Latest Chinese boast: should we shiver or die laughing?

[Philip]

Antarctica belong to barbalian westerners? What a road of lubbish! Grand Admiral,chief eunuch,Zheng He ,he discovered Antartica centuries ago and it berong to gleat People's Le Pubic of China.Barbalian refugees squatting in Antarctica illegally will be thlown out by gleat Chinese Navy in short time.Since Antarctica is south of southern Tibet,which extends to tip of what is called India,it stands to leason that Antarctica berongs lighfully to gleat PRC and no kangaloo-eating climinals from land of Oz dare enter our tellitory!

[Prasad]

That PLA is nude and all India has to to do is hold the lines. India wins.

Sounds eerily similar to TSP's claim of we didn't get destroyed so we won argument they use to explain away their wars with India.

When you have two opponents facing each other, only way to get your first punch in is to feint and distract the opponent. But that again will be paki tactical brilliance level only. What happens after? Even if the chinese paradrop a bunch of soldiers in Noida, to what end then? Any build-up of forces by PLA will be seen unless we back off surveillance like we supposedly did before Kargil. There is no way for that to happen due to no similar cbm nonsense with the chinese.

[shiv]

One of the biggest problems I have found about the shivering caused by the 1962 war is the lack of public information of what happened and where it happened. Knowing the history and associated geography is important. So I will start by posting a map of the spots where valiant battles were fought in 1962 and where men fought to the last bullet and last man. We lost hundreds even as the chinese took huge casualties.

BRFite LN Subramaniam - who is sti active on the forum under a different name has written up the stories - but let me provide a map
1962 battles

The map below shows black arrows where big battles took place - Walong in east, Namka Chu and the battle of La Gyala gompa in western Arunachal Pradesh. Then in the far west, south of Aksai Chin - the battles at Rezang La in the Chushul area. Many of these areas are difficult to locate. But I have marked them on the map to show the geographic spread of the war.

[Deans]

Looking at Google maps, it is easier for the layman to understand the 1962 battles in Western Arunachal, as the Chinese advance was roughly
along the yellow road: Starting from Namka Chu (Tri Junction of India-Bhutan China) the Chinese advanced along the route - Tawang, Se La & Bomdila.

[Gerard]

I am no supporter of Chinese aggressive takeover of territories, but look at the map below. Whose father's land is it? And how do the owners propose to protect their territory if someone else claims it?

Under the 1959 Antarctic treaty...

No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting , supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.

These claims are not recognized by other nations

[Prasad]

Its late and gotta get up early to see the lca fly tomorrow. But a quick check on google maps tells me two things. 1. theres a 500MW Zangmu damn on the river NE of TAWANG. 2. Their highway there runs right next to the river downstream of that same dam. 3. They're planning to build similar capacity dams - 2 upstream and 1 downstream.

I dont know our policy on dams but this will only cutoff access between eastern and western AP though each can be approached from different angles.

[shiv]

Its late and gotta get up early to see the lca fly tomorrow. But a quick check on google maps tells me two things. 1. theres a 500MW Zangmu damn on the river NE of TAWANG. 2. Their highway there runs right next to the river downstream of that same dam. 3. They're planning to build similar capacity dams - 2 upstream and 1 downstream.

I dont know our policy on dams but this will only cutoff access between eastern and western AP though each can be approached from different angles.

On Google Earth - what is marked as the Zangmu dam is not a dam, but a bridge. However there is a cluster of 3-4 dams further north East of that - off the main Tsangpo river

Alleged Zangmu dam: 29°10'41.04"N 92°31'23.92"E

[Prasad]

There are quite a number of dams in that region. I remember reading plans for some 90 odd dams on the main river and the Lhasa river. The big lakes one sees to the east and south east of Lhasa are predominantly dam caused. Hitting them will wash out reinforcement avenues for a while. And impose significant economic cost. But might be construed as escalation given its 'civilian' nature. Electricity comes from these dams to nearby cities. So fair game imo.

[svinayak]

One of the biggest problems I have found about the shivering caused by the 1962 war is the lack of public information of what happened and where it happened. Knowing the history and associated geography is important. So I will start by posting a map of the spots where valiant battles were fought in 1962 and where men fought to the last bullet and last man. We lost hundreds even as the chinese took huge casualties.

BRFite LN Subramaniam - who is sti active on the forum under a different name has written up the stories - but let me provide a map
1962 battles

The map below shows black arrows where big battles took place - Walong in east, Namka Chu and the battle of La Gyala gompa in western Arunachal Pradesh. Then in the far west, south of Aksai Chin - the battles at Rezang La in the Chushul area. Many of these areas are difficult to locate. But I have marked them on the map to show the geographic spread of the war.

Why is this map showing Kashmir with red borders. Why use this map

[manjgu]

this is a chinese map thats why !!

[Philip]

In a follow up to an article posted earlier,about challenging China's occupation of Tibet,We should sign a treaty with the Dalai lama making Tibet an Indian protectorate-while he is still alive.This will send the Chinese into the hypersphere. Sending an official delegation Taiwan simultaneously and imposing massive tariffs on all Chinese goods,with bans on anything affecting our SMEs and electronic /IT /commns. sector,would send the $50B trade imbalance into history,where the money saved could be used to massively beef up the armed forces.All Chinese visitors to India to be issued with stapled visas and sale of BMos,Shaurya,Akash,Prithvi,and other missiles.

[shiv]

Why is this map showing Kashmir with red borders. Why use this map

Oh that is from Google Earth. The best open source satellite imagery on earth - from an American company called Google. We are so proud of Google. An alumnus of IIT Kharagpur has gone to America and is now CEO of Google. Shows India's power and the greatness of Indians and how big they make it when they go abroad. It is so good to have an Indian in such a big position on Google that the company will eat out of Indian hands. One can only imagine the benefits to India of having Indians in such high positions.

[ShauryaT]

Why is this map showing Kashmir with red borders. Why use this map

Oh that is from Google Earth. The best open source satellite imagery on earth - from an American company called Google. We are so proud of Google. An alumnus of IIT Kharagpur has gone to America and is now CEO of Google. Shows India's power and the greatness of Indians and how big they make it when they go abroad. It is so good to have an Indian American in such a big position on Google that the company will eat out of Indian hands. One can only imagine the benefits to India of having Indians in such high positions.

Some corrections. Understand the post was tongue in cheek!

[Singha]

couple of interesting videos

trip to Gurudongmar lake in north sikkim (190k from gangtok). it is 5km south of border. as you can see once you leave mountains and clouds of south sikkim behind, it becomes dry and rolling like tibet, the sky clears....no different for tanks than golan heights and qalamoun hills of syria.




the route from gangtok to nathu-la pass near chicken neck is mountainous all the way

[Singha]

so north sikkim is an area both sides can attack and try to make gains. Sundarji's Mi26 airlift to sumdrong chu/zemi thang was there only.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji: It is great that you are doing all this last mile analysis. One thing you ought to factor is PLA and PLAAF's capabilities to position Rapid Reaction forces, air brigades and use of tactical lift assets to supplement a traditional infantry/artillery led and maybe some armored assault to ascertain more realistic threat dimensions on the ground at the LAC, to go beyond what was seen in 62 or other events in the 80's focused on the valleys and passes. Should not be left with a situation to find the cheese has moved.

While the logistics and geographical constraints are a continuing challenge, technology and training can help overcome these to an extent. From an Orbat perspective, both armies rely on NOT facing a two front situation (PLA more than the IA) and moving troops to the region to manage emergencies. The question then is who is better equipped to move and once moved, who is better equipped and trained to achieve some meaningful objectives. Let us assume for the sake of this analysis that an LAC confrontation by either party does have some meaningful objectives.

What I am interested in knowing is if the ground realities are different from the 30,000 feet analysis done my many. IMO: Tactical ORBAT is no replacement for capabilities built at higher levels. I am not saying it is divorced.

To be clear: I can laugh at the Chinese boast but not at the Chinese threat. My position is to neither shiver nor die laughing but wake up and worry as an Indian and hope the military is paranoid about the adversary's capabilities. The hope is the paranoia will fuel enough energy to build reasonable deterrent capabilities, lacking today.

[Singha]

bike ride from GAU to tawang - irritating music but good time lapse docu

[Singha]

bike ride to Walong - road seems better than tawang - its much lower elevation

[shiv]

While the logistics and geographical constraints are a continuing challenge, technology and training can help overcome these to an extent.

Shaurya - you are IMO going too far ahead by making that statement. I will try and explain my viewpoint. I am not saying that the above statement is wrong but it is very important not to assume it as correct until it can be verified, for the following reasons:

The terrain and geography is so bad in the region that there is X percent of issues that simply cannot be solved by technology in its current state of in the foreseeable future There is, in addition. Y percentage of issues that as you say: "technology and training can help overcome".

If X percent+Y percent=100%, then we cannot know Y until we know X. And it is possible to figure out some of that by looking at map detail.

There are areas where any attack will have to come over multiple mountain ridges where men have to climb multiple parallel peaks over 5500 meters. No logistics on the ground can help either side mount an assault in these areas. But someone has to do the dog's work and look at those maps to see where these areas are. Of course air attacks and missile attacks can come over the mountains, but once we talk missiles we must talk nukes - and that is a separate subject. We can end the entire discussion by saying that both countries will nuke each other and then argue about how much nuking hurts us versus them - and that would make this thread pointless.

There are other areas where roads are very good - but beyond a point there is just no way to collect up huge forces or rush in with motorized vehicles because there is no space. Also, like the article you posted there are times of year when nothing is possible in some areas.

The Chinese have (allegedly) solved some issues by stocking up what is needed - arms, ammunition, food, fuel, water etc - pre-placing them at convenient forward areas and all that is required is for the men to be brought there to start using them. If so where are those storage areas? Are there tunnels? Or sheds? Let me (and anyone else who is interested) scour the map for such areas. Maybe I am getting too big for my shoes but what I am talking about is basic grunt level intel collection from available satellite images. I will repeat two earlier comments I made on this issue

1. I see that Indians seem most interested in looking at Indian defences and Indian armed forces concentrations. They are doing grunt level satellite intel work that is of use to the Chinese and Pakistanis and the usual story is "Oh anyone can do it so there is no harm". This is absolutely true, but who is doing it for the Chinese side? We are marking our own defences on Google earth and swelling with pride and jingogiri or alternatively shivering. Why are we jingos not looking at the Chinese side? is it too boring?

2. The more I scour satellite images the more I find that the public space in India is dominated by misinformation and fears about what the Chinese are doing. It is not as if we should not be worried - but at least take the trouble to be worried about something that really exists and not someone's imagination. I have already mentioned some aspects of geography and info wrt this. But there seems to be misinformation about dams as well. Dams are said to be there where they don't exist and there are dams in places that no one mentions. How about marking power generating stations that would be targets of Indian attack in war? But that needs careful scouring of the images, and following power pylons and lines that can all be seen. It requires dedicated time - but with Google Earth available on mobile devices and fast internet - one can do this while travelling in public transport to work or at lunchtime.

[Rakesh]

The Case of Barahoti, the First Himalyan Blunder
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/the- ... n-blunder/

[nirav]

To be clear: I can laugh at the Chinese boast but not at the Chinese threat. My position is to neither shiver nor die laughing but wake up and worry as an Indian and hope the military is paranoid about the adversary's capabilities. The hope is the paranoia will fuel enough energy to build reasonable deterrent capabilities, lacking today.

I do not believe that the armed forces work on paranoia about our enemies capabilities.
They are professional fighting units tasked with the job of defending India and her interests.We must give them credit for ascertaining the nature of the Chinese military challenge and taking steps to mitigate it.

If a reasonable deterrent capability were indeed lacking as of today, the Chinese instead of making the boast would be actually headed towards Delhi.Thats not the case though.

Dhoti shivering and basing responses on forums may be fine for us arm chair jernails.
The armed forces dont dhoti shiver.

[Karthik S]

To be clear: I can laugh at the Chinese boast but not at the Chinese threat. My position is to neither shiver nor die laughing but wake up and worry as an Indian and hope the military is paranoid about the adversary's capabilities. The hope is the paranoia will fuel enough energy to build reasonable deterrent capabilities, lacking today.

I do not believe that the armed forces work on paranoia about our enemies capabilities.
They are professional fighting units tasked with the job of defending India and her interests.We must give them credit for ascertaining the nature of the Chinese military challenge and taking steps to mitigate it.

If a reasonable deterrent capability were indeed lacking as of today, the Chinese instead of making the boast would be actually headed towards Delhi.Thats not the case though.

Dhoti shivering and basing responses on forums may be fine for us arm chair jernails.
The armed forces dont dhoti shiver.

I saw an Israeli military documentary where they encourage having little paranoia among the ranks. Their justification was that having little of it will help in not making mistakes. It applies to strategic and tactical.

[chola]

Have the armed forces actually responded to this threat? I haven't been able to see any official response to a pretty serious provocation.

No response because of dhoti shivering? Or because they see (pretend) it as fake news?

What is certain is the PLA is weakly placed on the Indian border, terrain and geo-politics dictate it. We need a war with Cheen to stop this shivering once and for all.

All this mindless looking into minutiae on the border will not turn up any more chini troops than what we do not see. Tibet as a high plateau does not and cannot support large formations of troops, armor or aircraft. The closest frontline armor and air units are outside Tibet and need to be surged into the region. Geo-politically, the overwhelming majority of PLA might must be placed on its east coast against the US, Taiwan and Japan.

India commands all advantages on the chini front. It is time we take back what is ours.

[shiv]

Paranoia is a word that is being misused here. Paranoia by definition is an unjustified fear or anxiety. There should be NO paranoia. That means there should be no unjustified fears. By all means feel fear or anxiety but base it on fact and not myth. But ascertain the facts first

[Rakesh]

“Gentlemen, I have arrived and there will be no withdrawal without written orders and these orders shall never be issued.”
- During 1962 War, when General Manekshaw was sent to North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) to command retreating Indian forces against the Chinese force.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv Ji: I have expressed some reservations on the approach you have taken but do not let that stop you. I think it is important to have this last mile or 10 miles dimension documented, if we can. I just doubt if it will materially change the higher level analysis - but that is just me.

As you do this analysis, there is some lateral work that some have done with a focus on the use of special forces. I am quoting some excerpts from the linked paper. It will be worth your read, well referenced, but fair warning it is think tank oriented and goes deeper into the Indian state of affairs and challenges than the PLA's.

PS: Let us keep the nuclear dimension out completely, but why have you precluded the use of missiles without the nuclear dimension? My view is the Chinese are certainly not thinking on those lines. The erstwhile PLA 2nd artillery corps, now the Rocket Force has both and their new integrated commands retain these independent "rocket" brigades. I fully expect extensive use of cruise, SR/MR ballistic and LR artillery/Rockets to be part of the mix on both sides.

A Himalayan Challenge - Iskander Rehman

Some excerpts. A few italicized comments are mine..

When it came to conflicts along China’s terrestrial borders, it was argued that a growth in the effectiveness of transregional
support operations—principally via enhanced rail mobility—would allow the PLA to surge units stationed deep within China’s interior rapidly. These forces would be shielded by interlocking “mobility corridors” generated by early strikes on an adversary’s standoff platforms or the movement of mobile surface-to-airmissile (SAM) batteries.24.....

A key role of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), along with the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), would be to conduct standoff strikes to interdict, disrupt, and delay the arrival of Indian forces coming from the lowlands. As one Chinese military analyst notes, “Along the Sino-Indian borders, where the IA enjoys . . .manpower superiority vis-à-vis the PLA, the PLAAF will launch ‘shielding bombardment’ campaigns in a defensive land war to rebuff the enemy’s second-tier infantry and logistical reinforcement.....

One recently retired Indian SOF general drew attention to this aspect of Chinese thinking on special operations, noting, “If a divisional size attack is launched, say, in Tawang, then the Chinese could employ SOFs to cut off all routes for buildup of reserves, attack specific sensors, and also raid artillery and logistic locations. The deep induction of SOFs for providing early warnings and information on the movement of Indian reserves could also be tasked.”30.....

the rapid development of China’s airborne assault capabilities, in the form of the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Corps. Consisting of three divisions numbering over 35,000 troops, with a light artillery and mechanized component, the 15th Airborne Corps is headquartered in Xiaogan, from which it is expected to reach any part of China within ten hours.32 At this time their air lift capabilities are limited to a brigade

A future [limited] war could see the Chinese depending heavily on their airpower for air defense and air support. Offensive operations would be SOF- and air assault forces–intensive, unlike the simple infantry operations of 1962 vintage.”35

The proposed Indian Repsonse

A future [limited] war could see the Chinese depending heavily on their airpower for air defense and air support. Offensive operations would be SOF- and air assault forces–intensive, unlike the simple infantry operations of 1962 vintage.”35....

India’s mechanized counteroffensive would form only one component of a wider theater strategy, however. In addition to these movements, Indian air and missile power would be brought to bear on transport and communication nodes deep within the TAR, with the goal of delaying or preventing the arrival of PLA reinforcements.55

In short, India’s intense reliance on large, centralized, conventional forces—a substantial portion of which are stationed at lower altitudes—would not be the most operationally judicious approach in the event of a short, fast-moving, limited war launched from high elevations along the LAC.

The next section of this article makes an argument for providing the IA with a similarly “different yet complementary force”—one
that is forward deployed, distributed, and able to respond both rapidly and effectively to various contingencies. The candidate force—a mixture of SOFs and locally raised scouting battalions—would be geared toward rapid reaction and proactive defense....

In the conceptualized role of the mountain strike corps, the future Air Assault Division and Special Operations Forces will operate in tandem as part of India’s area denial strategy. What is implied is, SOFs will be inserted up to and beyond an operational depth to disrupt the build-up of PLA forces, isolate and invest critical vulnerable points and areas. These isolated vulnerable points will then be attacked via air
assaults through heliborne and airborne forces. It is important to keep in mind that the Tibetan plateau is a plane with little undulations, which allows for the application of both air assault forces as well as air assault mechanized forces.111....

Before India is able to envisage such ambitiously minded concepts of operations, however, steps will need to be taken and reforms will need to be enacted. These extend well beyond issues of equipment, training, and procurement; defense management, political vision, and doctrinal definition will need to be addressed. The long-discussed creation of a triservice JSOC would constitute an important step forward. Perhaps most importantly, India’s security managers will need to embrace an operational philosophy that places a greater emphasis on rapidly regaining the initiative and on high-end asymmetric warfare. In short, their mode of thinking may need to become more Chinese.

[ShauryaT]

Paranoia is a word that is being misused here. Paranoia by definition is an unjustified fear or anxiety. There should be NO paranoia. That means there should be no unjustified fears. By all means feel fear or anxiety but base it on fact and not myth. But ascertain the facts first

I used that word deliberately, not in its classic dictionary meaning but in a more colloquial use of the word in context of being constantly anxious and obsessed with outsmarting the opponent - based on facts. I think there is merit in that word in the India - China context. The rate at which China is executing upon its comprehensive national strength program is a challenge to India. I will not list the litany of these increasing differentials in power and use of power. I am paranoid that IF India does not execute at a feverish pace, we will be left behind in this great power race. Power will eventually fill in a space that has a vacuum. Not being paranoid is not an option, if we seek to fill that space with Indian power.

[chola]

Not being paranoid is not an option, if we seek to fill that space with Indian power.

Very bad way of going at filling space with Indian power. India enjoys manpower, aircraft and logistics advantages along the cheen border. Yet paranoia of what might happen during a surge from the chini interior a 1000 miles away or more is keeping us on the defensive. Unfounded fear is keeping India from filling that space with Indian power. Unfounded dhoti shivering.

We need to go to war with cheen to get what is rightfully ours back and rid ourselves of our pee-stained lungis once and for all.

[ShauryaT]

All this mindless looking into minutiae on the border will not turn up any more chini troops than what we do not see. Tibet as a high plateau does not and cannot support large formations of troops, armor or aircraft. The closest frontline armor and air units are outside Tibet and need to be surged into the region. Geo-politically, the overwhelming majority of PLA might must be placed on its east coast against the US, Taiwan and Japan.

India commands all advantages on the chini front. It is time we take back what is ours.

I can call your post all kinds of names based on my thinking but can someone like Shiv be given his due respect to think the way he wants to, without someone calling him mindless?

[chola]

All this mindless looking into minutiae on the border will not turn up any more chini troops than what we do not see. Tibet as a high plateau does not and cannot support large formations of troops, armor or aircraft. The closest frontline armor and air units are outside Tibet and need to be surged into the region. Geo-politically, the overwhelming majority of PLA might must be placed on its east coast against the US, Taiwan and Japan.

India commands all advantages on the chini front. It is time we take back what is ours.

I can call your post all kinds of names based on my thinking but can someone like Shiv be given his due respect to think the way he wants to, without someone calling him mindless?

Did I call him mindless? I call this kind of looking into minutiae mindless. It is like us looking over and over again at the moon and say "see this patch of lunar dust? There is no PLA here."

Of course not! The moon can't support major PLA formations and neither can Tibet.

[rohitvats]

so north sikkim is an area both sides can attack and try to make gains. Sundarji's Mi26 airlift to sumdrong chu/zemi thang was there only.

Sumdrong Chu and Zimithang are in Tawang Sector. Both are North-West of Tawang. Sumdrong Chu is about opposite of Namka Chu; both flow into Nyamjang Chu, Sumdrong Chu from east and Namka Chu from west. Namka Chu/Thag La ridge is where 7 Infantry Bde got decimated in the opening hours of 1962 War.

[rohitvats]

The Case of Barahoti, the First Himalyan Blunder
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/the- ... n-blunder/

Thank you for this post. I've long been searching for background info on the Central Sector; this has all the details I require. Of great help to understand some military aspects as well.

[shiv]

All this mindless looking into minutiae on the border will not turn up any more chini troops than what we do not see. Tibet as a high plateau does not and cannot support large formations of troops, armor or aircraft. The closest frontline armor and air units are outside Tibet and need to be surged into the region. Geo-politically, the overwhelming majority of PLA might must be placed on its east coast against the US, Taiwan and Japan.

India commands all advantages on the chini front. It is time we take back what is ours.

I can call your post all kinds of names based on my thinking but can someone like Shiv be given his due respect to think the way he wants to, without someone calling him mindless?

It's Ok Shaurya. He has his views and is entitled to them. Perhaps there is also an overlay of something more than mere disagreement with my views there - but as long as the urge to make personal pot shots at anyone is resisted, alternate opinions stand on their own merit - at least as much as they are able to muster. You do know that I have never ever been fobbed off by someone who has a different opinion from me. I have always stated that opinions are like xxxxxxxx - er I mean noses. Everybody has one.

[shiv]

The Case of Barahoti, the First Himalyan Blunder
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/the- ... n-blunder/

Thank you for this post. I've long been searching for background info on the Central Sector; this has all the details I require. Of great help to understand some military aspects as well.

Rohit the Barahoti region is interesting on Google earth. Appears at first glance to be a flat area 4500 meters high surrounded on all sides by mountains that are 5500 meters high. It looks like nothing is happening there but the name "Niti pass" is a clue. From Niti pass there is a river valley that goes down all the way into Uttarakhand that allows access into India. China has build some roads and bridges on their side, connecting to the G 219 highway - but so far the roads appear to be "good weather roads" that cross some rivers over the riverbed.

Significantly India seems to have a lot of forces in the region while China has not kept much that is visible. This is probably because this is definitely one area where they have the roads to push in an invading force and the flat area near the Niti pass to serve as a staging location for forces to come down the valley in strength

[Deans]

The Chinese coming down Niti pass seems a stretch. The central sector is where our road network appears to be better.
14th division of 2 Corps in Dehra Dun, should be well placed to tackle any incursion. If we can take the ridge just north of Niti pass, it would create problems for the PLA.

[rohitvats]

The Chinese coming down Niti pass seems a stretch. The central sector is where our road network appears to be better. 14th division of 2 Corps in Dehra Dun, should be well placed to tackle any incursion. If we can take the ridge just north of Niti pass, it would create problems for the PLA.

14 Division is a RAPID - tasked for western border.

6 Mountain Division, HQ in Bareilly and with brigades in Pitthoragargh, Ranikhet and Shahjahanpur, is the AHQ reserve which is tasked for Central Sector in case of shooting match with the Chinese. Plus, there is an independent Brigade Group in Joshimath which is dedicated for this sector.

Further, IA has asked for additional Independent Infantry Brigade Group for Uttarakhand which I think is being put in place [part of four new infantry brigades and two armored brigades which IA has asked for Chinese border]

[Singha]

the threat of chinese ground and air launched cruise missiles (CJ10 et al) to vital airbases in the eastern sector has been mitigated to some extent by the Akash deployments (more on order) and part of the spyder batteries will also be in NE or airlifted there in a crisis as a close-in 2ndary layer. the bofors L70 under radar guidance and any potshots with Iglas from hilltops at approaching CMs will for the last ciws.

but for BM like DF11 and such there is no SAM capable of intercepting...their terminal speed will be in Mach7 range ... only a deployed and productionized S400 "big missile" or AAD can tackle these and swat them upto a point. we need to be careful of the cost curve here....if the incoming missile cost Rs 100, and we expend a Rs 500 missile to swat it , its a losing game...ideally our response needs to (a) scale up to deal with salvo attacks (b) be cheaper (c) not tied to any all-or-nothing system like a single static OTH radar whose downtime or damage brings the whole bubble down . this cost game is the same one the USN is playing vs Cheen using cheaper LRASM and JASSM-ER which can be intercepted by modern naval SAMs to force the PLAN to fill up more its VLS with SAMS(defensive weapon) vs land attack missiles that can take down US bases or long range ASMs ... the Type55 with its bigger loadout of 128 cell VLS is a response to this problem.

detecting ground launches of CM / BM from deep within tibet is the first link in the chain. we do not have a solution yet except a orbiting AWACS high over Arunachal which makes it vulnerable. further south over the brahmaputra valley will reduce its slant into tibet due to 15000ft high mountains....Cheen TELARs can creep up right into the border and fire the missiles in a steep climbing trajectory to crest over the mountains (at which point awacs will see them)...but then only a short sharp 100-200km left to fly down and hit targets in india so not much reaction time.

we need large static OTH radars for sure backed by mobile ABM X-band radars of greenpine variety to get a sense of these swarms and movements. SAR-GMTI ghawk type drones to cue our own missiles to PLA movements too in tibet on the ground.

lot of work in radars and networks...most of the missiles except nirbhay are already in production or nearing so (garuda amma et al)

[rohitvats]

Rohit the Barahoti region is interesting on Google earth. Appears at first glance to be a flat area 4500 meters high surrounded on all sides by mountains that are 5500 meters high. It looks like nothing is happening there but the name "Niti pass" is a clue. From Niti pass there is a river valley that goes down all the way into Uttarakhand that allows access into India. China has build some roads and bridges on their side, connecting to the G 219 highway - but so far the roads appear to be "good weather roads" that cross some rivers over the riverbed. Significantly India seems to have a lot of forces in the region while China has not kept much that is visible. This is probably because this is definitely one area where they have the roads to push in an invading force and the flat area near the Niti pass to serve as a staging location for forces to come down the valley in strength

I've been myself trying to figure out some stuff in this area. The article from Rakesh was very helpful and has solved the puzzle for me. Give me time till Sunday, I will put together some analysis on the area.

There is another important pass in the region - this is the Lipulekh Pass at the tri-junction between India, Nepal and Tibet borders. This is the fourth pass in the region and the most easternmost. The Kailash Mansarovar Yatra crosses over into Tibet across this pass.

There is a very strong historical aspect related to Lipulekh Pass and area across it in Tibet. Remember someone by the name General Zorawar Singh of Jammu from the court of Gulab Singh? The fellow who conquered Ladakh and Baltistan and then forayed into Tibet to conquer western Tibet. During this initial expedition, be defeated the Tibetans and his army bathed in the Mansarovar Lake. But the Tibetans sent a large reinforcement from Lhasa and the Dogra General had stretched his supply line. Winter had set it and they could not retreat.

A battle took place between the Dogra Army and Tibetans at a place called Taklakot south of Lake Mansarovar. This place is now called Burang Town; the Dogra Army was defeated and Tibetans buried the good General with a Chorten to mark his grave.

Now, here is the interesting part -

- Had the good General not been defeated, the Jammu ( and later J&K) kingdom could've forged an overland alliance with the Gorkha Kingdom of Nepal.
- The Dogras would've controlled the trade route from Tibet into India (present day Uttarakhand) through all the four passes.
- Kailash Mansarovar would've been with Hindus.
- Most important part - western Tibet would've been under Indian control.

Alas, it was not to be!

[Singha]

and there it stands to this day, awaiting the restoration of the holy lands ...

[Deans]

The Chinese coming down Niti pass seems a stretch. The central sector is where our road network appears to be better. 14th division of 2 Corps in Dehra Dun, should be well placed to tackle any incursion. If we can take the ridge just north of Niti pass, it would create problems for the PLA.

14 Division is a RAPID - tasked for western border.

6 Mountain Division, HQ in Bareilly and with brigades in Pitthoragargh, Ranikhet and Shahjahanpur, is the AHQ reserve which is tasked for Central Sector in case of shooting match with the Chinese. Plus, there is an independent Brigade Group in Joshimath which is dedicated for this sector.

Thanks for clarifying. I simply assumed that 14th Div was Mountain and 6th RAPID, due to the location of their HQ's.

Given the increased force that we can deploy in this sector and a better ability to reinforce, I wonder if this is where we have scope to take the initiative by crossing over into Tibet ?