Draft report of nuclear doctrine - MEA site

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ramana
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Draft report of nuclear doctrine - MEA site

Post by ramana »

<P> Draft Report of <BR> National Security Advisory Board on <BR> Indian Nuclear Doctrine<P> A u g u s t 1 7, 1 9 9 9<P> 1. Preamble<P> 2. Objectives<P> 3. Nuclear Forces <P> 4. Credibility and Survivability <P> 5. Command and Control<P> 6. Security and Safety <P> 7. Research and Development <P> 8. Disarmament and Arms Control<P> Preamble<P> 1.1. The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass<BR> destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the<BR> international system. Unlike the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction,<BR> biological and chemical weapons which have been outlawed by international treaties,<BR> nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and collective security, the<BR> possession of which on a selective basis has been sought to be legitimised through<BR> permanent extension of the Nuclear. Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995.<BR> Nuclear weapon states have asserted that they will continue to rely on nuclear<BR> weapons with some of them adopting policies to use them even in a non-nuclear<BR> context. These developments amount to virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament.<BR> This is a serious setback to the struggle of the international community to ablish<BR> weapons of mass destruction.<P> 1.2. India's primary objective is to achieve economic, political, social, scientific and<BR> technological development within a peaceful and democratic framework. This requires<BR> an environment of durable peace and insurance against potential risks to peace and<BR> stability. It will be India's endeavour to proceed towards this overall objective in<BR> cooperation with the global democratic trends and to play a constructive role in<BR> advancing the international system toward a just, peaceful and equitable order.<P> 1.3. Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic<BR> matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people. India will strenuously<BR> guard this right in a world where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be<BR> legitimised for an indefinite future, and where there is growing complexity and<BR> frequency in the use of force for political purposes.<P> 1.4. India's security is an integral component of its development process. India<BR> continuously aims at promoting an ever-expanding area of peace and stability around it<BR> so that developmental priorities can be pursued without disruption.<P> 1.5. However, the very existence of offensive doctrine pertaining to the first use of<BR> nuclear weapons and the insistence of some nuclear weapons states on the legitimacy<BR> of their use even against non-nuclear weapon countries constitute a threat to peace,<BR> stability and .................<P> 1.6. This document outlines the broad principles for the development, deployment and<BR> employment of India's nuclear forces. Details of policy and strategy concerning force<BR> structures, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will flow from this framework<BR> and will be laid down separately and kept under constant review.<P> ^ top<P> 2. Objectives<P> 2.1. In the absence of global nuclear disarmament India's strategic interests require<BR> effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should<BR> deterrence fail. This is consistent with the UN Charter, which sanctions the right of<BR> self-defence.<P> 2.2. The requirements of deterrence should be carefully weighed in the design of Indian<BR> nuclear forces and in the strategy to provide for a level of capability consistent with<BR> maximum credibility, survivability, effectiveness, safety and security.<P> 2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy<BR> of "retaliation only", the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic<BR> concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs<BR> of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of<BR> nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India's peacetime posture<BR> aims at convincing any potential aggressor that :<P> (a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter<BR> the threat: and (b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive<BR> retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.<P> 2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat<BR> of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will<BR> not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation<BR> should deterrence fail.<P> 2.5. India will not resort to the use or thret of use of nuclear weapons against States<BR> which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon<BR> powers.<P> 2.6. Deterrence requires that India maintain:<P> (a) Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces, (b) a robust<BR> command and control system, (c) effective intelligence and early warning capabilities,<BR> and (d) comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy,<BR> and (e) the will to employ nuclear forces and weapons<P> 2.7. Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the<BR> threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or<BR> use of nuclear weapons.<P> ^ top<P> 3. Nuclear Forces<P> 3.1. India's nuclear forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive to<BR> the requirements in accordance with the concept of credible minimum deterrence. These<BR> forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based<BR> assets in keeping with the objectives outlined above. Survivability of the forces will be<BR> enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and<BR> deception.<P> 3.2. The doctrine envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to<BR> fully employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate<BR> effectively even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes.<P> ^ top<P> 4. Credibility and Survivability<P> The following principles are central to India's nuclear deterrent<P> 4.1. Credibility: Any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with<BR> sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will<BR> find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces.<P> 4.2. Effectiveness: The efficacy of India's nuclear deterrent be maximised through<BR> synergy among all elements iinvolving reliability, timeliness, accuracy and weight of<BR> the attack.<P> 4.3 Survivability:<P> (i) India's nuclear forces and their command and control shall be organised for very<BR> high survivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response. They shall<BR> be designed and deployed to ensure survival against a first strike and to endure<BR> repetitive attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike<BR> which would be unacceptable to the aggressor.<P> (ii) Procedures for the continuity of nuclear command and control shall ensure a<BR> continuing capability to effectively employ nuclear weapons.<P> ^ top<P> 5. Command and Control<P> 5.1. Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest<BR> political level. the authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of<BR> the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).<P> 5.2. An effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility<BR> and responsiveness shall be in place. An integrated operational plan, or a series of<BR> sequential plans, predicated on strategic objectives and a targetting policy shall form<BR> part of the system.<P> 5.3. For effective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces<BR> including dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.<P> 5.4. The survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective command, control,<BR> communications, computing, intelligence and information (C412) systems shall be<BR> assured.<P> 5.5. The Indian defence forces shall be in a position to, execute operations in an NBC<BR> environment with minimal degradation;<P> 5.6. Space based and other assets shall be created to provide early warning,<BR> communications, damage/detonation assessment.<P> ^ top<P> 6. Security and Safety<P> 6.1. Security: Extraordinary precautions shallbe taken to ensure that nuclear weapons,<BR> their manufacture, transportation and storage are fully guarded against possible theft,<BR> loss, sabotage, damage or unauthorised access or use.<P> 6.2. Safety is an absolute requirement and tamper proof procedures and systems shall<BR> be instituted to ensure that unauthorised or inadvertent activation/use of nuclear<BR> weapons does not take place and risks of accident are avoided.<P> 6.3. Disaster control: India shall develop an appropriate disaster control system<BR> capable of handling the unique requirements of potential incidents involving nuclear<BR> weapons and materials;<P> ^ top<P> 7. Research and Development<P> 7.1. India should step up efforts in research and development to keep up with<BR> technological advances in this field.<P> 7.2. While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both<BR> minimum and credible, it will not accept any restraints on building its R&D capability.<P> ^ top<P> 8. Disarmament and Arms Control<P> 8.1. Global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security<BR> objective. India shall continue its efforts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon-free<BR> world at an early date.<P> 8.2. Since no-first use of nuclear weapons is India's basic commitment, every effort shall<BR> be made to persuade other States possessing nuclear weapons to join an international<BR> treaty banning first use.<P> 8.3. Having provided unqualified negative security assurances, India shall work for<BR> internationally binding unconditional negative security assurances by nuclear weapon<BR> states to non-nuclear weapon states.<P> 8.4. Nuclear arms control measures shall be sought as part of national security policy to<BR> reduce potential threats and to protect our own capability and its effectiveness.<P> 8.5. In view of the veryhigh destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate<BR> nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures shall be sought, negotiated<BR> and instituted.<P> ^ top<P><BR> News | Culture | Economy | Sports | Tourism | Polity | Magazine | Info<P> Media | Science & Tech. | Social Issues | Foreign Relations | States <P> What's New | Search | Home <P>
Nikhil Shah
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Re: Draft report of nuclear doctrine - MEA site

Post by Nikhil Shah »

Ramana, you beat me to this post :-)<P>------------------<BR>Jai Hind! Jai Jawan!<BR>www.shahs.com<P>
Sagar
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Re: Draft report of nuclear doctrine - MEA site

Post by Sagar »

Is this the discussion thread??<P><BR> "He insisted that India would adhere to the policy of never being the first to use nuclear weapons and never using them against a non-nuclear<BR> state. But he said if the adversary is a non-nuclear weapons state protected by a nuclear power, then India would review the situation."<BR> *****<P> This statement IMO is very significant. I think it clears a lot of misgivings e.g. Taliban terrorists using Pak nuke cover to detonate devices in<BR> Bombay or Delhi. It also seems to send a message to nuke countries not to use rogue states to persue their agendas against India viz China<BR> using Pak against India. This issue should be further clarified and the position of using nukes viz terrorist movements should be addressed. <P> What are the scenarios under which the above statement could become valid?
Calvin
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Re: Draft report of nuclear doctrine - MEA site

Post by Calvin »

Lets keep the threads on DND focused!!!
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