Is it 'tax' the problem of international meddling ? Absolutely not. Pakistan took a conscious decision to live the way it lives - as a rentier state - at the time of Independence. The 3½ Friends mostly support and equip the armed forces.A_Gupta wrote:To free Pakistan of international meddling, Pakistan’s political leaders need only to subject themselves and their patronage networks to an agricultural and industrial tax, a move which Pakistan’s leadership has steadfastly avoided throughout the state’s entire history. Of course, it must improve income tax compliance too.
Managing Pakistan's failure
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Aren't the landed people in punjab etc, the very same people who sit in their parliament? How does Ms Fair then expect them to enforce strict tax compliance when it is the legislators themselves who are not paying taxes?
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
shiv wrote:In fact what I am saying is not as different as it may seem to you. The westernized Pakistani elite placed themselves inside Western nations as valuable and wealthy members of society who oiled deals for US and other Western businesses in massive and lucrative arms and infrastructure projects that had little impact on developing the population of Pakistan, which remained a feudal society. Islamic aid came with no strings - but it was money nevertheless and as long as the money flowed into western coffers via Pakistani orders and deals, private western businessmen, unhindered by governmental restrictions, were quite happy to toast and fete their Paki pals.
What businessmen? American arms have been paid for with American public funds. So were development projects by USAID, etc
The negotiations have been between American politicians and generals on one side, and Pakistani generals on the other. The Pakistanis demand A, B, & C weapons, and $X worth of support for their services, the USG offers a fraction of that that, the process repeats until eventually a bargain is reached.
This was not very different from the kind of bargaining process with the Chinese.
Secondly, Gulf money has not been free. The Saudis did not underwrite Pakistan's nuclear project out of goodwill, but out of a desire for their own proxy nuclear deterrent. Pakistan's growing reliance on Gulf money in the 1990s sharpened and intensified sectarian conflict with Pakistan, and damaged Pakistan's good relationship with revolutionary Iran.
In both the Gulf and Chinese cases economic aid is not limited to loans - they often involve investments by commercial interests owned by the government. The Chinese are interested in mining in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as transit trade and energy production.
North Korea and Iran (which bought its arms from the PRC, Russia and DPRK for the last 30 years) were certainly strong enough to be able to deter US military action.North Korea? Myanmar? Sudan? Look at Egypt, KSA, Iran, Pakistan as examples of US arms aid. Now put all seven countries together in one long list and see which ones strike you as being powerful and which ones as "irritants"
Sudan was able to deter through PRC and Arab-Islamic diplomatic support the considerable pressure of the Bush Administration to intervene directly in Darfur.
That is true on the question of financial aid to Pakistan, but not military aid.The history of US-Pakistan relations can be summed up as long periods of arms and monetary aid, and shorter periods when that aid was absent.
The US provided military aid for about half of Pakistan's post-partition history.
Until the 1990s - Chinese aid (aside from nukes) was a set of rust buckets. It certainly helped Pakistan - but China was only icing on the cake
....In this case you have chosen the time slice of "a decade of sanctions" and speak of the negative effects that the decade in question had. What this leaves out is that for at least the first 5 or 6 years of that decade - the old equipment supplied to Pakistan was perfectly serviceable and deadly and served to thwart India.
So equipment supplied by the US to Pakistan has served as both a threat and a deterrent to India for more than a decade after its supply despite the decade long gap in US support.
...The diplomatic support, and the fact that arms keep working well for decades after they are supplied do not show up on tables.
You seem to be suggesting that conventional weapons can deter the Indian government as much as nuclear weapons.
This is nonsense when you look at the pattern of GOI responses.
A decade of high levels of US military and economic aid did not deter India from retaliating with general war against Pakistani aggression in Kashmir in 1965. In that war the US declared itself neutral.
A high level of US political support in 1971 did not deter India from supporting the Bangladeshi separatist movement, or once again presenting Pakistan with general war
Yet India did not present Pakistan with general war in 1999 after the Kargil invasion, or after the Parliament Attacks of 2001, neither of which saw anything like the levels of US diplomatic support for Pakistan in 1971. Nor did VP Singh make good on his threats in April 1990.
India was not deterred by Pakistan before 1990. It is quite clear that the primary deterrent since then for the GOI has been nuclear weapons, not conventional .
In terms of diplomatic support, especially in terms of the United Nations, America is entirely replaceable. The PRC lest we forget has had a veto vote on the UNSC for the last 40 years, and most recently threatened to use it in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in order to shield the LeT.The diplomatic support and the support the Pakistanis got via western media cannot be displayed in tables. US media have dominated the world and that has made or broken reputations. Pakistan's reputation remained unsullied in a way that the Chinese would never have been able to manage and still cannot manage. China has a long way to go before it can influence the world the way America did. The impact of media in so called "free societies" cannot be accounted for using a bean counting technique. And Pakistan - despite deep flaws and unending conflict never stopped being a blue eyed boy in the west courtesy the media.
But there has been continuous diplomatic support for Pakistan and virtually no attempt to show up Pakistan as the dysfunctional state it has been for decades.
...If India had been an aggressor nation then these US actions could have some justification. But with Pakistan being the aggressor nation - lack of US opposition played a key role in Pakistani chutzpah.
In terms of positive media portrayals, its hardly as cut and dried as you claim, except during the Ayub era.
The pre-Ayub era was not particularly glowing - the Pakistan thread opens with a Time-Life article from 1951 ridiculing Jinnah and the Muslim League.
Pakistan got deservedly awful press during the 1971 war for its genocide in Bangladesh, and more awful press in the first three years of Zia's rule for hanging Bhutto and brining in Sharia.
The reporting of the 1980s were generally enormously supportive of the Afghans fighting the Soviets, but generally mixed on Pakistan. Hudood punishments, heroin trafficking, the nuclear programme and Zia's dictatorship generally featured in stories.
The 1990s had positive pieces on Benazir Bhutto personally, but Karachi's lawlessness, massive government corruption, drug smuggling, nuclear weapons and the expanding presence of extremists generally featured as well.
All of these trends only got worse in the 2000s after 9/11. Especially after Daniel Pearl.
Now if you want to talk about the way in which the *Pakistan Army*, or Kashmir were talked about, that's different. Before 9/11 The PA received much more positive coverage than Pakistan itself, except in 1971. That was not any sort of government policy, but rather the sheer amount of work the PA put in to projecting itself as the clean, orderly, and reasonable bulwark against the chaos that is the rest of Pakistan. Its important to point out that one of the most important reasons that the Western media bought the scam is because the vast majority of Pakistanis have bought it since 1947 and continue to buy it - Pakistanis who do not rely on Western media to tell them what to think.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Shiv, as far as the Pakistani Army is concerned - it depends on whether it thinks strategically or tactically. If it forces the politicians to put Pakistan's finances in order by raising taxes and tax compliance, in the long run, it will be in a stronger position.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
No Arun. It requires a really powerful clique in the army who realise that they have to make themselves weaker as an army to make their country more powerful. It is not going to happen.A_Gupta wrote:Shiv, as far as the Pakistani Army is concerned - it depends on whether it thinks strategically or tactically. If it forces the politicians to put Pakistan's finances in order by raising taxes and tax compliance, in the long run, it will be in a stronger position.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
These claims are laughable. The question is not how India reacted but how US behaved. On both occasions US staunchly supported Pakistan. In 1971 US was willing to even send its aircraft carrier group against India. US support to India is primarily business starting after PVNR and MMS's liberalization policies. US was again ready to help Pakistan (due to WOT of course) after 2001 parliment attack although it outwardly appeared neutralA decade of high levels of US military and economic aid did not deter India from retaliating with general war against Pakistani aggression in Kashmir in 1965. In that war the US declared itself neutral.
A high level of US political support in 1971 did not deter India from supporting the Bangladeshi separatist movement, or once again presenting Pakistan with general war
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
I put it to you that you are concocting this to make a point. Apart from the fact that I am certain you are not privy to how these deals are done, I would like to point out that Sajad Haider in his autobiography has named wealthy Pakistan middlemen who were important dealers in the 1960s and in the Zia era.Johann wrote: What businessmen? American arms have been paid for with American public funds. So were development projects by USAID, etc
The negotiations have been between American politicians and generals on one side, and Pakistani generals on the other. The Pakistanis demand A, B, & C weapons, and $X worth of support for their services, the USG offers a fraction of that that, the process repeats until eventually a bargain is reached.
This was not very different from the kind of bargaining process with the Chinese.
I am afraid your post, if taken seriously would make people think that arms deals are like buying a load of onions - except that the deal is done at an intergovernmental level. However "arms deals" are for multiple systems. An aircraft comes along with a large number of ancillary systems and weapons choices often supplied by private third parties - and this is where the middlemen come in. Haider in his autobiography mentions "Manaah" Rehman a middlemen who oiled the sale of Hispano-Suiza rockets to the PAF for F-86 Sabres in the 1960s and he mentions several other arms deals struck via middlemen using kickbacks.
I believe you are taking a naive and innocent view of things.
India was not deterred? Well India did not fight any wars with Pakistan from 1971 to 1999. You are saying on the one hand that the US was deterred by Korea but India was not deterred by Pakistan. Neither the US nor India fought any wars so how come one nation was "deterred" and the other was not. That is rubbish. India was as deterred by Pakistan as the US was by Korea. Remember that Korea had Chinese help. Pakistan had US and Chinese help. Removing that US help would be a good idea. That is all I am saying and I am not sure why you are so insistent on proving the US's malevolent actions vis a vis Pakistan as benign innocence by extended arguments.Johann wrote:North Korea and Iran (which bought its arms from the PRC, Russia and DPRK for the last 30 years) were certainly strong enough to be able to deter US military action.
<snip>
Johann wrote:India was not deterred by Pakistan before 1990. It is quite clear that the primary deterrent since then for the GOI has been nuclear weapons, not conventional .
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
^^^ So that past actions do not influence future relations between India and the US.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
From Dennis Kux's book titled "The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies"Johann wrote: Have you actually looked at the table of year by year military assistance to Pakistan 1965-80?
Have you looked at the weapon systems that were inducted in to the Pakistani armed forces in that period?
They were not American, but rather Chinese and French.
This is during Jimmy Carter's term
Page 231
In talking with Aziz Ahmed, Vance denied that the United States was trying to oust Bhutto and speculated that the charges might be the result of an anti-US "disinformation" campaign. Adopting his usual gentlemanly approach, Vance expressed a desire for friendlier bilateral relations, saying, "We should try to put the past behind us." Aziz Ahmed agreed and stated that he would explore ways to dampen the anti-US atmosphere when he returned home. In line with Vance's accommodating stance, the United States continued to provide arms to Pakistan-- the secretary characterized the tear gas episode as a "special case". Ironically, on April 28, 1977, the very day that Bhutto had blasted America for "colossal" interference, the U.S. Navy transferred two destroyers to Pakistan under a long-term loan arrangement.
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In line with its policy to de-emphasize arms transfer to the developing world, the Carter administration withdrew the offer of 110 A-7 attack aircraft that had remained on the table when Gerald Ford departed the White House.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Carter did make a better offer. He reversed his position on F-16s and offered them to Zia (see page 254 of Kux's book.)Johann wrote:
Why do you think Zia had the confidence to dismiss Jimmy Carter's initial $400m aid offer as 'peanuts' in February 1980? Carter did not make a better offer, but Reagan did.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
From Dennis Kux's book, page 172-173Johann wrote: Have you actually looked at the table of year by year military assistance to Pakistan 1965-80?
Have you looked at the weapon systems that were inducted in to the Pakistani armed forces in that period?
They were not American, but rather Chinese and French.
In March 1966, Johnson approved a modest easing of the arms embargo to permit Pakistan to obtain "nonlethal" equipment.
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Soon after arriving in Pakistan,the new ambassador became embroiled in a heated debate over arms policy with Chester Bowles, whom Johnson had retained as US envoy to India. At dispute was whether to provide Pakistan with $8 million worth of spare parts for lethal equipment.
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Consideration of the issue of South Asia arms policy dragged on for nearly a year, until April 1967. Johnson had finally decided that the United States would sell spare parts for previously supplied US equipment but would not provide financial credits or grant military assistance.
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On December 22, 1967, the president met Ayub briefly at Karachi airport en route home from a trip to Vietnam. In addition to agreeing to help Pakistan with additional supplies of vegetable oil and wheat, Johnson said that he would explore the possibility of replacing aging World War II-vintage Sherman tanks with more modern Patton tanks.
During the remainder of Johnson's term in the White House, according to James Spain, then in charge of Pakistan at State Department, US officials scoured the globe trying to locate tanks that could be transferred to Pakistan, since the arms policy ruled out sending them from the United States. At first, Belgium, Italy, and Germany were ready to oblige, but were pulled back mainly for domestic political reasons. Turkey was possible source, but it expected to receive more in return than Washington was willing to provide. In the end, the search for the tanks proved fruitless.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
*sigh* onlee. An ironic example.Johann wrote:
Yes, Shiv, maintenance and availability is important, which is why I asked you to look back at the readiness of the American platforms PAF and PN during the Kargil War in 1999 and Parakram in 2001-02 after a decade of sanctions. The list of post 9-11 deliveries and sales to Pakistan (which I posted in the mil forum a while back) had spares at the top of their list.
If India had for example had itself struck, or allowed the Israelis to strike Kahuta from IAF bases like Jamnagar as as had been considered, what would have been the best that the Pakistanis could have thrown up 1979-83? Ageing Sabres? Or would it have been Mirages and Crotales?
As far as Kahuta is concerned, we don't need to worry about the state of Paki military. The US Govt warned India that "The US will be responsive" if India attacks Kahuta. So we don't need to think about "ageing Sabres".
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
The issue of middlemen has come up in the discussion. While deals may be inter-governmental, these governments (on both sides
) consist of individuals acting on behalf of the state. Nevertheless, they often have personal objectives and desires and compulsions, quite apart from their state mandated role. It is not unusual for such individuals to bring in close friends, family members, long-time associates, etc into various intermediary roles in the purchase of weapons systems. It is not uncommon, for instance, for there to be competing groups within the same government influenced by competing companies from the other. Besides, it is not just a matter of placing the order, things can be delayed, things can be put "on hold", there are various other ways in which influence can be deployed. And this is where "middlemen" come in. One exhibit is Amer Lodhi, brother of Maleeha Lodhi. Of course, he is certainly not the only one. Just one of the better known ones.

Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Good read.
Peace process with Pakistan
On The Spot
By Tavleen Singh
http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/11feb11/edit.htm#3
Peace process with Pakistan
On The Spot
By Tavleen Singh
http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/11feb11/edit.htm#3
...
Meanwhile, what we like to think of as 'civil society' in our neighbouring Islamic republic has shrunk to a frighteningly small collecting of frightened people. In Davos this time I met many old Pakistani friends and, inevitably, we talked mostly about the change that has overcome their country. They were defensive. The daughter of an old friend who was in Davos as a TV reporter said that she worked for an Urdu channel and that whenever she expressed her 'liberal' analysis of a particular event she noticed that the TRPs were good. An old army man, who had once been close to General Pervez Musharraf, said that he did not think it was possible to understand what was happening in Pakistan from the safety of India. Yet another friend blamed the Americans for everything that had gone wrong. He said that if the Americans left Afghanistan he had no doubt at all that Pakistan would go back to being that happy, optimistic country that I had seen when I first took that short flight from Delhi to Lahore on a balmy evening in 1980.
It made me sad to listen to my friends because it confirmed that the people who could make a difference and help retrieve Pakistan from the brink of Islamist hell remain in denial about what has happened to their country.
I first noticed this in the summer of 2001 when I went to Lahore and Karachi to do a series of stories for Aaj Tak called 'Safarnama'. My going was a last minute decision on the part of Aroon Purie. The Pakistani government was being stingy with visas because General Musharraf was coming to Agra to talk to Prime Minister Vajpayee and they did not want any adverse advance publicity. It happened that I already had a visa to attend a friend's daughter's wedding and so it was decided that I should go.
There was no time to make hotel reservations so I stayed in Lahore with a friend and used a Pakistani television crew because there was no time to bring an Indian one. All day I wandered about the streets of Lahore with my Pakistani crew interviewing ordinary people and everywhere I went, including in some neighbouring villages, I met people who spoke the language of radical Islam. They objected to my not covering my head, to my working with strange men and to my wearing a sleeveless kameeze. It was mostly women who berated me for not 'respecting Pakistani culture' and the rules that had been made for Muslims by the Prophet of Islam. In Lahore's most famous 'nihari' restaurant I got into an argument with the owner, whose family were migrants from Delhi, because he said that television was forbidden in the Koran. When I asked him how this could be possible since television did not exist in the time of the Prophet he said, 'The Koran forbids the creation of images of human beings. Only Allah has this right.' When I came home in the evenings and told my friends the stories I had heard they did not believe them.
Since then whenever I have met them in Delhi or London or Davos I have noticed their determination not to acknowledge that their country was changing beyond recognition. And, that it was changing because of Islam. All the institutions of government including the police, the army, the judiciary, legislature and the executive are now manned by people born long after 1947. They believe that if Pakistan was created in the name of Islam then Islam has to be the solution to all their problems. They have been bred in schools that have taught them to hate India, to think of Hindus as evil and sly and to believe that there can never be peace between their 'land of the pure' and our land of happy infidels. The hostility against India runs deep and manifests itself in the violence of the jehadi groups that attack us on a daily basis online verbally and in more violent ways in real life.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
US Assistance to Pakistan during Nixon years
From Kux's book (page 178-214)
From Kux's book (page 178-214)
In keeping with the "somewhat warmer tone toward Pakistan", Nixon decided to make a gesture in the area of arms supply. Recognizing that any loosening of the ban on transfers of lethal weapons would disturb the Indians, the bureaucracy pondered for nearly a year over what the gesture would contain and how the package would be presented. It was not until shortly after October 25, 1970, when Yahya was scheduled to attend a White House dinner celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, that the U.S. government made up its collective mind. The decision, announced on October 8, 1970, was for a "one-time exception" to permit Pakistan to procure about $50 million worth of replacement aircraft and some three hundred armored personnel carriers.
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In the United States, public attention turned to the Pakistan army's use of U.S.-supplied military equipment in the suppression of the Bengalis. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously for an immediate and complete cutoff of arms transfers. Revelations that the U.S. government had been selling ammunition to Pakistan as a "non-lethal" item provided further embarrassment. Even though the White House tightly controlled foreign policy, Kissinger and his National Security Council (NSC) staff could not manage all the details. After the White House failed to respond to a recommendation to suspend arms exports to Pakistan as a way to allay critics, the State Department went ahead to impose what it thought was a complete ban.
The press revelations in June 1971 that arms exports to Pakistan were, in fact, continuing provided fresh embarrassment.
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When the State Department suspended issuance of export licences, it did not realize that the Pentagon was continuing to allow the Pakistanis to ship out of the country equipment that they had taken custody of under earlier licenses.
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Although barred by law from providing military help to Pakistan or permitting other countries to give American equipment, Kissinger told Hua that the administration had told Jordan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia and would tell Turkey that Washington would "protest" but would "understand" their sending military help to Pakistan.
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Less-controversial economic aid was quickly resumed. A $30 million commodity aid agreement was signed on March 18, 1972. Three months later, Charge d'Affairs Sober announced $60 million in long-term loans for industrial raw materials and spare parts and the full resumption of economic assistance.
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But in March 1973, he [Bhutto] felt better after Nixon released $24 million worth of military equipment blocked since 1971 and reinstated the 1967 arms-supply policy. This action enabled Pakistan to procure nonlethal equipment and spare parts for weapons that the United States previously had supplied.
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..the Nixon administration agreed to provide Pakistan with one-hundred thousand tons of wheat worth $24 million, to grant an $18 million AID loan, and to seek a further $40-50 million rehabilitation loan, in addition to providing other food commodities.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Abhishek-sharma, you are really taking a lot of pain to transcribe from Kux's book, unless you have an OCR. That book is a treasure trove of information. On military assistance, it should be read along with 'Crossed Swords'.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Shiv,shiv wrote: I put it to you that you are concocting this to make a point. Apart from the fact that I am certain you are not privy to how these deals are done, I would like to point out that Sajad Haider in his autobiography has named wealthy Pakistan middlemen who were important dealers in the 1960s and in the Zia era.
I am afraid your post, if taken seriously would make people think that arms deals are like buying a load of onions - except that the deal is done at an intergovernmental level. However "arms deals" are for multiple systems. An aircraft comes along with a large number of ancillary systems and weapons choices often supplied by private third parties - and this is where the middlemen come in. Haider in his autobiography mentions "Manaah" Rehman a middlemen who oiled the sale of Hispano-Suiza rockets to the PAF for F-86 Sabres in the 1960s and he mentions several other arms deals struck via middlemen using kickbacks.
I believe you are taking a naive and innocent view of things.
There is absolutely enormous corruption in the Pakistani arms procurement business - but that is in the deals where Pakistan is the one actually paying cash and buying from someone other than the United States. In other words, usually the Europeans.
FMS credits are paid from US government funds, procured by the US Congress, and paid to *American* companies. The only country I am aware of that gets an exemption is Israel.
Even in those cases where the Pakistanis might have some say in the sub-systems or support systems chosen, that is a stage that comes years in to the military aid and procurement process.
The first step is always protracted negotiations between the two governments about just how much the Americans are willing to pay for, and what kinds of weapon systems they are willing to supply which is then turned in to an inter-governmental agreement. After that the US notifies Congress about the specific weapon systems and support services the Pakistanis are interested in - this is a matter of public record. The next step is Congressional appropriations to actually fund the purchases. Once those funds reach the USG, the DoD (NOT the Pakistanis) initiates procurement through *its own channels*, the same as those used for domestic purchases.
Congress is often especially willing to pay for weapon systems, either for US forces or for foreign military aid recipients if it means keeping factory lines open in their constituencies. Losing jobs means losing votes, and whether its domestic or foreign sales, and US arms companies do lobby US politicians hard - but this is basically a domestic American process.
It is only when there is the prospect of *commercial* military sales, i.e. where Pakistan is paying, that US companies get busy lobbying the Pakistani government directly. You see this in periods when sanctions are not in place but the Pakistanis still want to buy from the French.
India was not deterred? Well India did not fight any wars with Pakistan from 1971 to 1999. You are saying on the one hand that the US was deterred by Korea but India was not deterred by Pakistan. Neither the US nor India fought any wars so how come one nation was "deterred" and the other was not. That is rubbish. India was as deterred by Pakistan as the US was by Korea. Remember that Korea had Chinese help. Pakistan had US and Chinese help.
How many wars have India and Pakistan fought, and how many wars have the US and North Korea fought? That should tell us how much deterrence was in play in the two different theatres.
There's no question that India's behaviour towards Pakistan has changed since 1990 - provocations that would have, and did produce general war between the two countries no longer do so. Before 1990 there is no question that Kargil would have produced offensive action across both the LOC and IB.
There are no shortage of people who have served in the Indian government in military and civil positions who will endorse that - in fact that was what the whole Cold Start doctrine was supposed to circumvent.
India was at a disadvantage in terms of conventional military technology in 1965 thanks to the US, and that made no difference to Shastri's willingness to make a drive for Lahore, which Ayub Khan and Bhutto assumed the Indians would never dare. You of all people must recall Indian pride in the fact that Pakistan's boasts about technological and training superiority were shown up.
India is fighting for its own territory, and for the lives of its citizens. Pakistan is also fighting for territory and the survival of its legitimating ideology.
America is a superpower attempting to uphold a global order. The Korean War cost the Democratic Party the 1952 elections, and was a grinding bloody war that left many scars. US policy from 1952 until North Korean nuclearisation was to deter North Korean invasion, and they did that through nuclear weapons to make up for numerical disadvantage. North Korea deterred the US through a massive standing conventional army always poised for the attack.
After the end of the Cold War North Korea's decaying army has also come to rely primarily on nuclear weapons for deterrence. China's support to North Korea is just enough to keep it alive to exercise that deterrence, and keep the regime in power against internal threats. The PRC and DPRK do not like or trust each other, and neither really controls the other, but that changes nothing. No external pressure has been sufficient to persuade the Chinese to stop propping up the regime.
This is the grim reality, and it is a lesson in the Pakistani context.
Shiv, once again, this is not about innocence or blame, or any of that sort of circular, emotional stuff.Removing that US help would be a good idea. That is all I am saying and I am not sure why you are so insistent on proving the US's malevolent actions vis a vis Pakistan as benign innocence by extended arguments.
I personally think that US military aid to Pakistan has generally been a bad idea that has produced a lot of terrible effects. I've said that many times here, and I'm surprised that you don't seem to remember that.
Pakistan's relationship with the US is facing growing strains, and its unlikely to last forever. Pakistan as a state has long lost its monopoly of violence within its borders, and faces enormous strains as its population grows and poor governance means that its carrying capacity struggles to keep up
However, none of that changes hard facts of nuclear deterrence, or the nature of the Pakistani (especially Pakjabi) public's relationship with their Army, or the consistently strong ties between Pakistan and an increasingly sophisticated and wealthy PRC (with its UNSC veto) on the one hand, and a paranoid, extremist-prone, oil rich Gulf on the other.
Painting American military aid as the necessary and sufficient cause of Pakistani strength and and belligerence in the past, present and future is to build a fundamentally unrealistic picture. There is no one silver bullet that will kill the PA.
The critical relationship is not between the PA and the Americans (although that is an enabling one), but between the PA and the majority of the Pakistani public. As long as that is intact, the PA will be free to manouvre to find the money it needs - if necessary through extortion.
As I said earlier Pakistan's capacity to extort from India, like North Korea's ability to extort from the South and from the Americans is something that they will increasingly rely on, especially as the wealth gap between India and Pakistan continues to grow.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Extortion is a game that can be played at many levels. TSPA would extort from India, India will pay something. The Taliban would extort from Pakistan Army and the Pakistan Army would have to cough up something. And India can provide all the arms Taliban need to extort from Pakistan Army. In all this, Pakistani Army's strength to keep on extorting would steadily decrease, because it is impossible to live off extortion forever.Johann wrote:As I said earlier Pakistan's capacity to extort from India, like North Korea's ability to extort from the South and from the Americans is something that they will increasingly rely on, especially as the wealth gap between India and Pakistan continues to grow.
There are going to be so many parties in Pakistan that India would always have the money to make any party pay up, not just in money, but also in blood, that dares to blackmail India.
It is not as if Pakistani Army would keep on extorting and India would not be doing something to bring the TSPA down through sub-conventional means. There would be more than enough Pakistanis willing to rip off the skin of the Pakistani Army to feed themselves.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Yes, the US and China have been malevolent. But the law of nature is that weakness inevitably invites aggressors. Our time might be spent more fruitfully asking why most Indian leaders have been so diffident about protecting India (see K Subrahmanyam interview at http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 7#p1027657).shiv wrote: India was not deterred? Well India did not fight any wars with Pakistan from 1971 to 1999. You are saying on the one hand that the US was deterred by Korea but India was not deterred by Pakistan. Neither the US nor India fought any wars so how come one nation was "deterred" and the other was not. That is rubbish. India was as deterred by Pakistan as the US was by Korea. Remember that Korea had Chinese help. Pakistan had US and Chinese help. Removing that US help would be a good idea. That is all I am saying and I am not sure why you are so insistent on proving the US's malevolent actions vis a vis Pakistan as benign innocence by extended arguments.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
As an argument, this is the height of sophistry. It was the US that chose to send its forces to Korea and it was Pakistan that always attacked India. The US was not deterred by Korea and Pakistan, well armed by the US, was not deterred by India. You might choose to equate India and the US but you are only bluffing yourself.Johann wrote: How many wars have India and Pakistan fought, and how many wars have the US and North Korea fought? That should tell us how much deterrence was in play in the two different theaters.
You must be joking. If the relationship is so strained how come the US is still supplying arms and money to Pakistan?Johann wrote:Pakistan's relationship with the US is facing growing strains, and its unlikely to last forever. Pakistan as a state has long lost its monopoly of violence within its borders, and faces enormous strains as its population grows and poor governance means that its carrying capacity struggles to keep up
"necessary and sufficient" are obfuscatory words you have used. "Needless aggravation with intent to harm nations and entities other than the US and its ally Pakistan" is the true nature of US arms supply to Pakistan. It must end.Johann wrote:However, none of that changes hard facts of nuclear deterrence, or the nature of the Pakistani (especially Pakjabi) public's relationship with their Army, or the consistently strong ties between Pakistan and an increasingly sophisticated and wealthy PRC (with its UNSC veto) on the one hand, and a paranoid, extremist-prone, oil rich Gulf on the other.
Painting American military aid as the necessary and sufficient cause of Pakistani strength and and belligerence in the past, present and future is to build a fundamentally unrealistic picture. There is no one silver bullet that will kill the PA.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Shiv,shiv wrote:It was the US that chose to send its forces to Korea and it was Pakistan that always attacked India. The US was not deterred by Korea and Pakistan, well armed by the US, was not deterred by India. You might choose to equate India and the US but you are only bluffing yourself.
You may be feeling the power of righteous indignation on your side, but are you sure you are actually reading anf thinking rather than just reacting?
Wasn't my post about the ways the fact that the role US and North Korea is very different from India and Pakistan?
As for the Americans and South Koreans not being deterred by North Korea, perhaps you'd like to tell me why the US did not treat North Korea like North Vietnam after 1953, or why despite the Axis of Evil rhetoric North Korea has received not even a fraction of the threats that have been showered on Iran.
In 1965 the Pakistanis attacked Kashmir in part over fear that India was going to nuclearise soon (based on things like Homi Bhaba's AIR interview in 1964 following the first Chinese test, the inauguration of the reprocessing plant at Trombay, etc) and that their perceived conventional military edge would disappear forever.
India chose to liberate Bangladesh in 1971 when the genocide began, well before December, and was fully prepared for a general war with Pakistan over its support to the Mukti Bhaini.
Pakistan in 1999 on the other hand did not dare escalate to general war. Neither India nor Pakistan were prepared to embark on general war in 1999 over Kargil. I wonder why....
The bottom line is that nuclear weapons change things between states.
Was it normal for the US-Pakistani alliance before 2001 to include threats of 'bombing in to the stone age', or to have members of each others security services shooting each other?Shiv wrote:You must be joking. If the relationship is so strained how come the US is still supplying arms and money to Pakistan?
Was it normal for both countries to attack against each other's forces in the field?
Is it normal that in the last two years the US has shifted 50% of its Afghan logistics from Pakistan to the former Soviet Union because of the intensification of attacks on NATO supplies?
The inherent conflicts between US and Pakistani interests, especially over Afghanistan have been growing steadily more intense. Aid is about the only thing that keeps the relationship alive.
Perhaps the differences will blow over - but the reality is that it will only blow over the day that America loses its interest in the region, or Pakistan changes for the better.
The differences will continue to intensify, and they will go beyond the point that American aid, even increased American aid can smooth over.
Why? Because Pakistan is dominated by the Army, and beyond that a narrow security mindset, and has been prepared to go to self-destructive lengths for Kashmir and Afghanistan right from the beginning.
Shiv its perfectly simple English, a language that you have at least as much command over as I do.Shiv wrote:"necessary and sufficient" are obfuscatory words you have used. "Needless aggravation with intent to harm nations and entities other than the US and its ally Pakistan" is the true nature of US arms supply to Pakistan. It must end.Johann wrote:However, none of that changes hard facts of nuclear deterrence, or the nature of the Pakistani (especially Pakjabi) public's relationship with their Army, or the consistently strong ties between Pakistan and an increasingly sophisticated and wealthy PRC (with its UNSC veto) on the one hand, and a paranoid, extremist-prone, oil rich Gulf on the other.
Painting American military aid as the necessary and sufficient cause of Pakistani strength and and belligerence in the past, present and future is to build a fundamentally unrealistic picture. There is no one silver bullet that will kill the PA.
Still, I'll put it in even simpler words just to be helpful;
Of course American military aid should end - but its end will change very little about the threat that Pakistan represents.
As long as the PA retains its ideology, its domestic popularity, its nuclear weapons and its regional friends it will continue to be a menace to everyone whether in India or the West.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Johann this is called astrology. You are making a prediction about a situation that has not yet arisen - that is the end of US arms aid to Pakistan. Your claim is that not a lot will change. You cannot know that and you choose to repeat that argument. US arms aid must end. And it must stay that way for over a decade before any changes can occur. That has never been the case. Until that happens your statement remains idle speculation based on your personal impression.Johann wrote:
Of course American military aid should end - but its end will change very little about the threat that Pakistan represents.
This has been the fundamental difference between your viewpoint and mine from the beginning.
That still does not explain why the US supplies lethal arms and nuclear weapons delivery platforms to Pakistan. Having known that F-16s were modified to deliver nuclear weapons by Pakistan. the US now finds an excuse to give Pakistan more F-16s. So what "things" have changed between the US and Pakistan?Johann wrote:The bottom line is that nuclear weapons change things between states.
Other than the fact that the US speaks with a forked tongue and you seem to subscribe to that viewpoint - we still have a US that is arming Pakistan with weapons for use against India including nuclear weapons delivery platforms. Everything else is fluff - like the hilarious Raymond/Redmond Davis saga.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Well,I am a liliput in front of Shiv Saar.
It is obvious to everyone that US is the successor of Britain in Indo-Pak relations.India is an ancient civilisation seeking to modernise in its terms.In American and British eyes,we are SDREs who got uppity.Who dare to design LCAs,Tejas etc.While Pakistan is the obedient lapdog.In Anglo-American eyes,India is an 'artificial' cunning alliance,seeking to change Wesrern domination.Paki elites are challenging Hindu revival.
It is not Amirkhans fault that we cannot convince musalmans in Cashmere.If I were a amirkhan,i would do everything to cripple India and magnify her faults,while denying or downplaying the genocide by pakis in East Bengal,Baluchistan or Baltistan or even in KP or Afghanisthan.
It is simple realpolitik.But in an increasingly 'grey' world,the West are no longer sure of their 'superiority' nor are the SDREs so docile or weak as the West liked to believe and portray.
It is the Anglo-American who have caused the greatest damage or who enabled China to do the dirty work they couldn't do.While China is a continuing threat,American threat has not ended.It still persists.
Politics is all about self-interest.We can only whine to some degree but atleast it is not out of place in an Indian forum.But it is 'odd' when someone in a very 'innocent' tone protests too much about the non-malignance of the benefactors of our sworn enemies,who were in the first place created by Anglo-Americans and continually sustained by them.
It is obvious to everyone that US is the successor of Britain in Indo-Pak relations.India is an ancient civilisation seeking to modernise in its terms.In American and British eyes,we are SDREs who got uppity.Who dare to design LCAs,Tejas etc.While Pakistan is the obedient lapdog.In Anglo-American eyes,India is an 'artificial' cunning alliance,seeking to change Wesrern domination.Paki elites are challenging Hindu revival.
It is not Amirkhans fault that we cannot convince musalmans in Cashmere.If I were a amirkhan,i would do everything to cripple India and magnify her faults,while denying or downplaying the genocide by pakis in East Bengal,Baluchistan or Baltistan or even in KP or Afghanisthan.
It is simple realpolitik.But in an increasingly 'grey' world,the West are no longer sure of their 'superiority' nor are the SDREs so docile or weak as the West liked to believe and portray.
It is the Anglo-American who have caused the greatest damage or who enabled China to do the dirty work they couldn't do.While China is a continuing threat,American threat has not ended.It still persists.
Politics is all about self-interest.We can only whine to some degree but atleast it is not out of place in an Indian forum.But it is 'odd' when someone in a very 'innocent' tone protests too much about the non-malignance of the benefactors of our sworn enemies,who were in the first place created by Anglo-Americans and continually sustained by them.
Last edited by svenkat on 14 Feb 2011 22:45, edited 2 times in total.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Well Shiv, I am afraid that your argument that anything more than a decade of US military sanctions will produce a sufficient weakening of the PA and of Pakistan is at least as much of an act of soothsaying, if not more.shiv wrote:Johann this is called astrology. You are making a prediction about a situation that has not yet arisen - that is the end of US arms aid to Pakistan. Your claim is that not a lot will change. You cannot know that and you choose to repeat that argument. US arms aid must end. And it must stay that way for over a decade before any changes can occur. That has never been the case. Until that happens your statement remains idle speculation based on your personal impression.
This has been the fundamental difference between your viewpoint and mine from the beginning.
I'm not sure that the Taliban is being armed by the ISI to kill American soldiers while the Americans shoot ISI men on the streets of Pakistan can be so easily dismissed as fluff. Few people, certainly not you or I dreamed of this in 1985 when Zia and Reagan were standing shoulder to shoulder.Shiv wrote:That still does not explain why the US supplies lethal arms and nuclear weapons delivery platforms to Pakistan. Having known that F-16s were modified to deliver nuclear weapons by Pakistan. the US now finds an excuse to give Pakistan more F-16s. So what "things" have changed between the US and Pakistan?Johann wrote:The bottom line is that nuclear weapons change things between states.
Other than the fact that the US speaks with a forked tongue and you seem to subscribe to that viewpoint - we still have a US that is arming Pakistan with weapons for use against India including nuclear weapons delivery platforms. Everything else is fluff - like the hilarious Raymond/Redmond Davis saga.
In any case, while I'd certainly agree that Pakistan never should have received F-16s, the Pakistanis have never put all their eggs in the Yankee basket. The Chinese A-5 which replaced their severely reduced B-57 Martins in 1983 (the same year the first F-16s were delivered) was designed by the Chinese to deliver both nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and has actually delivered live nuclear weapons in tests at Lop Nur.
The Pakistanis test of their Ghauri/Nodong ballistic missile in April 1998 has been described as a key factor in the GoI's decision to proceed with the Shakti tests, because for the first time the Pakistanis could credibly reach Delhi with a nuclear weapon.
American toys are shinier, but the Chinese and North Korean relationships still provide the Pakistani military with what it needs. North Korea has no F-16s, and US ABM defences are some of the most sophisticated in the world, but that hasn't seriously dented North Korea's nuclear deterrent capacity.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Add to that that the TSP-PRC relationship has been much more stable and smooth than the US-TSP relationship. Their core interests, their world-view and their barbaric treatment of people within borders matches perfectly. Most importantly, they are far far closer in how they view India. They both view India with intensely hateful eyes and would like nothing better to see India totally and irreverably destroyed. (The Amir Khans, on the other hand, are pursing the balance of power strategy, not a strategy of erasure of India.)
Both the TSP and PRC have territorial disputes with India, and both occupy huge chunks of Indian territory in J&K. We have gone to active war with both. Their confluence of core/fundamental interests is far more scary than any other relationship fo TSP. The PRC-TSP relationship has criminality taking it to the highest possible level.
If it has appears to us that the PRC angle is smaller or weaker, it is not because of PRC will, but its capability. In every war since 1965, PRC has flexed muscles on our borders, threatening full-scale war. In 1971, Maneckshaw had to time the war so that mountain passes with PRC are clogged (severly berating Gen. Jacobs, when he "borrowed" some mountain divisions for some urgent missionF.)
The nuclearizaton of TSP might have occured because the amir khani looking the other way, but it was PRC which donated that capability to them.
Both the TSP and PRC have territorial disputes with India, and both occupy huge chunks of Indian territory in J&K. We have gone to active war with both. Their confluence of core/fundamental interests is far more scary than any other relationship fo TSP. The PRC-TSP relationship has criminality taking it to the highest possible level.
If it has appears to us that the PRC angle is smaller or weaker, it is not because of PRC will, but its capability. In every war since 1965, PRC has flexed muscles on our borders, threatening full-scale war. In 1971, Maneckshaw had to time the war so that mountain passes with PRC are clogged (severly berating Gen. Jacobs, when he "borrowed" some mountain divisions for some urgent missionF.)
The nuclearizaton of TSP might have occured because the amir khani looking the other way, but it was PRC which donated that capability to them.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
I guess Lal masjid episode is forgotten.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
^^ Was just about to post that. Got to it before me!
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
US and Pakistani interests are at fundamental cross purposes over Afghanistan and FATA, and those differences have sharpened since August 1998 as the stakes have risen.
Where are PRC and TSP national interests at fundamental cross purposes? The PA, and I include the Hamid Gul types here have never seemed anything other than grateful towards the PRC in the last 48 years.
Perhaps one day like America, the Chinese will quarrel over Afghanistan and FATA (or perhaps more likely Kashmir), or even Baluchistan, but there's been no hint of it yet.
If the Pakiban (not the JI or any of the other Islam-pasand parties) took over Pakistan things would change with the PRC. Of course the other game changer is if the Chinese government were to undergo some kind of transformation away from the CPC, their perceptions of India might change as well.
Where are PRC and TSP national interests at fundamental cross purposes? The PA, and I include the Hamid Gul types here have never seemed anything other than grateful towards the PRC in the last 48 years.
Perhaps one day like America, the Chinese will quarrel over Afghanistan and FATA (or perhaps more likely Kashmir), or even Baluchistan, but there's been no hint of it yet.
If the Pakiban (not the JI or any of the other Islam-pasand parties) took over Pakistan things would change with the PRC. Of course the other game changer is if the Chinese government were to undergo some kind of transformation away from the CPC, their perceptions of India might change as well.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
That is a diversion from the issue. No matter what the current status of Pakistan China relations might be, the current state of US-Pakistan relations is not as bad as I would like them to be. Getting that out of the way would create a dynamic that has never existed for the last 50 years - a situation in which the US is not overtly and covertly supporting the Pakistani elite and armed forces.Johann wrote: Where are PRC and TSP national interests at fundamental cross purposes? The PA, and I include the Hamid Gul types here have never seemed anything other than grateful towards the PRC in the last 48 years.
Pakistan-China relations are an issue that needs to be addressed in its own right rather than obfuscating the issue by conflating them and imagining that Pakistan-China relations are an exact clone of Pakistan-US relations and that one can replace the other with no noticeable difference.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
More realistic to expect democratic transformation in Iran - giving US an alternative supply route to afpak,Johann wrote: Of course the other game changer is if the Chinese government were to undergo some kind of transformation away from the CPC, their perceptions of India might change as well.
and allowing it to give a cold shoulder to Kayani. That'll pull the plug from Pakistani churlishness, close the
tap on Kerry-Lougar doles.
From today's news, Hillary-ji is already making the right noises.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
The Pakistani elite and army have served America as faithful servants for years and the US has reciprocated by keeping alive their raison d'etre - enmity with India.
In my personal view, if Pakistan did not have a powerful military, areas of Baluchistan and NWFP/FATA would slip further out of Pakistani control. These areas were kept in a state that could be described as "Pakistani control" - but have slipped out somewhat. The US is buttressing the Pakistani military to save the nation state of Pakistan.
Now tell me folks, which one of you on here wants to save the nation state of Pakistan? Support for the US view necessarily means support for the Pakistani army to bring its fissiparous people and outlying districts under control. If the Pakistani army was weaker, the fractious tribes of Pakistan would get a leg up. Why must we see the US's viewpoint and not "put off" the US? I believe too many people are failing to se the trees for the forest.
In my personal view, if Pakistan did not have a powerful military, areas of Baluchistan and NWFP/FATA would slip further out of Pakistani control. These areas were kept in a state that could be described as "Pakistani control" - but have slipped out somewhat. The US is buttressing the Pakistani military to save the nation state of Pakistan.
Now tell me folks, which one of you on here wants to save the nation state of Pakistan? Support for the US view necessarily means support for the Pakistani army to bring its fissiparous people and outlying districts under control. If the Pakistani army was weaker, the fractious tribes of Pakistan would get a leg up. Why must we see the US's viewpoint and not "put off" the US? I believe too many people are failing to se the trees for the forest.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Shiv,
if it wasn't for Chinese help, overt and covert, including nuclear weapon development assistance, India would have been in a far more different situation today even with the same level of US support. For one thing, Pakistan would not have that "deterrence" and would have not been adventurous with its activities against India.
You cannot deny that fact anyway you slice. I think you are simply barking up the wrong tree when the tree should be China. If it wasn't for the delivery of the materials and blueprints for Shaheen and Ghauri missiles and nuclear bombs including testing a Pakistan designed nuke at Lop Nur, and nuclear weapons delivery capable A-5 planes, India would have been able to deal with Pakistan on its terms.
Yes American has aided Pakistan on military levels, but not on a level that it would allow Pakistan to really deter India and continue its terrorist activities against India. India would have been able to overcome those levels of aids. But when China gave the nuclear deterrence to Pakistan, India was not able to overcome that level of aid. That is a huge degree of difference. So I don't really find your arguments of US being the bogeyman that convincing especially in light of the Chinese help. China is the bogey man.
I am not saying that we should embrace US as an ally or treat him like a friend but I see no reason to treat US as an enemy. US can be an useful temporary partner, that's all.
if it wasn't for Chinese help, overt and covert, including nuclear weapon development assistance, India would have been in a far more different situation today even with the same level of US support. For one thing, Pakistan would not have that "deterrence" and would have not been adventurous with its activities against India.
You cannot deny that fact anyway you slice. I think you are simply barking up the wrong tree when the tree should be China. If it wasn't for the delivery of the materials and blueprints for Shaheen and Ghauri missiles and nuclear bombs including testing a Pakistan designed nuke at Lop Nur, and nuclear weapons delivery capable A-5 planes, India would have been able to deal with Pakistan on its terms.
Yes American has aided Pakistan on military levels, but not on a level that it would allow Pakistan to really deter India and continue its terrorist activities against India. India would have been able to overcome those levels of aids. But when China gave the nuclear deterrence to Pakistan, India was not able to overcome that level of aid. That is a huge degree of difference. So I don't really find your arguments of US being the bogeyman that convincing especially in light of the Chinese help. China is the bogey man.
I am not saying that we should embrace US as an ally or treat him like a friend but I see no reason to treat US as an enemy. US can be an useful temporary partner, that's all.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
I rate US willingness to help us somewhere equivalent to it's willingness to help Georgia in Aug'08.Hitesh wrote: I am not saying that we should embrace US as an ally or treat him like a friend but I see no reason to treat US as an enemy. US can be an useful temporary partner, that's all.
US is indifferent to see India Pak bleed each other, even happy if both buy it's hardware.
It'll be glad to see us bleed China, but not counting on us. It'll save it's best for it's Pacific allies.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Sorry. I consider this the most lame cop out I have heard in recent days on this forum. Pakistan has survived on US arms and monetary aid and both are still continuing and you want to shift the attention to China which is also guilty. This subtle shifting of attention to my mind is as serious as the sidelining of 26/11 by the government. The US cannot be let off simply because some other country is also chipping in.Hitesh wrote: You cannot deny that fact anyway you slice. I think you are simply barking up the wrong tree when the tree should be China.
China is an issue that I have not even started talking about yet and I fail to see the takleef that people are having when the US's perfidy is being highlighted. What gives? If China is guilty it does not mean the US is not guilty. And by saying the US is guilty I am not absolving China. I hear so many patriots blowing hot about Pakistan but everyone goes all soft mushy and sentimental about the US.
The contortions being used to somehow "let off" or "excuse" the US just astound me. I would be laughing if the whole thing weren't so seriously weird.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Because many of us in our personal Lives have benefitted from USA, we know many decent and good people who are Americans, we have had little or no interaction with China or Chinese. Hence, we are unable to diferentiate between, America(its decent people) and few miniscule Elite who follow a Foreign Policy Agenda without a care for Humanatarian disaster it is.shiv wrote:Sorry. I consider this the most lame cop out I have heard in recent days on this forum. Pakistan has survived on US arms and monetary aid and both are still continuing and you want to shift the attention to China which is also guilty. This subtle shifting of attention to my mind is as serious as the sidelining of 26/11 by the government. The US cannot be let off simply because some other country is also chipping in.Hitesh wrote: You cannot deny that fact anyway you slice. I think you are simply barking up the wrong tree when the tree should be China.
China is an issue that I have not even started talking about yet and I fail to see the takleef that people are having when the US's perfidy is being highlighted. What gives? If China is guilty it does not mean the US is not guilty. And by saying the US is guilty I am not absolving China. I hear so many patriots blowing hot about Pakistan but everyone goes all soft mushy and sentimental about the US.
The contortions being used to somehow "let off" or "excuse" the US just astound me. I would be laughing if the whole thing weren't so seriously weird.
Further, I have found Indians most willing to Compromise in good for society for own selfish good, this attitude can be best seen on Indian roads. An American can find himself Defending America in Afganistan or Iraq, an Indian may not want to defend India in Kashmir or his Own University if it compramises his personal benefits.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Fine. Fair enough. I have heard the following things in this thread and in the Pakistan thread. I post them without intent to demean or insult and I have a reason for stating things in the way I have been doingAditya_V wrote:Shiv said: Sorry. I consider this the most lame cop out I have heard in recent days on this forum. Pakistan has survived on US arms and monetary aid and both are still continuing and you want to shift the attention to China which is also guilty. This subtle shifting of attention to my mind is as serious as the sidelining of 26/11 by the government. The US cannot be let off simply because some other country is also chipping in.Hitesh wrote: You cannot deny that fact anyway you slice. I think you are simply barking up the wrong tree when the tree should be China.
China is an issue that I have not even started talking about yet and I fail to see the takleef that people are having when the US's perfidy is being highlighted. What gives? If China is guilty it does not mean the US is not guilty. And by saying the US is guilty I am not absolving China. I hear so many patriots blowing hot about Pakistan but everyone goes all soft mushy and sentimental about the US.
The contortions being used to somehow "let off" or "excuse" the US just astound me. I would be laughing if the whole thing weren't so seriously weird.
Because many of us in our personal Lives have benefitted from USA, we know many decent and good people who are Americans, we have had little or no interaction with China or Chinese. Hence, we are unable to diferentiate between, America(its decent people) and few miniscule Elite who follow a Foreign Policy Agenda without a care for Humanatarian disaster it is.
Further, I have found Indians most willing to Compromise in good for society for own selfish good, this attitude can be best seen on Indian roads. An American can find himself Defending America in Afganistan or Iraq, an Indian may not want to defend India in Kashmir or his Own University if it compramises his personal benefits.
But first the reasons for asking that we do not bother about US arms aid to Pakistan:
1) China will take over
2) China is more significant now
3) The US does things in its own interest
4) The US can be expected to show gratitude by helping Pakistan
5) We need to forget the past and think about the future where Chin will be the problem
6) The US has given many of us our lives and we are loath to rock the boat
7) The US is hardly an enemy
But excuse me - with so many Indians in the US and many being politically active, would it be so difficult for the Indian American community to press for a cessation of arms aid to Pakistan? Surely F-16s and AMRAAMs are hardly necessary. Would it be difficult to dig up the statements made by the US in the past that US arms to Pakistan would not be used against India to illustrate how those statements were proven wrong, given Pakisrans propensity for double crossing?
Instead I am hearing excuses for the US. Surely if the Indian government is ineffective, and we feel critical of its attitudes, we must use everything in our power to change attitudes and policies to suit India? What I see is a philosophical acceptance of the US as "great" "strong" and "wise" and a scathing criticism of India as "weak" and "vacillating". Why can't the US be pressured not to give Pakistan arms aid?
China is a different issue. We currently have no relations with China the the way Indians have with the US. dealing with Chin is a different topic. If Indians claim that relations with the US is so good, why can't they work on the simple issue of stopping arms aid being used against India? The US is yet to deliver some moer F-16s. Can that not be stopped? Can maintenance contracts not be put on hold? Have all the AMRAAMs been supplied? Why spend time whining about fellow Indians and fellow Indian Americans?
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
change will come in the US once indian origin americans are in elected positions as routine, still a few years to go
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
IMHO,
this dichotomy of view on US support to Pakistan, arises because
1) One opinion says that US financial and military support to Pakistan, has caused India too much harm, and this relationship needs to be terminated in whatever way possible. This is the highest priority.
2) The other view asks, fine, but what then? Let's go through the various scenarios and see, that Pakistan does not become an even more lethal enemy. Why game China separately? And why do we need to bring in the "psychology" and "background" of those who pose the question?! The question is valid on its own merits!
My Preference Hierarchy for Pakistan:
this dichotomy of view on US support to Pakistan, arises because
1) One opinion says that US financial and military support to Pakistan, has caused India too much harm, and this relationship needs to be terminated in whatever way possible. This is the highest priority.
2) The other view asks, fine, but what then? Let's go through the various scenarios and see, that Pakistan does not become an even more lethal enemy. Why game China separately? And why do we need to bring in the "psychology" and "background" of those who pose the question?! The question is valid on its own merits!
My Preference Hierarchy for Pakistan:
- Separated provinces/states fully integrated with India, whose people have been detoxicated.
- Separated provinces/states under Indian control, with people there posing no threat to India.
- Separated provinces/states in conflict with each other, each under Indian influence, with people there posing no threat to India.
- Completely fragmented region in constant conflict, under large Indian influence, albeit with people who can be considered hostile towards India, with India in full control of her borders.
- Separated provinces/states, under Indian but also other (Chinese, American, ME) influence, with people generally willing to live in peace with India, but with the elites still bearing anti-Indianism.
- Democratic unified Pakistan which is denuclearized, where TSPA is substantially reduced in size, Tanzeems have been decommissioned and disarmed, and Pakistan has "made peace with India".
- Separated provinces/states, with some under foreign (Chinese, American, ME) influence, still bearing enmity with India but posing no serious military threat to India, whereas other provinces/states are under Indian influence.
- Talibanized unified Pakistan which is denuclearized and impoverished, and has no outside backing, with India giving some financial support. Talibanism mostly inward directed.
- TSPA-controlled unified Pakistan which is denuclearized, under USA and Chinese influence, having "made peace with India".
- TSPA-controlled unified Pakistan which is denuclearized, under USA and Chinese influence, but still bearing enmity towards India.
- Talibanized unified Pakistan with nuclear weapons extorting money from all other powers including China and USA.
- TSPA-controlled unified Pakistan with nuclear weapons, under Chinese influence and extorting money from USA, trying to keep a modicum of pretense of being civilized (which allows a smoother extortion). [PRESENT]
- TSPA-controlled unified Pakistan with nuclear weapons, under Chinese influence and extorting money from USA, trying to keep a modicum of pretense of being civilized (which allows a smoother extortion), but with a better economy.
- TSPA-controlled unified Pakistan with nuclear weapons, under Chinese control and protection, with Americans out of the picture. TSPA uses its full potential for nuclear blackmail and terrorism for extortion. No pretense of civility any more.
- Talibanized unified Pakistan with nuclear weapons, under Chinese control and protection, with Americans out of the picture. TSPA uses its full potential for nuclear blackmail and terrorism for extortion. No pretense of civility any more.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
There are three reasons (for the sake of discussion) why the USA supplies arms to Pakistan:
1. Nuclear Blackmail - if the country destabilizes the arms can fall into the hands of anti-American Jihadis.
2. Afghan War - to get Pakistan to cooperate providing logistics and supply routes, and the dog and pony show of GWOT.
3. Keep India Down - there are different takes to it, but one unmistakable dynamic has been, that India more and more turns to USA to keep Pakistan in check, and USA likes it that way.
USA may some day extract itself from the Afghan quagmire or find different supply routes. India may break out of the American containment, develop its own resources within Pakistan, and deal with Pakistan directly, perhaps using the Pushtuns and the Baloch.
But how do you stop Pakistan from conducting nuclear blackmail of the world? Some ideas:
A. One needs to decrease the strategic depth of Pakistan's strategic weapons - Push them back into Pakjab Proper. This requires that the rest of the country breaks free of TSPA control.
B. One needs to deepen the rift between Pakistan's Strategic Forces, or the caretakers of Pakistan's crown jewels, on the one hand and the Inheritors of the New Pakistan - the Talibanized anti-Western Ghazis on the other. The aim is to contain the spread of nuclear weapons, and to not allow the next developmental phase of Pakistan to have nuclear weapons.
C. So as the geographic, identity and ideological Pakistan disintegrates to be succeeded by its viler version, Pakistan's Strategic Forces need to saved on an oasis of stability. If it involves pampering the particular Generals, then so be it. If it involves offering the scientists and officers involved asylum elsewhere, then so be it. If it involves offering the relatives of these scientists and officers college admissions in the West and India, then so be it.
D. One needs to have as many scientists and as many officers as possible, who have anything to do with Pakistan's Strategic Forces, in own pocket one way or another.
E. When the time comes, and they see that the world they were supposed to protect is disintegrating in front of them, and they owe no allegiance to whatever is taking its place, and there is only this one helicopter (figuratively speaking) available to take them and their families to security, then they might be willing to part with the nukes and put them under the control of the international community.
Otherwise nuclear blackmail would continue.
1. Nuclear Blackmail - if the country destabilizes the arms can fall into the hands of anti-American Jihadis.
2. Afghan War - to get Pakistan to cooperate providing logistics and supply routes, and the dog and pony show of GWOT.
3. Keep India Down - there are different takes to it, but one unmistakable dynamic has been, that India more and more turns to USA to keep Pakistan in check, and USA likes it that way.
USA may some day extract itself from the Afghan quagmire or find different supply routes. India may break out of the American containment, develop its own resources within Pakistan, and deal with Pakistan directly, perhaps using the Pushtuns and the Baloch.
But how do you stop Pakistan from conducting nuclear blackmail of the world? Some ideas:
A. One needs to decrease the strategic depth of Pakistan's strategic weapons - Push them back into Pakjab Proper. This requires that the rest of the country breaks free of TSPA control.
B. One needs to deepen the rift between Pakistan's Strategic Forces, or the caretakers of Pakistan's crown jewels, on the one hand and the Inheritors of the New Pakistan - the Talibanized anti-Western Ghazis on the other. The aim is to contain the spread of nuclear weapons, and to not allow the next developmental phase of Pakistan to have nuclear weapons.
C. So as the geographic, identity and ideological Pakistan disintegrates to be succeeded by its viler version, Pakistan's Strategic Forces need to saved on an oasis of stability. If it involves pampering the particular Generals, then so be it. If it involves offering the scientists and officers involved asylum elsewhere, then so be it. If it involves offering the relatives of these scientists and officers college admissions in the West and India, then so be it.
D. One needs to have as many scientists and as many officers as possible, who have anything to do with Pakistan's Strategic Forces, in own pocket one way or another.
E. When the time comes, and they see that the world they were supposed to protect is disintegrating in front of them, and they owe no allegiance to whatever is taking its place, and there is only this one helicopter (figuratively speaking) available to take them and their families to security, then they might be willing to part with the nukes and put them under the control of the international community.
Otherwise nuclear blackmail would continue.
Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
VikramS ji,VikramS wrote:Sometimes I imagine a nightmarish scenario where the TSPA goes for a Samson choice first strike on India with everything they have (50-100-150). The SDRE are so shocked that the response is muted with the Chipanda scooping in to destroy anything which is left, lest the SDRE imagine getting even with the Chipanda. Then the millions of Jehadis who are now running out of land and water, swarm into India armed with the 20 million AKs they have....
For a state like Pakistan, which does not have much going for it, its nukes are its only bargaining chips, and it uses it well for extortion. So Pakistan will continue to increase the level of fear in the world of its nukes, but not to an extent that the world decides to do something about it.
Actually regardless of how others think, I very much share your fear, and I am more than willing to put on a dhoti and shiver in it at your side. There are three ways of steadying our shivering legs.
1) We get other big powers in the boat and get it crowded enough so that our legs do not find much space to shiver in. That is the conventional BRF wisdom. If the others don't come to solve the nuclear problem of Pakistan, then we take the nuclear problem of Pakistan to the others. We globalize the fear of Pakistan's nukes.
And the method that is being proposed here on BRF is to change the trust level between the big powers (USA, PRC, KSA, etc) in the custodians of Pakistan's nukes, either by changing the custodians or by making their stability suspect, through the spread of the Taliban virus, which we believe would by itself culminate in a serious threat for the status quo.
This solution makes several assumptions:
- Spreading the risk does not necessarily mean that the risk to India decreases.
- The others could decide in favor of letting themselves be blackmailed of even larger sums of money, rather than forcing Pakistan's denuclearization.
- The others may not have the intelligence and the capacity to denuclearize Pakistan.
- During the efforts to denuclearize Pakistan, the situation can get out of hand, and in fact our shivering legs get evaporated.
Of all the possible solutions, this is the only solution actively being pursued - by doing nothing.
2) Ukraine Solution
Just like in the FSU everybody wore communism on their sleeves, in Pakistan everybody wears Pakistaniyat on his salwar! As long as FSU was a unified country, it was difficult getting rid of communism. But when it broke up, suddenly the various republics and their people could feel the freedom from a suffocating identity, and could return to their old ethnic identities. The earlier identity, which was mission-enabled, wanting to turn the world communist and fight the capitalist West, required that FSU keep a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. When FSU dissolved, new republics like Ukraine and Kazakhstan, did not see any need to prolong this mission or their past enmities, and decided to disarm their nukes.
If Pakistan breaks up into smaller provinces, and Pakjab becomes a land-locked province cut off from both China and the Sea, then it too could have its Ukraine moment and see that they cannot continue on the same Pakistaniyat course and enmity with India. The Punjabi identity may reassert itself, and the need for such military capacity is seen neither as useful nor as sustainable.
However it is unlikely that ideological fervor and past enmities would completely be allowed to be cleansed from Pakjab's body politic, and it is unlikely that the TSPA or their Talibanic successors would loosen their control over Sindh or Gilgit-Baltistan or be willing to disarm.
3) Game of Chicken
India can of course opt to actively do something against the nuclear threat from Pakistan. We can let them know that we take their nuclear threat seriously, and in nuclear deterrence if one sides takes the threat seriously, the other should too.
In order to play the Game of Chicken, we would have invest heavily in nuclear bunkers and other infrastructure which allows India to pick up the thread again, after taking everything Pakistan has to throw at us. We have to credibly show that we are prepared to take a nuclear hit. We have to show that our Civilization would survive, that our scientists, engineers, doctors, cultural elite, administrators, political class all the way down to village level, school children, elite students, all would survive a nuclear exchange.
We need to credibly show that we have enough storage of food and water, which will remain uncontaminated and can be used by the public, that there is a post nuclear exchange plan in place for the whole society.
We have to conduct regular drills in our offices, factories and schools to deal with a nuclear attack alert.
Parallel to this preparations, we also have to work on a credible BMD shield.
And most importantly we need a fleet of nuclear powered nuclear armed second strike submarines to sow real fear into the hearts of Pakistanis and other countries who have helped Pakistan in the past.
Last but not least, the whole Indian Population would have to be told to get rid of fear. Death will come, when it comes and we will face it!
If all this infrastructure, organization and the shield are in place, then we are ready to play a game of chicken with Pakistan, through conventional military incursions into Pakistan and shriller rhetoric. We would then have turned the game around, and Pakistanis would have to live under the fear of our nukes, for we will be posing the question to them: We are ready, are you?
At some point, Pakistan would have to decide that the threat to them, especially from a first nuclear strike from India is just too much and it is better to verifiably denuclearize.
4) Happy Surrender Solution
This solution involves that India robs Pakistan of all its dreams and its capacity to hate India. If we change the situation and Pakistan's perception of us in such a way that the likelihood of Pakistan attacking India is not much more them attacking Mecca, then a nuclear disarmament of Pakistan can be initiated.
For an elaboration of this please refer to my ebook!
IMHO, I think such a solution would the least costly in lives, resources and worry, and most likely to bring about Pakistan's disarmament! As a side note, it may also save our Civilization.