Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Posted: 19 Mar 2011 04:51
negi ji,
e-khat sent. You can remove address. Regards.
e-khat sent. You can remove address. Regards.
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No sir, my narrative is driven by the question a I have often wondered (in my spare time) "Soviet Union decides to invade Afghanistan. US decides to back *mujahideen*. How many Indians die?" (hint: K2. K2 one of the stages of TOPAC known better by its other name)What you are saying here is a version of the narrative that was very often repeated by CNN and the New York Times as justification for "US compulsion to keep India out of any Afghanistan solution." It is a very convenient justification for the US, which was no more willing than Pakistan to have India play a military or political role in any Afghan solution. It would have thrown all of Washington's geostrategic calculations out of whack if India gained influence in Afghanistan as a result of Op Enduring Freedom... something far more important in the long term than "catching Bin Laden."
We know that Armitage threatened Mush with Pakistan being bombed back to the stone age if he did not comply. Add to this the fact that Pakistan's economy was, as always, in the toilet and could only stand to gain from any sort of economic and military aid from the US. Does that seem as if Pakistan was in any position to be dictating terms or "imposing conditions" on the US for its GUBO? I don't believe that for a minute. It is all very well for the US to say "oh, we kept India out of Enduring Freedom because Pakistan wanted it that way," when in fact the US also wanted it that way, at least as much as the Pakistanis did.
Like you I took have followed these event and the rise of Taliban, because of the visible hand of TSPA mil adviors.Again, I have heard too many times about how the US was ignorant, delusional, naive, stupid, far too trusting and bhola-bhala in believing that Pakistan would be its loyal friend and ally against the Taliban.
Unkil did not become Unkil by being naive or ignorant. The US knew, and observed, and attempted to influence events in Afghanistan right since the end of the Soviet occupation... even though it is their popular media narrative (propaganda) that they had just forgotten all about Afghanistan and "ignored the region until 9-11." They were in fact very much present, setting up Kekmatyar against Mojadeddi, blessing (if not actively helping) the Benazir/Aslam Beg program to bring Afghanistan under Pakistani influence via the Taliban, inviting the Taliban for TAP pipeline talks in the US under the Clinton Administration, and carrying on a dialogue with the Taliban via a team of State Dept. interlocutors headed by Robin Raphel, even after OBL had been given shelter there as a wanted fugitive from US law following the African Embassy bombings.
The US went along every step of the way, and every step was calibrated to maximize Pakistani influence via the Taliban in Central Asia. Even terrorism against US citizens and economic interests was not allowed to risk or compromise this larger goal in any way. Today they say "oh, we ignored the region from 1989-2001", because that sounds like a far less damning mistake than "oh, we relentlessly and continuously supported the same people who came back and bombed our world trade center, and will continue doing so in the name of geostrategy."
There is absolutely no way the US did not know what it was going in for by forming an alliance with the TSPA in 2001. Any notion that they imagined having full and honest support from the TSPA/ISI... whom they knew so very well... simply does not hold water.
That we choose to believe this hogwash about poor ignorant US being taken for a 10-year, 18 billion dollar ride by the wily Pakis, ignoring ground realities, forgiving nuclear proliferation, and absorbing terrorist attacks on their own interests shows only one thing. It's not the US, but we who are still delusional about this.
Nothing is cast in stone, Sir, for the future. Only limitations are what Indians can think off.They were always aware of it, and always preferred it to any chance of India having a role in the military-political dispensation of post-Taliban Afghanistan. No matter how bad or costly the duplicitous game, it was preferable in their geostrategic worldview.
IMO, it is being done because it is cheaper. I do not see a role for TSP's, for US POV, in the region beyond stabilizing Afghanistan.Drones are a palliative measure designed to inflict harm on specific proxies who are undermining the US' mission in Afghanistan. They are only controlling a symptom. Nothing is being done against the "cause" of the disease, because it is still an article of faith in US foreign policy making circles that this "cause" is necessary to sustain and support for long-term geopolitical purposes.
This is because, if anything, it puts State Dept at a disadvantage, becuase everyone else is reading it and learning from it. The lessons learned will be used against, guess who, State Department. SD could have made it be a learning exercise, because there is pretty valid criticism of it in places.Why are you disappointed? State Dept with CIA input formulates US foreign policy, and backing TSPA/ISI as a geopolitical proxy for West and Central Asia is an absolute cornerstone of US foreign policy. You are only disappointed because you assumed otherwise to begin with.
RD is not the only straw in the wind. Outing of station chief and before that bombing of CIA team in Afghanistan are the other two.In the matter of a few weeks since the RD affair you expect things have changed? I'm afraid you are going to be disappointed again.
I guess, now we will never know. BTW, UAE just joined. Some of those, I suspect, ex-TSPAF, but that is another game.I don't see how this has any relevance to my original point, which is that India was not invited, and its participation was not encouraged, in any military enforcement of a NFZ in Libya... so on what basis were we going to go in? Were we going to ask to join, and then be told "no thanks?" For all you know this might have been exactly what happened, even before the UNSC vote. End result, we're not invited and we're not there... so it makes eminent sense for us not to have committed ourselves politically in favour of the whole adventure.
As long as India shows up, call it investment.India *always* had more credibility and appreciation among Afghans than the Pakis or the US. We have tried to play our cards there as well as we can, following the removal of Taliban. Thanks to our friends in Karzai's regime we have been able to maintain a presence with economic, humanitarian and developmental aid which has enhanced our goodwill.
But we do not have any influence on the military-political dispensation in Afghanistan, and in that sense we play a negligible role in the "Afghan solution". We were relegated to the back-bench during the London conference on Afghanistan, and kept entirely out of the Turkey summit. I simply can't believe that this was only because of the demands of a third-rate beggar nation like Pakistan. It was because this suits the geopolitical priorities of the West... period.
Wikileaks as the starting point of the domino effect we are seeing now.Not sure what you are saying here. Yes, I agree it is P3 out of P5 who are leading the Libyan operation, but where does wikileaks come into the picture?
Yes, that should be role of the Diplomatic Corps/Foreign Policy. That should be its job because today we are learning to survive a nuclear strike. (Today it should be opposing the invitation of Gilani to Mohali, as there is no institutional support for this. A PM is not supposed to act on his personal preferences.)It seems that what you are saying is that Indian foreign policy only succeeds if India punishes TSP with US help. If India punishes TSP by itself, or US punishes TSP without India on board, then India has somehow "failed"?
Well, if what you say is true, we should reconcile ourselves to failure. The US will never, ever, ever allow India to benefit from any punishment of TSP that the US undertakes unilaterally. That is, unless something occurs to drastically alter US geostrategic calculations at the most foundational level. I cannot even imagine what that might be (even Paki nuclear proliferation to Iran/Libya/North Korea and the loss of NYC's twin towers were not enough.)
Likewise, if the US punishes TSP with any Indian help of any kind, it will STILL insist on complete control of whatever happens in Pakistan afterwards. Any cursory glance at history reveals that the US has no use for allies... only subsidiaries, and subsidiaries don't get any say in dividing the spoils. The only way we will be able to assert our influence in Pakistan in that situation will be to oppose the US once the job is done, as the Soviets did following the end of WW2. Do we have the "dum" for this?
In fact the only way at present, that we have any guarantee of controlling the post TSPA/ISI dispensation of Pakistan is to do the job ourselves, and without the US having any locus standi in the matter.
It is not that people are not interested. Indeed many here know the real situation. We celebrate the successes, even little ones to keep our morale high. The truth is the politicians know that without indigenous military industrial capability, we can never occupy our rightful place.brihaspati wrote:I know that a whole subforum is devoted to military capability analysis. It is also a minefield of opinions. But what I have remained curious about is the lack of a debate on the strategic importance of indigenous military hardware and capability development. I have tried to raise the discussion on this from time to time, but we appear to be more focused on the technical finesse aspect only.
What can be done?
A stronger Saudi-Indian relationship can bolster U.S. interests insofar as it enhances regional stability, supports political moderation, and advocates for more open investment and economic development.
[...]
8. (C) India also remained concerned that Saudi funding for religious schools and organizations contributed to extremism in both India and Pakistan. ""Indian Islam is a tolerant Islam, and we cannot abide by the spread of extremist views."" The GOI remains concerned about charitable contributions from Saudi sources to South Asia.
When the reports surfaced, Haifa bint Faisal, wife of Saudi ambassador Bandar bin Sultan, acknowledged that she sent nearly $150,000 to the wife of a Saudi living in San Diego. The recipient, Majeda Ibrahin Dweikat, signed over some of the checks to a friend whose husband, Omar al-Bayoumi (with Dweikat’s husband), helped hijackers Khalid Almidhar and Nawaf Alhazmi find housing in San Diego, open bank accounts, get Social Security cards, pay expenses and arrange flying lessons in Florida.
U.S. authorities suspected days after September 11 that al-Bayoumi, by then in Birmingham, England, had helped the hijackers. The British arrested him and, in a search of his house, found phone records showing calls to two diplomats at the Saudi Embassy in Washington. Lacking conclusive evidence, they released him, and he is now believed back in Saudi Arabia.
U.S. authorities continued to investigate his connections. FBI spokesman Ed Cogswell told In These Times that the bureau had discovered the bint Faisal money transfers when it examined al-Bayoumi’s accounts. (Records would have included the check endorsed to al-Bayoumi’s wife.) Bint Faisal insists she did not knowingly aid the terrorists—that she did not even know the woman—but was only giving charity to Dweikat, a thyroid patient, whose husband had written seeking funds to pay medical bills.
Yet the revelation again raises questions about U.S. policy, which has consistently supported the Saudi oil monarchy in spite of its refusal to cooperate with the United States in investigations of terrorist attacks against Americans.
The links between bint Faisal’s powerful Saudi family and financing of terrorism are even more extensive, however. The trails of both Omar al-Bayoumi, the man who aided the hijackers, and that of the financial network of bint Faisal’s family each lead to Osama bin Laden.
According to a 1996 U.S. State Department report, al-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum, Sudan, was capitalized by bin Laden and wealthy members of Sudan’s National Islamic Front. Bin Laden invested $50 million in the bank. Mohammed al-Faisal, bint Faisal’s brother, is an investor and board member at al-Shamal.
Al-Shamal appears to have been a bin Laden bank of choice. Al-Qaeda members had accounts in al-Shamal, according to testimony during U.S. trials surrounding the 1998 attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. One al-Qaeda collaborator, Essam al-Ridi, recounted how bin Laden transferred $230,000 from al-Shamal to a bank in Arizona to buy a plane to fly Stinger missiles from Pakistan to Sudan.
One of the bank’s three founding members and major shareholders is Saleh Abdullah Kamel. A major financial and media power in the Arab world, he is in addition the chairman of the Dallah al-Baraka Group (DBG). Al-Bayoumi was assistant to the Director of Finance for Dallah Avco, a DBG company that works with the Saudi aviation authority. The Wall Street Journal has reported that the United States believes the Dallah al-Baraka Bank, another DBG company, was also used by al-Qaeda.
Mohammed Al-Faisal is president of Dar al-Mal al-Islami (DMI), the House of Finance of Islam. This Geneva-based bank is charged with distributing subsidies of the royal family in the Muslim world. DMI, founded in 1981 and with assets of an estimated $3.5 billion, also has connections to the bin Laden family: Its 12-member board of directors includes Haydar Mohamed bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s half-brother, and Khalid bin Mahfouz, whose sister Kaleda is one of Osama bin Laden’s wives. (Bin Mahfouz was indicted by the United States in the notorious BCCI banking scandal, which defrauded depositors of $9 billion, and in 1995 paid a $225-million fine.)
DMI and al-Shamal are not the only banks that link al-Faisal to Osama bin Laden. Al-Faisal’s DMI is also a major shareholder of al-Taqwa, the bank registered in the Bahamas and based in Switzerland that was shut down last November after Washington blacklisted it as a centerpiece of bin Laden’s financial network. The United States has not, however, blacklisted al-Shamal.
These banking connections are compounded by long-standing questions about the function of some Saudi charities. At a December press conference in Washington, Saudi adviser Adel al-Jubeir said, “We have not found a direct link or support from the Saudi charities to terrorist groups.”
Despite al-Jubeir’s claims, one major Saudi charity—the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), which directs millions of dollars a year to fundamentalist movements—has strong connections to bin Laden. A 1999 Jordanian intelligence report, obtained by In These Times, said that Islamic Relief, “used by bin Laden’s men,” was active in the Balkans, Chechnya, Azerbaijan and Kashmir.
He then "reappears" :Press Tv
September 27, 2010
The whereabouts of Saudi Arabia’s former US envoy Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz remains unknown nearly two years after his mysterious disappearance.
He was last spotted following a meeting with King Abdullah in Jeddah on December 10, 2008.
The prince was appointed secretary general of the National Security Council by Saudi Arabia’s sixth monarch King Abdullah in October 2005. In September 2009, he was reappointed to the post, but he failed to arrive for the official pledge of allegiance to the king. Surprisingly Prince Bandar’s absence did not garner much media attention.
Known as “Bandar Bush” because of his close relations with former US president George W. Bush, the 61-year-old was born in the western city of Ta’if, in Mecca Province. He is the son of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz. Dr. Sabri Anousheh, an expert on Middle East and Saudi affairs, links the disappearance of Prince Bandar with Saudi arms deals.
The prince’s father played a crucial role in Saudi arms acquisition and was previously in charge of overseeing the country’s military expenditure and arms deals, Anousheh notes. He was elected as the Saudi ambassador to Washington in 1983, and held the position for over two decades. Prince Bandar became so intimated with US government officials that he was deemed an insider.
Bob Woodward, the renowned US journalist who played a key role in revealing the Watergate scandal, demonstrates Bandar’s influence in his book Plan of Attack. Woodward says Bush informed his Secretary of State Colin Powell of his plans for launching the 2003 invasion of Iraq only after discussing the scenario with Prince Bandar.
Iraq’s Buratha News Agency has recently said it has evidence proving that that the Saudi national security chief was responsible for arming terrorist organizations in the Middle East. The agency claims Prince Bandar has assumed leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq, financing and equipping the terrorist group. In August 2009, Saad al-Faqih, the head of the opposition group Islamic Reform Movement, told Arab-language Al-Alam channel that Prince Bandar was placed under house arrest after his plot to stage a coup against King Abdullah was discovered and foiled.
In September 2009, British daily the Independent reported that the prince, who was staying in Britain at the time, had not appeared in public for several weeks. The report triggered rumors that Prince Bandar is seeking to ascend to the Saudi throne. Semi-official reports say the prince is running secret underground operations in France, while other repots say he has been spotted several times across the European country.
Speculation about his whereabouts may differ, but all analysts agree that regardless of his current location, Prince Bandar is enjoying the US government’s full support and is running, equipping and financing terror organizations in Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan.
What is interesting is the link to the US, and what the Iranian news agency is not highlighting - is the role of the next posible heir - Nayef, who is reputed to be an ultra-conservative and heads the Interior Ministry.Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the kingdom's former ambassador to the United States, is reportedly under house arrest over a conspiracy against the monarch.
Saad al-Faqih, head of the opposition group Islamic Reform Movement, told Arab-language TV al-Alam that Prince Bandar has been disappeared and the media has published no word from the ex-diplomat's whereabouts since nearly three months ago. According to al-Faqih, the prince first disappeared in Britain but he returned to the kingdom shortly afterwards.
He added that after Saudi officials discovered that he had provoked 200 agents working for the Saudi security service to stage a coup against King Abdullah, he was put under house arrest. Al-Faqih said people close to the king had disclosed Bandar's plots and foiled them.
He said Saudi sources believe that intelligence provided by some Arab countries help the Saudi monarch foil Prince Bandar's conspiracy. Power struggle between members of the Saudi royal family has been common as power is shared among some 200 princes out of the estimated 7000 family members.
Known as Bandar Bush because of his close relations with former US President George W Bush, the prince is son of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz.
http://www.twq.com/11spring/docs/11spri ... _Cohen.pdfTop analyst outlines possibility of India abandoning “strategic restraint” doctrine
NARAYAN LAKSHMAN
A top analyst in Washington has described India’s possible abandonment of its “strategic restraint,” or reticence to use force as an instrument of policy, as potentially “revolutionary.”
However he has argued that the doctrine’s roots are too strong and India’s “survival despite failures, including against China and Pakistan, suggest that it will endure.”
In a recent paper entitled, Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine? Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution in Washington, along with Sunil Dasgupta of the University of Maryland, noted that India has shown strategic restraint historically towards aggressive neighbours such as Pakistan and China.
In this light, they argue, “Linear projections of current trends do not predict India abandoning its strategic restraint; for that, it will require a major and unforeseeable disruption at home or abroad.”
The authors suggest that while a strategically and militarily assertive India could be “revolutionary,” perhaps even end India’s 60-year strategic equivalence with Pakistan and precipitate a more competitive relationship with China, it is unlikely to abandon strategic restraint with each of its neighbours for specific reasons.
Regarding China, Mr. Cohen and Mr. Dasgupta suggest that the India-China bilateral relationship has been as cooperative as it has been conflicting, and a number of Indians “including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” who would prefer to avoid an expensive arms race with China that will detract India from its primary task of economic development.
In the context of Pakistan, the paper leans more towards the case for India abandoning strategic restraint, arguing, “The potential of a failed Pakistan would have horrendous consequences, and India seeks to be strategically active in limiting the fallout of a collapse.”
Yet, they note, India has not moved to abandon strategic restraint and “develop the institutional capacity to deal with such an eventuality.”
The fact is that the article is to push Indian leadership towards some action since they have reached a limit on their control over TSP and a distorted PRC leadership. They want change and they want it their way and control it.brihaspati wrote:But is not that article based on a study of the current crop of leadership that they have opportunity to study and keep under surveillance? How can they really compute anything about dark horses, unexpected or unforeseen leaderships, groups, etc? For a country as complex intellectually and politically as India, such simplistic Cohenisque projections are not really predictive. So the future is not predictably as simple as Cohen pretends.
This is precisely the reason - since they dont know the Indian mind that they had created the monster of PRC and assorted players to keep a check on Indians for 60 years. But it has taken a turn out of their control.I would suggest that it would be impossible to guess what really is in the inscrutable Indian "mind" and Cohen and others of his persuasion should probably start doubting their own conclusions - to start with. Only by doubting constantly what you seriously want to believe can you get closer to the objective behind that belief. Because then it subjects the objective to the severest drubbing down and one begins to see the weaknesses and errors that need to be corrected.
THey dont want change in the international power equationsAmerica can only see in the short term up to the memory of Potsdam. UK cannot see beyond a lost empire. China only sees a Long March. Each country is partly hung up in its dreams of a glory already gone past, and hence cannot see the potentials for radical changes in the direction of nations it looks down upon towards upsetting international power equations.
Three intangible strengths of any military issomnath wrote:If we initiate a limited action along the Indo-Pak border and (say) re-occupy Haji Pir pass, does it minimise the dangers of Pak-sponsored Islamist terror in the Indian heartland? Not really, salami slicing of Pak territory does not really hurt the Paki military elite, it enables them rally the rest around the green crescent..
There is enough in Pak's history to erode all of the above to less than zero, and then some more! But fact is that the Pak military's role has not diminished yet...Its not as if "salami slicing" hasnt happened.We did that with Siachen, at least psychologically speaking...It simply got converted to another frontier of national security for the Pak military to rally the hoi polloi around...RajeshA wrote:1) Pride of the people in its military
2) Soldier's faith in the intellect of its generals
3) Victories to boast about
Devesh-ji, you misunderstand.."Slicing" here refers to slicing away of territory through limited actions...BTW, the term "salami slicing" was first used in the context of Ops Parakaram...I think I have posted an article somewhere in BR before..devesh wrote:what happened at Siachen was not "slicing." if one really wants to see what slicing looks like, look into American bombings of Japan. that's what i call slicing. the entire infrastructure and land of enemy was so thoroughly destroyed that it struck fear. of course, the Japanese wouldn't surrender short of nuke, but Paki mentality would tremble if India ever showed that kind of guts.
NEW DELHI — India added more than 181 million people to its swelling population in the past decade, growing to over 1.21 billion people, according to the latest census data released by officials on Thursday.
“We are now over 17 percent of the world population, and India is 2.4 percent of the world’s surface area,” said C. Chandramauli, India’s census commissioner. “We have added the population of Brazil to India’s numbers this time.”
The total population grew from 1.02 billion people in 2001 to 1.21 billion this year, according to the preliminary calculations of the massive census exercise that ended in February, costing over $492,000. The population of India now is almost equal to the combined population of United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Japan.
But the census’ most alarming finding is the continuing preference for sons over daughters in Indian society. In the past decade, girl-boy ratio has plunged to 914 girls for 1,000 boys in the age of 6 and below. It was 927 girls to 1,000 boys in the previous census.
“This is a matter of grave concern. This is the lowest ever in the demographic history of the country,” said Chandramauli. “The last census in 2001 had warned us about this, the tendency has worsened.”
In many parts of India female fetuses are either aborted or female infants killed soon after birth by families that look upon daughters as a financial burden. The trend is worse in the states where people are prosperous and educated, including the northern state of Punjab and the western state of Gujarat.
The trend has continued despite the government forbidding ultrasound tests from revealing the gender of the unborn fetus to the families.
“Whatever policy measures we have been following in the last 40 years will need a complete review now. They have not been effective,” said India’s home secretary, G. K. Pillai, when asked about the drop in the proportion of female children.
There was good news too. India’s overall female sex ratio has improved, from 933 to 940 women for 1,000 men in the past decade. But the national capital region of Delhi has recorded a female sex ratio lower than the national average, at 866.
The literacy rate also has gone up. Almost 74 percent of Indians are now literate, a jump from 64 percent in 2001. The growth in the number of female literates has outpaced that of men too.
But the general count continues to be a cause for worry for many analysts. India’s population growth rate in the past decade is over 17 percent. Even though this is the sharpest fall in growth rate since India’s independence in 1947, the absolute numbers are rising.
The population growth rate also varies wildly between states.
“I foresee a lot of political problems because of a regional imbalance in the growth rate of population. Our federal government sends funds to the states according to their population. This means that the states that have worked harder to reduce their population growth get less money from New Delhi,” said Devendra Kothari, a consultant to Management Institute of Population and Development. “The states with lesser population send fewer members to the Indian parliament. Their financial and political clout will go down.”
Officials said that the final numbers would be released after thorough analysis over the next year.
All wars and battles where we have done some salami slicing, happened before the information revolution. The Pakistani people got to hear only one side of the story. Lies and Misinformation were freely used tools. It was much later after the 1965 war that Pakistanis began understanding that they had lost the war.somnath wrote:There is enough in Pak's history to erode all of the above to less than zero, and then some more! But fact is that the Pak military's role has not diminished yet...Its not as if "salami slicing" hasnt happened.We did that with Siachen, at least psychologically speaking...It simply got converted to another frontier of national security for the Pak military to rally the hoi polloi around...RajeshA wrote:1) Pride of the people in its military
2) Soldier's faith in the intellect of its generals
3) Victories to boast about
That is why the message we send to the Pakistanis should be consistent - Land for Terror! That should be the message after every terrorist attack! Entrenched elites can be uprooted by consistent pounding.somnath wrote:The issue with complex societies, and Pak is an incredibly complex one, is that entrenched eliites are difficult to displace...And the Paki elites, even the non-military ones, are deeply entrenched with the military...
All that is self-delusion by Indians to feel better - It doesn't matter that we don't show any gonads, because Karma will take care of Pakistan....somnath wrote:What we can do is to sharpen the divides within...the Islamist terror within Pak is doing that for example...
This rally of Islamist hordes however would demand the general's head for his defeat at the hands of the Kufr. So he would be a bit careful when doing his rallying!somnath wrote:It however gives the general ideological ammunition to rally the Islamist horde to his "cause"...
Not sure which salami we sliced in 1965 (Tashkent restored ceasefire positions, didnt it?), but yes, in 1971 we did slice some salamis, most notably Turtok (besides the big dog bone in East PakRajeshA wrote:All wars and battles where we have done some salami slicing, happened before the information revolution. The Pakistani people got to hear only one side of the story. Lies and Misinformation were freely used tools. It was much later after the 1965 war that Pakistanis began understanding that they had lost the war
Its not, not at all...The Islamist hordes are physically targeting the generals and their families...Pakistan's subaltern is in active revolt against its elites...Its been done before - Israel promoted Arafat to delegitimise George Habash, and then promoted Hamas to put down Arafat....Any action by us to sharpen the divide helps the cause...RajeshA wrote:All that is self-delusion by Indians to feel better - It doesn't matter that we don't show any gonads, because Karma will take care of Pakistan....
Not at all..With the identification of a common enemy, a hindu India, the rallying will be easy...How did the Paki Army recover so soon from the 1971 humiliation? Zia simply changed the Army's motto - Jihad fi safil Allah - and wrapped the Army in an Islamist flag..The Islamists are not stupid.If their core interests are not touched, they know the benefits of allying with a powerful armed force to counter a strong enemy...RajeshA wrote:This rally of Islamist hordes however would demand the general's head for his defeat at the hands of the Kufr. So he would be a bit careful when doing his rallying!
Yes, even after salami slicing we returned the salami slices. The wars were however not for the purpose of conquering territory and retaining it, as Land for Terror strategy proposes.somnath wrote:Not sure which salami we sliced in 1965 (Tashkent restored ceasefire positions, didnt it?), but yes, in 1971 we did slice some salamis, most notably Turtok (besides the big dog bone in East PakRajeshA wrote:All wars and battles where we have done some salami slicing, happened before the information revolution. The Pakistani people got to hear only one side of the story. Lies and Misinformation were freely used tools. It was much later after the 1965 war that Pakistanis began understanding that they had lost the war)...
What we need to change is either the dismemberment of Pakistan, or a change in regime behavior. Land for Terror is actually the least jingo or ambitious of the options, designed only for one thing - to teach the current regime in Pakistan, i.e. the Pakistani Establishment that both nuclear blackmail nor terrorism will work against India. Land for Terror is not designed for conquering a few hundred square kms of land as a goal in itself. It is to let Pakistan know, that they cannot intimidate us, so they better not even try. Land for Terror is a teaching tool!somnath wrote:Which is precisely the point..The Pak Army has lost face, credibility and aura - not once, but repeatedly..It hasnt weakened its hold over the Pak power structures...Unless we have a viable plan for regime change, salami slicing at the margin may give us cheap thrills, but not accomplish anything strategically..
And now Hamas is an Iranian proxy! Was that too a part of Israel's plan? Whichever brand of Islamist comes to power in Pakistan, he would target India, first to consolidate his position, and secondly to send a message to the powers, that Pakistan is again open for business, the same old business of keeping India down, because that is Pakistan's bread and butter!somnath wrote:Its not, not at all...The Islamist hordes are physically targeting the generals and their families...Pakistan's subaltern is in active revolt against its elites...Its been done before - Israel promoted Arafat to delegitimise George Habash, and then promoted Hamas to put down Arafat....Any action by us to sharpen the divide helps the cause...RajeshA wrote:All that is self-delusion by Indians to feel better - It doesn't matter that we don't show any gonads, because Karma will take care of Pakistan....
The Islamists are not external to the TSPA, but rather are now heavily represented in its ranks and file. This is an inter-Islamist competition for top job. If the general gets a hammering from the Kufr, he would be replaced. It would be far better for the general to simply use rhetoric but not to hit India.somnath wrote:Not at all..With the identification of a common enemy, a hindu India, the rallying will be easy...How did the Paki Army recover so soon from the 1971 humiliation? Zia simply changed the Army's motto - Jihad fi safil Allah - and wrapped the Army in an Islamist flag..The Islamists are not stupid. If their core interests are not touched, they know the benefits of allying with a powerful armed force to counter a strong enemy...RajeshA wrote:This rally of Islamist hordes however would demand the general's head for his defeat at the hands of the Kufr. So he would be a bit careful when doing his rallying!
Middle finger to the world. We have grown ourselves beyond those little fantasy monsters under our bed, which the Great Powers used to use to scare us in our childhood.somnath wrote:In fact a terror attack-retaliation-terror attack-retaliation cycle will invariably attract the world's attention, in fact in the first instanec itself...And the whole music on "core issues", "scariest place on earth" etc will start, and engulf India in its wake..We are better off letting Pak stew in its own juice while doing ever so much to maintain the cauldron there..
RajeshA wrote:Middle finger to the world. We have grown ourselves beyond those little fantasy monsters under our bed, which the Great Powers used to use to scare us in our childhood.somnath wrote:In fact a terror attack-retaliation-terror attack-retaliation cycle will invariably attract the world's attention, in fact in the first instanec itself...And the whole music on "core issues", "scariest place on earth" etc will start, and engulf India in its wake..We are better off letting Pak stew in its own juice while doing ever so much to maintain the cauldron there..
This kind of discussion "letting Pakistan stew in its own juices" can be done in some other forum. In here we have fully explored all options on Pakistan and non military threat such as religion is more dangerous than the military threat.brihaspati wrote: There is an infinite repeating of "letting Pakistan stew in its own juices". Such an attitude is incompatible with the dissolution of Pakistan and is essentially a clever way of saying that the underlying wish is to let Pakistan be - and whether it survives or not does not really matter. This is in turn based on the delusion or perhaps a criminal deception] that survival of Pakistan has no real costs on India.