Managing Pakistan's failure

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RajeshA
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting from Indus Water Treaty Thread
Gerard wrote:IWT was signed by India, Pakistan and the World Bank.
The world recognizes India's right to enter into such a treaty. It recognizes India's rights to the water.
The IWT awards the waters of the Western Rivers to Pakistan. How can then one claim, that it recognizes India's rights to the water?
Gerard wrote:There is nothing to gain by pandering to an elite looking for rental income especially those dreaming about Yankee tenants.
Respect and honor should be reserved for those with honor who respect themselves.
The above suggestion was intended to effect following changes in India's geostrategic environment.
  1. Give India access to the waters of the Western Rivers, and if needed to all of them.
  2. Effect a positive change in the minds of the Kashmiris towards staying in India. Put an end to Kashmir insurgency.
  3. Effect a positive change in the minds of the PoKers, making them wish to be part of India, and them starting an armed insurgency against Pakistan.
  4. Give India a potent weapon - water, usable as a coercive means to several effects, including forcing Pakistan to undertake full, effective, transparent, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by shiv »

RajeshA wrote:
I think Government of India should reach a separate treaty with Govt. of J&K on water, which gives J&K full ownership of the waters of the Western Rivers and GoI the ownership of the Eastern Rivers. In the treaty, GoI reaches an understanding on how much India would be willing to pay J&K for the waters of the Western Rivers,
In India this would be political suicide. Apart from the fact that it may be unconstitutional.

The constitution can be changed, but suicide can't be reversed.

I can imagine the celebrations in Karnakata when the state demands and reaches a similar agreement for money to be paid by the central government to release water to Tamil Nadu. The population of the two states Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is almost one Pakistan (Its about 140 million actually), and is similar to or more than the population of Sindh and Pakjab.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by JE Menon »

>>Government of India should reach a separate treaty with Govt. of J&K

Boss this should be a no go area. Nothing that implies the "separateness" of J&K should be entertained. Our IWT arrangement is with Pakistan. The rivers are already controlled by GoI, and it will act in the best interest of J&K which is a state of India. J&K has as much autonomy as the other states of India, if not more.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)
shiv wrote:
RajeshA wrote:
I think Government of India should reach a separate treaty with Govt. of J&K on water, which gives J&K full ownership of the waters of the Western Rivers and GoI the ownership of the Eastern Rivers. In the treaty, GoI reaches an understanding on how much India would be willing to pay J&K for the waters of the Western Rivers,
In India this would be political suicide. Apart from the fact that it may be unconstitutional.

The constitution can be changed, but suicide can't be reversed.

I can imagine the celebrations in Karnakata when the state demands and reaches a similar agreement for money to be paid by the central government to release water to Tamil Nadu. The population of the two states Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is almost one Pakistan (Its about 140 million actually), and is similar to or more than the population of Sindh and Pakjab.
According to Article 370 from 1952, the GoI is responsible only for Defence, Communications, and Foreign Policy of J&K, as well as other areas to which J&K Legislature has given approval. There is no mention of water.

So GoI in fact was not in a position to barter away the Western rivers and give them to Pakistan as per IWT from 1960.

India should recognize this fact, and allow the ownership of waters of the rivers - Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to revert to J&K state!

With regard to other states, India does not have any such issue, and Article 262 from 1956 from the Administrative Chapter of the Indian Constitution based on the The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act (1956) provides for adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-state rivers and river valleys.

Other states cannot demand in a similar way as J&K for others to pay for the water that flows in through rivers to them.

The J&K case is special, and we should use that exception to get rid of the IWT!

In fact, Indian Supreme Court can simply tell the GoI that its ratification of IWT was illegal! Both Pakistan and World Bank would stand there high and dry!

India loses absolutely nothing, and it does not set a precedent for other states.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)
JE Menon wrote:>>Government of India should reach a separate treaty with Govt. of J&K

Boss this should be a no go area. Nothing that implies the "separateness" of J&K should be entertained. Our IWT arrangement is with Pakistan. The rivers are already controlled by GoI, and it will act in the best interest of J&K which is a state of India. J&K has as much autonomy as the other states of India, if not more.
JE Menon saar,

First and foremost, this proposal was not for the purpose of stressing J&K's separateness from rest of India, though that to some extent is a consequence of it.

The point is that we still don't know how to disarm Pakistan of its nukes! We still don't know how to win over the KMs and turn them into Indian patriots. We still don't know how to win back PoK, even as China is taking over the whole bloody place! Also Indian thirst for water is going to increase, and not decrease!

When Indus Water Treaty was signed it allocated around 33 million acre feet to India, and 135 million acre feet to Pakistan. Now I don't see, why India should be allowing water to flow into Pakistan through India, when Pakistan threatens to nuke us. Water is the most potent weapon to use against such an enemy, such as Pakistan.

Every time there is a terrorist attack, India needs to have the capability to stop water flow to Pakistan! We need levers of power to influence Pakistan's behavior!

The IWT is rubbish today, and does not help India in any way! Whatever has been allocated to us, is anyway Indian, so we lose not on waters we receive, but we can threaten Pakistan with waters they receive.

IWT as such cannot be abrogated or terminated as such by India. There is no provision for that in the Treaty. It can only be annulled and declared illegal, say by the Supreme Court of India.

When IWT was signed Pakistan was not a nuclear power with its nukes pointed at India. Today it is. Why should we give milk to the snake?
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by A_Gupta »

Pakistan will not fail. It will simply go into a long glide into irrelevance.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by Klaus »

RajeshA ji,

After having had a preliminary read of your e-book, I have one question which stands out (although there are others):

After integrating Sindh and Balochisthan into the United India project, the assumption you have made is that Pakjab and Karachi would essentially be fenced off (or a wall erected). Wouldnt this mean that the only land link to Balochisthan from India would pass through Sindh?

Possible implications of this is that Balochisthan would be an area for meddling elements to needle United India, pretty much the same way the North East is today. Sindh becomes an up-scaled version of chicken's neck, with the collective memory of Sindhis being that of hostility with India, though it is nowhere near as rabid as the Pakjabi version. Added to this is the opportunism of the Sindhis, they would realize that India has pretty much placed the sovereignty of Balochisthan in their hands. This scenario also takes into account the fact that there would be maritime interaction between Balochisthan and the peninsular Indian landmass.

The assumption is that Pashtunisthan would still be a restive region for Indian trade to efficiently pass through it into Central Asia and that Kashmir wouldnt be fully integrated yet (talking in a future sense here).
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by ramana »

-post...

Sunanda Datta Ray makes a very important point in his book review in Pioneer

Exploring the idea of India

...
A suave, highly Westernised Pakistani barrister I once met in the US took my breath away by claiming the Taj Mahal was Pakistani. Now, Gautam Adhikari tells us in this fine dissection of the anatomy of the Indian state that some Bangladeshis also feel that an example of Islamic art like Shah Jehan’s monument to love cannot be Indian.

Two assumptions are central to the claim. First, the socially handy theory that Muslims worldwide constitute a single community transcending national identities which enables “local peasants and fishermen who converted to Islam” (the words of another Bangladeshi Adhikari quotes) to upgrade themselves and claim fictitious ancestors of culture if not blood. Nirad C Chaudhuri speaks of a Mymensingh peasant lad saying dates, which he had never seen, were his favourite fruit! Second, that Muslims (like Sangh Parivar diehards) regard India as a Hindu — not multi-religious— country.....
Afridi's statements show the inherent belief in thse two assumptions.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Klaus ji,

thanks very much for your interest in the ebook.

If I may say so, what was written in the book, was written with a particular context and process in mind. I guess reading some of it here, devoid of much of context, makes it really look the work of some very hairy-brained arm-chair general! :D
Much of the discussion was in the Google Group under hijab! :wink:

As to your assumptions, I would say, I pretty much agree with them.

Sindhudesh would indeed have this connector role between India and Baluchistan, and may feel for this reason somewhat more important, but as you say we have a good maritime connection with Baluchistan, so it would be more of a illusory self-importance, this is unlike Siligur corridor, without which all our connections to Indian Northeast would be cut off.

We also have to look at the close relationship between the Sindhis and the Baluchis, where many Sindhis are considered to be of Baluchi origin. I don't think, Sindh would be doing much which would go against Baluchi interests.

The Sindhi nationalists were apprehensive of having a truck with India, because of their experiences of Gangetic Valley Muslims migrating to Karachi and Hyderabad and overrunning so to speak the Sindhi dominance of those cities. The Sindhis think that any union with India would invite more such migrants to their land. Considering the change in prosperity levels in India, that would unlikely be the case. Besides in our model, we are keeping Karachi out of the Grand Deal.

Once the PPP government is gone at the Center, with hardly any hope of making a come back any time soon, Sindhi nationalism would again get a shot in the arm. It will become interesting again.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by Sushupti »

Symbolic representation of India's job at hand.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by A_Gupta »

From Mani Shankar Aiyar's review of MJ Akbar's book, in the Friday Times:
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/25032011/page22.shtml
The portrayal of Pakistan as the coming surrender of a modern nation-State to a howling underclass, incensed by religious fervour, is parody at best and dangerous misreading at worst. Akbar himself concedes that “Fears of Pakistan disintegration however are highly exaggerated” (p. 310) but then can’t resist sacrificing the truth at the altar of an aphorism (a crime of which I myself am often quite correctly accused!) For Hoodbhoy’s “slow-burning fuse of religious extremism” will be stamped out before it reaches the powder keg, as Pervez Musharraf demonstrated in Swat and then in Buner when the Taliban/Al-Qaeda emerged from their mountain fastness to invest Islamabad, and as he again showed in clearing the Lal Masjid in the centre of Islamabad with rather more dispatch than the Indian army displayed against Bhindranwale.

No, Pakistan is not about to commit hara-kiri. And it is in the Indian interest to understand that than fear (or hope) that Pakistan will just blow up. For all their many difficulties, and for all the pessimism and even despair that permeates conversation and reflection with far too many Pakistanis from all walks of life, they are now past the anti-Indian and anti-Hindu extremism of their founders in three-piece suits. The consolidation of Pakistan’s Islamic identity, and its reconciliation of that identity with the imperatives of contemporary nation-building, is their problem, not ours; and the sensible thing to do would be to wish them well. More, the really sensible thing to do would be to engage with Pakistan in sincerely searching for joint answers instead of the self-defeating polemics to which our forensic skills have reduced our diplomacy. A proper appreciation of Pakistan being a modern nation-state with a modernizing civil society and an awakened people yearning for democracy, human rights and participative development (just as our people are), and which is what Pakistan really is for all the headline-grabbing of its theocratic nut-cases and gun-toting thugs, is a Pakistan we can help to come into its own, and thereby ourselves come into our own, through uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue. That is the way forward, not by recourse to “I told you so”. We should be treating Pakistan not as a Tinderbox but as a Tenderbox. n
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by shiv »

A_Gupta wrote:From Mani Shankar Aiyar's review of MJ Akbar's book, in the Friday Times:
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/25032011/page22.shtml
The consolidation of Pakistan’s Islamic identity, and its reconciliation of that identity with the imperatives of contemporary nation-building, is their problem, not ours; <snip> the really sensible thing to do would be to engage with Pakistan in sincerely searching for joint answers
:rotfl:

Mani Shankar Aiyar is a brainless twit. He manages to contradict himself in the span of two sentences.

If something is Pakistan's problem why look for joint solutions?

My neighbour is a gambler neck deep in debt and has sold his family to some of the lowest bidders. What's in it for me to kook for a "joint solution? This is like rapist and raped looking for a joint investigation into rape.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by JE Menon »

And a publicity hound who fancies himself as a bit of an expert on the English language; most important though is his willingness to repeatedly demonstrate his slavish sycophancy to the Gandhi dynasty, no matter how many times they ignore, dismiss or scorn him. All the while, hoping for that elusive patronising pat on the head. His only evident skill is in abrasive and uncouth debate defined more by volume than value. An easily detestable and slimy character.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by Vikas »

Well Pakistan and other being a pucca WKK is his only claim to fame nowadays...What else would fetch him headlines.
For all their many difficulties, and for all the pessimism and even despair that permeates conversation and reflection with far too many Pakistanis from all walks of life, they are now past the anti-Indian and anti-Hindu extremism of their founders in three-piece suits.
..
A proper appreciation of Pakistan being a modern nation-state with a modernizing civil society and an awakened people yearning for democracy, human rights and participative development (just as our people are), and which is what Pakistan really is
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by A_Gupta »

I hope you noticed Aiyar's "through uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue." Didn't we hear similar words from the Foreign Minister?
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

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A_Gupta wrote:From Mani Shankar Aiyar's review of MJ Akbar's book, in the Friday Times:
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/25032011/page22.shtml
For Hoodbhoy’s “slow-burning fuse of religious extremism” will be stamped out before it reaches the powder keg, as Pervez Musharraf demonstrated in Swat and then in Buner when the Taliban/Al-Qaeda emerged from their mountain fastness to invest Islamabad, and as he again showed in clearing the Lal Masjid in the centre of Islamabad with rather more dispatch than the Indian army displayed against Bhindranwale.
Mani Shankar Aiyar's forte are his English and bad temper, not truth and logic. His character is displayed in ample measures by the portions bolded above. One doesn't even need to explain why so because the untruth is so obvious from the above.

I am surprised that he didn't deem it fit to somehow introduce Hindu-terrroism and Hindutva in his narrative and strike an equality, his usual practice.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by JE Menon »

A_Gupta wrote:I hope you noticed Aiyar's "through uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue." Didn't we hear similar words from the Foreign Minister?
Not from ours I don't think. I don't think any GoI official has referred to "uninterruptible" dialogue. Would like to know if any one has used that word. But the Pakis have done so, frequently in the recent past.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by harbans »

I don't think any GoI official has referred to "uninterruptible" dialogue. Would like to know if any one has used that word. But the Pakis have done so, frequently in the recent past.
Menon Ji it's all over..
.. Mohali, we apparently agreed to an India-Pakistan dialogue that would be "comprehensive and (run) in an uninterrupted manner". The Indian Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao .
http://www.andhranews.net/India/2011/Un ... e-3371.htm
Last edited by harbans on 11 Apr 2011 19:16, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by SSridhar »

harbans wrote:
I don't think any GoI official has referred to "uninterruptible" dialogue. Would like to know if any one has used that word. But the Pakis have done so, frequently in the recent past.
Menon Ji it's all over..
.. Mohali, we apparently agreed to an India-Pakistan dialogue that would be "comprehensive and (run) in an uninterrupted manner". The Indian Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao .
harbans ji, but Ms. Nirupama Rao still didn't say it was not 'uninterruptible'. Having said that, We don't know what Mr. Man Mohan Singh personally conveyed to Mr. Gilani in chaste Punjabi.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting a conversation with SSridhar garu from Indus Water Treaty Thread

SSridhar garu,

Perhaps I am missing something with respect to the Indus Waters Treaty! Perhaps you could explain in short (or long), what exactly does India get for being in the IWT?

Okay, India averts a conflict with Pakistan, which hasn't really worked. But besides that?
SSridhar wrote:RajeshA, one has to look at the treaty in the context in which it was signed. In c. 1959, Ayub Khan took over Pakistan. In c. 1960, India and Pakistan signed a border agreement in the western sector and by Jan. 1961, troops began to withdraw from areas ceded to each other as part of the agreement. There was an American President, Eisenhower, who felt that he could establish a better relationship with India if he intervened in the water dispute (which started in 1948) as a neutral country friendly to both nations and settled the issue. India was unable to start its Bhakra-Nangal project, in which Nehru placed enormous faith for a green revolution. Nehru probably also thought that he could establish a new relationship with a new President in Pakistan.

So, all stakeholders felt something positive in the agreement.
SSridhar garu,

Thanks for your response.

Perhaps it did have its purposes in 1960. But today India has sufficient infrastructure on the Eastern Rivers. Pakistan has some on the Western Rivers. The Partition of the Indus Basin so to speak is complete, and IWT helped us get there.

My question pertained to the Present. What dividends are we getting today from IWT? It has more to do with the idea, whether it would be beneficial for India to terminate the IWT one way or the other? Should we do it, do we have anything to lose from it?
SSridhar wrote:Rajesh, the treaty, as it was drafted, is a great detriment to India. There can be no doubt about that. The award is not equitable from an Indian PoV at all. Moreover, it puts a lot of shackles on us, and we constantly have to prove our innocence to a paranoid Pakistan that hides its hatred for us under the facade of paranoia and thus deceives the world. This should be the only treaty where an upper riparian gave up so much to its sole lower riparian which has been most inimical. Such a generosity has brought us nothing but wars, skirmishes, terrorism, killing, maiming, water shortage, huge costs because of the conditions in IWT etc.

But, the question is how to scrap it now and renegotiate. I do not see that happening. We have to relentlessly implement our projects. The lesson here is that India should never barter away its interests because it would be too costly or even impossible to recover from such mistakes. Even if a there is a piece of land 'where not a blade of grass grows', it simply doesn't matter. We cannot let go of it. Similarly, even if we did not realize how to make use of waters of the so-called western rivers at that time, we should not have given four times the water that was eventually allocated to us, to Pakistan.
SSridhar garu,
I have a little amateurish proposal, consisting of a few mental somersaults.

The three parties to the treaty were India, Pakistan and the World Bank! As I understand, we cannot abrogate the treaty, we cannot terminate the treaty. But the Treaty can still be struck down as illegal in the first place.

This is where Article 370, which has been a millstone tied around our neck, can surprisingly, be of use. According to the Article 370 from 1952, J&K gave India the responsible only for Defence, Communications, and Foreign Policy of J&K, as well as other areas to which J&K Legislature gives approval. There is no mention of water. The waters did not belong to India in the first place.

So GoI in fact was not in a position to barter away the Western rivers and give them to Pakistan as per IWT from 1960.

India should recognize this fact, and allow the ownership of waters of the rivers - Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to revert to J&K state!

GoI should reach an agreement with J&K that preserves India's current rights over the waters flowing through J&K, but gives the ownership of the water itself to J&K.

In fact a simple complainant can bring a lawsuit in front of Supreme Court of India to judge on the matter, whether India was in a position to negotiate the IWT or not! The Supreme Court of India says India was not in such a position, and IWT is declared null and void. E Voilà, the waters of the Western Rivers belong to J&K.

With Indian rights secured, now it is up to J&K to give the waters to Pakistan, being the upper riparian. Of course, World Bank and Pakistan would impress upon J&K to continue with the current arrangements, but J&K can say, No!

India can make J&K an offer to pay for the waters of the Western Rivers, and gets the necessary infrastructure for the diversion built to divert the waters into other Indian rivers.

Considering, that for J&K this could be a lucrative deal, J&K decides to take up on India's offer.

After that J&K demands from Pakistan to be paid a similar amount for the water per cubic meter, that Pakistan receives from Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. That is where the fireworks begin between J&K and Pakistan.

Considering that India would be the country willing to pay for water from the Western Rivers, India controls how much water really goes to Pakistan, which would be equal to the amount India is not willing to buy!

There may be some downsides to this of which I am not sure.

I would appreciate your thoughts on this!
SSridhar wrote:Rajesh, there are two aspects as far as I can see.

The first is the constitutional matter. The second is the implication of leaving a foreign policy issue with a state.

On the constitutional issue, being only a layman, I see the following. The Constitution divides powers (legislative, executive and financial) into three lists, the Union List, the Concurrent List and the State List. Legislative power over anything not mentioned in these lists (the so called residuary powers) rests with the Central Government. Now, Article 370 makes certain exceptions for the State of J&K. In its original form of Article 370, the Union List & Concurrent List adhered to the T&Cs of the Instrument of Accession (IoA). These lists have been modified subsequently, especially in 1956. As I understand it, the Union Government can today legislate on Foreign affairs 'which bring the Union into relation with foreign countries' as well as 'Regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament in the public interests'.

If 'water' was not mentioned in the IoA, it comes under the residuary power of the Union Government.

On the issue of leaving it to the state of J&K, there are several issues. Firstly, not the entire Indus system of Rivers concern J&K. The eastern rivers do not flow through J&K. Among the Western rivers, only Jhelum originates in J&K. The Chenab originates in Himachal Pradesh and the Indus itself near Manasarovar in Tibet. So, the entire system of rivers cannot be considered as a package for settlement by an entity other than GoI. Secondly, Indian Constitution does not allow any state to negotiate a treaty with another country. that is a sure recipe to fragmentation in double quick time. Thirdly, we cannot selectively go back on the integration of J&K to suit our convenience.
SSridhar garu,

Again thanks for your response!

On constitutional matters, this is what I read:

The Instrument of Accession says the following with regard to External Affairs:
1. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries;
From the wording, I would assume, that negotiation of treaties and agreements does not fall into the purview of Indian Government.

According to Article 370 the J&K State Assembly has to give its concurrence to any Indian Law for it to be valid over J&K.

That would mean for any Law, which is not about Defence, Communications or Foreign Affairs, India would have to get the concurrence of the J&K State Assembly, regardless of whether the law in question deals with a subject in the Union, Concurrent or Residual List. This is different for other states in the Indian Union.
SSridhar wrote:If 'water' was not mentioned in the IoA, it comes under the residuary power of the Union Government.
My reading is different on this matter. Water would perhaps come under Residuary Power of the Union Government, if it is not part of the Union List or Concurrent List or State List. But the Schedule in the Instrument of Accession is a positive list, and not a negative list. It states the issues over which the Dominion of India may avail without concurrence of J&K State Assembly. For all other issues, the concurrence of J&K State Assembly is required.

So even as GoI would be the only instance to deal with foreign issues externally, in this case IWT, GoI internal to India, would first need to bring the resources or aspect in question under its responsibility, in this case river waters of J&K, which can only happen with concurrence of J&K State Assembly. I am not sure whether GoI has received that concurrence on this matter.

So J&K State Assembly can always claim that before India signed on to the IWT, India should have sought concurrence and clearance from J&K State Assembly. As India did not do so (I am assuming here), India did not have the right to barter away J&K water wealth.
SSridhar wrote:On the issue of leaving it to the state of J&K, there are several issues. Firstly, not the entire Indus system of Rivers concern J&K. The eastern rivers do not flow through J&K. Among the Western rivers, only Jhelum originates in J&K. The Chenab originates in Himachal Pradesh and the Indus itself near Manasarovar in Tibet. So, the entire system of rivers cannot be considered as a package for settlement by an entity other than GoI.
  • For Jhelum, J&K takes full responsibility!
  • For Chenab, J&K would have to find a sharing formula with Himachal Pradesh, perhaps share in the profits of selling the water, where Himachal's share would flow back to India. The Central Govt. can adjudicate the sharing of river waters. The last law has the concurrence of the J&K State Assembly.
  • For Indus, J&K would simply claim all water that passes through its area as its own. Are the Chinese going to change the course?
SSridhar wrote:Secondly, Indian Constitution does not allow any state to negotiate a treaty with another country. that is a sure recipe to fragmentation in double quick time.
I am not saying GoI should not be the party to sign treaties and agreements with foreign countries and then take the responsibility of their implementation.

What I am saying is that GoI should have first brought the river waters of the Western rivers under its responsibility by reaching an agreement with the J&K State Assembly (making the assumption, that they didn't), and then having the J&K State Assembly pass a law to this effect, and then India could/should have signed the IWT.

Only GoI could have signed the IWT, of course! Only GoI did not do the needful to get the authority to do so from the J&K State Assembly as per Article 370 prior to signing on the IWT. This means GoI signed the IWT without the necessary authorization from J&K State Assembly (again some assumption being made here).

So GoI's sole privilege to deal with External Affairs for the Union of India is not being questioned or diluted, just the manner in which it was executed with respect to J&K river waters, thus making India's signature on the IWT untenable.
SSridhar wrote:Thirdly, we cannot selectively go back on the integration of J&K to suit our convenience.
J&K is well integrated with Union of India. Just for reference a list of all the Indian Laws which are applicable to J&K.

There is a certain procedure laid down on how Indian Laws would be extended to J&K. Considering how many laws are already part of J&K legal corpus, it has been proven that at least on this front the J&K State Legislators do not deem necessary to underline the separateness.

Of course, Article 370 has many negatives with respect to India, especially in regard to owning property there or voting there. But in this particular case, Article 370 may be our savior.

<rhetoric start>
If we have had to carry the burden of Article 370 for so many years, why not enjoy this rare opportunity, where it works in our favor. If we water the trees for so long, why not enjoy this one time fruit, it brings forth!
<rhetoric end>

I understand, that my exposition above almost sounds seditious, but the cause is noble - to bring the Western Rivers under Indian control, and with that to bring Pakistan itself under Indian control!

If IWT is so bad, we should explore all venues to get rid of it! We should look for loopholes where ever we can!

If we get Pakistan under our control, then Kashmir gets solved by itself.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting from Indus Water Treaty Thread
JE Menon wrote:There is also the matter that J&K issue can be revived at the UN by interested parties - and we do not have a veto there. The issue is dormant, not dead. There are a lot of countries that would like to have a greater influence on the allocation of water resources in that area. And J&K governments are every ready to sniff out the possibility for getting others in, especially if things are not necessarily going their way politically.

I just don't see what we will get, that we don't have now, from allowing J&K government a greater say in the water flowing through there. Why not relentlessly build and keep quietly squeezing the neck, boa constrictor style, with every breath?

I genuinely might be missing something here.
JE Menon saar,
thanks for the interest!

<metaphorically speaking start>
Basically it is about taking a bone from the neighborhood dog, which it considers its rightful due, and give it our own dog, which has been sniping at us, and wants to join the neighborhood dog out of dog solidarity.

If our dog gets to have the bone, and tells the other dog, the neighborhood dog, that he will get to lick his old bone only if he pays up, then there is a big fight brewing up between the two dogs. Our dog may decide to make peace with us!
<metaphorically speaking end>

We are telling the Kashmiris (or rather citizens of J&K), that they own the 135 MAF per year water that flows into Pakistan. We are telling the Kashmiris, that they have the right to charge for that water (this we tell in whispers). We are telling the Kashmiris, that India would be building the infrastructure to divert the waters from the Western rivers to the other rivers flowing into India. For all the water we divert from the Western Rivers, we shall be paying the J&K state, perhaps twice more than the subsidies they get right now!

Kashmiris would want the Pakistanis too should pay for the water they get from the Western rivers, because if they don't pay up, the Kashmiris are willing to sell even more water to the rest of India.

Considering the amount of money that would be involved, Kashmiris would tend to start leaning towards India, for only India protects the Kashmiris right to charge money for water from the Western Rivers. Now for a people, who do not like to toil that much, this would be a big extravaganza!

We are giving the Kashmiris entitlement over their natural resources! When it comes to entitlement, friendship ends there! We will be having a Kashmiri in South Block in a J&K Water Exports Dept., perhaps recommended by the J&K Chief Minister, who would be negotiating with the Pakistanis for a suitable price for their water!

For the Kashmiri Elite, there is a lot of money to be made here in this business! They would certainly play along!

Then we come to the question of Kashmir in UN. Well with the Kashmiris now in India's favor, it would be difficult for Pakistanis to make a case!

But before we go into UN business, let's consider what would be the mood in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan! The people there would be watching how their cousins in J&K under Indian control are making money from water. Wouldn't they want that the Pakistani government also pays them for the water that flows through their land! Wouldn't they want their share of the 'loot'?!

Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan would now probably want to be united with J&K under Indian control, simply because without that they would be missing out on the loot!

Under such circumstances, Pakistan may not want to take the matter to the U.N.! Taking the matter to the U.N. would also bring forth all of Pakistan's many warts in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan!

And basically whatever the U.N. orders, we can show the middle finger to the U.N. now! There have been several U.N.S.C. Resolutions against Israel and it doesn't bother them!

Under this arrangement, we should not forget, we would be having Kashmiris in India's favor, something we haven't had very often!

Other countries cannot really force either India nor J&K to give water to Pakistan! If Pakistan wants water, they should pay up! If Pakistanis can sell the Basmati, they grow using Indus waters, in the international markets, why can't Kashmiris sell the same water itself!

Mark, this arrangement can only be availed by J&K State and not other Indian States because of Article 370!

So what we are getting:
  1. Give India access to the waters of the Western Rivers, and if needed to all of them.
  2. Effect a positive change in the minds of the Kashmiris towards staying in India. Put an end to Kashmir insurgency.
  3. Effect a positive change in the minds of the PoKers, making them wish to be part of India, and them starting an armed insurgency against Pakistan.
  4. Give India a potent weapon - water, usable as a coercive means to several effects, including forcing Pakistan to undertake full, effective, transparent, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting from Indus Water Treaty Thread
Gerard wrote:
Give India a potent weapon - water, usable as a coercive means to several effects,
That is a recipe for involvement of Great Powers (UNSC) in India-Pakistan affairs, to the detriment of India. Coercion will be portrayed as a threat to international peace and security and Pakistan's many sponsors will be all too willing to get involved.
This is true. USA, PRC and KSA could feel encouraged to intervene on behalf of their rentier state. But even as we acknowledge this possibility, or rather certainty, we should keep in mind, that it does not constitute an end of the world.
  • Plead Helplessness: The model proposed to get out of the IWT is a Supreme Court verdict in favor of J&K State and against India. That is J&K State should take India to court for bartering away its waters without Kashmiri concurrence. India should put up at least a pretense, that India is against scrapping the IWT, but J&K State insists. Once we "lose" the case, we should simply plead helplessness. We should make India's incomplete sovereignty over J&K as an excuse.
  • J&K Water Rights: We should put forth a narrative, that it is not India, that is trying to grab the waters of the Western Rivers, but rather the Kashmiris who are trying to assert their rights over the waters. Since "most of the world" has always been for the rights of "suppressed" Kashmiris, the Great Powers would be hard put to justify their support for Pakistan over the rights of Kashmiris. The more images we show of Kashmris rejoicing at winning back the "rights" to "their" waters, the more difficult we make it for the Great Powers.
  • It's all Business: J&K State should simply say, that it not about denying Pakistan any water, but rather it is about ensuring revenues for the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Considering the instability of the previous years, mostly because of interference from outsiders, the economy of J&K has suffered. J&K simply wants to be paid for its resources. J&K State also wishes to create a market for its water resources, and hence would also be offering Rest of India the option to buy water from J&K. Pakistan has enjoyed a free ride for far too long.
  • Water Wastage: J&K State can also claim that if Pakistan is forced to pay for its water, Pakistan would better appreciate the value of water and not allow it to go waste, in which case Pakistan would learn to be far more environmentally conscious. Also there would be more attention given to the phenomenon of water theft in Pakistan.
  • Water Subsidies: J&K State can also claim, that any well-wisher of Pakistan, including the Great Powers, are free to subsidize Pakistan's water purchases from J&K State.
  • Great Powers: Great Powers are not that great as they used to be. India in many respects is already there.
  • India's power equations: India's relationship with the Great Powers has also seen a shift for the positive. In fact, we are even rubbing shoulders with KSA, Pak's ideological godfather.
  • Still some time: In any case, should India adopt such a strategy, it will still be some time in the future, and in this time India would have grown still further - economically, politically and militarily.
  • Support for India: In this episode of confrontation with Pakistan, the Kashmiris, in fact on both sides of the LoC would be sitting in India's corner.
  • Opportune Time: India should await the right opportunity for the story of the collapse of IWT to break. When USA is sitting in Afghanistan, dependent on Pakistani cooperation for their GOAT, it would perhaps not be the right timing. If India considers that it is in her interest that USA stays put in Afghanistan, and India manages to find alternative supply routes to Afghanistan, then US desire to intervene in Kashmir could be neutralized. Considering that Pakistan is a hotbed for terrorists, it is also only a question of time, when Pakistanis again get involved in terrorism against the West. Western relations with Pakistan may deteriorate. So we have to be on the lookout for the right opportunity.
In the end, we have to make a judgment call - Do we go outside and solve our Pakistan problem or do we sit back huddled in our room afraid of the Great Powers lurking outside?
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting a post by chaanakya from Indus Water Treaty Thread

I followed your proposal with great interest. I think one needs to look at it and come out with a model which give us the opportunity to achieve our objectives within the confines of the legal framework as well as IWT. And this is not a loophole which is being exploited but the internal mechanism as it exists in case of other states. There is a genuine feeling in J&K that they have got shortchanged under IWT.India has this responsibility to redress these grievances as well to ensure enduring peace and prosperity in J&K.

The framework of River laws in India

There are quite a few legislation on this subject but first constitutional provisions

Union List , Entry 56

Code: Select all

56. Regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys to
the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of
the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public
interest.
State List ,Entry 17

Code: Select all

17. Water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage
and embankments, water storage and water power subject to the provisions
of entry 56 of List I.
Article 262 of the Constitution

Code: Select all

Disputes relating to Waters
262.  (1) Parliament may by law provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter-State river or river valley.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may by law provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint as is referred to in clause (1).
Other laws

The River Boards Act 1956
Inter-state water disputes Act 2002

Committees

Standing Committee on Inter-State Issues in Water Resources
The Sarkaria Commission on Centre- State Relations

Policy

National Water Policy, 2002


Instrument of Accession does not include the Subject "River.." for federal govt. That is quite consistent with what is provided for in the constitution of India. Hence by allowing J&K to take decisions in respect of its water no breach of law is observed. In so far inter-state river waters (concerned states are HP, Punjab. Haryana) these matters could easily be sorted out by setting up River Board for Indus Rivers.

Now the question of IWT comes.

The following entry is of interest

Code: Select all

B. External Affairs

1. External affairs; the [b]implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries[/b]; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to parts of His Majesty's Dominions outside India.

Now it is here, we have to apply our creative thoughts

District Water and irrigation committees could be set up which would undertake engineering works of canal construction , irrigation etc. Then J&K HP & Irrigation Board can be created and entrusted with the task of coordinating with district committees.

The canal of suitable strength could be constructed within the state on the basis of the outline provided by RajeshA. But not actually connected. District committees and local panchayats could be roped in (??) to create noise about illegality of IWT and that how J&K is not bound by it and that it has right to charge for water. Presently whatever GOI is paying J&K , some of that could be utilised for giving grant to them. J&K can increase the area under cultivation and irrigation.Energy of Locals should be diverted to productive work providing money and epmloyment at the same time lopening their eyes to the perfidy of pakistan when their interests conflict with that of Pakjab etc.

More thought later on this as I once again go through RajeshA's path braking suggestions and revisiting IWT. (#1111 post)
RajeshA
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting from Indus Water Treaty Thread

chaanakya ji,
First of all, many many thanks for support and your contributions to understanding the legality of the issue.
chaanakya wrote:I followed your proposal with great interest. I think one needs to look at it and come out with a model which give us the opportunity to achieve our objectives within the confines of the legal framework as well as IWT. And this is not a loophole which is being exploited but the internal mechanism as it exists in case of other states. There is a genuine feeling in J&K that they have got shortchanged under IWT.India has this responsibility to redress these grievances as well to ensure enduring peace and prosperity in J&K.
We should try to extract maximum profit from the current provisions of our legal framework and IWT. Much of that we are already doing.

IWT has many aspects which go against India's interests. However the central weakness of IWT is, that it gives the lower riparian country a sort of entitlement to the waters - the waters belong to Pakistan! And if Pakistanis see something as their entitlement, then a simple rumor of India withholding waters, can set off huge anti-India protests. India has adhered to the letter and spirit of the treaty, and still we get huge propaganda campaigns from JuD claiming that India is stealing their waters. Should India commit even a minor violation, it would be taken up as evidence for all the false accusations every Paki has been throwing at India and vindicate them, not to speak of any major violation. So Pakis have really pinned India to the wall in this game. India is being forced to live up to her commitments due to an aggressive posturing by the Pakistanis, who claim that even the current arrangement of IWT is less than their entitlement.

As long as Pakistanis feel that the waters flowing through J&K is their entitlement and as long as India has to commit herself to ensuring that Pakis get their entitlements, this is the way the game will be played. The Pakistanis would continue to build up jihadism against India on the basis of baseless rumors of Indian theft of their entitlements.

As an upper riparian country we have been forced onto the defensive.

We have to change the game! And two things we need to do for that is:
  • Pakistan should feel zero entitlement on the water! That is why it is so important that the water rights get transferred to Jammu & Kashmir. If India asserts those rights over the water, Pakistanis are going to go for full Jihad! Secondly Pakistanis have to be forced to pay for the water they get. More than the money J&K receives from the Pakis, it is important to rub it in, that the Pakis do not own the water. They own only the water they pay for!
  • Also India should step back from giving any commitments at all to Pakistan. No Treaty Commitments means No Violation Possibility means No False Anti-Indian Propaganda means No Jihad. Well more or less, and at least as far as water is concerned.
In order to make those two changes in the game, IWT would need to be scrapped. I seem to be unable to see how those two changes can be accommodated within IWT itself.

More later!
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting from Indus Water Treaty Thread
chaanakya wrote:Water is a state subject.

Where inter-state regulation and development of river valleys are concerned , Parliament has to pass an Act to the purpose. Ricer Boards Act 1956 is such enabling act. It is extended to J&K .

For disputes , Inter state water disputes Act 2002 is enacted for setting up tribunals specific to river valleys.

Their role is not exactly binding and taken more as advisory. May a times jurisdiction of Supreme court is also restricted by 262 (2) of COI.

J&K would not get anything more then what other states are already enjoying it.

The whole idea is how to work IWT within its legal framework and test its limit to restrict Pakistan from exercising eventual veto as and when it comes and if possible to make it irrelevant and have a veto on them. Like "behave or we deny DHMO"
I may be wrong in interpreting RajeshA's ideas in this way.
chaanakya ji,
we are indeed following different ideas.

As I understand it, you want to explore IWT's legal weaknesses, giving J&K more control over the waters of the Western Rivers, in the process hurting Pakistan's share of waters.

I am saying we ought to get rid of IWT altogether, and take away Pakistan's whole sense of entitlement and India's thankless commitments. Many have said, the treaty cannot be abrogated or terminated. I was trying to show a means of getting out of IWT in spite of those restrictions - by getting the treaty declared illegal, and null and void, based on the premise that India was not legally authorized to enter into such a treaty by the J&K State.

It is good if there are more than one model of busting the IWT. Both need to be explored.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting from Indus Water Treaty Thread
chaanakya wrote:
RajeshA wrote:Many have said, the treaty cannot be abrogated or terminated. I was trying to show a means of getting out of IWT in spite of those restrictions - by getting the treaty declared illegal, and null and void, based on the premise that India was not legally authorized to enter into such a treaty by the J&K State.

It is good if there are more than one model of busting the IWT. Both need to be explored.
The first part is correct.
chaanakya wrote:I have quoted Subjects under IOA which includes Foreign treaty and comes within the purview of Central Govt.

Code: Select all

B. External Affairs

1. External affairs; the [b]implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries[/b]; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to parts of His Majesty's Dominions outside India.
chaanakya ji,

I also had looked at it and found that it spoke of "implementing" of treaties, but not about negotiating them or for that matter even signing them, but that may be some diplomatic mumbo jumbo where implementing includes negotiating and signing.

My point is that one can give away only that what one owns or what one controls. J&K IOA did not include J&K natural resources, including water in the schedule, which means J&K owned that water. According to IOA and Article 370 India's sovereignty over J&K is limited, and as I see it Indian sovereignty did not extend to J&K waters.

In any treaty with a foreign country or foreign organization, the GoI can only barter away only that what falls under its sovereignty, and in J&K's case the sovereignty is extended over issues on a case by case base, one act at a time, through the concurrence of the J&K Legislature.

If the sovereignty of Union of India did not extend over the natural resources of the J&K State at the time of signing of IWT, September 19, 1960, then India was not authorized by her Constitution which includes J&K Constitution to sign on this treaty.

I claim, that only India has the right to sign foreign treaties, which impeach on J&K issues, but that right's extent needs to be negotiated with J&K State prior to India signing such a treaty with a foreign country. The J&K State needs to extend Indian Sovereignty over J&K on the issues which the right touches upon, BEFORE India uses that right to sign foreign treaties.

I think, as far as the question of implementing treaties and agreements with foreign countries go, it probably also refers to the fact that J&K citizens are also Indian citizens and if India signs a foreign treaty then it can be considered that all Indian citizens, including J&K citizens, are bound by that treaty. That is, India can speak in the name of J&K citizens as well.

But in the case of IWT, India is not only speaking in the name of J&K citizens but also speaking in the name of J&K State and over issues that fall under its domain - waters of J&K. That I think, was not permissible.

Actually I too find it somewhat funny that I am playing the devil's advocate, "burying India's authority over J&K" in order to preserve India's national interest in this case!

I think there exists a opening in the Constitutionality of IWT, and India should take it, and turn off the tap on Pakistan.
chaanakya wrote:On the other hand , water is a state subject and J&K has every right to exploit it as it deems fit. But they have to raise demand for its abrogation and call it illegal. If India has not taken J&K into confidence then it raises interesting possibilities. After all IWT does not confer recognition on J&K as part of either countries but skirts this issue with a disclaimer. J&K does not figure there at all. Hence J&K should be encouraged to take advantage of this lacunae. For India , it would be a win-win situation and for Pakistan it would be lose-lose only.
1) Of course, J&K is free to use as much of the waters it wants, but that would only mean India cannot deliver on its commitments in IWT for the Western Rivers, and the Pakistanis would hold India responsible. So we would be expecting more Jihad!
2) J&K may not be in a position to utilize much of those waters internally, especially as outsiders cannot buy land and property there and as such one cannot put up industry that easily, which could utilize water. Similarly it may not deemed positive to do away with forest cover in J&K and turn it into agricultural land. The real thirst for water in India is outside J&K. So it would not be bad idea, if India (besides J&K) could also make use of those waters through appropriate canals and diversions. But even within an IWT "distorted" by J&K's use of water, India would still not be able to avail of those waters.
3) That would also limit J&K's ability to influence Pakistan, for without the infrastructure and threat to divert the waters in a significant amount, e.g. to rest of India, Pakistan may remain nonchalant about any substantial threat, nonchalant enough not to change its behavior viz-a-viz India, but not enough not to go on a propaganda crusade against India.

I think this would be more at a level of pin-pricks to wake up the Jihadi and not at the level of a bayonet on his throat forcing him to change his ways!
chaanakya wrote:India being a signatory to it might not like to go back on the treaty unless there is war. And it has not used opportunities presented to it since independence.
India is not going back on a treaty, we are not violating it, we are not abrogating it, we are not terminating it. The treaty would simply be declared null and void, because India's Supreme Court would judge that India was not authorized to sign the treaty in the first place! The treaty would simply cease existing because of its birth defects!

There is nothing in the IWT which helps India protect her national interests. We are feeding the snake that bites us! That has to stop!

My claim is that
- if IWT is cancelled, and
- J&K is give possession of its waters, and
- India reaches a different treaty with J&K which protects our current privileges as far as waters and infrastructure is concerned, and
- India builds the infrastructure to divert water from the Western Rivers, and
- J&K opts to sell its waters,

then Kashmir problem will be solved for India, and even Pakistan problem would be solved for India.

chaanakya ji,
I do not wish to sound critical of your proposals. I still have to read them and understand them properly.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting from Indus Water Treaty Thread

chaanakya ji,

I was just looking over your ideas in your earlier posts, to see how much congruence there between our thinking in this direction.
chaanakya wrote:So treaty has to be extended to J&K with concurrence of its Legislature only. In fact J&K is , apparently not bound by the treaty so there is no question of violation by J&K govt.( It is not clear to me if J&K govt was consulted and concurrence obtained )
By implication J&K can do whatever they wish to with the waters of rivers passing through their state.

This may have serious implications for Pakistan as well as India in case of independence or merger with either country or sanctified LOC giving each country held portion of J&K. IWT could be properly operated only in these situations. Till such time J&K is not legally bound by IWT nor can it be enforced by parties to either POK or J&K which are not party to IWT.

This is my loud thinking and subject to further elaboration/clarification etc by esteemed members, esp ssridhar.
RajeshA wrote:1) Of course, J&K is free to use as much of the waters it wants, but that would only mean India cannot deliver on its commitments in IWT for the Western Rivers, and the Pakistanis would hold India responsible. So we would be expecting more Jihad!
While at a legal level J&K has the right to do with its waters whatever it wants, in signing the IWT, India gave a commitment to Pakistan, that India would ensure that the use of Western Rivers would be regulated by the terms of the IWT Treaty. India gave a commitment to Pakistan, that J&K State would not be allowed to use its waters arbitrarily. So for any violation, Pakistan is going to hold India responsible. They will say, "you control Kashmir, so make sure that our waters are not held back. You said you would do that!"

So in a way, IWT and Pakistan are forcing India to "oppress" J&K citizens.

I would rather have the IWT totally thrown out.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 3

Water for Nuclear Disarmament Solution (cont.)

X-Posting from Indus Water Treaty Thread
AKalam wrote:These water issues alone should have been enough to convince the short sighted supporters of two nation theory that Partition was a bad idea. As time passes, it is natural that India will make increasing use of the upstream water in the interest of Indian citizens. Downstream nations can complain all they want, but the ultimate responsibility does lie with their past leaders who chose to form separate nations and bring this eventuality which could be avoided. Scrapping of IWT and similar efforts should help convince people at downstream nations that it is indeed in their long term interest to work with India rather than acting like its eternal enemy.

We cannot put the genie back in the bottle, but the best case scenario would be to negate the ill effects of Partition, through a tight regional integration effort like we discussed before.

A population can be deluded to believe that share of water in international rivers belongs to downstream people, but the reality is that ultimately might makes right, if might is not enough to get something, then one must negotiate, be on the good side, listen to the other side and make deals.
AKalam ji,
For the last 50 years, India has stuck to IWT meticuluously which gives Pakistan, the lower riparian, the rights to of the waters of the Indus Basin, and still we get wars and terrorism from Pakistan. Pakistan sees the waters as their entitlement and the jihadi organizations keep on with their propaganda about India stealing waters.

I can't think of a more thankless bat sucking your blood!

Were it not for Pakistan's animosity against India, Indians would probably have not given it any thought about the justice of this distribution of waters. But with attacks like Mumbai 26/11 we have to rethink our sense of generosity.

As far as I am concerned, I think, Pakistan should be made to beg for water, and after a long period of begging, they may come around to the idea, that they should get rid of enmity against India.

Water is the most potent weapon in India's hand short of using violence! It is the best way to teach Pakistan some lessons without resorting to blood-letting.

Basically I find it surprising that India still sticks to the treaty and has not thrown it into the dustbin of history.

For peace on the Subcontinent, it is vitally important that mentality of Pakistan changes and changes drastically, and we have to look for all possible ways to get the message across. Water is the most non-violent means to that end.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 2

Unchaddee the Echandee of the Bully & Swat It Solution

Continuing from here.

X-Posting from Future Strategic Scenarios in the Indian Subcontinent - II Thread
somnath wrote:
RajeshA wrote:Middle finger to the world. We have grown ourselves beyond those little fantasy monsters under our bed, which the Great Powers used to use to scare us in our childhood.
RajeshA-ji, dont know about you, but most people have to live in the world as it exists, not a world that we wish there was..

There is no tolerance in the world for armed conflict between nuclear armed nations, for that matter, armed action against even a potential nuke armed adversary...If "teaching a lesson" by random, frequent limited actions against a nuke-armed rogue was so plausible,
somnath ji,
I thank you for bringing up a very important point - "tolerance in the world for armed conflict between nuclear armed nations"!

Because perhaps the tolerance is low, as you yourself claim here, may be we can use that low tolerance in our favor. The world is given an ultimatum by us, or perhaps one can use a more diplomatic term, the world is shown an opportunity by us, either the world HELPS us solve the Pakistan problem or the world LETS us solve the Pakistan problem. But the option where the world STOPS us from solving the Pakistan problem, is not on the table.

Now the laundry list is long on Pakistan, but topmost on that list should be a UN Security Council Resolutions
  1. Declaring Pakistan a terrorist state
  2. Putting an arms embargo on Pakistan, especially on big-ticket items.
So the question is, can India make the "Great Powers" so jittery, that they accede to these minimum demands from India.
somnath wrote:Israel/US would have carried that out against Iran long back...SoKo/US would have done it against NoKo...In both those cases, the power differentials, even in purely conventional military terms are far better than what exists between India and Pak today...
Don't you think, that it is part of American duplicity to extend support to you against your enemy, but to see to it, that your enemy lives on, albeit somewhat weak but still threatening.
somnath wrote:Israel learnt (or didnt learn!) the futility of the whole "limited military action" theory over the years...military operations did little to reduce rocket attacks or terror attacks...What did work was political and intel work - like getting Egypt on board to economically aphyxiate the Paletinians, getting Jordan on board...Playing on the fears of Saudi Arabia...Perpetually keeping the Palestinians divided - Hamas and Fatah (yes, if you didnt notice, once Hamas became too big for their boots, Israel shifted patronage to Fatah!)...
There are differences between India vs. Pakistan and Israel vs. Palestine. For one thing, the whole Islamic world cares a lot more about happens around Islam's third most holy site, than what happens to the Pakis. Secondly the Palestinians are confined to a very small space, whereas Pakistan is large, which means that if India bites off chunks of Pakistan, there is still going to be enough of left over for Pakis, so for Pakis, it is not existential. Thirdly even in the minds of the Ummah, Pakistan is still considered part of Hindustan, the Pakis are still Hindustanis, despite Paki pleas to accept them as their offspring. Fourthly Jews are the historical enemies of the Muslims. Hindus were just slaves and not to be taken seriously.

The point is Israel has had only limited room for maneuvering. And they still have played a pretty aggressive game.

Indians do not really have this history of aggressiveness towards Pakistan, and I think this must change, especially as Indians do have a lot more room for slapping Pakistan. I concede Amreeka bahadur and not Cheen bahadur would frown, but even 1971 did not stop India to do what was necessary when these countries were strongly anti-Indian, why should it stop us now. Even USA and PRC have their doubts about Pakistan.

All this give us a lot more leeway, than Israel ever had!
somnath wrote:those who blithely comment that "prosperity for a select few is unimportant" display nothing but a complete lack of understanding of either the complex globally integrated state of the Indian economy as well as geopolitics...During Ops Parakram, one of the pressure points on the govt was brought about by IT companies, as travel advisories from the US started hurting....No one will base their back-office or tech support in a country that is frequently doing small wars with a rogue nuke armed neighbour...
somnath ji,
I think all Indians even the WKK have some function in the overall design of bringing Pakistan down.

Those Indians who are connected to the global supply chains should ensure that India has minimum costs due to temporary phases of regional "instability", when India goes to spank Pakis. However I do not think, that these Indians should be arguing against India solving Pakistan problem.

I ask you, did USA, UK and other Western countries not issue travel advisories in the wake of Mumbai terror attacks? And even when CWG were to be held, fearing terrorist attacks?

Once Afghanistan eases, don't you think that the phase of "less" terror attacks against India would be over, and Pakjabi Generals would go back to their daily schedule?

Pakistanis NEED TO BE DEALT WITH. Even though the games you propose can be pretty useful, they are at best a little cream over our sores, not a solution to our disease - Pakistan.
somnath wrote:A "comprehensive" political solution, companied with ethnic cleansing (as some members here fantatsize about) are more than just fantasizing, they are delusional...We saw the costs of regime change in Af and in Iraq to the US...Finally, the Pak problem will be solved by time - we can only keep managing it by insuating ourselves as much as possible while hastening Pak's downfall..
What does regime change in Pakistan really mean?

If there is a "democratic" election it would throw up one or the other feudal/civilian joker, who would admit his helplessness in going against the Army or their policies against India.

If we somehow push through a COAS of our choice even, his Islamized Pakjabi officers may sideline him, if his policies are too India-friendly.

If we dismantle the whole Pakistani Army a la Paul Bremer, the society would again throw up the same crap as candidates for whatever security force is put up instead.

So regime change in Pakistan, would not help one bit! The only change we can push through is either dismemberment or effect a change in regime behavior. The change in regime behavior can however come only from what lessons they learn when dealing with India.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 2

Unchaddee the Echandee of the Bully & Swat It Solution

Continuing from here.

X-Posting from Future Strategic Scenarios in the Indian Subcontinent - II Thread

somnath ji,

just adding to the above,

"teaching Pakistan a lesson" means more than just lashing out in revenge. It is a rational thought intended for exact that purpose, and not to be mistaken for simply a mask for revenge.

The comments below are to be understood in the context of "Solving Pakistan: Solution 2: Unchaddee the Echandee of the Bully & Swat It Solution", which includes the "Land for Terror" aspect.

Attacking a nuclear armed country like Pakistan is especially important, because how else can one tell the Pakis that your nukes do not work in more ways than one - one does not fear the nukes. This is the way to tell the Pakistani Establishment that neither we fear their nukes nor their terrorism nor their conventional military nor their faujis.

Only when this lesson sinks in, that basically Pakistan has nothing that makes India break into a cold sweat, only then will the Pakistani Establishment be willing to change its spots and stripes.

Of course our infrastructure and investments, the business climate, and even our lives all make us very sensitive to pressure and fear. It is to keep that fear alive, that we get hit every now and then. And then there is a big constituency of Indians, and I can understand them very well and sympathize with them, who fall for this agenda, are fearful, but more importantly display that fear outwardly to the Pakistanis, confirming their theories that bullying works, and reaffirming their program of instilling fear into Indians through regular terrorist attacks.

FEAR ATTRACTS TERRORIST ATTACKS!

The more we fear, the more travel advisories would go out!

"Teaching the Pakistanis a Lesson" is all about telling them that Indians are not afraid, and if they wish to continue to rule, they better come up with a new business model!

And if they want help, in looking for a new business model, Indians may even relent and help.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 4

First Orphanize It, Then Straighten It Solution

There is some churning in the Gulf region which provides us with some hope that Pakistan could be solved differently, than conventionally.

Pakistan depends on the Arab world, on Saudi Arabia primarily, to provide itself with an ideological compass as well as with monetary, material and moral support, which keeps the country trudging along.

We have often given it some thought about how we could persuade Pakistan's 3½ friends from keeping the Pakistani monster afloat and withdrawing chiefly the monetary support.

But just as important is Pakistan's ideological compass. This compass always points to Saudi Arabia and draws sustenance from the purity advocated by Wahhabism, a sub-sect of Sunniism. More generally Pakistan looks towards Arab Sunnis for ideological guidance and patronage. Accordingly in the sectarian schism in Pakistan, many of the more "committed" Sunnis in Pakistan have come to regard the Shias as impure at best and as apostates, who are wajib ul-qatl at worst.

What if the ideological compass broke down and the monetary stream dried up?

What if the Arab Sunnis lost all their Oil wealth and most Arabs became Shia? That would make the Pakistanis into orphans!

So is there a chance of this happening?

The current winds in the Gulf seem to whisper "Yes"! Iran has decided to push on with its nuclear program. Secondly the Shias in Bahrain have become restless and threaten to overthrow the Sunni monarch. GCC in response has decided that it is better to solve the problem with Iran now than later. GCC has started putting up a united front and making GCC into a security alliance. Secondly GCC has decided to build a coalition against Iran and is trying to rope in Turkey and Pakistan. GCC has in fact called on the Indians to decrease India's threat level towards Pakistan so long as GCC requires Pakistani services in this regard. Moreover GCC is expected to get American support in cracking down on Iran, and American forces stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan can be helpful in this regard.

So how does all this portend Sunni loss of Oil revenues and emergence of Arab Shi'ism as the dominant sect amongst the Arabs?

For Shi'ism to become the dominant sect amongst the Arabs, it would have to let go of its dependence on the Iranians. The Iranians would have to become the junior Shi'ite power letting the Arab Shia to become the dominant Shi'ite power brokers. Shi'ism would have to become Arab again. That is possible if there is a net transfer of power from the Iranians to the Arab Shi'ites, as well as relative change in the power levels of the two.

Secondly Shi'ites, in particular Arab Shi'ites would have to attain a measure of national power which dwarfs the power of the Sunnis. That is possible only if there is a net transfer of power from the Arab Sunnis to the Arab Shi'ites.

When we talk of Arab Shi'ites, we actually mean the Iraqi Shia for there Shi'ism is at home.

So both Iranians and Saudi Arabians are in the way of an Arab Shia consolidation. Iranians are as much in the way of Shia empowerment as the Wahhabis. The Persian character of Iran allows the Saudi Arabians to paint Shi'ism vs Sunni tussle as a Persian-Arab conflict! If the main Shi'a power was itself Arab, that would not be possible, and many more Arabs would be willing to listen to the Shi'a message as is right now the case.

The coming conflict can change the current status quo! It is to be expected that the GCC-USA coalition would attack Iran if a war breaks out, and Khuzestan Province of Iran, which has an Arab majority and is the single most important province in terms of Oil, Gas and Water, could be expected to be occupied by American, British and Iraqi (perhaps Sunni) troops. The British have old and strong relations with the Ahwaz region. One speaks of the Khuzestan Gambit. If that is subsequently integrated into Iraqi Shia State, then there is a net transfer of power from Iranian Shias to Iraqi Shias.

Considering that the effort would be to weaken the Iranians, it is quite possible that further breakages in Iran are actively encouraged which could see the Iranian Kordistanis, the Azeris and the Baloch in the South-West to break up leaving Iran a much diminished state. That leads to a relative rise in national power for the Arab Shia and a corresponding relative decline for Iranian national power.

Since all this carving up of Iran would not be taken lying down, it is to be expected that the Iranians would activate the Shias in Saudi Arabia and send the various Shia militias to strengthen the hands of the Shia majority in the Oil rich Eastern Province. In fact most of Saudi Arabia's Oil comes from this region, and if this region with or without America's nudge and wink goes into the Shia column, then it can mean a complete death of the Arab Sunni cash cow!

The Saudi Oil Fields in the Eastern Province are the single biggest source of money for the Sunni dawas, medrassas and mosques the world over including in Pakistan, or especially in Pakistan. Not just for dawas, etc, but the Saudis give aid directly to Pakistani State as well. All this would evaporate if the region turns Shia.

An Arab Shia State with the resources of Southern Iraq, Khuzestan (Iran) and Eastern Province (Saudi Arabia) would be an Oil behemoth. It would be able to keep these resources only if it accepts a continued American presence which protects it from both Persian as well as Wahhabi wrath. But with the scales having tilted decidedly in favor of Arab Shias, it would become possible again for them to proselytize and woo the rest of the Arab Sunnis over to Shi'ism, and there is no reason to doubt their success.

For the Saudis to continue to enjoy a relative good standard of living, they would have to follow suit and look up to Iraqi Shias for subsidizing their lives and turning Shia may allow them to continue to enjoy the largess! So even though the Wahhabis will fight the Shi'ites tooth and nail, many Saudi tribes may give in to Shi'ism, for people often dance to the music of the biggest Oil-well. Even Egyptians may be receptive to the Shia message! UAE too may have to make peace with such an overwhelmingly strong Arab Shia State in the Gulf. The point is that if the Oil fields change hands, the Arab faith would too!

So with what face would Pakistan, the second Wahhabi bastion, be asking for money from the Arab Shias when they would have been killing Shias indiscriminately in the past years.

This would invariably lead to ostracisation of the Pakistanis by the Arab rich and the Arab Shi'ite Ulema. A recarving of Iran (as per Ralph Peters) could also lead to alternate ways for the Americans to Central Asia. Without any further use of Pakistan for propping up Sunni dictators in the Gulf or for access to Central Asia, 2½ friends of the 3½ friends would simply show Pakistan the middle finger and ditch it.

From then onwards India would find it easier to deal with Pakistan.

Should India do something to aid these transitions? Considering that India has the second biggest Shia population in the world, some 25 million strong, India could use them to help in the transitions, but considering our necessity to always ensure communal peace in India, it is best we do not do anything to endanger that peace. So I would suggest India to refrain from it, but still some private initiatives could be pursued!
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 5

India-Bangladesh Merger

X-Posted from TIRP Thread
SSridhar wrote:
arun wrote:Dawn’s version of US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Michael Mullen’s comment
“The ISI has a rich history of how they operated in this part of the world, to protect their own country; I understand that some of the aspects of that we strongly disagree with and that is something that we continue to address.” …………………
I hope BRfites clearly understand 'which aspects of TSP's terro policy that the US agrees with'. I am simply amazed at how some Indians believe that the US will solve India's problems. Some people like Ms. C. Fair say openly why the US will *NOT* solve India's problems while Adm. Mullen et al cloak it but still deliver the message to us Indians. Yet, we repose faith in US intervention.
The Indians are in prarthna modus, and one is in prarthna modus, when one sees oneself as impotent to change the situation. We are praying that the Americans would solve our problems, and that is not going to happen. We fall prey to praying, because our strategic community simply has not put forth any plan, any course of action, any road map which ensures an end to Pakistani terrorism under the umbrella of nuclear threat! We are taking the geopolitical environment around India as a given, immune to our manipulation, immune to resolution! Why?

Today we live under the threat of several tens of nuclear bombs going off in our cities, set off by mad dogs who in their collapse have nothing to lose and all satisfaction to gain from seeing India going down with them. With every year, the difference between India and Pakistan would grow, and so too would the jalan, the envy from Indian progress. The threat of some nuclear strike on India only increases with time!

Does the Indian establishment have no ideas how to resolve this, other than with prarthna and pappi-jhaphi!

There have always been huge events in world history which have wiped away established political structures, so why is such a tide not being considered!

If the powers that be in Delhi, are willing to share power, than Pakistan can be unraveled within 3 years. I had proposed an India-Bangladesh merger in the context of "Peaceful Consolidation of the Indian Subcontinent". How long can Pakjabis hold on to the various other provinces in the backdrop of something like that?

One can unravel and disarm Pakistan without firing even a single bullet, without any bloodshed! But one requires some very bold decisions from the top!
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Solving Pakistan: Solution 5

India-Bangladesh Merger

X-Posted from TIRP Thread
VikasRaina wrote:RajeshA: Your idea of India-BD merger would somehow trigger giant tsunami of Pakis trying to divestiture the country known as Pakistan somehow doesn't inspire confidence in me. We are trying to hit a six and cricket and hoping for a Gold in hockey. Still you have some original idea. At least you can't be called a arm chair critic.
As far as I see it,
  • Pakjabis with a sprinkling of Pushtun and Mohajirs thrown in, are the ones flying the Pakistani flag.
  • Non-Pakjabi ethnicities are kept in by showing them Hindu India as bogey man and for saving Islam.
  • And then there is a vast population, who are simply fed up of a non-performing Pakistani State, including in Pakjab.
An India-BD merger would negate the raison d'être of Pakistan, its birth, its foundation and its ideology so comprehensively, that Pakjabis would be left with no more excuses.

Pakistan is being kept together by having forced the other ethnicities to swear on Islam itself. It is not necessarily any loyalty to Pakistan that keeps the other provinces tied to Pakjab, but rather their loyalty to Islam, and Pakjabis have successfully equated Pakistan with Islam. You be disloyal to one, you are disloyal to the other.

With Indo-BD merger, the whole Hindu bogey-man and "Islam in danger" falls flat on its face. Pakistanis would see that 1947 is not written in stone. They are free to rethink the Two-Nation Theory. They are free to rethink Partition, and this time with the benefit of hindsight.

There is a knot which has frozen Pakistani attitude towards India in time. Indo-BD merger would open that knot, and let the thoughts of non-Pakjabis in Pakistan flow freely again.

The giant tsunami would come from the Sindhis, the Mohajirs, the Baluchis, the Gilgitians, the Baltistanis, and Pakjabis would not be able to keep this urge back. We need not take in any. We just need to get them out of Pakistan first. We can do the cherry picking later if we wish.

To be frank, Indians have not been able to solve Pakistan, because of complicated thinking amongst the Indian leadership and their calculations regarding Muslim sentiments in India and rest of the world. In this regard, Bangladeshis at the helm of MEA's Pakistan Desk can do better! No more Muslim sentiments to think weigh in!

IMHO, it is difficult for Indians to comprehend the enormous change we will go through in looking at ourselves and at India's opportunities in the that post-merger New World! We will be much much more than the sum of our parts!

Looking through a prism, one would see two "MUSLIM" nations in the Indian Subcontinent, one almost twice as big as the other, both nuclear powers, but one successful, prosperous with a double-digit GDP growth, the other going down the drain! To which "Muslim" nation in the Indian Subcontinent, would the Sindhis, the Baluch, the Gilgitians, the Baltistanis want to belong to! Can the Pakjabis really deny the others that right? Aren't Muslims supposed to join the bigger Ummah (as India could be considered through that prism)?

Let's not forget what we have here at stake! The Indo-BD merger is definitely preferable to a nuclear war! At the moment, all GoI has done is to put wool on our eyes and pretend that there is no nuclear threat from Pakistan! More than that, there is no preparedness drive for the population on the part of GoI either!
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Some posts from chaighar made by Feroz Khan
Feroz Khan wrote:The state has no alternative for the dreams of Muslim martial traditions because the state is incapable of any policy decision, which mitigates against this phenomena. The policy framework required to create a response against the occupation of South Punjab by the Islamic militant groups cannot be allowed to exist as a workable policy option. The formulation of such a policy, designed to resist the growth of Islamic militancy, in the heartland of Pakistan, poses a direct threat to the very institutional existence of the Pakistani armed forces and such, will never be tolerated to exist let alone succeed.

In terms of emerging global threat indicators and trends, the growing cause of concern in international security studies, as they pertain to Pakistan, is not the failure of the state or even a Islamic styled revolution, but the questions of durability and sustainibility of the Pakistani armed forces, particularly the army. The greatest mortal threat to the state of Pakistan orginates from within the Pakistan army and not these non-state actors.

The non-state actors, which are gradually entrenching themselves into the political fabric of the Pakistani society do not have the ability to usurp political power completely and rule the state, but they do have the capability to plunge Pakistan into circumtances of acute anarchy. The political forces in Pakistan, and this term implies the political parties in Pakistan, are not capable of resisting the militant groups in Pakistan, because these groups exist under the umbrella of the military’s offical patronage.

The Pakistani army views these groups as its “strateic assets” not because of their usefulness to the army’s own political interests in Kashmir or Afghanistan, but because these groups are increasingly offering the only viable avenue to the army’s own raison d’ etre as an insitution. To understand the proliferation of these militant non-state actors/groups in Pakistan, it is incumbent to understand the reasons why the Pakistani military supports them; shelters them and preserves them from harm.

Pakistan is a state, which though not a failure in the most objective sense, is on verge of an impending economic implosion. The Pakistani military, particularly the army, has historically siphoned resources from the state towards its own betterment and it has used the existence of the state as a rationale for its own very existence. The problem, for Pakistan in light of the proliferation of the militant groups and their offical linkages with the state, is that the Pakistani military is an institutional bureaucracy and the first principle of any bureaucratic organization is the idea of self-preservation.

The Pakistani military; the army, represents the state and sees itself as the embodiment of the state’s authority but in a reverse sense. The legitimacy of the state of Pakistan draws from the legitmacy of the Pakistani army as a viable institution. The problem is that as the state of Pakistan continues to fail and seems to be failing, it poses certain questions for the long-term existence of the Pakistani military and its most dominating influence; the Pakistani army.

The mindset of the Pakistani army is such that it believes that without it, Pakistan cannot exist. With the economy of Pakistan under severe strains and the international opinion critical of miliary intervention in Pakistani politics, atleast overtly, the army had to find an argument to justify its existence in Pakistan and still be the recipient of external donor support in order to exist as an institution.

The Pakistani army is creating a narrative that that suggests that without it, Pakistan would be overtaken by the militant Islamic groups and to ensure that this idea is credible, the army sees these militant groups as “prized strategic assets” which insure the army’s own existence.

What matters to the army mindset and what motivates it is not the idea of whether there is or there is no Pakistan in the future, but that there MUST be an army in the future. The Pakistani army, being a colonial legacy, follows the colonial policy of divide and conquor and it is for this reason, why the army and its various intelligence services, play handmaiden in Pakistani politics and why they continually mutate the political realities of Pakistan into countless premutations for their own benefit.

Pakistani army supporting the Islamic militant groups is one of the premutations of politics whereby the army wishes to create a specter of a Islamic threat to Pakistan, because it wants to make sure it has access to money to exist as an organization. This is a form of blackmail to ply a state of fear in the minds of international security analysts that if Pakistani army is not financially supported by international donor money as a bulwark against threats of Islamic militancy in the war on terror, its collapse would be a greater threat to world peace not because of Islamic take over in Pakistan, because it might sell its services to the highest bidder for sake of its, not Pakistan’s, self-preservation.

It is for this reason, why the Pakistani military is embarking on a massive escalation of its nuclear program and why, despite the dismal state of Pakistani economy, it is pouring money into its nuclear weaponization program. It is preparing the tools of blackmail by which, raising the imagery of its collapse as an institution, it hopes to gurantee the flow of funds into its coffers and thus, allow for its continued existence in the future.

The Pakistani army has never cared for Pakistan or its people, but for its own institutional interests and it has always seen Pakistan as a stepping stone to its own ambition of securing its own survivial. This also explains, why in the aftermath of the 1971 war, Pakistani army doubled in size when Pakistan itself was halfed and in actuality, the size of the army should have been cut in proportions to what was commeasureate to the territorial size of a post-1971 Pakistan.

As long as the Pakistani army sees these non-state Islamic groups as offering it a lease on life and as the state of Pakistan becomes more and more incapable of supporting the Pakistani army, Pakistani army will increasingly rely on these groups to preserve its intitutional intergrity and why it will resist all attempts to isolate, dismantle and defeat these groups in Pakistan.
Feroz Khan wrote:Pakistani army is a mercenary army becuse the only patronage that it seeks is a patronage for war. Saudi Arabia may have paid for Pakistan’s nuclear weaponization program, but that begs a different question and opens up different avenues of questioning into the nature of political power in Pakistan itself. The army is the defination of political power in Pakistan and if we validate the proposition that it is a mercenary army, then we are by default suggesting that Pakistan is, and was, a mercenary state since its inception.

Pakistani army started to make its forays into the areas of governance and foreign policy early in the 1950s and after the initial dialogue that led to Pakistan recieving military aid from the United States, the army circumvented the civilian government and started to discuss the terms of the alliance with the United States itself.

The next logical step in this process, of the militarization of the Pakistani state, was the inclusion of Ayub Khan, as a serving general in the Pakistani cabinet. A few years later, Ayub Khan simply discarded the illusion and the military took over the state of Pakistan and since that day in 1958, it has dominated every aspect of the Pakistani society. In the 1950s, the army was already becoming a mercenary force for hire, as it readily rented itself out to the United States’ version of the Cold War.

Saudi Arabia using Pakistani army as a mercenary force overlooks the role of the Pakistani army in Jordan, when Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq, spearheaded Jordan’s explusion of the Palestinians in what became known Black September. Then in the 1970s, Z. A. Bhutto loaned the army to Saudi Arabia for purposes of guarding its oil and this continued till the early 1980s, when the army was withdrawn by Zia-ul-Haq, who by then the head of the army.

Zia withdrew the army because the Saudis were starting to intervene in the internal matters of the army and suggesting that shia officers of the Pakistani army not be allowed to serve in Saudi Arabia. Zia, fearing for the unity of the army itself and worrying for its institutional cohesion, withdrew the army from Saudi Arabia.

With the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Zia could not tolerate a rebellion within the army and in the early 1980s, American aid was still a few years away and Zia was still a pariah on the international stage for having hanged an “elected” civilian head of government – Z. A. Bhutto.

Therefore, the withdrawal of the Pakistani army was made possible by the institutional interests of Pakistani army itself and not due to the considerations of Pakistan’s foreign policy. In a smilar sense, Zia agreeing to Pakistan becoming a frontline state and fighting the Soviet Union as a proxy of the United States, was done to further secure his own military rule and legitimize it and end his own pariah status in the world.

Pakistan became an ally of the United States, against the Soviets in 1981, but the Soviet invasion was in 1979. The timing was perfect, because just as the Pakistani army was ending its patronage links with Saudi Arabia, the war in Afghanistan allowed itself to regenerate the dormant alliance with the United States, and once more offer itself to the American cause against the Soviets.

This alliance lasted till the early 1990s, when the United States having no use for the Pakistani army, started to sanction Pakistan because of its nuclear program. Then, the fates intervenened again, the Second Gulf War happened (the First Gulf War was between Iraq and Iran in 1980s) and Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Pakistani army once more looked to the Saudis for patronage.

By this time, the indoctrination of the Pakistan army was complete and with its motto of “jihad in the name of Islam” and the numberical designation of the GHO in Rawalpindi as “786″, Pakistani army was more amenable to the Saudis and it would play a key role as a Saudi proxy in bringing the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.

Throughout the 1990s, it acted as a Saudi proxy and this alienated Pakistan’s ties with Iran, which started to open up to India. Iranian overtures to India and its hatred for Pakistan stemmed from the Taliban massacre of shias in Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, and the systematic perceution of the shias which started under Zia in the 1980s.

Then, 2001 happened and another illegitimate military ruler adopted another means to save the army from annihilation. Pakistani army has ruined Pakistan and since 1958, it has been the army which has made all the important decisions which Pakistan is now paying for in blood and tears.

Pakistani army, being a colonial creation, plays a policy of divide and conquor because it is not willing to tolerate any opposition to its own institutional interests and towards this purpose, it first dismantled and undermined the idea of institutional politics in Pakistan; then it introduced religion into politics and claimed itself as a champion of that idea and in all, its policies have been consistent and uniformal; to serve the interests of the army itself at the expense of Pakistan.

Sikandar, Saudis will not pay for Pakistan’s massive debt. Pakistan’s massive debt will be paid by the non-Muslim world, which is becoming concerned at the idea of Pakistani army; the only mercenary army in the world with possession of nuclear weapons (not even Blackwater/Xe can claim this honororfic), and what it will do if Pakistan is allowed to sink into an economic black hole.

Pakistan has no economy or industrial production and no visible means of wealth generation. Who do you think is paying the salary of the Pakistani army? Pakistani people with with their taxes? It is the international loans also known as Coalition Support Funds, which are paying for upkeep of the Pakistani army!

Bahrain is not the wildcard! The wildcard is the Pakistani army and what it will do; and who will deal with it if Pakistan is allowed to implode! Keeping Pakistan on the hook of insupportable debt and feeding small gasps of financial oxygen to its economy is still a better idea than dealing with a mess of Pakistan collapsing and the Pakistani army opening up an international bazzar for its nuclear weapons!

By keeping Pakistan economically afloat, the idea is to keep Pakistani army contained with the territory of Pakistan and limit its influence and any potential fallout to Pakistan.

Reverting back to the begining, a mercenary army lives for patronage for war and world is offering that patronage to the Pakistani army by keeping it busy fighting a war inside Pakistan than causing harm outside of it!
Feroz Khan wrote:Pakistan army is not concerned about the fate of an ordinary Pakistani citizen. It is concerned about its own institutional existence. The world is not concerned about the deaths of Pakistanis from stravation or hunger and therefore, as long as those deaths from a Malthausian scenrio are limited to the territorial limits of Pakistan, the world will remain least bothered about how to feed the Pakistanis in the next 25-30 years.

The idea is to limit the consequences within Pakistan and not allow any fallout outside of its borders. The millions of Pakistanis, uneducated, hopeless and fired by visions of fanaticism are not the problem.

Where do these screaming fanatics have to go? Can they travel outside of Pakistan? Where is the greatest damage they can cause? They will die, eventually, within Pakistan will they not?.

Pakistani population will naturally be culled from stravation, war and its resultant after effects. This scenrio is called “crisis management” and a potential crisis in Pakistan is going to managed, because no has the capability to solve it let alone commit resources to Pakistan in hopes of solving it. Pakistani army had no historic qualms about killing its own people, so the idea of Pakistani being incapable of killing Pakistanis for the sake of its own surivial seems remote and not a realistic one.

The question is, are we going to see a possible application of a Malthausian scenerio in Pakistan given that other options of dealing with problem are problematic in their own ends and means?

We should not judge the outcome of this crisis on the humanitarian nature of the world but on its logistical abilities to deal with the problem. Unless, Pakistan develops an ability to sort out its problems, there is no hope for another option save a possibility of a Malthausian end to the problem.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

One of my posts on chaighar:

Code: Select all

http://pakteahouse.net/2011/05/05/pakistans-deep-state-after-obl/comment-page-1/#comment-60083
I wrote:AA Khalid,

Your use of the term "Deep State" is as Feroz mentioned in itself an effort to put more wool over the eyes of the world, than an effort in introspection.

When you speak of introspection, you speak of going into a house, in which on all doors is written "No Entry", so you come out without going in into the rooms, calling it introspection.

What is Pakistan? Pakistan is a privileged Elite which uses all the aggressive memes intrinsic to Islam, fashioned into a state ideology, by instrumentalizing them to secure the Elite's domination over the people residing within the state, and by brainwashing the people to support their crooked state ideology by asserting the ideology's and state's relevance to the salvation of people's religious beliefs.

So Islam may or may not be the root problem, but Pakistani Elite's Islam-nurtured Nationalist Ideology is a problem for the whole world. As long as the Pakistani Nation is around, you will find this Islam-nurtured Nationalist Ideology also around, simply because the Pakistani State is for the sole purpose of nourishing the Pakistani Elites and not the people! Pakistan was never created for serving the common people, so why do the common "Pakistanis" believe that they would get something out of it. They serve the Pakistani State by nourishing its roots with Islamic fervor. That is their job description apart from slavery.

Of course, one can consider Islamic Reform, the division between Religion and State, etc. etc. but this is meaningless as long as you have a State, which gets its glue from an Islam-nurtured Nationalist Ideology.

It is also useless to look for an alternative narrative for Pakistan, some alternate ideology to keep Pakistan together, and make it behave as a normal country.

The only way is to break Pakistan, to dump its Pakistaniyat and to alternatively build ethnically harmonious independent states which have a progressive nationalist narrative. In that context, it would be easier to talk about Islamic Reform, and a division between Religion and State.

Don't mix up Pakistan with the people living within its boundaries.
The post was deleted later. The Pakis are scared like sh*t to face the truth! So much for introspection!!! :lol:
I wrote:Cohesion of Pakistan is dependent not on Islam for that alone would prove insufficient; especially in light of the open abuse of power and illegitimate privileges the Pakistani Elite and their supporters extract from the state, especially in light of colonialist attitude of the Pakistani Elite towards the outlying areas of Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, Chitral, Gilgit, Baltistan, etc; especially in light of the cultural and historical brotherhood of the peoples of the Subcontinent, and the appeal of India next door.

So it is not Islam which is being used as the glue, but rather an Islam which is hyper-aggressive, uses a siege narrative, and demands purity. It nurtures itself from a hate for the Hindu and needs to reject the pre-conversion history of its people!

This is the Islam-nurtured Nationalist Ideology and Pakistaniyat I speak of!

So those who speak of reforming Islam in Pakistan and making Pakistan a modern state devoid of its India hate, do not know what they are talking about!

Reform of Islam would be good in itself, but it would not stop the Pakistani Elite from harvesting Islam's aggressive memes to nurture their Pakistaniyat as defined above!

They need a cohesive Pakistan for their exploitation and any dilution of Pakistaniyat would lead to either break up of Pakistan, or empowerment of the common people or even reunion with the parent nation of India - all eventualities which lead to the demise of the Pakistani Elite!
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

X-Posted from TIRP Thread

The way to put the nuclear genie back into the bottle in Pakistan, is
  • to ensure an ever decreasing area for the Pakjabi Army to operate (break up Pakistan, Pakjab consists of only non-Seraiki Pakjab),
  • to remove the various access routes for sustenance (no access to Arabian Sea or China or Iran),
  • to make "Pakistan" dependent on Indian benevolence (trade, access), and
  • to revert the ideology from Islamism to ethnicity-based (Punjabi Pride).
Once the ambitions of Pakjab have been contained, considering the cost of maintaining a nuclear deterrence, the nuclear arsenal can be decommissioned in due time.
RajeshA
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by RajeshA »

Continuing from TIRP Thread

Acharya wrote:
RajeshA wrote:The way to put the nuclear genie back into the bottle in Pakistan, is
  • to ensure an ever decreasing area for the Pakjabi Army to operate (break up Pakistan, Pakjab consists of only non-Seraiki Pakjab),
  • to remove the various access routes for sustenance (no access to Arabian Sea or China or Iran),
  • to make "Pakistan" dependent on Indian benevolence (trade, access), and
  • to revert the ideology from Islamism to ethnicity-based (Punjabi Pride).
Once the ambitions of Pakjab have been contained, considering the cost of maintaining a nuclear deterrence, the nuclear arsenal can be decommissioned in due time.
Not practical and too simplistic.
The Islamic radical ruling group has a nuclear weapon and in the history of Islam this is the first time they have something to destroy large nations, infidels etc. This is the coming of mahdi and the history of Islam and its future is very important to them. This has been exploited by US and the west for the last 30 years and Indians have been oblivious of this.

This ambition is not going to go away. This needs a serious approach and US is showing signs of being serious now.
Even amongst the Islamists, some are prone to corruption. Even amongst the Islamists, some would be willing to put the welfare of their immediate families above peer pressure. Pakjabis only more so!

I see no need to attribute some superhuman extraordinary above normal strength of Islamic faith to the Pakjabis! Upon break up, the state ideology need not remain the same amongst Pakjabis. The ideology is made to suit needs and opportunities. A much smaller Pakjab as the retreat of the Pakjabi Army would push them to think differently!
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Post by svinayak »

RajeshA wrote:
I see no need to attribute some superhuman extraordinary above normal strength of Islamic faith to the Pakjabis! Upon break up, the state ideology need not remain the same amongst Pakjabis. The ideology is made to suit needs and opportunities. A much smaller Pakjab as the retreat of the Pakjabi Army would push them to think differently!
It is not about the strength at all but about their view of Islam.

Smaller state might be possible but after some upheaval it could become a reality.
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

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Acharya wrote:
RajeshA wrote:
I see no need to attribute some superhuman extraordinary above normal strength of Islamic faith to the Pakjabis! Upon break up, the state ideology need not remain the same amongst Pakjabis. The ideology is made to suit needs and opportunities. A much smaller Pakjab as the retreat of the Pakjabi Army would push them to think differently!
It is not about the strength at all but about their view of Islam.

Smaller state might be possible but after some upheaval it could become a reality.
The view of Islam, that is predominant in a Muslim society, is a variable dependent on the aggressiveness of the (sub-)sect or the view-holders.

The aggressiveness of the sub-sect (let's say Wahhabism) is enabled by external support (Saudi Arabia) and state tolerance or promotion (Bhutto, Zia ul-Haq, Musharraf appeasing the Islamists). Simply a difference in world-view is not sufficient for say a group, no matter how intolerant, to dominate other groups.

Once Pakjab has been cut to size, with even Seraikistan broken off from Pakjab, Pakjab would become heavily susceptible to Indian pressure. It would lead to a complete breakdown of Pakjab's current business model - capacity to keep India down, provision of access to Central Asia to Western powers, use of "cooperation against terrorism" as a leverage for financial support, etc. As Pakjab loses its channels of sustenance - from China through PoK, from West through Arabian Sea, it would become a useless piece of real estate for the rest of the world.

Other states like Baluchistan as an independent gateway to mainland Asia, Pushtunistan as a source of minerals, Northern Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asia, these areas would receive added importance. Pakjab where the Pakjabi Army would have retreated would have no worth for foreign powers. Even the Wahhabis would be less interested in a small region called Pakjab with not much of a strategic location, cut off from rest of the world due to conflicts with other entities like Pushtunistan, Sindh, Baluchistan and India.

In this scenario, Pakistan would lose even its own Pushtun lands, not to mention any need of looking for strategic depth using a variety of Taliban. Pakistan would lose Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, Sindh, even Seraikistan and most probably Gilgit-Baltistan, so it would be far-fetched that Pakistan/Pakjab would continue with its Kashmir Jihad, meaning that it would have to decommission its Kashmiri-specific terror-assets.

Of course there would still remain a variety of Islamist groups in Pakjab intent upon defining the character of Pakjab. India can then decide which Islamic group we want to support in Pakjab and fund the groups accordingly. It will be groups financed by us, which will mow down the other groups inimical to our interests. It is groups financed by India that would be the most aggressive in Pakjab. With other groups starved off of external funding, they will not survive long. In Pakjab, all Army personnel would have an Indian knife at their throats and those of their family through these India-funded groups. In Pakjab, all Army personnel and their families would have an opportunity to live off Indian dole.

It is in an environment such as this, in which nuclear disarmament would be possible in Pakjab.

A smallish state like Pakjab still in turmoil, sitting next to a U.S. $ 30 trillion economy in India, would feel the weight of India as India starts squeezing Pakjabi Army and other Islamist groups in Pakjab through machinations.

Most important thing we should take away from Pakjabis is their dream of being the ghazis of the world, uniting the Ummah under their nuclear umbrella, and crushing the Kufr. Far from it, the Pakjabis would be having their asses handed out to them by the TFTA Pushtuns on their western border; ostracized by ethnicities over which they lorded earlier - Pushtuns, Baluchis, Sindhis, Gilgitians, Baltistanis, etc; and seeing the Kufr in India rise to the third largest economy in the world right under their noses!
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

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X-Posting from TIRP Thread
SSridhar wrote:There is an interesting discussion going on here about the developing scenario in Pakistan.

Some history is in order. Osama bin Laden, various Taliban leaders including Mullah Omar and several Punjabi Taliban leaders such as Maulana Masood Azhar or Fazlur Rehman Khalil (Harkat-ul-Ansar Chief) et al have spent time together or have been close to the top ideologues in Jamia Binoria or taught by the same Mufti Nazimuddin Shamzai. Shamzai was the teacher of JeM's Maulana Masood Azhar, HuJI's Qari Saifullah Akhtar and Taliban's Mullah Omar. Shamzai brokered the deal between Osama and Mullah Omar and brought him from the Sudan to Jalalabad with the blessings of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. These leaders have also had extensive contacts with Fazl-ur-Rehman and Sami-ul-Haq of Jama'at-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) for a long time. In fact, it was the thousands of talebs sent from their Deobandi madrasseh who turned the tide decisively in Mullah Omar's favour in a few critical battles when the Taleban were fighting the internecine war with various mujahideen faction. Hence, their nexus is strong and deep. Osama himself had been quite close with the Ikhwani Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) and the Ahl-e-Hadith Lashkar-e-Taiba. Though he may be gone from the scene today, their sympathies lie with his approach which can be expected to be carried forward by Ayman al Zawahiri, another Ikhwani. Though there have been some differences ideologically among themselves, they have all coalesced against a common enemy and some common objectives. I, for one, therefore believe that rather than compartmentalizing these various groups according to ideological or ethnic identities, they should be treated as just one unit. For example, they have shared training facilities, safe houses etc for years as we know even before 9/11. Since 9/11, the great stress under which they have existed, have only brought them even closer. The point I am making is that we should no longer compartmentalize Afghan Taliban, Punjabi Taliban, Pakistani Taliban as individual units with separate minds of their own. They may still have their own goals, but they are not diverse.

Certainly therefore, they will jointly work towards coveting WMDs from the Pakistani arsenal. After all, hasn't Pakistan always claimed that theirs was an Islamic bomb since the Christians, Jews and the Hindus had already possessed one ? And, who could be a better Muslim than the Salafi/Wahhabi/Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith and Ikhwani adherents of Islam ? Aren't the corrupt political class helping the Great Satan ? Aren't they tying down the hands of the PA from retaliating against audacious US operations and their agents such as Davis ? No PA officer/footsoldier could believe that Osama bin Laden lived in Abbottabad without the PA/ISI being aware of that fact. They would be incensed, like the rest of the country, that he was somehow betrayed and may suspect the political class of being in cahoots with the infidels. The only defenders against the onslaught from Yahud, Hunud and the Nasara are the AQAM, whose head was murdered by the Americans and his body was disposed off in the high seas unceremoniously. This should be the reasonable thought passing through the minds of many senior and most middle-level officers of the PA. I am certain that the foot soldiers of the PA would subscribe wholeheartedly to this considering how much the society itself believes in this. I expect a sense of sympathy among most of the PA for the efforts of the AQAM. After Op Geronimo, Kayani had to rush to various garrisons and address the officers and the soldiers. He could only have been critical of the high handedness of the US. I would guess that he was also critical of the political class as that would have been the only way to assuage the feelings of the PA units (as evidenced by the fact that one officer told Gen. Kayani that he was 'ashamed of the operation' to which Kayani agreed). The PA has outsourced action against NATO supplies to its new-found blue-eyed boy, Imran Khan.

The Islamists outside the PA and the Islamists within the PA are increasingly becoming indistinguishable in their worldview. Certainly, the most influential section of the ulema (and therefore the society) is militant Deobandi, not the more circumspect Berelvi though the latter may still exist in absolutely larger numbers. I include Wahhabis and Ahl-e-Hadiths under the Deobandi classification. Not that the Berelvis are less jihadist or less fundamentalist (as Taseer's case demonstrated) in nature. In such a milieu, it is difficult to judge with any certainty when the PA would lose the nuclear weapons. The 'cradle-to-grave' vetting mechanism which the Strategic Planning Directorate (SPD) proudly claims to its American interlocutors or the multiple layers of security is as hollow as GoP fighting against global terror. In a society that is overwhelmingly believing that 'Islam is in great danger' and conspiracies are being hatched against the Muslims, who can implement a comprehensive vetting process more common in civilized societies and guarantee its success ? How can the SPD even find men who do not subscribe to these falsehoods or jihadi ideologies ? Why should we even assume that the SPD itself is above board in these Islamist matters ? There has been a long list of jihadi Islamist Generals as DG of ISI or as Corps Commanders of the PA. The top leadership of PA may present a different face to the American interlocutors but the distrust of and anger against the infidel among the rest of PA is complete and cannot be reset. Why should we expect that the nukes may not fall into more adverse hands in Pakistan ?

It is prudent to proceed on the assumption that it is indeed the case.
SSridhar garu,

thanks for a concise and insightful piece.

I just want to touch upon the growing strength of the Salafi/Wahhabi/Ahl-e-Hadith/Deobandi/Ikhwani combo in Pakistan.

In the coming years, one would see several attacks on the Shias and Barelvis from the Salafi/Wahhabi/Ahl-e-Hadith/Deobandi/Ikhwani (SWADI) combo! Any attack by one group gives the other, an excuse to retaliate. The problem is that the Barelvis and the Shia do not have the military strength to take on the SWADI combo. Any reprisals from the Barelvis should be even more brutal and more importantly directed at the leaders of the SWADI group.

I don't think it is all that relevant that their ideologies are so much similar, especially from a non-Muslim viewpoint. Much more relevant is that they have different group identities, group identities that constitute a certain rivalry.

One needs to create a military arm of the Barelvis or to strengthen already existing militant Barelvi Sunni Tehreek. Any attack by the SWADI combo should result in a massive retaliation by the Barelvis, escalating their division. India has the choice of seeing the SWADI combo fully decimating the separate Barelvi identity and incorporating their followers into their own ranks, or we can see the SWADI combo more than matched by Barelvi militants and holding their own. Both scenarios lead to more Islamists, but the choice is between consolidated Islamic front against say India, or a civil war amongst the Islamists.

India needs to get into the fight. Now it is not clear how far the Sunni Tehreek would be amenable to Indian control even if we fund and arm them. In case they prove to be not amenable, then India can find herself another group of Barelvis, as the Pakistanis did with the Kashmiri Azaadi movement.

We can channel this funding through our own Barelvi community.
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