Nixon Era and India Nuclear Program 1972- 74

[Amber G.]

Since some recent (see http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1437282 ) discussion in few places has brought this topic, I am putting some
historic references from declassified information from various sources here.

I was in US around that time period. I was a grad student (or early post-doc) around that time and knew some of the people mentioned in the article above. I may put some of my thoughts and perspective, as I remember them now, later but let me put some documents with the link here for experts...

(Some excerpts are there)
Various recent intelligence reports
>State Department cable to Embassy New Delhi, 6 January 1972, Secret

For years, the U.S. intelligence establishment had been monitoring India's nuclear program for signs of a decision to produce nuclear weapons, but in late 1971 and early 1972 it had to consider the possibility that a nuclear test was impending. Recently collected intelligence about an imminent test led the State Department to send a query to the U.S. Embassy in India for its assessment.

A Concerted Effort by India to Conceal Preparations May Well Succeed
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, "India to Go Nuclear?" 14 January 1972, Secret

Before the Embassy sent a full response, a team of analysts at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research produced their evaluation of varied report about India's nuclear intentions: that it would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a "peaceful nuclear explosive." According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover.

"India's Nuclear Intentions," 21 January 1972, Secret,

Embassy identified a number of reasons that made it unlikely that India would a test a nuclear device in the coming weeks, but saw "straws" suggesting an underground test "sometime in future." For example, the Government of India had publicly acknowledged ongoing work on the problem of safe underground testing . Moreover, India might have an interest in making its nuclear capabilities known to "enemies." Whatever the Indians decided, external pressure would have no impact on a highly nationalist state and society: "we see nothing US or international community can presently do to influence GOI policy directions in atomic field."

Memorandum from Ray Cline, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, enclosing "Possibility of an Indian Nuclear Test," 23 February 1972, Secret

At the request of Undersecretary of State John Irwin, INR prepared an assessment which included a detailed review of Indian's nuclear facilities and their capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium as well as capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons to target. While India had signed agreements with Canada and the United States that nuclear reactors were to be used for peaceful purposes, the Indians were likely to claim that an explosive device for "peaceful" purposes was consistent with the agreements. Whether the Indians were going to test in the near future was in doubt. INR could not "rule out" one in the near future. Further, the "strongest incentive [to test] may well be the desire for the increased status of a nuclear power."

U.S. Embassy Canada cable to State Department, "India's Nuclear Intentions," 7 March 1972, Secret

With With Canada's role as a supplier of nuclear technology, including the CIRUS research reactor, senior Canadian officials had close working relationships with their Indian counterpart. James Lorne Gray, the chairman of Canada's Atomic Energy Board, had recently visited India and U.S. embassy officials interviewed him closely on his thinking about Indian nuclear developments. Having spoken with Homi Nusserwanji Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and other officials, Gray believed that Sethna opposed a test and that as long as Sethna and Indira Gandhi were in office "there was no chance" that India would test a nuclear device, which would take three to four years to prepare. Gray was mistaken, but was correct to declare that if a decision to test was made, Sethna would "undoubtedly" head the project.

Unlikely to Test in the "Near Future" -- State Department cable to U.S. Embassy Ottawa, "Indian Nuclear Intentions," 9 March 1972, Secret

State Department officers were also consulting with their counterparts at the Canadian embassy in Washington. During a discussion with the embassy counselor, country desk director David Schneider opined that Indian was unlikely to test a device in the "near future" but he wanted Ottawa's prognosis. Schneider was also interested in whether the Soviets, with their close relationship with India, might be able to use their influence to "deter" a test. If India tested, the U.S. could respond with a "strong statement," but whether "punitive" measures would be taken would depend on whether the test "violated existing agreements."

No Technical or Fiscal Obstacle to a Test --U.S. Embassy Canada cable 14 March 1972, Secret

Elaborating on his earlier cable and responding to the general issues raised by the Department's 9 March message, science attaché Hudson questioned Gray's evaluation of Sethna, suggesting that by combining "guile" and "technical proficiency," the latter could easily have "easily misled" the Canadian. Based on consultations with a variety of Canadian insiders with knowledge of and experience with the Indian nuclear program, the Embassy saw no technical or fiscal barriers to an Indian test. Moreover, any pressure on India not to test would increase the "likelihood" of that happening.

Leaving Their Options Open" - cable U.S. Embassy Canada, 24 March 1972, Secret

Further discussions with the Canadian embassy counselor disclosed Ottawa's view that it had no evidence of Indian intentions to test a nuclear weapon or a PNE. The Indians were "leaving their options open." If they decided to test, however, it would be "impossible" for them to move forward "without revealing some indication of their intentions."

British See No Evidence of a Decision -U.S. Embassy United Kingdom 7 April 1972

The British Government was taking the same view as the Canadians, seeing no evidence that the Indians had made a decision to test, although they had the "capability."

"Apparent Reliability and Seeming Credibility" - To U.S. Embassy United Kingdom 22 April 1972

The Canadian embassy had asked the State Department for information on the intelligence reports from earlier in the year that an Indian nuclear test was "imminent." The State Department denied the request, but informed the Canadians that the reports were so numerous and their "congruity, apparent reliability, and seeming credibility" so striking that it had become necessary to update official thinking about Indian intentions.

"The Indians Have Decided to Go Ahead" (All around June 20, 1972)
(This group of telegrams discloses that one Japanese diplomat made a good guess ... "Indians have decided to go ahead with a nuclear test" which could occur at "any time;" The Thar Desert in Rajasthan would be the test site....!!! - Americans doubted all the info)

Japanese Views Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans
Japanese-Pakistani Conversations Regarding Indian Nuclear Plan
More on Japanese Views Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans

Next: Some memos of Dr K to Nixon, more in 1973 and 1974...Some personal reflections...
(

[ramana]

Note the cluster around a particular time period in 1972. In Dec 1971, US had sent the Task Force 74 into Bay of Bengal. Inder Malhotra has written that clinched Mrs G's decision to exercise the option. And she gave the go ahead.

So all these assessments are to see if there is any movement after that.


BTW try to see Vipin Gupta's paper on using remote sensing data to view India's test preparations. The oddest thing in that old paper is that when sat photos were at a premium and were most relevant to look at FSU and PRC, the US spent a few flybys of Pokharn when the range was acquired in 1960 to get pristine baseline images!

Added url link to the old paper. Will see if it has the old picture? If not will keep looking.
-------------

Found it: Look at Plate 6. Shows picture dated Dec 1961 when there was no gleam of a test in any one's eyes!

Investigating allegations of Indian nuke test site preparations

Its a large file ~12MB and 88 pages long.
My point is the year is 1961 and just after JFK got sworn in and the "kadi nigrahi"(KN) started. During Eisenhower days the debate was when will India test not can? And was always dismissed away. Refer to "Must the Bomb Spread?" and other titles of the same genre.

To use scarce resources to look at peaceful India shown they had some inkling and started the KN.

So from 1961 to 1974 quite fast paced even with three wars like 1962 China war and 1965 Paki war and 1971 Bangla Desh liberation war.

Wouldnt put it past MrsG to think all those wars were proxy ones to stop India in its tracks and the final straw was Task Force 74.

[Amber G.]

x-post:

Shut out of BARC, U.S. scientist foresaw Indian nuclear test

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/s ... epage=true

Full text for analysis;

A year before India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, a Bombay-based scientific representative of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was quite certain it would do so ‘in the not too distant future.’ Concurring with his assessment, a senior U.S. diplomat felt Prime Minister Indira Gandhi would take the step to offset public disenchantment with her government and the country’s growing economic troubles.

The American scientist’s suspicions grew, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable obtained by WikiLeaks, when the Indian nuclear establishment shut its doors on him, afraid that he was being used by the U.S. government to spy on them and would find out too much.

It is generally thought that the world was taken by surprise when the ‘Buddha smiled’ in Pokhran on May 18, 1974. But the cable sent by the U.S. Consul General in Bombay on April 4, 1973, was quite certain that India was on the verge of testing a nuclear device.

“As aura of Indo-Pak victory and 1970/72 electoral successes dim and as public disenchantment with PM and GoI mount reflecting increased economic distress it occurs to us in Bombay that in addition usual scapegoats, ‘demonstration’ of a nuclear device for peaceful purposes in not too distant future,” the U.S. Consul-General in Bombay wrote in the cable (1973NEWDE03743_b, secret).

The main source for the assessment was the AEC representative, John Pinajian, who had shared his ‘personal evaluation’ of India’s nuclear position with the Consul General, based on his own observations at ‘various levels in India, broad extrapolations based on technical papers presented at Indian scientific meetings as well as impression gathered from public and personal comments made by member atomic energy community.’

Dr. Pinajian told the U.S. Consul General that it was “fully within the capabilities” of India to “demonstrate its nuclear capability by exploiting peaceful application of a nuclear device” in the “near future and indications available to this end suggest that GoI may be working to this end.”

Dr. Pinajian was also of the view that the Department of Atomic Energy was laying the groundwork for the export by India of “largely ingenous [sic] atomic reactors (200 MWe).”

His impressions, Dr. Pinajian told the diplomat, were based on several things. Although he had “excellent credentials and contacts dating back to Oak Ridge” (the Tennessee city where some U.S. nuclear research facilities are located), he was being rebuffed by top scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research (TIFR).

Despite an agreement with AEC India that the USAEC was making Dr. Pinajian “available as an expert,” and a suggestion by Dr. Homi Sethna, then AEC India chairman, that the scientist should ‘immediately’ go to work at BARC, Dr. Raja Ramanna, the head of BARC avoided meeting him until Dr. Sethna personally intervened to get him the appointment.

But the meeting was fruitless for the American scientist, as the BARC chief said it would be ‘impractical’ for him to work in the particular division he wanted to be in, as that would require permission from the Centre.

{So it confirms he was on an intel gathering mission in that division!}

Dr. Ramanna pushed him off to TIFR instead. There too, Dr. Pinajian tried in vain to meet the institute’s boss, Dr. M.G.K. Menon. A member of Dr. Menon’s staff, Professor B.V. Thosar, had asked for permission to work with Dr. Pinajian, but “months have passed” and neither had heard anything.

The scientist felt this was significant as both BARC and TIFR would be “principal Orgnaisations [sic] involved in any move toward development of a nuclear device.”

{He gets refused access to restricted areas in BARC and TIFR and decides India is working on a bomb! Suffers from Paredolia}

Even Dr. Sethna, the USAEC scientist’s initial supporter, seemed to have abandoned him. “Additionally Pinajian has had increasing difficulty in seeing Sethna (has not seen since Feb although has requested appointment on number of occasions),” the cable notes.

The cable says that “key men in India’s atomic energy hierarchy are apparently reluctant to allow Pinajian to become involved in any access to these institutions. In my view their reluctance derives from their concern that Pinajian is knowledgeable and could find out more than they might like that he should. They probably fear we may be using him to observe their activities in the nuclear field”.

{So their fears are fully justified now so many years later.}


Then, despite Dr. Sethna’s statement that Trombay is “wide open and we have no secrets,” Pinajian told the U.S. Consul General, his contacts with personnel working there “(and he has a number of excellent contacts who value his advice) do not bear this out. His contacts suggest that outsiders working at Trombay are not free to roam around. In fact, friendly sources are unable to tell him who is working on a project and what is being done.”

{Again he is abusing his old contacts to find out about a particular project and who is working on it! And he claims to be research scholar!!!. Name one country that allows outsiders to roam around in high security areas? What an ego and a duffer.}

Pinajian, says the cable, was satisfied from all indications available to him that the Indians are doing extensive work in the field of plutonium, recognising in addition that a “strong base for plutonium work is also necessary for utilization of plutonium in the DAE breeder reactor program.”


{Yet he claims India was working on a bomb!}

Meeting MGK is not easy even for his relatives.

[Amber G.]

Note the cluster around a particular time period in 1972..

Some of the "clustering" is because, I chose to use the time period, starting from 1972... Sure, post 1971 period was important, so I chose that time period...(and not because I saw high volume in 1972 vs 1971.)

Also, let us concentrate on getting the raw data, and technical analysis vs fitting the data in
pre-conceived narrative.


More - some selected documents in 1972 (from gwu archive)
Kissinger to Nixon, "Proposed NSSM on the Implications of an Indian Nuclear Test," 4 July 1972, Secret

Kissinger asked President Nixon to approve a national security study memorandum [NSSM] on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests.

No Evidence of a Decision -- Embassy in India to State Department, 26 July 1972, Secret

Embassy acknowledged that India had the "technical know-how and possibly materials to develop nuclear device within period of months after GOI decision to do so." Nevertheless, it saw no evidence that a decision had been made to test a device

50-50 chance that India will test - August 1972
No firm Intelligence..

(This US Cable, and other near this time is sited by many, to show the US Gov. intelligence was not very good, as this was the time IG has already given a go ahead for preparation of PNE .BTW Scientific community in US, from my recollection, was pretty sure that it India can test PNE at any time (within months after deciding) she wished)

I do not see , much of interest in archives, after this date till April, May 1973 with the cable which is discussed in recent Hindu article.. BTW, years before it was published/noted by Hindu article (and wikileaks), this has been posted and discussed on gwu.edu archives. (I have seen the discussion about this before, I also happened to know/heard of Dr. Pinajian in 70's so that may have caught my eye)..

In any case, this memo from some Brewsterin sent in January 1973 to Henry K's desk (where it languished) mention that US is not giving high priority about India's nuclear situation...
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ ... -16-73.pdf

I will end this with two cables (Declassified in 2011), which have already been mentioned .. from this archive..
Bombay consulate cable to Department of State... 4 April 1973, Confidential
and
U.S. Embassy cable 5797 to State -forwarding above cable - 17 May 1973, Confidential

For continuity, I will post what was already posted..

The possibility that the GOI had made a decision to test surfaced in a message from the U.S. consulate in Bombay signed off by Consul Bane. ...that Oak Ridge Laboratory scientist John J. Pinajian, then serving as the Atomic Energy Commission's scientific representative in India, had pointed out several "indications"—notably his lack of access to key individuals and facilities in India's atomic establishment--suggesting that India "may well have decided" to test a nuclear device. While stating that Pinajian's evaluation was "subjective and impressionistic," Consul Bane agreed that the atomic energy establishment did not want this American poking around because he might find out too much. Bane further observed that a nuclear test "in the not too distant future" could meet the GOI's political goals and help attain "greater recognition major power status."

Raja Rammana, the director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, one of the organizations that Pinajian was trying to contact, played a key role in directing the PNE project

(Notes; ( By Amber G) - In any event, later, Pinajian got some access to BARC. Also he was getting cooperation from the TIFR to conduct an experiment (Not to mention, there were some other profs of Nuclear Physics in IIT's with whom he had good relationship). One notable thing is he, and that telegram is mentioned in US state dept's 1974 post-mortem report ( as evidence that it should have been considered more seriously but the report also notes that that Secretary of State William Rogers was aware of the report and asked for more information in a memo).

Just a day before the test

The Likelihood of an Early Test [at] a Lower Level than Previous Years ..

..The embassy concluded that "deeper economic problems," among other considerations militated against a nuclear test in the near future, even though the Indian government had the capabilities to produce and test a device. While there were no rumors about a test as there had been in 1972, "we know little about relevant internal government debate..

Fun starts the day after the device was tested ...
"Rebound to their Credit Domestically"

..Having written off an early test, the day that it took place the Embassy scrambled to come up with an explanation. While the Embassy had no clue about IG's decision-making, it saw domestic politics and "psychological" explanations for the test : the need to offset domestic "gloom" and the need for India to "be taken seriously." According to the telegram, "the decision will appeal to nationalist feeling ....

And state department replies ...
"Enough Plutonium for Some 50-70 Nuclear Weapons" [url]

The day of the test, they rushed to update Kissinger, then in the Middle East negotiating

[/quote]

I will end it with TOP SECRET report (now declassified) about all the postmortem about 1974 .. US intelligence from US state department .. Happy reading..
[url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb367/docs/7-74%20post-mortem.pdf]Post Mortem Report -- An Examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance Before the Indian Nuclear Test of May 1974, July 1974, Top Secret, Excised copy]

[Vayutuvan]

Ahha!

KEY CHINESE TARGETS

That is what got Nixon/HK duo worried.

[Amber G.]

^^^!
Actually, according to what I read by fairly reliable source.. (Article in Time in mid/late 70's) Idira G, got an assurance from top soviet level, and a top soviet general personally delivered a stern message to his counterpart in China - basically to stay out and do not get involved (its military ) in 1971 conflict..(China then had nukes).

China did not get involved, but IG learned her lesson as never to feel helpless , (and to depend on others). As soon as 1971 war was over and she got a chance, she decided to give green light to Indian Scientists.

Indian Intelligence did know about Pak/Bhutto's meeting with his scientists in early 1972, and the news has reached IG in 1972 itself (per Jacques Hymans)

There is a very good archive compiled by Hungarian Foreign Ministry for these years, also now published which has lot of info from Soviet side.

Russia, for example, after 1974 test, did NOT utter a single word in criticizing India. It also stepped in to fill the needs of India when Canada stopped providing reactor fuel and equipment..

(I do know soviet physicists visiting India around that time, and one I know had a very good friendship (which is still there) with his Indian counterpart)

[pentaiah]

Yes Russians and the French supplied heavy water as well LEU.
Only the Germans FRG stopped all technical transfer to NFC for zirconium alloy plant tube manufacturing

[ramana]

I will try to locate the Inder Malhotra article that gives the exact timing of Mrs Gandhi's go ahead so we can see things in prespective.

-------------

Here it is:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 8#p1212399


ramana:

Crucial missing piece by Inder Malhotraji.

Fourteen Days to Freedom

...
Yet, towards the end of the 1971 war, the arrogant incumbent of the White House dispatched a nuclear task force of the US Seventh Fleet, with one Marine battalion on board, to the Bay of Bengal. Again, Indira Gandhi was unperturbed. All she did was send for Raja Rammana, then director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and told him to start working on an underground nuclear detonation.

This test took place on May 18, 1974 when the JP movement — so named because the Gandhian Jayaprakash Narayan was its leader — was in full blast, and there was much discontent against the prime minister. Her opponents screamed that she had “staged” the test to divert attention from her failings. The ignoramuses didn’t know that a nuclear test has a gestation period of at least three years.

So very clearly Nixon broke and unstated bargain and forced India's hand. India took a beating in 1962 and still didnt go for a test. However when US sent a nuke armed task force India had to go for it.
-----------------------

[Amber G.]

Ramana - Can you and others, post critical dates here for reference...

The IG's authorization according to various sources was on On 7 September 1972 to go ahead. To be clear, this go ahead was for actual preparation of test (survey, preparation of test site, assemble /system integrate the designed device etc.. the design work was in for quite some time)

(This day IG gave the commencement speech at IIT Mumbai, and she also spent quite a long time at BARC -- was briefed and shown the detailed design/model of PNE ..US Gov/intelligence reported nothing about this..)

Interestingly, as we know now, IG's cabinet was not notified either. Defense Minister (J Ram) and Foreign minister came to know about the details just before the test (less than a week - and even then they were just notified - not consulted)..

I am going through the cables sent by eastern block around this time... Soviet Union, around this time (or actually a few years ago). noted (according to cables sent by Hungarians) that, in their estimate, Indian scientists can produce and test a device within 10 months of getting a green light from the government.

[svinayak]

The IG's authorization according to various sources was on On 7 September 1972 to go ahead.

The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, also known as the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), was an important diplomatic document issued by the United States of America and the People's Republic of China on February 28, 1972 during President Richard Nixon's visit to China. The document pledged that it was in the interest of all nations for the United States and China to work towards the normalization of their relations, although this would not occur until the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations seven years later.
The US and China also agreed that neither they nor any other power should "seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region". This was of particular importance to China, who shared a militarized border with the Soviet Union.

One the soviet Union and India knew what the plan was for Asia Pacific then the ball started rolling.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Communiqu%C3%A9
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Nixon_visit_to_China
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-American_relations


Find the archives between Feb 1972 to Sept 1972.
It should give lot of information

[Amber G.]

Just for perspective ..

Mostly from Balazs Szalontai's paper about Soviet Union and India’s Nuclear Program around this time..Wrt to eastern block (From archived/unclassified documents)

• “Strategic objectives” including regional power balancing, security, and other foreign policy concerns at times eclipsed non-proliferation in determining Soviet policy toward India’s nuclear program.
(The Soviets, however, initially sought to prevent India from gaining nuclear weapons and wanted India to sign NPT but while in 1960's these restrictions were there, after Germany signed NPT there was less opposition) (it worried that West Germany might develop its own atomic bomb and the concern that Indian opposition to the NPT could encourage similar behavior in Bonn )
After Bonn joined the NPT in the early 1970’s, these fears and the associated tension subsided.

• India’s main interest in the Soviet Union was the possibility that it could provide security
against India’s regional rivals, Pakistan and China.

In 1969, India proposed an Indo-Soviet mutual-security agreement, which was signed in 1971. Yet India’s leadership did not feel that the Soviet security guarantee was strong enough to warrant a halt in India’s nuclear research.

India felt having a nuclear weapon was the only way to be taken seriously as a global power and to
take part in international policy making.

• The Soviet reaction to the India’s peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) at Pokhran in May, 1974 showed
Moscow could be willing to turn a blind eye toward India’s nuclear program when doing so benefited the
Soviet Union.

Moscow privately opposed the test, but never publicly criticized it. In doing so, the Soviets hoped to bolster their relationship with India relative to other countries, like the U.S. and China, which had openly criticized the test
.
By this time, Beijing had become Moscow’s greatest rival, and the opportunity to undermine China, by
strengthening Indo-Soviet relations prevailed over the competing non-proliferation goals.

• Following the Pokhran test, the Soviets realized that if India became a nuclear power it could help balance the potential of as many as four nuclear powers, the United States, China, United Kingdom, and France. Further, strong Indo-Soviet relations could and greatly strengthen Soviet influence in the East. (Moscow agreed, in the late 1980’s, to the greatest nuclear deal ever between the
U.S.S.R. and India. The Soviets would construct two 1,000-MW light-water reactors and provide enriched uranium fuel for the reactors’ entire operational life, and twice offered to sell to New Delhi a nuclear power plant.)

• Soviet policy on India’s nuclear development emphasized the U.S.S.R.’s general non-proliferation goals, except when these goals were superseded by other geopolitical or regional policy concerns. Indian leaders also understood that nuclear weapons carried with them important political benefits. They believed that an Indian bomb could add to their influence in international forums.

[Amber G.]

For the record:

The text of telegrams: (Translation in English) from Balazs Szalontai paper: All from Hungarian National Archives..

Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 23 May
1974.

According to the opinion of Indian foreign policy experts, the Indian nuclear explosion might
make India draw closer to the Soviet Union, taking the anti-Indian attitude of the other
nuclear powers into consideration.
In their view, only the Soviet Union can be expected to support India in its nuclear test
explosions.

Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 23 May
1974.

On May 22, Trivedi, the secretary general of the F[oreign] M[inistry] received the departing
GDR ambassador, to whom he said that the Indian government was grateful to the socialist
countries because they did not confront India over the Indian nuclear explosion, though they
had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Comment:Szalontai
The socialist ambassadors of this place consulted with each other on the Indian nuclear
explosion, and concluded that it was appropriate on our part to adopt the position that having
taken notice of the fact, we expressed our trust in the official Indian declaration, according to
which the explosion served peaceful purposes (the communique published earlier this week).
According to our common evaluation, under the present circumstances the Indian nuclear
explosion might hinder Indian-American rapprochement and further aggravate
Indian-Chinese relations.

Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 31 May
1974.

According to the information I received from Congress Party circles, India’s foreign policy,
having settled the problem of the subcontinent, lays the main emphasis on reinforcing India’s
independence. This is also one of the principal objectives of the nuclear explosion. According
to what the informant said, India is “becoming more independent” from the Soviet Union, but
this does not mean that it will come dangerously close to the USA. India’s goal is to reinforce
its independence, achieve complete self-reliance, and assume a greater role in international
politics. At the same time, the government is going to restore internal order with a firm hand,
because the chaotic internal situation endangers the position of the government, damages the
potency of Indian foreign policy, and disturbs cooperation with other countries. Our
informant said that due to the disorderly internal situation, there were signs of distrust [of
India] in Western financial and economic circles. Besides preserving its independence, India
also strives for extensive international collaboration, and for the development of industrial
cooperation, in order to solve its economic problems. It makes use of credits and economic
aid, for which, however, it must create the necessary preconditions and generate trust by
stabilizing the internal situation.

Telegram, Permanent Mission of Hungary to the UN in Geneva to the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry, 14 August 1974.

A Soviet UN official in charge of disarmament issues said that India had informed the Soviet
Union in advance that it intended to explode a nuclear device. The Soviet Union applied
strong pressure to prevent that.
In the spring, however, the position of Indira Gandhi had been greatly weakened. Her fall and
a turn to the right became a real possibility. The execution of the nuclear explosion has
reinforced Indira Gandhi’s position, and attenuated her conflicts with the ultra-rightist
nationalist forces.
According to the Soviet evaluation, the Indian nuclear test poses danger from the perspective
of nuclear proliferation, but the fall of Indira Gandhi would have caused much more serious
harm. The nuclear test does not affect the military balance in Asia, and it will not relieve the
Soviet Union of the burden of facing China, not even in the long run. Its positive aspect is
that it lessens, or offsets, Beijing’s influence on the smaller states of the region and on the
developing countries in general.
From the perspective of the Soviet Union, a further advantage is that there is a certain change
in the situation and orientation of Pakistan.