing the gender of the unborn fetus to the families.

“Whatever policy measures we have been following in the last 40 years will need a complete review now. They have not been effective,” said India’s home secretary, G. K. Pillai, when asked about the drop in the proportion of female children.

There was good news too. India’s overall female sex ratio has improved, from 933 to 940 women for 1,000 men in the past decade. But the national capital region of Delhi has recorded a female sex ratio lower than the national average, at 866.

The literacy rate also has gone up. Almost 74 percent of Indians are now literate, a jump from 64 percent in 2001. The growth in the number of female literates has outpaced that of men too.

But the general count continues to be a cause for worry for many analysts. India’s population growth rate in the past decade is over 17 percent. Even though this is the sharpest fall in growth rate since India’s independence in 1947, the absolute numbers are rising.

The population growth rate also varies wildly between states.

“I foresee a lot of political problems because of a regional imbalance in the growth rate of population. Our federal government sends funds to the states according to their population. This means that the states that have worked harder to reduce their population growth get less money from New Delhi,” said Devendra Kothari, a consultant to Management Institute of Population and Development. “The states with lesser population send fewer members to the Indian parliament. Their financial and political clout will go down.”

Officials said that the final numbers would be released after thorough analysis over the next year.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by somnath »

^^^I had posted the Census provisional data in the Economy thread..X-posting..

^^^The official numbers, with tables etc here..
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov ... t_2011.pdf

A lot more data-cuts here..

Key points:

1. Population growth is ~1.7%, dipping marginally..
2. Literacy rates are up to 74%, from 65% in 2001.
3. Sex ratio has improved (to 940, from 933), but sex ration in the "0-6" category has declined.

More data should be coming out in the next few weeks..The religion and caste numbers should give rise toa round of fun and games
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RajeshA »

somnath wrote:
RajeshA wrote:1) Pride of the people in its military
2) Soldier's faith in the intellect of its generals
3) Victories to boast about
There is enough in Pak's history to erode all of the above to less than zero, and then some more! But fact is that the Pak military's role has not diminished yet...Its not as if "salami slicing" hasnt happened.We did that with Siachen, at least psychologically speaking...It simply got converted to another frontier of national security for the Pak military to rally the hoi polloi around...
All wars and battles where we have done some salami slicing, happened before the information revolution. The Pakistani people got to hear only one side of the story. Lies and Misinformation were freely used tools. It was much later after the 1965 war that Pakistanis began understanding that they had lost the war.

Re: Siachen
Siachen can't really be considered as salami slicing. The area was not properly demarcated, but understood by Pakis to belong to them. They are past masters of entitlement. Neither was the area under the protection of Pakistani forces, as none were deployed there. It was much easier to portray the issue as Indian perfidy than as a defeat for the Pakistani Army.

One of the main pillars of the Land for Terror strategy is propaganda - the ability to show that Indian invasion of Pakistan is a response to a Pakistani terror attack, that it is meant to be Pakistan's punishment. In this age of Internet and TV Channels, it is much easier to get Indian PoV across.
somnath wrote:The issue with complex societies, and Pak is an incredibly complex one, is that entrenched eliites are difficult to displace...And the Paki elites, even the non-military ones, are deeply entrenched with the military...
That is why the message we send to the Pakistanis should be consistent - Land for Terror! That should be the message after every terrorist attack! Entrenched elites can be uprooted by consistent pounding.
somnath wrote:What we can do is to sharpen the divides within...the Islamist terror within Pak is doing that for example...
All that is self-delusion by Indians to feel better - It doesn't matter that we don't show any gonads, because Karma will take care of Pakistan....

But a sliver of territory in faraway Haji Pir pass doesnt hurt the general in Pindi personally, or his mill-owner friend he plays golf with...[/quote]No but professionally! For hurting personally, there are other solutions! ;-)
somnath wrote:It however gives the general ideological ammunition to rally the Islamist horde to his "cause"...
This rally of Islamist hordes however would demand the general's head for his defeat at the hands of the Kufr. So he would be a bit careful when doing his rallying!

TSPA is the Chief Lashkar of Pakistan. Too many defeats at Indian hands, and they will have to make space for others. Too many defeats, and the crore commanders would have make space for the others. Not really in the best interests of TSPA Generals.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by somnath »

RajeshA wrote:All wars and battles where we have done some salami slicing, happened before the information revolution. The Pakistani people got to hear only one side of the story. Lies and Misinformation were freely used tools. It was much later after the 1965 war that Pakistanis began understanding that they had lost the war
Not sure which salami we sliced in 1965 (Tashkent restored ceasefire positions, didnt it?), but yes, in 1971 we did slice some salamis, most notably Turtok (besides the big dog bone in East Pak :twisted: )...

Which is precisely the point..The Pak Army has lost face, credibility and aura - not once, but repeatedly..It hasnt weakened its hold over the Pak power structures...Unless we have a viable plan for regime change, salami slicing at the margin may give us cheap thrills, but not accomplish anything strategically..
RajeshA wrote:All that is self-delusion by Indians to feel better - It doesn't matter that we don't show any gonads, because Karma will take care of Pakistan....
Its not, not at all...The Islamist hordes are physically targeting the generals and their families...Pakistan's subaltern is in active revolt against its elites...Its been done before - Israel promoted Arafat to delegitimise George Habash, and then promoted Hamas to put down Arafat....Any action by us to sharpen the divide helps the cause...
RajeshA wrote:This rally of Islamist hordes however would demand the general's head for his defeat at the hands of the Kufr. So he would be a bit careful when doing his rallying!
Not at all..With the identification of a common enemy, a hindu India, the rallying will be easy...How did the Paki Army recover so soon from the 1971 humiliation? Zia simply changed the Army's motto - Jihad fi safil Allah - and wrapped the Army in an Islamist flag..The Islamists are not stupid.If their core interests are not touched, they know the benefits of allying with a powerful armed force to counter a strong enemy...

In fact a terror attack-retaliation-terror attack-retaliation cycle will invariably attract the world's attention, in fact in the first instanec itself...And the whole music on "core issues", "scariest place on earth" etc will start, and engulf India in its wake..We are better off letting Pak stew in its own juice while doing ever so much to maintain the cauldron there..
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RajeshA »

somnath wrote:
RajeshA wrote:All wars and battles where we have done some salami slicing, happened before the information revolution. The Pakistani people got to hear only one side of the story. Lies and Misinformation were freely used tools. It was much later after the 1965 war that Pakistanis began understanding that they had lost the war
Not sure which salami we sliced in 1965 (Tashkent restored ceasefire positions, didnt it?), but yes, in 1971 we did slice some salamis, most notably Turtok (besides the big dog bone in East Pak :twisted: )...
Yes, even after salami slicing we returned the salami slices. The wars were however not for the purpose of conquering territory and retaining it, as Land for Terror strategy proposes.
somnath wrote:Which is precisely the point..The Pak Army has lost face, credibility and aura - not once, but repeatedly..It hasnt weakened its hold over the Pak power structures...Unless we have a viable plan for regime change, salami slicing at the margin may give us cheap thrills, but not accomplish anything strategically..
What we need to change is either the dismemberment of Pakistan, or a change in regime behavior. Land for Terror is actually the least jingo or ambitious of the options, designed only for one thing - to teach the current regime in Pakistan, i.e. the Pakistani Establishment that both nuclear blackmail nor terrorism will work against India. Land for Terror is not designed for conquering a few hundred square kms of land as a goal in itself. It is to let Pakistan know, that they cannot intimidate us, so they better not even try. Land for Terror is a teaching tool!
somnath wrote:
RajeshA wrote:All that is self-delusion by Indians to feel better - It doesn't matter that we don't show any gonads, because Karma will take care of Pakistan....
Its not, not at all...The Islamist hordes are physically targeting the generals and their families...Pakistan's subaltern is in active revolt against its elites...Its been done before - Israel promoted Arafat to delegitimise George Habash, and then promoted Hamas to put down Arafat....Any action by us to sharpen the divide helps the cause...
And now Hamas is an Iranian proxy! Was that too a part of Israel's plan? Whichever brand of Islamist comes to power in Pakistan, he would target India, first to consolidate his position, and secondly to send a message to the powers, that Pakistan is again open for business, the same old business of keeping India down, because that is Pakistan's bread and butter!
somnath wrote:
RajeshA wrote:This rally of Islamist hordes however would demand the general's head for his defeat at the hands of the Kufr. So he would be a bit careful when doing his rallying!
Not at all..With the identification of a common enemy, a hindu India, the rallying will be easy...How did the Paki Army recover so soon from the 1971 humiliation? Zia simply changed the Army's motto - Jihad fi safil Allah - and wrapped the Army in an Islamist flag..The Islamists are not stupid. If their core interests are not touched, they know the benefits of allying with a powerful armed force to counter a strong enemy...
The Islamists are not external to the TSPA, but rather are now heavily represented in its ranks and file. This is an inter-Islamist competition for top job. If the general gets a hammering from the Kufr, he would be replaced. It would be far better for the general to simply use rhetoric but not to hit India.

India is a neighboring country. India can conquer and occupy Pakistani land permanently, so the danger from India is far greater because a loss can be permanent. Whereas any land occupation by America is only temporary, and everybody knows it, so no Islamist really fights with America over retaining land in any Muslim country, but only for the glory of fighting crusaders. The Islamists revel in inviting Americans over for occupation, so that they can get on with their propaganda and the usual messy Jihad.

India would occupy territory and then seal it off. Where is the glorious and messy Jihad? (Don't tell me Kashmir!) The point is that the Islamist gets punished only if his loss to the enemy is permanent, and Muslim lives do not count as losses, nor does the military hardware. Land loss is permanent. That is why Spain and Hindustan rankles. So the Islamist should look for a better model for preserving his Jihadist credentials amongst his Mujahideen, than terror attacks on India.
somnath wrote:In fact a terror attack-retaliation-terror attack-retaliation cycle will invariably attract the world's attention, in fact in the first instanec itself...And the whole music on "core issues", "scariest place on earth" etc will start, and engulf India in its wake..We are better off letting Pak stew in its own juice while doing ever so much to maintain the cauldron there..
Middle finger to the world. We have grown ourselves beyond those little fantasy monsters under our bed, which the Great Powers used to use to scare us in our childhood.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by svinayak »

RajeshA wrote:
somnath wrote:In fact a terror attack-retaliation-terror attack-retaliation cycle will invariably attract the world's attention, in fact in the first instanec itself...And the whole music on "core issues", "scariest place on earth" etc will start, and engulf India in its wake..We are better off letting Pak stew in its own juice while doing ever so much to maintain the cauldron there..
Middle finger to the world. We have grown ourselves beyond those little fantasy monsters under our bed, which the Great Powers used to use to scare us in our childhood.
:lol: India cannot be taking policy action based on media created propaganda. Never knew this kind of discussion can even take place.
brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

We go around in circles and semi-circles, endlessly about this debate where one side says - oh, we need to concentrate on non-military means onlee, and avoid anything that could be suspected of leading to such military means that is declared by anyone in the world to be a threat to economic prosperity of "Indians".

The fundamental issue is what to do with Pakistan. Do you want to preserve Pakistan or not? If you do not want, then that has concrete implications for even the so-called non-military pure "diplomatic" route. There is an infinite repeating of "letting Pakistan stew in its own juices". Such an attitude is incompatible with the dissolution of Pakistan and is essentially a clever way of saying that the underlying wish is to let Pakistan be - and whether it survives or not does not really matter. This is in turn based on the delusion or perhaps a criminal deception] that survival of Pakistan has no real costs on India. Exploration of this angle further may reveal something even worse. Inevitably the "costs" will be calculated in terms of "money", in which say 10,000 lives lost on Indian side is much more than compensated for by 1000 crore supposed addition to the Indian economy by not resorting to revenge attacks or spending on the military sector to destroy the capacity of Pakistan to carry out atrocities in the future.

What in reality happens is that economy perhaps gains by continued concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, a small section of Indian society associated with the finance industry gains from continued fiscal activity, big business flourishes, more FDI comes in and helps even bigger big business - since large scale international monetary flows could be affected by perceptions of risk with the prospect of war. So that the monetary profits and financial interests of a small section of Indians get blown up as the supposed loss of "profits" and "prosperity" of the entire nation and its commons.

This is the hijacking of the voice of the commons, and appropriating their voice to enhance the interests of exactly that minuscule section of India that profits from large financial transactions.

Let us have a very clear division among ourselves. Those who stand committed to dissolution of Pakistan as a rashtra and reabsorbing the territories and peoples currently under a Paki government after proper sanitization, should realize that those who do not think so will bring up various excuses to prevent any steps - short term or long term - that goes towards deliberate planned destruction of Pak led by India.

These are internal enemies, who will collaborate perhaps, as and when opportune with paki elements or perhaps third party friends of Pak who want to maintain Pakistan as an independent rashtra to launch atrocities continuously on India. Enemies have to be neutralized. One way or the other. A start could be made by exposing these excuses first.
brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Can anyone put up estimates of the gain to the Indian economy by not resorting to military retaliation on Paki atrocities?

The following would also be of interest :
(1) Defence expenditures on Indian side to counter Paki military capacities.
(2) Losses to the Indian economy on the four major conflicts so far since Independence. Comparative losses on the Pak economy side.
(3) The estimated gain to the Indian economy by not retaliating to Paki atrocities, and where this gain has explicitly entered and who has benefited directly from such gains.
svinayak
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by svinayak »

brihaspati wrote: There is an infinite repeating of "letting Pakistan stew in its own juices". Such an attitude is incompatible with the dissolution of Pakistan and is essentially a clever way of saying that the underlying wish is to let Pakistan be - and whether it survives or not does not really matter. This is in turn based on the delusion or perhaps a criminal deception] that survival of Pakistan has no real costs on India.
This kind of discussion "letting Pakistan stew in its own juices" can be done in some other forum. In here we have fully explored all options on Pakistan and non military threat such as religion is more dangerous than the military threat.
Prem
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Prem »

BSir ji,
While i agree with the borader gist of separating the sleazy secular suckers from vital elements ,We must have all the cards in our hand before solving the Poak Pollution problem. Time is not ripe yet. Curerent ME mess will buy us another decade progress and passing of old generation in politics. The article like Indian might renounce strategic restraint etc are meant to probe such thinking in Yindoo mind. IMHO, willful, deliberate obliviousness in certain matters serve our interest for few more necessary consolidtaing years. Time will come when we wil be able to bring up all the dead issues to settle the score.
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