Israel-Hezbollah-Iran War

[Vayutuvan]

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GuB-EDyXYAA ... name=small

How is it relevant to this thread? Take your trump fanboyism to the right thread and go wild.

Now riddle me this Batman. viewtopic.php?p=2652681#p2652681

[bala]

and the image of the article written by Sonia G.

What a moronic article. Why does the Kangress suck up to such despots who are in charge of Iran. We are talking about acquisition of nuclear weapons, with China doing its proliferation bid quietly behind the scenes. Since when has S. G become a writer of articles, when she cannot complete full sentences properly when she opens her mouth.

[chetak]

Not just them, but I think it's a message to every nation that is thinking about going against US interests, or trumps interests.

Are you suggesting that Indian nuke facilities are at risk

Vyautuvan ji,


eyeraaan is an existential threat to israel and a regional bully with a bug up its butt. The ruling junta is oppressive, irrationally medieval, enforcing diktats bordering on religious psychosis and the mullahs govern by fear, murdering citizens at will

saudi is no better but it has, of late, acquired a thin veneer of so called modernity which is a facade, behind which equally rabid mullahs are angrily champing at the bit

Both have, in the past, bullied India for their own benefit but now neither will dare to do so because they lack the testimonials

When India test fires a long range nuclear capable missile, or acquires a new nuclear sub, no one even bats an eyelid, because we are not seen as a threat to anyone.

Janab Jaishankar and Modi ji have rewritten the India story on the global arena

However Op Sindoor has shocked a lot of gora countries and has seriously rattled their cages. The ferocity, efficiency and competency of the strike has left them stunned, as has the complete domination and dynamic management of the escalatory ladder

They all realize that the strike against the pakis was defensive because those clowns crossed a lot of red lines, like a coiled hissing cobra that strikes mainly to defend itself.

[Vayutuvan]

@chetak garu, I agree 100%. But mine was a semi-rhetorical question for poster @Jay who is given to smart two liners, mostly.

[pravula]

Apparently Iran has moved/hidden their 60% enriched uranium. So what now? troops on the ground to hunt for WMD? Iraq-redux?

[A_Gupta]

Let’s be real — this was an act of war. Whether we like the Iranian regime or not (and I definitely don’t), launching strikes like this is almost certainly illegal under both U.S. and international law. We can’t just ignore that.

I wanted to really check this before bringing it up.

In February 2025, a Hamas leader attended a conference titled “Kashmir Solidarity and Hamas Operation Al Aqsa Flood” in Rawalkot, POK.

This, we are told, signaled an intention of bringing Gaza-style terrorism into J&K, and uniting the Palestinian and Kashmir jihads. Al Aqsa Flood was the October 7th attack on Israel.

Whatever the intent was, there is zero doubt that there was this attendance, it was dangerously anti-India, and it would not have happened without Iran’s tacit approval. What of this was in accord with international law or whatever?

This is after all a Bharat-centric forum and so the weakening of the Iranian theocracy by hook or by crook and without Indian involvement even is a matter of celebration.

[Deans]

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) a deal signed by IRAN and US that would limit the Iranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and other provisions. Publicly stating that Iran is building a nuclear weapon violates this agreement. The US has a right to strike Iran for violation of JCPOA. The US Dumbocrats (e.g., AOC, Schumer) are iching to impeach DJT due to a MOAB strike on nuclear facility violating a deal signed by Iran. Any nuclear weapons facility in IRAN is fair game for a strike. DJT spared Khamenei life twice from Israel. No civilian facility was hit, it is all nuclear by the US, this is not war against Iran, it is war against nuclear weapons. DJT has offered to continue talks for peaceful resolution.

The United States, under President Donald Trump, withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. So what deal are you talking about that Iran violated?

Trump unilaterally walked out of the JCPOA and I was critical of him at the time. In retrospect though, I think US concerns were justified. Iran used
sanctions relief to increasing financing of their proxies - Hamas/Hezbollah, Houthis. The Biden administration tried to get them back to the JCPOA, but Iran did not want to give up enriching uranium to 60% (against the 3.67% permitted for civilian use under the JCPOA). Iran has the capability to go from 60% to weapons grade 90% uranium, though the process had not been started, as per IAEA and Tulsi Gabbard's assessment.
If Iran's leadership has been publicly and constantly saying for the last 30+ years, that they want to destroy Israel, are close to getting a nuclear weapon and have the ballistic missiles to deliver it, I can't blame Israel for a pre emptive strike.

[A_Gupta]

Saudi reaction expresses concern about the targeting of nuclear facilities in the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran.

Note: sisterly, not brotherly. One should not transgender these national relationships.

Iran is the sex change capital of middle east . Factual verifiable info . So it's ok to transgender the relationship in this case .

Perhaps the real significance is that in Islamic law, brothers inheri twice as much as sisters; as men brother’s testimony has twice the weight of sister’s testimony, etc. so ‘sisterly Islamic republic’ means, yes, you are not a republic of kafirs, but you are still worth only half.

[bala]

This is an instructive YT by Lt. Gen P R Shankar on Iran - he talks about Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis; missiles; nuclear stuff. Shankar displays the declining graph salvo of missiles targeted on Israel by Iran. On nuclear, Shankar provides the basics on Uranium ores, enrichment, bomb design, etc. Each nuclear site has some specific aspect of enrichment. Each site's speciality is covered and if they were bombed by Israel and US.

Worthwhile to catch up on many topics, especially if you are not familiar with nuclear stuff in detail. Fissile material U 235 and U 239 plutonium are discussed. Uranium ore contains U235 0.7% and the rest are U238. When U235 is extracted via enrichment it becomes highly enriched uranium HEU (bombs require 90+% HEU). Low enriched uranium 3-5% U235 are used in fuel rods for reactors. The remaining U238 in the fuel rod get bombarded with neutrons and becomes plutonium U239. When U235 is removed the remaining U238 is depleted Uranium used in ammunition. One step for enrichment involves mixing U235 with fluorine to make it UF6. This is used in centrifuges. Getting bomb grade Uranium U 235 involves a series of centrifuges. Lots of tricky stuff is involved in each step. Many of Iran's sites are involved in certain aspects. One site Bushehr nuclear center was not hit, since that would cause radiation.

The Chinese are involved heavily in many aspects, UF6 conversion and heavy water supply. North Korea was used by Iran to do some cold testing of nuclear bomb.

IRAN'S MISCALCULATIONS / LT GEN PR SHANKAR

[A_Gupta]

The United States, under President Donald Trump, withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. So what deal are you talking about that Iran violated?

Trump unilaterally walked out of the JCPOA and I was critical of him at the time. In retrospect though, I think US concerns were justified. Iran used
sanctions relief to increasing financing of their proxies - Hamas/Hezbollah, Houthis. The Biden administration tried to get them back to the JCPOA, but Iran did not want to give up enriching uranium to 60% (against the 3.67% permitted for civilian use under the JCPOA). Iran has the capability to go from 60% to weapons grade 90% uranium, though the process had not been started, as per IAEA and Tulsi Gabbard's assessment.
If Iran's leadership has been publicly and constantly saying for the last 30+ years, that they want to destroy Israel, are close to getting a nuclear weapon and have the ballistic missiles to deliver it, I can't blame Israel for a pre emptive strike.

Yes, US concerns were justified.
Yes, Israel is justified for a preemptive strike, especially given that Iran's Hamas instrument attacked Israel on October 7th, Operation Al Aqsa Flood.

But that was not the issue. This is:

The US has a right to strike Iran for violation of JCPOA.

The US has no right to strike anyone for an agreement that the US walked out of. The other JCPOA signatories have a greater right, if any.

It would be like after India put the IWT in abeyance, India having a right to punish Pakistan for Pakistan now violating the IWT.

( coming to think of it, I would like India to have that right )

[Amber G.]

Some Thoughts on Iran, Uranium, and the JCPOA – A Physicist’s Perspective
(Amber G' take - ignore if not interested -)

Been following recent discussions and IAEA reports on Iran’s nuclear program, and thought I'd share a few points for those curious — especially from a physics and treaty compliance point of view. Hope this helps clarify a few things.

1. How Much Uranium Does Iran Have (as per IAEA)?

As per the May 2025 IAEA quarterly report, Iran has:

~9,250 kg of enriched uranium in total (that’s uranium mass, not UF₆ mass).

Of this:

~5,500 kg is enriched up to 5%

~274 kg up to 20%

And ~409 kg enriched to 60% (yes, sixty — more on this below).

The 60% enriched material is very significant. From a physics standpoint, enrichment from natural U (0.7%) to 60% takes ~90% of the total work required to reach weapons-grade (~90%). So having 400+ kg at 60% gives you a serious breakout capability — it’s enough for several bombs if further enriched.

(In 2023, trace particles enriched up to 83.7% were detected at Fordow. These were not stockpiled amounts — just environmental particles caught in swipe samples. Iran claimed this was an “unintended fluctuation” — plausible in a cascade setup — but it shows the technical capability is there to enrich to weapons-grade.

2. JCPOA vs NPT – What’s Allowed?

Here's where the legal/political framework matters.

Under the JCPOA (2015), Iran agreed to:

Limit enrichment to 3.67% U-235

Stockpile no more than 300 kg of LEU (low-enriched uranium)

Use only first-gen IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz

No enrichment at Fordow at all

Allow extensive IAEA verification and monitoring (including Additional Protocol)

But after the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran incrementally stopped complying with those limits.

That brings us to the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), which Iran is still party to. Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states (like Iran) are technically allowed to enrich uranium to any level, provided:

It’s for peaceful purposes

It’s under IAEA safeguards

So while 60% enrichment is suspicious (since it’s way above reactor-grade), it’s not illegal under the NPT per se. But it’s a proliferation red flag. The IAEA can’t forbid it — only inspect and report.

3. Current IAEA Status & Concerns
Iran has reduced IAEA access — many cameras removed, online enrichment monitoring paused.

The IAEA is still conducting visits, but verification is incomplete.

The IAEA recently reported growing concerns about undeclared nuclear material, and has not received satisfactory explanations from Iran about past activities at several sites.

In short: The IAEA is ringing the alarm, but without political backing or a revived JCPOA, its hands are tied.

4. Physics of Enrichment – Why 60% Matters

For those technically inclined: enrichment is a nonlinear process. It takes exponentially more separative work (SWU) to go from 0.7% to 3.5% than from 3.5% to 20%. But once you’re at 20%, going to 60%, and then 90%, gets faster.

From a nuclear weapon design POV:

~25 kg of U-235 at 90% is a typical first-generation bomb core.

Iran’s 409 kg at 60% is sufficient feedstock to quickly produce multiple bombs, if further enriched.

Even if Iran doesn’t cross the threshold, they are clearly reducing breakout time — possibly as a bargaining chip.

5. So What Now?


Iran is not violating the letter of the NPT, but definitely violating JCPOA commitments.

IAEA is watching closely, but access is limited.

Physics-wise, Iran is sitting on material that is very close to bomb potential — not yet weapons-grade, but uncomfortably near.

Whether this is a political move (pressure for sanctions relief), a breakout strategy, or both — remains an open question.

Happy to go into SWU math, cascade dynamics, or policy background if anyone’s interested. As always, facts matter, and physics doesn’t care about politics

[Amber G.]

Let’s be real — this was an act of war. Whether we like the Iranian regime or not (and I definitely don’t), launching strikes like this is almost certainly illegal under both U.S. and international law. We can’t just ignore that.

I wanted to really check this before bringing it up.

...
Whatever the intent was, there is zero doubt that there was this attendance, it was dangerously anti-India, and it would not have happened without Iran’s tacit approval. What of this was in accord with international law or whatever?

This is after all a Bharat-centric forum and so the weakening of the Iranian theocracy by hook or by crook and without Indian involvement even is a matter of celebration.

Absolutely zero sympathy for Hamas, LET, or any terror group — full support to India, the U.S., and every decent society that stands against this kind of violence.

But that’s exactly why actions like this U.S. strike have to be strategic, legal (at least in US's own view), and coordinated — not done unilaterally on the whims of one leader. Trump (or any president) acting on impulse without consulting Congress or allies weakens the moral and legal ground we stand on. (Trumps inviting Munir is similarly, in my view Trumps' whim - not smar)

From an Indian perspective too — yes, Iran backing Hamas or allowing that Rawalkot conference is dangerous and unacceptable. But even then, a U.S. strike done this way doesn’t really help India. It doesn’t break the IRGC-Hamas-LET network meaningfully, and it risks dragging everyone into a bigger mess. Plus, it alienates many Americans and important allies like Europe and even India, who are left out of the loop. (India actually did not like this while they are safely bringing people home from the war zone..)

So my issue isn’t whether Iran should be pressured or not — I’m all for weakening dangerous theocracies. But this particular move? Not smart, not lawful, and not effective. (I can talk about this later but this move, IMO, *in all probabilities does not achieve anything significant ). That’s what concerns me.

[Cyrano]

It may look like these MAOB strikes were done on one man's whim, but the intel gathering, cross check and validation, attack strategy, planning, prep and coordination required would have taken at least a year or two.

Which means since Bidenwa's time.

Trump is boasting and credit hogging, but the wheels were set in motion long ago and these strikes would have happened sooner or later irrespective of who is sitting in the white house.

[Amber G.]

India strikes on fake claims of many Pak/Pak based/ Pak linked handles over Iran strikes
Issues clarification of no Indian support to US during its strikes on Iran

[Aditya_V]

It seems the US attack has deescalated the Situation rather than escalating the situation.

[Ashokk]

https://x.com/AryamanBharat/status/1936888360657912180
As per DDM -
Tomahawk Cruise Missiles = Tom cruise missile

[chetak]

It may look like these MAOB strikes were done on one man's whim, but the intel gathering, cross check and validation, attack strategy, planning, prep and coordination required would have taken at least a year or two.

Which means since Bidenwa's time.

Trump is boasting and credit hogging, but the wheels were set in motion long ago and these strikes would have happened sooner or later irrespective of who is sitting in the white house.

Guys,

leave trumpwa alone. He is much misunderstood

All the poor guy wanted was to build a golf course in eyeraaan

It's his passion ...... is that really so bad .......

He's already made the first three holes ........


ps my VI@WA groups are incorrigible

[A_Gupta]

It may look like these MAOB strikes were done on one man's whim, but the intel gathering, cross check and validation, attack strategy, planning, prep and coordination required would have taken at least a year or two.

Which means since Bidenwa's time.

Trump is boasting and credit hogging, but the wheels were set in motion long ago and these strikes would have happened sooner or later irrespective of who is sitting in the white house.

Yes, it seems so.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-israel ... on-report/

US, Israeli militaries jointly drilled Iran strike during Biden administration – report
Last March, the Israeli Air Force held a joint exercise with the US Air Force, in what was seen at the time as a message to Tehran


The US and Israel drilled an American strike on Iran about a year ago, according to a report published early Sunday as the US military launched an unprecedented attack against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities.

It was the first exercise that war-gamed an offensive strike against Iran’s nuclear program, ABC News reported, citing an unnamed source in Israel familiar with the matter.

The exercise was planned and executed during the Biden administration, “but we did not think a year ago that this would happen now,” the source said.

[A_Gupta]

At this point @Amber G, I am compelled to quote you back to yourself:

We just don’t know what we don’t know. Without access to the intel that top officials see, it’s hard for any of us to truly judge whether this was necessary or smart. We're left guessing.

Illegal -yes.
Effective - we’re left guessing
Unplanned, attack on a whim - I don’t think so. Starting with Israel did not start this nuclear decapitation on a hope and a prayer.
Best, but unlikely alternative after Israel started this and without US entry: stalemate by exhaustion of munitions after two weeks, but Iran nevertheless feels compelled to negotiate away its nuclear program???????

[gakakkad]

Amberg I have a question. How would you model radiation in the surrounding area when you hit a nuke site ?

Would hitting a nuke reactor with conventional high yield explosives like moab cause less radiation exposure than a sub kiloton fission device . Could using a small fission device on a nuke side trigger a chain reaction ? You can take it to fizzicks dhaga as well if you want .

If you hit a gas centrifuge with uf6 it has a sublimation temp of 57 c. I am assuming at some point it is hit it would cool down to solid . Is there a way the impact of hitting a gas centrifuge complex be modeled ?

[A_Gupta]

Amber G wrote:

For those technically inclined: enrichment is a nonlinear process. It takes exponentially more separative work (SWU) to go from 0.7% to 3.5% than from 3.5% to 20%. But once you’re at 20%, going to 60%, and then 90%, gets faster.

If a cascade of centrifuges changes the ratio of U235 to U238 by a fixed factor, then the way to think about the work involved is the factor increase in isotope ratio. Going from 0.7% to 3.5% is a change in ratio of isotopes from 0.00705 to .03627, a 5.15-fold increase. Going from 3.5% to 20% is going from an isotope ratio of .03627 to 0.25, a 6.9 fold increase. Going from 20% to 60% is going from an isotope ratio of 0.25 to 1.5, a 6-fold increase. Going from 60% to 90% is going from 1.5 to 9 isotope ratio, another factor of 6.

What am I getting wrong here?

[vera_k]

This "negotiation-by-threat" tactic might have been the trigger to okay the attack on Iran.

Dept. of Homeland Security warns of ‘heightened threat environment' following Iran strikes

Sources told NBC News Iran sent a communication to President Trump last week, threatening to activate sleeper-cell terror inside the United States if it were attacked

[Amber G.]

Amber G wrote:

For those technically inclined: enrichment is a nonlinear process. It takes exponentially more separative work (SWU) to go from 0.7% to 3.5% than from 3.5% to 20%. But once you’re at 20%, going to 60%, and then 90%, gets faster.

If a cascade of centrifuges changes the ratio of U235 to U238 by a fixed factor, then the way to think about the work involved is the factor increase in isotope ratio. Going from 0.7% to 3.5% is a change in ratio of isotopes from 0.00705 to .03627, a 5.15-fold increase. Going from 3.5% to 20% is going from an isotope ratio of .03627 to 0.25, a 6.9 fold increase. Going from 20% to 60% is going from an isotope ratio of 0.25 to 1.5, a 6-fold increase. Going from 60% to 90% is going from 1.5 to 9 isotope ratio, another factor of 6.

What am I getting wrong here?

FWIW, Here is physics (any standard source or text book):
| SWU (Separative Work Unit):
- SWU is a measure of the effort required to increase the percentage of U‑235 in a uranium sample by separating it from U‑238.

Think of it as:

“How much engineering effort (energy + time + number of centrifuges) does it take to enrich uranium from a lower to a higher percentage of U‑235?”

It accounts for:
Feed: natural uranium (0.7% U‑235)
Product: enriched uranium (say, 3.5% or 90% U‑235)
Tails (waste): depleted uranium (say, 0.3% U‑235)

The SWU Formula (Physics Behind It) :
The fundamental enrichment formula is:

𝑆𝑊𝑈 = 𝑃⋅𝑉((𝑥_ₚ) + W.V((x_w) -F.(𝑥_f) )

Where:
P = product mass (kg)
W = waste/tails mass (kg)
F = feed mass (kg)
x_p, x_w, x_f = enrichment fraction of product, waste, and feed

That value function gets steep at high enrichments.
V(x) = (1-2x) ln (x/(1-x))

so . How Much SWU is Needed?
To make 1 kg of uranium enriched to:

Enrichment Level SWU needed (approx.) Use Case
3.5% ~4.5 SWU Light-water reactor fuel
20% ~20 SWU Research reactors / HEU
90% ~200 SWU Weapons-grade uranium

Notice the jump! From 20% to 90% takes 10× more SWU than going from natural to 3.5%.

( For example: Hiroshima Bomb Used ~64 kg of uranium enriched to 80–90% Required ~15,000 SWU total

That would take:
~2,000 IR-1 centrifuges (in Iran) running for about a year

Or fewer months with advanced centrifuges (IR-6 or IR-8)

5. Why 20%+ Is a Red Flag
Below 5% = reactor-grade = low proliferation risk

20% and up = high-assay LEU (HALEU) or HEU

Getting to 20% gives you ~80–90% of the work needed for 90%

So even though 60% isn't technically weapons-grade, you're very close to breakout.
So Iran having 400+ kg at 60% is worrying because it’s just one short step from 90%.

Imagine climbing a steep hill:
From 0.7% to 20% is a hard uphill climb (first few switchbacks).
From 20% to 60% is steep but manageable.
From 60% to 90% is the last scramble — short, but intense.
Once you’re at 60%, the summit is within reach...



--- Added later - did a goolge serch and found this :
A recent policy brief states: (basically seems to agree with my calculations)

“[E]nrichment to that level [60%] already accomplishes over 90% of the work needed to bring natural uranium to weapon‑grade.”
Iran's Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential

And this

A physics Q&A observes:

“At ~20% U‑235, it is considered to be about ‘90% of the way’ to weapons‑grade uranium”
“Because uranium enrichment in centrifuges follows a geometric (or exponential) law

[Jay]

Not just them, but I think it's a message to every nation that is thinking about going against US interests, or trumps interests.

Are you suggesting that Indian nuke facilities are at risk

They have always been.

[A_Gupta]

If 0.7 to 20 takes 20 SWU and 0.7 to 90 takes 200 SWU, then I still don’t understand “Getting to 20% gives you ~80–90% of the work needed for 90%”. But thanks, you have given enough information for me to figure it out.

[A_Gupta]

The regime change op starts:
https://www.npr.org/2025/06/23/nx-s1-54 ... a-conflict

Israel launched a wave of airstrikes across Tehran early Monday, hitting what it called "regime targets and government repression bodies" in the heart of the Iranian capital, including Evin Prison, notorious for jailing political opponents. The military also said it struck the Fordo nuclear facility, already damaged by U.S. strikes over the weekend, to obstruct access routes to the site.

The Israeli military said its warplanes, guided by intelligence, hit command centers linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including the Basij headquarters and the Alborz Corps, which oversee internal security.

[Dilbu]

Iran has launched missiles targeting US military base in Qatar. Projectiles have been shot down and no casualties reported so far.

[Aditya_V]

This is more of a message from Iran to the Gulf Arabs, that they will hit them if they are going down but not a threatening attack. Let's see how this plays out

[Amber G.]

If 0.7 to 20 takes 20 SWU and 0.7 to 90 takes 200 SWU, then I still don’t understand “Getting to 20% gives you ~80–90% of the work needed for 90%”. But thanks, you have given enough information for me to figure it out.

To be clear, see the exponential graph ..
It shows the exponential dependence I described. Enriching from natural to 4-5% takes more energy then going from 4-5% to 95%.

This might be useful to https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia ... _work_unit

--- What is important here, is for Iran's case:

Breakout Time Estimates (to get 1 bomb’s worth of HEU) (My Calculation-estimation using published numbers only )

60% U-235 (409 kg) 60% → 90% ~7–12 days Just further enrichment — feedstock already high
20% stock only (~274 kg) 20% → 90% ~3–6 weeks Needs more enrichment steps
5% or lower (~7,700 kg) 5% → 90% 3–6 months Full SWU required; longer cascade time
Natural uranium 0.7% → 90% 1–2 years Not Iran’s case now — needs full enrichment plant

.

[Vayutuvan]

This is more of a message from Iran to the Gulf Arabs, that they will hit them if they are going down but not a threatening attack. Let's see how this plays out

But with what? If their nukes are gone, their missiles would cause a few craters and a few buildings are taken down. US moved unhangered planes out of the base already as per news reports on FNN.

[Jay]

@chetak garu, I agree 100%. But mine was a semi-rhetorical question for poster @Jay who is given to smart two liners, mostly.

Vayu ji, I do not know how you managed to construe my post saying Indian nuclear program is also in their sights as me being a wiseacre, but this argument is between you and you brain, I'll stay out of it.

What chetak garu said is what I feel. If that maga-murkh trump decides that he will negotiate peace again and if he declares indian nuke program as halal, then there's not much we can do. It might be a very slow rolling ball, but at some point it will pick up pace and we need to be ready for it. Even as a trade negotiation tactic if he tweets saying he will not approve of a trade deal unless we also put our nuke program on line, we will be on the spot.

All signs point to trump's thought process as seeing the world shared between 3 powers and we are not in that list of 3.

[williams]

Are you suggesting that Indian nuke facilities are at risk

They have always been.

That is one of the reasons we put our top priority on our AD infrastructure and second strike capability. We need to ability to deter people even thinking about such things against our assets. NPAs were constantly harping about how we cannot protect our assets and hence we should not have any. Kudos to our strategic planners we slowly over came every hurdle and we demonstrated our ability to thwart attacks that requires very quick reaction time in Op Sindoor. For the future we need to test our longer range AST and SLBM/BM assets more and more to make sure no joker from anywhere in the world dare to even entertain the idea of getting away from striking our assets first.

[A_Gupta]

Ok. I was going with the amount of work to reduce a given sample down to a particular concentration of U235!isotope, which was dumb. The correct measure is the amount of work to get a given quantity of end product at the desired concentration. Since U235 is so dilute in natural uranium, an enormous mass needs to be processed to get an initial say low HEU value. A much reduced mass of low HEU needs to be run to get it to a high HEU value.

[bala]

AD is an evolving concept and India has to adapt to various things like saturation missiles, hypersonic and/or wierd trajectory missiles. The system also needs to take out incoming missiles are some distance, failing which the next layer and so on to make sure it is 100% coverage. On nukes, the production centers need extra protection and storage can be truly anonymized and dispersed. For example, Key data centers are usually in unmarked non-descript buildings. One of the things India is pioneering is thorium reactors and these facilities must be extra extra safeguarded.

[A_Gupta]

FWIW: (e.g., CNBC)

U.S. intelligence found that Iran did not move nuclear material from its Fordo facility before American B-2 bombers struck it on Saturday, said Sen. Markwayne Mullin.
"In fact, we actually believe they stored more of it in Fordo because they believe Fordo was impenetrable," said Mullin, an Oklahoma Republican.

[Amber G.]

(This may answer/clarify few questions and points I posted. This is my take and views - Ignore if not interested)


Subject: Iran's Enriched Uranium, Breakout Potential, and Why the "100% Dismantled" Narrative Is Misleading

Posted by Amber G (Physics hat on)

Just chiming in with a few technical clarifications on Iran’s nuclear program — especially in light of some bold political claims like “we bombed them back to zero” or “dismantled 100% of their nukes.” That sounds good in a press conference, but from a physics and policy standpoint, it’s… let’s say, optimistic.

- IAEA’s latest (May 2025) reports confirm that Iran now holds over 400+ kg of uranium enriched to 60%.
This isn’t trivial — that’s enough feedstock for 10–20 Hiroshima-type bombs, assuming further enrichment to 90% and some basic design work.

The important point:
- This entire amount can easily fit in a carry-on suitcase.

Even with shielding and containment (say UF₆ cylinders or oxide in dense canisters), you’re looking at maybe 50–70 kg additional weight. Heavy, yes. Bulky? No. This is not sci-fi — it’s routine for uranium metal or powder.

(For perspective Hiroshima Uranium (about 60 kg 80% U235) maal could easily fit inside an ordinary 1Gallon milk bottle. Pu Bomb on Nagasaki would fit in a coffee mug))

- And about detection — here's the uncomfortable truth:

Uranium, even weapons-grade, is not easily detectable with standard border or cargo gamma counters. It’s an alpha emitter (which doesn’t penetrate) and gives off only weak gammas. Unless you have specialized neutron or active interrogation systems, or the uranium is unshielded (which it wouldn’t be), it can pass unnoticed.

This is precisely why smuggling of HEU is a nightmare scenario for nuclear security experts — it’s the hardest material to detect and the easiest to weaponize once enriched.

- Comparison: Iran vs. North Korea
People often ask: Where does Iran really stand compared to North Korea?

Here’s a quick (approximate) comparison:

Metric Iran (2025) North Korea
NPT Status Signatory (still) Withdrew in 2003
IAEA Access Limited but partial Zero (no inspectors since 2009)
Material HEU (up to 60%), no known weapons-grade stock Confirmed plutonium & HEU stocks
Tested Bombs 0 6 nuclear tests (2006–2017)
Delivery Systems IRBMs, improving precision ICBMs tested (e.g. Hwasong-15, -17)
Breakout Time ~7–10 days for 1 bomb Already has ~20–40 bombs estimated
Weaponization Evidence Ambiguous Confirmed nuclear weapons capability

So: North Korea is a nuclear weapons state in all but name, while Iran is a threshold state — technically non-nuclear-weapon under NPT, but capable of breaking out quickly.

And critically: Iran still has a more advanced civilian infrastructure, and more sophisticated enrichment capacity than North Korea’s 1990s-era gas centrifuges.

So… when someone says:

We el

iminated all of Iran’s nuclear capability!

…just apply a little physics.

Iran today:

Has enriched up to 60%, which is ~90% of the work needed to get to 90%.

Has hundreds of advanced centrifuges (IR-6, IR-4) already installed and spinning.

Has partial IAEA oversight, with key cameras removed and access limited.

Could reach 90% enrichment in 7–10 days with current stockpile.

Let’s just say the “breakout time” is now measured in days, not months.

Trump’s claim (and many of his tweets) about totally stripping Iran of nuclear capability are — let’s be honest — about as trustworthy as his saying he got the “Noble Prize” for brokering India–Pakistan peace.

Bottom line:

Iran’s nuclear program is not dismantled, just dangerously flexible.
Physics doesn’t lie. Enrichment is nonlinear. HEU is compact. Detection is hard.
No tweet has changed that reality.

– Amber G
(Physicist, BRfoldie since ages)

[Amber G.]

Amberg I have a question. How would you model radiation in the surrounding area when you hit a nuke site ?

Would hitting a nuke reactor with conventional high yield explosives like moab cause less radiation exposure than a sub kiloton fission device . Could using a small fission device on a nuke side trigger a chain reaction ? You can take it to fizzicks dhaga as well if you want .

If you hit a gas centrifuge with uf6 it has a sublimation temp of 57 c. I am assuming at some point it is hit it would cool down to solid . Is there a way the impact of hitting a gas centrifuge complex be modeled ?

Re: Radiation Modeling from Strikes on Nuclear Facilities
(short reply — feel free to take to fizzicks dhaga)

Excellent question — lot to unpack, but I’ll keep it short (I put some similar points in Sindoor dhaga too):

- Conventional vs. Fission Detonation:
Blowing up a nuclear site with conventional weapons (e.g., MOAB) will not cause a nuclear explosion — no chain reaction — but it can cause major radiological dispersal, depending on what's present (spent fuel, HEU/LEU, Pu, etc.). Think dirty bomb, not mushroom cloud.

- Fission Device on Nuke Site:. (if Iran have it hidden there, unknown to outside world)
Using a small nuke on a nuclear facility doesn’t “trigger” a chain reaction either — criticality requires precise conditions. But it adds fission fallout + spreads pre-existing radioactive materials. Net result: far worse radiological outcome than MOAB alone.

UF₆ Gas Centrifuge Hit Modeling:
Yes, that can be modeled — UF₆ sublimates at ~57°C, and is very reactive with moisture (forms HF and uranyl fluoride). Upon impact:

It could rapidly sublimate and hydrolyze, producing toxic clouds.

Thermal plume modeling + CFD (computational fluid dynamics) can estimate dispersal.

Radiation hazard is minor unless enriched; chemical toxicity is the bigger issue.

Happy to expand this in fizzicks dhaga if there's interest — or run a few plume sim scenarios.

– Amber G

[Amber G.]

^^^ Let me add some more to above (which may not relate to Iran but other countries)
Clarification on Hitting Nuclear Facilities

- Hitting a nuclear reactor, especially:an operating power reactor, or a spent fuel storage pool,
…is far more dangerous than hitting a uranium enrichment facility (like a centrifuge hall).

Reactors have large inventories of highly radioactive fission products (e.g., Cs‑137, Sr‑90).
Spent fuel pools can contain many times more long-lived radiation than even the reactor core.

Damage can lead to core breach, steam explosions, loss of coolant, and massive radiological release — like Fukushima or, in worst cases, Chernobyl-level events.

- In Iran’s case (as of 2025):

No large-scale operating power reactor like Bushehr is known to be actively generating a large fission product inventory.
Enrichment sites like Natanz and Fordow are centrifuge plants — they process uranium (UF₆), enriched to up to 60%, but:

No chain reaction,

No fission products,

Lower radiological hazard from impact.

Chemical toxicity (UF₆ + water = HF) is the main immediate risk.

So: Hitting a gas centrifuge hall is not like bombing a running nuclear reactor — the scale of radiation release is much smaller. (Most likely any radiation, if present will be local/confided inside))

[A_Gupta]

Don’t go by what Trump says. Go by what the US forces and Israeli forces do, any more than you judge Op Sindoor by what Trump keeps saying.

IMO, if we assume Iran was going for bombs, then the key metrics are:

Break out time for Iran after initial Israeli strikes/ break out time for Iran before Israeli strikes == ????

Break out time for Iran after US strikes/ break out time for Iran before US strikes == ????

Break out time for Iran after continuing Israeli strikes after Op Midnight Hammer / break out time for Iran just after Op Midnight Hammer == ????

—-
The press rumors are CENTCOM and Tulasi Gabbard have a disagreement on Iran’s state of nuclear break out.

—
Of course, it is possible that Iran would be happy to continue in a state of strategic ambiguity while continually reducing its break out time. But one must judge by capabilities, not intentions.

—-
Start with this:
According to one analysis based on IAEA data from May 2025, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for:
One nuclear weapon: In as little as two to three days using its Fordow facility.
Nine nuclear weapons: In three weeks at Fordow.
Eleven nuclear weapons: In the first month, utilizing both Fordow and Natanz.

[pravula]

We will probably see a NoKo redux. Iran is trying to protect its current regime with a dramatic de-escalation...