Deterrence

[Gagan]

WRT munna and its master.
Munna has troubled us for quite a long time. Munna's balls are entirely in master's hands.

It is our choice to break our head with munna, which is clearly dysfunctional.
Or we can build good relations with its master.

MMS is trying to do both of the above, building really strong and long lasting interdependence with massa, and indulging in chai-biskoot with munna. Every babu in nai dilli knows that munna is a gone case, and for a variety of reasons, for which one can only pity them, they will not normalize things with us.

Meanwhile India's economy and defence infrastructure grows handsomely.

[shyamd]

^^ exactly! Spot on. That's exactly what I told the guru.

[Sanku]

Gagan-ji;

As long as the master has the munna to keep us in check all the "building really strong and long lasting interdependence with massa," is pretty much like paying protection money, since there is a element of "buying" off the pain that exists because of local arm of master.

If however, we comprehensively removed any and all ability of the local chamcha to bother us, the "build good relations with its master" will go much smoother and easier and more on "equal" terms.

Amber thought that they were on terms of "mutual interdependence" with Mughals, Mewar realized what the reality was and chose to pay the price to create a situation where they could negotiate terms. For all the diplomacy of Amber, we know what Mewar means to India and what Amber does.

[ShauryaT]

The whole body of deterrence literature grew out of a specific case of USA-USSR Cold War confrontation. Thus, it cannot be assumed as generally applicable to all cases. Moreover, many analysts feel that there were many other factors, apart from deterrence, that stopped war. In the present India-Pakistan deterrence, many aspects are different from the Cold War experience. For example, the Cold War deterrence was ideological in nature, not territorial. In our case, it is both territorial and ideological. Even in this ideological difference, it is only Pakistan that has given it an ideological colour and that too a highly flammable religious colour. In the case of US-USSR, neither side was reckless (in spite of the Cuban Missile crisis) as they knew the horrendous fallout of a nuclear exchange. In our case, Pakistan is certainly reckless because as they are often heard saying that the Muslims love death. Their casual references to using nuclear weapons and even nuclear signalling through blackmail conveyed to Indian Prime Ministers at various times testify to that. The widespread and increasing jihadi fervour present among military personnel adds to the fear of recklessness. Also, the fear of unauthorized access and launch is ever increasing in the case of Pakistan.

Although your point about TSP-India deterrence having both an ideological and territorial dimension is well taken, what is not understood well (at least by me) is, does this over ride, classical deterrence theory based on the concept of rationality and the need to self preserve

The TSPA though ideological also shows, dare I say, rational behavior. They have not let up on conventional deterrence, through a build up of their conventional forces - through ANY means. At least to a degree, where Indian forces will not simply walk over - even if the gap continues to and will likely widen. Their bet is they can hold on long enough to either let some outside intervention happen and/or the nuclear card to come into play.

There have been enough rumblings about "red" lines, which will trigger the nuclear card. No one knows, precisely what they are or will be in various scenarios but if one goes through a logical deduction of the matter then, the choice will come down to "since I am going down anyways, one way or the other, I might well as take you also down with me".

One of the critiques of NFU is the enemy would know about this and is more likely to inflict a massive attack, anticipating such a response to either a limited or massive attack. It leaves little scope for an escalation matrix, once the nuclear rubicon is crossed. The good part of the Indian NFU is, since the enemy expects a massive retaliation for a nuclear strike and knows that it will lead to unacceptable damage, they have all the incentive in the world to act "rational".

Translation: As long as the TSP has a chance to be a state and the TSPA is largely intact, the likelihood of the nuclear rubicon being crossed is slim. Building a nuclear arsenal to counter a superior conventional force, perceived to be a mortal enemy is rational.

For all the ideological grand standing, the TSPA has shown remarkable dexterity - seen from their perspective.

The only way, I see all of this getting void, is if there are truly folks, who believe in the 72 houris in the top echelons of the TSPA. A certain risk, since rumor has it that the Zia era Islamized officers have now reached the brigadier general levels. Propose that we should have a separate thread to track the men of the TFTA army to further our understanding of these men.

[Gagan]

Sanku-ji,

Massa will NEVER give up munna. I mean if munna number 1 goes down the drain, munna number 2 will arise and continue to be on our back.
That is the way realpolitik works. We have to live with it, and continue to chart our progress inspite of it.

Some day when we are a superpower we too can find some munna of our own to return the favour to the various great powers in the world. But till then it is a question of minimizing risk by ensuring interdependene with the great powers so that they will have to think twice before they wink at their munnas to hurt us.

Hurting us will now mean that massa will also feel the pain. That is what interdependence does. Massa's tendency of 'stepping aside' as munna recklessly did what it did as in the 80s & 90s with full blown terror targeted at Punjab and J&K and nuclear brinkmanship perhaps might not occur in the 21st century.
Already munna is held in a tighter leash, some even talk of massa's birds swooping down and taking away munna's crown jewels should they try and use them against India.

So more interdependence with massa is India's first line of defence against munna - political deterrence. Should that break down, our nukes will do the rest.

[negi]

In our case, Pakistan is certainly reckless because as they are often heard saying that the Muslims love death. Their casual references to using nuclear weapons and even nuclear signalling through blackmail conveyed to Indian Prime Ministers at various times testify to that. The widespread and increasing jihadi fervour present among military personnel adds to the fear of recklessness. Also, the fear of unauthorized access and launch is ever increasing in the case of Pakistan.

I agree and this is even more important when we take into account the recent reports about MKNs fears about JDAM( BRF dictionary) being slipped into India for TSPA can safely distance itself from such a catastrophe by putting the blame on non-state actors.

Now my question is how does any country/state deal with above scenario ? I guess this warrants some serious discussion but as always my question would be has GoI thought about it (no Sri MKN mentioning it does not cut it) ? Iow does our nuclear doctrine address it in B&W ?

[Sanku]

Gagan-ji; I humbly offer a different point

I partially agree with you

,
Massa will NEVER give up munna.

But for very different reasons. For example I certainly do not agree with

I mean if munna number 1 goes down the drain, munna number 2 will arise and continue to be on our back.
That is the way realpolitik works.

I do not agree, not for reasons that go against realpolitik but for reasons of it. A snake like this needs 60 years to constant love attention and care (and copious amounts of milk) to get there. Where are they going to get another from? They may want to but they cant. The earth has finite number of nation, and a Georgia is not a Yugoslavia.


In fact because of this specially I do agree that they wont give up the Munna willingly, because of the TINA factor coupled with sunk costs.

Its up to us to "persuade" them.

Some day when we are a superpower we too can find some munna of our own to return the favour to the various great powers in the world.

That would certainly be one way.

But till then it is a question of minimizing risk by ensuring interdependene with the great powers so that they will have to think twice before they wink at their munnas to hurt us.

Its not that I don't see the validity of the approach, merely question the utility of it beyond very narrow gains.

perhaps might not occur in the 21st century.

Perhaps? I am not sure I want India to wonder "will she, wont she", and so far, they have indeed not only NOT stepped aside, but OTOH their assets get used till quite recently.

So when is that magical level of threshold going to come that they feel unacceptable pain and how much pain will India have to feel to for it to result in some pain for them.

Do I really want India to suffer so much so that Americans "may also perhaps" feel it?

I don't think so.

Already munna is held in a tighter leash, some even talk of massa's birds swooping down and taking away munna's crown jewels should they try and use them against India.

Massa has been good at talk. No real change whatsoever.

So more interdependence with massa is India's first line of defence against munna - political deterrence. Should that break down, our nukes will do the rest.

Sir, this level of interdependence is only deterring us, and no one else. We really need to understand that.

[shyamd]

Excellent debate. At the end, we should really work out the pro's and cons of this strategy and identify what is the optimal strategy for our people.

The guru's statement was actually music to my ears as I had always believed MMS was about money and economic growth.

Look back at some of my posts on 26/11and others.

I think India doesn't want to lose Kashmir(killing terrorists) and will gain money(by not fighting pakistan despite the huge amount of evidence that TSPA is involved in attacks). Sadly this is costing lives via terrorism. But is it a price worth paying is the question?
If tomorrow tsp inflicts a major terror attack at the elite. If India decides to go to war, will this be good for the country? Do we want to control that part? How will pak react to a overwhelming military defeat? Will nukes become mated?
Remember the kargil experience, ABV fouhht the war within our borders as intel had come in saying nukes were mated and ready. Which led to the decision not to cross the border

Just some thoughts.

[Sanku]

Shyamd -- I believe the Gordion Knot can indeed be cut through, however we have to first make "Destroying Pakistan (with minimum cost of course) is crucial step in undoing the great games" as a corner stone of strategic understanding.

Once that is decided ways and means can be looked at.

I now understand why the 71 war was critical, it was not about East Pakistan at all.

[ramana]

sanku, Spend more time reading all those tributes to KSgaru. By pushing for TSP dismemberment he ensured that no repeat of an invasion from TSP.TSP did it twice in 1965.

Thus he safeguarded the tryst with destiny.

[shyamd]

^^ once you destroy Pak, what's the plan? Keep in mind, AK's are as common as naan bread. Once it breaks up, who should provide security? Who will prevent the sectarian conflict?
Should Indian troops be on the ground, if not who should be there to provide security for the people and set up the administration? What will you do about the non-state actors and former TSPA? Who should foot the bill? How will this impact indian security situation? How will this impact economy? Nuclear weapns - do we know where they all are?

I guess, what I am trying to say is, is it worth it? And what's the action plan after it splits?

[ramana]

Read my plan in Conceptual thread in GDF.

[Sanku]

sanku, Spend more time reading all those tributes to KSgaru..

Sir, I did, almost all of them; that is why I made this statement.

I now understand why the 71 war was critical, it was not about East Pakistan at all.

I am beginning to understand what the reason of past actions better.

[ramana]

LINK


dated article

NUCLEUS OF THE PROBLEM

BY MANVENDRA SINGH

The visit of the Japanese prime minister, Yoshiro Mori, has yet again underlined the fact that India’s relations with the world have moved out of the orbit of the Pokhran tests of 1998. This was first apparent from the bonhomie generated by the visit of the United States president, Bill Clinton, and has since then been regarded as a declared fact. The word sanctions is now barely audible and the nonproliferation regime is no more the determinant of India’s communication with the rest of the world. Things are happening between India and the world, in the economic and security fields. Businesses are picking up, and there is a certain mood of confidence and achievement in the country. But is that enough to sustain India’s growth engines? And its security interestsvis-à-vis the world community?

The visiting Japanese delegation did mention it, but out of diplomatic politeness, did not place undue stress on it. The fact of the matter, nevertheless, is that India’s accession to the global nonproliferation regime is a matter of concern to the world at large. Despite India’s declared unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing, there continues to be a demand for New Delhi’s accession to the comprehensive test ban treaty.

Greater awareness of India’s security compulsions does certainly restrain most members of the world community from reducing the accession to the treaty into a zero-sum issue. The dialogue is no more of the “either — or” variety, and this says much for India’s ability to explain its position, and for the world community’s ability to listen, and dovetail, those concerns. In the new millennium that, however, is insufficient.

The fact remains that there are sanctions in place against India for the tests carried out in May 1998. And that those sanctions do prevent India’s access to monies and technologies for the further advancement of its economy and the general wellbeing of its people. These facts are undeniable. And what is also undeniable is that the India conducted the Shakti series of tests in May 1998 for supreme national interests. A point had arrived in the evolution of the Indian nation wherein it could no longer allow its security concerns to be determined solely by external factors while New Delhi remained a hapless bystander.

The two decade long illegal and surreptitious transfer of nuclear and missile technology by China and North Korea to countries in the vicinity of India was the final determinant of the decision to test, and exercise the nuclear option. The international nonproliferation regime did nothing to prevent and punish these transfers. Unwilling to repeat the mistakes of the Sixties India went ahead with the tests and the weaponization. These actions are irreversible, and neither is there any such demand for them to be reversed. But what are reversible are the sanctions imposed on India, and for which there are certain responsibilities that fall on New Delhi.

A carefully crafted five-decade long effort to put in place a global nonproliferation regime was destroyed by India’s 1998 tests. This is a fact that does not receive adequate attention in India. Not that it should for the sake of attention, but only so as to fully understand the world’s responses to the tests. And understanding the world’s responses is essential to coming to a conclusion on the future of India’s role, position and responsibilities.

There is no denying the fact that India can no longer continue to exist as though it lived in a vacuum. Being among the most isolated of economies has allowed India to bear the brunt of the sanctions with relative ease. But that is not sufficient for further economic progress since the country needs technologies if it is to improve the lives of its people. These are currently denied on account of the sanctions. And one method of eliminating this problem is by India’s limited accession to the global nonproliferation regime and the signing of the CTBT.

The debate in India on whether or not to sign the CTBT has been mixed up with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty issue. That is unfortunate for two reasons. Firstly, the CTBT issue has little to do with the discrimination perpetuated by the indefinite extension of the NPT. The CTBT is essentially a continuum of the 1963 partial test ban treaty of which India was a prime moving force. Atmospheric tests were banned with that treaty, and virtually all tests are sought to be banned by the CTBT.

And secondly, India’s isolation from the NPT is the result of a mystifying morality of the Sixties that neither read the writing on the wall, nor allowed science to determine security. Once the most advanced nuclear research programmes in Asia, India could quite conceivably have tested a nuclear device in the Sixties and beaten the NPT deadline of 1968. The world did not disarm, and India did not test. Thus neither was India’s security enhanced nor its morality appreciated.

This moralizing was to be reenacted almost three decades later when New Delhi went into fits trying to sell the saintliness of its decision to sign and ratify the chemical weapons convention. The Congress supported United Front government of I.K. Gujral signed and ratified it when the official Indian position was that it did not possess such weapons and was in principle opposed to such weapons.

Whose morality was served is difficult to discern. And what is more, the chemical weapons convention is a far more intrusive and expensive, treaty for India than the CTBT is ever likely to be. As a party to the convention India has to pay for the destruction of those very weapons that it first spent millions to produce for the protection and promotion of its security. India has also to pay for the inspection visits undertaken by the technical secretariat of Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons.

This inspection regime is an ongoing process and the destruction schedule is stretched over 10 years. Had India unilaterally begun the destruction process it would have saved a semblance of its morality, and a lot of money. It could then have signed the convention as a non-possessor state, and avoided the intrusive inspection regime. The mere suspicion of a chemical weapons facility now allows another country to impose a challenge inspection on India. To prevent challenge inspections from continuing, India needs to garner a three-fourths majority in the 41 member executive council of the OPCW.

The process, as far as the CTBT is concerned is, in fact, the reverse. An on-site inspection for what is suspected to be a nuclear test, not a facility or weapons storage or some such thing, has to be approved by, at the very least, 30 of the 51 members of the executive council of the CTBT organization. And that too after the global network of the international monitoring system detects signs of seismic activity. Accession to the CTBT does not prevent India from modernizing the designs of its nuclear weapons. And it also does not prevent India from conducting sub-kiloton tests for that modernization.

Data recovered from the 1998 tests, processed through the necessary software and high-speed computing, will allow India to continue the modernization of its weapons. Configured into the sub-kiloton variety, these designs can then be tested, legally. Anybody familiar with India’s sixth test in May 1998 will recognize the worth of the expertise available within the country. What is required is some technology, but for that India has to first sign some documents.

[JE Menon]

>>India’s isolation from the NPT is the result of a mystifying morality of the Sixties

I have to say that it was neither mystifying nor moral. The powers that had nuclear weapons simply decided that they would try to limit the numbers in this group, a rational notion given the destructive capability and its power as a policy instrument that is wielded discreetly. And it was also a calculation based on the underestimation that some powers would not be able to develop nuclear weapons without significant outside help. I wouldn't call that racism, because I don't think it was. It was more a sort of self-satisfying wishful thinking. Nothing mystifying about it all.

[ramana]

IPCS had an articel on Credibility of teh deterrence:

India-Pak Nuke lexicon: An Indian perespective on CMD

Indo-Pak Nuclear Lexicon: An Indian Perspective on Credible Minimum Deterrence


Written by: IPCS



By Tanvi Kulkarni

Why Credible Minimum Deterrence?

India’s nuclear weapons policy is identified with the posture of Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence (CMD). The principle entails quite a different interpretation than that understood in the western nuclear lexicon in that western theories and constructs, particularly from the Cold War, cannot be applied effectively to the Indian context. K Subrahmanyam has defended the CMD doctrine by stating that it has been adapted to suit India’s requirements and thinking on nuclear weapons. Bharat Karnad defines it as a self-explanatory, moderate, limited, reasonable and legitimate posture that justified India’s nuclear weapons and missile capabilities after the 1998 tests. The CMD doctrine highlights that India does not seek an open-ended nuclear arsenal and pillars other postures like the second-strike capability and no first use. Both terms, credible and minimum, are important individually and their equation makes for the credible minimum nuclear deterrence policy.

What is the Indian understanding of credibility?

Odd as it seems, as a key feature of nuclear deterrence, ‘credibility’ is a dynamic, ambiguous and controversial concept. A theoretical understanding of credibility often embroils into a political and technical debate and its definition then depends on which decision-making community, school of thought and context one chooses to represent.

The Indian nuclear doctrine looks at credible deterrence as a political-psychological concept and serves as a prime means of communicating to potential adversaries that India maintains the will and capability to inflict unacceptable punishment through retaliation with nuclear weapons. An effective second strike capability and survivability become important elements of credibility. Credibility must be maintained by robust command and control systems, safety and security of arsenal, operational force preparedness, planning and training of forces, research and development and effective conventional military capabilities. The doctrine lends dynamism to the credible deterrent by making it responsive to India’s strategic environment, national security and technological imperatives.

A state’s approach and policy towards strategic weapons as well as the concepts and ideas that define them are affected by the internal politics of the state’s decision-makers. In India, strictly speaking, the political leadership, military and scientific communities do not share the same approach to credible deterrence. The difference is however, to use the words of Professor Rajesh Basrur, a matter of ‘political-technical perspective’.

In an interview to the Hindu newspaper on 29 November 1999, the then Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh stated that “credibility lies in the possibility of retaliation and not its certainty.” The political leadership in India maintains that deterrence credibility lies in its psychological impact on the adversary and on oneself. This neither suggests that the Indian political leaders are averse to sanction new technological developments, nor that the debate within the political class is monolithic. But from the political perspective, credibility has more to do with the effective communication of the threat of retaliation to the adversary – a sentiment echoed in the nuclear doctrine – than with the quality and quantity of weapons.

The psychological approach does not go too comfortably with the Indian military. As a professional entity and the end-user of weapons systems, the military seeks credibility through technical parameters. The size, structure, level of technology, targeting philosophy, degree of acceptability of damage, time component and the temporal and physical reach of weapons systems are factors that decide how credible the deterrent is. The contentious Cold Start Doctrine, which enjoys little political support, is nevertheless reflective of the Indian Army’s understanding of credibility in the operational sense. In a September 2009 television interview, General VP Malik suggested that India’s inability to acquire requisite weapons and missile technology had eroded deterrence. In another USI Journal article in 2008, Gen Malik, who oversaw the Pokhran II tests as the Army Chief, wrote that a credible Indian deterrent would require allaying doubts about India’s thermonuclear weapons capability, fissile weapons policy and the nuclear triad. A similar conception of ‘credible’ runs into a technical debate amongst the Indian nuclear scientific community. Debates on the partial success of the thermonuclear device and the need for further testing, which became even more pronounced against the backdrop of the Indo-US nuclear deal, have divided Indian nuclear scientists. Many scientists may not be as vocal as Dr. K Santhanam, but they would cast doubts on the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent based on a technical and technological yardstick.

Credible nuclear deterrence as a policy allows a range of diverse interpretations under the conceptual flexibility it provides. There is thus scope for a difference of interpretations among members of a country’s strategic community. In the Indian nuclear strategic community, experts like K Subrahmanyam – a nuclear pragmatist, according to Professor Kanti Bajpai – would strongly advocate the politico-psychological approach towards nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent. On the other, Bharat Karnad – often termed a nuclear maximalist by the pragmatists – argues for a capability credible enough to deter China as the principle adversary.

The context of nuclear deterrence presents us with yet another parameter to assess credibility. Does the level of credibility differ for deterrence against China and Pakistan? Opinions differ. To gauge it technically or politically would also depend on what kind of confrontation is to be deterred, what is to be communicated to the adversary and with what aspect of the adversary’s nuclear identity does one associate the deterrent (a mutual no first use policy with China or the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal?).

How we choose to define credibility further affects the size of the nuclear arsenal and therefore affects the ‘minimum’. This commentary on the interpretations of ‘credibility’ is hoped to be followed by another which would look at how the minimum is debated within India. The number-game is perhaps the most complicated debate for nuclear weapons states.

Tanvi Kulkarni
Research Officer, IPCS
email: [email protected]

In 1999 I wrote my BRM article "What Next? Way to a Credible Deterrent", which deals with some of these issues long ago.

Including the numbers game based on different threat levels. Lets see what she writes.

[Anujan]

Bharat Karnad: Nuclear mind games

Maj. Gen. Ali indicated that Pakistan planned to beef up its nuclear forces sufficient to enable a “counterforce third strike” — a scheme too ambitious not to prompt scepticism. A counterforce third strike essentially means having enough surviving nuclear weapons/warheads and delivery systems to take out Indian nuclear force assets after absorbing an Indian retaliatory hit in response to Pakistan’s first use of nuclear weapons. His impressive confidence notwithstanding, this strategy is unsustainable.

There are two great nuclear deficit areas: In the light of the failed hydrogen bomb test in 1998, the absence of proven high-yield thermonuclear armaments — a condition only further explosive testing can remedy, and curtailed weapon-grade plutonium production capacity.

[Kanson]

^

The stock answers by senior officials to any sensitive questions regarding national security are usually unilluminating counter-questions: “How do you know we are not taking appropriate actions? And, if we are, would we be announcing them?” Alas, excessive opacity hurts nuclear deterrence when there’s little evidence of meaningful measures on the ground.

[RajeshA]

X-Posted from Managing Pakistan's Failure Thread

Sometimes I imagine a nightmarish scenario where the TSPA goes for a Samson choice first strike on India with everything they have (50-100-150). The SDRE are so shocked that the response is muted with the Chipanda scooping in to destroy anything which is left, lest the SDRE imagine getting even with the Chipanda. Then the millions of Jehadis who are now running out of land and water, swarm into India armed with the 20 million AKs they have....

VikramS ji,

For a state like Pakistan, which does not have much going for it, its nukes are its only bargaining chips, and it uses it well for extortion. So Pakistan will continue to increase the level of fear in the world of its nukes, but not to an extent that the world decides to do something about it.

Actually regardless of how others think, I very much share your fear, and I am more than willing to put on a dhoti and shiver in it at your side. There are three ways of steadying our shivering legs.

1) We get other big powers in the boat and get it crowded enough so that our legs do not find much space to shiver in. That is the conventional BRF wisdom. If the others don't come to solve the nuclear problem of Pakistan, then we take the nuclear problem of Pakistan to the others. We globalize the fear of Pakistan's nukes.

And the method that is being proposed here on BRF is to change the trust level between the big powers (USA, PRC, KSA, etc) in the custodians of Pakistan's nukes, either by changing the custodians or by making their stability suspect, through the spread of the Taliban virus, which we believe would by itself culminate in a serious threat for the status quo.

This solution makes several assumptions:

1. Spreading the risk does not necessarily mean that the risk to India decreases.
2. The others could decide in favor of letting themselves be blackmailed of even larger sums of money, rather than forcing Pakistan's denuclearization.
3. The others may not have the intelligence and the capacity to denuclearize Pakistan.
4. During the efforts to denuclearize Pakistan, the situation can get out of hand, and in fact our shivering legs get evaporated.

Since GoI does not seem to be doing anything actively or at least publicly to deal with the situation permanently, the dynamics of the evolving situation in Pakistan is our only comfort, and as such this solution finds most favor amongst us, because it is the solution of auto-pilot and passivity on our part. Whether it truly represents a solution or not, any further analysis on that would only disturb our comfort. GoI does its part in comforting the masses by not publicizing the danger too much from any nuclear attack on India.

Of all the possible solutions, this is the only solution actively being pursued - by doing nothing.

2) Ukraine Solution

Just like in the FSU everybody wore communism on their sleeves, in Pakistan everybody wears Pakistaniyat on his salwar! As long as FSU was a unified country, it was difficult getting rid of communism. But when it broke up, suddenly the various republics and their people could feel the freedom from a suffocating identity, and could return to their old ethnic identities. The earlier identity, which was mission-enabled, wanting to turn the world communist and fight the capitalist West, required that FSU keep a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. When FSU dissolved, new republics like Ukraine and Kazakhstan, did not see any need to prolong this mission or their past enmities, and decided to disarm their nukes.

If Pakistan breaks up into smaller provinces, and Pakjab becomes a land-locked province cut off from both China and the Sea, then it too could have its Ukraine moment and see that they cannot continue on the same Pakistaniyat course and enmity with India. The Punjabi identity may reassert itself, and the need for such military capacity is seen neither as useful nor as sustainable.

However it is unlikely that ideological fervor and past enmities would completely be allowed to be cleansed from Pakjab's body politic, and it is unlikely that the TSPA or their Talibanic successors would loosen their control over Sindh or Gilgit-Baltistan or be willing to disarm.

3) Game of Chicken

India can of course opt to actively do something against the nuclear threat from Pakistan. We can let them know that we take their nuclear threat seriously, and in nuclear deterrence if one sides takes the threat seriously, the other should too.

In order to play the Game of Chicken, we would have invest heavily in nuclear bunkers and other infrastructure which allows India to pick up the thread again, after taking everything Pakistan has to throw at us. We have to credibly show that we are prepared to take a nuclear hit. We have to show that our Civilization would survive, that our scientists, engineers, doctors, cultural elite, administrators, political class all the way down to village level, school children, elite students, all would survive a nuclear exchange.

We need to credibly show that we have enough storage of food and water, which will remain uncontaminated and can be used by the public, that there is a post nuclear exchange plan in place for the whole society.

We have to conduct regular drills in our offices, factories and schools to deal with a nuclear attack alert.

Parallel to this preparations, we also have to work on a credible BMD shield.

And most importantly we need a fleet of nuclear powered nuclear armed second strike submarines to sow real fear into the hearts of Pakistanis and other countries who have helped Pakistan in the past.

Last but not least, the whole Indian Population would have to be told to get rid of fear. Death will come, when it comes and we will face it!

If all this infrastructure, organization and the shield are in place, then we are ready to play a game of chicken with Pakistan, through conventional military incursions into Pakistan and shriller rhetoric. We would then have turned the game around, and Pakistanis would have to live under the fear of our nukes, for we will be posing the question to them: We are ready, are you?

At some point, Pakistan would have to decide that the threat to them, especially from a first nuclear strike from India is just too much and it is better to verifiably denuclearize.

4) Happy Surrender Solution

This solution involves that India robs Pakistan of all its dreams and its capacity to hate India. If we change the situation and Pakistan's perception of us in such a way that the likelihood of Pakistan attacking India is not much more them attacking Mecca, then a nuclear disarmament of Pakistan can be initiated.

For an elaboration of this please refer to my ebook!

IMHO, I think such a solution would the least costly in lives, resources and worry, and most likely to bring about Pakistan's disarmament! As a side note, it may also save our Civilization.

[NRao]

Bharat Karnad: Nuclear mind games

Maj. Gen. Ali indicated that Pakistan planned to beef up its nuclear forces sufficient to enable a “counterforce third strike” — a scheme too ambitious not to prompt scepticism. A counterforce third strike essentially means having enough surviving nuclear weapons/warheads and delivery systems to take out Indian nuclear force assets after absorbing an Indian retaliatory hit in response to Pakistan’s first use of nuclear weapons. His impressive confidence notwithstanding, this strategy is unsustainable.

There are two great nuclear deficit areas: In the light of the failed hydrogen bomb test in 1998, the absence of proven high-yield thermonuclear armaments — a condition only further explosive testing can remedy, and curtailed weapon-grade plutonium production capacity.

A distinct possibility IF India treats China and Pakistan as two different entities.

[NRao]

Shiv ji,

What is your email id?

I just may have have some pictures for your collection.

[shiv]

Shiv ji,

What is your email id?

I just may have have some pictures for your collection.

Just drop a line to bennedose at hotmail.com

[shiv]

Bharat Karnad: Nuclear mind games

Maj. Gen. Ali indicated that Pakistan planned to beef up its nuclear forces sufficient to enable a “counterforce third strike” — a scheme too ambitious not to prompt scepticism. A counterforce third strike essentially means having enough surviving nuclear weapons/warheads and delivery systems to take out Indian nuclear force assets after absorbing an Indian retaliatory hit in response to Pakistan’s first use of nuclear weapons.

Very interesting.

In my opinion the first and foremost requirement for deterrence is credibility. If you believe that the other guy can hit you, you are likely to be deterred, or make plans that will foil his effectiveness. If you do not believe that his nukes are going to work - you are less likely to be deterred by them and make fewer plans to face them.

"Believing" that someone's nukes are a "credible threat" can also exist on two planes. On the one hand you may believe that the other guy is bluffing, that his nukes don't work. On the other hand, you may know that his nukes work, but you don't believe he has the guts to use them.

Does India believe that Pakistan has working nukes? If India believes that Pakistan has working nukes, does India believe that Pakistan is willing to use them? India speaks of a "second strike" capability. That means that India accepts (believes) that Pakistan has nukes, they they will work, and that Pakistan will be willing to use them. That is why India insists on developing a credible second strike capability with a triad.

Does Pakistan believe that India has nukes that work? Do they believe that India will use them? It appears that Pakistan does believe that India has nukes and that India is willing to use them. That is why they talk of surviving an Indian nuclear retaliation to launch a third strike against India. The "credibility" of surviving an Indian strike to launch a third strike from Pakistan is based on the idea that the whereabouts of 30% of Pakistan's nuclear weapons are unknown and that the Indian second strike will target known locations of Pakistani nukes in a counterforce strategy.

To me the question that comes to mind is if India should "respond" visibly to this in public. As I see it if India says in public "Hey we are not going to get 30% of Pakistan's nukes and they will hit us back after we have struck so we must do something and plan a 4th strike or stop their 3rd strike" then it will be a public indicator that India accepts what Pakistan is saying. It will mean that India accepts that its own second strike will not be good enough and that the Pakistanis are right and that our deterrent needs to be better. Even if this is 100% correct India simply cannot say it publicly. That would be damaging its own credibility by saying "We agree that Pakistan is right. We are not confident of silencing them with a retaliatory strike"

If we accept that Pakistan is right - any preparations we make have to be done secretly. Right now Pakistan has publicly accepted that it is in danger of a second strike from India and is publicly making noises that it intends some of its weapons to survive that second strike. Pakistan has said nothing about what parts of Pakistan will survive. They are only saying that some (30%) nuclear weapons will survive and are trying to ensure that the command and control of those weapons also survives. This gives a good indicator of what an Indian response against Pakistan should be like.

I have something more to say about "conterforce" strikes in general. I will save that up for a separate post some other time - I need to do some revision of the layman understandable physics of "overpressures" required to take out deep underground bunkers. I will post when I get around to doing that.

[rkirankr]

^
Is the assumption of NFU means that India will wait till one of the bombs actually explode in Indian lands or even the intent of pakis to bomb us in a war can be considered as a first use and India will respond ? I believe Indian doctrine may have an ambiguity in this and this may be deliberate.
The pakis may not even get a chance to use it the first time, so third strike talk from pakis may be hot gas

[NRao]

Shiv ji,

What is your email id?

I just may have have some pictures for your collection.

Just drop a line to bennedose at hotmail.com

Please check your email.

[shiv]

NRao - got it thanks!

[ramana]

Thanks to A_Gupta linking C Fair's articles archives:

Interesting paper:

"Learning to Think the Unthinkable: Lessons from India's Nuclear Test,"

C. Christine Fair, India Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 2005).

I think its interesting for the ref data and not her conclusions which are germane to her employers.

Mrs G was a master of balanced decision making. Hats off.

-----------
Compare C Fair's Narrative with KS's interview.
:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1025292

I wish some of our members takes up a challenge and shows how US had tired to hog tie India while allowing TSP to be armed with weapons from PRC and delivery vehicles (F-16s) from US.

[Christopher Sidor]

Bharat Karnad: Nuclear mind games

Maj. Gen. Ali indicated that Pakistan planned to beef up its nuclear forces sufficient to enable a “counterforce third strike” — a scheme too ambitious not to prompt scepticism. A counterforce third strike essentially means having enough surviving nuclear weapons/warheads and delivery systems to take out Indian nuclear force assets after absorbing an Indian retaliatory hit in response to Pakistan’s first use of nuclear weapons. His impressive confidence notwithstanding, this strategy is unsustainable.

There are two great nuclear deficit areas: In the light of the failed hydrogen bomb test in 1998, the absence of proven high-yield thermonuclear armaments — a condition only further explosive testing can remedy, and curtailed weapon-grade plutonium production capacity.

Another paragraph from the article

Indeed, with the decommissioning of the CIRUS reactor at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, courtesy the nuclear deal with the United States, a third of the weapon-grade plutonium production capacity was lopped off.

Oh the cost that we paid for the 123 nuclear deal. The 123 deal directly impacted our Deterrence.
Plutonium has one advantage over Uranium nukes, Plutonium nukes are more light. For example it is estimated that 50 kg of Uranium is needed to reach critical mass, whereas less than 10 kg of Plutonium is necessary for the same. The problem with plutonium is its toxic nature and the toxic waste products produced in its manufacture.

So for example consider a missile or a plane capable of carrying a 100 kg warhead. So using uranium warhead we will may be able to fit max 2 warheads. In case of plutonium we might be able to put in more warheads. For simplicity I am assuming that MIRV capability is present in the missile and the intensity of the warheads is the same.

Also the article says a third-strike option. The article also claims that 30% of Paki nukes will never be found. One way I see of delivering these left-over nukes or the third-strike nukes is via terrorist groups. Or groups which according to Paki GHQ are dependable, like LeT.
Without delivery vehicles nukes are useless. If PAF is going to be wiped out in 3 days of conflict, PN going to be a non-factor within a week (the french agosta submarines are very very hard to detect and kill and hence I give them a week) then that leaves only two delivery vehicles, missiles and/or artillery in hands of Pakistan. Now here is the kicker the IA/IAF/IN know this. So they will go gung-ho from day zero of conflict against the missiles and/or artillery. And I am hoping that they are able to significantly degrade this capability of PA/PN/PAF. With this how does Pakistan deploy and use its so called third-strike option? The only way possible is terrorist groups.

Comments anybody

[SSridhar]

Pak toxic chaos plan changes nuke debate - Shaun Gregory

From the dawn of the nuclear age, it has been the task of nuclear strategists to "think the unthinkable" and speculate about the dynamics of nuclear war. The foundations of this analysis rest on the works of 1940s US strategists Bernard Brodie and Herman Khan, and fellow pioneers, whose work was so brilliantly parodied in Stanley Kubrick's "Dr Strangelove" and so incisively deconstructed in Fred Kaplan's "Wizards of Armageddon".

The ideas of these individuals, and later revisionists such as Robert Jervis, have effectively structured the thinking of all the states that have followed the US into the nuclear weapons club. The nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan has, as a result, been almost exclusively analyzed through the US and cold war-centric lens. While many of the differences between the US-Soviet and the contemporary India-Pakistan contexts have been noted, and to some extent explored, these have not persuaded strategic analysts of South Asia to question either the fundamentals or the specificities of relying on nuclear ideas forged in the cold war USSoviet context to provide strategic guidance in South Asia. Perhaps part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that so many of India and Pakistan's leading strategic thinkers have been educated or trained in the US.

In the case of Pakistan, however, nuclear strategic analysis faces an anomalous state with which it has yet to come fully to terms. In three important respects Pakistan differs from every other nuclear state that has emerged to date. First, in Pakistan it is the military and not the civilian government that controls nuclear weapons and it is military analysts (mainly within the Strategic Plans Division and Strategic Command) rather than civilian analysts that control the nuclear discourse.

Second, Pakistan is the only nuclear weapons state that hosts and backs sub-national terrorist and insurgent groups as instruments of security policy, greatly complicating the calculus of state-to-state dynamics and of nuclear escalation pathways as was evidenced in the Kargil crises of 1999, the military stand-off of 2001-02 in the wake of the attack on the Indian Parliament, and in the wake of 26/11.

Third, and most importantly, Pakistan is a revisionist and irredentist state, which accepts neither its own borders nor the regional status quo. As a consequence, nuclear weapons in Pakistan have a different meaning and a different purpose from those held by other nuclear weapons states. For Pakistan, nuclear weapons are a tool to challenge the status quo and are subordinated —as are all other instruments of state policy —to that end. Thus, while the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, India and Israel seek to use nuclear weapons to maintain durable stability, Pakistan seeks to use nuclear weapons to maintain instability because to agree to durable stability is to accept the status quo. This does not mean that Pakistan is necessarily an irresponsible nuclear weapons state, but it does mean that it is not searching for nuclear stability but for a managed nuclear instability. The purpose of this instability is to keep India off balance, to resist agreement, to underpin uncertainty, and to generate ambiguity. This is the basis on which Pakistan's nuclear behaviour needs to be understood and it is rather different from that envisaged —before Pakistan even existed —by Brodie, Khan and others.

Viewed in this way, some of the key ideas in nuclear strategy are placed in doubt, none more so than the "stabilityinstability paradox", which has been the focus of so much analytic attention in South Asia. Somewhat simplified, this argues that agreements or deterrent realities that create stability at the nuclear level (because both parties fear nuclear war) may allow or generate instability at lower, conventional levels of war-fighting because both sides know the other will not risk escalation to nuclear war and, thus, there is no barrier to conventional war. Pakistan's adventurism in Kargil in 1999 was cited as an early exemplar of this phenomenon, coming as it did only a year after India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons.

This key strand of nuclear analysis has always assumed that all nuclear weapons states seek stability at the nuclear level. However, Pakistan does not: it seeks managed instability. We thus enter the poorly understood and poorly analyzed and theorized realm of the "instability-instability paradox", which poses a whole new order of challenge for a state that faces —as India does with Pakistan —a nuclear weapons state which seeks to maintain instability at the nuclear level.

In this context, Pakistan's recent rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal (stated by some estimates to have doubled in size in the last three years), the expansion of its nuclear weapons production facilities with the KH2 and KH3 reactors, its refusal to sign the widely supported Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the retention of the nuclear first-use option, and the move to deploy nuclear weapons which have long been considered as destabilizing – such as cruise missiles – point to an increasingly complex challenge for India.

Furthermore, all leading nuclear nations, and indeed all nations concerned about international peace and order, should be paying increased attention to the challenge India faces from Pakistan's expanding and rapidly evolving nuclear weapons and to the emergence of nuclear weapons dynamics in South Asia that may not fit comfortably into the Brodie/Khan model. The reason for this is simple: the states that are next in the queue to join the nuclear club, such as Iran and North Korea, are much closer in character to Pakistan than to the other nuclear weapons states. They too are nuclear "anomalies" in terms of the factors which make Pakistan so distinctive.

For contemporary nuclear analysts, amongst whom analysts of the South Asia context should be in the vanguard, there are now the twin tasks both of understanding and managing nuclear relations between nuclear weapons states which seek stability at the nuclear level (as has been the norm), and understanding how states that seek nuclear stability manage their relations with nuclear weapons states that do not. In the next few years, this question is for no state —other than India —more consequential than for Israel, facing up to a revisionist Iran with strong links to terrorist groups, intent on developing nuclear weapons, and with the very survival of Israel at stake.

The writer is director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit and associate dean, University of Bradford, UK

[ShauryaT]

And I am hoping that they are able to significantly degrade this capability of PA/PN/PAF. With this how does Pakistan deploy and use its so called third-strike option? The only way possible is terrorist groups.

Comments anybody

India does not have this massive conventional superiority and fire power at its disposal yet, to bring about an annihilation of TSP military forces within days. More so, India Pakistan wars have never been wars of annihilation but limited domination and defiance games.

[shiv]

Shiv garu, IMHO the most effective way of surviving a nuke bomb attack would be to prevent it beforehand. In current state our nuclear doctrine expects us to be well baked, burned and vapourised before we can pitch in our "disproportionate" response, provided we are in a position to deliver. This is the most absurd expectation from mangoes like me.

I suggest our ND be modified to include, credible intelligence about imminent nuclear attack, as crossing the red line. Credible intelligence of first strike should be treated at par with an event of actual nuclear strike. Therby providing India the option of nuking tattistan under the pretext of self-defence. We need to become more paki than the pakis themselves, if we are to deal with this assymetric stale mate.

Any porki gernail will henceforth be having his balls in his mouth, should he be ordering any integration of nuclear warheads on their delivery systems Or threating India with a nuclear attack, should India retaliate to some pigLet attack or even for the sake of psy ops.

Our ND should not be passive Gandhian literature only, but a very useful psycological tool to keep the abduls guessing of the consequences and fate if they adhere to any nuclear blackmailing.

Narad with reference to the statement highlighted in blue - I see one probem with it and that's as follows

if I were Pakistani - I would secretly ready one or two nukes to launch at India. If nothing happens it means that India is unable to get credible intelligence about my moves, or, alternatively, it means that the Indians are chickening out when they should be nuking me.

The policy is asking for failure. Either way it's bad for India. It means that Indians are not getting the intel or are chicken.

If we want to nuke them we must just nuke them, not find excuses with such clauses.

[Sanku]

Oh the cost that we paid for the 123 nuclear deal. The 123 deal directly impacted our Deterrence.

The impact on deterrence is not the cost of 123 deal. It is the prime purpose, it was always so, hoping to play both US and its agents in India in order to obtain the crack in the window was a little too audacious. Even for Grand Sires of the country.

IMVHO I am sad to say they erred in their calculations.

Of course just my thoughts and all that.

[RajeshA]

X-Posting from Surviving a 50 to 100 nuke bomb attack on India

India's Nuclear Doctrine

1. Any singular nuclear attack on India, invites India's retaliation against Pakistan, which is complete and comprehensive!
2. Any retaliatory nuclear attack by Pakistan on India, invites India's retaliation against all parties that helped Pakistan build the bomb - namely China, Saudi Arabia!
3. Any large scale nuclear attack on India, invites India's retaliation against both Pakistan and all those parties, who helped Pakistan build the bomb!

This need not become India's official nuclear doctrine and be declared publicly, but one needs to talk of this so often and especially by respected security experts, that they believe that it is the official albeit undeclared nuclear doctrine of India.

One should push Pakistan's associates to start thinking backwards, starting from a nuclear attack on them by India!

What such a doctrine does is, it requires China and Saudi Arabia first to do their maximum to ensure that Pakistan does not attack India using nuclear materials. Secondly they would be doing their best to prevent Pakistan from developing a credible second/third-strike capability.

Anything more than one nuke on India, should mean India strikes both China and Saudi Arabia using nukes. Saudi Arabia is targeted not because it is home of the two holy mosques of Islam, but rather because they assisted Pakistan in developing the nuclear bombs by financing it.

So basically we are making Pakistan a lethal threat to all Chinese and to all Saudi Arabians, and could involve the holy sands of Arabia to become irradiated, causing much spiritual stress to Muslims all over the world.

China is not the only power that is complicit in Pak nukes. P5 powers may think they can get away with it since Indians will not develop reliable, proven thermonukes.

The goal of any doctrine must be that when potential adversaries game the various scenarios, they should reach the conclusion that they will not survive.

Yes, but if we start telling everybody we will nuke them, then nobody would be taking us seriously.

And what if China preempts this move and nukes India right after an Indo-Pak spat goes nuclear?

Nuking China is not our official policy!

Secondly China is at risk, only if Pakistan uses more than one bomb on India! It is much easier for them to stop Pakistan from second/third strike, and avoid China being hit.

It is also not as if India will not retaliate against China, so something that was a speculation - India hitting at China, would all of a sudden become unavoidable!

[ramana]

X-post..

Jaswant for review of no-first-use Nuke policy

...
Noting that the security concerns are multi-dimensional and policies of 20th century will not work, he pressed for a revision of the nuclear policy “with a sense of urgency”, particularly of the no-first-use doctrine formulated by the NDA government.

”...(Nuclear) policy of NDA is greatly in need of revision ...Please hold broader consultations,” he suggested to the UPA government, adding “Time will not wait for us.”

The government should also take into confidence the Opposition while revising India’s nuclear policy, he said.
...

So what has changed that he feels the need to change NFU. NFU had the underlying assumption that only one power would attack India with other(s) backing it. India was confident of preventing that as its a derivative challenge. The NFU was to assure the backers that India-Pak is not a two-player game.

[ramdas]

Ramanaji,

If the adversary has a much larger arsenal than ours, NFU makes no sense. The question is: how far are these numbers saying that TSP has a bigger arsenal trustworthy ?

If even TSP ( a derivative challenge) has a bigger arsenal, how are we to deter the main challenge ? A more explicit build up is the only way out.

OTOH, is Jaswant Singh also someone from the Pro U.S lobby ? If so, what could be his motivation in saying this ?

[ramana]

I don't know if TSP numbers are credible. As for JS being pro-US lobby thats a joke.

There are many issues with the NFU. It was created informally by KS in the RG period and formalised by NDA in the post POKII phase. Again the rationale I already stated.

So what has changed? By dropping NFU, we want to deter even the derivative power TSP. So what changed?

BTW, S.S. Menon in his NDC speech in Nov 2010 already limited the NFU to non-nuke powers. He made the speech in front of the President and all the important cabinet members and chiefs of staff. It cant be slip of the toungue (lapsis lingua)

So there was a shift already. BRF did discuss this in this very thread....

[ramdas]

Ramanaji,

When you called TSP a derivative challenge, it was that TSP was seen as a small extension of other powers as far as nukes were concerned.

When you say "deter the derivative power", you are saying we want to deter even TSPs ability to use its nuke arsenal as a cover for its activities: we want to get around the earlier situation where TSP says "move against me and I nuke you".Is this correct ?

What do you think about the numbers stated for India ?80-100 as per FAS and now 50-60 as per JS? Are these just some numbers to push a point or are they reliable ?These numbers are very puny...

[ramana]

Well its arsenal is clearly PRC derivative. If PRC hadn't given it to them its remote or next to impossible that they could make the bum despite all the help from Western Europe.

Well numbers are not everything when it comes to nukes.

[ramdas]

Ramanaji

Numbers are not everything once they cross a certain threshold...that threshold must be sufficient to cause TSP to cease to exist as a nation (with no hope of recovery even with massive international aid) even after a first strike by TSP/PRC and it must be enough to devastate several key targets/cities of PRC....Take this into account. Take also into account that not all delivery systems will reach their target: more so if PRC develops an ABM system (which will surely happen soon).

To guarantee massive retaliation, we will need an arsenal above a threshold: say, several hundred warheads (including TN warheads). Above this threshold, numbers do not matter. Minimum credible deterrence should mean deterret at a level marginally above this threshold. Below that, they do. They especially do if stories of 50-60 warheads or 80-100 warheads are true. For example, with 80% reliability for delivery systems and 30% surviving an enemy first strike and 50% going thru an enemy defensive shield, 50-60 warheads means that only 5-6 finally hit the enemy. This is puny even for TSP - insufficient to completely take out even Karachi.

In case we havent yet reached the above mentioned threshold, it will make sense to make the larger nuclear program singularly focus on military needs to cover this gap before focusing on civilian energy programs.

[ramana]

BTw, here is BRF thread from 2003 on this very topic!

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... f=12&t=310