IAF strategy and capability assessment by SIPRI

[Amit Mitra]

Eric Arnett is leader of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Project on Military Technology and editor of Nuclear Weapons and Arms control in South Asia after the Test Ban. Eric Arnett is also a leading India basher and his article, “Nuclear Stability and Arms Sales to India: Implications for U.S. Policy “ tries to make a case for containing India’s military capabilities. Here are extracts from the article. You can find the full article at<BR> <A HREF="http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/august/arnett.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/august/arnett.html</A> <P>Does any one know if the IAF cannot optimally or effectively use the Paveway II guidance system for smart bombs as the USAF seems to think (in private)as quoted by Arnett?<P>Here are some extracts from the Arnett article re IAF strategy and capability:<P>”…Like its American counterpart, the IAF has long preferred the battle for air superiority--fought primarily over the enemy's air bases--to the nitty gritty of direct support for ground forces. Strike aircraft have been the highest priority in India's tight military modernization budget, not as strategic counterforce systems, per se, but as the most effective tools for gaining air superiority as part of India's doctrine of “offensive defense.” <P>While most of the Indian armed forces struggle in the face of funding constraints imposed by the budget crisis, the IAF's 22 strike squadrons have fared well. During the past 25 years, the IAF has received more than 700 MiG 21, MiG 23, MiG 27, Mirage 2000 and Jaguar aircraft used primarily for air to ground missions; approximately 300 of these strike aircraft remain in active service. In a conflict with Pakistan, most of these aircraft would be used to attack Pakistan's 17 air bases (of which about half are primary bases and half are “dispersal” bases), and nine other airports capable of handling jets from the first day of a war. <P>In addition to smart bombs, IAF attack aircraft have been armed with runway cratering munitions and area denial bombs (which prevent runways from being repaired), as well as unguided gravity bombs and cluster weapons. If recent writings are to be believed, even the Prithvi short range ballistic missile is seen by the IAF primarily as a conventionally armed, air base attack weapon that could destroy aircraft in the open and hamper runway repairs.5 <BR>During the 1991 Gulf War, IAF officials watched with particular interest as U.S. strike aircraft destroyed Iraqi hardened aircraft shelters with 2,000 pound smart bombs. Because destroying Pakistani aircraft on the ground is so important to the IAF, Indian military planners had been frustrated by the practically invulnerable sanctuary created for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in the form of hardened aircraft shelters, built with U.S. assistance in the 1980s. IAF planners quickly set out to buy heavy, shelter busting smart bombs like the ones demonstrated in the Gulf War. In 1992, India closed its first arms deal with Russia that included an unknown number of 2,200 pound smart bombs…..<P>In 1994, 315 Texas Instruments Paveway II guidance kits--one of the types used by the U.S. Air Force in 1991--were delivered for installation on 2,000 pound British bombs. French and Israeli contractors assisted the IAF in its initial experience with the laser guided weapons. Then, in April 1997, U.S. manufactured smart bombs were delivered to the IAF for the first time. They are now a standard part of IAF air base attack exercises. <BR>Indian attacks on Pakistani air bases would no doubt target the building at the Sargodha air base in which Pakistan's ballistic missiles are believed to be stored. Because the attacks would be conventional attacks on legitimate military targets, the Indian leadership would not expect Pakistan to escalate to nuclear first use, especially given India's capability of retaliating “in the range of ten megatons for one,” in the words of a retired Indian chief of army staff.7 ….<P>If a conventional war continued long enough, most of the PAF's strike force could be destroyed--even if the IAF was not intentionally targeting Pakistan's nuclear capability--a danger of which Pakistani military planners are becoming increasingly aware. At an April 1997 briefing to journalists, a PAF official expressed doubts that the armed forces could hold up for more than six to eight weeks under IAF plans “to neutralize [Pakistani] radars and [surface to air missiles] and destroy the Pakistan air force on the ground and in the air.”8 ….<P>But even if the IAF did not entirely eliminate Pakistan's nuclear delivery capabilities (a possibility that reduces India's incentive to risk a preventive war to destroy Islamabad's nuclear option without some other provocation), these capabilities would still be eroded. Furthermore, the Pakistani leadership's understanding of the unfolding battle would be undermined by IAF attacks on radar sites carried out with lighter smart bombs and Armat anti radar missiles, which were acquired from France in the late 1980s. In 1971, even without the Armat, the IAF did considerable damage to the Pakistani radar network with unguided bombs. <P>India's capability to erode Pakistan's nuclear option is particularly troubling …in 1990, then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan told a U.S. official that “in the event of war with India, Pakistan would use nuclear weapons at an early stage,” despite the risk of Indian retaliation and regardless of the war aims.10 ----Pakistan can only hope to deter wars for limited aims if Indian planners believe “we are primed, almost desperate, to use our nuclear capabilities when our national objectives are threatened, for example, a major crackdown on [the] freedom movement in Kashmir.”11<P>---Another rationale for the Paveway transfer--not cited by any U.S. official--is popular among some military analysts but, ultimately, is not persuasive. Their claim is that the IAF is simply not up to the job of using military technologies like the Paveway effectively, ….”<BR>

[L Beeson]

I don't think Arnett is arguing the IAF cannot use the Paveway system effectively.<P>------------------<BR>Laurie

[rama]

I thought close air support was the primary mission of IAF's Mig27 fleet, which numbers about 200. Besides this, the Mig23BN's and Mig21M's are also tasked with this role, primarily, are they not?<P>Given the abscence of strategic depth of TSP, all of these platforms are good for strike on PAF, as the article mentions. But the strike role is primary only to the Jaguars and the multirole Mirage 2000's and Su-30MKIs (which are numerically insignificant right now).<P>In addition to CAS, the IAF is reasonably outfitted for logistics ( ~20 Il-76's, ~100 An-32's, another hundred odd Do-228's and HS-748s, not to mention the 10 Mi-26 now transferred to IA) for a force it's size and budget. <P>So while all jocks prefer air superiority, I would think IAF has been reasonably scrupulous about support for ground troops. And it is in this that the IAF is primarily differentiated from the PAF. <P>The one major change necessary is unified command, until which intra-service bickering will continue to hold back all the services.

[Tim]

BTW, <P>Looks like this article was written in 1997, so some of the info may be dated.<P>Tim

[Ved]

Rama,<P>"I thought close air support was the primary mission of IAF's Mig27 fleet"<P> By "close air support", I presume you mean what the IAF now terms "Battlefield Air Strike", meaning attacking enemy targets on the frontline. That is the minimal part - the MiG-27 is primarily valuable for deep strike, leaving BAS to the shorter range aircraft. However, your point well taken.

[vverma]

CAS is the primary mission for the Mig-23 which are optimised to carry things like rocket pods, etc. Another mission type Mig-23 are being groomed for with upgrades is Wild Wease/SEAD.

[Philip]

Tim is right ,the article appears to be very dated.It would be interesting to know if Arnett has updated his writings in the aftermath of Kargil.I like what Tim has written in the Monitor on the afternath iof kargil.<BR> <BR>There is really no "cure" for an adversary who despite his inferiority keeps on challenging a more powerful state.Shades of David and Goliath!<BR>Complacency is the greatest enemy.Alertness and mentally preparing for any eventuality is absolutely neccessary if we are to reduce the risks of being bettered on the battlefield.In the present context India has to prepare for both conventional and unconventional (NBC)warfare in the coming decades.The spectre of Islamic fundamentalism is sweeping across Central Asia.S.Asia is also a victim.International cooperation seems to be unable at the present to restrain or stop it.I suggest that the powers who matter should reward the democracies with economic and military support and assistance, rather than continuing to mollycoddle dictatorships and human rights violators.Secret deals with dictatorships as is being done with N.Korea are only a stop gap measure.The blackmailer knows that he can always extort another handout from his victim at a future time.It also encourages more nations to follow his example.