"Becoming the Kabila": An Alternate Strategy For Afghanistan

[Rudradev]

I want to put forward an idea for discussion here, about an alternative strategy by which the US could pursue its security interests in Afghanistan that may be more successful than the strategy they've followed from 2001 to the present.

It is dependent on a hypothetical US-India security partnership of an unprecedented degree, which in itself could be problematic. However, let's leave that aside for now. It could be argued that both US and India have lasting interests in Afghanistan that are largely convergent... that, if they work together in this, both countries may be able to secure their respective interests at less cost than otherwise.

I'm not saying it's a good idea or a bad idea. It is definitely predicated on many assumptions, which may not all be valid; and its implementation will have very extensive strategic and geopolitical repercussions, not all of which I have analysed. However, I'd like to put it down here for the consideration and analysis of fellow BRF-ites as a thought-experiment.

Essentially the idea is that Afghanistan has always resisted long-term occupiers because it is prime Kabila territory. A mobile, maneuverable military force can prevail over a less mobile force that is more invested in governance, development etc. simply by denying strategic control to the invested force.

The Taliban, being a Kabila, has a much easier criterion for strategic success than the US/NATO/ANG (Afghan National Govt.) does.

If the US/NATO /ANG want to engage in nation building, the Taliban can win simply by denying the US/NATO/ANG any opportunity to achieve this sustainably. If the US/NATO/ANG want to be credible providers of security to Afghan cities and villages, they must succeed 100% of the time in foiling each and every Taliban attack... meanwhile, even 1 successful Taliban attack represents a palpable loss to the US/NATO/ANG. In the long run, US/NATO/ANG is perpetually at a strategic disadvantage in trying to fight a war like this.

Meanwhile, it has been shown by invaders from Alexander to the Persians to the Sikhs to the British that an attacking force which is also mobile, and restricts its operations to the short-term achievement of specific goals of strategic importance, can influence Afghanistan successfully in the long-term.

Think of Afghanistan as a very hot lump of clay. You cannot shape this clay by slowly squeezing and moulding it this way and that way until it takes the form you want. The longer your hands remain in contact with the clay the more certain they are to get burned, before the goal of shaping the clay is achieved. The way to shape Afghanistan is through a series of strategically applied slaps... whack it here, whack it there until gradually it assumes the approximate form you want. Fine tuning may not be possible by this method... but at least some degree of strategic re-shaping is achieved, and meanwhile you can out-wait the fire that is heating up the clay. That fire also requires some exhaustible source of fuel to keep burning. Ultimately when the fire goes out, the clay will no longer be too hot to touch, and more detailed shaping will become possible.

The primary problems with the current US strategy in Afghanistan are:

1) Over-dependence on Pakistan. We all know what the double game is and I won't go into further detail here. Pakistan cannot be the political lynchpin, the logistical supply-line or the military "ally" for the US mission in Afghanistan because all its strategic goals are opposed to the interests of the US.

2) The US is the "invested" force, which gives the Taliban the strategic advantage of being the "Kabila" force.

What I propose here is a strategy whereby both these pitfalls could theoretically be circumvented. This of course introduces other potential pitfalls, including a very close degree of partnership between the United States, India and Russia. These might not be possible to work around for a thousand reasons... but just for argument's sake, let's assume that they are.

According to a recent article by Praveen Swami in the Hindu, http://www.thehindu.com/news/internatio ... 321586.ece Putin has declared open support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and other CARs are with him in this; meanwhile, there are definite convergences of some Indian and US interests in preventing the emergence of Pak-pasand jihadi groups as state authorities in Afghanistan.

I am very well aware of the usual arguments for why this could not work, as they have been discussed on BRF in thousands of lakhs of posts. Yet those arguments have not brought us any closer to finding a solution... in fact, they have only driven us further into the "despairing Indian" mode, which certainly doesn't help us develop any capacity for strategic thinking. So let's see if we can at least find some new objections to the following, rather than simply rehashing the old ones!

The basic assumptions on which the strategy is predicated are:

1) Pakistan's cooperation is completely unavailable and must be completely excluded as a possibility. Its cooperation with the US/NATO/ANG has ceased 400%. ISI/TSPA are not allowing NATO overflights, drones or anything else... they are in fact doing everything possible to help Haqqani, Maulvi Nazir, Hekmatyar and their other proxies.

2) US/NATO and allies... including India and (to some extent) Russia... cannot win by being the "invested" government in Kabul. That role is to be played only by the ANG. What the US/NATO/allies must do is to become a Kabila themselves.

3) At the start of the scenario, 2014, most US troops have pulled out of Afghanistan. About 10-15,000 US military and CIA personnel remain as "advisors" to the ANP/ANA.

4) ANP/ANA are about 250,000 strong all told. 90% of the brush-fire missions, putting down small uprisings, taking out troublesome warlords, maintaining law and order are left exclusively to this force.

5) The US maintains SSGNs and a CBG off the coast of Karachi as a reserve of airpower. Some squadrons for CAS may still remain at Bagram and a few other bases. These will be called in by the ANA if required.

6) In every ANG-controlled district of Afghanistan, with the cooperation of the ANG and the US, India has teams of civilians working in advisory capacity on development projects, medical and educational missions etc. Embedded with these civilians are a rotating force of 5-7,000 IA personnel (about 1-2,000 officers, many from intelligence, and 4-5,000 other ranks including JCOs and NCOs.)

7) This group of IA personnel, along with perhaps a squadron each of IAF combat and reconnaissance aircraft, represent India's entire *permanent* deployment in Afghanistan. They, and the permanent US deployment of 10-15,000 will be supplied exclusively by the Northern Corridor via Russia and CARs. If India can leverage Iran as a supply route for its own troops that is well and good, but it should not be necessary.

8 ) Meanwhile, the IA will raise an Afghan Combat Operations Task Force (ACOTF) under Western Command, based out of Ambala, Udhampur and other sizeable facilities mainly in Punjab/J&K. This will be an airborne force of a size whose personnel and equipment, plus supplies for a two-week campaign, can be transported entirely by air (using C17s and C130s) to a location in Afghanistan within a 36-hour period. I am not at all sure what the size of such a force would be but given PLA claims of moving 30-plus divisions into Tibet within a week, I would guess two full-strength mountain infantry divisions plus two IABs and air support elements. I am not a mil-tech sort of guy so I'll leave the actual composition of the ACOTF to Rohitvats, Singha, RahulM and other orbat experts.

9) The "permanent" deployment of IA in Afghanistan will be drawn in rotation from the combat personnel of the ACOTF. The idea is that ACOTF personnel, particularly those in leadership roles at all levels, should continuously familiarize themselves with their potential theatre of operations without providing a large "sitting duck" target for Kabila attacks. In India, the ACOTF will be maintained in a state of combat readiness at all times.

10) Following major US withdrawal, it can be expected that ISI proxy Taliban will mount an offensive to seize territory in Southern Afghanistan. The ANA will resist to the extent possible, but will tactically withdraw in the face of overwhelming assaults. The idea is that the Taliban should be able to become invested, to some extent, in occupying and governing territory. This will reduce their maneuverability as a Kabila force, and transform them into more of an invested force.

11) The ANA will be able to exert itself more effectively by focusing on fewer strategic loci, mainly in North and Central Afghanistan. ANP will be better able to concentrate its efforts on providing security in a few well-defined regions, where sustainable development can be pursued under a stronger watch. Mainly the ANA will fight a defensive war, making it as costly as possible for the Taliban to make any territorial gains, and disrupting any attempts by the Taliban to consolidate political power or undertake governance in the territory they have captured. 90% of the low-intensity warfare in Afghanistan will be conducted exclusively by the ANA, with support from US air assets based in Bagram.

12) The ACOTF will be the sword-arm of India's Kabila in Afghanistan. Its purpose is to serve as a land-force spearhead for major offensives by the ANA, or intervene when the ANA finds itself facing a sustained and overwhelming Taliban offensive aimed at a key strategic location. ACOTF will go in, do its job aided by the personnel of "permanent" IA deployment in theatre, and leave within less than two weeks... along the lines of the Cold Start model. It will not be an occupying force to hold territory (that job will have to be done by ANA/ANP) but an executive force to accomplish limited, well defined objectives of strategic importance.

13) When action is required, the US naval and air assets off the coast of Sindh will enforce a no-fly zone for the PAF, and neutralize Pakistani air-defense assets, along a well-defined corridor of Pakistani airspace to facilitate the deployment of the ACOTF by air. This will probably be a corridor overflying parts of Pakjab and K-P. Ideally the IAF will not be involved in attacking Pakistani territory at all. This will deprive Pakistanis of the opportunity to usurp the escalation ladder against India and initiate an India-Pakistan conventional conflict. Of course, if they do attack Indian territory in retaliation that's something we have to be ready for; but I doubt they would find it in their interest to do so, and their actions following the Abbotabad operation do not make it seem likely that they would try to outfight the USAF and USN.

14) Within 12 hours of the no-fly-zone being established, ACOTF will begin deployment. Within 48 hours deployment to the theatre of action will be completely achieved. Within two weeks, the objective will be achieved to the extent that ANA can take over entirely in theatre, and the ACOTF will return to base.

15) Essentially, the ACOTF in Punjab/J&K and the USN/USAF assets off the coast of Sindh will constitute a maneuverable force that is applied for limited periods of time to achieve specific strategic objectives, and tip the scale of the forthcoming Afghan civil war in favour of the ANA at critical times. These US and Indian forces will not be deployed on Afghan soil permanently, or become invested in any "nation building" process. They will be applied as and when common Indian, US and ANG interests are to be upheld, i.e. when the Taliban is to be defeated in its attempt to secure a major strategic objective. This will give the ANG (with Indian civilian assistance) space to create sustainable development in Afghanistan, and maximize the attritive erosion of the ongoing civil war against the Pakistanis and their Talib proxies.

16) Ultimately, the Afghan war will be fought between the ANA and the ISI's proxies until one side or the other is exhausted; ACOTF will be a decisive ingredient in advancing eventual ANA victory (and Pakistani exhaustion) without the burden of becoming an invested, occupying army. The end result hoped for is that Indian influence and strategic interests in Afghanistan will be secured in the long-term, while the IA remains in the more effective "Kabila mode" as opposed to the more risky "invested mode" of a large permanent deployment.

Thanks for taking the time to read this and answer the poll. Re-voting is allowed. As a starting point for discussion, please mention which poll option you chose and what your reasoning is.

[shiv]

I have not voted yet because I do not see any of the options as appropriate. I do not believe that India and the US have any common interests in Afghanistan

I do not think Afghanistan is a problem for India. Afghanistan is a "problem" that was created by a British explorer called Alexander "Indus" Burnes who was greatly feted in Europe for falsely claiming that the Indus was fully navigable by boat. He later imagined that the Russians were coming and that prompted the British occupation of Sindh and their later disastrous forays into Afghanistan.

Pakistan itself was the result of these delusions, and Afghanistan became a convenient place for the US to avenge its Vietnam debacle. The Taliban were the US's "cutting edge" in that campaign and Pakistan was base.

One option is to let Afghanistan go to hell and concentrate on Pakistan. India and the US _could_possibly_ have common interests in Pakisatn. By controlling Pakistan, the Afghan kabila can be controlled.

Right now Pakistan is playing the US off against india. An India and US that are being played off against each other by Pakistan will hardly ally in Afghanistan.

[Rudradev]

Shiv, Pakistan isn't the issue on this thread. It is, specifically, how to secure Indian interests in Afghanistan. Do you believe that India has no interests in Afghanistan per se, at all? Whether as a means to further leveraging our interests in Pakistan, or independently of our interests in Pakistan, do we not want to have some available means of intervening militarily in the civil war that *will* unfold in Afghanistan post 2014?

Afghanistan was a problem for the British, true, but long before that it was a part of India, and even today it is part of India's near abroad. That means what happens there affects us, like it or not. In fact, I think one of the problems in our analysis of the region is that WE have been subliminally influenced by the Obama govt's incessant repetition of "Af-Pak Af-Pak Af-Pak" and have come to see the two countries as one inseparable unit. We have begun to think that Pak is everything and Af is just a playground or backyard for the various forces in Pak... which could be a self-defeating perspective for us to imbibe because it denies any independent agency for Afghanistan itself. The Af-Pak myth may be true from America's POV but it is certainly not true from ours, ever since Af explicitly opposed the entry of Pak into the UN in 1947.

Added later: Also, have you considered the effect that such an ACOTF strategy aligned with the US could have on Pakistan itself? What are the implications for Islamabad, of a situation where large numbers of Indian forces are crossing their airspace and doing what they need to do in a country which the Pakis want to claim as "strategic depth"? Could the model also be used to project Indian military influence in other nations of India's near abroad... creating a formation of Indian forces that is airborne, based always at home but capable of quick intervention?

[Rudradev]

Also, I see someone voted in favour of a strategy that involves Iran/Russia and possibly China, while excluding the US. That's fair enough, but for the benefit of our discussion I would request a model of how this would work in practice.

The ACOTF model works when aligned with the US because the US has the capacity to allow very rapid deployment of ACOTF, from Indian bases to Afghan theatres of ops, by the shortest route. This is the key advantage... no US forces ever set foot on India's soil, no large contingent of Indian forces is ever based outside India. It is plausible because the US can enforce SEAD and no-fly-zones as necessary, over Pakistani airspace, creating a window for ACOTF to be deployed to Afghanistan and back.

Can we work out anything like this with Iran and Russia, and will China be amenable? The closest thing in this formulation would be transporting ACOTF via Iran to Afghanistan. That's a much longer route and greatly reduces the mobility and capacity for rapid response... the key attributes of successful Kabila warfare.

[Sanku]

Rudradev-ji; a timely and a topical re-visitation of the long festering issue. Unfortunately this thread does not seem to be getting as much traction as it should. It may be because it is a fairly complicated topic as seen by the first post and the options are a little difficult to chose from.

Speaking for myself, I have not voted yet, and the reason is some what different from Shiv's. I do not right now worry so much about the correctness of the various assumptions that you have listed, or of the issues around "desirability" of working with the anglo-saxon.

My issue is with the fundamental premise -- or the method if you will, that you have listed --> crudely speaking, if I understand correctly, your proposal in a nut shell is to "turn the tables"; that is instead of taking the burden of "hold & build", the Alliance forces behave like a striking force, only to pull ANA chestnuts from the fire when the need arises.

However -- my chief issue is this --> Taliban can be a Kabila because IT IS a Kabila, it has no interest in "hold and build", even when it was in power in Afg last time, it was holding, but was STILL a kabila. Merely a force camped, using force for some amount of rent extraction (from US through Pak and from local populace) -- it did not build a long term sustainable wealth creation mechanism at lower level of any sorts. I can give other arguments to buttress the point, but suffices to say, the Taliban is the archetype Kabila of the (pre Mughal) Islamic marauder mold. (Let me know if you disagree)

Now, a Kabila, can not be countered by a "counter Kabila" tactic; in the clash between two Kabila's the winning Kabila returns to being a Kabila, that is of economic sustenance through loot and plunder and primarily an armed yahoo group on the move.

In that context what is the "economic rationale" of a Alliance counter Kabila? In terms of siding with the settlers, it already loses a important flexibility and freedom of a Kabila, that of not being tied to welfare of any fixed piece in any manner. Why would a true Kabila pull the chestnuts of a loser side like Afg Govt and ANA, frankly said?

In fact US HAS BEHAVED like a Kabila, the examples are in Iraq and elsewhere, but the "economic rationale" was clear. The oil paid for the troops, and there was really no nation building with millions being allowed to die through starvation, loss of law and order, state instruments and so on. There, the advantages of Kabila are really visible.

In Afg, a counter Kabila model would similarly work, if its main focus was protection of an exploitative commercial enterprise. Let us say that we get a Iran-Afg-India Gas pipeline (I know no direct connection, this is just a example) -- I would happily support a Indian "special group" to keep the gas flowing as ANA faced the burnt of keeping the rest of the country in tolerable control, with a fluid moving division border of Afg between ANA and Talebs. With the two groups merrily massacring each other and we gleefully lending a hand to finish of 100s of talebs in one swoop at regular intervals.

That would be one reason.

Similar strong economic motivation will provide a Kabila rational for us.

============================================

What I really think is that India needs to have its own Kabila, but then TARGET PAKISTAN. Pakistan, even the garbage dump it is, probably can quite easily provide a greater economic reason for a maurdering Kabila.

Fighting over current Afg is a loosing proposition for us, from a economic perspective. We need to start leveraging the Geo-political advantage of Afg into economic terms ASAP. And then yes, I am sure you will have your Kabila

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And to think I am hounded regularly by "economist" types on BRF for not being mercantile. Heck I am a total blood-sucking, money hoarding, capitalist running dog.

If I had my way, even old slavers of the Roman senate would worry. (no just kidding this love is specially for some people and some regions)

[shyamd]

I think Iran Russia India with US and PRC support. Each of these countries have an interest in stability an an independent Afghanistan emerging.

You need a coup intervention force for starters within Kabul. Then you need money to keep Afghan govt to function. For that SAIL can build its mines, as can china. India can expand its current arrangement of providing Afghan air force training in CAR countries. This is very important for now. Let the US SF help break the back bone and keep small troops in north with Ayni for air support. Signal to pak diplomatically that if there is any attempt to try and take over Kabul. Troops go in and if ANSF request strikes and military support then we will all go against you. That will worry them coz their back yard is defenceless

[Rudradev]

Rudradev-ji; a timely and a topical re-visitation of the long festering issue. Unfortunately this thread does not seem to be getting as much traction as it should. It may be because it is a fairly complicated topic as seen by the first post and the options are a little difficult to chose from.

Speaking for myself, I have not voted yet, and the reason is some what different from Shiv's. I do not right now worry so much about the correctness of the various assumptions that you have listed, or of the issues around "desirability" of working with the anglo-saxon.

My issue is with the fundamental premise -- or the method if you will, that you have listed --> crudely speaking, if I understand correctly, your proposal in a nut shell is to "turn the tables"; that is instead of taking the burden of "hold & build", the Alliance forces behave like a striking force, only to pull ANA chestnuts from the fire when the need arises.

However -- my chief issue is this --> Taliban can be a Kabila because IT IS a Kabila, it has no interest in "hold and build", even when it was in power in Afg last time, it was holding, but was STILL a kabila. Merely a force camped, using force for some amount of rent extraction (from US through Pak and from local populace) -- it did not build a long term sustainable wealth creation mechanism at lower level of any sorts. I can give other arguments to buttress the point, but suffices to say, the Taliban is the archetype Kabila of the (pre Mughal) Islamic marauder mold. (Let me know if you disagree)

Sanku ji, upto this point I largely agree. Taliban did not engender any sustainable type of wealth-creation mechanism after taking control of 90% of Afghanistan in the '90s. Largely this was because they didn't need to... Saudi and UAE funds, via Pakistan, were enough to finance their activities and those of their "guests" from West Asia. But assuming there was no 9/11, there is every reason to believe that they would have (with US facilitation) embarked on wealth creation... witness that even while it didn't officially recognize the Taliban regime, the Clinton administration invited their people to the US to negotiate for the UNOCAL TAPI pipeline. So the wheels were in motion for them to become something more than a roving Kabila. Once the pipeline was built it would have been theirs to protect... therefore, one step away from Kabila and one step towards becoming an "invested" force.

Let's remember that Kabilas throughout history follow this pattern:

1) start off as a marauding, roving band with no "investments" to tie you down... live off the loot you grab
2) capture few centres of agricultural and mineral production in a mostly arid and useless land
3) dominate a few well-defined trade routes
4) capture the cities which are market and distribution centres.
5) throughout 2, 3, 4... establish a mullah network in territory you control, that serves the political purpose of subjugating the population to you (in Allah's name) while also spying on and eliminating potential dissenters.
6) Gradually become entangled with the interests of ultra-mercantile "survivor" classes who have climbed to functionally dominate trade and production in the territories you control.
7) Thus, gradually become "invested"... losing mobility and maneuverability.
8 ) Fall to military assaults by a new Kabila
9) Become totally destroyed when your "mullah network" switches allegiance to the new, "purer" Kabila.

Taliban by 2001 had got to about stage 5. Absent 9/11 the other stages would have followed surely as night follows day.

Now, a Kabila, can not be countered by a "counter Kabila" tactic; in the clash between two Kabila's the winning Kabila returns to being a Kabila, that is of economic sustenance through loot and plunder and primarily an armed yahoo group on the move.

Here I disagree.

Whether it was the Castilians in Spain or the T'angs in Turkestan... the defeat and ouster of Islamic Kabilas was always accomplished by other, more brutal Kabilas onlee.

See, stage 8... facing a public, visible hammering from a superior military force... is the key to the end of the Kabila. That is why, for example, TSPA's "settled" Kabila is fighting a losing battle against the TTP, a "purer" Kabila.

The effects of such punishment can be somewhat mitigated if the "superior military force" is itself an invested force and NOT a Kabila... such as the US is in Afghanistan right now, with its "hold and build" imperatives. In that case the original Kabila can fight back in a guerilla war and continuously undermine the "hold and build" efforts of the enemy, even if it can't trounce them in open conflict. The original Kabila can still retain credibility with the Mullah network by doing this.

But if the superior force that beats the original Kabila is itself a Kabila... mobile, with no investments that can be touched in retaliation... then the original Kabila is toast.

In that context what is the "economic rationale" of a Alliance counter Kabila? In terms of siding with the settlers, it already loses a important flexibility and freedom of a Kabila, that of not being tied to welfare of any fixed piece in any manner. Why would a true Kabila pull the chestnuts of a loser side like Afg Govt and ANA, frankly said?

Ultimately the long-term rationale is to destroy the entire Kabila Islamic model. It is to effect social engineering of Afghanistan, through military means, thus undermining the Mullah Network on which all initially-successful Kabilas since 1992 have depended for their ongoing survival. A thorough, comprehensive cleanup of the social order created there in the 1979-89 period.

Here is how it may work.

Right now, ANG is the "hold and build" group. That's why it is the "loser side." US, by being present in Afghanistan as a large-scale permanent deployment, joins this "loser side." The fact that the US is kaffir, strengthens public support for the Taliban, because the Taliban's Mullah Network constantly motivates the general population against the ANG with calls to jihad.

Taliban on the other hand is a Kabila that fights and undermines the ANA. But the key to its enduring success... and the key to the success of Haqqanis, Hekmatyar or whoever the Pakis send afterwards... is the power, reach and influence of the Mullah Network that supports it at the grassroots level. The Mullah Network thus ensures that only forces inimical to civilization can gain political control... this is true of all nations where Mullah Networks exist.

Now consider if the ANG's allies (US, India, whoever) were not themselves permanently deployed in Afghanistan... hence, not explicitly on the settled/invested side of the battle. Instead, what if they were simply another Kabila that periodically comes in, reams the cr@p out of the Taliban Kabila, and leaves.

At one level, this helps out the settled ANG by seriously disabling the Taliban Kabila's capacity to wage war on the ANG.

More than that, however, it puts the Taliban's Mullah Network in a predicament. Any Mullah Network's essential basis for propaganda is..."our Kabila is mighty and undefeated, therefore Allah is on our side, therefore as good Muslims you must support our Kabila."

If the Kabila supported by the Mullah Network is fighting a guerilla war against a technically superior enemy who is "invested" (like the US/ANG at present), the Mullah Network can still say: "see, our Kabila is undefeated even against the mighty weapons and aircraft of the invader. Our Kabila still survives and successfully assaults the invader in his invested territories. That alone shows that Allah is on our side, therefore as good Muslims you must support our Kabila."

But OTOH... what happens if the force beating up the Taliban Kabila is itself a marauding Kabila that comes in, hammers the Taliban and goes away? They are not occupiers, so the idea of "jihad against colonial invader" has far less resonance as a propaganda platform.

The Mullah Network now has two choices.

One, it can continue to support the Taliban Kabila. But this option comes with diminishing credibility for the Mullah Network, because the Taliban keeps getting beaten up by a foreign Kabila.

In this situation, because there is no permanent deployment of US or Indian troops in Afghanistan, the Taliban has no opportunity to hit back against a "settled Kaffir occupier" ... therefore, no chance to prove Allah-mandated invincibility. It can try to strike back at the ANG but whenever it brings overwhelming force, the foreign Kabila will arrive and derail its efforts. Net result: Taliban is at a dead end, unable to hold and build, unable to mount major offensives, unable even to present itself as a heroic guerilla force surviving against overwhelming military odds. As a Kabila it stands discredited.

Two, the Mullah Network can change sides and support the ANG. But the ANG is not a Kabila, it is a settled and invested force, and also clearly less-pure than the Taliban in terms of the kaffir company it keeps!

Thinking about this, whatever option the Mullah Network follows will be something that undermines its standing and credibility in Afghan society in the medium-to-long-term. Much of the power of a Mullah Network, any Mullah Network anywhere in the Islamic world, derives from *perception* that the side it backs is the Allah-pasand side and therefore the ultimately victorious side.

If the Mullah Network responds to this by quietly withdrawing from the political and social arena... as the Iraqi Sunni Mullah Network did in Anbar province during the "Awakening"... it is a big step towards containing and reversing Islamization of the Afghan polity. Moreover, if the Mullah Network itself falls apart under this pressure, with different Madrasseh backing different sides of the battle... a major goal will have been achieved. The general population will put less and less stock in the Mullahs as social and political gurus who tell them which side to support. Instead of being the exalted referees of the battle for Afghanistan, the Mullah network will become subsumed and torn apart by the battle. Hopefully many of them will be killed by it as well.

This is the first step towards undoing the process of Islamization that started in Afghanistan in 1979. If it serves as a proof of concept... then, as you rightly said, it can be applied to Pakistan as well.

In fact US HAS BEHAVED like a Kabila, the examples are in Iraq and elsewhere, but the "economic rationale" was clear. The oil paid for the troops, and there was really no nation building with millions being allowed to die through starvation, loss of law and order, state instruments and so on. There, the advantages of Kabila are really visible.

The US has not successfully behaved like a Kabila in Iraq, because it has no equivalent of "Mullah Network" there.

It did at one time successfully behave like a Kabila... the Spanish American War, and subsequent interventions in Latin America through the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was able to send military expeditions into those countries, shape them to its own strategic benefit and use the LOCAL opinion-makers... including the Roman Catholic Church and local elites... to ensure its continuing influence even after its troops largely went back home. That lingering local influence was the equivalent of Islamic Kabilas' "Mullah Network" in the territories they control.

That really isn't happening in Iraq... if anything the Maliki govt is more pro-Iran, than Saddam Hussein ever was, and may present a greater geopolitical headache for Washington in the long run. Also, the oil may not have adequately paid for the troops either, which is why Iraq War borrowings have contributed significantly to the present financial crisis in the USA.

In Afg, a counter Kabila model would similarly work, if its main focus was protection of an exploitative commercial enterprise. Let us say that we get a Iran-Afg-India Gas pipeline (I know no direct connection, this is just a example) -- I would happily support a Indian "special group" to keep the gas flowing as ANA faced the burnt of keeping the rest of the country in tolerable control, with a fluid moving division border of Afg between ANA and Talebs. With the two groups merrily massacring each other and we gleefully lending a hand to finish of 100s of talebs in one swoop at regular intervals.

That would be one reason.

Not sure about this... because having some tangible economic asset to protect immediately decreases Kabila maneuverability and increases "investment" for the ACOTF. The pipeline, if there is one, becomes our weak point. It is better to do this without any investments to protect.

I'm talking about military action against the Kabila of Taliban, specifically aimed at destroying the Mullah Network that keeps Taliban credible... the Network which Saudi/Pak can keep using to support other post-Taliban proxies whom they send along.

And, possibly establishing a model for targeting and destroying the skeletal framework that sustains social and political Islamization in many other nations as well. Including Pakistan.

[ShauryaT]

I think Iran Russia India with US and PRC support. Each of these countries have an interest in stability an an independent Afghanistan emerging.

You need a coup intervention force for starters within Kabul. Then you need money to keep Afghan govt to function. For that SAIL can build its mines, as can china. India can expand its current arrangement of providing Afghan air force training in CAR countries. This is very important for now. Let the US SF help break the back bone and keep small troops in north with Ayni for air support. Signal to pak diplomatically that if there is any attempt to try and take over Kabul. Troops go in and if ANSF request strikes and military support then we will all go against you. That will worry them coz their back yard is defenceless

Also invest heavily into the Durrani tribes. Investing in the Tajiks alone is not enough.

[Singha]

in my opinion having even a single airmobile brigade with all assets air transportable is a expensive prospect (the reason why we dont have it yet). two divisions will need a khan/vvd type budget...so unless khan subsidizes us financially it wont happen.

but my more important objection is that until the taliban have a huge country like pakistan for R&R, logistics and to disappear into they can essentially find new recruits and keep up the war in southern afghanistan forever with no end state reached. there is a risk of wavering commitment atleast from khan if it drags for years, let alone decades

so I agree with Shiv, focus must be on economic collapse inward of pakistan so that various warlords carve out regions of dominance and tear each other apart. this will divert the taliban resources into their own areas and carving out pashtunistan.

[Sanku]

Rudradev-ji; thanks for engaging me in the debate, also, apologies, I believe I may have been less than clear and may have been slightly misunderstood.

(Let me know if you disagree)

Sanku ji, upto this point I largely agree.

Great!! This part at least is now sorted out between us. I am also fully in agreement with the Kabila model you outlined in greater detail.

However here I goofed up a bit

Now, a Kabila, can not be countered by a "counter Kabila" tactic; in the clash between two Kabila's the winning Kabila returns to being a Kabila, that is of economic sustenance through loot and plunder and primarily an armed yahoo group on the move.

Here I disagree.

I seemed to have suggested that a Kabila can not be defeated by another Kabila, but that is not really what I wanted to say, in fact I did say later that a Kabila can be defeated by a Kabila but the net result is a Kabila win, in one shape or form.

My concern is some what different. What I am suggesting is that for a defeat Kabila with another Kabila tactic/strategy, the other party has to be a Kabila. In the truest sense of the word. To use your model, it has to start at step 1. What are the characteristics

1. Loot model (at any degree of refinement, i.e. direct loot, mine control, trade control)
2. A theology glorying the Kabila and a set of theologians -- the mullah network
3. Lack of any fixed point of interest to defend.

Now my humble submission is that in the counter Kabila you propose, all the three are essentially missing, let me go over it in reverse.
3. Support for Afg Govt/ANA essentially means we become the "good guys" caring about a settled power/people. Trying to defend, even if in the guerrilla mode -- a society. A big no no for a fresh challenging Kabila
2. Kabila theology? India? We have hated Kabila's since the cow stealing dasyus were condemended for the same in Rik Vedas. We are unlikely to develop the specific mindset that a Kabila needs.
1. Loot model -- fails because there is nothing to loot.

In that context what is the "economic rationale" of a Alliance counter Kabila?

Ultimately the long-term rationale is to destroy the entire Kabila Islamic model.

RD-ji; I understand the overall rationale from a "grand goal" perspective, what I am concerned about here is how the strategy/tactic of Kabila works in real mechanics.

My humble submission has been that, we dont have the underlying mechanics to be a Kabila, for a good reason. We are we and they are they. Had we been them, they would be already toast.

And we are bound to be we, force of nature. "Hum to aise hain bhaiyaa" (we are like this onlee)

However you ideas have substantial merit, I propose we tweak some of them to work with "people like us"

Here is how it may work.

Instead, what if they were simply another Kabila that periodically comes in, reams the cr@p out of the Taliban Kabila, and leaves.

A very appealing idea, however as Singha mentioned, needs a bunch of money and a good reason. What are we getting out it? In terms of clear cut tangible gains (I am deliberately leaving out geo-pol gains because the lack of tangibility of geo-pol gains makes a single loss appear bad, where as the advantage of holding on a land is not understood --- this I say with respect to those who ultimately pay the costs, the lay person of the country)

I or you would happily pay the cost, and the perceptions of a single hit weakening the hold would not bother us.

So what do we do here? My suggestion is, since we cant out Kabila the Kabila, we do something slightly different.

Say the Shivaji/Ranjit Singh model (roughly speaking) -- Shivaji was fighting a entrenched Kabila in form of the Mughals and Aurangzeb, however he did not use counter Kabila tactics. They did use brutal hard forces at key nodes coupled with destruction of the theologists and control of populace.

We need to have a force which comes in and whacks the hell out of the Kabila, humiliate them and take away their religiously sanctioned sense of superiority. However, we need to have a strong economic rationale while doing it (Tax collection from Surat etc)

Will put in more later, but IMVHO the whack them hard, model of a Kabila, needs to be married to some aspects of a "settled" society in more detail (I am fully aware that your effort is essentially this) -- to be able to bear results.

In short, great idea but needs more work.

======================================

In fact US HAS BEHAVED like a Kabila, the examples are in Iraq and elsewhere, but the "economic rationale" was clear. The oil paid for the troops, and there was really no nation building with millions being allowed to die through starvation, loss of law and order, state instruments and so on. There, the advantages of Kabila are really visible.

The US has not successfully behaved like a Kabila in Iraq, because it has no equivalent of "Mullah Network" there.

I see your point and agree, but still it did fulfill at least 2 out of 3 tests of a Kabila. In terms of trying to break Iraq to free Kurds from the Mullah network, it may have in a way attempted 3 too.

In a place like Iraq point 3 would have taken a 100-300 year effort. Unlike in Latin America where a suitable base already existed. (Latin America too was essentially a Catholic Kabila)

Not sure about this... because having some tangible economic asset to protect immediately decreases Kabila maneuverability and increases "investment" for the ACOTF. The pipeline, if there is one, becomes our weak point. It is better to do this without any investments to protect.

It is a weak point, but also a magnet to draw the moths to fire as we burn them. And the flame also pays for the bills of burning the moths.

Win-win.

This is a bait. Come hit us.

[Rudradev]

in my opinion having even a single airmobile brigade with all assets air transportable is a expensive prospect (the reason why we dont have it yet). two divisions will need a khan/vvd type budget...so unless khan subsidizes us financially it wont happen.

Singha,

An air-mobile formation is something we are going to need, sooner or later, for projection in many potential areas of conflict in our near abroad. Cold Start-type IBGs can work on the Pakistan border, and maybe some sections of the Bangladesh border conducive to quick penetration by land-based units. However, for all those other theatres, including Tibet, evolving air-mobile deployment capacity is going to be vital.

Expensive, certainly; but if we could set up a prototype in the form of the ACOTF, subsidized partially by khan's GOAT budget, wouldn't that kick start a process we would eventually have to commit ourselves to anyway? We could certainly use the experience, even if nothing else came of it.

but my more important objection is that until the taliban have a huge country like pakistan for R&R, logistics and to disappear into they can essentially find new recruits and keep up the war in southern afghanistan forever with no end state reached. there is a risk of wavering commitment atleast from khan if it drags for years, let alone decades

The Taliban having a safe haven in Pakistan is the main reason why the US' Afghanistan project has failed miserably thus far. It is the reason why the US cannot win by simply keeping a permanent troop deployment in Afghanistan, and backing a Kabul government which the Taliban can easily undermine from its bases in Pakistan.

The situation today: Taliban cannot push out the US and Afghan National Govt (ANG) to take over Afghanistan; but the US and ANG cannot consolidate themselves or undertake nation-building because the Taliban can effectively deny them strategic control of Afghanistan. Given this stalemate, whoever gets tired first is the loser, and the other party wins by default. Taliban, having safe haven in Pakistan, is unlikely to get tired first.

But once the US withdraws the bulk of its troops, the picture changes. Taliban then HAS to come into Afghanistan, and try to conquer and govern territory in Afghanistan (otherwise what is its credibility as a "victor" against the US?)

Once Taliban enters Afghanistan, possibly taking over Kandahar-Jalalabad and some other centers, then its own ability to impose strategic denial on the ANG decreases... because the entire nature of the war has changed and it cannot simply hit and run back to Pakistan anymore. Moreover, ANG now gains the capacity to impose strategic denial on the Taliban, in those parts of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban.

It is in the context of this new situation that I suggest raising an Indian ACOTF, to work in conjunction with khan. Rest assured that the Pakis will be sending land forces (both auxiliary and uniformed) to beef up the Taliban offensive against the ANG. Some countervailing force is needed to balance the conflict in favour of the ANG; and yet, the continuous deployment of such a force as an occupying presence in Afghanistan would be counter-productive.

To fulfill this role of a countervailing-but-not-occupying force, I suggest we have an ACOTF that is based on Indian soil, but deployable by air to locations in Afghanistan as required. Meanwhile, khan's own commitment will also become much less than at present... he simply needs to maintain a Carrier battle group and some cruise missile submarines in the Arabian Sea.

So two things: (1) Khan won't have huge numbers of boots on the ground in Afghanistan, and will not be taking regular casualties, as he is now. (2) The war fought by ANG/khan/India will no longer have the same aims as the current Afghan war (i.e. nation building) which the Taliban can easily undermine to claim "victory."

The new strategy will not be aimed at reaching a quick "end state" where Taliban is permanently extinguished and Karzai rules over a peaceful, democratic Afghanistan forever. It will be aimed at maintaining a status quo where ISI/LeT/Haqqanis/"Al-Qaeda" cannot take strategic control of Afghanistan, and can be exhausted by consistently undermining their efforts to take control of Afghanistan.

For these reasons, I don't think Khan's commitment will waver even for an indefinite length of time. He is going to have those air and naval assets in the neighbourhood anyway. He is going to be spending resources on covert warfare inside Afghanistan anyway. India joining his cause with an ACOTF, simply gives us more of a presence, and more of an opportunity to directly influence further events in Afghanistan.

At least, that's how I see the situation right now. I may be wrong, but then the point of this discussion is to identify the pitfalls and errors of such a strategy.

so I agree with Shiv, focus must be on economic collapse inward of pakistan so that various warlords carve out regions of dominance and tear each other apart. this will divert the taliban resources into their own areas and carving out pashtunistan.

Singha, economic collapse of Pakistan won't happen, and even if it does happen, there will be no tearing apart for the foreseaable future.

Economic collapse won't happen because the 3.5 friends of Pakistan will pump money in regardless of anything else. They do not want to lose influence with the TSPA/ISI no matter what. Pakistan can simply light a bonfire of all the dollar bills in the country and the US will replace them the next day. Even the P3C Orions torched at PNS Mehran last year are being replaced!

Secondly, even assuming that one day the 3.5 friends all go broke and stop pumping money into Pakistan: what then? Yes, as you say, warlords will start trying to take over. But the biggest, baddest warlord of all will STILL be the TSPA by a very, very long shot. Compared to any other warlord they have the best armaments, the most men, the strongest and best-trained organization by far... EVEN with defections or mutinies here and there along ethnic or sectarian lines, the core of the PA will easily remain strong enough to withstand centrifugal pressures by any Tanzeem or group of Tanzeems.

Here on BRF we keep talking about how Pakistan is on the verge of collapse because some Mehsuds ran riot in Swat for a few days, or because some other group detonated a bomb at GHQ once. All rubbish IMHO; by this token Indian Mujahedin and the Maoists are equally capable of destroying the Indian state. Pakistan army is much, much more powerful than any of these clowns, and will continue to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Today the Pakistan Army still has to exercise some restraint and keep up token appearances of "responsible behaviour" because it desires respectability among the international community. Tomorrow, if the 3.5 friends stop paying money, and there are no political pretensions to uphold, Pakistan army will simply become the best-equipped and strongest Tanzeem on the block. They can behave in a manner as openly medieval as TTP, LeT, JeM, HuJI or any of the rest of them... but with tanks, artillery and aircraft.

[Rudradev]

My concern is some what different. What I am suggesting is that for a defeat Kabila with another Kabila tactic/strategy, the other party has to be a Kabila. In the truest sense of the word. To use your model, it has to start at step 1. What are the characteristics

1. Loot model (at any degree of refinement, i.e. direct loot, mine control, trade control)
2. A theology glorying the Kabila and a set of theologians -- the mullah network
3. Lack of any fixed point of interest to defend.

Now my humble submission is that in the counter Kabila you propose, all the three are essentially missing, let me go over it in reverse.
3. Support for Afg Govt/ANA essentially means we become the "good guys" caring about a settled power/people. Trying to defend, even if in the guerrilla mode -- a society. A big no no for a fresh challenging Kabila
2. Kabila theology? India? We have hated Kabila's since the cow stealing dasyus were condemended for the same in Rik Vedas. We are unlikely to develop the specific mindset that a Kabila needs.
1. Loot model -- fails because there is nothing to loot.

.

Sanku-ji,

Reading your post, I have had to re-think the language in which I phrased my idea. You are right; for the three reasons you have outlined above, the ACOTF proposal I outlined will not involve India acting like a "Kabila" in the classically understood sense of the word.

It would have been more accurate for me to say: we will adopt Kabila tactics and modus operandi to pursue gains that cannot be achieved by more conventional behaviour (permanently deploying forces, fighting insurgency etc.)

Yes, we will not have anything tangible to loot, not in the short term anyway. In the long term, when the Taliban is quelled and an ANG dependent on India consolidates power permanently in Kabul, then all of Afghanistan's resources and strategic qualities fall firmly within our sphere of influence.

We will not have the Kabila theology but, in lieu of a "Mullah network", we will have an organized local instrument with widespread presence to disseminate our ideological/soft-power influence: the Afghan National Govt. itself. I do not suggest backing the ANG (Karzai, Abdullah or whoever) simply because I feel sorry for them. I would like us to cultivate a MuNNA in Kabul just as Unkil has in the UQ or Canada.

So you see... WE will not be the "settled" guys in Afghanistan... ANG will be the "settled" guys owing suzerainty while we enjoy the strategic advantages of a Kabila. As an analogy consider the relationship of Shivaji to Bijapur/Golconda, or of the Sikh Misls to Sialkot/Attock/Peshawar.

Except that Shivaji and the Misls taxed the wealth of those vassals to finance their own further campaigns; meanwhile, we have other sources of finances for the present, and our immediate interest in the ANG is rather to establish and maintain influence, while curtailing hostile influences in our near abroad.

[johneeG]

I disagree with the primary premise that US' and India's interest coincide in Astan. I think US' interests are diametrically opposite of India's.

Astan is part of Indian civilizational zone. If Astan and Pstan(pakis) are not funded by anti-Indian forces, then sooner than later, India will exert its complete influence over them. Both Pstan and Astan are being kept outside Indian influence by the anti-Indian players. US is at the top of this group, right now. Europe and China have been willing partners.

Once Pstan and Astan are abandoned by these anti-Indian players, they will have no other choice but to make alliance with India. It is precisely for this reason that anti-Indian players within and without India are trying desperately to keep the present status quo by making extra-ordinary concessions to the pakis.

[Rudradev]

I disagree with the primary premise that US' and India's interest coincide in Astan. I think US' interests are diametrically opposite of India's.

There is no question that, as a general rule, US interests are opposed to those of India.

However, there is a major problem with considering this general rule a "primary premise" in an axiomatic sense. The problem is that of reductionism: we oversimplify "US interests" as a well-honed, well-articulated and mutually harmonious set of principles consistently acted upon by the US foreign policy establishment. If we refuse to look beyond that simplistic assumption in any particular case, we leave ourselves blinkered, and permanently devoid of solutions.

Evidence bears out that "US interests" are anything but harmonious; in fact they are highly contradictory and conflict with each other, a trend that has intensified several-fold over the last decade. "US interests" are not a permanently solidified set of principles on which the US foreign policy establishment acts... indeed, they are always in flux depending on the prevailing geopolitical climate.

Given this, it is very much possible for a power like India to take advantage of the state of flux of US interests at any given point in time. Consider that the same Washington which devised the NPT in 1967, and imposed sweeping economic sanctions following Pokhran II in 1998, signed a 123 agreement with Delhi only 9 years later... and as a result we have unprecedented access to NSG nuclear commerce. Subsequently we have signed reactor deals with Russia and France, and are negotiating Uranium supply deals with Australia and various African countries.

Meanwhile the US, whose stated policy interest remains to "cap, roll-back and eliminate non-NPT states' nuclear weapons programs" hasn't made a single tangible gain at our expense. So: even if the system in Washington is generally stacked against India, it can be gamed for India's benefit.

Coming specifically to the topic at hand, we know that the US has several interests in the region, many of them conflicting with each other. As we all know, the primary interest since 1947 has been

A) The Caroevian-Dullesian policy of making Pakistan the lynchpin of US strategy. This necessitates ensuring that India is unable to exercise hegemony in her own near abroad.

However, following developments that led up to 9/11, a new interest has emerged to coexist with (A). This is:

B ) Ensuring that Islamist groups do not use nations of the region to threaten the security of US and its Western allies, or their economic interests in West Asia.

On 12 Sept 2001, these two interests (A) and (B ) were balanced by the brilliant solution of co-opting Musharraf's Pakistan as an "ally" in the war on terror. We all know how that turned out; it is the reason why Afghanistan remains a debacle and money-sink for the US a decade later.

Since 2006-7, the US has responded to the newly recognized challenge of Pakistan's double-game with a "carrot-and-stick" policy of pumping money towards TSPA/ISI, while conducting drone strikes etc. on TSPA/ISI allies in Pakistani territory. That has led to increasingly open hostility between the US and Pakistan, with corresponding ramifications in Afghanistan. We have seen Raymond Davis, increased Haqqani activity, the Abbotabad snatch and the Salala hammering of a TSPA outpost by NATO. Most recently, Washington's last-ditch effort towards peaceful resolution with the Taliban was answered by the Kabul attack last month.

All this has brought the US to a situation where interests (A) and (B ) can no longer be credibly balanced through the use of a Pakistani proxy. Of course there are still groups in the US foreign policy establishment which are fanatical about (A), and insist that whatever solution happens must occur through co-opting Pakistan. But for the first time in history there are other voices openly contradicting the first group, talking of Pakistan as a problem and an enemy of the US in the sphere of public discourse. Of course (A) is still an interest, but the flux at this point has come about because the US was unable to reconcile (A) with (B ) by co-opting Pakistan. Now what?

India cannot afford to say "oh, all US interests are ultimately against us anyway" and remain a silent spectator to all this... not if we want to secure our own interests in our near abroad at the earliest possible time. India has consistently moved to establish influence in Afghanistan since 2001, mainly through development projects, economic and humanitarian assistance... but for a long time, when the US was counting on Pakistan to balance interests (A) and (B ), India faced a lot of opposition to such efforts from figures in the US foreign policy establishment. Today things are different... the US has welcomed the MMS/Karzai agreement promising strategic security cooperation between India and Afghanistan (this would have been unthinkable in Quolin Bin Powell's days.)

This is a sign that, in Washington at least, certain aspects of India's short- an medium-term interests in Afghanistan are being seen as convergent with US interests. India's actions, to some extent, are being given precedence over (A)... the key American interest since 1947 of appeasing Pakistan and preventing Indian "hegemony." I am not even going to go into other interests such as C (Washington's shift from Cold-War China engagement to present-day China containment), D (Washington's increasing economic interest in India per se), E (Washington's desire for a security partnership in the IOR) etc. for now. Even considering just (A) and (B )... the situation today is that interest (B ) is triumphing over interest (A) right now, and we should take full advantage of that.

This development does not mean the US is necessarily on a broad course of harmonizing its long-term geopolitical interests with India... of course not. Indeed, the US will still keep doing other things in India to "balance" the dilution of (A)... cultivating influence with Northeastern separatists, J&K separatists, Maoist groups (via the NGO/evanjehadi networks) and maybe even Khalistan separatists. US will still want to keep these levers of coercion against India, may be more so than before because the primary lever of Pakistan isn't cooperating with them anymore. But the current situation does give us a window of opportunity to secure our own interests in Afghanistan, without opposition from a power which has considerable influence in our part of the world.

Essentially, as long as we can prevent Washington from doing harm to us on the basis of *some* American interests, we should seize the opportunity to gain Washington's cooperation with our own strategic advancement, based on *other* American interests. That's how the game is played.

[kmkraoind]

Rudradevji in your scenario, you had considered only 3 power players in it, that is Pakistan; Afgans; and US, NATO, Soviet block and India.

What about if a scenario emerges where the cry comes that their version of Islam is in danger from 3 following entities.
1. Persian - yesteryear's cultural power house (shiaism and immediate neighborhood) .
2. Turkey - Caliphate ideology - gives a preeminence or equal importance of human central power point.
3. GCC - Custodians of holy places and want to impose their own new version - Wahabism.

[Sanku]

Except that Shivaji and the Misls taxed the wealth of those vassals to finance their own further campaigns; meanwhile, we have other sources of finances for the present, and our immediate interest in the ANG is rather to establish and maintain influence, while curtailing hostile influences in our near abroad.

Thank you Rudradev-ji, I believe we are largely in sync. I do however still think that we should also look for immediate short term economic benefits from this exercise as well.

Can some be found/designed?