Historical Battles in Ancient & Medieval Bharat

[skganji]

Guys, Chennamma is not a Telugu queen . She is from Karnataka.

"She ruled over a small state, Keladi, for twenty five years (1671-1696), but proved herself a great and heroic queen. She protected the kingdom when her husband failed in his duty. And she faced the wrath of the mighty Aurangazeb, and gave shelter to Rajaram, Shivaji's son.
She was the Queen of an ancient State. She had no husband. Still she fought with the many foes around and freed the kingdom from several dangers. But soon she had to face another danger.

Aurangzeb was the Moghul Emperor then. 'Alamgir' was his title. Alamgir means one who has conquered the whole world.
Aurangzeb had conquered manykingdoms in North India and had turned his eyes towards the South. His thirst for expansion was not yet quenched and his vast: powerful army attacked this small State. The reason given was that the Queen had given shelter to the son of Maharaja Shivaji.

But the Queen was not afraid. Nor did she feel sorry. She did not ask for pardon. She faced the attack like a heroic woman. When the enemies themselves withdrew their attack and begged for a treaty, she was quite generous.

This heroic Queen and noble lady was Queen Chennamma of Keladi.

Chennamma ruled the kingdom of Keladi for twenty-five years. She had the complexion of a pearl, with bright eyes and a broad forehead. A long nose and curly hair adorned a face of royal dignity. The beautiful Queen was full of good qualities too. And she had the ability to kill her enemies in the battles, like Durga (the goddess of power). Beauty, valour, piety and generosity all blended in this great Queen.'

More information can be found about her in these pages.

http://www.freeindia.org/biographies/gr ... /page1.htm
http://www.freeindia.org/biographies/gr ... /page2.htm
http://www.freeindia.org/biographies/gr ... /page3.htm
http://www.freeindia.org/biographies/gr ... /page4.htm
http://www.freeindia.org/biographies/gr ... /page5.htm
http://www.freeindia.org/biographies/gr ... /page6.htm
http://www.freeindia.org/biographies/gr ... /page7.htm
http://www.freeindia.org/biographies/gr ... /page8.htm

[Airavat]

It was at this time that he received a communication from Sanga proposing that if Babur advanced on Delhi, the Rajput ruler would take Agra.

What is the source for this?

I know what you're going to say, that the source for this is only the Baburnama, and the Rajput sources do not confirm it. But please remember that I have also included the Rajput tradition in my write-up, that Babur negotiated and offered to pay tribute, which is not confirmed from the Mughal sources.

[Airavat]

Guys, Chennamma is not a Telugu queen . She is from Karnataka.

"She ruled over a small state, Keladi, for twenty five years (1671-1696), but proved herself a great and heroic queen. She protected the kingdom when her husband failed in his duty. And she faced the wrath of the mighty Aurangazeb, and gave shelter to Rajaram, Shivaji's son.
She was the Queen of an ancient State. She had no husband. Still she fought with the many foes around and freed the kingdom from several dangers. But soon she had to face another danger.

Yes you're right. Jadunath Sarkar does mention this episode but briefly and does not give the name of the queen:

Rajaram had been kept in prison by Sambhaji, but after the latter's capture and execution by the Mughals in 1689, Rajaram was crowned the Maratha ruler at Raigarh. After killing Sambhaji, and capturing the rest of the Maratha royal family, Aurangzeb came for Rajaram but the latter escaped with an escort of 300 men and entered the Kingdom of Bednur (Keladi).

But a Mughal force under Jan Nisar Khan invaded the territory (now in the Shimoga district of Karnataka) so the Rani of Bednur allowed Rajaram to escape to the fort of Gingee/Jinji in Tamil Nadu. She then made peace with Aurangzeb by paying a small fine.

[Rahul M]

Rahul, BR member Ramanan K in the previous Historical Battles thread may be able to help you.

and I was a participant in that discussion.

I simply wondered if further information was available.

[Ari Samir]

I read somewhere that Medieval Indian warfare lagged in technology behind the West Asian or even Persian and Central Asian warfare. Examples that were given included the following:
1. Evolution of flat bottom iron stirrup in Turkestan vs. wooden round stirrup used by Rajputs: That meant the Turks could execute much more accurate and deadly form of mounted archery since stability provided by flat iron stirrup was higher
2. Long bows vs. short/ cross bows: Indians used long bows that needed to be pressed with foot to the ground to master maximum range. Again that compromised miobility.
3. Chain mail armor as used by Rajputs was inferior to the solid metal armor used by contemporary European knights. It also kept their eyes and part of face unprotected.
4. Indians also viewed external technologies with suspicion. For example, the artillery (cannons) were used in Asia minor as early as in 1453. But 75 years laters, Indian armies (Hindus and Moslems alike) did not adopt artillery. It is unimaginable that they were not aware of this form of warfare being extensively used in Persia and Central Asia....

Any comments, insights will be most welcome.

[Lalmohan]

ari

you are possibly right about stirrups, but these would have been copied much before medieval times by indian warriors from invaders. the scythians had stirrups from what i remember

indians had all kinds of bows, including cross bows. the specific long bow you cite was a specialist weapon

chain mail is superior to plate armour for most applications and is much more comfortable to wear in the indian climate

canon were used in india by hindu kings - but the more important factors in their lack of use and other deficiencies are probably due to

1. lack of manoeuver mindset in indian fighting, largely dictated by the geography of central india - discouraging cavalry and horse drawn transport due to rocky terrain, in preference to elephants supported by infantry

2. righteous warfare mindset on hindu kings - following arcane rules of engagement - which total war believing foreigners did not adhere to

3. lessons learned from fighting invaders were soon forgotten as kings ended up fighting each other and failing to unite against new external threats

[Airavat]

2. Long bows vs. short/ cross bows: Indians used long bows that needed to be pressed with foot to the ground to master maximum range. Again that compromised mobility.

Indians used long bows in Ancient India and not in the medieval era.

That meant the Turks could execute much more accurate and deadly form of mounted archery

The thing to understand is why some nations excelled in mounted archery? The Arabs, despite their vast conquests, were not known for horse-archery. The Mongols, Turks, and other peoples in Central Asia excelled in horse-archery because in the vast open plains warfare, hunting, and sheer survival depended a lot on the ability to shoot arrows while riding. This technique was learned, and practiced, and practiced, from a very young age until it became second nature.

For other parts of the world these conditions did not exist, and horse-archery had to be drilled to soldiers through special training, which made the process expensive and cumbersome. In India princes and nobles could really afford to train for horse-archery, while the rest of their horsemen excelled as lancers and swordsmen. The Kingdom of Vijaynagar employed Turkish bowmen and cavalry to match the Bahmani army.

Chain mail armor as used by Rajputs was inferior to the solid metal armor used by contemporary European knights. It also kept their eyes and part of face unprotected.

Actually chainmail was used by early Europeans, Arabs and Turks and not by Indians. And chainmail was in some ways superior to solid metal armour; it made the rider lighter and provided more flexibility in using weapons. A rider with full metal plate armour was clumsy and easy to unhorse by infantry using their long spears. The Europeans went from using chainmail to plate armour, and then abandoning it altogether after the development of firearms. Indians before the Turk invasions used metal plates sewn together and other kinds of armour.

Indians also viewed external technologies with suspicion. For example, the artillery (cannons) were used in Asia minor as early as in 1453. But 75 years laters, Indian armies (Hindus and Moslems alike) did not adopt artillery. It is unimaginable that they were not aware of this form of warfare being extensively used in Persia and Central Asia....

Not true. In North India cannon were adopted by the contemporary powers after they were first used in Chaldiran Panipat and Khanua, and in South India by the Portuguese. The attitude of Hindu and Muslim cavaliers was one of superiority; the dirty task of handling gunpowder and scrambling around in the dirt behind the guns, was left to the lower castes, and in later times to the Europeans.

[ParGha]

2. Long bows vs. short/ cross bows: Indians used long bows that needed to be pressed with foot to the ground to master maximum range. Again that compromised mobility.

Indians used long bows in Ancient India and not in the medieval era.

That meant the Turks could execute much more accurate and deadly form of mounted archery

Tribal levies, like Bhils and Gonds, did use a bamboo long bow when they came out to support Rajputs and Marathas in battle. But it was not the classical Indian warbow.

It has always fascinated me to know why Indian armies abandoned the long-bow? Indians had long been famous for their long-bowmen, as Greek and Chinese chronicles attest, in the ancient period. But at some point of time they seemed to have abandoned it altogether. The explanations, I think, would be highly controversial but very interesting.

The English had two explanation for why they (and Welsh) were able to make good use of bowmen, but not their enemies. The first was physiological - i.e. English boys grew up playing with the bow and on the legends of the bow, so they had developed the peculiar shoulder and fore-arm muscles used to draw the bow... and they were mentally accustomed to the usage of the bowman. The second explanation was social - all European nobles hated the bowmen because of their mode of warfare and their ability to kill their "superiors" on horseback and in armor, but English nobles could overcome that hatred because of the social conditions prevailing on the islands and make good use of them in war.

[ParGha]

The attitude of Hindu and Muslim cavaliers was one of superiority; the dirty task of handling gunpowder and scrambling around in the dirt behind the guns, was left to the lower castes, and in later times to the Europeans.

Fundamentally it had a lot to do with the abysmal incompetence of the kings and the State in general. The king and the state would not pay the soldiers from the Treasury, but "paid" them by allowing them to plunder after the battle. It naturally meant that the man on the horse could move the fastest, get rich pickings and carry a lot more loot. The man with the 300 kg gun to look after would have to live on the pittance that was sometimes paid out (after long arrears).

Competent kings, like Shivaji, hated that practice and tried to maintain a regular paymaster and pay-schedule. Consequently his soldiers were happy enough to serve in whatever role the mission called for: from flashy light cavalry to humble pioneers. But his successors again seems to abandoned that wise practice and started "paying" by loot. It was a disaster to the State: The cavalry wouldn't dismount at a critical junction in battle, the foot and the artillery would be severely demoralized... the army often defeated.

It still has a lot of lessons for us in modern day.

[peter]

It was at this time that he received a communication from Sanga proposing that if Babur advanced on Delhi, the Rajput ruler would take Agra.

I know what you're going to say, that the source for this is only the Baburnama, and the Rajput sources do not confirm it. But please remember that I have also included the Rajput tradition in my write-up, that Babur negotiated and offered to pay tribute, which is not confirmed from the Mughal sources.

a) Does BNama say messengers were exchanged with R Sanga before Panipat? Does it give dates? Who was sent etc?

b) Also seem to have read that Lodi had been defeated by Sanga. So if this was true why would Sanga invite Babur?

c) Can rajput tradition be believed? What was Silhadi's status post Khanua?

[peter]

I read somewhere that Medieval Indian warfare lagged in technology behind the West Asian or even Persian and Central Asian warfare. Examples that were given included the following:
1. Evolution of flat bottom iron stirrup in Turkestan vs. wooden round stirrup used by Rajputs: That meant the Turks could execute much more accurate and deadly form of mounted archery since stability provided by flat iron stirrup was higher
2. Long bows vs. short/ cross bows: Indians used long bows that needed to be pressed with foot to the ground to master maximum range. Again that compromised miobility.
3. Chain mail armor as used by Rajputs was inferior to the solid metal armor used by contemporary European knights. It also kept their eyes and part of face unprotected.
4. Indians also viewed external technologies with suspicion. For example, the artillery (cannons) were used in Asia minor as early as in 1453. But 75 years laters, Indian armies (Hindus and Moslems alike) did not adopt artillery. It is unimaginable that they were not aware of this form of warfare being extensively used in Persia and Central Asia....

Any comments, insights will be most welcome.

It would be useful if you could demonstrate each of your points having an impact in a real war. Then we can discuss the merits/demrits in that battle's context.

While hypothesizing is an interesting excercise but ultimately fruitless. A parallel can be drawn in Indo-Pak wars. Pakis had better tanks and air-crafts and yet they lost. So it is the man behind ... that matters.

[VinodTK]

Management lessons from Rani of Jhansi

[shiv]

Cross post of thoughts and queries sparked off by the post at the following link:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 85#p627185

A young king of a small kingdom, against a seasoned champion with an elite army of 600,000. And in spite of these differences, Aurangjeb had to remove armies from Maratha territory and redeploy them against Adilshahis and Kutubshahis.

I frequently see such numbers thrown about. 600,000 was the estimated size of the Paki army in the late 1990s.

Estimates of India's population around 1500 are in the region of 100 to 150 million. There is very little evidence to suggest that India has great urbanization in that era and it is highly likely that India's population was 90% rural at that time - and therefore dispersed widely across India. It is unlikely that any ruler then ruled an area that had more than 80 million people and these people were dispersed widely.

A 600,000 strong army congregated in one place is like a small city (a large city of that era). I would really be curious about the logistics of getting men from widespread areas to take up arms, feeding them and maintaining their morale. Surely if 600,000 was the total - the "tail" must have been at least 400,000 - with only 200,000 doing the actual fighting. Even 200,000 is huge - and they must have raped the local countryside for food in terms of grain, milk and cattle.

So how do historians casually throw such numbers around?

[Atri]

Shiv ji,

Do you wish to say that Mughal army that invaded Deccan under Aurangjeb in 1681 was not as strong as 600,000? The army was spread out all over Deccan and pillaged it for 27 years at stretch; this is documented fact.

[shiv]

Shiv ji,

Do you wish to say that Mughal army that invaded Deccan under Aurangjeb in 1681 was not as strong as 600,000? The army was spread out all over Deccan and pillaged it for 27 years at stretch; this is documented fact.

I am not saying anything that I have not said. Please read my post and see if you can come up with answers to the questions I have asked rather that the question you think I have asked.

[Lalmohan]

Shiv - most armies of the day had huge baggage trains and followers of different sorts. i expect that estimating army sizes was done by counting the numbers of generals and estimating their forces in standard or semi-standard units. i find it hard to imagine that a force larger than a few tens of thousands could be living off the land in a given area without totally stripping it bare. similarly, equipping so many in uniforms and armour and weapons, and training them... geography only supports so much population density

the mongols - an army that marched without provisions - got around it by spreading thinly across a wide front and then coalescing rapidly into large fighting forces when required (thanks to good communications). by late middle ages that was also no longer possible due to the need to transport war machinery

[peter]

A 600,000 strong army congregated in one place is like a small city (a large city of that era). I would really be curious about the logistics of getting men from widespread areas to take up arms, feeding them and maintaining their morale. Surely if 600,000 was the total - the "tail" must have been at least 400,000 - with only 200,000 doing the actual fighting. Even 200,000 is huge - and they must have raped the local countryside for food in terms of grain, milk and cattle.

So how do historians casually throw such numbers around?

Depends on which historian! Hindu historians usually exaggerate numbers by 10x and muslim court historians always inflated the number in opposing hindu armies!

If you read Bernier's travel through mughal empire you will find he describes in a colorful way how aurangjeb's army moved. It was indeed a city. The army had a specific department which oversaw the movement of forces, procurement of eating supplies, milk etc. And when things did not go as planned then country side was raped.

[Ari Samir]

It would be useful if you could demonstrate each of your points having an impact in a real war. Then we can discuss the merits/demrits in that battle's context.

While hypothesizing is an interesting excercise but ultimately fruitless. A parallel can be drawn in Indo-Pak wars. Pakis had better tanks and air-crafts and yet they lost. So it is the man behind ... that matters.

Good suggestion.

Battle specific examples: The battle between Babur and Ebrahim Lodi, where Babur's Uzbek artillery won the day. The Indian monarch's army, although much bigger, did not have any artillery to speak of. The said event took place in 1526, by which time artileery was a standard compoenent of West Asian armies.

King Porus' longbowmen proved less than a match to Alexander's cavalry because rain on the previous day had dampened the soil (Indian longbows had to be pressed with thumb to the ground), thus reducing the range and firing frequency. If the archers were mounted archers (on horseback), they would not have to face that difficulty.

If anyone has any input, please enlighten.

[Lalmohan]

King Porus' longbowmen proved less than a match to Alexander's cavalry because rain on the previous day had dampened the soil (Indian longbows had to be pressed with thumb to the ground), thus reducing the range and firing frequency. If the archers were mounted archers (on horseback), they would not have to face that difficulty.

If anyone has any input, please enlighten.

there are differing versions of the jhelum battle. the initial indian attack with chariots failed due to the soft nature of the ground. the main indian body held off the repeated attacks of the greeks all day, the elephants inflicting many casualties. as the indian army followed its practice of disengaging for the night coupled with the withdrawal of the injured porus from the field by his mahout causing another traditional signal of 'break for the day', the greeks attacked and broke the formation and most indian casualties occured as the greek cavalry pursued the broken ranks. the battle is now largely deemed to be inconclusive, and the greeks got sufficient of a bloody nose to abandon their conquest of india, reinstate porus in power and withdraw down to the makran coast

a failing if any is the practice of sticking to rules that your enemies do not know or recognise

[Rahul M]

for whatever reasons, puru was given the charge of a kingdom larger than his original one (sorry don't remember exact sources but shouldn't be too difficult to find)

that hardly looks like the result of a defeat, IMO.

[disha]

a failing if any is the practice of sticking to rules that your enemies do not know or recognise

Has anybody heard of Geneva Conventions? They define the "rules" on engagement. In this case the greeks were barbaric and uncivilized! So the western world made a virtue of it. Just like making virtue of the horrible conditions in the crimean war and also making virtue of the march of the light brigade.

Anyway, given that Paurava expanded his territory after the war and given that Alexander had been helped by Paurava's bete-noir Ambhi, it is seen that it is Alexander who lost!

[Airavat]

Battle specific examples: The battle between Babur and Ebrahim Lodi, where Babur's Uzbek artillery won the day. The Indian monarch's army, although much bigger, did not have any artillery to speak of. The said event took place in 1526, by which time artileery was a standard compoenent of West Asian armies.

Babur's artillery was Ottoman Turk, and not Uzbek, in origin. The Ottoman Turks had used artillery to win the Battle of Chaldiran against the Safavids of Iran. Babur used the same tactics at Panipat and Khanua; in fact Babur hired Ottoman Turk gunners and matchlockmen five years after the Battle of Chaldiran. After Panipat and Khanua guns became common in North Indian armies. In the south guns were introduced by the Portuguese.

Chaldiran Panipat Khanua

[Lalmohan]

disha - there is no virtue in the CHARGE of the light brigade - it is now well acknowledged as an act of stupidity, albeit courageous. the victorian british played up the unquestioning following of orders and blind courage, but they knew that it was a mistake. the incident occured due to an ambiguous order from a signals officer who didn't fully explain the general's command to the head of the light brigade, who then took it upon himself to charge the russian guns. the signals officer might have been impatient with progress and was deliberately vague or his orders were mistaken in the heat of battle

[disha]

disha - there is no virtue in the CHARGE of the light brigade - it is now well acknowledged as an act of stupidity, albeit courageous. the victorian british played up the unquestioning following of orders and blind courage, but they knew that it was a mistake. the incident occured due to an ambiguous order from a signals officer who didn't fully explain the general's command to the head of the light brigade, who then took it upon himself to charge the russian guns. the signals officer might have been impatient with progress and was deliberately vague or his orders were mistaken in the heat of battle

Lalmohan - please re-read what I stated I was indicating that the western civilization makes a virtue of their own stupidity.

[Lalmohan]

with respect, i am a simple person, what you wrote was not clear to me

[ramana]

Shiv, That is called the teeth to tail ratio. Pre-modern armies were notoriuos for long tails.

BTW,the Cholas were one of the first in carrying their own supplies instead of foraging aka loot mar. The idea was not to create animosity in the conquered people.

[tsarkar]

You are right Lalmohan – “lack of manoeuver mindset in Indian fighting”

To explain more, I’ll start by quoting Clausewitz - "war is a continuation of politics by other means". Military forces are a means to that end.

Initial Mauryan, Mughal, Maratha or Sikh forces were maneuver forces. However when empires were established, the military requirements changed to stabilization – an over ambitious nobleman not paying taxes, intercine fighting, peasant/tribal/regional uprisings, protecting populace from raiding bandits, etc.

When you’ve smaller forces, you can train them to high proficiency. Command, Control and Communications are manageable. Leadership can practice and hone C3 skills. Troops too can practice and inculcate C3 required of them by their leaders.

Stabilization requires more feet on ground. Managing large numbers increases complexity. Training and MAINTAINING a high level of proficiency is difficult. C3 becomes difficult. Generalship becomes difficult. Conducting large scale exercises to practice C3 becomes difficult. Hence both generals and troops end up lacking essential warfare skills.

To complicate, stabilization does not require high level skills – all it requires is a man with a spear or SLR. Like Rashtriya Rifles battalions that additional rifle companies and lesser heavy weapons. Troops are not required to have specialized TIME CONSUMING / MATERIAL CONSUMING skills like archery/anti tank/anti aircraft (imagine the expenditure of Milan missiles if RR troops are trained in anti tank).

To complicate even more, larger troops require larger number of generals. A General on Peacemaking/Peacekeeping requires much lesser skill than coordinating artillery, airpower, armour and infantry during thrusts. Larger number of generals leads to ego clashes – eg. The recent case of Lt. Gen. Panag vs. Gen. Deepak Kapoor

Most militaries in such situation maintain a small maneuver corps for contingencies and larger stabilization forces. However strategic battles happen once in 30-100 years. Most annual military requirements are stabilization. Kings, ministers and accountants start questioning both fiscal and material expenditure (ammo & missiles or swords & arrows) to maintain maneuver corps that are unused all year. Common people want to pay lesser taxes. So there is pressure on Generals to disband such forces or reduce expenditure. In the absence of threats, the General finds it hard to justify. On top of it, the General has to be on the right side of the King, Ministers and Coterie when they’re building Ashok Stupas, Taj Mahals or 60,000 crore waiver of farmer loans. Otherwise he won’t be made Governor of Nagaland after retirement. And the King will simply replace him with someone more compliant. I am sure in 1649, Mughals wouldn’t have lost Kandahar to Iranians if Shah Jahan and his Generals’s focus were on bettering the army rather than building Taj Mahal.

Even if right material is made available at the last moment, they cannot be effectively employed at a moment’s notice. That is why Su30 inducted in 1996 saw no service in 1999. Because as a part of the NORMAL learning curve, IAF pilots were still learning how to use then and IAF leaders were still learning how to employ them. During 1962 China War, NATO gifted India FN FALs and FN MAGs. IAF airlifted them to NEFA and Ladakh. However troops didn’t know how to use them and leaders didn’t know how to employ them. Most were burnt, thrown into rivers/ravines with other material during the initial retreat. Some were captured by the Chinese. Thankfully their doctrine then was burn-western rather than reverse-engineer.

When confronted with a strategic threat once in 30-100 years, all these factors come into play at one decisive moment of truth.

Large number of untrained or skilled-in-something-else or trained-but-forgot-through-disuse soldiers milling around in confusion, generals lacking C3 and strategic vision, infighting among leadership, take their toll. Even if horses or cannons or bows are available, troops might not know how to effectively use them and leaders might not know how to effectively employ them.

[peter]

Battle specific examples: The battle between Babur and Ebrahim Lodi, where Babur's Uzbek artillery won the day. The Indian monarch's army, although much bigger, did not have any artillery to speak of. The said event took place in 1526, by which time artileery was a standard compoenent of West Asian armies.

Babur in Baburnama ascribes his victory in both battle of panipat and khanwa to his artillery. If one reads this account on khanwa:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silhadi
it is not clear that artillery was all that crucial for this battle.
Perhaps traitors were in Lodi's army too? Airavat might be able to help us here.

King Porus' longbowmen proved less than a match to Alexander's cavalry because rain on the previous day had dampened the soil (Indian longbows had to be pressed with thumb to the ground), thus reducing the range and firing frequency. If the archers were mounted archers (on horseback), they would not have to face that difficulty.

If anyone has any input, please enlighten.

Alexander's battle is interesting too. Please read this:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 55#p446155

Do tell us about other battles.

Peter

[ramana]

Airavat and peter,

Army of the Mughals

[ramana]

From Pioneer, 2 June 209

FRONT PAGE | Tuesday, June 2, 2009 | Email | Print |


Frolicking bull unearths big slice of history

Sanat K Chakraborty | Guwahati

A frolicking bull triggered off archeological interest after it dug out a few cannon balls with its horns from a mound near a place called Kajolichowk, about 30 km away from Guwahati.

The granite-type round balls — 165 of them — tumbled out after the playful animal knocked at a heap, which were noticed by local people, who later brought this to the notice of the authorities of the Assam State Museum.

Experts believe that the cannon balls may date back to the Ahom rule in the 17th century. The Ahoms were said to have come from Southern China and set up their first kingdom by King Sukapha way back in 1228 and ruled Assam for nearly 600 years.

The stone spheres of various sizes resemble the cannon balls kept in the museum, which belonged to the Ahom age. “However, the antiquity of the cannon balls can be established only after investigation,” said assistant curator of the State Museum Jiten Shyam.

Shyam, who rushed to the site, said the location of the cannon ball pile looked like a fortification, which also sits well with the local name, Kajolichowki. In Hindi, Chowki also means a watch-post.

Researchers like Shyam believed that there could be many more such cannon balls in the site, which might be remnants of an armoury, connecting it with the famous Battle of Saraighat between the Ahoms and the invading Mughals of 1671.

The Mughals met with their most embarrassing defeat at Saraighat, even as they made their last unsuccessful attempt to enter the Brahmaputra valley.

The Ahom forces under the command of legendary Ahom general Lachit Bor Phukan fought valiantly and defeated the mighty Mughals. The crafty general deftly using his enormous knowledge of hilly terrain and war craft resisted the great advancing forces of the Mughals at the Saraighat.

Borphukan reclaimed Ahom territory on both sides of the Brahmaputra and defended Guwahati by constructing huge ramparts surrounding the ancient capital of Pragjyotispur.

It is believed that the site of the new archeological find might be one of the military posts, which is not quite far from the site of Saraighat battle.

Locals say that they used to find similar cannon balls from time to time, but unaware of such a historically important site.

[Lalmohan]

in typical indian context, the native armies were/are meant more for resistance/defence and not for invasion.

Rajah's and Maharajah's were quite busy invading and conquering each other all across Bharath, it was typically their inability to recognise external threats as being of an existential nature, the lack of comprehension of "total war" and a belief in Arthashastra derived 'ritualised' warfare that led to failure. Even when faced with a highly mobile foe, Indian armies that fought on their own terms in favourable terrain and able to use their strong defensive formation driven battle tactics were almost always impossible to defeat. Inability to pick the battle site or breaking formation to chase a supposedly defeated foe who turned around to counter attack led to most defeats.

the problem has never been one of tactics, but that of doctrine and inability to adapt. those Indian kings that did adapt to changing conditions fought brilliantly - even to the extent of defeating the Huns with more mobile tactics than they themselves were famous for

[Samay]

ari

you are possibly right about stirrups, but these would have been copied much before medieval times by indian warriors from invaders. the scythians had stirrups from what i remember

indians had all kinds of bows, including cross bows. the specific long bow you cite was a specialist weapon

chain mail is superior to plate armour for most applications and is much more comfortable to wear in the indian climate

canon were used in india by hindu kings - but the more important factors in their lack of use and other deficiencies are probably due to

1. lack of manoeuver mindset in indian fighting, largely dictated by the geography of central india - discouraging cavalry and horse drawn transport due to rocky terrain, in preference to elephants supported by infantry

2. righteous warfare mindset on hindu kings - following arcane rules of engagement - which total war believing foreigners did not adhere to

3. lessons learned from fighting invaders were soon forgotten as kings ended up fighting each other and failing to unite against new external threats

I think it will be fair to say last reason was the only reason
and it is prevalent even today

[SivaVijay]

3. lessons learned from fighting invaders were soon forgotten as kings ended up fighting each other and failing to unite against new external threats

While it is easy for us modern Indians to think as one India(though it is more a urban phenomena), it is important to note that akhand Bharat was similar to medieval europe, too many states fighting each other. For the pandyas the chalukyas where just like the lankans or portugese a foreign power and so it wont be fair to comment on their inability to unite from a 21st century perspective.....

[ramana]

3. lessons learned from fighting invaders were soon forgotten as kings ended up fighting each other and failing to unite against new external threats

While it is easy for us modern Indians to think as one India(though it is more a urban phenomena), it is important to note that akhand Bharat was similar to medieval europe, too many states fighting each other. For the pandyas the chalukyas where just like the lankans or portugese a foreign power and so it wont be fair to comment on their inability to unite from a 21st century perspective.....

Actually it took about 150 years after Sultanate was established in Dilli for unified resposne to take shape in the form of Vijayanagar. An earlier instance was when the Western Chalukyas gave unified response to the Arabs and confined their growth in 733 AD. There was the response to Mahsud at Bharaich.

Am looking for more refs on this:

The vigor of South India Badami-Chalukyas was shown when the Arabs tried to move into south after winning victories in Sindh. They were repelled by another Badami Chalukya, Pulakesin in the reign of Vikramaditya II in 733. This defeat put back Islam by four hundred years.

So reading up on Chalukya history

[ParGha]

Am looking for more refs on this:

The vigor of South India Badami-Chalukyas was shown when the Arabs tried to move into south after winning victories in Sindh. They were repelled by another Badami Chalukya, Pulakesin in the reign of Vikramaditya II in 733. This defeat put back Islam by four hundred years.

So reading up on Chalukya history

Look for the Battles of Rajasthan and Navsari (Gujarat) respectively. Militarily both were more significant than the grossly over-blown Battle of Tours/Potiers, but lacked an appropriate Song of Roland to keep their memories alive in popular and academic imagination. (Though I am told that it marks the beginning of real history of many a modern Rajput clan). However I am somewhat skeptical that any one of these three defeats "put back Islam by four hundred years" - simply put, the Arabs had exhausted their genius for expansion and it was the time for them to sit back and statify; it was the demographic explosion in Central and Northern Asia that restarted a phenomena that would otherwise have stopped.

[ramana]

In response to my question above our SwamyG responded in IF:

Ramana:

In A.D. 711, Hajjaj, Arab governor of Iraq sent his son-in-law Muhammad ibn Qasim to invade Sindh. Sindh was then ruled by a brahmana king Dahir (or Dahar). The capital was captured, citizens massacred, women & children imprisoned & temples ransacked. Dahir met with 50,000 warriors in the battle, he died in the fighting. Dahir is supposed to have fought courageously and gallantly. His widow then took over what ever army remained and defended the fort till their provisions failed. Then the women chose death instead of dishonor, they lighted fire in the courtyard and threw themselves and their children into fire - their husbands watched and after the fire devored the women and kids, the men rushed with swords to meet the invaders eventually to their death. R.C.Majumdar notes before this battle the treachery of Buddhists played no small part in some campaigns to reach Dahar. There is treachery involved in the capture of Multan too. A traitor pointed out water-supply of Multan to Muhammad.

So that is the setting of Sindh...Now on to Pulakesiraja.

Later, Caliph Hisham (A.D. 724-43) appointed al-Junayad as the governor of Sind. Around A.D. 725 Junayad's forces invaded and defeated rulers of Kachchellas of Cutch, Maitrakas of Saurashtra, Chavotakas of South Rajasthan, Saindhavas of Bhumilka in West Kathiawar, Mauryas of Chitor and Gurjaras of Bhillamala. Then the forces proceeded towards Deccan with the entire Southern and Northern India seeming to fall to the Arabs. Some where between A.D. 731 and A.D. 738 Pulakesi defeated these forces. Pulakesi was a Chalukyan prince of Lata in the southern part of Gujarat, near Navasarika. Lata was the northern-most province of Chalukyas. Dantidurga, a Rashtrakuta King was known to have helped Pulakesi. This defeat of the Arabs is important because this is the deepest part of India that the Caliphate ever penetrated.

Pratihara Nagabhata I of Avanti (present Malwa) (A.D. 730-56) is credited for driving out the Muslims out of the area.

I think Nagabhata operated from the Northern-Eastern side (Ujjain) and Pulakesi operated from the Western-Southern area. Thus the North and South were saved.

Subsequently the Arabs are driven back till the Indus river.

Now let us see what people say about the defeat of Arabs by Pulikesi.
1) R.C.Majumdar says "Southern India was thus saved".
2) D.P. Dikshit says "If the Arabs had been successful, probably it would have meant the end of Hindu rule in Western India and complete extinction of their power."
3) Vikramaditya II the King then bestowed the title "the repeller of the unrepellable" on Pulakesi. This shows the power of the marauders.

Notes:
1) The Arabs were refered by the term 'Tajika'. There is a branch of Astrology related to this term.
2) Lata a.k.a Lata Desh or Lar Desh is believed to be Ptolemy's Larike that included Broach, Ujain and Nasik. Navasari was the capital of Lata.

Source: Several of the sources use the 'Gurjara Grants' of the time.

0) INTERNET ))
1) The Royal Gurjars by Nau Nihal Singh
2) The End of Jihad State by Khalid Yahya Blankinship
3) Ancient India, R.C.Majumdar
4) A History of South Inda, KAN Sastri
5) Gazetter of the Bombay Presidency - Khandesh.
6) Political History of the Chalukyas - D.P.Dikshit.

Very good summary article in such a short time! So this battle was as important as Tours was to France for it checked Arab expansion(Note I didnt say Islamic expansion) and stemmed the tide. How come this was never brought out in the history books of India? Growing up the Chalukyas were described as another medieval dynasty that rose and fell as if by magic.

I think this one should be better documented and available as an essay.

Airavat can you help?

Thanks, ramana

[SwamyG]

Shiv:
Another thing for you, I think I posted this earlier somewhere....posting it again as the numbers are simply astounding.

I have the book "A History of Vijayanagar: The never to be forgotten empire" by B.Suryanarain Row. Looking at these numbers the number 900000 seems to fit the pattern in those days - admitting some kind of exaggeration in reporting and observations. Since more than one person has reported such numbers, the probability of these numbers being near the actual value is high.

I paraphrase from the Introduction chapter:
1) Abdur Razzak visited Bijangar in 1443 AD. He claims to have seen 1000 elephants and 11,00,000 lakhs (eleven lakhs).
2) Nuniz a Portuguese traveler remarks that Krishna Deva Raya marched to the seige the battle of Raichur with 703,000 foot, 32,6000 horse and 551 elephants.
3) Paes another Portuguese traveler who was often present at K.D.Raya court observes that the King had continually a million fighting troops - which included 35,000 cavalry in armor. In one instance Raya dispatched 150,000 soldiers under 50 captains. Sometimes when he wants to show his strength he is known to put 2 million soldiers.
4) Castanheda who visited near the end of K.D.Raya's reign comments that King kept around 100,000 horses and 4,000 elephants.
5)The King's special bodyguard consisted of 6,000 well trained, well-mounted and richly-dressed horsemen.
6)The military population at the capital was 150,000 men.
7)The grand city is said to have had about 30,00,000 (thirty lakhs)

[Lalmohan]

I'm working my way though some meaty books on ancient and medieval India right now. One thing that strikes me is that every abdul, mohammad or qutubuddin ghazi sultan claims to have slaughtered lakhs of Hindus and smashed all their idols and temples and enslaved their women. if that is entirely true (as in the numbers, not the event) then surely the population of India would have gone into immediate decline and almost vanished? This is what generally happens to most living populations if you eliminate a large chunk of the reproductively capable members. something tells me that the ghazi babas liked to do a 1:10 on their bigoted, genocidal, extreme cruelties just to talk their game up. I have little doubt that Timur slaughtered lakhs, there is plenty of corroborating evidence from many sources, but many of the others, are not necessarily credible. Perhaps someone can do some mathematical modelling on this based on actual known population levels, their concentration and growth and declination rates? The only datapoint I have is that modelling shows that early humans were able to cause species extinction in the case of mammoths etc., with just a 2% kill rate.

just curious about the maths - and please lets not start a religious thing here, thats not my intent.

[ramana]

There are some spec for handing out the title ghazi. So claimants used to quote the number.

But by same token they say that in the 13th-14th century urban India was pretty much empty towns due to the vast killings.

[SwamyG]

Lalmohan:
As per some missionary accounts, circa 1850 the Indian population was estimated to be around 200 million. Encyclopedia Britannica, circa 1850, estimate the population to be around 134 million. In Parliamentary debates around the same time a figure of 150 million was assumed.