Bharat Rakshak

In PoK, the camps are located in Tattapani, Garhi Dupatta, Barnala, Sensa, Forward Kahutta, Peer Chinasi, Shavai Nallah, Bhimbher, Kotli, Skardu, Abdullah Bin Masud, Nikial, Gulpur, Samani and, Jhandi Chauntra, among others. Within the militancy-wracked NWFP, there are several seminaries which also function as terrorist training camps in the mountainous Manshera region. These include Jangal Mangal, Shinkiari, Andher Bela, and Jalo Gali. Elsewhere in the Frontier, there are camps located in Oghi, Boi, and Attar Shisha. Furthermore, there are also camps situated at other locations within Pakistan, including Muridke, Sialkot, Beesian, Garhi Habibullah and Jalogali.

12. If the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) had been set up in time and had it started functioning as it was supposed to, we might have been in a better position to detect and neutralise preparations for retaliatory action. The exercise to set up the NCTC has come to a halt due to political mishandling. This exercise needs to be resumed and completed vigorously.

darshhan wrote:Some observations regarding covert action to neutralise paki enemies of India.

1. A separate agency(fresh and lean) will have to be formed for this task. Most probably RAW will not be able to carry out this task effectively.

2. Apart from Pakistan, some neutralization actions should be carried out in countries like UK, Canada and Scandinavian Countries. Saale bahut lecture dete hain. Add UAE and Saudi Arabia too. Will have tremendous payoff.

3. Pashtuns and Baloch youth should be fully utilised for making low level hits.

RoyG wrote:
So your solution is to create another intelligence service?

Gagan wrote:Congress I is not willing to go after the terrorists. They have this misplaced sense of killing pakistani terrorists will somehow aleniate their muslim votebank here.
I wish security of Indian lives becomes a non compromising issue for all political parties.

It is quite clear that RAW has resurrected a capability to track things inside TSP. We should continue to invest in these capabilities for covert action of all kinds.

sum wrote:

It is quite clear that RAW has resurrected a capability to track things inside TSP. We should continue to invest in these capabilities for covert action of all kinds.

Shaurya-ji,
Could you please indicate how you came to this conclusion?

Amitabh wrote:

Gagan wrote:Congress I is not willing to go after the terrorists. They have this misplaced sense of killing pakistani terrorists will somehow aleniate their muslim votebank here.
I wish security of Indian lives becomes a non compromising issue for all political parties.

Right, because the pseudo-nationalist heroes of Kandahar did such a great job eliminating India's enemies.

. Left Wing Extremism now outstrips the combined total of all other incidents of attack and casualties. Not saying things are perfect or even close to it. But, we are not sleeping

. Left Wing Extremism now outstrips the combined total of all other incidents of attack and casualties. Not saying things are perfect or even close to it. But, we are not sleeping

anmol wrote:

Amitabh wrote: Right, because the pseudo-nationalist heroes of Kandahar did such a great job eliminating India's enemies.

I am still very much a "newb" here but how can anyone on BRF compare that with Kandahar ?

BJP did what it did during Kandahar to save life of Indians..

Congress won't take actions which will help save life of Indians.. because it affects votebank.

See no difference ?

Amitabh wrote:In fact one can discern a lot more destabilisation in Pakistan since 2008 than before. Now I am not obviously privy to RAW covert ops but the betting man in me would say that Indian agencies have been much more active in this period. At least the Pakistanis believe it. And the target set seems a lot better aligned with Indian goals.

It may well be that Indian agencies have in fact close to zero influence on what is happening in Pakistan. But the assumption that somehow the UPA is softer on terror than the NDA is delusional. The actual evidence of covert action will always be hazy, but circumstantial evidence suggests the opposite of what you posit.

Sanku wrote: The statistics of internal security has been posted on various threads far too often (and can be easily goggled)

shiv wrote:

Sanku wrote: The statistics of internal security has been posted on various threads far too often (and can be easily goggled)

Sanku the colour of the goggles is important. Red, green, saffron or yellow.

shiv wrote:

Sanku wrote: The statistics of internal security has been posted on various threads far too often (and can be easily goggled)

Sanku the colour of the goggles is important. Red, green, saffron or yellow.

November 22, 2012 17:18 IST

Lashkar founder Mohammad Sayeed and 26/11 attacks accused Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi must be neutralised one by one if Pakistan does not act against them, says Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (retd).

Ajmal Kasab [ Images ], the sole terrorist arrested during the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai [ Images ], has finally been hanged. But he was only a foot soldier of the Lashkar-e-Tayiba [ Images ], a fundamentalist organisation that continues to launch acts of terror on Indian soil.

Despite the voluminous evidence presented to Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari's [ Images ] government has failed to satisfactorily meet India's demands for either effectively putting on trial the masterminds of the Mumbai terror strikes or handing them over to face justice in India.

Peace is undeniably important, but not if the cost is a continuing proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir [ Images ] and terrorism in other parts of India, being sponsored from across the border by organisations over which the Pakistan government claims it has no control.

Since all other options have been exhausted, the Government of India must consider viable military and covert options to send a strong message to the Pakistan army [ Images ] and the Inter Services Intelligence that India's threshold of tolerance has been crossed and enough is enough, especially if a similar incident recurs.

Military options include raids across the Line of Control [ Images ] on the leadership and training camps of the Lashkar, the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Hizbul Mujahideen [ Images ] by Special Forces, the destruction of the Pakistan army's posts on the Line of Control and its logistics installations in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir by heavy doses of artillery fire and the precision bombing of selected targets by the Indian Air Force.

However, hard military options have only a transitory impact unless these are sustained over a long period of time. The use of force also causes inevitable collateral damage, runs the risk of escalating into a larger war with attendant nuclear dangers and has adverse international ramifications.

In order to achieve a lasting impact and ensure that the actual perpetrators of terrorism are targeted, it is necessary to employ covert capabilities to neutralise the leadership of terrorist organisations. Clandestine operations can be methodically planned and stealthily executed at an opportune moment.

These are not time-critical responses and they also have an element of 'plausible deniability' built into them. Other advantages include relatively low political, economic and military costs and low risk of casualties for operatives as local personnel -- who harbour grudges against the targeted organisations -- can often be used.

After Independence, Indian intelligence agencies had virtually no covert capabilities available while Pakistan launched irregular warfare against India in Kashmir and sustained it over the next few decades.

After the 1962 war with China, the newly-established external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, received help from the Central Intelligence Agency to establish capabilities for clandestine operations across India's borders.

When the ISI intervened to provide 'political, diplomatic and moral' support to the protagonists of the insurgent Khalistan movement in Punjab [ Images ] in the 1980s, India is reported to have retaliated in the restive regions of Sindh and Balochistan.

Soon after the Brass Tacks IV crisis in 1987 (when the Indian Army's [ Images ] simulation of a full-scale war on the border unsettled Pakistan), R&AW chief A K Verma and then ISI chief Lieutenant General Hamid Gul (now on India's wanted list) reportedly agreed to stop launching covert operations against each other.

Pakistan did not keep its part of the bargain in Kashmir on the specious plea that it is was a disputed territory. It went flat out to support militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. Since then, Pakistan has often accused India of clandestine interference in its internal affairs, but has failed to corroborate its claims with hard evidence.

B Raman, a well-known intelligence analyst, has written, 'R&AW imposed heavy costs on Pakistan for supporting the Khalistanis and should be able to do so now for its support to the LeT and other jihadi terrorist organisations.'

According to the intelligence grapevine, India's covert capabilities in Pakistan were wound down on the prime minister's orders in 1997, so as to promote reconciliation.

If that is true, a great deal of effort will be necessary to establish these capabilities from scratch. Young operatives will have to be selected and trained -- initially in the rudiments of intelligence gathering -- and after being given some in-country experience, in the complexities of high-risk special operations in a hostile foreign environment.

They will also need to be imparted specialised instructions in selecting, training and motivating local agents to carry out pre-planned and opportune strikes against selected targets.

It takes at least three to five years to put in place basic capabilities for covert operations in Pakistan as both the terrorist organisations and their handlers like the ISI have to be penetrated. It is to be hoped that permission has been given to R&AW to revive its earlier capabilities.

Targets should include the leaders of fundamentalist terrorist organisations in Pakistan who are sponsoring terrorist strikes in India and their ISI handlers -- particularly those who are renegade or rogue elements.

Masterminds like Lashkar founder Mohammad Sayeed and 26/11 attack accused Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi must be neutralised one by one if Pakistan does not act against them.

Fugitives from the Indian justice system, like gangster and prime accused in the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts Dawood Ibrahim [ Images ], must be hounded out. In fact, Dawood should be secretly apprehended from his hideout in Karachi and brought back alive to India to face a public trial.

In a later phase, when a network of operatives is in place and sufficient experience has been gained, logistics installations of the army like ammunition dumps -- from which explosives are issued for suicide strikes -- should be blown up.

In this age of realpolitik, adherence to ahimsa (non-violence) will not pay dividends and India will remain at the mercy of terrorist organisations. Such organisations will always have the initiative as they can choose the time and place of the next attack.

R&AW must be given the wherewithal necessary to undertake sustained covert operations in Pakistan to eliminate the leadership of organisations inimical to India.

The flames of fundamentalist terrorism in India are still being fanned by the Pakistan army and the ISI, though on a reduced scale. The time to debate this issue on moral and legal grounds has long since passed.

Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) is a Delhi-based strategic analyst.

shyamd wrote:Things will change after 2014/15.

shyamd wrote:Geopolitical situation and India is working on a long term plan, which you will see soon. Bumping off one person or 2 people isn't going to resolve the issue.

shyamd wrote:

Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) is a Delhi-based strategic analyst.

Things will change after 2014/15.